ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant, vs.

ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, Respondent.

A.M. No. CA-05-18-P; April 12, 2005

Facts:

The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez
(Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter’s pending case in the Court of Appeals.

Complainant earlier sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-
SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent
again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that
respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan
for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.

During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to believe that she never had any intention of
committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from complainant and that it was
complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.

When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her
cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those
that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.

Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting her, not to get
the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.

Issue:

Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in court?

Held:

Yes. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly
presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable
decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since
the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence65 which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms
of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case,
complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their
contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone
from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of
the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text
messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.

The Court has no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack
thereof of respondent in this case.
 MAMBA v. GARCIA

Facts:

On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866 (illegal possession of firearms) was filed
against a certain Renato Bulatao by the Cagayan Provincial Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge
Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan. Respondent set the preliminary investigation, but the
same was subsequently postponed and reset as respondent was not present, although the complaining officers
appeared in court. Later, the preliminary investigation was again reset. On the day before the new date of preliminary
investigation, the accused, Renato Bulatao, complained to the NBI that at the first scheduled preliminary investigation,
the arresting officer demanded P30,000.00 from him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him.
According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent judge. As Bulatao told them that he could
not afford it, the amount was reduced toP6, 000.00.Based on Bulatao’s report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and
respondent judge.

Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will receive the money. After handing the
money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting
outside respondent's court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police officers after recovering
marked bills in their possession. After the matter was referred by this Court to the Executive Judge for investigation, the
latter scheduled several hearings for the reception of evidence for the respondent. The records show that hearings were
set on different dates, but respondent did not appear despite due notice. Accordingly, he was deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Hence only his counter-affidavit was considered,
in which respondent claimed that it was Bulatao who asked permission to talk to the two police officers.

Issue:

Whether the investigating judge’s reliance on the taped conversation is proper?

Held:

The Investigating Judge's reliance on the tape-recorded conversation between Bulatao and the two police officers is
erroneous. The recording of private conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of Rep.
Act. No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders the same inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding. In all other respects, however, the findings of the Investigating Judge are in accordance with the
evidence. We hold, however, that respondent judge is guilty not just of improper conduct but of serious misconduct.
Serious misconduct is such conduct which affects a public officer's performance of his duties as such officer and not only
that which affects his character as a private individual.

Case Digest: People vs Nazario

Facts:

Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes amounting to Php 362.62
because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa
Manila and just leases a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in
question of failure to pay were for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered
under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
Held:

1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with the term
“Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the
national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly
stated “Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the amendment under Ordinance 12 is
being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means
Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

MARIA B. CHING v. JOSEPH C. GOYANKO, GR NO. 165879, 2006-11-10

Facts:

In turn, Goyanko executed on October 12, 1993 a deed of sale[3] over the property in favor of his common-law-wife-
herein... petitioner Maria B. Ching.

After Goyanko's death on March 11, 1996, respondents discovered that ownership of the property had already been
transferred in the name of petitioner.

Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages
against petitioner, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of TCT No. 138405 and the issuance of a new one
in favor of their father Goyanko.

Issues:

The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships.

Ruling:

ARTICLE 1490. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other, except:

(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or

(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191.

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain
exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or
conveyances between spouses were... allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership,
a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other,
as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone... of family law.

Principles:

The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, "the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public
interest... and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties
 CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, GR No. L-28771, 1971-03-31

Facts:

The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister of the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation
made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee

Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a
time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter's stand. Hence... this appeal. The question, as
noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court
of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista,[2] by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that
year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation
between common-law spouses falls... within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy."[3] Such a
view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.

Issues:

whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

Ruling:

The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result
in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix

Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She
is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the... plaintiff,
as the surviving sister, to the other half

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The
questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plain-tiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the... property in
question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the
above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Principles:

A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage.

When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes
and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They... became spouses only when
they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the... same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship.

Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.

Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla
y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of
payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for
residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then
acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started
construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas
sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed
according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA
to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid
considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a
Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264
states that implied power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the
local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is
found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to
promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27
was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of
the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and
noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found violating
Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action
initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed by Republic Act 4136, the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues:

1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.

Held:

1. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law
prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the
statute.
2. Yes, the terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and no
distinctions were made between cars, trucks, buses, etc.

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

 Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February 15,
2008

I. THE FACTS

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped
mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the
playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”

Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that the
conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or
Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of
false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello
Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.

Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which
resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes
should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press?

2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro and Velasco in the minority) in granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalez’s press statement
was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTC’s press statement was
concerned.]

1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press.

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to
hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape
recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and
confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of
the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a
“complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the
how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-
wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have
only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great
significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In
fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest
must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference
of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be
misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the
State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump
the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.

2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.

[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their
official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued
its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself
to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official
order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar
are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech
and press.

MARIO R. MELCHOR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

G.R. No. 95398,August 16, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of Phase I of
the home Technology Building of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang, Leyte, for the price of P488, 000.
Pablo Narido, chief accountant of the school, issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost.
Narido, however, failed to sign as a Witness to the contract, contrarily to the requirement of Section I of Letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 968.
While the construction of Phase I was under way, the contractor, in a letter dated November 8, 1983 addressed to
Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000 equivalent to 15% of the stipulated amount due to an increase in the
cost of labor and construction materials. The petitioner then sent a letter asking for the approval of the Regional
Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) on the contractor's additional charge which the latter
later approved.

The contractor requested series of extensions for the completion of the construction which the petitioner granted.
However, the contractor later gave up the project mainly to save itself from further losses due to, among other things,
increased cost of construction materials and labor.
The Commission on Audit Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, disallowed the payment of P515,305.60 in post-audit on
the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid for the construction of a public
school building on the ground that the infrastructure contract is null and void for want of one signature.

RULING:

The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner and Cebu Diamond Construction is enforceable and,
therefore, the petitioner should not be made to personally pay for the building already constructed. In the case before
the court, the chief accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds but failed to sign the contract as witness. But
since Section 86 states that the certificate shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contract,
then the failure of the chief accountant to affix his signature to the contract was somehow made up by his own
certification which is the basic and more important validating document. The Court agreed with the petitioner's view
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract.

Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Caption:
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts:

Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of
medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled check, greeting
cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the
properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s
fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:

The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in
court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

Ruling/Held:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and
the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.