Notes on Euthyphro

Quick Themes

Socrates is a philosopher, E is a ​mantis​.

Socratic Definition (arriving at a standard description of X which only applies to X but not to
anything else.

Socratic Elenchus (oral examination of the coherence of someone else’s belief, presumably best
done when one looks for a definition)

Dialogue

First, Euthyphro and Socrates meet. E asks why S is there. Socrates is being prosecuted. E shows
sympathy for Socrates. E thinks it is wrong to prosecute Socrates and that Socrates shall win his
case.

The name of Meletus is mentioned (the names of Anytus and Lycon are not mentioned). Meletus
appears not to be a well known person. E does not know him. S does not know him well either or
hardly. Though S is able to describe the person.

S asks E why ​he ​is there. E is prosecuting his father. S is surprised. S says that E must be very
confident that what E is doing is right.

E says he is sure he is right. Moreover, Gods also prosecute their fathers or punish them. E also
gives his idea of pollution, a very interesting idea of the reason why we punish someone. Not
only to cleanse him, so to speak, but to cleanse ourselves as well.

E follows divine law as he is a mantis.

Socrates says that his case will be much helped if he can learn what piety is from E. Hence the
search for a definition starts.

Before the search starts, Socrates makes E admit that

1) The unholy is the opposite of the holy

2) Everything called unholy is so called because of one standard (same applies to the holy,
presumably)

First Definition

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1) Piety or Holiness is what E is doing right now (prosecuting his father)

S demurs. This is an ​example of holiness. It does not tell us how to judge something or some
action as holy, which we can do only when we have the standard (or the definition) in hand, “the
special feature which makes all things holy holy”.

Also E’s definition is pointless and circular as the whole idea is whether E is right about
prosecuting his father. So E cannot say “I am prosecuting my father and that is holy.”

E understands and offers another definition.

Second Definition

Holy is what the gods approve of

Socrates asks E whether the gods have differences amongst them. Yes, they do, admits E. If so,
what do they differ about? Not about what is greater or smaller in number, or what is big or
small, or what is heavier or lighter, for all these can be easily resolved. So they must differ about
what is just or unjust, what is fine and what is despicable and what is good and what is bad.
Same as humans. E agrees. If so, some gods think X is holy and some think X is unholy.

But if the approval of gods is not unanimous, then that hardly gives us any idea of what is pious
and what is not pious.

Third Definition

Piety is what ​all​ gods approve of. (No gods fight over what is holy and what is not, that is)

Socrates’ first reaction

But humans also think that what is wrong should not go unpunished. So, even humans approve
of what is right and disapprove of what is wrong (this shows that even if gods agree on what to
approve, this is not unique to the gods). What this means is that one could as well say “Piety is
what humans approve of…”

Socrates also says that it is actions that are pious and impious but not people. The gods do not
approve or disapprove of people but of actions. (the exact point being made is obscure and might
have larger implications that are not followed up in the dialogue)

Socrates’ second reaction

S says that let us admit that E’s definition is right.

So that is pious or holy which all the gods approve of.

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Now S poses ​E’s dilemma​:

“Is the holy approved by the gods ​because it is holy or is it holy ​because it is approved by the
gods?”

E says he cannot understand what this means.

Socrates explains:

1) ​Distinction​: There is a distinction between ​being carried and ​carrying and ​being led and
leading and ​being seen and ​seeing.​ In the same way, there is a distinction in ​being approved and
approving.​

2) ​Direction of Explanation​: Is what is carried in the state of being carried because it gets carried
or does it get carried because it is in the state of being carried? (S says that the answer is the
former: it is carried because it gets carried.

Same for: it is in the state of being seen because it gets seen and not that it gets seen because it is
in the state of being seen; again, same for being led and leading. It is in the state of being led
because something is leading it, and not that something is leading it because it is being led).

Socrates believes in the ​Principle of Asymmetry of Explanation​: If A explains B then B does not
explain A.

What is the relevance of these observations to the E Dilemma?

3) ​Relevance of the Distinction to E Dilemma:​ (the logic is now applied to god-approval). Is what
is god-approved because it is approved by the gods or is it approved by the gods because it is
god-approved? Answer: the former. It is god-approved because it is approved by the gods.

4) ​Admission by Euthyphro​: Do the gods approve the holy for the reason it is holy? Yes, says
Euthyphro.

5) ​Implication of Admission:​ Then what is holy and what is god-approved cannot be same.
Indeed, what is divinely approved is not holy, and what is holy is not divinely approved.

How so?

Socrates’ explanation:

Reminder 1: If the holy gets approved because it is holy then it is not holy because it gets
approved

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Reminder 2: Divinely approved means getting approved by the gods (they are the same) and it is
not the case that it gets approved because it is divinely approved.

But if the holy and the divinely approved were the same then:

A) If the holy were getting approved because it is holy, then the divinely approved would be
getting approved because it is divinely approved (but from Reminder 2 we know this is false)
[Substitute “divinely approved” for “holy”]

and

B) If the divinely approved is divinely approved because it gets approved by the gods, then the
holy would be holy because it gets divinely approved, but we know from Reminder 1 that this is
false. ‘[Substitute “divinely approved” for “holy”]

So, E would get the antecedent of the conditional as true and the consequent as false. So he
would believe a conditional statement with a true antecedent and a false consequent. But no one
believes that.

Substitutions lead to inconsistency. From B, If you do not admit that the holy is divinely
approved because it is holy, you would also not believe the perfectly obvious principle that what
is divinely approved is divinely approved because it is approved by the gods. And, from A, if
you do believe that the holy gets approved because it is holy, then, if you believe that the holy is
approved by the gods, then you would believe that the divinely approved is approved because it
is divinely approved. Both are absurd.

Hence to think that piety = approval of all gods leads to having inconsistent beliefs.

Here is a shorter way of putting the argument:

Premise 1: If y is carried by x, then y is in the state of being-carried because x is carrying y.

Premise 2: If A explains B, then B does not explain A (Asymmetry of explanation)

Premise 3: therefore, x is not carrying y because y is in the state of being carried

Premise 4: if y is approved by the gods, then y is in a state of being divinely -approved because
the gods are approving y (from premise 1)

Premise 5: Gods are rational

Premise 5: So, gods are not approving y because ​y in a state of being divinely approved. (From
premise 2 and 5, you don’t love something because you love it)

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Premise 6: But if holy = what is approved by the gods, then, (a) if the holy were getting approved
because it is holy, then what is divinely approved would be approved because it is divinely
approved (Substitute “divine approval” for “holy”) and (b) if the divinely approved is divinely
approved because it is approved by the gods, then the holy is holy because it is divinely
approved. (Substitute “holy” for “divinely approved”.)

Premise 7. (a) and (b) are inconsistent beliefs in premise 6. E would believe two conditionals in
which the antecedent is true and the consequent false.

Conclusion: What is holy cannot be what the all the gods approve.

Premise 6 may not be necessary. Right from Premise 5, we can conclude that gods must have
some reason to approve what is holy and that cannot be because they divinely approve of what is
holy. Premise 6 is brought in to hammer in inconsistency in E’s beliefs.

Let us move to the second part of Euthyphro

E’s definitions are not working, so Socrates offers some help to Euthyphro.

The holy must be part of justice thought not all just things are holy (just as the even is part of
number but not all numbers are even or we are afraid of what we are ashamed of but we are not
necessarily ashamed of what we are afraid of.)

These are Socrates’ assertions and E accepts them.

E offers the following characterization of what is holy.

The part of justice that is pious and holy is that part in which we are looking after the gods.

Socrates’ reply: To look after is to making something better, and we do that when we do some
service. When we do service we benefit someone or something. Service is done to the advantage
of another. But when we do service to the gods, then do we benefit the gods? Do the gods
improve in some way by our service? Of course not, and E agrees that we do not benefit the gods
by our service of the gods.

E offers another characterization of what holy or pious means.

The kind of looking after that E means is the kind of looking after that slaves do of their masters.

Socrates’s reply: Masters have some endeavor and slaves are used to achieve this endeavor.
What is the endeavor of the gods? E says”: a multitude of good things”. Yes, people like generals
and farmers also achieve a multitude of good things. but what is that chief endeavor that gods are
after, what is the chief thing they want to achieve, just like generals seek victory and farmers
food from earth?

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E has no answer. Instead he says, what is holy is to do sacrifice and prayer which will in turn
gratify the gods.

Socrates’s reply: Sacrifice is to donate to gods and prayer is to ask for something. Hence, what is
holy is to do things like giving and taking which is like trading with the gods. So piety is the
science of trading with the gods. But how can gods be benefited by the sacrifices we make? It
seems that the benefit is all ours, in that, god gives us what we pray for and are not benefited the
least by what we give to the gods.

Now, E says that sacrifices are meant as token of esteem and as gratification of the gods.

Socrates asks whether piety is something gods find gratifying but it is not approved by them.

E says No. Gods do approve of it.

But if piety is what is gratifying to the gods and this is what is approved by the gods, then again,
piety is what is approved by the gods (or the gods approve their own gratification, or the gods
approve what pleases them).

Socrates says that we are just moving in circles now. And we already know that piety is not what
is approved by the gods.

Socrates encourages E to start from the beginning but E says he has business somewhere else and
pushes off.

END