A REVIEW OF THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE

FINAL REPORT

19 October 2019

1. INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the general election, Mmusi Maimane asked Ryan Coetzee to chair an independent
review into the party’s election performance and broader circumstances. Mmusi also asked Tony
Leon and Michiel Le Roux to join Ryan and together they formed the panel that conducted the
review.

The review’s terms of reference were as follows:

“The panel will conduct a review of the party’s fitness to achieve its stated objective of building a
constitutional liberal democratic alternative to the ANC. The review will investigate the underlying
drivers of the party’s performance in the 2019 general election and will encompass the capacity of
the party’s leadership and public representatives, its political identity, policy platform, strategy,
structure, processes and operations as well as any other considerations that may be relevant to
achieving the party’s objectives.”

All public representatives and staff of the party were invited to make written submissions to the
panel. Over 200 submissions were subsequently received. In addition, a series of meetings was
held with key office bearers in the party and a number of people outside of party structures.

The panel would like to thank every person who made a submission or attended a meeting for
their contribution. We were enormously impressed by the thoughtfulness, insight and honesty with
which party members and friends of the party made their submissions and very careful
consideration was given to each one.

We would also like to extend our appreciation to the party leader for setting up the review and
ensuring it could operate without fear, favour or interference. We believe it was a good,
courageous decision made with the best interests of the party at heart.

Finally, we would like to thank Sandy van Hoogstraten who was deputised by the leader to assist
us and has been indefatigable in providing us with every form of support required.

2. GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE REPORT

In reaching our conclusions, the panel has of course been informed by the submissions, views and
information we have studied, but in the end the findings and recommendations are the product of
our own carefully considered analysis.
The panel took the view that in order to be useful, the review needed to:

1. Be based on an honest assessment of the challenges the party faces no matter how
uncomfortable.

2. Focus its findings and recommendations on the defining and fundamental challenges the party
faces rather than comment on every aspect of the party’s business or attempt a detailed reworking
of the party’s systems and operations.

3. Produce clear, decisive recommendations.

4. Be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater by making recommendations that
compromise what is best and most successful about the party.

The report is ordered into a series of themes informed in large part by the submissions we
received and designed to provide focus on the priority issues.

3. THE IMPERATIVE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY AND ACT DECISIVELY

South Africa urgently needs a credible alternative to the governing ANC, an effective opposition
and a strong constitutional liberal-democraticcurrent in its body politic. It is therefore deeply
concerning that the Democratic Alliance regressed in South Africa’s 2019 general election, falling
1.5 percentage points to 20.7% from 22.2% in 2014, losing 470 000 votes nationally and official
opposition status in two provinces. This marked the first regression in what had been a consistent
trend of electoral growth over 25 years.

Subsequent to the election, the DA has gone backwards in a number of by-elections and is
tracking at below 20% in its internal polling.

Against this backdrop, the DA faces a date with destiny in 2021. The losses at this year’s general
election could well pale into insignificance against the likely disintegration of the party’s support at
the 2021 local government elections.

In most of the submissions received and discussions held there was a very clear acknowledgement
and acceptance that the party needs to change in order to succeed. However, we also detected a
tendency to blame others for the circumstances in which the party finds itself and a consequent
tendency therefore to expect others to do the changing.

It is of course true that what the DA seeks to do is hard and that the environment in which it
operates is tough. But it won’t do to blame the rise of racial populism, a hostile media, the election
of Cyril Ramaphosa, the Twitter mob or the legacy of ANC mismanagement of the councils we run.
And it’s true that the DA has suffered indiscipline and factionalism of late, but it won’t do to blame
others without taking a long hard look at oneself first.
That way lies the road to ruin.

It is absolutely vital, therefore, that every leader, public representative and staff
member is willing to confront the party’s failings and take decisive action to turn its
fortunes around. Failure to do so could fatally compromise the party’s future and the
future of the country.

4. THE ELECTION

In the wake of the 2016 local government election four objectives were set for 2019:

1. National growth

2. Bringing the ANC under 50% in Gauteng

3. Bringing the ANC under 50% in the Northern Cape

4. Retaining a majority in the Western Cape

In the event, only one of those objectives – retaining a majority in the Western Cape – was
achieved.

The critical question is thus: what happened between 2016 and 2019 to cause this negative turn in
the DA’s election fortunes?

In our view, the primary causes of the party’s failure predate the election campaign. A series of
missteps over a 3-year period led to:

- A significant shift away from the DA among white voters, particularly white Afrikaans voters.

- A less sharp but nevertheless noticeable shift away from the DA among coloured voters.

- A marginal increase among black voters, where much larger growth had been expected.

- Lower overall turnout of DA supporters.

These conclusions are borne out by the table below, which shows the percentage of voters overall
and from each population group that voted for the DA in every election since 2000.

2019 2016 2014 2011 2009 2006 2004 2000

Black
Eastern Cape 2.4% 3.6% 2.1% 2.4% 0.5% 0.9% 0.3% 1.6%
Free State 6.6% 7.4% 3.8% 5.8% 1.5% 2.6% 1.6% 6.6%
Gauteng 6.6% 12.5% 6.6% 5.4% 1.2% 4.9% 3.3% 9.6%
KwaZulu-Natal 2.2% 2.4% 1.5% 1.5% 0.6% 1.6% 0.8% 4.6%
Limpopo 3.1% 4.8% 3.6% 3.1% 0.7% 3.3% 2.1% 5.3%
Mpumalanga 3.2% 3.3% 1.1% 4.9% 1.0% 3.8% 0.8% 4.5%
North West 4.2% 4.7% 2.6% 5.6% 1.0% 1.6% 0.6% 1.5%
Northern Cape 3.5% 1.8% 1.7% 2.8% 0.4% 0.7% 0.6% 5.4%
Western Cape 2.6% 8.1% 2.1% 2.2% 0.5% 1.0% 0.3% 1.0%
National 4.0% 5.9% 3.2% 3.5% 0.8% 2.5% 1.4% 4.9%

***

2019 2016 2014 2011 2009 2006 2004 2000

Coloured
Eastern Cape 77.5% 84.0% 82.7% 80.6% 50.1% 44.8% 39.0% 65.7%
Free State 60.6% 63.8% 62.0% 61.0% 28.0% 28.2% 19.9% 39.7%
Gauteng 81.4% 89.5% 90.5% 88.5% 56.1% 48.8% 41.1% 72.6%
KwaZulu-Natal 82.4% 89.6% 85.1% 69.8% 65.3% 53.9% 45.4% 62.0%
Limpopo 69.7% 75.1% 74.6% 69.8% 53.7% 36.3% 26.4% 59.1%
Mpumalanga 69.7% 75.1% 74.6% 69.8% 53.7% 36.3% 26.4% 59.1%
North West 62.3% 63.6% 74.6% 78.7% 33.0% 3.3% 12.4% 42.5%
Northern Cape 38.5% 34.9% 33.1% 30.6% 13.0% 17.4% 8.8% 38.2%
Western Cape 71.7% 78.4% 78.1% 74.5% 63.3% 38.0% 24.5% 62.0%
National 69.7% 75.1% 74.6% 69.8% 53.7% 36.3% 26.4% 59.1%

***

2019 2016 2014 2011 2009 2006 2004 2000

Indian
Eastern Cape 68.7% 79.1% 76.5% 58.1% 57.7% 33.1% 37.1% 57.0%
Free State 68.7% 77.3% 69.5% 60.3% 53.5% 36.2% 35.8% 56.5%
Gauteng 48.7% 67.6% 58.3% 70.0% 48.8% 37.2% 32.1% 50.9%
KwaZulu-Natal 76.1% 81.0% 72.7% 56.3% 54.8% 36.6% 37.0% 58.0%
Limpopo 68.7% 77.3% 69.5% 60.3% 53.5% 36.2% 35.8% 56.5%
Mpumalanga 68.7% 77.3% 69.5% 60.3% 53.5% 36.2% 35.8% 56.5%
North West 68.7% 77.3% 69.5% 60.3% 53.5% 36.2% 35.8% 56.5%
Northern Cape 68.7% 77.3% 69.5% 60.3% 53.5% 36.2% 35.8% 56.5%
Western Cape 73.6% 79.1% 76.5% 58.1% 57.7% 33.1% 37.1% 57.0%
National 68.7% 77.3% 69.5% 60.3% 53.5% 36.2% 35.8% 56.5%

***

2019 2016 2014 2011 2009 2006 2004 2000

White
Eastern Cape 80.3% 97.1% 95.2% 98.0% 91.0% 95.7% 83.0% 96.1%
Free State 65.2% 86.8% 86.3% 91.5% 80.8% 84.0% 64.6% 96.4%
Gauteng 72.3% 92.0% 92.4% 93.2% 80.6% 96.9% 84.8% 97.9%
KwaZulu-Natal 80.1% 96.7% 94.9% 97.5% 78.9% 93.3% 75.2% 97.7%
Limpopo 51.9% 80.3% 73.4% 79.6% 71.5% 67.4% 56.9% 76.3%
Mpumalanga 51.7% 86.8% 86.6% 94.5% 74.7% 81.9% 66.9% 88.7%
North West 54.1% 84.1% 82.7% 96.1% 76.6% 88.2% 62.1% 84.2%
Northern Cape 60.6% 82.2% 80.9% 87.3% 56.7% 85.3% 63.4% 96.4%
Western Cape 80.9% 97.4% 93.7% 99.1% 93.7% 96.2% 77.8% 98.6%
National 72.6% 92.8% 91.4% 94.9% 82.7% 93.4% 77.6% 96.3%

***

2019 2016 2014 2011 2009 2006 2004 2000

Total
Eastern Cape 14.8% 19.7% 15.9% 16.4% 9.9% 8.6% 7.3% 11.6%
Free State 16.7% 20.6% 16.2% 20.0% 12.1% 12.5% 8.9% 17.9%
Gauteng 24.3% 37.2% 28.5% 33.3% 21.4% 26.7% 20.3% 31.8%
KwaZulu-Natal 14.0% 15.4% 13.4% 12.3% 10.3% 9.1% 10.0% 15.4%
Limpopo 5.3% 8.1% 6.6% 6.6% 3.7% 5.6% 3.8% 7.9%
Mpumalanga 7.9% 12.9% 10.0% 13.7% 7.6% 10.3% 7.2% 12.9%
North West 11.1% 15.1% 12.6% 15.9% 8.9% 8.4% 5.5% 10.2%
Northern Cape 24.0% 25.3% 23.4% 22.1% 13.1% 14.1% 11.6% 28.8%
Western Cape 51.9% 63.6% 57.3% 58.1% 48.7% 39.5% 26.9% 51.6%
National 20.4% 27.0% 22.2% 24.1% 16.6% 16.2% 12.4% 22.3%

***

What is striking about the DA’s decline in 2019 is that it came against the backdrop of a very
significant upsurge in the party’s support immediately after 2016, unsurprising given that voters
generally shift towards parties in the aftermath of successful election outcomes.

The party’s tracking of its support shows that it reached its peak in early October 2016 (31%).
Then, over a period of 27 months it fell a precipitous 17 percentage points before regaining some
ground to end at just over 20% on election day.

The following events and incidents occurred during that period, each of which damaged the party’s
brand and dented its support level:

- Helen’s Zille’s tweets about colonialism and the subsequent handling of the issue.
- The protracted and confusing ejection of Patricia De Lille from the party.

- The water crisis in Cape Town.

- The failure to factor in and plan for the ascendancy in December 2017 of Cyril Ramaphosa to the
presidency of the ANC and the country in 2018.

- Many and varied disputes over race issues, from the leader’s tweet about Ashwin Willemse to the
party’s handling of the Schweizer-Reneke controversy to race-based redress policy.

- The loss of the Nelson Mandela Bay metro.

The rest of this report focusses on the themes and issues we believe underly the DA’s poor
electoral performance and party management leading into and through the 2019 campaign.

5. LEADERSHIP

It is our carefully considered view that the single most important factor in shaping the DA’s current
circumstances is a failure of effective leadership.

Key findings

Significant and widespread concern was expressed in submissions and during discussion regarding
the effectiveness of the party’s leader and wider federal leadership.

The overwhelming view of those who made submissions or with whom we held discussions is that
the party leader, while immensely talented, committed to the cause, hardworking and widely liked,
can be indecisive, inconsistent and conflict averse and that this has led to:

- A lack of clarity about the party’s vision and direction.

- Confusion about the party’s position on key issues.

- The erosion of the party’s unity of purpose.

- Deep divisions within the national caucus.

- A breakdown in trust between the leader and some of the party’s structures

- A failure to produce a credible policy platform.

- A general erosion of discipline across the party.

- The ‘outsourcing’ of key leadership matters and decisions to the CEO of the party in the face of
such a vacuum, which has had a ratcheting effect on the breakdown of trust between key party
formations and the federal head office.

It is striking that some or all of these views were expressed by almost every person or delegation
we met and are contained in a number of key written submissions we received.

The relationship between the leader and the chairperson of the federal council has become
dysfunctional. The relationship has come to be characterized by a lack of trust and a failure to
communicate effectively.

The key nexus of the leader, the chairperson of federal council, the chief executive and the chief
whip has ceased to function as a team as distrust and division makes unity of purpose impossible.

The national management committee has become overly large and is no longer regarded as a
forum where frank conversation is possible. In consequence it no longer functions as the “kitchen
cabinet” it is meant to be.

Taken together, the preceding points suggest there has been is a critical failure of leadership at
the top of the party resulting in confusion about the party’s values and vision, uncertainty about its
direction and a fragmentation of its purpose.

There is a widespread view among members of the federal executive that the federal head office of
the party dominates decision-making at federal executive meetings. While this may be so, the
complaints actually speak to a failure of the leader and the federal executive to perform their
duties effectively. In particular, the federal executive and, more broadly, the federal council has
failed to take full and proper responsibility for the party’s strategic decisions.

In addition, members of the federal executive fail effectively to take ownership of its decisions and
communicate them to their constituencies. As a consequence, the body fails both to be the
representative forum it is meant to be and to exercise authority over the party, rendering it
ineffective and contributing to the general vacuum of leadership at the top of the party.

The relationship between the senior staff leadership and much of the party’s federal and provincial
leadership has become seriously strained and, in some cases, dysfunctional. There is fault on both
sides. However, the central fact is that the chief executive has lost the confidence of the federal
and provincial leadership.

Recommendations

Given the above, we have come to the conclusion that significant changes are required to restore
functional and effective leadership to the party. It is also our view that the party’s supporters and
potential supporters need to see that the party understands it has performed sub-optimally,
accepts responsibility and is prepared to change. Consequently, we recommend:
- That those ultimately responsible for the leadership and management of the party – the leader,
chairperson of federal council and chief executive – step down and make way for new leadership.
We note that James Selfe, the chairperson of the federal council, has already retired from the post.
James has served as chairperson of the federal council for almost two decades, has done so with
great success and enormous distinction and is the most committed of party stalwarts. We wish him
well in his new role providing oversight of and guidance to the DA’s governments. We note also
that Paul Boughey has also announced his resignation. Paul has served the DA in a variety of
senior roles over the past 15 years. We recognize his commitment to the party and outsized
contribution to the cause over the years and wish him well in his next role.

- That a federal congress is held as soon as constitutionally possible to allow for the election of a
new leader and make possible a number of other recommendations contained in this report.

- That the national management committee be reconstituted to include only the leader,
chairperson of the federal council, chief whip and chief executive, with select others joining for
discussions relevant to their responsibilities.

- That the national management committee should participate in a programme at least once a year
designed to enable effective teamwork.

- That term limits are introduced for the national and provincial leaders of the DA, the chairperson
of the federal council and the chief whip. We suggest that these leaders may serve for a maximum
period of 10 years before a break of at least 5 years is required.

- That future CEOs are contracted for a period of no more than five years.

- That the party source and deliver much more effective leadership development specific to the DA
and its needs. It is essential that the party craft and instill a specific DA approach to leadership
that is designed to enable its long-term success.

- That the federal executive of the party establish a ‘board of advisers’ consisting of sympathetic
and expert ‘outsiders’ deeply committed to the DA project who can act as a sounding board for the
party leadership. Meetings should be quarterly or thereabouts, held in a convivial atmosphere, be
entirely off the record and allow the leadership to obtain advice from a distance and from
genuinely disinterested people.

6. PURPOSE AND VALUES Key findings

The second theme to dominate submissions was the feeling that there is a lack of clarity
and consensus about the party’s purpose and values. At the heart of this concern is the view that
the party is both uncertain and divided on how to approach the question of race and that this has
had a particularly negative impact on its election performance.

The panel discerned five separate but related aspects of this particular issue:
1. A general incoherence in the party’s philosophical approach to the issue of race.

2. An insensitivity on the part of some public representatives to the feelings generated by South
Africa’s racialised past and present.

3. The party’s approach to redress policy.

4. The party’s approach to racially charged public issues and incidents.

5. The party’s approach to race in its own structures.

It is our view that these issues are all a consequence of the party’s difficulty in developing a
coherent and principle-based approach to race that allows it to make clear, consistent,
communicable decisions, especially when hard choices are required. It is not enough to operate in
slogans and generalities. We offer here a recommended approach and recommendations designed
to assist the party in charting a course forward.

Philosophy

We start from the premise that the DA’s purpose is to promote substantive freedom by ensuring
every person has the right, space and wherewithal to live a life they value. This is a statement of
purpose that simultaneously privileges the individual as the touchstone of value and recognizes
that individuals require more than constitutionally enshrined rights in order to be free.

At the centre of this project is the imperative to transcend South Africa’s history of competing
racial nationalisms and the discrimination, division and inequality that are the legacy of racial
oppression in South Africa. Unless we do, South Africans cannot enjoy the substantive freedom for
which the DA stands.

Within this framework it is possible to develop a view of some key concepts that relate to race and
about which the DA requires clarity.

The individual. The DA view should be that every person is an individual in that each of us has a
unique perspective on the world and is consequently best placed to determine what we value in
life. This does not mean that people exist in isolation from any context. Each person is the product
of a complex interplay between nature and the familial, psychological, social, economic, cultural
and historical forces that shape who we are. And as a consequence, we all have multiple aspects to
our identities. But none of us is first and foremost a representative example of a group, including a
race group. This is a critically important conclusion because anyone who sees themselves primarily
as a representative of a group should not feel at home in the DA.

Non-racialism. In the framework set out above, non-racialism means: non-discrimination on the
basis of race; seeing people as individuals and not as mere facsimiles of abstract racial
archetypes; avoiding assumptions about people on the basis of their race; recognizing the need to
redress the consequences of racial discrimination.

Redress. Redress concerns making right a wrong. It is, in other words, a matter of justice. In the
South African context, the purpose of redress should be to compensate people who suffered
discrimination and exclusion in the past and who still suffer from the consequences of that
discrimination and exclusion. The second part of that sentence is particularly important. In the
DA’s framework, it is not just to compensate someone for wrongs they suffered if they have
already been compensated, especially if there are others who have yet to be compensated.

It is also worth pointing out that it is not possible entirely to compensate people for the injustices
of the past. There are things – like the loss of loved ones, for instance – that can never be made
right. And the most effective way to ensure a better future is to promote policies that support
social cohesion and enable prosperity. No redress policy can ever match the positive impact that
excellent education, better healthcare, safer streets and a successful economy would have on the
circumstances of South Africa’s poorest citizens. But it’s not either/or. Opportunity policies and
redress policies can and should both be pursued, provided they are targeted at individuals, not
groups.

Diversity. The value of diversity lies in the wide variety of skills, attributes, perspectives,
backgrounds and experiences different people can bring to bear on the world’s challenges. It does
not and should not simply mean racial diversity, not least because people of the same “race” are
not all the same and do not all share the same perspective. In promoting diversity, for example in
selections and appointments, the DA should employ this broader approach to diversity rather than
a narrowly racial one.

Representivity. Representivity is the idea that people from a particular demographic group can
and should represent others from the same group. This idea is profoundly at odds with the DA’s
philosophy in that it is premised on the idea that people are not individuals but rather iterations of
a larger entity. It should have no place in the DA.

Reconciliation. Reconciliation is an idea that seems to have fallen by the wayside in recent years
but remains foundational to the building of a successful constitutional democratic state because it
requires empathy, insight, judgement and patience and, above all, requires a commitment to the
inclusion of all who live in South Africa. These qualities are sorely lacking in much of what passes
for political leadership in South Africa today.

Given the above and the wider need to ensure the DA’s staff and public representatives
understand and internalise its core values, we recommend:

- That every DA public representative and staff member is given thorough training in the DA’s
political philosophy, vision and values.

Understanding and empathy

Many conflicts over race are a consequence of a lack of understanding and empathy. The truth is
that unless leaders and parties are sensitive to people’s feelings, intellectual debates over
philosophy and policy will fail to resolve tension, generate trust or build consensus.

For example, it doesn’t help to accuse black South Africans who want the material and emotional
consequences of apartheid acknowledged and addressed of being racial nationalists.

Equally, it doesn’t help to accuse white South Africans who are concerned about their legitimacy,
place and prospects in South Africa of racism and “white privilege”.

And it doesn’t help to ignore or dismiss the views and feelings of coloured and Indian South
Africans who suffered their own particular form of oppression in the past.

Transcending South Africa’s past, and leading a political party that seeks to do so, requires a
sensitivity to feelings. It requires empathy, insight, patience and generosity. And it is possible to
possess and display these attributes without compromising any principle.

Unless every member, public representative and leader in the DA embraces this reality the party’s
effectiveness will be compromised at best and at worst, its prospects capsized.

Our recommendation in this regard is covered in the recommendation on leading diversity, below.

Redress policy

Before dealing specifically with redress policy, we would note that the party has failed over the
past few years to develop a compelling policy platform designed to achieve the open, opportunity
society for which it stands and that this is one of the reasons so much attention has been focused
on the subject of redress policy in particular. Redress policy should never be presented outside of
a broader policy platform designed to empower South Africans to live lives they value.

It is common cause inside the party that many South Africans remain disadvantaged as a
consequence of past discrimination and that this disadvantage should be addressed in part through
a policy of redress. There is some disagreement however on whether race should be used as a
proxy in determining who the recipients of this redress should be, or whether disadvantage is
identifiable without recourse to a proxy.

Our view is that much of the disagreement stems from a suspicion about motive: some people
who oppose using race as a proxy are suspected of a lack of empathy for the circumstances and
feelings of black South Africans and even an unspoken opposition to any form of redress; some
people who support race as a proxy are in turn suspected of being racial nationalists who are at
odds with the party’s core principles, and that such people leverage race as means of personal and
political advancement.
Without suggesting that there is no disagreement on this issue at all, our view is that there is
greater accord inside the party than public disputes on the subject suggest.

Having said that, the party cannot avoid a clear choice on this issue. We recommend the following:

- That the party develops and adopts a compelling redress policy programme grounded in DA
values and that this is developed as part of a wider policy development programme.

- That the party targets its redress policies at people who currently suffer disadvantage as a
consequence of past discrimination and does not use race as a proxy for disadvantage.

Racially charged issues and incidents

There is very significant dissatisfaction inside the party with the way in which certain incidents and
issues have been dealt with. The most significant of these is the incident in Schweizer Reneke but
others were also frequently mentioned, including the leader’s tweet about Ashwin Willemse and
comments about “white privilege”, etc.

It seems to us that these issues have been caused by two factors: first, a failure to establish the
facts before taking public positions and second, the desire to use incidents of alleged racism to
reaffirm the party’s non-racist credentials.

While the party should indeed take a stand against racism, we believe that it is wrong and
unhelpful to take positions on incidents before the full facts have emerged and that in any event it
is tactically unwise to become embroiled in every blow-up on social media. The party’s anti-racism
agenda should be clearly thought-through, properly articulated and prosecuted through sound
policy and constructive engagement with the public.

Consequently, we recommend:

- That the party and its public representatives establish the full facts of incidents reported in the
news or on social media before taking a public position on them.

- That the party avoid embroiling itself in social media storms in general.

The place of race inside the DA

Internal divisions

There seems to be significant internal division over the place of race in the life of the party.

On the one hand, there are those who feel the party seeks to achieve diversity by promoting
people on the basis of race and that this is contrary to the DA’s values. There is further concern
among this group that some public representatives are increasingly mobilising on the basis of race
in pursuit of their personal career objectives. Finally, there is concern that the DA as an institution
has begun to succumb to an element of racial nationalist thinking.

On the other hand, there are people who feel that too many in the DA fail to understand their
experience, seek to exclude them from full participation in the life of the party and resist the need
for diversity and redress.

What struck us during our discussions with people inside the party, however, was that while these
groupings and views existed, people generally seemed thoughtful, reasonable and open to the
views of others on this subject. It is important therefore to conduct discussion and debate on this
issue in a manner that seeks to enhance understanding, not exacerbate division.

We would also strongly urge DA leaders, public representatives and members to unite around the
ideas set out in the “philosophy” section of this chapter.

In addition, we recommend:

- That together with training on the DA’s philosophy, the party sources and provides training on
how to lead diverse groups of people in emotionally charged environments for every person in
national, provincial or regional leadership positions as well as national, provincial and metro
caucus leadership positions. It is not possible to legislate for every aspect of human relationships
in a political party. Leadership is critical and needs to be exercised more effectively across
the board.

Promoting diversity inside the DA

Promoting diversity inside the DA is a fraught undertaking. We need to be honest here: on the one
hand, selecting or promoting people simply on the basis of their race or other demographic
characteristics is a violation of the DA’s values; on the other hand, lists and caucuses that are not
diverse undermine the DA’s claim to be a party for all South Africans.

The DA’s current nomination regulations are actually an impressively sophisticated attempt to
square this circle. Through three distinct and sequential processes, they seek to reflect the need to
respect internal democracy (the election of a “pool”), reward competence (the assessments) and
achieve diversity (allowing for a limited adjustment of the lists).

It is important to note that the “competence” part of the process offers no guarantee that those
who find themselves in electable positions are in fact properly qualified for the job. All it achieves
is a relative measure (ranking) of the people on offer.

Nevertheless, it seems to us that the system has the merit of honesty: it respects principle and
where it compromises it does so in a limited fashion, acknowledging that the compromise in indeed
a compromise. But the aim of course should be to achieve diversity without having to adjust lists.
In order to arrive at this outcome as soon as possible – and here we think the party should target
2024 – we recommend steps that could help achieve two things: first, better quality candidates of
all races, genders and backgrounds; second, an assessment framework that recognizes and
rewards all the various skills and attributes successful public representatives require.

We therefore recommend the following:

- That a structured always-on programme is established to recruit a wider range of high-quality

candidates into the party.

- That the programme is headed by someone appointed as a deputy chairperson of the federal
council in accordance with our recommendation in section 10 of this report.

- That a mechanism is established which allows for the insertion of some of these candidates into
the party’s lists in electable positions. (For example, positions 3, 13 and 23 could be used for
this purpose.)

- That the same person may not be “promoted” to a higher position on any list more than once in
their careers on the grounds that five years’ experience of being a public representative should be
sufficient to empower anyone to compete without the need for such promotion.

- That the training and development programme for public representatives be intensified and
designed to impart concrete, measurable improvements in the skills and attributes required to
succeed at the job.

- That the assessments used during candidate selection are reviewed with the aim of ensuring all
the skills and attributes successful candidates require are recognized and fairly accounted for.

Taken together and implemented well, these recommendations should ensure that the party is
able to produce diverse groups of electable candidates without over-reliance on artificial methods
of doing so.

7. CULTURE Key findings

An organisation’s culture is defined by the way in which its people behave and the way in which
people behave is driven by the values they believe in. It is therefore easy to identify an
organisation’s animating values by observing the behaviour of people in that organisation.

During the review process we detected a number of behaviours that we think militate against the
party’s success. These are identified below.

Authoritarianism. We have been struck by the rigid formality and coded aggression with which
people address each other in the party. Communication often seems to be delivered with a
possible legal challenge in mind. Allied to this is an attachment to hierarchy, position and title that
is frankly out of place in a party like the DA. All in all these things can make the party an
unpleasant place to work, whether as a public representative or a staff member.

Fear of speaking out. A surprising number of people contacted us for reassurance that
submissions would be kept strictly confidential. Far too many people are afraid of expressing their
views for fear of some sort of reprisal. This state of affairs is clearly not healthy in a democratic
organisation.

Internal litigiousness. Over the past few years it seems that internal disciplinary processes are
increasingly used by aggrieved parties to prosecute disputes and by party authorities to prosecute
indiscipline. This is an unhealthy state of affairs that creates both an unpleasant internal
environment and embroils the party in drawn out quasi-legal processes that damage its credibility
with voters.

Destructive behaviour on social media. Paradoxically, over the past few years there has been
a significant increase in public and often very personal contestation and destructive behaviour,
most often on social media. While members and public representatives should not be forced to
conform to straight-jacketed thinking and public debate of competing ideas is not in and of itself a
problem, there is something dysfunctional about willfully and stubbornly engaging in behaviour
that damages the party’s prospects.

Leaking. The party has become unable to discuss anything without it almost immediately being
leaked to the media, often in a purposefully distorted fashion. This undermines trust between
colleagues, makes honest interaction difficult and compromises the effective functioning of the
party.

Leveraging race. There is a tendency for some DA leaders to suggest a racial motive on the part
of those they disagree with or are competing against. This makes reasoned debate impossible,
causes division and has the potential to fatally destabilise the party.

In light of the above, we recommend:

- That the party survey its public representatives and staff in order to map the current culture of
the organisation and then engage in a process to define the values and behaviour it wishes to see
manifested internally. In short, a functional culture needs to become something that leadership
and members work actively to nurture and protect.

- That the DA should abandon its social media policy and require members only to adhere to the
party’s constitution by not bringing it into disrepute. While the party must protect its reputation,
the social media policy is both authoritarian and impossible properly to police and apply. The best
protection against those who damage the party on social media is a strong internal culture and
more effective leadership.
- That the party seeks first to resolve discipline issues through the exercise of leadership and
reserve the use of formal disciplinary processes as a last resort. Further recommendations in this
regard are to be found in section 10.

- That the party adopt a “first name basis” policy. We think this might help to make for a more
collegiate environment.

8. POLICY Key findings

Over the past few years, the party initiated a number of policy development processes and
appointed at least one person to head up policy development. None of the policy development
processes reached a conclusion and the policy head resigned from the job on the grounds that the
party failed to take policy making seriously. In the end, the manifesto was cobbled together at the
last minute by a team at the federal head office.

A substantive, values-driven, evidence-based and properly costed policy platform is critical to the
party’s long-term credibility. The failure to produce one is in our view further evidence of the
failure of leadership at the top of the party and the lack of clarity over the party’s values and
vision refenced earlier. It is also a consequence of the privileging of organisational matters over
philosophical and policy concerns. It speaks to a lack of interest in and commitment to ensuring
the philosophical and policy infrastructure of the party is in good order.

To remedy the situation, we recommend:

- That the party urgently undertake a well-structured policy development programme to give effect
to its vision for South Africa, that it is both values-driven and evidence- based and that
appropriate resources are made available for it.

- That the foundation of the policy programme should be an economic policy that would enable
growth, opportunity and inclusion.

- That the programme is headed by a suitably qualified person appointed in consultation between
the leader and the chairperson of the federal council, after consultation with the federal executive,
as per our recommendation below in section 10 of this report.

- That all public representatives and structures of the party are invited to be part of the policy-
making process.

9. STRATEGY

The party’s political objective – to bring about an Open, Opportunity Society for All in South Africa
– has not changed. Neither has the route to that objective shifted: winning power at local and
provincial elections and ultimately becoming part of a national government.
In order to achieve our objective, however, it is necessary that the party (1) holds onto the
support it has, (2) wins new support and (3) governs in a way that starkly and positively contrasts
the DA and the ANC.

Since the 2016 local government elections, the party has struggled to execute in all three of these
areas.

Key findings

We have discerned three key drivers of the party’s strategic approach over the past few years.

1. The view that the primary obstacle to greater support among black voters is a belief that the
party exists primarily to promote the interests of whites.

2. The assumption that white voters have “nowhere else to go”.

3. The decision to enter a number of arrangements with the Economic Freedom Fighters after the
2016 elections, putting the DA in government in Johannesburg and Tshwane.

We will address each of these in turn.

Winning more support from black voters

There is an enormous amount of quantitative and qualitative data that suggests the party does
indeed have a serious trust problem among black voters, the most obvious of which is of course
actual election results over the past 20 years. There are two reasons for this: first, many South
Africans think about their interests through the prism of race, which is unsurprising given our
history; second, there were and are weaknesses in the DA’s appeal to many black voters, not least
the tendency of some DA members and public representatives to display little understanding of
their experiences or empathy for their circumstances.

The party has undertaken a range of initiatives over many years to address this problem and it is
commendable that the DA has been prepared to confront its own weaknesses in an attempt to
broaden its electoral appeal. The challenge, however, is how to do so without compromising its
values or unnecessarily alienating its existing supporters, and this is where we believe there has
been an element of failure over the past few years.

In particular, we believe that the party has:

- Adopted certain policy positions (on BEE, for example) that compromise, or at least flex, a clear
application of its core principles.

- Reacted to events (such as Schweizer Reneke and Ashwin Willemse) in a way that was impulsive
and alienating of white voters.
- Struggled to promote diversity inside the party without it leading to resentment and division.

Leaving aside any contradiction of the party’s values, even seeming to choose between races is an
approach that is destined to fail in a country awash in racial and ethno-nationalist parties who are
much better at nationalism that the DA could ever be.

It is important to clarify what we are saying here. Very few of the voters who deserted the DA in
the last election would have done so because they were dismayed at some sort of liberal slide-
away. It is unlikely, for example, that voters who choose the FF+ or the ACDP over the DA do so
because the DA is not liberal enough for them. But one of the benefits of liberal principles as
opposed to nationalist ones is that they allow the DA to be for everyone equally. They allow the DA
not to have to choose between races. It is precisely because the DA views people as individuals
that it can seek to build one South Africa for all.

In the end, if the DA is to grow, it has to grow on the basis of its core values. To attempt
otherwise is to risk either hollow success, where growth is achieved at the price of principle and
impact; or outright failure, where limited growth among black voters is outweighed by the loss of
support among minorities.

This is not to suggest the DA should not concern itself with the trust problem it continues to
experience among many black voters. It is rather to suggest that success for the DA depends on
avoiding either (a) compromising its principles in a way that leads to long-term incoherence and
ineffectiveness or (b) leaves any of its potential supporters with the impression that it chooses
some voters over others on the basis of race.

In light of the above, we recommend:

- That the DA undertake a study designed to identify a group of voters of all races that
fundamentally agree with the party’s values and then determine how best to overcome any
obstacles that may exist to winning their support. The purpose of such research should therefore
be to help the party work out where its values intersect with voter need and to pitch the party
from that position. This research would feed into the development of a larger growth strategy for
the party.

Assuming white voters have nowhere else to go

The party’s relentless focus on winning more support from black voters is understandable given
the frustrations of the party’s failure to do so over many years. But taking existing voters for
granted is always a mistake. It is striking that over a period of many years, the DA failed to heed a
number of warnings that it was alienating sections of the white Afrikaans electorate.

In particular, two significant analyses published in Afrikaans language newspapers seem not to
have been given the attention they deserved. The first, by Professor Hermann Gilomee, was
published in September 2017 under the heading "DA versaak Afrikaanse kieser" which contained
an explicit warning that the DA was at risk of losing the support of Afrikaners. The second, by
Professor Roger Southall was published a year later and contained a similar warning.

Historically, the DA has been extremely sensitive to the prospect of shedding support and would be
more alive to the risk of doing so than academics or newspaper editors. That seems no longer to
be the case.

Consequently, we recommend:

- That the party take urgent steps to reengage disillusioned Afrikaans voters in an effort to win
back their trust, and that it does so on the basis of the DA’s values and vision of an open,
opportunity society for all.

Arrangements with the EFF

While appreciating the complexity and difficulty of the decision at the time, our view is that
forming governments with the EFF’s support in Johannesburg and Tshwane was a mistake. There
are two related problems with the move: first, our governments in those cities are unable to
prosecute a properly DA agenda because we are overly beholden to the EFF; second, it is corrosive
of the DA’s brand to rely on the EFF’s support to govern given that party’s political philosophy,
policy agenda and general behaviour.

It is of course true that if the DA is to succeed it has to learn to succeed at managing coalitions
and other forms of cooperation in government. It is also true that the party has previously
participated in coalitions and relied on other parties for support to govern. The issue here isn’t
solely the ideological incompatibility of the EFF and the DA; it is also a matter of strategy and
tactics. Where the DA can dominate coalitions and protect its identity and brand while doing so, it
should not hesitate to enter cooperative government. If it cannot do that, it should avoid such
governments. In Cape Town in 2006, for example, the DA formed a coalition with a range of
parties including the FF+, the ACDP and the African Muslim party. But there was never any doubt
who was in control and the party’s agenda in the city was an almost entirely a DA one.

We understand that the DA has now ceased any formal arrangement with the EFF but continues to
govern in both cities. Our view is that this has not resolved the issue. First, it is unclear that voters
know there has been a change in the relationship between the DA and the EFF and second, it does
nothing to overcome the problem that the DA is not in control of its own destiny in either city.

Having said that, we believe the party should not make a final decision on whether to exit
government in Johannesburg or Tshwane without a proper study of voters’ views and a careful
consideration of the consequences. To that end, we recommend:

- That the DA immediately undertake research to determine current voter perceptions of its brand
and performance in Johannesburg and Tshwane and assess the impact on voter sentiment of
exiting those governments. Having done so, it should determine (a) whether to resign the
mayoralty in those cities or (b) how to proceed in a manner that will increase rather than decrease
the party’s support in the 2021 local government elections.

Developing a strategy for 2021 and beyond

Factoring in the analysis and recommendations made in this report, on the basis of a clear
commitment to its values and vision and underpinned by a values-driven and evidence- based
policy agenda, we recommend:

- That the party develop a refreshed growth strategy, focusing in the first instance on the local
elections in 2021 but also laying the foundation for future success thereafter.

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10. POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES

Key Findings

Political structures

Having listened to representations from the party and studied the way in which the political
structures of the party function, we have reached the following conclusions:

Neither the federal council nor the federal executive are used effectively for political decision-
making, in particular in respect of strategy and policy.

There is an unnecessary duplication and proliferation of positions at federal level.

In particular, there is no compelling reason to retain the position of federal chairperson and
therefore of the deputy federal chairpersons. The position of federal chairperson was originally
designed to provide status without responsibility for a senior figure in the newly formed
progressive party. That situation pertains to this day, except that three deputy posts have been
attached to it. The original reason for the creation of the deputy posts was to create the image of a
more diverse leadership, but again, the positions don’t involve any substantive responsibility.

The job of the federal council chairperson is overly large and complex and cannot be done by one
person. Indeed we received from the chairperson of the federal council a 19-point job description,
some individual points of which themselves constitute a full time job.

Provincial leaders and chairpersons don’t adequately communicate discussions and decisions at
federal level, contributing directly to a disconnect between the federal level and other levels of the
party.
PPAS

We have also looked into the PPAS system in some detail having received a number of complaints
about it. In our view it is a very sophisticated system that allows for great flexibility in determining
the areas on which each individual is assessed and in determining how those assessments are
done.

The challenge for any performance management system for public representatives is (a) that it
requires implementation by a great number of people and such implementation is therefore always
likely to be variable and (b) that it requires implementation by people who rely on those they are
assessing for political support and (c) that it is open to the possibility of abuse given its centrality
to people’s re-election prospects. It is also true that some public representatives simply resent
being assessed for performance at all.

It is difficult to avoid these inherent challenges to a performance management system of public

representatives in a political party. We make some recommendation below that might help. But in
general we think the PPAS system is credible, fair and necessary.

Federal legal commission

There is a general unhappiness with the federal legal commission which revolves around the idea
that it treats people unequally and therefore fails to dispense justice. It is difficult to establish the
veracity of these claims but in the end the fact that the commission seems to have lost the
confidence of so many in the party is the key finding.

It is however important to note that the federal legal commission merely makes recommendations
to the federal executive. In the end, it is the federal executive that makes the final decision. It is
therefore incumbent on the federal executive to ensure it acts impartially and is seen to do so.

In addition, we propose:

- That the party strengthen its recently adopted measured to promote mediation rather than
litigation as a means to resolve disputes.

- That the party obtain independent legal advice on how to simplify and improve its existing
disciplinary procedures to ensure appropriate and acceptable outcomes from such processes and to
ensure, to the extent possible, that restores the confidence of party members in the efficacy and
even-handedness of any outcomes from disciplinary processes

Recommendations

In light of the above, we recommend:

- That federal executive and council meetings are refocused on political matters.
- That provincial leaders are required to provide their provincial executives with written feedback
on political discussion and decisions at federal executive.

- That the positions of federal chairperson and deputy federal chairperson of the party
be abolished.

- That the chairperson of the federal council continues to be elected by the federal council, but that
the following deputy chairpersons be nominated jointly by the chairperson and the leader and
approved by two-thirds of the federal executive.

o A deputy chairperson for policy development

o A deputy chairperson for DA government oversight and development

o A deputy chairperson for the PPAS and the development of public representatives

o A deputy chairperson for legal matters

o A deputy chairperson for talent acquisition

- That PPAS reviews happen no more than twice a year and that further training be given to those
who deliver the system across the country.

- That the party consider eliminating the use of PPAS in the selection of candidates except in so far
as it should be able to identify those who should not be eligible for reelection, and use it
exclusively to improve performance, as this would incentivize a better and more accurate use of
the system.

11. OPERATIONS

The DA has, over the years, built a very effective operational and campaigning capability. Most DA
staff are committed, competent and effective, and are a credit to the party. Having said that, it is
appropriate after an election to reassess the party’s operational capability with the purpose of
ensuring it is best able to deliver on its mandate which, put simply, is to maximize the DA’s
electoral outcomes.

Key findings

Relations between FHO and party structures

The relationship between the federal head office and the provinces and constituencies has always
involved a degree of tension on account of naturally occurring competing interests or imperatives.
However, if relations break down and become dysfunctional, the party’s effectiveness as a
campaigning organisation becomes compromised. It is our view that relations in recent years have
become severely strained and, in some cases, dysfunctional.

The feeling in many provinces is that the federal head office fails to listen adequately to provincial
and local concerns or take into account local expertise, is overly controlling and sometimes
dictatorial.

The feeling in return is that many leaders and structures lack competence and commitment and
that vested interests in certain structures override the party’s interests.

Broadly speaking, we think there is merit in both views although we would point out that the
generalisations captured above certainly do not apply to every individual involved in the
relationship between federal head office and the provinces, regions and constituencies.

In the end, one cannot legislate for every conceivable human interaction. Leadership and effective
communication are the ingredients that best ensure a functional relationship between FHO and the
provinces (and constituencies).

Given the above, we recommend:

- That the party institutionalise consultation and discussion between FHO and the provinces
through the establishment of a forum devoted entirely to operational matters. The forum should
include FHO leadership, provincial directors and provincial chairpersons.

The design of FHO

It is also the view of the panel that the federal head office is overly bureaucratic, especially in
relation to its human resource management. Many of the representations made by both public
representatives and staff included this concern. We understand of course that the larger an
organisation becomes the more it requires processes and controls, but these should nevertheless
be designed for maximum possible efficiency.

We are also of the view that a rationalisation of the number of posts and staff is required,
especially in light of the election result. We believe this process is already underway.

Given the above, we recommend:

- That the federal executive institute a thorough review of the staffing, structure and systems at
FHO with a view to ensuring it is (a) staffed by the best possible talent, (b) designed to deliver
world-class campaign success and (c) operates efficiently and effectively, specifically in so far as
the management of people and money is concerned.

Operational structure in provinces

Much unhappiness was expressed about the bifurcation of the operational structure in provinces
between an administrative head and a campaign chief.

While it makes sense to separate campaign and administrative functions at provincial level, and
certainly in the bigger provinces, it is our view that there needs in each province to be one staff
member in charge of operations, and that person should be the provincial director. It is still
possible to split campaigning off as a separate function, but if that is done the campaign chief
should report to the provincial director and, with the concurrence of the provincial director, to the
campaign director at head office. It is not clear to us why this would be difficult to achieve.

- Our recommendation is therefore to give effect to the structure outlined above.

Field reorganization

The field reorganization was mentioned in a large number of submissions and discussions. Having
looked into the genesis and design of the system, we would note the following:

- It makes sense to design a field organisation working backwards from the objective of
maximizing the impact of the ground war, and the field redesign does that.

- It also makes sense to find ways to recruit and empower volunteers to deliver the party’s ground
war effort, and not to rely solely on public representatives and people who are paid to do so.

- It makes further sense to design a field organisation system around geographical areas that
make sense to voters, rather than to the party or the demarcation board.

- The system was extensively piloted in 2017, both federal executive and federal council were
briefed on it on a number of occasions since 2017 and a significant effort was put into training the
party to use it.

- Having said that, there is a clear tension between the field organisation system and the existing
constituency system (and to a lesser extent, the ward system).

- The constituency system is designed to give voters the sense that there is a senior DA public
representative they can turn to for help and hold accountable more generally, while ward
boundaries are determined by the demarcation board. The field redesign, by contrast, is designed
to arrange the ground war in a way that maximizes campaign effectiveness. These are all
competing imperatives.

Given the above, we recommend:

- That the federal executive institute a review of the field organisation system with a view to
finding ways to enhance compatibility with constituency structures and branches, but that it should
not discard the field organisation system simply because it requires difficult change.
- That the party accept that the field organisation system does not need to be applied in exactly
the same way in every province and region, given inevitable differences between them.

12. CONCLUSION

South Africa is at a perilous time in its history.

Every ‘outsider’ interviewed by this panel emphasized this and coupled it with dismay at the DA’s
situation and performance.

Every party member who made a submission or was interviewed displayed both a deep
commitment to the Party and a large measure of distress at its current situation.

We were encouraged by the fact, however, that we did not discern an irretrievable irreconcilability
of interests even between so-called ‘factions’ within the party. However, these differences can only
be managed by the most assiduous, wise and strong leadership and management.

The path of least resistance for the Party is to ignore the signals from the electorate, and attempt
to diminish the meaning and effect of the Party’s backsliding in the 2019 election and further and
significant by election losses since and attribute these to a variety of factors beyond the control of
the DA. However, such a path in our experience usually leads downhill at an accelerated pace. It is
equally imperative, to repeat the introductory remark, that ‘the baby is not thrown out with the
bathwater’. There are critically positive and indeed unique political properties owned by this Party.
But their mere possession is no guarantee, absent of necessary changes, for their continuance.

Our recommendations are crafted in response to these deeply felt imperatives.

We cannot guarantee that the full implementation of this report will address all the challenges and
lead to an inevitably successful outcome. No one can offer that reassurance.

However, it is our view that, in the absence of a step-change along the lines of these
recommendations, and possibly other corrective measures beyond the purview of this report, the
Democratic Alliance’s current travails will intensify and metastasize to the huge disadvantage of
the democratic project in the country and could over time lead to the destruction of the DA as a
political force for the good in SA.

While no two political processes are parallel or exact, it is noteworthy to recall the demise of the
New National Party between 1994 and 1999. After the 1994 election it was, by far, the second
largest party in South Africa, occupied 80 seats in Parliament and governed the Western Cape and
Cape Town. Within five years, it had been reduced to a 27-seat parliamentary party, lost its
national opposition status and was forced into a coalition government in the Western Cape. It
ceased to exist within five years of the next election.
Obviously different issues pertain now as opposed to then. However, it is salutary and instructive
to bear this example in mind and to remember that no political party has a preordained right to
exist, and without taking hard stock of itself and applying stringent remedial measures when
necessary, a political party, however meritorious, can face fracture and even extinction.

ANNEX: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Leadership

- That those ultimately responsible for the leadership and management of the party – the leader,
chairperson of federal council and chief executive – step down and make way for new leadership.
We note that James Selfe, the chairperson of the federal council, has already retired from the post.
James has served as chairperson of the federal council for almost two decades, has done so with
great success and enormous distinction and is the most committed of party stalwarts. We wish him
well in his new role providing oversight of and guidance to the DA’s governments. We note also
that Paul Boughey has also announced his resignation. Paul has served the DA in a variety of
senior roles over the past 15 years. We recognize his commitment to the party and outsized
contribution to the cause over the years and wish him well in his next role.

- That a federal congress is held as soon as constitutionally possible to allow for the election of a
new leader and make possible a number of other recommendations contained in this report.

- That the national management committee be reconstituted to include only the leader,
chairperson of the federal council, chief whip and chief executive, with select others joining for
discussions relevant to their responsibilities.

- That the national management committee should participate in a programme at least once a year
designed to enable effective teamwork.

- That term limits are introduced for the national and provincial leaders of the DA, the chairperson
of the federal council and the chief whip. We suggest that these leaders may serve for a maximum
period of 10 years before a break of at least 5 years is required.

- That future CEOs are contracted for a period of no more than five years.

- That the party source and deliver much more effective leadership development specific to the DA
and its needs. It is essential that the party craft and instill a specific DA approach to leadership
that is designed to enable its long-term success.

- That the federal executive of the party establish a ‘board of advisers’ consisting of sympathetic
and expert ‘outsiders’ deeply committed to the DA project who can act as a sounding board for the
party leadership. Meetings should be quarterly or thereabouts, held in a convivial atmosphere, be
entirely off the record and allow the leadership to obtain advice from a distance and from
genuinely disinterested people.
Purpose and values

Values training

- That every DA public representative and staff member is given thorough training in the DA’s
political philosophy, vision and values.

Redress policy

- That the party develops and adopts a compelling redress policy programme grounded in DA
values and that this is developed as part of a wider policy development programme.

- That the party targets its redress policies at people who currently suffer disadvantage as a
consequence of past discrimination and does not use race as a proxy for disadvantage.

Responding to incidents of racism or perceived racism

- That the party and its public representatives establish the full facts of incidents reported in the
news or on social media before taking a public position on them.

- That the party avoid embroiling itself in social media storms in general.

Internal divisions

- That together with training on the DA’s philosophy, the party sources and provides training on
how to lead diverse groups of people in emotionally charged environments for every person in
national, provincial or regional leadership positions as well as national, provincial and metro
caucus leadership positions. It is not possible to legislate for every aspect of human relationships
in a political party. Leadership is critical and needs to be exercised more effectively across
the board.

Promoting diversity inside the DA

- That a structured always-on programme is established to recruit a wider range of high-quality

candidates into the party.

- That the programme is headed by someone appointed as a Deputy Chairperson of the Federal
Council in accordance with our recommendation in section 10 of this report.

- That a mechanism is established which allows for the insertion of some of these candidates into
the party’s lists in electable positions. (For example, positions 3, 13 and 23 could be used for
this purpose.)
- That the same person may not be “promoted” to a higher position on any list more than once in
their careers on the grounds that five years’ experience of being a public representative should be
sufficient to empower anyone to compete without the need for such promotion.

- That the training and development programme for public representatives be intensified and
designed to impart concrete, measurable improvements in the skills and attributes required to
succeed at the job.

- That the assessments used during candidate selection are reviewed with the aim of ensuring all
the skills and attributes successful candidates require are recognized and fairly accounted for.

Culture

- That the party survey its public representatives and staff in order to map the current culture of
the organisation and then engage in a process to define the values and behaviour it wishes to see
manifested internally. In short, a functional culture needs to become something that leadership
and members work actively to nurture and protect.

- That the DA should abandon its social media policy and require members only to adhere to the
party’s constitution by not bringing it into disrepute. While the party must protect its reputation,
the social media policy is both authoritarian and impossible properly to police and apply. The best
protection against those who damage the party on social media is a strong internal culture and
more effective leadership.

- That the party seeks first to resolve discipline issues through the exercise of leadership and
reserve the use of formal disciplinary processes as a last resort. Further recommendations in this
regard are to be found in section 10.

- That the party adopt a “first name basis” policy. We think this might help to make for a more
collegiate environment.

Policy

- That the party urgently undertake a well-structured policy development programme to give effect
to its vision for South Africa, that it is both values-driven and evidence- based and that
appropriate resources are made available for it.

- That the foundation of the policy programme should be an economic policy that would enable
growth, opportunity and inclusion.

- That the programme is headed by a suitably qualified person appointed in consultation between
the leader and the chairperson of the federal council, after consultation with the federal executive,
as per our recommendation below in section 10 of this report.
- That all public representatives and structures of the party are invited to be part of the policy-
making process.

Strategy

- That the DA undertake a study designed to identify a group of voters of all races that
fundamentally agree with the party’s values and then determine how best to overcome any
obstacles that may exist to winning their support. The purpose of such research should therefore
be to help the party work out where its values intersect with voter need and to pitch the party
from that position. This research would feed into the development of a larger growth strategy for
the party.

- That the party take urgent steps to reengage disillusioned Afrikaans voters in an effort to win
back their trust, and that it does so on the basis of the DA’s values and vision of an open,
opportunity society for all.

- That the DA immediately undertake research to determine current voter perceptions of its brand
and performance in Johannesburg and Tshwane and assess the impact on voter sentiment of
exiting those governments. Having done so, it should determine (a) whether to resign the
mayoralty in those cities or (b) how to proceed in a manner that will increase rather than decrease
the party’s support in the 2021 local government elections.

- That the party develop a refreshed growth strategy, focusing in the first instance on the local
elections in 2021 but also laying the foundation for future success thereafter.

Political structures and public representatives

- That federal executive acts impartially and is seen to do so in matters of discipline.

- That the party strengthen its recently adopted measured to promote mediation rather than
litigation as a means to resolve disputes.

- That the party obtain independent legal advice on how to simplify and improve its existing
disciplinary procedures to ensure appropriate and acceptable outcomes from such processes and to
ensure, to the extent possible, that restores the confidence of party members in the efficacy and
even- handedness of any outcomes from disciplinary processes

- That federal executive and council meetings are refocused on political matters.

- That provincial leaders are required to provide their provincial executives with written feedback
on political discussion and decisions at federal executive.

- That the positions of federal chairperson and deputy federal chairperson of the party
be abolished.
- That the chairperson of the federal council continues to be elected by the federal council, but that
the following deputy chairpersons be nominated jointly by the chairperson and the leader and
approved by two-thirds of the federal executive.

o A deputy chairperson for policy development

o A deputy chairperson for DA government oversight and development

o A deputy chairperson for the PPAS and the development of public representatives

o A deputy chairperson for legal matters

o A deputy chairperson for talent acquisition

- That PPAS reviews happen no more than twice a year and that further training be given to those
who deliver the system across the country.

- That the party consider eliminating the use of PPAS in the selection of candidates except in so far
as it should be able to identify those who should not be eligible for reelection, and use it
exclusively to improve performance, as this would incentivize a better and more accurate use of
the system.

Operations

- That the party institutionalise consultation and discussion between FHO and the provinces
through the establishment of a forum devoted entirely to operational matters. The forum should
include FHO leadership, provincial directors and provincial chairpersons.

- That the federal executive institute a thorough review of the staffing, structure and systems at
FHO with a view to ensuring it is (a) staffed by the best possible talent, (b) designed to deliver
world-class campaign success and (c) operates efficiently and effectively, specifically in so far as
the management of people and money is concerned.

- That the party gives effect to the structure outlined in the section of this report titled
“Operational structure in provinces”.

- That the federal executive institute a review of the field organisation system with a view to
finding ways to enhance compatibility with constituency structures and branches, but that it should
not discard the field organisation system simply because it requires difficult change.

- That the party accept that the field organisation system does not need to be applied in exactly
the same way in every province and region, given inevitable differences between them.