PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS JUDGE VEGA
Posted by kaye lee on 10:12 AM
G.R. No. 105364, 28 June 2001 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]
FACTS:
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation
of Philippine Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24,
1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the bank.
In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega
continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169
became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
RULING:
Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino
signed it into law on January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said
date. Its subsequent publication was not necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of
internal nature and not have general application thus it took effect on the date
provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court
upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as
indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.
YAOKASIN V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (1989)
FACTS:
On May 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized sacks of refined sugar, which were
being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the
Bureau of Customs.
Petitioner presented a sales invoice to prove that the sugar was purchased locally.
The District Collector of Customs, Yutangco, however, proceeded with the seizure of
the bags of sugar.
On June 1988, show-cause hearings with Yutangco, were conducted and was held in
favor of petitioner.
Days later, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board (EIIB) filed a Motion
for Reconsideration , for "further hearing on the merits", based on evidence that the
seized sugar was of foreign origin. The case was indorsed to Customs Commisioner,
Mison. Petitioner opposed the motion for being merely pro forma and/or that the
same was, in effect, a motion for new trial. Petitioner also applied for and secured a
writ of replevin from the RTC.
On July 1988, Mison, reconsidered the June 1988 decision, now in favor of the
government.
Petitioner now contendsthat the June 1988 decision became final and executory, in
view of the absence of an appeal therefrom by the "aggrieved party" (himself) within
the 15-day period provided for in Sec. 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code
.
The Customs argue that since the June 1988 decision is adverse to the government,
the case should go to Mison on automatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order
No. 20-87.
ISSUE: Whether the June 1983 decision became final and executory.
RULING:
NO. The memorandum order implements Section 12 of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan (IRP) which provides that where a decision of a Collector of
Customs in such seizure and protest cases is adverse to the government, it shall
automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs which, if affirmed, shall
automatically be elevated for final review by the Secretary of Finance.
Section 12 of the IRP applies in this case. Section 12 of the IRP and Section 2313 of
the Tariff and Customs Code do not conflict with each other. They may co-exist.
Section 2313 of the Code provides for the procedure for the review of the decision of
a collector in seizure and protest cases upon appeal by the aggrieved party. On the
other hand, Section 12 of the IRP refers to the general procedure in appeals in seizure
and protest cases with a special proviso on automatic review when the collector's
decision is adverse to the government. Section 2313 and the proviso in Section 12,
although they both relate to the review of seizure and protest cases, refer to two
different situations — when the collector's decision is adverse to the importer or
owner of the goods, and when the decision is adverse to the government.
ISSUE:
Is the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and thereafterFacts:
CMO No. 20-87 valid when these laws have not been published in the Official
Gazette?
DECISION:
Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is enforceable. The
requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 since it is Issue:
only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates,
namely the customs collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which
enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative
orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general
applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Ruling:
Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or
a class of persons, hence no general applicability therefore need not be published in
the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative issuances are considered laws which require
publication in the
Official Gazette for their effectivity.
RULING:
It depends. Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the
Official Gazette, does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative
order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the customs
collectors.Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines. Executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, shall also be published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no
general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply
strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to
particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors). It need not be
published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned
National Marketing Corporation Plaintiff, Appellant
Vs.
Miguel Tecson, et. Al defendants, Miguel Tecson defendant-appellee, The
Insurance Commissioner, petitioner
On December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor
to all properties, assets, rights, and chooses in action of the Prize Stabilization
Corporation, filed for the revival of the judgment rendered in Case No. 20520.
Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint on the basis of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription.
Whether or not there is prescription of complaint.
Judgment affirmed. There is prescription as years are to be understood as
365 days; hence, 1960 and 1964 being leap years, so that ten years of 365 days each
or an aggregate of 3,650 days from December 21, 1955 expired on December 19,
1965.
BAGATSING vs. RAMIREZ
74 SCRA 306
G.R. No. L-41631 December 17, 1976
MARTIN, J.:
Facts:
Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE
REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING
FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City
Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance.
Respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced a Civil Case
before the CFI by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance
No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Committee
was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by
Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has
been violated; and (d) the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of
September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and
animal products.
Private respondent also bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed
ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the
said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract."
Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, respondent Judge issued an order denying the plea for failure of the
respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the administrative
remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code.
After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered another decision,
declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary
ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the Revised
City Charter.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only
a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action in court.
Respondent Judge denied the motion. Hence petitioners brought the matter to the
Supreme Court through the a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal
Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires
publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local
Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval.
Held:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special
act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a
general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone
defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special
law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly
said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law.
The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general
law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily
yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the
general statute treats in particular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the
case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of
"ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas,
Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes,
fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant
force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code
controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular
provision. Special provision governs. This is especially true where the law
containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the
general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as
against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making
power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile
systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by
which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a
result would render legislation a useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the law to
the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.
It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax
ordinance," because the imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not
strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the procedure for
publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The pretense bears its
own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of
taxation. Under Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to
levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be provided by law." And one of those
sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in particular: "Local
governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets
and premises * * *." 14 They can provide for and regulate market stands, stalls and
privileges, and, also, the sale, lease or occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit
the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges.
Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed
ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the
said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The assumption is of
course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the
private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the
corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it
serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public
purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether
the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to
tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It
is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or corporation whose
intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a
public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private
corporation.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside.
Ordinance No. 7522 is held validly enacted.
Garvida vs. Sales
GR No. 124893 April 18, 1997
Facts:
 Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The Board of
Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that
petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan as laid
down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
 April 1996, Garvida filed a petition for inclusion as registered kabataang
member and voter with the MCTC.
 MCTC found Garvida as qualified and ordered her registration. Board of
Election Tellers appealed to the RTC. The presiding judge inhibited himself
due to his close association with Garvida.Garvida filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Chairman of SK. Election Officer Rios
disapproved the certificate due to her age. When appealed to COMELEC
Regional Director Asperin, he allowed Garvida to run.Rios informed
Garvida of her ineligibility and gave her 24 hours to explain why her
certificate should not be disapproved.
 Sales, a rival candidate for Chairman, filed with COMELEC en banc a
ptition for denial or cancellation of Garvida's certificate for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy.
 COMELEC en banc issued an order to suspend the proclamation of Garvida
in the event she won in the election.
 Garvida won by 2 votes (78-76). The Board of Election Tellers did not
proclaim her as the winner. She was subsequently proclaimed the winner,
but without prejudice to any further action by the COMELEC or any other
interested party.
 Garvida ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was
proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.
Issue:
Whether she was qualified to run as an elective official of the SK
Held:
Garvida is ineligible for the 1996 elections.
 The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by Presidential Decree
No. 684 in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization
composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but
less than 18 years of age.
 In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the Local Government Code, raised
the maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18
years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age."
 Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual
resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21
years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang
Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires
that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a
resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day
of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
 The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan
must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only
exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his
incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining
portion of the term for which he was elected. According to Senator
Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st
birthday."
 The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded on
public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be
declared ineligible.
 In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16,
1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections,
petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day
of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she
assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days
old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old.
Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set
by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for
the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

 National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. Miguel D. Tecson
 Case No. 184
 G.R. No. L-29131 (August 27, 1969)
 Chapter 4, Page 127, Footnote No.18
 FACTS:
 On 14 November 1955, defendants were ordered by the Court of First
Instance
 of Manila to pay PRATRA, the sum of P7,200 plus 7% interest until the
amount was
 fully paid until May 25, 1960. On 21 December 1965, Plaintiff filed a
complaint
 against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the
initial
 case. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of  there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis
lack of non
 jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. The  excusat”. The court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of
complaint general
 was dismissed as having prescribed.  application which have not been published shall have no force and effect,
 ISSUE: and the
 W/N the date on which ten years from December 21, 1955 expired was  court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official
 considered to be December 21, 1965. Gazette
 HELD:  immediately.
 NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are
of
 three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code.
PNB v. CA
1960 and
Case No. 238
 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that
G.R. No. 98382 (May 17, 1993)
ten (10)
Chapter I, Page 47, Footnote No.195
 years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, FACTS:
1955, To secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
 expired on December 19, 1965. Petitioner bank. For failure to pay the obligation, Petitioner bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale.
 Tanada v. Tuvera Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor
 Case No. 287 of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.
 G.R. No. L-63915 (December 29, 1986) The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on
 Chapter I, Page 37, Footnote No.159 March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The
 FACTS: date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a
 Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of Friday
a and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of
 number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”.
as ISSUE:
 required by law. The government argued that while publication was W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication
necessary as a of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
 rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees HELD:
themselves It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the
 declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their definition of what is “week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was
approval. interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. The
 ISSUE: Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication.
 W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to
the
 necessity of publication.
 HELD:
 No, the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not
to
 the requirement of publication per se, which cannot in any event be omitted.
 Publication in full should be indispensable. Without such notice or
publication,