HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas v.
 Respondents were charged with having violated RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, RTC, Mandaue
City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor
PATERNO CAÑETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang Panlungsod Member
RAFAEL MAYOL
December 12, 1995 | Vitug, J.
Digester: Chua, Gian Angelo; Edited by: Chrissete Agustin
SUMMARY: Respondents were preventively suspended by Petitioner Deputy
Ombudsman of Visayas. Respondents filed a petition for prohibition with the
RTC. Respondents argued that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over
local officials have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative
charges, listed under Section 60 thereof, on various offices. In case of complaints
against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities, disciplinary
authority lies with the President. RTC granted. SC reversed. There is nothing in
the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or
impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
DOCTRINE: There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to
the very reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution which is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom.
The 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of
the Ombudsman Act is not repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension
provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its
application. The two provisions govern differently. (See 2nd issue)
FACTS:
 Criminal and administrative complaints against respondents (Mandaue
Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Mandaue Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete and Mandaue
City Councilors Rafael Mayol) were filed by complainants (Mandaue City
Councilors Magno Dionson and Gaudiosa Bercede) with the petitioner Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Corrupt Practices Act), RPC 170 (falsification of legislative documents), RPC
171 (falsification by public officer), and RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officials and Employees).
 The complaints were separately docketed as Criminal Case No. OMB-VIS- 92-
391 and Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92- 015. In the administrative
case, complainants moved for the preventive suspension of respondents.
Respondents, on other hand, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
 RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT: Ombudsman is bereft of jurisdiction to try,
hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under
Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate
and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to
effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of
the President.
 COMPLAINANT’S ARGUMENT: Local Government Code of 1991 could not
have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of
the Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases
against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had
remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of
1991.
 Petitioner denied the MTD of respondents, and recommended the
preventive suspension of respondents. To prevent their suspension,
respondents filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the RTC of
Mandaue City. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. RTC denied petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and issued a writ of injunction. Petitioner appealed the the
Court seeking the nullification of the denial of its MTD and the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING: Petition granted.
PETITIONER: Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to decree preventive
suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. Cited:
 The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section
13(1), Article XI, 1987 Constitution: “The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions, and duties: (1) Investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
 employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.”
 His statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in
Section 19, RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act): “Administrative complaints. – The
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or
omissions which: (1) Are contrary to law or regulation; (2) Are unreasonable,
unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3) Are inconsistent with the general
course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law; (4) Proceed
from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (5) Are in the
exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (6) Are
otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.”
 The officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman are identified in Section 21, RA 6770: “Officials Subject to
Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.· The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.”
 Power to decree preventive suspension is provided in Section 24, RA 6770:
“Preventive Suspension. – The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. x x x The preventive
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the
delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to
the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period
of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided.”
RESPONDENTS: The disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials
must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7190) which vests the authority to
investigate administrative charges, listed under Section 60 thereof, on various
offices. In case of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly
urbanized cities, disciplinary authority lies with the President. Cites:
 Section 61(a), RA 7190: “Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. – A
verified complaint against any erring local elective officials shall be prepared
as follows: (a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly
urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be
filed before the Office of the President.”
 Section 63(b), RA 7190: “…Preventive suspension may be imposed at any
time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence;
Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials
shall not extend beyond 60 days: Provided, further, That in the event that
several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot
be preventively suspended for more than 90 days within a single year on the
same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.”
Whether the Ombudsman has been divested of his authority to conduct
administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the
subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 – NO.
 There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act.
 The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent,
let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down
the other.
o Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication
are not favored, and that courts must generally assume
their congruent application. The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must
surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn.
o The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every
statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord
with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should
be presumed to have known the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied
 repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
o Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice evidence.
to the very reason that underlies the creation of the
Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which is to insulate
said office from the long tentacles of officialdom. Whether respondents are correct in arguing that petitioner committed grave
 Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government abuse of discretion when he caused the issuance of the preventive suspension
Code run almost parallel with the provisions then existing under the old order without any hearing – NO.
code. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose
preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that  The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension
time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion
concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of RA 6770, for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in
specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that as it may, we have held
grant. The Local Government Code of 1991, in fine, did not effect a change that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be
from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and
substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the even before the charges are heard.
Office of the President.  Moreover, respondents were put on preventive suspension only after
petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier,
that the evidence of guilt was strong.
Whether respondents’ argument that the 6-month preventive suspension
without pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to
Whether respondents availed of the right remedy in questioning their
the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local
preventive suspensions – NO.
Government Code to even now maintain its application is correct – NO.
 Finally, it appears that respondent officials’ petition for prohibition, being an
 The two provisions govern differently.
application for remedy against the findings of should not have been
o In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public
entertained by the trial court.
official under Section 24 of RA 6770, the evidence of guilt
o Section 14, RA 6770. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction
should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or
shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the
charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
respondent’s continued stay in office would prejudice the
Ombudsman… No court shall hear any appeal or
case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-
application for remedy against the decision or findings of
month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether
the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
elective or appointive, who are under investigation.
question of law.
o Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of 60
o Section 27, RA 6770. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. –
days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local
…In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives,
Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the
certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the written notice
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of,
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion
(b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of
the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of
for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
 PABLICO v. VILLAPANDO
July 31, 2002 | Ynares-Santiago, J. |
Digester: Tan, Raya Grace; edited by: Aspi, Maria Margarita
SUMMARY: Mayor Villapando was accused of abuse of authority and culpable
violation of the Constitution for appointing to a government position the
defeated mayoralty candidate. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found
him guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed. Vice-Mayor Pablico
took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor but Villapando assailed the validity of
the oath. RTC issued a TRO; Pablico ceased from discharging mayoralty
functions. Villapando’s motion for extension of the TRO was denied; Pablico
resumed his assumption of the functions of mayor.
CA ruled that the decisions of the Office of the President and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan are void. SC affirmed, ruling that the local legislative
bodies and/or the Office of the President have no power to remove elected
officials.
DOCTRINE: The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is
lodged exclusively with the courts.
FACTS:
 Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan members Maagad and
Fernandez, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan (SP) an
administrative complaint against then Mayor Villapando, for abuse of
authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.
 Complainants alleged that Villapando, on behalf of the municipality, entered
into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty
candidate in the May 1998 elections; that such amounted to an appointment
to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article
IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
 Villapando countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired
him. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the DOJ, stating that the
appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a
consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or
position as prohibited by the Constitution.
 SP: Villapando guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from service.
 Office of the President (OP): affirmed.
 Pending Villapando’s MR of the decision of the OP, Vice-Mayor Pablico took
his oath of office as Municipal Mayor. Villapando then filed with the RTC a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer
for a TRO, seeking to annul the oath administered to Pablico.
 RTC: granted the TRO effective for 72 hours. As a result, Pablico ceased from
discharging the functions of mayor.
 Villapando filed a motion for extension of the TRO. Denied. Pablico resumed
his assumption of the functions of mayor.
 Villapando then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
 CA: decisions of the OP and the SP of Palawan are void; ordered Pablico to
vacate the Office of Mayor. MR denied.
RULING: Petition for review is denied.
Note: The term of the contested office expired on June 30, 2001 so the case may
be dismissed for having become moot and academic but the court decided to
resolve the issue concerning the application of certain provisions of the LGC.
May local legislative bodies and/or the OP, on appeal, validly impose the penalty
of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials? – NO.
 Sec. 60 LGC: Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
grounds: xxx An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
 Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al: the OP is without any power to remove
elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts
as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Sec. 60.
 Art. 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC
adds that “(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the
grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other.”  VOID. This grant to the “disciplining authority”
(pertaining to the SP/Panglungsod/Bayan and the OP) of the power to
remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
 Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation
may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the LGC.
 Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the LGC of
1991, expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the
implementing rules.
Senator Pimentel: This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of
whether or not the Department Secretary or the OP can suspend or remove an
elective official.
 The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. Hence, Art. 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC, insofar as it vests power on the
“disciplining authority” to remove from office erring elective local officials, is
void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the LGC of 1991.
 The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly
construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension
or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is
involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must
not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining
authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to
suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to
manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF DON MARIANO MARCOS v. PUNONG BARANGAY
SEVERINO MARTINEZ
March 3, 2008 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Removal
Digester: Chua, Gian Angelo
SUMMARY: Respondent Punong Barangay (charged with Dishonesty,
Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
was removed by the Sangguniang Bayan. Respondent Punong Barangay
questioned the validity of his removal. The Court said the his removal was void
since under LGC 60, an elective local official may be removed from office only by
order of the proper court.
DOCTRINE: The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an
elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness
or partisan activity by the disciplining authority.
FACTS:
 Respondent Punong Barangay Martinez was administratively charged with
Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner Sangguniang Barangay of
Don Mariano Marcos before the Sangguniang Bayan of Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya, pursuant to LGC 61.
 Later, an Amended Administrative Complaint was filed for Dishonesty,
Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
o Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the
income of their solid waste management project since 2001
particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting.
o Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of
recyclable materials taken from garbage collection.
o Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand
and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to the
barangay because no income from this source appears in the
year-end report even if payments were collected.
o Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants,
wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of
using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees
collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project.
o Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in
2003 because although a cash advance was made by the
respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend
said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be
on seminar they saw him in the barangay.
o That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions
were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and
would adjourn the session.
 Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the
penalty of removal from office. Thereafter, Martinez filed a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari before the RTC questioning the validity of said Decision.
 RTC issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan void. It
is the proper courts, and not the Sanggunian, which are empowered to
remove an elective local official from office under LGC 60.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local
official, from office – NO.
 The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly
establish that the Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to do so.
o LGC 60 – “x x x An elective local official may be removed from
office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper
court.”
o Deliberation of the Senate on the LGC – the legislative intent to
confine to the courts (i.e., regional trial courts, the
Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts) jurisdiction over cases
involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.
o Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. – Office of the President is without any
power to remove local elected officials, since the power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as provided in LGC 60.
 Invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991 since the Oversight Committee that prepared
the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the
“disciplining authority” the power to remove elective
officials, a power which the law itself granted only to
the proper courts. This Rule provided that – “x x x An
 elective local official may be removed from office on
the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article
by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the other.”
 Petitioner argues that courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of
removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that
a penalty of removal is warranted.
o This argument runs counter to the rationale for making the
removal of elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative.
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to
remove an elective local official from office is intended as a
check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the
power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be
removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a
mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free
the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or
partisanship of the disciplining authority.
o Moreover, such an arrangement clearly demotes the courts to
nothing more than an implementing arm of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan. This would be an
unmistakable breach of the doctrine on separation of powers,
thus placing the courts under the orders of the legislative
bodies of local governments. The courts would be stripped of
their power of review, and their discretion in imposing the
extreme penalty of removal from office is thus left to be
exercised by political factions which stand to benefit from the
removal from office of the local elective official concerned, the
very evil which Congress sought to avoid when it enacted
Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
o Congress clearly meant that the removal of an elective local
official be done only after a trial before the appropriate court,
where court rules of procedure and evidence can ensure
impartiality and fairness and protect against political
maneuverings. Elevating the removal of an elective local
official from office from an administrative case to a court case
may be justified by the fact that such removal not only
punishes the official concerned but also, in effect, deprives the
electorate of the services of the official for whom they voted.
 As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the
procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective
barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
o However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official
from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power
under Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
 Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay
official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would
merit the penalty of removal from office, the case
should be filed with the regional trial court.
 Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains
jurisdiction over the case even if it would be
subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty
less than removal from office is appropriate.
o The most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay
official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official
from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper
charges be filed in court.
 Petitioner argues that an interpretation which gives the judiciary the power
to remove local elective officials violates the doctrine of separation of
powers.
o This allegation runs contrary to the 1987 Constitution itself, as
well as jurisprudence. The 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity
of acts of the political departments.
 Paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution – “x x x Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.”
o Moreover, the doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute
in its application; rather, it should be applied in accordance with
the principle of checks and balances.
 This means that the removal from office of elective
officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and
used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress
 itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial
tribunal, the court.
o Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of
the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are
prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.

NOTES/OTHER ISSUES:

 There was no failure to exhaust administrative remedies. As a general rule,

no recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have been
exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction and
where the question or questions involved are essentially judicial. Here, the
decision of the Sangguniang Bayan to remove Martinez was, as discussed,
patently illegal. Moreover, where the case involves only legal questions, the
litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial
relief can be sought. Here, only a legal issue was involved – whether the
Sanggunian had jurisdiction over a case involving the removal of a local
elective official from office.
 Moot, but the Court still decided on the case: Although Martinez’s term as
Punong Barangay expired upon the holding of the 29 October 2007
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and, thus,
rendering this petition moot and academic, the Court will nevertheless settle
a legal question that is capable of repetition yet evading review.
 CSC v. SOJOR
May 22, 2008 | Reyes, R.T., J. |
Digester: De Leon, Fenina
SUMMARY: Respondent Sojor, appointed president of the Central Visayas
Polytechnic College by the Board of Trustees (BOT), was charged before the CSC-
RO with various violations of civil service laws (dishonesty, grave misconduct,
nepotism, etc). Respondent argues that CSC has no jurisdiction over him as a
presidential appointee and that he is exclusively under the jurisdiction of the OP.
CSC denied the appeal and adopted the formal charges issued by CSC-RO. CA
however ruled for the respondent, holding that the power to appoint carries
with it the power to discipline, thus the BOT has the exclusive power to remove
and discipline respondent. SC reversed CA and reinstated CSC. CSC has
jurisdiction over respondent and this jurisdiction is concurrent with the BOT.
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by
the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service
officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board
of CVPC. He is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
DOCTRINE: When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested
with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,
unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not
remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
FACTS:
 (Aug 1, 1991) Respondent
Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino
as president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete
City.
 R.A. 8292, or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997," was
enacted, mandating that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the
governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed respondent as
president, with a four-year term. Upon the expiration of his first term, he
was appointed president of the institution for a second four-year term.
 CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU). A
Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
 CVPC faculty members filed 3 separate administrative cases against
respondent before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) for dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service i,
dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documentsii, and
nepotismiii
 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaints on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a
presidential appointee.
- The Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation,
discipline, and removal of presidential appointees.
- Being part of the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Office of the President (OP).
- Since the BOT is headed by the CHED Chairperson who was under the
OP, the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was
appointed by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee.
- P.D. 807 was superseded by the provisions of R.A. 8292, a later law
which granted to the BOT the power to remove university officials.
 CSC-RO denied his MTD and MR. Thus, respondent was formally charged
with three administrative cases.
 CSC dismissed respondent’s appeal, preventively suspended for 90 days, and
authorized the CSC to proceed with the formal investigation
- His appointment was signed by then CHED Chairman Ester A. Garcia.
Moreover, the said appointment expressly stated that it was approved
and adopted by the CVPC BOT in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. 8292
(Higher education Modernization Act of 1997), which explicitly provides
that, "He (the president of a state college) shall be appointed by the Board
of Regents/Trustees, upon recommendation of a duly constituted search
committee." Since the President of a state college is appointed by the
Board of Regents/Trustees of the college concerned, it is crystal clear
that he is not a presidential appointee. Being the President of a state
college, he is within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC.
- CSC and the CVPC BOT have concurrent jurisdiction over cases against
officials and employees of the said agency. Since the complaints were
filed with the CSC and not with the CVPC, the former already acquired
disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant to the exclusion of the latter
agency.
 - Respondent is a third level official, as defined under its rules, who are
under the jurisdiction of the CSC proper. Nevertheless, it adopted the
formal charges issued by its regional office and ordered it to proceed
with the investigation:
 CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the CSC to cease and
desist from enforcing its Resolution. It eventually resolved in favor of
respondent.
- The power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to
discipline. The enactment of R.A. No. 9299 in 2004, which converted
CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power to discipline and
remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees.
Respondent was appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of
the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292. The power
of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members,
and administrative officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of
R.A. No. 9299.
Power and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the
following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of
administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors
of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known
as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and
employees x x x; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law.
- E.O. 292, which grants disciplinary jurisdiction to the CSC over all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, is a general law. It does not prevail over R.A. No.
9299, a special law.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED. CA REVERSED. CSC. REINSTATED
Whether the CA erred in holding that CSC acted without jurisdiction in issuing
Resolution – YES. CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints
directly filed before the regional office, concerning violations of civil service rules
against respondent.
Respondent is under CSC Jurisdiction
 The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil
service. As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every
government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further classified into
career and non-career service positions.
- Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or
highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career
positions; and (3) there is security of tenure.iv Career positions are further grouped into
three levels.v
- Non-career service positions are characterized by: (1) entrance not by the usual tests of
merit and fitness; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous
with the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made.vi
 CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code
jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government service, whether
career or non-career. From this grant of general jurisdiction, the CSC
promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. The specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not
depart from the general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of
the Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office
(Commission Proper) is specified in the CSC rules as:
- Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. – The Civil Service Commission shall
hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service
Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
- Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. – The Civil Service Commission
Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
xxx
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are
not acted upon by the agencies and such other complaints requiring
direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;
B. Non-Disciplinary
Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought
before it;
Xxx
- Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. – The Civil Service Commission
Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices provided that the alleged acts or
omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Office, including Civil Service examination anomalies or
irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of
agencies, local or national, within said geographical areas;
Xxx
 Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office
appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-
career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members
of the governing board of CVPC. He is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC
has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state university.
 Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of
1997, under which law respondent was appointed, provides that the school’s
governing board shall have the general powers of administration granted to
a corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the
power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and
employees for cause:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. – The governing board shall have the
following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration
and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation
under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of
the Philippines:
xxxx
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and
employees subject to the provisions of the revised compensation and classification system
and other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such
other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves
of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to
the contrary not withstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law.
 The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the
succeeding law that converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. In contrast
with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the administration of
the university and exercise of corporate powers of the board of the school
shall be exclusive:
Sec. 4. Administration. – The University shall have the general powers of a corporation set
forth in Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, as amended, otherwise known as "The Corporation Code
of the Philippines." The administration of the University and the exercise of its corporate
powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Regents and the president of the
University insofar as authorized by the Board.
 Respondent’s argument that the BOR has exclusive power to remove its
university officials must fail.
 When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
- All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,
unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does
not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
 Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members,
employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition
to its general powers of administration." This provision is essentially a
reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292, demonstrating
that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of
the new law.
 Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the
university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and
removing its employees and officials. Although the BOR of NORSU is given
the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and
officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive.
 In University of the Philippines v. Regino, this Court struck down the claim of
exclusive jurisdiction of the UP BOR to discipline its employees: “The Civil
Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate
jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil
Service… As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was
clearly a part of the Civil Service… As a component of the Civil Service, UP is
therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the
discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.
 Camacho v. Gloria: Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a state
university official may be filed either with the university’s Board of Regents
or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC may delegate
the investigation of a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any
department, agency, official or group of officials to conduct such
investigation.
Whether the principle of academic freedom applies – NO.
 Academic freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach,
who may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.vii Schools have the independence to determine who to accept to study
in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to enroll a
student.
 That principle, however, finds no application to the facts. The administrative
complaints involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of
nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are
 classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with
suspension or even dismissal.
 Academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory basis. A school official, who is a member
of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service
rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of
academic freedom.

Whether respondent’s appointment to the position of president of NORSU,

despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation
by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him – NO.

 The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v.
Santos are inapplicable. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective
officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed,
election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle
of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed,
supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-
appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the
people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post
of university president.
 CSC v. DACOCOY
April 29, 1999 | Pardo, J. | Nepotism
Digester: Fausto, Jaime Manuel A.
SUMMARY: Respondent Pedro Dacocoy was charged with nepotism. CSC found
him guilty on two counts for the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped, as
driver and as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under
his immediate supervision, and thus imposed on respondent the penalty of
dismissal from the service. CA reversed since it was not the respondent himself
who appointed his two sons. The SC reinstated the CSC decision. The
appointment of the two sons, though made by another person in the service, still
fell under the definition of nepotism. Namely, in the situation of where the
person is exercising immediate supervision over the appointee, it is immaterial
who the appointing or recommending authority is. The Court also abandoned the
doctrine that “the party adversely affected by the decision” refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action xxx” Thus the CSC was the proper party to file an
appeal before the CA, as the latter’s decision adversely affected the former.
DOCTRINE: Highlighted in yellow.
Note: The main case is only up to the second page. The rest are separate
opinions, mainly focused on the second issue of the main case.
FACTS:
 George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter,
Northern Samar, filed with the CSC, Quezon City, a complaint against herein
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and
nepotism.
 CSC found a prima facie case and issued a formal charge against respondent.
It then conducted a formal investigation, later promulgating a resolution
finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual
drunkenness and misconduct.
 However, the CSC found respondent guilty of nepotism on two counts as a
result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver
and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate
supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal
from the service.
 After his MR was denied, respondent filed with the CA a special civil action
for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside the CSC’s resolutions.
 CA reversed and set aside the CSC decision, ruling that respondent did not
appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and hence was not guilty
of nepotism (aka someone else in the school appointed the sons albeit
under respondent’s supervision). The CA also held that “the person who
recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs
the prohibited act.”
 Hence this appeal before the SC.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 44711.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.
Whether respondent Pedro O. Dacocoy is guilty of Nepotism - YES; thus the CSC
correctly meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service.
 The law defines nepotism as follows:
 Sec. 59. Nepotism.—(1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city
and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor
of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the
chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
 “As used in this Section, the word “relative” and members of the family
referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.
 (2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on
nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers,
(c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.”
DOCTRINE #1:
 Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment
is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of any of the following:
 a) Appointing authority; 
 
 b) Recommending authority; 
 of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
 c) Chief of the bureau or office; and 

 d) Person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. 
 As to the question of who is the party adversely affected who may take an
 Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned
situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority
is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
AS APPLIED:
 Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not
appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility
worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr. Jaime
Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended
the appointment of Rito.
 Mr. Daclag’s authority to recommend the appointment of first level positions
such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and
emergency laborers for short durations of three to six months was
recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional
Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be
under Mr. Daclag’s immediate supervision.
 Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte,
appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. On January 3, 1993, Mr. Daclag
also appointed Ped Dacoycoy casual utility worker. However, it was
respondent Dacoycoy who certified that “funds are available for the
proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy” and even rated his performance
as “very satisfactory.”
 On the other hand, Ped stated in his position description form that his father
was “his next higher (and thus not immediate) supervisor.” But the Court
held that the circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Mr.
Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Dacocoy, who was the school
administrator. Respondent authorized Daclag to recommend the
appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then
Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent’s 2 sons and placed
them under respondent’s immediate supervision serving as driver and utility
worker of the school. Both positions are career positions.
To the Court’s mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy
was behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment
appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil
service disciplinary case - CSC.
 There is no question that respondent may appeal to the CA from the CSC
decision that was adverse to him; he was the official dismissed from the
service.
 On appeal to the CA, the court required respondent to implead the CSC as a
party as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.
 Subsequently, the CA reversed the CSC decision and held respondent not
guilty of nepotism.
DOCTRINE #2:
SC: Who may now appeal the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court?
 Clearly, not respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge, nor
complainant Suan, who was merely a government witness.
 Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely
affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system.
Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the CA to the
Supreme Court.
 By this ruling, the Court now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that “the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’
refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is
filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office” and not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days salary” or “when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is
no occasion for appeal.”
 In other words, the Court overrules prior decisions holding that the Civil
Service law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating
officers or employees from administrative charges (Paredes v. CSC; Mendez
 v. CSC; Magpale v. CSC; Navarro v. CSC and Export Processing Zone Authority
and more recently Del Castillo v. CSC).”
CA’s reliance on Debulgado v CSC is misplaced.
 The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered
by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original
appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had gravely
abused its discretion in recalling and disapproving the promotional
appointment given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved
that appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly limited the coverage of
the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recommending authority for
appointing a relative.
 Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency
of its personnel. In Debulgado, we stressed that “The basic purpose or
objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the
prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one.” “The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually
very broad and comprehensive.”
 If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in
the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in
an earlier case “what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or
reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and
potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing
legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of
the law.”
SEPARATE OPINIONS
DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION: MELO, J.
 Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdom in
which the issues relating to nepotism are threshed out in the majority
opinion, I do not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil Service
Commission may appeal a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case
involving nepotism.
 This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in Paredes vs. Civil Service
Commission, as reiterated in many other cases, that, the Philippine Civil
Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers
and employees from administrative charges.
 The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of
nepotism. From such “adverse decision,” the Civil Service Commission,
through its Office for Legal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by way of
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under
existing laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in the
above-cited cases.
 The Court held in Mendez, that:
 It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law
(Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs,
153 SCRA 318).
 A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as “The Philippine Civil Service
Law” shows that said law does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
 Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
o The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion
in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. x x x.
(Italics supplied) (p. 7, Rollo)
 Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D. 805
(should be 807) which contemplates:
 Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision x x x. (italics supplied) (p. 104, Rollo)
 The phrase “party adversely affected by the decision” refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of
disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or
salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant case, Coloyan
who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not
the respondent in the administrative case below.
 Finally, pursuant to Section 37, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor, as head
of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on
lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of salary
equivalent to one month against erring employees.
 By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a
case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges against him. But when
the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in the case, there is no
occasion for appeal.
 It is true that as early as Paredes, this Court was already aware of the fact
that in an administrative case, any offense, not only that involving nepotism
as intimated in the majority opinion, is committed against the government.
The charges in Paredes and the other subsequent cases were as serious, if
not more serious than the present charge of nepotism.
 If the complainant is allowed to appeal in cases involving nepotism, then
with more reason should appeals be allowed in the dismissal of, or in the
 imposition of lighter penalties in, the charges mentioned. How about sexual
harassment? Malversation? Where will this end up in except allowing appeal
in all cases. The Court shall then be legislating or, at least, abandoning
settled doctrines for no compelling reasons.
 Taking the case of nepotism as the exception to the rule would not be
justified considering that, despite the greater seriousness of the charges in
the earlier cases, we still did not rule therein that the government may take
the appeal as the “party adversely affected.”
 There is more cogent reason, therefore, for the Court to adhere to the
general rule in an administrative case involving nepotism. Besides, the law
cannot be clearer on the matter. It made no distinction as regards the
charge of nepotism. When the law does not distinguish, the Court should
not distinguish.
 It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this
practice of disallowing appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue
or not, exclusively belongs to Legislature.
 Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case
which could result in the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like
dismissal from office, constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal
nature
 Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the
respondent in the administrative case. The term “party adversely affected”
should not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges
involving nepotism.
 To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or otherwise, against
civil service employees would, to my mind, be stocking the stakes too much
against our civil servants.
 A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a
judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct
Merit System Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the
government agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This is
especially so when there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or
application of the law as in the present case. This notwithstanding, the right
to appeal, which is merely statutory may not be invoked, much less
exercised, when the law does not provide any. Again, until and unless
Congress exercises its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is bound
by it and has no other recourse except to apply the same.
DISSENTING OPINON: ROMERO, J.
 Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality to appeal a
decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating an employee charged in an
administrative case, which decision, in effect, reversed and nullified the
Commission’s finding that the respondent employee is guilty as charged?
 After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807 (otherwise known as
the Civil Service Law), Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I find no legal basis to
support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal
personality.
 Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to who may appear before
the Commission, thus:
 “Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate
officer or employee by the following officials and employees:
o (a) Secretary of department;

o (b) Head of Office of Equivalent Rank;
o (c) Head of Local Government Unit;
o (d) Chief of Agency;

o (e) Regional Director; or
o (f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other Person.”6
 Consequently, the complainant can either be the Secretary of department,
head of office of equivalent rank, head of a local government unit, chief of
agency, regional director or any other person or party. “The phrase ‘any
other party’ has been understood to be a complainant other than the head
of department or office of equivalent rank or head of local government or
chiefs of agencies or regional directors.’’ As further illustrated in Sec. 37 of
P.D. No. 807:
 “x x x. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a
private citizen against a government official or employee x x x.”
 The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer or employee.
Nowhere can be found, expressly or impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one
of the parties, either as complainant or respondent in an administrative case.
Logically and by necessary implication, it cannot be considered either a
complainant or a respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
 Based on the foregoing, there is no other conclusion but that the Civil
Service Commission is not a party to an administrative proceeding brought
before it. As provided by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 1-95,
decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court, now to the Court of Appeals, on certiorari by the aggrieved
party. By inference, an aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the
 complaint before the Commission or the respondent, the person subject of
the complaint.
 According to jurisprudence, the aggrieved party in an administrative case is
the government employee against whom an administrative complaint is
filed.
 The Civil Service Commission is definitely not a government employee.
Neither is it an agency against whom an administrative charge is filed.
 While it may be argued that, in a sense, the government is an “aggrieved
party” in administrative proceedings before the Commission, it
nevertheless is not the “aggrieved party” contemplated under P.D. No.
807 or the Civil Service Law.
 Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a party, much
less an aggrieved party, then indubitably, it has no legal personality to
elevate the case to the appellate authority. The Commission, therefore, has
no legal standing to file the instant petition.
 While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party
when its decision is brought before the Court of Appeals, such is only a
procedural formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is not the
aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact that the
decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed and
secondarily, for purposes of enforcement.
CONCURRING OPINION: PUNO, J.
 (Once again discussed the general rule/ doctrine as laid out in Paredes and
later in Mendez, and all the following cases as mentioned in the majority
opinion)
 With humility, I make the submission that it is time to strike down the
doctrine disallowing appeals to the Civil Service Commission when the
decision exonerates a government official or employee from an
administrative charge.
 The doctrine is principally based on a constricted interpretation of Section 39
of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law) which states:
 “Sec. 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which
petition shall be decided within fifteen days. x x x”
 According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase “party adversely
affected by the decision” refers alone to the respondent government official
or employee against whom the administrative case is filed. They excluded
from its compass the party complainant whose charge is dismissed. Hence,
when the respondent government official or employee is exonerated, the
decision is deemed final as the party complainant is precluded from
appealing.
 I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation, which is not only
too narrow but is subversive of the essence of our civil service law.
 It is beyond argument that nepotism is prohibited by our civil service law for
it breeds inefficiency, if not corruption, in government service. The critical
question, therefore, is: who has the standing to prevent the violation of this
law and protect public interest?
 The general rule is that one who has a right to be heard has standing to
seek review of any ruling adverse to him. Hence, if a private citizen has the
right to file an administrative complaint, he must also have the right to
appeal a dismissal of his complaint, unless the law clearly precludes his right
of appeal for indubitable policy reasons.
 A contrary rule will diminish the value of the right to complain. The cases of
Paredes, Mendez and Magpale do not give any policy reason why the
dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed. They merely resort to
doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to appeals. Such an approach goes
against the rule that “preclusion of judicial review of administrative action . .
. is not lightly to be inferred.”
 In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the
Civil Service Law. For what the law declares as “final” are decisions of heads
of agencies involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in
an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy
reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor
offenses.
 Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on
government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The
objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions
allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially
judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions
exonerating public officials from minor offenses cannot be appealed, ergo,
even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like
nepotism cannot also be appealed.
 The cases of Paredes, Mendez and Magpale precisely barred all appeals
despite lack of an explicit, positive provision in the Civil Service Law.
 Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party adversely affected to
resort to judicial review.
 The question therefore is whether or not this Court is precluded from
reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45.
 Again, I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this review.
Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has even been
expanded “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government.’’ The question is not our lack of
jurisdiction but the prudential exercise of power. In certiorari cases alleging
grave abuse of discretion, our given task is to determine how much is too
much of an abuse.
 To my mind, it is also of de minimis importance that the petition to this Court
was filed by the Civil Service Commission. The records will reveal that Suan,
the original complainant, wrote to the Civil Service Commission urging it to
make the appeal ostensibly for lack of means. But even without Suan, I
submit that the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its impact on the
effectiveness of government give the Civil Service Commission the standing
to pursue this appeal.
 The issue in the case at bar is basically a legal one, i.e., the proper
interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this
Court has the authoritative say on how to interpret laws. Administrative
agencies have always conceded that the final interpretation of laws belongs
to regular courts. And the issue has broad implications on the merit and
fitness philosophy of our civil service system.
 There are also other disturbing implications if we do not junk the doctrine of
non-reviewability of decisions exonerating government officials from
charges of nepotism.
 For one, the doctrine unduly favors officials charged with nepotism, for
while we allow further review of their conviction, we disallow review of
their exoneration, regardless of the errors.
 For another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an evil that should be
extirpated wherever found, can never be the intent of our legislators
who crafted our Civil Service Law.
 For still another, completely cutting off access to judicial review goes
against the spirit of the 1987 Constitution expanding the jurisdiction of
this Court. Putting up borders of non-reviewability weakens the
judiciary’s checking power.
 Geronga v. Varela
February 22, 2008| Austria-Martinez. |
Digester: Lingat, Anna Mickaella N.
SUMMARY: Benjamin Geronga was an Engineer at the local government of Cadiz
City. Two administrative cases were filed against him. City Mayor Varela referred
the two cases to the City Legal Officer for investigation. The City Legal Officer
issued two separate Resolution/Recommendations for the cases. Varela
approved both recommendations and issued a Memorandum, meting a penalty
of dismissal. Geronga filed an appeal with CSC, which was granted and directed
his reinstatement. Mayor Varela filed an MR, arguing that he cannot be
reinstated with respect to the first administrative case because Geronga failed to
appeal his dismissal in the first admin case (i.e. Geronga discussed the second
administrative case (Admin Case No 96-05), completely omitting reference to the
first administrative case (Admin Case No 96-04) in his appeal with CSC). CSC
granted the MR of Varela. CA affirmed CSC. Geronga argues that Varela is not a
proper party to file an MR.
The Court held the following:
1) CSC correctly entertained Mayor Varela’s MR because he is a real party in
interest. CSC amended the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases through
Resolution No. 021600, by allowing the disciplining authority to appeal from a
decision exonerating an erring employee. CSC v. Dacoycoy and subsequent cases
have the same ruling.
2) Geronga effectively appealed both administrative cases. CSC and CA erred.
The Court said that there is a material difference between a mere
recommendation to dismiss an employee and an administrative
decision/resolution sentencing him with dismissal. Memorandum Order No. 98-V-
05 is the decision of Varela in both Administrative Cases, which was referred to
by Geronga in his appeal. By so doing, petitioner effectively included in his appeal
not just Administrative Case No. 96-05 but also Administrative Case No. 96-04.
3) The decision in the first administrative case is null and void.
The records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 reveal that petitioner was
dismissed for an act (i.e. grave misconduct) which was not alleged in the
administrative charge filed against him.
DOCTRINE: CSC v. Dacoycoy: A judgment of exoneration in an administrative
case is appealable and that the CSC, as the agency mandated by the Constitution
to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system, and/or the
appointing authority, such as a mayor who exercises the power to discipline or
remove an erring employee, qualifies as parties adversely affected by the
judgment who can file an appeal.
FACTS:
 Benjamin Geronga was an Engineer IV at the General Services Dept of Cadiz
City.
 In 1996, he was involved in two administrative cases:
o (1) Admin Case No 96-04 - For unjust vexation, contempt,
insubordination, conduct unbecoming of a public officer, and alarm and
scandal,
o (2) Admin Case No 96-05 - For grave misconduct and engaging in
partisan political activity (impleaded with Edwin Nuyad and Nick Ambos)
 City Mayor Eduardo Varela referred the cases to City Legal Officer Del Pilar.
 After investigation, the City Legal Officer issued in Admin Case No 96-04 a
Resolution/Recommendation dated Dec 1, 1997 for the dismissal of Geronga
for grave misconduct. For the second admin case, the officer issued a
separate Resolution/Recommendation for the dismissal of Geronga, Nuyad
and Ambos for grave misconduct and partisan politics. Mayor Varela
approved both recommendations.
 Varela issued to Geronga Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05, to wit:
Attached is a copy of the Resolution/Recommendation of the City Legal Officer
which this office has approved in toto and considered an integral part hereof.
We find the recommendation as contained therein to be just and proper under
the premises.
In view hereof, you are hereby meted a penalty of dismissal from the service as
recommended effective January 09, 1998. For strict compliance.
CSC:
 Without a counsel, Geronga filed with CSC a Notice of Appeal. He filed a Joint
Memorandum with Nuya and Ambos in which he discussed the second
administrative case (Admin Case No 96-05), completely omitting reference
to the first administrative case (Admin Case No 96-04).
 CSC issued Resolution No. 990717, granting the appeal and directed the
reinstatement of Geronga, Nuyad and Ambos.
CSC MR:
 Varela filed a Motion for Reconsideration, questioning the order to reinstate
Nuyad, Ambos and petitioner. He pointed out that Geronga cannot be
reinstated anymore because the latter failed to appeal from his dismissal in
Administrative Case No. 96-04 (first admin case), which consequently
became final and executory.
 CSC partly granted the MR. Varela’s request for non-reinstatement of
Geronga in view of the finality of decision in the Admin Case No 96-04 is
granted.
CA: affirmed CSC
RULING: the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Joint Decision dated October 15,
2002 and Resolution dated October 1, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE only insofar as
Benjamin B. Geronga is concerned; Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 992107 dated
September 17, 1999 and Resolution No. 000715 dated March 21, 2000 are ANNULLED. The
December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation of Cadiz City Legal Officer Marcelo R. del
Pilar and Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 of Cadiz City Mayor Eduardo Varela in
Administrative Case No. 96-04 are also ANNULLED. Administrative Case No. 96-04 is
REMANDED to the incumbent city mayor of Cadiz City for proper disposition.
Whether CSC may entertain Mayor Varela’s MR of its decision exonerating
Geronga? - YES
 Petitioner argues that after Varela ordered his exoneration, CSC could no
longer entertain an MR filed by Varela who is not even a proper party. CSC
violated Sec 38, Rule III, in relation to Sec 2(l), Rule I of Memorandum
Circular No. 19 s of 1999 (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil
Services).
Court:
 Sections 37 (a) and 39 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (The Philippine
Civil Service Law), provide:
Section 37. – (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office x x x.
Section 39. – (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely
affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a
petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within
fifteen days x x x.
 Sec. 47 of EO No 292 (Admin Code) reiterated that the CSC may entertain
appeals only from: a) a penalty of suspension of more than thirty days; or (b)
1 Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. – x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED
refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to
the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.
a fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary; or (c) demotion in rank or
salary or transfer; or (d) removal or dismissal from office.
 Based on the foregoing provisions, the Court has earlier held that in an
administrative case, only a decision involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension of more than 30 days, fine exceeding 30-day salary, demotion,
transfer, removal or dismissal is appealable to the CSC; hence, a decision
exonerating an employee cannot be appealed. Moreover, given the nature
of the appealable decision, only said employee would qualify as the "party
adversely affected" who is allowed to appeal; other persons, such as the
appointing or disciplining authorities, cannot appeal.
 However, the present view is different!
 CSC v Dacoydcoy: A judgment of exoneration in an administrative case is
appealable and that the CSC, as the agency mandated by the Constitution to
preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system, and/or the
appointing authority, such as a mayor who exercises the power to discipline
or remove an erring employee, qualifies as parties adversely affected by the
judgment who can file an appeal. The rationale as explained by CJ Puno:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil
Service Law. For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies
involving suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days salary x x x. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since
some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed,
ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like
nepotism cannot also be appealed.
 CSC amended the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases through Resolution
No. 021600, by allowing the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision
exonerating an erring employee.1 The exoneration of petitioner may be
subject to a motion for reconsideration by respondent who, as the
appointing and disciplining authority, is a real party in interest.
Whether CSC was correct in granting the MR of Varela and CA in affirming it? –
NO
Whether Geronga appealed both his administrative cases with CSC? - YES
 The CA and CSC declared as final and executory the decision of respondent in
Administrative Case No. 96-04, finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
and sentencing him with a penalty of dismissal from government service, on
the sole ground that the latter failed to appeal from said decision.
 The CA added that the appeal which petitioner interposed from the decision
in Administrative Case No. 96-05 cannot be treated also as an appeal from
the decision in Administrative Case No. 96-04 because the "Joint
Memorandum before the CSC mentions only Administrative Case No. 96-05,
not Administrative Case No. 96-04."
Court:
 The CSC is under the impression that in Administrative Case No. 96-04,
respondent issued a "Decision dated December 1, 1997," and that it is said
decision which petitioner should have appealed. The CA shared the notion.
Both are wrong. What is dated December 1, 1997 is merely the
Resolution/Recommendation issued by the City Legal Officer in
Administrative Case No. 96-04. The formal decision of respondent is
Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 8, 1998.
 There is a material difference between a mere recommendation to dismiss
an employee and an administrative decision/resolution sentencing him with
dismissal.
 Under Section 35, Rule III of the URACCS, a recommendation to dismiss is
that contained in a formal investigation report issued by a hearing or
investigating officer and submitted to the disciplining authority for approval.
 The December 1, 1997 Recommendation/Resolution in Administrative Case
No. 96-04 and the December 4, 1997 Recommendation/Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 96-05 issued by the City Legal Officer falls under this
category.
 While they contain the approval of respondent as disciplining authority, both
Recommendations/Resolutions merely state findings of probable cause that
petitioner is guilty of the administrative charges filed against him, and
recommend that he be dismissed.
 In contrast, a decision/resolution of dismissal is that rendered by the
disciplining authority after receipt of the recommendation of the
investigating/ hearing officer, and on the basis of his independent
assessment of the case. Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 falls under this
category.
 Thus, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 being the decision of respondent in
both Administrative Cases, it is crucial to emphasize that in the Notice of
Appeal which petitioner filed, he distinctly stated that what he is appealing
to the CSC is his dismissal as "contained in [respondent's] Memorandum
Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 08, 1998."
 By so doing, petitioner effectively included in his appeal not just
Administrative Case No. 96-05 but also Administrative Case No. 96-04.
Therefore, respondent erred in concluding that Administrative Case No. 96-
04 had become final and executory for failure of petitioner to appeal the
same to the CSC.
 CA and CSC did not look into the merits of the decision in the first admin case
because Geronga raised no issue or argument against it. This is in line with
the rule that in any proceeding, a party who fails to cite specific grounds or
raise particular arguments is deemed to have waived them. But this rule is
not sacrosanct. It yields to the imperatives of equity, where at stake is the
security of tenure of labor, which is protected by the Constitution.
 The Court should allow petitioner redress from the decision of respondent in
Administrative Case No. 96-04. While petitioner, unaided by legal counsel,
may have omitted to raise specific grounds against the decision insofar as
Administrative Case No. 96-04 is concerned, it cannot be denied that he
intended to appeal from it. The least he deserves then is a scrutiny of the
legal and factual bases of his dismissal.
Whether the decision in relation to the first administrative case is void? - YES
 In the present case, the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 reveal that
petitioner was dismissed for an act which was not alleged in the
administrative charge filed against him.
 Administrative Case No. 96-04 sprung from a Sworn Complaint filed by
Rodrigo Mateo (Mateo) against Geronga for unjust vexation, gross
misconduct, insubordination, conduct unbecoming a public officer and alarm
and scandal, allegedly committed through the following acts: a) his refusal to
comply with several orders issued by respondent and Mateo for the filing of
daily time records; and b) his having challenged Mateo to a fistfight.
 The Subpoena which the City Legal Officer Del Pilar issued to petitioner
required the latter to answer the incidents cited by Mateo in his Sworn
Complaint. Even the evidence which Del Pilar summarized in his December 1,
1997 Resolution/Recommendation pertains solely to said incidents.
 The conclusion which the City Legal Officer arrived at in his
Resolution/Recommendation has no bearing whatsoever on the offenses
with which the latter was charged under the Sworn Complaint nor to the
incidents/acts described therein. The conclusion pertains solely to the
alleged defamatory statements.
 Nowhere in the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 does it appear that
petitioner was charged with grave misconduct, or that he was held to
answer for his alleged defamatory statements in his April 1, 1996 letter. Thus,
the December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation of Del Pilar dismissing
petitioner on that ground, and Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 of
respondent approving said resolution/ recommendation were issued in utter
contempt of the right of petitioner to due process. Both are void ab initio
and should be treated as inexistent.
 Therefore, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 and the December 1, 1997
Resolution/Recommendation constituted an unlawful deprivation of
petitioner's security of tenure, insofar as Administrative Case No. 96-04 is
concerned. The CA and CSC gravely erred in upholding them.
 The nullity of the Memorandum and Resolution/Recommendations
(regarding first administrative case) remain unresolved. The Court defers to
the prerogative granted to the primary disciplining authority, Mayor of Cadiz
City, whether or not to pursue the administrative case.

 RUBENECIA v. CSC
May 31, 1995 | Feliciano, J. | Merit Systems Protection Board
Digester: Magtanong, Patch
SUMMARY: This case involves a high school principal, Rubenecia, who has a
pending administrative charge for dishonesty, nepotism, oppression and
violation of Civil Service Rules before the MSPB. However, CSC issued a
resolution that all cases handled by the MSPB be elevated to the Commission.
Rubenecia argues that the CSC had no jurisdiction to take over the case because
MSPB is a creation of law and therefore, it can only be abolished by law. The
Court ruled for CSC and said that MSPB was created by law in such a way that its
decisions involving removal of officers and employees from the service were
“subject to automatic review by the Commission;” all other decisions of the
Board were also subject to appeal to the CSC. It was a part of the internal
structure and organization of the CSC and thus a proper subject of organizational
change which the Commission is authorized to undertake according to the Civil
Service Law.
DOCTRINE: The MSPB was intended to be an office of the CSC, a part of the
internal structure and organization of the CSC, and thus a proper subject of
organizational change which the CSC is authorized to undertake under Sec. 17 of
the present Civil Service Law.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Ruble Rubenecia assails Civil Service Resolution No. 94- 0533
acquitting him of a charge of insubordination but finding him guilty of
several other administrative charges and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal from the service. He also questions the validity of CSC Resolution
No. 93-2387 which allegedly abolished the Merit System Protection Board
(MSPB) and authorized the elevation of cases pending before that body to
the Commission.
 Teachers of Catarman National High School in Catarman, Northern Samar,
filed before the MSPB an administrative complaint against petitioner
Rubenecia, the School Principal, for dishonesty, nepotism, oppression and
violation of Civil Service Rules.
 Rubenecia wrote to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, praying
that the case against him be dismissed and attaching to that letter many
documents in support of his claim of innocence. The Regional Director
submitted an investigation report to the Chairman, MSPB.
 Before the MSPB could render a decision, the Commission issued Resolution
No. 93-2387 which provided, among other things, that cases then pending
before the MSPB were to be elevated to the Commission for decision.
 The Commission, accordingly, took over the case against petitioner and on
25 January 1994, rendered its Resolution No. 94-0533 finding petitioner guilty
and ordering his dismissal from the service.
RULING:
Whether the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution No. 93-2387 and assume
jurisdiction over the administrative case against petitioner– YES.
 Petitioner Rubenecia contends that the Commission had no jurisdiction to
take over the administrative case against him from the MSPB for the reason
that CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 was invalid. The argument of the petitioner
is that since the MSPB was a creation of law, it could be abolished only by
law, and that Resolution No. 93-2387 was accordingly an ultra vires act on the
part of the Commission. [Full text of Resolution in notes, important parts
italicized]
 The Merit System Protection Board was originally created by P.D. No. 1409,
dated 8 June 1978, Section 1 of which said: “There is hereby created in the
Civil Service Commission a Merit Systems Board.” Decisions of the Board
involving removal of officers and employees from the service were “subject
to automatic review by the Commission;” all other decisions of the Board
were also subject to appeal to the Commission.
 Section 16 of the present Civil Service Law found in the 1987 Administrative
Code followed the same line and re-created the Merit Systems Board as an
office of the Commission and gave it a new name: “Merit System Protection
Board.”
 The 1987 Administrative Code thus made clear that the MSPB was intended
to be an office of the Commission like any of the other thirteen (13) offices in
the Commission: e.g., the Office of Legal Affairs; the Office of Planning and
Management; the Central Administrative Office, and so forth. The MSPB
was, in other words, a part of the internal structure and organization of the
Commission and thus a proper subject of organizational change which the
Commission is authorized to undertake under Section 17 of the present Civil
 Service Law (“As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises…”)
 Since it was part and parcel of the internal organization of the Commission,
the MSPB was not an autonomous entity created by law and merely
attached for administrative purposes to the Civil Service Commission.
 It will be noted that under the provisions of Section 16 (2) (a) and (b) quoted
earlier, cases originating outside the Civil Service Commission itself and
appealed to the MSPB were, in cases involving division chiefs and higher
officials and cases where the penalty imposed was dismissal or separation
from the service, subject to further appeal to the Commission itself. At the
same time, cases filed originally with the MSPB could also be filed directly
with the Commission itself under Section 12 (11) of the Civil Service Law. It
was this apparent duplication or layering of functions within the Commission
that the Commission sought to rationalize and eliminate by enacting
Resolution No. 93- 2387 quoted in full earlier.
 The change instituted by CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 consisted basically of
the following: decision in administrative cases appealable to the Commission
pursuant to Section 47 of the present Civil Service Law may now be appealed
directly to the Commission itself and not to the MSPB. Administrative cases
already pending on appeal before the MSPB or previously brought directly to
the MSPB, at the time of the issuance of Resolution No. 93- 2387, were
required to be elevated to the Commission for final resolution. The functions
of the MSPB relating to the determination of administrative disciplinary
cases were, in other words, reallocated to the Commission itself.
 These changes were prescribed by the Commission in its effort to
„streamline the operation of the CSC‰ which in turn required the
„simplification of systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of [an]
unnecessary bureaucratic layer.‰ The previous procedure made it difficult
for cases to be finally resolved within a reasonable period of time. The
change, therefore, was moved by the quite legitimate objective of
simplifying the course that administrative disciplinary cases, like those
involving petitioner Rubenecia, must take.
 We consider that petitioner Rubenecia had no vested right to a two-step
administrative appeal procedure within the Commission, that is, appeal to an
office of the Commission, the MSPB, and thereafter a second appeal to the
Civil Service Commission itself (i.e., the Chairman and the two [2]
Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission), a procedure which most
frequently consumed a prolonged period of time.
 We note also that Resolution No. 93-2387 did not purport to abolish the
MSPB nor to effect the termination of the relationship of public employment
between the Commission and any of its officers or employees. At all events,
even if Resolution No. 93-2387 had purported to do so, petitioner
Rubenecia, who does not claim to be an officer or employee of the MSPB,
has no personality or standing to contest such termination of public
employment.
 Fernandez and De Lima v. Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas: the Court upheld
Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service which effected certain changes in
the internal organization and structure of the Commission because none of
the “changes in organization” introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried
with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public
employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees.
 Petitioner Rubenecia also claims that the Civil Service Commission itself (as
distinguished from the MSPB) did not acquire jurisdiction over his case
because he had not been notified by individual written notice sent by mail
that his case had been elevated to the Civil Service Commission as required
by Resolution No. 93-2387.
 We consider this objection unmeritorious. CSC Resolution No. 93-2387 did
not require individual written notice sent by mail to parties in administrative
cases pending before the MSPB. Assuming that Rubenecia had not in fact
been sent an individual notice, the fact remains that Resolution No. 93-2387
was published in a newspaper of general circulation which may accordingly
be deemed to have complied substantially with the requirement of written
notice in its own Resolution
 Moreover, he filed before the Commission itself his letter-cum-annexes
which effectively was his answer to the Formal Charge instituted before the
MSPB. He cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
Whether petitioner had been accorded due process in connection with
rendition of CSC Resolution No. 94-0533 finding him guilty and ordering his
dismissal from the service– YES.
 The Formal Charge prepared by the MSPB and given to petitioner Rubenecia
constituted sufficient notice which, in fact, had enabled him to prepare his
defense. The Formal Charge contained the essence of the complaint and the
documents in support thereof and the conclusion of the MSPB finding a
prima facie case against Rubenecia.
 We are also not persuaded by petitioner’s complaint that he had not been
furnished copies of all the documents that had accompanied the Formal
Charge. Rubenecia was given an opportunity by the Investigating Officer, the
Regional Director of CSC, to obtain those documents from the CSC Regional
Office. Rubenecia did not avail himself of that opportunity and he cannot
 now be heard to complain that he was not given such documents. This
letter-answer constitutes proof that he did have notice of the accusations
against him and was in fact able to present his own defense.
 Finally, the motion for reconsideration filed by Rubenecia before the
Commission cured whatever defect might have existed in respect of alleged
denial of procedural due process. Denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on
his motion for reconsideration.
Whether the Commission had erred in disregarding the “overwhelming
evidence” in his favor—NO.
 The findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long
as such findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
 The decision of the Civil Service Commission finding Rubenecia guilty of the
administrative charges prepared against him, is supported by substantial
evidence.
 VIOLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS
o Rubenecia committed the said offense. He himself admitted that he did
not accomplish his DTR but this was upon the suggestion of the
Administrative Officer.
 DISHONESTY
o He was charged for misrepresenting that he was on ÂOfficial TravelÊ to
Baguio City to attend a three-week seminar and making it appear in his
CSC Form No. 7 for the month of October 1988 that he has a perfect
attendance for that month
 NEPOTISM
o Rubenecia alleged that he is not the appointing authority with regard to
the appointment of his brother-in-law as Utilityman but merely a
recommending authority. Under the provision of Sec. 59, of the 1987
Administrative Code, the recommending authority is also prohibited from
recommending the appointment to a non-teaching position of his
relatives within the prohibited degree.
 OPPRESSION
o He did not give on time the money benefits due to Ms. Leah Rebadulla
and Mr. Rolando Tafalla, both Secondary Teachers of CNHS, specifically
their salary differentials, their salaries and their proportional vacation
salaries.
 INSUBORDINATION
o He is not liable for Insubordination arising from his alleged refusal to
obey the “Detail Order” by filing a sick leave and vacation leave
successively. The records show that the two applications for leave filed
by Rubenecia were duly approved by proper official, hence it cannot be
considered an act of Insubordination on the part of Rubenecia when he
incurred absences based on an approved application for leave of
absence.
NOTES:
 Resolution No. 93-2387 reads in full:
WHEREAS, the Civil Service Commission recognizes the government-wide call
and the need for streamlining of operations which requires simplification of systems,
cutting of red tape and elimination of unnecessary bureaucratic layer;
WHEREAS, one of the powers and functions of the Commission provided for in
Section 12 (11) of Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 is to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it;
WHEREAS, Section 47 (1) of Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
specifically provides that the Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of penalty of suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office;
WHEREAS, under Section 16 (2) of Book V of the Code, the Merit System
Protection Board (MSPB), an office of the Commission, has the function to hear and
decide administrative cases involving officials and employees of the civil service
concurrently with the Commission;
WHEREAS, most decisions on administrative cases rendered by the MSPB are
later appealed to the Commission for review and final resolution;
WHEREAS, the existing procedure wherein most administrative cases are first
reviewed by the MSPB before they are elevated to the Commission makes it difficult
for these cases to be finally resolved within a short period of time;
WHEREAS, the present situation requires immediate streamlining of the
operation of the Civil Service Commission to achieve a speedier delivery of
administrative justice and economical operation without impairing due process and the
substantive rights of the parties in administrative cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17 of Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which authorizes the Commission, as an independent
constitutional body, to effect changes in its organization as the need arises, the
Commission Resolves as it is hereby Resolved to effect the following changes;
1. Decisions in administrative cases involving officials and employees of the civil
service appealable to the Commission pursu-ant to Section 47 of Book V of the Code
including personnel actions such as contested appointments shall now be appealed
directly to the Commission and not to the MSPB; and
2. Decisions and administrative cases involving the officials and employees of
the Civil Service including contested appointments which have already been appealed
to the MSPB, and other pending administrative cases brought directly before the
MSPB, shall now be elevated to the Commission for final resolution.
 QUIMBO v. ACTING OMBUDSMAN MARGARITO GERVACIO and DIRECTRESS
MARY SUSAN GUILLERMO OF THE OMBUDSMAN OFFICE
August 9, 2005 | Carpio-Morales, J. |
Digester: Santos, Ihna
SUMMARY: Prudencio Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was
administratively charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo Padaon, a
general foreman who was detailed by Governor Roño to the Motor Pool Division
of the Provincial Engineering Office. During the pendency of the administrative
case before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, Quimbo was placed under
preventive suspension without pay. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found
Quimbo guilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspended from
office for a period of 8 months without pay. This recommendation was approved
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Quimbo’s MR was denied by the Ombudsman.
On appeal, CA modified the decision of the Ombudsman and found Quimbo
guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspension from office
for a period of 2 months without pay. Quimbo filed an MR, calling attention to
the fact that he had been on preventive suspension without pay for 2 months
and 17 days already so he is praying that the order be modified to take into
account this period. The Ombudsman denied the MR and clarified that
preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation.
CA dismissed Quimbo’s petition for certiorari. SC also denied Quimbo’s petition.
DOCTRINE: That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly
provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under
preventive suspension is not considered of the actual penalty of suspension—
service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of the penalty.
Neither may the concept of crediting, in criminal law, preventive imprisonment in
the service of a convict’s term of imprisonment be applied to preventive
suspension during investigation in administrative law in the service of a
respondent’s final penalty of suspension.
FACTS:
 May 21, 1995 – Prudencio Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was
administratively charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo Padaon, a
general foreman who was detailed to the Motor Pool Division, Provincial
Engineering, Barangay Payao, Catbalogan, Samar by then Provincial
Governor Jose Roño.
 During the pendency of the administrative case before the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman, Quimbo, on motion of Padaon, was, by Order of the
Ombudsman dated November 28, 1997, placed under preventive suspension
without pay to commence upon receipt of the order and until such time that
it is lifted but in no case beyond 6 months. Quimbo began serving his
preventive suspension on March 18, 1998.
 After Quimbo had presented on direct examination his last 2 witnesses, the
Office of the Ombudsman, by order, lifted his preventive suspension. He was
thus thereupon ordered by the OIC Provincial Governor, by a Memorandum,
to resume performing his duties as Provincial Engineer.
 The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Quimbo guilty of oppression
and recommended that he be suspended from office for a period of 8
months without pay, this case being the second commission by him of the
same offense. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman.
Quimbo’s MR was denied.
 On appeal, CA modified the decision of the Ombudsman and found Quimbo
guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspension from
office for a period of 2 months without pay. Following the finality of the CA
decision, the Office of the Ombudsman, by Order, directed the Provincial
Governor to implement its decision, as modified by the CA.
 Quimbo filed, however, before the Office of the Ombudsman an MR, calling
attention to the fact that he had been on preventive suspension from March
18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order under reconsideration be
modified to take into account the period of his preventive suspension of 2
months and 17 days without pay as part of the final penalty imposed.
 In a similar move, Provincial Governor Milagrosa Tan sent a letter to the
Ombudsman seeking clarification on the merits of petitioner’s contention
that he should no longer be required to serve the penalty of 2-month
suspension without pay, he having priorly served preventive suspension for
more than 2 months.
 By letter addressed to the Provincial Governor, the Office of the
Ombudsman clarified that “preventive suspension is not a penalty but a
preliminary step in an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the
charge is established and the person investigated upon is found guilty . . .
warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall accordingly be
penalized.” The order for the implementation of its decision, as modified by
the CA, was thus reiterated in the letter.
 Quimbo, via certiorari, assailed before the CA the Office of the
Ombudsman’s denial of his plea to be considered having served the modified
penalty.
 By Resolution, the CA dismissed Quimbo’s petition for certiorari, it affirming
the Ombudsman’s ruling that preventive suspension pending investigation is
not a penalty.
 Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Quimbo is arguing that
the dismissal of his petition is in violation of the doctrine enunciated in Gloria
v. CA and the rule on equity that a person should not be punished twice nor
be made to suffer the suspension penalty after he had served the same
(although in a preventive suspension).
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether the CA committed reversible error when it dismissed Quimbo’s
petition to consider him having served the modified penalty – NO.
 Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as
preventive measure and suspension as penalty. Preventive suspension is
merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused
from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in
the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the
charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
 That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws.
o Sec. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty
for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive
measure.
 Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive
suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So
Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:
o Sec. 25. The period within which a public officer or employee
charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed
upon the employee found guilty. (Emphasis supplied).
 Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of
penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial
distinction between, and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and
suspension as penalty.
 Quimbo’s reliance on Gloria v. CA fails. In said case, the SC recognized two
kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged
with offenses punishable by removal or suspension, to wit: (1) preventive
suspension pending investigation (Section 51 of the Civil Service Law [Book
V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987]), and (2) preventive
suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining
authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is
exonerated (Section 47[4] of The Civil Service Law). This classification has
significant implications in determining the entitlement of the employee to
compensation during the period of suspension, and to credit the preventive
suspension to the final penalty of suspension.
o Gloria v. CA: Preventive suspension pending investigation, as
already discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling
the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered
investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension
pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and
the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence,
he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the
suspension. Thus, §47(4) states that respondent “shall be
considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On the other
hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated,
the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty
of suspension or dismissal.
 In this case, as Quimbo’s preventive suspension was carried out pending his
investigation, not while his appeal from his conviction was pending, the
same cannot be credited to form part of the final penalty of suspension.
 Neither may the concept of crediting, in criminal law, preventive
imprisonment in the service of a convict’s term of imprisonment be applied
to preventive suspension during investigation in administrative law in the
service of a respondent’s final penalty of suspension. For not only are they
distinct in the objective or purpose, or in their nature as preventive
imprisonment involves restriction of personal liberties which is not the case
with preventive suspension; the respective laws covering them are explicit.
 Finally, since the law explicitly prescribes the rules on crediting of preventive
suspension to the final penalty of suspension, Quimbo’s invocation of equity
may not lie.
 OMBUDSMAN and CIR v. Beatriz PELIÑO
April 14, 2008 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Topic
Digester: Solis, Jose Miguel
SUMMARY: A complaint was filed against Beatriz Peliño, who heads a division in
the BIR, charging her 18 counts of perjury under the RPC and for nondisclosure of
several assets in the SALN, for violation of the SALN law itself for the
nondisclosures, and dishonesty and grave misconduct under the Admin Code; it
was likewise found that she omitted to declare in her Personal Data Sheet that
she had a son, and on the contrary categorically stated her status as single. The
Ombudsman ordered that Peliño be placed under preventive suspension for 6
months without pay to which she filed a motion to lift said order. Before the
resolution of such motion, Peliño elevated the matter with the Court of Appeals
and via petition for certiorari citing GAOD and was consequently a granted a writ
of injunction. Peliño anchors her argument that the requisites of preventive
suspension was not complied with saying that in cases of dishonesty or grave
misconduct, which ultimately is not the charge against her, and where the
evidence of her guilt is strong, which is hardly the case. The Ombudsman and the
CIR questioned the decision of the granting the WPI. The Court held for the OMB
and found satisfaction of the requisites. (See ratio in bold and underline)
DOCTRINE: In preventively suspending a public officer or employee pending
investigation, the law does not require that all the four requirements should
concur. What is required is merely a showing that the evidence of guilt is strong;
and that any of the three:
(a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; OR
(b) the charge warrants removal from the service; OR
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him.
Ultimately, the Ombudsman is given the discretion to decide when the evidence
of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by § 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly
left such determination of guilt to the judgment of the Ombudsman on the basis
of the administrative complaint
FACTS:
 Respondent Peliño (PELIÑO) is the head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) Large Taxpayers’ Document Processing and Quality Assurance Division,
while Joseph Albert Cuaki (CUAKI) appears on record as PELIÑO’s son by one
Alfonso D. Cuaki (Alfonso). Albert’s birth certificate lists Peliño and Alfonso
as his parents who were married in Manila on July 16, 1975.
 On May 11, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as nominal complainant, through its Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer filed a complaint3 against respondent Beatriz S. Peliño
and Joseph Albert Peliño Cuaki for violation of the following laws:
o Eighteen (18) counts of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code, for not making a true detailed Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Net Worth (SALN);4
o 2. Republic Act No. 6713 (R.A. No. 6713), § 8 in relation to § 11 thereof, in
regard to the filing of SALNs;5
o 3. Dishonesty and grave misconduct under § 22, paragraphs (a) and (c),
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292, as amended by Civil Service Commission Circular No. 19, series
of 1999; and,
o 4. Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379), for alleged unexplained wealth. 6
 The complaint charges PELIÑO with illegally acquiring and accumulating the
properties and investments, as well as incurring expenses and liabilities (See
Notes) grossly disproportionate to her income and earning capacity as a
government employee, and for not disclosing the same in her annual SALNs.
 In relation to the charge of dishonesty and grave misconduct, apart from her
failure to file true detailed SALNs as required, PELIÑO likewise omitted to
declare in her Personal Data Sheet8 that she has a son. On the contrary, she
claims that she is single. CUAKI’s Certificate of Live Birth9 shows that PELIÑO
and Alfonso are his parents, who were married on July 16, 1975, although
subsequent verification would show that no marriage between the two ever
took place.10 PELIÑO herself is categorical in her claim that she never got
married.
 The complaint likewise sought to place PELIÑO under preventive suspension
for six (6) months without pay, in accordance with § 24 of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770).
 The Ombudsman placed PELIÑO under preventive suspension for a period of
six (6) months and directed her to file her counter-affidavit and other
controverting evidence. Consequently, PELIÑO filed an Urgent Motion to Lift
 Order of Preventive Suspension,15 followed by a Supplemental Motion to Lift
Order of Preventive Suspension.
 Meanwhile, or on November 11, 2005, PELIÑO filed her counter-
affidavit.20 On December 9, 2005, the FIO filed its comment21 on the motion
to lift the order of preventive suspension and its supplement.
 Before her motion to lift order of preventive suspension and the
supplemental motion thereto could be resolved, however, PELIÑO elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against the petitioners claiming grave abuse of
discretion in her being placed under preventive suspension while the charges
against her were pending.
 The Court of APPEALS granted PELIÑO’s application for a temporary
restraining order. An MR was filed by the CIR but it was denied. Hence this
petition.
 In the meantime, it appears that on July 25, 2007, shortly after the appellate
court rendered its January 26, 2007 Decision, the Ombudsman resumed
proceedings and thereafter issued an Order requiring the parties to submit
their respective position papers, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision. The FIO submitted its verified position paper on
August 7, 2007, while PELIÑO submitted hers on September 14, 2007. On this
account, respondent now seeks that the present petition be considered
moot.
 Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation; the purpose thereof is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his
office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be
vital in the prosecution of the case against him.24The case having been
submitted for resolution, there is no more need for preventively suspending
PELIÑO.
 However, there is a need to make a determination as to whether the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
order of preventive suspension. To do this, we must resolve the issue of
whether the evidence of PELIÑO’s guilt is strong as to justify the issuance of
a preventive suspension order against her.
 In Garcia v. Mojica,25 the Court held that the strength of the evidence to
warrant preventive suspension may be properly raised in a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, advancing the view that the equitable remedies
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court exist to provide prompt relief where an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
RULING: Petition GRANTED.
Summary of laws allegedly violated by Peliño and several legal principles
 R.A. No. 6713, requires that public officials file under oath their SALNs and a
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections (DBIFC), under
pain of imprisonment or fine, dismissal or removal, as well as
disqualification, from public office. The two documents shall contain
information on the declarant’s properties, real and personal; improvements
thereon; other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks,
bonds and the like; their acquisition cost, assessed value and current fair
market value.26§ 1(a)(2), Rule VII of the Rules implementing R.A. No. 6713
states:
“(2) The Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall
contain information on any existing interests in, or any existing connections
with, any business enterprises or entities, whether as proprietor, investor,
promoter, partner, shareholder, officer, managing director, executive,
creditor, lawyer, legal consultant or adviser, financial or business consultant,
accountant, auditor, and the like, the names and addresses of the business
enterprises or entities, the dates when such interests or connections were
established, and such other details as will show the nature of the interests or
connections.”
 Pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, every public officer, after assuming office, and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon
the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation
from office, shall prepare and file a true detailed and sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of
his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year.27 A
violation of this requirement proven in a proper administrative proceeding
shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if
no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.28
 Under § 2 of R.A. No. 1379, whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facieto have been unlawfully
 acquired. The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption
to apply are:
(1) The offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) He must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property
during his incumbency; and,
(3) Said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property.29
Thus, an incumbent public officer or employee’s failure or omission to
include in his SALN or DBIFC property which is manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, may give cause to his prosecution under R.A. No. 1379, for
harboring unexplained wealth. The proceedings thereunder are civil in
nature, although forfeiture of the property involved is considered to be in
the nature of a penalty.30
 Perjury in solemn affirmation, on the other hand, is committed when the
declarant omits to declare material information that is required of him under
oath. It is an act which infirms a public officer’s integrity and reliability,
qualities that are necessarily connected with the discharge of his functions
and duties.31 In Burgos v. Aquino,32 a court stenographer was suspended for
six months for maintaining illicit relations with the complainant’s husband
and for perjury in not disclosing in her personal information sheet that she
had a daughter as a result of that relationship. The Court held therein that
her deliberate omission to disclose her child without a valid justification
makes her liable for perjury.
 Under the laws governing civil service, dishonesty is classified as a grave
offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first
infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor
and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. This ideal
standard ensures that only those of known probity, competence and
integrity are called to the challenge of public service.33 It is understood to
imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.34 Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s
ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of
a public officer or employee.35
 Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, with respect to the
imposition of preventive suspension, provides that
“SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the
charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges
would warrant removal from the service; or(c) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.”
 The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the
Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay,
except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in
which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
 In preventively suspending a public officer or employee pending
investigation, the law does not require that all the four requirements
should concur.
What is required is merely a showing that the evidence of guilt is strong;
and that any of the three:
(a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; OR
(b) the charge warrants removal from the service; OR
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him
 The immediate issuance of a preventive suspension order is required to
prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further
irregularities. The same is in consonance with Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770
which exhorts the Ombudsman to give priority to complaints filed against
high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory
positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints
involving large sums of money and/or properties.36
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it
preventively suspended respondent – NO.
 PELIÑO is charged with eighteen (18) counts of perjury under Article 183 of
the Revised Penal Code; violation of R.A. No. 6713, § 8 in relation to § 11
thereof; dishonesty and grave misconduct; and violation of R.A. No. 1379.
These are all in relation to PELIÑO’s failure to disclose material information in
her Personal Data Sheet and Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN).

Peliño’s arguments:
 In her counter-affidavit, PELIÑO admits such non-disclosure but claims that
her alleged "unexplained wealth" came from, among others, a certain Henry
Go, former Vice Chairman of Universal Robina Corporation, who is the
biological father of CUAKI.
o She claims that in 1985, Alfonso brought CUAKI – then a baby – to her
home, explaining to her that the boy’s father was one of his "business
buddies" and that his mother had abandoned him at the hospital.
Thereafter, Alfonso had caused the boy to be registered as "Joseph
Albert Peliño Cuaki"; that in the boy’s birth certificate, it was made to
appear that she and Alfonso were married and the boy was their son;
but that she never signed the said birth certificate and that her signature
which appears therein is a forgery.
o She claims that she was "shocked, alarmed and angry" at Alfonso "for
what he did," and she insisted that he "rectify" the child’s birth
certificate, but that before he could do so, Alfonso died.
o Apparently, nothing was ever done to correct the alleged falsified birth
papers of the boy, despite the fact that he grew up with PELIÑO, who
"learned to love and treat (CUAKI) as (her) own flesh and blood,"
"nurtured him every day of his life and watched him grow as a proud
mother would."37
o PELIÑO then goes on to claim that due to her constant prodding,
Alfonso finally divulged to her that CUAKI’s father was Henry Go; that Go
later confirmed it to her and he allegedly asked her to take care of his
child for him. PELIÑO promised to do so, making a "covenant with God
to hold (CUAKI) as (her) own child."38
 Rosa Cuaki, Alfonso’s wife, allegedly could not believe that her husband
could have had a child outside of their marriage, so she filed a criminal
complaint against PELIÑO for falsification of CUAKI’s birth certificate which
was dismissed by the Secretary of the Department of Justice.
 PELIÑO further insists that Henry Go (who died in 2000), as the supposed
father of CUAKI, provided her with the funds – totaling P11,640,000.00 (from
1985 up to 2000) – which were used to purchase the real estate properties
and the cars, as well as to finance all but one of their yearly trips abroad.
 She claims that she did not include disclosing the questioned properties
because she regarded them as being properties of CUAKI although placed in
her name or that some of these were not purchased using her money but
that it came from Go as proceeds from the financial support that was set
aside for CUAKI and administered by her. According to her, the Isuzu pickup
was necessary for the then "on-going.
 As for the other properties, PELIÑO offers that some were held by her in
trust by her siblings of a co-owned property, collateral for a debt owed to
her, or named under her as trustee for help she extended with several
people she dealt with.
 In questioning that the evidence of guilt is not that strong, respondent
argues that: Preventive suspension is justified only (a) in cases of dishonesty
or grave misconduct, which ultimately is not the charge against her; (b)
where the evidence of her guilt is strong, which is hardly the case; and (c)
where continued stay in office will prejudice the just, fair, and independent
disposition of the administrative case, which in her case is like saying that
lighting a candle causes global warming.
COURT:
 Quite the contrary, however, we have held time and again that what the
law requires is merely that, first, the evidence of guilt must be strong;
and second, that at least any one of the three circumstances – (1) that the
charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (2) that the charge warrants removal from the
service; or (3) that the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him – is present.
 In PELIÑO’s case, we find that evidence of her guilt is strong. The evidence
does not show that CUAKI is Go’s son, such that it could be believed that
PELIÑO, who claims to act as the de facto guardian and administrator of the
boy’s properties, received a total of P11,640,000.00 from 1985 up to 2000 as
financial support from Go, which she used to purchase some of the
properties in question.
 Alfonso and PELIÑO are CUAKI’s parents, as the latter’s certificate of live
birth shows. Although the same has been denied by PELIÑO herself, who
claims that CUAKI’s birth certificate is a forged document, the said document
subsists and has not been duly voided. Being a public document, CUAKI’s
certificate of live birth offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a high
degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained
therein. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The evidentiary nature of such document must,
therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity.41
 This being the case, it follows that we cannot, under the law, consider
PELIÑO’s claim that she used the amount of P11,640,000.00 which she
allegedly received from Go (which was intended for CUAKI) to acquire the
Valle Verde (Pasig City) residence, the San Juan condominium, the house and
 lot in Tagaytay City, the Isuzu Fuego pickup and the Toyota RAV4, as well as
to finance her yearly trips abroad with CUAKI.
 With respect to the other properties registered in PELIÑO’s name but which
she did not declare in her SALNs, it is immaterial if it was co-owned or merely
held by her in trust, she should have disclosed the same disclosing the extent
of her interest in the co-ownership and disclosed the same while showing
proper documents of deed of mortgage or the designations of trusts to
substantiate the same.
 In Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada,43 a sheriff of the regional trial court was
dismissed from the service for violating § 7 of R.A. No. 3019 and § 8 of R.A.
No. 6713 for his failure to declare a true and detailed SALN for a certain
number of years during his stay in government. There were discrepancies,
inconsistencies and omissions in his SALNs, consisting of properties and
business interests acquired but which were declared in his SALNs only two or
more years later. In Montemayor v. Bundalian,44 the Court upheld the
dismissal of a Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth, when he could not sufficiently
explain why a piece of property which he claimed belonged to his sister was
registered in his name.
 MOREOVER, respondent claims she is not CUAKI’s biological parent; and that
in 1983, or two years before CUAKI was born, she had her uterus surgically
removed. She blames Alfonso for obtaining the boy’s fake birth papers
wherein she is declared as the boy’s mother. This is, however, a matter of
defense which is appropriately threshed out during trial. As against her self-
serving denials, the boy’s certificate of live birth prevails.
 Even granting that the claim of forgery is true and that she had nothing to do
with the commission thereof, an inquiry should be made into the extent of
PELIÑO’s participation in the fraud, taking into consideration that all these
years, she may have condoned the use of these documents, or herself used
them. During their trips abroad,45 CUAKI who was then only a minor46 would
not have been allowed by the immigration authorities to travel along with
PELIÑO without the requisite passport and written permission from CUAKI’s
real parents, whom PELIÑO does not even know at all, as the evidence
suggests. Even assuming that CUAKI’s real parents were known to her, they
would not have been able to give their written consent just the same,
because CUAKI’s birth papers declare PELIÑO and Alfonso as his parents. In
such event, PELIÑO may be criminally charged with use of falsified
documents, as well as administratively, for dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Even if it were true that she did not participate in the actual
commission of the forgery, she virtually became a party to the fraud, privy to
the use of the falsified documents or using them herself, took advantage of
it by benefiting from the practical and legal consequences engendered by
their mere existence and use.
 Finally, CUAKI’s birth certificate constitutes proof that PELIÑO, who was
working with the BIR,47 maintained an adulterous relationship with Alfonso,
who was married to Rosa Cuaki.48 In addition to the accusations made
against her, PELIÑO should be charged with immorality as well.
 There likewise appears to be strong evidence to suggest that, apart from
failing to disclose the subject properties in her SALNs, PELIÑO is harboring
unexplained wealth as well, considering the sheer number of real and
personal properties acquired by her in her name and in that of CUAKI.
During the period 1993 to 1994, PELIÑO and CUAKI took four (4) and two (2)
foreign trips each, respectively,49 and PELIÑO acquired no less than four (4)
sizable pieces of real property. Yet in her 1993-1994 SALNs,50 she did not
declare any cash in bank; nor is there any indication in her previous (1986-
1992) SALNs51 that she had property which she may have sold (and which is
no longer declared in her 1993 and 1994 SALNs) or any business interest from
which to draw funds to be able to afford to acquire the said four pieces of
property; nor did her liabilities increase (to show, for example, that she took
a loan for the purchase of these properties); nor did she inherit said
properties; nor was she a donee thereof, as the evidence shows that she
appears to have acquired all four by purchase totaling, per purchase price
and estimate of the FIO based on market value, P1,063,508.00.
 In 1993, PELIÑO’s annual salary was only P56,522.00; and, for
1994, P65,832.00. The discrepancy is too obvious to ignore.
 Indeed, PELIÑO’s admissions, coupled with the evidence on record, have
farther-reaching implications than the appellate court was willing to
consider. The Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in placing
PELIÑO under preventive suspension because there is enough strong
evidence to engender the belief that she is guilty of the accusations lodged
against her. Besides, the admissions contained in her defense leave us with
more questions than answers, and may have opened a Pandora’s box worthy
of further serious inquiry by the petitioners.
 Thus, we do not subscribe to PELIÑO's argument in her
Comment,54 borrowed from the appellate court’s pronouncement, that the
FIO complaint, apart from alleging non-disclosure of material facts in the
SALNs, did not show any other positive or specific unlawful acts on her part
that will support the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, lack of
integrity or untrustworthiness.
 Her failure to disclose in her personal data sheet and her SALNs that CUAKI
was her son constitutes an act of deception and dishonesty, in that by not
disclosing the fact, she is effectively shielding herself from a possible
 charge of immorality or falsification. Moreover, the non-disclosure of a
substantial number of properties opens her to a charge of harboring
unexplained wealth, since the acquisition of the undisclosed properties was
manifestly out of proportion to her salary as earlier on demonstrated herein.
 Considering PELIÑO’s high rank and delicate office, the gravity of the
charges against her – dishonesty, grave misconduct, accumulation of
unexplained wealth and perjury, and the possibility of filing other charges
as a result of her admissions in her pleadings, such as immorality,
falsification and/or use of falsified documents – which merit dismissal from
service as the corresponding penalty, it may not be said that the Office of
the Ombudsman exercised its discretion in a despotic and arbitrary manner;
preventive suspension was an option which it could properly exercise under
the circumstances.
 There is nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation
and before the charges against him are heard.55 The immediate issuance of
such order is required to prevent the subject of the suspension from
committing further irregularities. Such prompt action, moreover, is in
consonance with § 15 of R.A. No. 6770 which exhorts the Ombudsman to
give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials
and/or those occupying supervisory positions, those involving grave
offenses as well as those involving large sums of money and/or
properties.56
 Ultimately, the Ombudsman is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by § 24 of R.A. No. 6770,
which expressly left such determination of guilt to the judgment of the
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint.57
 In the instant case, the order of preventive suspension was issued only after
PELIÑO filed a sworn explanation detailing her defenses to the charges
made against her. It may thus be said that the order for her preventive
suspension was issued after assessment of her defenses. Being so, we find
no abuse, much less grave abuse of the exercise of this discretion.
NOTES:
 The complaint charges PELIÑO with illegally acquiring and accumulating the following property
and investments, as well as incurring expenses and liabilities grossly disproportionate to her
income and earning capacity as a government employee, and for not disclosing the same in her
annual SALNs:
o 1. A house and lot in Pasig City acquired in 1986 (for P800,000.00) was not declared in her
1986-1988 SALNs, but only in her 1989-2003 SALNs;
o 2. Two (2) lots in Quezon City (Transfer Certificate of Title, or TCT, Nos. 341855 (260 square
meters, acquired on March 26, 1986) and 334240 (1,008 square meters, acquired on August
26, 1985) were not declared in her 1986 and 1987 SALNs. These two properties were sold
to a certain Dante Gutierrez on April 13, 1988;
o 3. An 84.5-square meter condominium unit (CCT 5188-R) with 12.5-square meter basement
parking lot (CCT 5189-R) in San Juan (acquired for P800,000.00) allegedly bought by CUAKI
in 1989 and registered in his name. The deed of sale indicates that CUAKI was of legal age
at the time of the execution of the deed, yet he was actually only about three (3) years old
on said date. This property was not declared in PELIÑO’s 1989-2003 SALNs;
o 4. A house and lot in Antipolo City worth (i.e. market value) P240,000 and with
improvements amounting to P501,125.00, which was not declared in her 1989-2003 SALNs.
Records further indicate that a loan with a 20-year payment plan was obtained from the
GSIS for the purchase thereof, which loan was fully paid after only 12 years;
o 5. A three-storey building and lot in Rosario, Cavite worth P788,400.00 acquired in 1992 but
which was not declared in her 1992-2003 SALNs;
o 6. A 578-square meter residential lot in Tanza, Cavite (TCT 408006) acquired in 1993, but
not declared in her 1993-2003 SALNs;
o 7. A 1.58 hectare lot in Naic, Cavite (TCT 874663) acquired in 1994, and not declared in her
1994-2003 SALNs;
o 8. A 2.09 hectare lot in Naic, Cavite (TCT 874664) acquired in 1994, and not declared in her
1994-2003 SALNs;
o 9. A 4,475-square meter house and lot in Tagaytay City acquired in 1994, but declared only
in her 1999-2002 SALNs. Acquisition cost is P1,000,000.00, while construction cost of the
house is P1,251,961.08;
o 10. A 2.48 hectare agricultural land in Tanza, Cavite (TCT 871630) acquired in 1999, but not
disclosed in her 1999-2003 SALNs;
o 11. In her 1996 and subsequent SALNs, PELIÑO did not declare her interest as incorporator
in Israel Armour Phils., Inc. a marketing company established in 1996 where she has a total
of P500,000.00 paid up capital contribution;
o 12. A 2002 model Isuzu Fuego vehicle (plate number XEW 396) acquired in 2002
for P740,000.00 but not declared in her SALN;
o 13. A 2004 model Toyota RAV 4 vehicle worth P1,101,000.00 acquired for cash in the name
of CUAKI, who was only nineteen (19) years old then. Moreover, a certification from the
BIR shows that from 1993-2003, CUAKI did not file an income tax return, indicating that
during that time he did not have any source of income to be able to afford the said vehicle;
o 14. PELIÑO’s 2000-2002 SALNs discloses a P800,000.00 loan liability, which was reduced
substantially to P200,000.00 in her 2003 SALN. Meanwhile, in her 2003 SALN, PELIÑO’s
cash in bank increased from P100,000.00 to P108,240.50 only. Thus, while her annual salary
during 2002 was only P236,874.00, she was able to discharge a P600,000.00 loan liability
during that year;
o 15. Records from the Bureau of Immigration show that respondents frequently traveled
abroad (from 1993-2003), for the most part twice every year (except for the year 2001), to
such destinations as Hongkong, Seoul, Bangkok, Osaka, Xiamen, Los Angeles and Taipei.
"Conservative estimates" place their total incurred expenses (airfare only) at P528,488.44,
which most likely PELIÑO paid considering that CUAKI had no income during those years;
o 16. When computed, the respondents’ total unexplained wealth amounts to
approximately P10,891,009.11, which is the difference between their 1986-2004
accumulated wealth of P P13,144,599.71, and P2,253,590.60, which is PELIÑO’s total lawful
income for that period.
i respondent approved the release of salary differentials despite the absence of the required Plantilla and Salary
Adjustment Form and valid appointments
ii
respondent maliciously allowed the antedating and falsification of the reclassification differential payroll, to
the prejudice of instructors and professors who have pending request for adjustment of their academic ranks
iii respondent appointed his half-sister, Estrellas Sojor-Managuilas, as casual clerk
iv Career services include: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in
nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and
technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit
systems; (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of
whom are appointed by the President; (4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service,
who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign
Affairs; (5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate
merit system; (6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and (7) Permanent
laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.
v Entrance to the first two levels is determined through competitive examinations, while entrance to the third
level is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board. The positions covered by each level are: (a) The first
level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve non-professional or
subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate
studies; (b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four
years of college work up to Division Chief level; and (c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career
Executive Service.
vi The Non-Career Service shall include: (1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; (2)
Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
their personal or confidential staff(s); (3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms
of office and their personal or confidential staff; (4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the
government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or
technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no
case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and (5) Emergency and
seasonal personnel.
Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that institutions of higher learning has the freedom to
vii
decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from outside coercion, except
when the welfare of the general public so requires.