G.R. No.

79538 October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.

Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.

Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation.

COURTS, J.:

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to
the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the
Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement
which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356
which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to
take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp.
54-63].

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano,
wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species
within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the
municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to
as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in
Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other
forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which were
as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING
OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF
LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT
FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A
COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the Petition; Rollo,
p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to
then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in
support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly
covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA
No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by
Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued
an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was
not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be
withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated
against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983.
Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija,
Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been denied in view of the
total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao
which was imposed for reasons of conservation and national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t
considers itself the trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of forest
resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well documented.
Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is well
within its right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its established
institutions and the liberty and democratic way of life of its people.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request that
TLA No. 356 issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this
motion in an order dated September 15, 1986. stating in part:

xxx xxx xxx

Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks
Realty Development Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to say that the
Ministry is now in the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into, granted, issued
or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution for
the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national interest so requires.

xxx xxx xxx

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority over all forest
lands. On the basis of this authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging
operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where movant's former concession area is
located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity from removing cut or uncut
logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or
superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the
logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a
resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President
ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the
MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a
supplement to its petition for certiorari. Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their
respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto. In a resolution dated May 22,
1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which militate
against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected
parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata
thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v.
Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].

In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought
the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which
cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently
issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of
Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986.
By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR
requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as
petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v.
Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190,
August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 374].

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which
petitioner claimed to have sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53],
seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be
pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against
officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In the
letter to then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of concessionaires,
whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation practices in
the subject concession area. Yet, no other administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner
until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced
by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present
case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public
respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the
petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA
No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier
administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause.
For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time".
The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of
time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the
proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566,
571]. And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the
petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of
First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392).

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or
declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v.
Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable delay on
the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their
rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435
(1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that
petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from
the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of
these orders will not lie.

3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of
petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from
departing from the general application of the rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR which
were ed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which effectively forestall
judicial interference in the case at bar,

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop
and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all
timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation.
In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration are presently
taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing an
agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global
concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a
balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in
this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country's forest resources
which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna peculiar to the region, but has
produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of nature
having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and
energy resources required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate
financial requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival
in a viable environment demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further
denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view
of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II
of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board
of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828,
February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-
21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966,
18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera,
G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637,
July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging
company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the
proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz,
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests
so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's
refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous
regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the
issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the
procedure outlined in the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department
officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and
exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special favors" to preferred
individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a
flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
Therefore, should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part
of officials in the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the
Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers
under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondents herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the
affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

-----

Oposa vs Factoran

Legal Standing: Common and General Interest

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR

G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993

OPOSA et al, petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-
profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging
companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails
and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his
opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him,
the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving
the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1,
Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had
done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein .

All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead
as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements

----

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA

MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA

G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784

Ponente: J. Davide Jr.

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded
them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into
the premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No,
The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber.

While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is
found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

----

CASE DIGEST: PAAT VS CA

Paat v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111107

10 January 1997

Facts:

On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR because
the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Four days later, Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO, issued an order of confiscation and asked the
owners to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited within fifteen days. Private
respondent, however, failed to do so. R.E.D. Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. de Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration but was
subsequently denied. The letter was forwarded to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to the respondent’s
wishes. During the pendency of the resolution, however, the respondent filed a suit for replevin. The
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was later denied by the RTC. Their motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied and the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the confiscation of the truck was valid.

Held:

Yes. The suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation
and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. The
provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of
E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 could never be clearer.

(same case)

CASE DIGEST: PAAT VS. CA

11:05 AM

G.R. No. 111107

Leonardo Paat vs. CA

January 10, 1997

The truck of private respondent was seized and confiscated by the DENR because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Private
respondents filed before the courts a suit for replevin (recovery of personal property) despite the
pending administrative resolution. Private respondents contended that the DENR had no legal authority
to seize the items and that said authority lies on the court as provided for in Section 68 of P.D. 705, as
amended by E.O. 277.

RULING:

The Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Private
respondents could not say they were deprived of due process, knowing that an administrative
proceeding is pending before the DENR, who was yet to render a resolution on the controversy.

The Court also ruled that private respondents miserably failed to prove the wrongful detention of the
subject truck confiscated. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was
transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of
Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably
warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the
continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

The Court clarifies that with the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D.
705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code.

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