The Court hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006
B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F.
BALUTAN Petitioners,vs.LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA CORONA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE CARPIO-MORALES, ARMED FORCES OF THE CALLEJO, SR., PHILIPPINES, COL.
GILBERTO AZCUNA, JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL TINGA, INVESTIGATING OFFICER,
THE CHICO-NAZARIO, PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL GARCIA, and OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan are high-ranking officers of the AFP.
On 22 September 2005, Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at
a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security concerning
the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of
massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt between PGMA and Comm.
Garcillano.
Petitioners attended such hearing and testified before the Committee, despite the fact that
the day before, there was an order from Gen. Senga (which in turn was sourced "per
instruction"from President Arroyo) prohibiting them from testifying without the prior
approval of the President. Petitioners do not precisely admit before this Court that they had
learned of such order prior to their testimony, although the OSG asserts that at the very least,
Gen. Gudani already knew of such order before he testified.
On the very day of the hearing, PGMA issued EO 464 which enjoined officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval.
Gen. Senga issued an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the
Provost Marshall General (OPMG) for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was
compulsory retired from military service. The OPMG recommended that petitioners be
charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in
relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline.
Petitioners seeks that: (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga
preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be
declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges stated in the charge sheets be quashed; and (3)
Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or
orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of
their having testified before the Senate.
Issue: Whether or not the President may prevent a member of the armed forces from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.
Ruling:
Page 1 of 52
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also
hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a
military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under
law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not
so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress
does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-
in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege.
As the general rule, the President could require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a
contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-
chief. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that
the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded
the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose
the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The Court believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality
by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if
the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives
prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to
allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should
be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who
wield authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. And once the
courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply
with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or
disfavor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN
AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,vs.GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his
capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO CLEMEN PN,
P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as
officers of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively, Respondents.
Facts:
On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres
Notter, Eugenio Iagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba were purportedly inspecting a water and
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men
who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).Sulu Crisis
Management Committee was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The
committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the
Provincial Governor of Sulu.
On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state
of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It
also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows
on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made
and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same Proclamation,
respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure
public safety
Petitioner, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as
the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Issue: Whether or not the LGC authorizes a governor to declare a state of emergency and
exercise the calling-out powers of the President.
Ruling:
Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic.
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and
that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as
well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof.
While the President exercises full supervision and control over the police, a local chief
executive, such as the provincial governor, only exercises operational supervision over the
police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations.
Page 2 of 52
Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called
upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently
vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the
Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.
Moreover, the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity
or disaster, as contemplated on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465, as the said
provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding
respondents to desist from further proceedings m implementing Proclamation No. 1,
Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation and guidelines
are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-
Intervenor,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
Facts:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder and impose the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, wherein he is
restored to his civil and political rights. Former President Estrada received and
acceptedthe pardon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the
COMELEC. However, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform
grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President
Arroyo restored the formers right to vote and be voted for a public office. Nonetheless,
after the 2010 elections, former President Estrada only managed to garner the second
highest number of votes.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the
City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former President Estrada before the COMELEC on the theory that Former President Estrada
is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan. She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). However, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition for disqualification.
While this case was pending before the Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were
conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office. The next day,
the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
Lim, one of former President Estradas opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for leave
to intervene in this case. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidals theory that former President
Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon granted to the latter
failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification.In defense, former President Estrada
argues that: the factual findings of public respondent COMELEC are binding on this
Honorable Supreme Court;that he was granted an absolute pardon and thereby restored to
his full civil and political rights, including the right to seek public elective office such as the
mayoral position in the City of Manila;that the text of the pardon granted to him
substantially, if not fully, complied with the requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised
Penal Code as it was categorically stated in the said document that he was restored to his
civil and political rights;that since pardon is an act of grace, it must be construed favorably in
favor of the grantee.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be
voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
Ruling:
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The
only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is
that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that
the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts
of executive clemency.
The only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
Page 3 of 52
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents power of pardon
by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an
overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected
a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of the President in the
form of "offenses involving graft and corruption"that would be enumerated and defined
by Congress through the enactment of a law.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or
diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons
convicted of violating penal statutes.
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal,
is unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President
to grant executive clemency.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will give
full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an
overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the pardon
which emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by the Chief Executive
himself/herself. The said codal provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of
Congress to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the power of
the President to grant executive clemency. All that the said provisions impart is that the
pardon of the principal penalty does notcarry with it the remission of the accessory
penalties unless the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the pardon.
It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant executive clemency and,
specifically, to decide to pardon the principal penalty while excluding its accessory
penalties or to pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the pardon
so decided upon by the President on the penalties imposed in accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to
former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and
imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned
which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e
is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,"expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the textof the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
It is well- entrenched that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Thus, the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that
former President Estrada is hereby restored to his civil and political rightssubstantially
complies with the requirement of express restoration.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to former
President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual
basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention are DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the
Resolution dated April 23, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, En bane, both in SPA No.
13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,vs.GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents.
Facts:
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5),
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend
that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and
preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed
and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, due to the
escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
the president. On the same day, the President also issued General Order No. 5 implementing
PP 1017 and directing the AFP and PNP to take appropriate actions 'to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
Pursuant to such PP 1017, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest without issuance of warrant.
On February 5, 2006, the Daily Tribune was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985
Page 4 of 52
for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
One week after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO No. 5, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
Petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of and G.O. No. 5 and PP 1017.
Issue: Whether or not President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is
an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers.
Ruling:
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national
emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the
laws and to all decrees x x x"but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17,
Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State
may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
Thus, during the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant
the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct
the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of
national emergency"and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated
by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
In this case, President Arroyo could validly declarethe existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from
Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The
taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the
"the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,"it refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress
may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following the Courts interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, the Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over . In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
Wherefore, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article a. is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;b. is required
VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.
G.R. No. 231658
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO,
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitionersvs.HON.
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents
Facts:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo Roa
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; orb. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
Page 5 of 52
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been
plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the
passing of time.
That on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have
been unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by
intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only against the government
authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties.
The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and
significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the
Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls under the
control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No.
3888 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation
No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with the law". In the same
Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the
same". The House of Representatives likewise issued House Resolution No. 1050
expressing its full support to the President, as it finds no reason to revoke Proclamation
216.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus:
to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon of the Secretary of National Defense;c. is
required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;
2. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
3. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely
calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and
declaration of martial law;
4. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the
Report of the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
Ruling:
1. a. No. In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the factual basis,
and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of
the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of
the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly
burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-making. Such a requirement
will practically necessitate the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of
the reports submitted to him within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be
able to dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but
would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him. Possibly, by
the time the President is satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would
be too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that
is hard, if not impossible, to curtail. Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered
intelligence reports of military officers as credible evidence that the President ca appraise
and to which he can anchor his judgment.
b.No. The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the declaration
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's
power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of
actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to
common sense if the decision of the President is made dependent on the recommendation of
his mere alter ego. Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the exercise of the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is
bestowed.
c. Yes. Since the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the President, the
determination of this Court as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of
such, must be based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at
the time he made the declaration or suspension, which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may be
based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past events. As to
how far the past events should be from the present depends on the President. Past events
may be considered as justifications for the declaration and/or suspension as long as these
are connected or related to the current situation existing at the time of the declaration.
2. Yes. he President deduced from the facts available to him that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers
and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was probable cause that the
crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In fine, the
President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
Page 6 of 52
3. No. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not
extend to the calibration of the President's decision of which among his graduated
powers he will avail of in a given situation.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as
Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to
determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the calling out power; or
whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially,
with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary
powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the
President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his
prerogative to address exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very
integrity of the State.
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating
the President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of
facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive
domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least
initially, lies with the President.
4. a. A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show
that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public
uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the President
from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration
of the facts.
b. The 1987 Constitution grants to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the discretion
to determine the territorial coverage or application of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law."Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the
territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial
law.
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department,
particularly the President as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital,
classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in calibrating the territorial
application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and
thus has a more informed understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the
Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of application, which is 60 days, unless
sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of coverage; it
merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof,"depending on the assessment of the
President.
Although the President is not required to impose martial law only within the Court's
compound because it is where the armed public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if
he sees fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from expanding the coverage of
martial law beyond the Court's compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within
predetermined bounds.
In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct
proportion to the "range"of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and
public safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies
precise measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could
only be drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered
these limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining
the territorial scope of martial law.
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
91. BAYAN MUNA V. ROMULO, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011
FACTS:Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent
the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions."4 The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered
grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes of aggression.5
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the
Rome Statute which, by its terms, is "subject to ratification, acceptance or approval"by the
signatory states.6 As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory
countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The
Philippines is not among the 92.
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral
agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter),
the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals
embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the
US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as
Page 7 of 52
"persons"of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.
ISSUE:WON, agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least
two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the senate. (YES)
RULING: Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an
international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation."
International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative
concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive agreements that are
similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are
usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long
as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Neither, on the
domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Authorities are,
however, agreed that one is distinct from another for accepted reasons apart from the
concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a
treaty has greater "dignity"than an executive agreement, because its constitutional
efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the
Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence
over any prior statutory enactment.
[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest
days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark
and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of
claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
92. SAGUISAG V. EXECTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
FACTS:The petitions before this Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America (U.S.). Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with
the U.S., claiming that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions. In reply,
respondents argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of
their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.
Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international
sphere inheres in the person of the President. This power, however, does not crystallize
into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As
previously mentioned, the Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international
agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.
Previously, treaties under the 1973 Constitution required ratification by a majority of the
Batasang Pambansa, except in instances wherein the President "may enter into international
treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require."20 This left a large
margin of discretion that the President could use to bypass the Legislature altogether. This
was a departure from the 1935 Constitution, which explicitly gave the President the power
to enter into treaties only with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.21 The 1987 Constitution returned the Senate's power and, with it, the legislative's
traditional role in foreign affairs.23
The responsibility of the President when it comes to treaties and international agreements
under the present Constitution is therefore shared with the Senate. This shared role,
petitioners claim, is bypassed by EDCA.
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within
certain "Agreed Locations"in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.85 Accordingly, in June
2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic
notes confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for the agreement to
enter into force in the two countries.86
According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EDCA was the result of intensive
and comprehensive negotiations in the course of almost two years.87 After eight rounds of
negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines
signed the agreement on 28 April 2014.88 President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6
June 2014.89 The OSG clarified during the oral arguments90 that the Philippine and the U.S.
governments had yet to agree formally on the specific sites of the Agreed Locations
mentioned in the agreement.
Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us assailing the constitutionality of
EDCA. They primarily argue that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by
the Senate, not an executive agreement.
On 10 November 2015, months after the oral arguments were concluded and the parties
ordered to file their respective memoranda, the Senators adopted Senate Resolution No. (SR)
105.91 The resolution expresses the "strong sense"92 of the Senators that for EDCA to
become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and
concurrence.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in entering
into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement. (NO)
RULING:The President, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
Page 8 of 52
SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State. (Emphases supplied)
In view of this provision, petitioners argue that EDCA must be in the form of a
"treaty"duly concurred in by the Senate. They stress that the Constitution is unambigous
in mandating the transmission to the Senate of all international agreements concluded
after the expiration of the MBA in 1991 - agreements that concern the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in the country. Accordingly, petitioners maintain that
the Executive Department is not given the choice to conclude agreements like EDCA in
the form of an executive agreement.
The Court ruled that; First, the concept of "executive agreement"is so well-entrenched in
this Court's pronouncements on the powers of the President. When the Court validated
the concept of "executive agreement,"it did so with full knowledge of the Senate's role in
concurring in treaties. It was aware of the problematique of distinguishing when an
international agreement needed Senate concurrence for validity, and when it did not; and
the Court continued to validate the existence of "executive agreements"even after the
1987 Constitution. This follows a long line of similar decisions upholding the power of
the President to enter into an executive agreement.
Second, the MDT has not been rendered obsolescent, considering that as late as 2009,174
this Court continued to recognize its validity.
Third, to this Court, a plain textual reading of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to
the conclusion that it applies only to a proposed agreement between our government and
a foreign government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign
government would be "allowed"or would "gain entry"Philippine territory.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts
are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and
Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
The VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the Philippines. Moreover, the Court
indicated that the Constitution continues to govern the conduct of foreign military troops
in the Philippines,185 readily implying the legality of their initial entry into the country.
Therefore, EDCA can be in the form of an executive agreement, since it merely
involves "adjustments in detail"in the implementation of the MDT and the VFA. It
points out that there are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that
have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Section 25. Because of the status of these
prior agreements, respondent emphasizes that EDCA need not be transmitted to
the Senate.
93. PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
FACTS:This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence
in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which "shall have the power
to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern
xxx and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions."1 Its jurisdiction
covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression as defined in the Statute.2 The Statute was opened for signature by all states in
Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December
28, 2000 through Charge dAffairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations.3 Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs — to transmit the signed text of the treaty
to the Senate of the Philippines for ratification.
ISSUE:WON, the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a
ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member
of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.
(NO)
RULING:In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative
with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold
recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties,
the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate."The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature
to the treaties entered into by the executive.
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and
exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for
registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the
validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Page 9 of 52
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns
this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with
credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start
of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of
the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the
subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the
issues involved, and may even "collapse"in case the parties are unable to come to an
agreement on the points under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened
for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument
and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does
not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is
required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each
of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to
his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of
ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to
give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their
interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and
consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated them.
xxx
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of
ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date
has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no
effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its
signature.16 [emphasis supplied]
Petitionerssubmission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international
law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify
the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the
provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the
representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state
expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is
signed by the states representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is
burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the
treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people.
Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the
Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the
head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be
pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify
a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to
ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial
grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be
justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions
seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore,
cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of
Rome Statute to the Senate.
94. MACALINTAL V. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, November
23, 2010
FACTS:Confronting us is an undesignated petition1 filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty.
Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an
illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for
the purpose,"he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal"complemented by
a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the
constitutional mandate.
Petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of
the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
ISSUE:WON, the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is
unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII. (NO)
RULING:"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The word "contest"in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be
invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no
"contest"before a winner is proclaimed.
Page 10 of 52
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral
tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution
to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications"of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a
litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise
jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in an election.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:
"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal x x x which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-
elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines."
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the
election of the President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the
votes case for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment
declaring that he is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may be, and
that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing,
further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice
and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court,"said legislation has conferred upon
such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred
upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of
the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the
functions of such ordinary courts of first instance, those of court of land registration,
those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations.
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the
same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope
than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the
power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the
imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court,
albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was
constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully
complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate
seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral
court.
95. IMBONG V. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that
strikes down constitutional disobedience.
The population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over
76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. The executive and the legislative,
thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its
objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information
on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools
to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain
acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the
current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE:WON, the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. (YES)
RULING: In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of
the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of
judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of
the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of
government.
The Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal
branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine
whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its
Page 11 of 52
unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in
the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may
be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be
subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The Court
may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches,
since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they
have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of
them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations
of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This
is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. "Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
Judicial reviewis essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Case or Controversy
An actual case or controversymeans an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
The pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not
merely a theoretical question or issue.
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of the act complained of.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy.
As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
Locus Standi
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The
rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.
#96 (LEGAL STANDING)
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT, E.G.,
TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, JOINED
IN AND REPRESENTED HEREIN BY HUMAN BEINGS GLORIA ESTENZO RAMOS AND
ROSE-LIZA EISMA-OSORIO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS LEGAL GUARDIANS OF THE LESSER
LIFE-FORMS AND AS RESPONSIBLE STEWARDS OF GOD'S CREATIONS, PETITIONERS,
VS. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), LEONARDO
R. SIBBALUCA, DENR REGIONAL DIRECTOR-REGION VII AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CHAIRPERSON OF THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE MANAGEMENT BOARD,
BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM I.
SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), AS REPRESENTED BY ITS PHILIPPINE
AGENT, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. RESPONDENTS.[G.R. No. 181527]CENTRAL
VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON
YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY AND AS
Page 12 of 52
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES
OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE
PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE
SIMILARLY AFFECTED, PETITIONERS, VS. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), JOSE L.
ATIENZA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DENR REGIONAL DIRECTOR-REGION VII AND AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE TAÑON
STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE MANAGEMENT BOARD, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU-REGION VII,
DOE REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION VIII[1] ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), AS REPRESENTED BY ITS
PHILIPPINE AGENT, SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527 | 2015-04-21
Before us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC -46), which allowed the exploration,
development, and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tanñ on Strait, a narrow
passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. 2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus, and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46
and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain
international and municipal laws.3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection
with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public
respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the
Tanñ on Strait Oil Exploration Project.4
FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the Resident Marine
Mammalsin the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tanñ on Strait. They are joined by
Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma- Osorio) as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as the Stewards) who allegedly
empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for
her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tanñ on
Strait, among others.5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
(FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the
welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial),
Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tanñ on Strait. The studies included surface
geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by
DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in
Tanñ on Strait.7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tanñ on Strait. 8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tanñ on Strait. A
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done(YES)
to
determine the areas underwater composition. 9
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project.
Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan,
where the Tanñ on Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, 10 JAPEX agreed to comply
with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1586, entitled Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes. 11
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board 12 of the Tanñ on Strait (PAMB
-Tanñ on Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, 13 wherein it adopted the Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the
approval of JAPEXs application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tanñ on Strait. 14 Months later, on November 16,
2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. 15 This drilling lasted until February 8,
2008.16
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for
redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others,
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike 17 its name as a respondent on the ground Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the
that it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the branch
office application of JAPEX,18 wherein the latters resident agent was clearly identified. SOS
claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and The gas issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in
exploration activities in the Philippines.
Page 13 of 52
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOSs motion on the ground
that it was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that
SOS admitted that it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEXsince it did the drilling and other
exploration activities in Tanñ on Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They
argued that it would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not yet been
joined in the case; and that it was convenientfor SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its
name from the parties when what it should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX
to join it in its motion to enable proper substitution. At this juncture, petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards also asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a
co-respondent or as a substitute for its parent company, JAPEX. 19
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
ISSUES: 1. WON Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 have legal standing to file the instant
Petition.
2. WON Petitioners were correct in impleading former President Arroyo as an unwilling
Plaintiff
(NO)
3. WON Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Constitution (YES)
RULING:
YES. The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, claimthat they have the legal
standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
this suit. 40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their right to sue for the faithful
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor
and for their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand
that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international
instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation
pour autrui.42
the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a
campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tanñ on Strait and as
stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its
duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine. 43
benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. 44
actions before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental
law.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found
useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a
personfor purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary,
spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first
enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet
unborn.53 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)

So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of
trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of
modern life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of
—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at
including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who may feel
river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those people who have that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
a meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a procedure.54
zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and
which are threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.) Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court
had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either and healthful ecology is concerned.56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as
to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a representative. it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. 57

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring
juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are
cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in
Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglass
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. 2. Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo by reason of her express declaration and undertaking
under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitionershabitat, among
others. She is meantime d[en]ominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, 51 which allow material time in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal
for a citizen suit,and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for complications that may hereafter arise by reason of her official relations with public
violations of our environmental laws: respondents under the alter ego principle in political law. 58

This is incorrect.

Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure Under
for the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be
Environmental Cases, commented: obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the
unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants her through its processes. The unwilling partys name cannot be simply included in a
enforcing environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due
liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the process.

Page 14 of 52
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-
Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner.
Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the
performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling
the President in suits, to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from
any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is
a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands undivided
attention.59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this
suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
3. This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the
1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words service contractsin the
1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we
quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII,
they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution,
albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial
law regime.
The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in
provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement
is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at
different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.69
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract
No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act
No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Page 15 of 52
#97 (LEGAL STANDING)
ANA THERESIA RISAHONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANIEL L. EDRALIN, VICTOR M.
GONZALES, SR., JOSE APOLLO R. ADO, RENE D. SORIANO, ALLIANCE OF
PROGRESSIVE LABOR, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, LAHING
PILIPINO MULTI-PURPOSE TRANSPORT SERVICE COOPERATIVE, PNCC SKYWAY
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION (PSCEU), AND PNCC TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
&SECURITY DEPARTMENT WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTMSDWO), PETITIONERS,
VS. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, SKYWAY O &M
CORPORATION, AND CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORP., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 181293 | 2015-02-23
FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 1112[1] in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government,
the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector.
On the same date, P.D. 1113 [2] was issued granting to the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or
PNCC) the right, privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities
in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May
1977.
TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement, [3] which prescribed the
operating conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113. P.D. 1113 was
amended by P.D. 1894,[4] which granted PNCC the right, privilege, and authority to
construct, maintain, and operate the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila
Expressways, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto. The term of 30 years
provided under P. D. 1113 starting from 1 May 1977 remained the same for the North
and the South Luzon Expressways, while the franchise granted for the Metro Manila
Expressway (MME) provided a term of 30 years commencing from the date of completion
of the project.
On 22 September 1993, PNCC entered into an agreement [5] with PT Citra Lamtoro Gung
Persada (CITRA), a limited liability company organized and established under the laws of
the Republic of Indonesia, whereby the latter committed to provide PNCC with a pre-
feasibility study on the proposed MME project. The agreement was supplemented [6] on
14 February 1994 with a related undertaking on the part of CITRA.

On 30 August 1995, PNCC and CITRA entered into a Business and Joint Venture
Agreement[10] and created the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CMMTC). CMMTC
was a joint venture corporation organized under Philippine laws to serve as a channel
through which CITRA shall participate in the construction and development of the project.
On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines – through the TRB – as Grantor,
CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement (STOA)[11] covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South
Metro Manila Skyway.
On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC
executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA).
[13]
The ASTOA incorporated the amendments, revisions, and modifications necessary to
cover the design and construction of Stage 2 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Also under
the ASTOA, Skyway O &M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations
and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway.
Pursuant to the authority granted to him under Executive Order No. (E.O.) 497 [14] dated 24
January 2006, Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Secretary
Leandro Mendoza approved the ASTOA through the challenged Memorandum dated 20 July
2007.[15]
Meanwhile, on 28 December 2007, petitioner PNCC Traffic Management and Security
Department Workers Organization (PTMSDWO) filed a Notice of Strike against PSC on the
ground of unfair labor practice, specifically union busting. [18] The Secretary of Labor and
Employment[19] assumed jurisdiction over the dispute in an Order dated 31 December 2007
and set the initial hearing of the case on 2 January 2008. [20]
On 3 January 2008, petitioners PTMSDWO and PNCC Skyway Corporation Employees Union
(PSCEU) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Paranñ aque City, Branch 258 (RTC), a
complaint against respondents TRB, PNCC, PSC, CMMTC, and SOMCO. The complaint was for
injunction and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order, and sought to prohibit the implementation of the ASTOA and
the MOA, as well as the assumption of the toll operations by SOMCO. [21] Petitioners PSCEU
and PTMSDWO also sought the subsequent nullification of the ASTOA and the MOA for being
contrary to law and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government. [22] They later filed
an Amended Complaint[23] dated 8 January 2008, additionally praying that PSC be allowed to
Page 16 of 52
continue the toll operations. With the exception of TRB, all defendants therein filed their
Opposition.
On 23 January 2008, the RTC issued an Order [24] denying the prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. According to the RTC,
petitioners were seeking to enjoin a national government infrastructure project. Under
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8975,[25] lower courts are prohibited from issuing a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction against the government – or any person or
entity acting under the governments direction – to restrain the execution,
implementation, or operation of any such contract or project.
THE PARTIESPOSITIONS
Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was exclusively vested by P.D.
1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its franchise through PSC in accordance
with the STOA. By agreeing to the arrangement whereby SOMCO would replace PSC in
the toll operations and management, PNCC seriously breached the terms and conditions
of its undertaking under the franchise and effectively abdicated its rights and privileges
in favor of SOMCO.
Furthermore, the TOC granted to SOMCO was highly irregular and contrary to law,
because 1) it did not indicate the conditions that shall be imposed on SOMCO as provided
under P.D. 1112;[41] 2) none of the requirements on public bidding, negotiations, or even
publication was complied with before the issuance of the TOC to SOMCO; 3) applying the
stricter grandfather rule,SOMCO does not qualify as a facility operator as defined under
R.A. 6957,[42] as amended by R.A. 7718; [43] and 4) there were no public notices and
hearings conducted wherein all legitimate issues and concerns about the transfer of the
toll operations would have been properly ventilated.
Petitioners also claim that the approval by the DOTC Secretary of the ASTOA could not
take the place of the presidential approval required under P.D. 1113 [44] and P.D.
1894[45] concerning the franchise granted to PNCC.
All respondents counter that petitioners do not have the requisite legal standing to file
the petition. According to respondents, petitioner Hontiveros-Baraquel filed the instant
petition as a legislator in her capacity as party-list representative of Akbayan. As such,
she was only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action when it
infringed on her prerogative as a legislator.[46] Presently, she has cited no such prerogative,
power, or privilege that is adversely affected by the assailed acts. [47]
While suing as citizens, the individual petitioners have not shown any personal or
substantial interest in the case indicating that they sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the implementation of the assailed acts. [48] The maintenance of the suit by
petitioners as taxpayers has no merit either because the assailed acts do not involve the
disbursement of public funds.[49] Finally, the bringing of the suit by petitioners as peoples
organizations does not automatically confer legal standing, especially since petitioner-
organizations do not even allege that they represent their members, [50] nor do they cite any
particular constitutional provision that has been violated or disregarded by the assailed acts.
[51]
In fact, the suit raises only issues of contract law, and none of the petitioners is a party or
is privy to the assailed agreements and issuances.[52]
ISSUE: WON Petitioners have legal standing to file the instant Petition. (NO)
RULING: Standing is a constitutional law concept allowing suits to be brought not
necessarily by parties personally injured by the operation of a law or official action, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters who sue in the public interest. [75] Determining the
standing of concerned citizens, taxpayers, or voters requires a partial consideration of the
substantive merit of the constitutional question, [76] or at least a preliminary estimate thereof.
[77]
In this case, petitioners raise the power of Congress to grant franchises as a constitutional
question. They allege that the execution of the ASTOA and the MOA, the approval of the
ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary and the issuance of the TOC infringed on the constitutional
power of Congress, which has the sole authority to grant franchises for the operation of
public utilities.
This Court has had a few occasions to rule that a franchise from Congress is not required
before each and every public utility may operate.[78] Unless there is a law that specifically
requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular agencies in the executive
branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the operation of certain classes of public
utilities.[79] In the instant case, there is no law that states that a legislative franchise is
necessary for the operation of toll facilities.
In PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board,[80] this Court enunciated:
Page 17 of 52
Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or
to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of
the practice by the courts. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived
indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power
to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a
legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant
by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as
though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. [81]
It is thus clear that Congress does not have the sole authority to grant franchises for the
operation of public utilities. Considering the foregoing, we find that the petition raises no
issue of constitutional import. More particularly, no legislative prerogative, power, or
privilege has been impaired. Hence, legislators have no standing to file the instant
petition, for they are only allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
when it infringes on their prerogatives as members of Congress.[82] Standing is accorded
to them only if there is an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or
impairs their rights and prerogatives as legislators. [83]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
#98 (JUDICIAL REVIEW)
G.R. No. 218406
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its
President Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ARCHBISHOP
RAMON C. ARGUELLES, ARCHBISHOP ROMULO T. DE LA CRUZ, ARCHBISHOP
FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, and NORBERTO B. GONZALES, Petitionersvs.PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT (GPH), represented by MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, and MIRIAM
CORONEL FERRER, MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, and
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 218761
G.R. No. 204355
G.R. No. 218407
G.R. No. 204354
Before the Court are consolidated petitions 1 challenging the constitutionality and validity of
the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the Framework Agreement on
the Bangsamoro (FAB) entered into between the Government of the Philippines and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 27 March 2014 and 12 October 2012, respectively.
In G.R. No. 218406, petitioners contend that the provisions of the CAB and the F AB violate
the Constitution and existing laws. They argue that the conduct of the peace process was
defective since the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel
negotiated only with the MILF and not with the other rebel groups. Hence, respondents
violated Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 2 in giving unwarranted advantages to
the MILF. Petitioners further argue that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
when they "committed to cause the amendment of the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the FAB and CAB x x x."3
In G.R. No. 218761, petitioners claim that the CAB and the FAB are unconstitutional since the
agreements seek to create a virtual sub-state known as the Bangsamoro Political Entity
(BPE) to replace the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and guarantee to
make amendments to the Constitution to shift from the present unitary state to a new
federal state which is beyond the GRP Peace Panel's power and authority to commit.
In G.R. No. 204355, petitioners argue that the GRP Peace Panel usurped the power of
Congress to enact, amend, or repeal laws since it bound Congress to agree to the provisions
of the F AB and abolish the ARMM. Petitioners add that the FAB provisions are replete with
ambiguities, violative of the provisions of the Constitution, and inconsistent with Republic
Act No. 9054.4
In G.R. No. 218407, petitioner argues that the CAB and the FAB violate the provisions of the
Constitution, as well as the consultation requirement under Executive Order (EO) No. 3 and
Memorandum of Instructions of the President. Petitioner further contends that respondents
exceeded their authority when they guaranteed the amendment of certain provisions of the
Constitution to conform to the CAB and the FAB.
In G.R. No. 204354, petitioner claims that the constitutionally infirm MOA-AD of 2008 and
the FAB are substantially the same since they are both aimed at creating a "fully independent
Islamic State"covering Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu. 5 Petitioner argues, among others, that
there were no consultations regarding the FAB. Petitioner further contends that the doctrine
of res judicata applies since the MOA-AD and the FAB are similar. Consequently, the decision
in the MOA-AD case is applicable.
Essentially, the petitions commonly seek to declare the CAB and the FAB unconstitutional for
being similar to the void MOA-AD, which was struck down by the Court for violating, among
others, the constitutional provisions on constitutional amendments.
FACTS: On 15 September 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued EO No. 125 6 creating the
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and calling for a "comprehensive,
Page 18 of 52
integrated and holistic peace process with Muslim rebels"in Mindanao. On 28 February
2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued. EO .No. 3 7 which amended EO No. 125
to reaffirm the government's commitment to achieve just and lasting peace in the
Philippines through a comprehensive peace process.
Pursuant to EO No. 3, the Government Peace Negotiating Panel (GPNP) held negotiations
with the MILF, an armed, revolutionary Muslim separatist group based in Mindanao
seeking separation of the Muslim people from the central government. The negotiations
eventually led to the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) on 27 July 2008. However, on 14 October 2008, in the case of Province of North
Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain,8 the Court declared the MOA-AD unconstitutional.
During the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III, the government resumed
peace negotiations with the MILF. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen 9 headed the GPNP and became
the government's chief peace negotiator with the MILF in July 2010.
On 10 September 2014, a draft of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, referred to as House Bill
(HB) No. 4994,20 was presented by President Aquino to the 16th Congress. On 27 May
2015, in Committee Report No. 747, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Basic Bangsamoro Law
of the House of Representatives substituted said bill and passed another version known
as House Bill No. 5811.21 In the Senate, a revised version of the Bangsamoro Basic Law,
known as the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region or Senate Bill No.
2894,22 was presented on 10 August 2015. However, on 6 June 2016, the 16 th Congress
adjourned23 without passing the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.
On 7 November 2016, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued EO No. 08 27 expanding the
membership and functions of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission. EO No. 08
expands the number of members of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission from 15 to
21. Section 3 of EO No. 120, as amended by EO No. 08, provides for the functions of
the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which include drafting proposals for a
Bangsamoro Basic Law, to be submitted to the Office of the President for
submission to Congress, and recommending to Congress or the people proposed
amendments to the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
ISSUE: The threshold issue in this case is whether the CAB, including the FAB, is
constitutional. (WON the constitutionality of CAB and FAB may now be subject for
judicial review)
RULING: We dismiss the petitions. (Not based on the constitutionality but rather on the
ground that Petition is not yet ripe for adjudication)
In the present case, however, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no
actual case or controversy requiring a full-blown resolution of the principal issue
presented by petitioners.
Unlike the unconstitutional MOA-AD, the CAB, including the FAB, mandates the
enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law in order for such peace agreements to be
implemented. In the MOA-AD case, there was nothing in the MOA-AD which required the
passage of any statute to implement the provisions of the MOA-AD, which in essence would
have resulted in dramatically dismembering the Philippines by placing the provinces and
areas covered by the MOA-AD under the control and jurisdiction of a Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity.38
In the present case, there is no such guarantee when the CAB and the FAB were signed. The
government gives no commitment, express or implied, that the Constitution will be amended
or that a law will be passed comprising all the provisions indicated in the CAB and the FAB.
Thus, contrary to the imagined fear of petitioners, the CAB and the FAB are not mere
reincarnations or disguises of the infirm MOA-AD.
The CAB and the FAB require the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law for their
implementation. It is a fundamental constitutional principle that Congress has full
discretion to enact the kind of Bangsamoro Basic Law that Congress, in its wisdom,
deems necessary and proper to promote peace and development in Muslim areas in
Mindanao. Congress is expected to seriously consider the CAB and the FAB but
Congress is not bound by the CAB and the FAB. Congress is separate, independent, and co-
equal of the Executive branch that alone entered into the CAB and the FAB. The Executive
branch cannot compel Congress to adopt the CAB and the FAB. Neither can Congress dictate
on Congress the contents of the Bangsamoro Basic Law, or the proposed amendments to the
Constitution that Congress should submit to the people for ratification.
The CAB and the FAB cannot be implemented without the passage of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law. The CAB and the FAB remain peace agreements whose provisions cannot be
enforced and given any legal effect unless the Bangsamoro Basic Law is duly passed by
Congress and subsequently ratified in accordance with the Constitution. The CAB and the
FAB are preparatory documents that can "trigger a series of acts" 40 that may lead to
the exercise by Congress of its power to enact an organic act for an autonomous region
under Section 18, Article X41 of the Constitution. The CAB and the FAB do not purport to
preempt this Congressional power.
During the Aquino administration, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission submitted its
proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law to former President Benigno S. Aquino III, who submitted
the same to the l6th Congress, which however failed to enact the same before its
adjournment. Thus, the bill proposing the Bangsamoro Basic Law has to be refiled with the
present Congress. With the signing of EO No. 08 by President Duterte, the expanded
Bangsamoro Transition Commission shall redraft the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law to be
submitted to the President who is expected to certify it to the present Congress as an urgent
bill. Congress, in turn, may or may not accept the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law as it is
worded. There is therefore no guarantee that Congress will enact the Bangsamoro Basic Law.
Congress has the sole discretion whether or not to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law, as
proposed by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission.
It is not the CAB or the FAB that will establish the Bangsamoro but the Bangsamoro
Basic Law enacted by Congress and ratified in a plebiscite in accordance with the
Constitution. Congress must still enact a Bangsamoro Basic Law. The requirement of a
Bangsamoro Basic Law under the CAB and the FAB ensures that the pitfalls under the
invalid MOA-AD will be avoided.
Page 19 of 52
Even if there were today an existing bill on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, it would still
not be subject to judicial review. 42 The Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC43 that
it has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional
because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a
proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised
in vacuo. As the Court in Montesclaros noted, invoking Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality
of a proposed bill. The power of judicial review comes into play only after the
passage of a bill, and not before. 44 Unless enacted into law, any proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law pending in Congress is not subject to judicial review.
Clearly, any question on the constitutionality of the CAB and the FAB, without the
implementing Bangsamoro Basic Law, is premature and not ripe for adjudication.
Until a Bangsamoro Basic Law is passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no
actual case or controversy that requires the Court to exercise its power of judicial
review over a co-equal branch of government.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitions on the ground of prematurity.
SO ORDERED.
# 99 (PROCEDURAL RULE MAKING OF SUPREME COURT)
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE (BAMARVEMPCO),
represented by RECTO INSO, Operations Manager, Petitioner, versus HON.
ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City,
Respondent
G.R. No. 165922 | 2010-02-26
For review[1] are the Orders[2] of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City finding petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative liable
for payment of foreclosure fees.
FACTS: Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (petitioner) is a
credit cooperative organized under Republic Act No. 6938 (RA 6938), or the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines.[3] Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives from the
payment of all court and sheriff's fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in
connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such action is brought by
the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.[4]
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as
amended.[5] Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended,[6] petitions for extrajudicial
foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee's claim.
Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the
fees.
In an Order dated 30 August 2004, Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent),
Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rule's coverage
only the "Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities"and certain
suits of local government units.[7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration but respondent denied its motion in the Order dated 6
October 2004.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner's application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees
under Article 62(6) of RA 6938. (NO)
RULING: We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner's foreclosure
proceeding.
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA
6938
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives
is limited to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2)
actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of
obligations contracted in favor of cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately
apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim
exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding because first, the fees
imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act 3135. Second, petitioner is
Page 20 of 52
not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to
enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among
others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court [under] Section 5(5), Article
VIII[18] x x x .
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. x x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Any lingering doubt on the import of the textual evolution of Section 5(5) should be put
to rest with our recent En Banc ruling denying a request by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) for exemption from payment of legal fees based on Section 39 of
its Charter, Republic Act No. 8291, exempting GSIS from "all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or dues of all kinds."[19] Reaffirming Echegaray's construction of Section 5(5),
the Court described its exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and
procedure as "one of the safeguards of this Court's institutional independence":
[T]he payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court's institutional independence,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court's
exclusive domain.[20] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Orders dated 30 August 2004 and
6 October 2004 of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
#100 (PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE)
RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
ACTING JARLOS-MARTIN, EMMANUEL M. LAUREZO AND ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 146376 | 2014-04-23
FACTS: OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 arose from OMB-0-99-1015, another administrative
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Junia, then Group Manager for the Project Technical Services Group of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), filed on May 25, 1999 a Complaint[3] before the Office of the Ombudsman
against several NHA officials, together with Agdeppa and Ricardo Castillo (Castillo), resident
auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA) at the NHA. Junias Complaint was docketed as
OMB-0-99-1015. Junia alleged that Supra Construction (SupraCon), the contractor for the
NHA project denominated as Phase IX, Packages 7 and 7-A in Tala, Caloocan City (NHA
Project), was overpaid in the total amount of P2,044,488.71. The overpayment was allegedly
facilitated through the dubious and confusing audit reports prepared by Agdeppa and
endorsed by Castillo, to the detriment, damage, and prejudice of the Government.
Junia also mentioned in his Complaint that Agdeppa had initiated several cases, arising from
the same NHA project, against Junia and other NHA officials. While the other cases had
already been dismissed for lack of merit, the Office of the Ombudsman endorsed OMB-0-94-
2543 to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No. 99-
1979.
Eventually, on June 14, 2000, Jarlos-Martin issued a Resolution[23] in OMB-0-99-1015,
concluding as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding probable cause to indict respondents RODOLFO
M. AGDEPPA and RICARDO B. CASTILLO for violation of section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act relative to the overpayment of the amount of P182,543.43
to SUPRA Construction, let, therefore, an information be filed against them in the proper
court.
The charge of overpayment to [SupraCon] of the amount of P1,861,945.28, representing the
additional escalation cost for the subject contract is hereby DISMISSED, for insufficiency of
evidence.
Pursuant to Jarlos-Martins foregoing Resolution, an Information[24] dated June 14, 2000
was filed before the Quezon City RTC-Branch 91, docketed as Crim. Case No. 01-100552,
charging Agdeppa and Castillo with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Quezon City RTC-Branch
91 issued a Warrant of Arrest[25] for Agdeppa and Castilllo on May 10, 2001.
Page 21 of 52
Meanwhile, as his Motion to Resolve in OMB-0-99-1015 was still unacted upon by April 7,
2000, Agdeppa filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against
Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia, docketed as OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. Agdeppa
accused Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia of violating Section 3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of
Republic Act No. 3019; and Rule II, Section 4(a), (b), and (g) of Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure)
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated July 31, 2000 dismissing
Agdeppas complaint in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 for the following reasons:
We find for [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia].
We shall explain the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 which are
clearly inapplicable to the instant case:
To warrant the indictment of [Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia] for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it is not enough that the act of [Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo]
in the discharge of their official function caused undue injury to [Agdeppa]. It
behooves [Agdeppa] to prove that the assailed act must have been done with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence (Alejandro
vs. People, 170 SCRA 400). Moreover, unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of
right has been established, its existence must be proven as one of the elements of
the crime, and that the injury be specified, quantified, and proven to the point of
moral certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or
upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork; mere inconvenience is not constitutive
of undue injury (Llorente vs. Sandiganbayan, 287 SCRA 382).
Mere neglect or refusal, after due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before the
office of [Jarlos-Martin and Laurezo] is not punishable under Section 3(f) of RA
3019. It is necessary that such neglect or refusal must be for any of the following
purposes: a) obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, b) favoring respondents
own interest, or c) giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any
other interested party. That respondent Jarlos-Martin will obtain pecuniary
benefit from her act or omission is an allegation that must be proven to the point of
moral certainty and cannot be presumed or based on surmises.
The dismissal of the instant complaint, is therefore, in order.[36]
Agdeppa filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 31, 2000 but said
Motion was denied for lack of merit by the Office of the Ombudsman in an Order dated
September 28, 2000.
ISSUE: WON the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470. (NO)

RULING: After an exhaustive review of the records, the Court finds no merit in the Petition at
bar.
RULING:
The Courts power of review in thepresent Petition is limited to OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-
0470 and the grounds/issues timely raised and discussed by the parties.
At the outset, the Court makes it clear that its review herein shall be strictly limited to OMB-
MIL-CRIM-00-0470. To recall, OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 involves Agdeppas complaint against
Jarlos-Martin, Laurezo, and Junia before the Office of the Ombudsman for corrupt practices
under Section 3(a), (e), (f), and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019, allegedly committed by the
latter three in the course of the preliminary investigation in OMB-0-99-1015..
The Court underscores that it cannot touch upon the merits of the other cases which,
although related and/or arising from the same set of facts, are proceeding independently
from and simultaneously with OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470.
The Court adheres to a policy of non-interference with theinvestigatory and
prosecutorial powers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In general, the Court follows a policy of non-interference with the exercise by the Office of
the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, in respect of the initiative and
independence inherent in the said Office, which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of
the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.[43] The Court expounded
on such policy in M.A. Jimenez Enterprises, Inc. v. Ombudsman,[44] thus:
It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause against those in public office
during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is vested with the sole power to investigate and prosecute, motu proprio or
upon the complaint of any person, any act or omission which appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. It has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its
attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. As explained in Esquivel v.
Ombudsman:
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the
rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of
his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate
otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts
will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if
Page 22 of 52
they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time
they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
Petitioner failed to clearly demonstrategrave abuse of discretion by the Office of
the Ombudsman that would havejustified the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the
Court.
It falls upon Agdeppa, as petitioner for the writ of certiorari, to discharge the burden of
proving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman, in
accordance with the definition and standards set by law and jurisprudence.
Grave abuse of discretionis well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily
be manipulated to suit ones purpose.[45] The Court gave the following comprehensive
definition of said term in Yu v. Reyes-Carpio[46]:
The term grave abuse of discretionhas a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal
can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.
Throughout his Petition, Agdeppa presents a grand conspiracy between the Office of the
Ombudsman and Junia, with the Office of the Ombudsman deliberately acting upon and
deciding OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 (as well as OMB-0-99-1015) contrary to Agdeppas
interest and favorable to Junias. Agdeppa sees every act or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman adverse to his interest tainted with capriciousness and arbitrariness.
However, other than his own allegations, suspicions, and surmises, Agdeppa did not
submit independent or corroborating evidence in support of the purported conspiracy.
The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.
When the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to
substantiate his allegations, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.[50]
Taking away Agdeppas conspiracy theory, the grounds for his Petition no longer have a
leg to stand on. As the succeeding discussion will show, the Resolution dated July 31,
2000 and Order dated September 28, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470 were rendered by
the Office of the Ombudsman in the valid exercise of its discretion.
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by the Office of the Ombudsman in the issuance of its Resolution dated July
31, 2000 and Order dated September 28, 2000 in OMB-MIL-CRIM-00-0470, the Court
cannot depart from the policy of non-interference.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
(NO DIRECT DISCUSSION ABOUT THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE)
FACTS: During the 11th Congress,Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalitiesinto cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other
municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted RA 9009, which took effect on 30 June
2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, "the mad rush"of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger
share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all
the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills.
The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July
2007 without the President's signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether
the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality
into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for
violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Page 23 of 52
Issues:Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
HELD: We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a
prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress.This law specifically
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices,xxx
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a
city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending
in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009.
Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,
exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11th Congress. This
Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint
Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their
respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common
provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income
requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March
to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA
9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress
passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus,
respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic
rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being
applied retroactively but prospectively.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a
city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent
of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow
the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code.
Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30
June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities,
even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
Page 24 of 52
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities
with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision
found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014
Araullo v. Aquino
(I FOCUSED ON THE DISCUSSION ABOUT OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE.)
FACTS:The Court declared several acts under DAP unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of operative fact is applicable.
HELD: Doctrine of operative fact was applicable
The doctrine of operativefact recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that
produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it
nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to
the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must
be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair
play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its
application.
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional
executive act. The term executive actis broad enough to include any and all acts of the
Executive, including those that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.The Court
discusses that the term executive actis broad enough to encompass decisions of
administrative bodiesand agencies under the executive department which are
subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court.
A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma as
Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and as Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel which was declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest
Center, Inc. v. Elma. In said case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of
Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as
Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act. Prior to the
declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were
made in good faith and in reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside
or invalidated by its subsequent invalidation.
In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that
despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians, certain operative
facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the
accused therein. Relevant thereto, in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, it was ruled that
military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as
Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives.
Even assuming that De Agbayani case initially applied the operative fact doctrine
only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations, said principle can
nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under
the executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied
liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In
keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts
and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is
quasi-legislative in naturebut also on decisions or ordersof the executive branch which were
later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be
recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, the Court
likewise declared that "for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a legislative or
executive measure,meaning a law or executive issuance."Thus, the Court opined there that
the OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO A MERE ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICEof the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz:
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the
Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the
Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect. This, in essence, is
the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the
Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith.Amere administrative
practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere
administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative
practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can
be availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government agency.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP
and its related issuances were executive acts.1avvphi1 The DAP itself, as a policy,
transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through the
DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars. The pooling of savings
Page 25 of 52
pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and
departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the
Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle – the
budget execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by
virtue of his primary responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the national
economy towards growth and development. This is simply because savings could and
should be determined only during the budget execution phase.
As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of
savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or
that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to
other departments of the Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare
the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior
implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as
well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair.
Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under
it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo everything that they had
implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously
burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond
debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that
enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count the positive results may be
impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily include roads,
bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the
doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such
worthy results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the
doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always the consequence of
every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only in situations where
the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and
injustice;but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional
law is totally ineffective should apply.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can
apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in
good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and
implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by
the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.
G.R. No. 192302 June 4, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, Petitioner,vs.RAFAEL A. MANALO, GRACE M. OLIVA, and FREIDA Z. RIVERA-
YAP, Respondents.

FACTS: Republic two civil forfeiture cases in the RTC of Manila. In the said civil forfeiture
cases, the Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits and government
securities maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants therein, which were
related to the unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public, in
violation of the Securities Regulation Code as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of
2001.
On September 25 and 27, 2006, herein respondents filed separate Motions for
Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Answer-in Intervention12 (separate motions for
intervention), in the civil forfeiture cases, respectively, alleging, inter alia, that they have a
valid interest in the bank accounts subject thereof.
RTC denied such motion for intervention.
Upon petition for certiorari in CA, CA ruled that Manila RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying respondentsseparate motions for intervention. It found that
respondents were able to establish their rights as assignees in the insolvency case filed by
Sps. Baladjay. As such, they have a valid interest in the bank accounts subject of the civil
forfeiture cases.
At this point, the Court duly notes that during the pendency of the instant petition,
the Manila RTC rendered a Decision which ordered the assets subject of the said cases
forfeited in favor of the government
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing order which denied respondentsseparate motions for intervention in
the civil forfeiture cases.
HELD: The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or
a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no
actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or
dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case which presents a moot
question can no longer be enforced.
In this case, the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decision, by virtue of which the
assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of the government, are supervening
events which have effectively rendered the essential issue in this case moot and academic,
that is, whether or not respondents should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to
intervene on the ground that they have a legal interest in the forfeited assets. As the
Page 26 of 52
proceedings in the civil forfeiture cases from which the issue of intervention is merely an
incident have already been duly concluded, no substantial relief can be granted to the
Republic by resolving the instant petition.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic.
G.R. No.166923 November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE MIGRANTS RIGHTS WATCH, INC., on its own behalf and on behalf of its
memberoverseas Filipino workers, JESUS REYES and RODOLFO
MACOROL, Petitioners,vs. OVERSEAS WELFARE WORKERS ADMINISTRATION and its
Board of Trustees composed of HON. PA TRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, VIRGILIO R. ANGELO,
MANUEL G. IMSON, The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, represented by Undersecretary JOSE
S. BRILLANTES, ROSALINDA BALDOZ, The Secretary of Budget and Management,
represented by Assistant Secretary EDUARDO P. OPIDA, MINA C. FIGUEROA, VICTORINO
F. BALAIS, CAROLINE R. ROGGE, GREGORIO S. OCA, CORAZON P. CARSOLA and VIRGINIA
J. PASALO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondent Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) issued Board
Resolution No. 0383 entitled the OWWA Omnibus Policies to provide guidelines on
matters concerning OWWA membership and its coverage, collection of contributions, and
availment of benefits.
Petitioner Philippine Migrants Rights Watch, Inc., filed a Complaint4 before the
RTC of Pasay City seeking to annul certain section of the Omnibus, for that the OWWA
was created by law to provide welfare services to all Filipino overseas contract workers,
without limiting the same to member-contributors only. However, because of the passage
of the Omnibus Policies, the OWWA benefits shall be available only to those overseas
contract workers who have paid their monetary contribution on a per contract basis.
RTC promulgated its Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.\
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved in this case
HELD: Yes, it is settled in law and jurisprudence that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve
the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, executive order, or administrative
regulation, as recognized in Section 2(a), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the foregoing provision, the jurisdiction of regular courts involving
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation cannot be denied. We have had
several occasions wherein We affirmed the power of the RTC to take cognizance of
actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules promulgated by administrative bodies for
the power of judicial review is vested by the Constitution not only in this Court but in all
Regional Trial Courts. It was, therefore, erroneous for the RTC to abruptly dismiss the
complaint filed by petitioners on the basis of lack of jurisdiction since said court clearly
had the power to take cognizance of the same. In so doing, the lower court failed to
ascertain factual issues necessary to determine whether the subject issuance is, indeed,
invalid and violative of the Constitution. Considering the settled rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts, a remand of this case to the RTC for the proper determination of the merits of
the complaint is just and proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.
G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010
DE CASTRO V. JBC
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration from the previous ruling of the Court, which
dismisses several petitions from the petitioner. Arguments of movants are discussed on the
ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not MR be granted
HELD: No.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and
accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela. The
contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply
means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same
Section 13. xxx:
jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of
competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly The those
spouseofand relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts
and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down.
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but
also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like
ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate
authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested
with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
Page 27 of 52
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification. The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like
the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But
ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and
rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a
precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant,
and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable
to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or
abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this
case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget
that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify
or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in
division.
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the
Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the
records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or
Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The
records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might
not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr.
withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any
further complication," such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13,
Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
Last:The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does
apply to appointments in the Judiciary.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
 Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court
in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.
The Judicial and Bar Council
106. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
Facts: A body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process was
conceived and called the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and its composition, term and
functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which also
indicates that the JBC shall be composed of seven (7) members.
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At
present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco I.
Chavez, (petitioner) questioned this practice in this petition.
The Supreme Court granted the petition.
Issues: Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of
the 1987 Constitution.(Yes)
HELD: As stated in the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. It reads:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congressas ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative and the other sectors
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
Page 28 of 52
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be
discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the
creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to
its composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Courtand a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice,
who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justiceand "a representative of Congress."
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter "a"preceding
"representative of Congress"is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had
in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had
it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit
in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
The word "Congress"used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether
the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the
composition of the JBC reflects the Commissions desire "to have in the Council a
representation for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex-officio members of
the Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of government while
the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-
officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the
JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members
having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental
branches to assign the same weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for one
branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches
in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and
principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
Hence, the term "Congress"must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.
To quote one former Secretary of Justice:
represented in the JBC must be corrected especially when considered vis-aà -vis
the avowed purpose for its creation, i.e., to insulate the appointments in the
Judiciary against political influence.By allowing both houses of Congress to have
a representative in the JBC and by giving each representative one (1) vote in the
Council, Congress, as compared to the other members of the JBC, is accorded
greater and unwarranted influence in the appointment of judges. 54 [Emphasis
supplied]
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole
vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law
of the land
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Judicial and Bar Council
107. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
FACTS: In 2014, incumbent Solicitor General Francis Jardelezawas nominated to replace
retiring Associate JusticeRoberto Abad. CJ Sereno manifested that she would be invoking
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 regarding a question on Jardelezas integrityover his handling
Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
of an international arbitration case for the government.
When Jardeleza appeared before the JBC, he was asked by CJ Sereno if he wanted to
defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would
defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically
demanded that CJ Sereno and AJ Carpio execute a sworn statement specifying their
objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine them in a public hearing.
Finally, he requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court En Banc would
meet the next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was
excused.
Later in the afternoon of the same day, and apparently denying Jardelezas request
for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote
for the nominees to be included in the short list. Thereafter, the JBC released the subject
short list of four (4) nomineeswhich included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes,
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and
Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes and which excluded Jardeleza.
Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
Page 29 of 52
seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court
Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice
Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the
position. Considering that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the
only conclusion is that a majority of the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for
the position of Associate Justice.
ISSUES:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUE COURSE TO
THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS. (Yes, under the Courts
Power of Supervision over the JBC) – main issue
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF
NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT. (Yes, despite of the application of the
unanimity rule)
HELD:
Procedural Issue:The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the
case.
A - The Courts Power of Supervision over the JBC - Yes
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the
JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. [Emphasis
supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of
supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their
own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see
to it that the rules are followed.
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the
overseeing of compliance with its rules.In this case, Jardelezas principal allegations in
his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
 B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus - No
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available.
"Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public
officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. There is no
question that the JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to
do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari - Yes
Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. Respondents assert that in the performance of
its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.Hence, the resort to such remedy to question its actions is
improper.
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in
the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule"on integrityin violation of
his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Councils own
rules. For said reason, the Court is of the position that it can exercise the expanded
judicial power of reviewvested upon it by the 1987 Constitution.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.
Substantial Issues – you may not read this portion
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicants integrity is
challenged
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every
case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for
nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of allthe Members of the
Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher
voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is
questioned.Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or
her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes "unanimous"instead of the "majority
vote". Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity"as an essential qualification for
appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is,
Page 30 of 52
the unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that
"integrity"as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is challenged. It
follows then that the "unanimity rule"only comes into operation when the moral
character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is
essentially unrelated to an applicants moral uprightness.
The records bear that the "unanimity rule"was initially invoked by Chief Justice
Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June 5, 2014, where she expressed her position
that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required to be a member of the Court. In the
same meeting, the Chief Justice shared with the other JBC members the details of
Jardelezas chosen manner of framing the governments position in a case and how this
could have been detrimental to the national interest.
The Court resolved that his adoption of a specific legal strategy in the
handling of a case does not bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his
moral character.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of,
interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has complete discretion on
whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him28 provided that he lives up tohis
duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts
to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law.
On the other hand, on the issues of Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair
and acts of insider-trading,the Court ruled that these issues fall within the purview
of "questions on integrity"under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.
The claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a
candid relation to his moral character. Jurisprudence is replete with cases where a
lawyers deliberate participation in extra-marital affairswas considered as a disgraceful
stain on ones ethical and moral principles. The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages
in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. On the
other hand, insider tradingis an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities
market. Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider trading, throw a
monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. Clearly, an allegation of
insider trading involves the propensity of a person to engage in fraudulent activities that
may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on
integrity"under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of
"questions on integrity."Hence, the "unanimity rule"may come into operation as
the subject provision is worded.
However, after careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the
determination that the application of the "unanimity rule"on integrity resulted in
Jardelezas deprivation of his right to due process.
 While Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within
the contemplation of a "question on integrity"and would have warranted the application of
the "unanimity rule,"he was not afforded due process in its application. Jardeleza was
deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally
informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to
prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have
been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that
Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the
President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate
Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Judicial and Bar Council
108. FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FACTS: The petitionerwas appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he appliedfor the
vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
The JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination informed the petitioner
that he was not includedin the list of candidates for the said stations. Upon seeking for
reconsideration, the petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer of its decision not
to include his name in the list of applicants due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening
the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who
have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been
a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to
take recourse to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level
courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional. (Yes)
HELD: As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public
interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the
Page 31 of 52
1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does
not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing
policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for
vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution
did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to
set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary,
subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for
every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given
this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to
ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-
year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court,
which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the
qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial
experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards
requiring that a member of the judiciary be of "proven competence."In determining
competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and
performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-
level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It
deems length of experience as a judge as indicative of conversance with the law and court
procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire
professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in place improved
procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work environment,
and gain extensive experience in the judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity,
probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for
their promotion, they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards."Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the soundness of their
judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character.
The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe on the equal
protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven
competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and constitutional.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
The Judicial and Bar Council
109. HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, et al. v. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III et al.
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts:On June 11, 1978, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) issued Presidential
Decree No. 1486, creating a special court called the Sandiganbayan, composed of a
Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judgesto be appointed by the President, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government owned
or controlled corporations.A few months later, on December 10, 1978, President Marcos also
issued Presidential Decree No. 1606,which elevated the rank of the members of the
Sandiganbayan from Judges to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the Court of
Appeals; and provided that the Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices
each.5 Republic Act No. 7975was approved into law on March 30, 1995 and it increased the
compositionof the Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justiceswho would sit in five
divisions of three memberseach. Republic Act No. 10660,recently enacted on April 16,
2015, created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices each, thereby
resulting in six vacant positions.
On July 20, 2015, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star
and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for
applications or recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of
the Sandiganbayan.8 After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to
President Aquino six shortlistscontained in six separate letters, all dated October 26, 2015.
President Aquino issued on January 20, 2015 the appointment papers for the six
new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo
P. Cruz; (3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega; (5) Justice Karl
B. Miranda; and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses.
According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution to
reduce the politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary.It is the function of the JBC to
search, screen, and select nominees recommended for appointment to the Judiciary. It shall
prepare a list with at least three qualified nominees for a particular vacancy in the Judiciary
to be submitted to the President, who, in turn, shall appoint from the shortlist for said
specific vacancy. Petitioners emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is
clear and unambiguous as to the mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the
President for "every vacancy"to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the President's
authority to appoint members of the Judiciary from among the nominees named in the
shortlist submitted by the JBC.
Page 32 of 52
In this case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees
each, for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16 th, 17th, 18th, 19th,
20th and 21st Associate Justices. Petitioners contend that only nominees for the position of
the 16th Sandiganbayan Associate Justice may be appointed as the 16 th Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for each of the vacancies for the
17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. However, on January 20,
2016, President Aquino issued the appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices.
The instant Petition fundamentally challenges President Aquino's appointment
of respondents Musngi and Econg as the 16th and 18th Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
Petitioners contend that only one of them should have been appointed as both of them
were included in one clusterof nominees for the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The Petition presents for resolution of the Court the issue of whether President Aquino
violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution and gravely abused his
discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the
clustering by the JBC of the nominees for each specific vacant position of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice.
Issue: Whether President Aquino, under the circumstances, was limited to appoint only
from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy. (No)
Held: The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. 47 It is a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities.48 The extent of the role of the JBC in recommending appointees vis-a-vis the
power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary was discussed during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on July 10, 1986.
It is apparent from the CONCOM deliberations that nomination by the JBC shall
be a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary, but this only means that the President
cannot appoint an individual who is not nominated by the JBC. It cannot be disputed
herein that respondents Musngi and Econg were indeed nominated by the JBC and,
hence, qualified to be appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to
restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose
someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still
paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC,
the appointment is valid.On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was
not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six
shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six
shortlists encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary
from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for
every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional
mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering impinges upon
the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of the
qualified nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is limited to the five
to seven nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster,
then he is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other
vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of
the President's appointing power.
In view of the foregoing, President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary
power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of
nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacanciesfor the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th,
20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely maintained the
well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional
prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified
nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of
the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least
three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy.To meet the minimum
requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should
at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted
for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are
valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition for
Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The Court DECLARES the
clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the
appointments of respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine
Faith A. Econg, together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan, as VALID.
The Judicial and Bar Council
110. HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO et al. v. HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III et al.
G.R. No. 224302, August 08, 2017 (MR)
FACTS: On November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc DECLARED the clustering of nominees
by the Judicial and Bar Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of
respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan,
as VALID.
The JBC disputes the ponente 's observation that clustering is a totally new practice
of the JBC. The JBC avers that even before Chief Justice Sereno's Chairmanship, the JBC has
generally followed the rule of one short list for every vacancy in all first and second level trial
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courts. The JBC has followed the "one list for every vacancy"ruleeven for appellate
courts since 2013. The JBC even recalls that it submitted on August 17, 2015 to then
President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Aquino) four separate short lists for four
vacancies in the Court of Appeals; and present during the JBC deliberations were
the ponente and Supreme Court Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Velasco) as
consultants, who neither made any comment on the preparation of the short lists.
On the merits of the Petition, the JBC maintains that it did not exceed its
authority and, in fact, it only faithfully complied with the literal language of Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution, when it prepared six short lists for the six vacancies in
the Sandiganbayan.
The JBC further contends that since each vacancy creates discrete and possibly
unique situations, there can be no general rule against clustering. Submitting separate,
independent short lists for each vacancy is the only way for the JBC to observe the
constitutional standards of (a) one list for every vacancy, and (b) choosing candidates of
competence, independence, probity, and integrity for every such vacancy.
The JBC ends its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention with a reiteration
of the need for the ponente to inhibit herself from the instant case as she appears to
harbor hostility possibly arising from the termination of her JBC consultancy.
Issue: Whether or not the clustering of nominees made by JBC unconstitutional. (Yes, in
this case only)
HELD: There is no cogent reason to reverse the Decision dated November 29, 2016,
particularly, in view of the admission of the JBC of the lack of unanimity among the JBC
memberson the issue involving the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and their disinterest to question the
"cross-reaching"or non-observance by President Aquino of such clustering.
The arguments of the JBC on the merits of the case fail to persuade the Court to
reconsider its Decision dated November 29, 2016. Noteworthy is the fact that the Court
unanimously voted that in this case of six simultaneousvacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the
nominees into six separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive
vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular
nominee.A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender
to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with
many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment.
The Court further points out that its Decision dated November 29, 2016 only
discussed vacancies in collegiate courts. The constant referral by the JBC to separate
short lists of nominees for vacant judgeship posts in first and second level trial courts as
proof of previous clustering is inapt. The separate short lists in such (previous)situations
are technically not clustering as the vacancies happened and were announced at different
times and candidates applied for specific vacancies, based on the inherent differences in the
location and jurisdiction of the trial courts, as well as the qualifications of nominees to the
same, hence, justifying a separate short listfor each vacant post. (unlike in this case,
simultaneous yung 6 vacancies for SB)
The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the
simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that
President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did not require
the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as the issue of clustering of the
nominees to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was concerned.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its motion/prayer for intervention,
which the Court has now granted, the Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the
Inhibition of the Ponente) and the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the
Decision dated 29 November 2016) of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of
merit.
Nota bene: The Court has agreed not to issue a ruling herein on the separate short lists of
nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte for the
present vacancies in the Supreme Court resulting from the compulsory retirements of
Associate Justices Jose P. Perez and Arturo D. Brion because these were not in issue nor
deliberated upon in this case, and in order not to preempt the decision the President may
take on the said separate short lists in the exercise of his power to appoint members of the
Judiciary under the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion
for the Inhibition of the Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-
in-Intervention (of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017. The Court,
in a Resolution dated February 21, 2017, denied both Motions.
Presently for resolution of the Court are the following Motions of the JBC: (a)
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 (MR-Resolution), filed
on March 17, 2017; and (b) Motion to Admit Attached Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 and the Supplement to Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 (Supplement-MR-Resolution)
filed on March 24, 2017.
The aforementioned MR-Resolution and Supplement-MR-Resolution lack merit
given the admission of the JBC itself in its previous pleadings of lack of consensusamong its
own members on the validity of the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, further bolstering the unanimous decision of the Court
against the validity of such clustering. The lack of consensus among JBC members on the
validity of the clustering also shows that the ponente's decision in this case did not arise from
Page 34 of 52
personal hostility - or any other personal consideration - but solely from her objective
evaluation of the adverse constitutional implications of the clustering of the nominees for
the vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The JBC contends in its MR-Resolution that since JBC consultants receive
monthly allowance from the JBC, then "[o]bviously, JBC consultants should always favor
or take [the] side [of] the JBC. Otherwise, there will be conflict of interest on their
part."While the ponente indeed received monthly allowance from the JBC for the period
she served as consultant, her objectivity would have been more questionable and more of
a ground for her inhibition if she had received the allowance and decided the instant case
in favor of the JBC.
It bears to stress that the Court also unanimously held in its Resolution dated
February 21,2017 that there is no factual or legal basis for the ponente to inhibit herself
from the present case. Worth reiterating below is the ponente's explanation in the
Resolution dated February 21, 2017 that there was no conflict of interest on her part in
rendering judgment in this case, and even in her voting in Jardeleza v. Sereno, considering
that she had absolutely no participation in the decisions made by the JBC that were
challenged before this Court in both cases:
As previously mentioned, it is the practice of the JBC to hold executive sessions
when taking up sensitive matters. The ponente and Associate Justice Velasco, incumbent
Justices of the Supreme Court and then JBC consultants, as well as other JBC consultants,
were excluded from such executive sessions. Consequently, the ponente and Associate
Justice Velasco were unable to participate in and were kept in the dark on JBC
proceedings/decisions, particularly, on matters involving the nomination of candidates
for vacancies in the appellate courts and the Supreme Court. The matter of the
nomination to the Supreme Court of now Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), which became the subject matter of Jardeleza v. Sereno, was taken
up by the JBC in such an executive session. This ponente also does not know when and
why the JBC deleted from JBC No. 2016-1, "The Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council,"what was Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009, the former JBC Rules, which gave due
weight and regard to the recommendees of the Supreme Court for vacancies in the Court.
The amendment of the JBC Rules could have been decided upon by the JBC when
the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco were already relieved by Chief Justice Sereno of
their duties as consultants of the JBC. The JBC could have similarly taken up and decided
upon the clustering of nominees for the six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice during one of its executive sessions prior to October 26, 2015.
Hence, even though the ponente and the other JBC consultants were admittedly
present during the meeting on October 26, 2015, the clustering of the nominees for the
six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was already fait
accompli. Questions as to why and how the JBC came to agree on the clustering of
nominees were no longer on the table for discussion during the said meeting. As the
minutes of the meeting on October 26, 2015 bear out, the JBC proceedings focused on the
voting of nominees. It is stressed that the crucial issue in the present case pertains to the
clustering of nominees and not the nomination and qualifications of any of the nominees.
This ponente only had the opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the
clustering of nominees for simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate
courts in her ponencia in the instant case. As a Member of the Supreme Court,
the ponente is duty-bound to render an opinion on a matter that has grave constitutional thereof provides that the date and sequence of the appointment of the Justices
implications. determine their seniority courtwide.On the other hand, Section 1, Rule II thereof
states that the Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the order of
Since all the basic issues raised in the case at bar had been thoroughly passed upon their appointments as officially transmitted to the Supreme Court.
by the Court in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 and Resolution dated February 21,
2017, the Court need not belabor them any further. The CA Committee on Rules opined that Section 1, Rule II should prevail over Section 1,
Rule I pursuant to the basic rule of statutory construction that gives premium to a
Considering the foregoing, the Court resolves to DENY for lack of merit the Motion specific provision over a general one. However, any conflict between or confusion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 and Supplement to Motion for engendered by the above-quoted provisions should be resolved in accordance with
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 of the Judicial and Bar Council. Republic Act No. 8246. Section of said law categorically states that the Associate
Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective appointments, or
  when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same date, according to the
order in which their appointments were issued by the President.
A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC September 28, 2010
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela disagreed with the interpretation of the CA Committee on
RE: Seniority Among the Four (4) Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Rules, insisting that she is the most senior among the four newly appointed CA Associate
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals Justices pursuant to Section 1, Rule 2 of the 2009 IRCA which provides that seniority of
the Associate Justices shall be determined "according to the order of their appointments
as transmitted to the Supreme Court."
PONENTE: C.J. CORONA
ISSUE: Whether or not the seniority of CA Associate Justices is based on the date of the
FACTS: On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the SC the
transmittal of the appointment to the SC.
appointments of CA Associate Justices Myra G. Fernandez, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., Ramon Paul
L. Hernando and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela. The respective appointment papers of the
Justices bore the following dates and bar code numbers: HELD: NO. An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the
authority, of designating or selecting an individual to discharge and perform the duties
and functions of an office or trust. Where the power of appointment is absolute and the
appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary and
Name of Associate Justice Date of Appointment Bar Code No. the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once. The
appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority
Justice Fernandez February 16, 2010 55466 has been complied with.

Justice Peralta, Jr. February 16, 2010 55467 In Valencia v. Peralta, the Court ruled that a written memorial that can render title to
public office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the
commission.For purposes of completion of the appointment process, the
Justice Hernando February 16, 2010 55468 appointment is complete when the commission is signed by the executive, and
sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to the
appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commissionis an act which is done after the
Justice Antonio-Valenzuela February 24, 2010 55465 appointment has already been completed. It is not required to complete the
appointmentbut only to facilitate the effectivity of the appointment by the appointees
receipt and acceptance thereof.
All four newly appointed CA Justices took their oath on March 10, 2010. After some initial
confusion, the four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has
order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice Hernando been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such
and Justice Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior). The ranking was based in a letter dated document) is the date of the appointment.Such date will determine the seniority of
March 25, 2010 submitted by the members of the CA Committee on Rules to CA Presiding the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP
Justice Reyes. 129, as amended by RA 8246.In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of
an appointee, the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only
According to the CA Committee on Rules, there appears to be a conflict between certain when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of
provisions of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. In particular, Section 1, Rule I issuance of the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of

Page 35 of 52
statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the
provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as
transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a particular law cannot override but must give
way to the law they seek to implement.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of CA Justice
Antonio-Valenzuela is hereby DENIED with finality. SO ORDERED.
UDK-15143 January 21, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF)
AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.
PONENTE: J. LEONEN
FACTS: In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farinñ as filed
House Bill No. 4690, which would require SC to remit its Judiciary Development Fund
collections to the national treasury. A week later, or on July 14, 2014, Iloilo Representative
Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 entitled "The Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund
(JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949."
Thereafter, Petitioner Rolly Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to
compel SC to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived
hostility of Congress. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after SC
promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) case on November 19, 2013 and
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) case on July 1, 2014. His complaint further
implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President (i.e. proposed bills
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and replacing it with the Judiciary Support Fund)
after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence.
ISSUE:Whether or notSC should grant the Mijarespetition and issue a writ of mandamus.
HELD:No. The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject
to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review
before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:
Page 36 of 52
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Petitioners failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal
of this petition.
The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review. There is no actual
case or controversy. Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that: The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
One of the requirements for the SC to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence
of an actual controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The controversy must be
justiciable — definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it
must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.
For the SC to rule on constitutional issues, there must first be a justiciable controversy.
Pleadings before this court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The SC cannot render an advisory
opinion. The power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction
of law. This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted
any and all acts that would remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that
defines the extent of our doctrines laying down exceptions to our rules on justiciability
are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a right, but the
impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed
exercise of judicial review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that
should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the constituents that they legitimately
represent.
The reason for that is courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
Petitioners allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills
abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its
powers granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed
bills because a bill is not a law.
Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve,
petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. The rule on legal
standing has been discussed in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo: Locus standi is defined as "a right
of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."In private suits, standing is governed
by the "real-parties-in interest"rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest."Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest"is "the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit."Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right"in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger,"or in the category of a
"citizen,"or taxpayer."In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication
of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen"or "taxpayer."
This Court adopted the "direct injury"test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that
the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."The
Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed
bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is laudable, it does not, by
itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a proposed
bill that may only affect the judiciary.
This court, however, has occasionally relaxed the rules on standing when the issues involved
are of "transcendental importance"to the public. The rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
Page 37 of 52
Transcendental importance is not defined in our jurisprudence, thus, in Francisco v.
House of Representatives: There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former SC Justice
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.
A mere invocation of transcendental importance in the pleading is not enough for this
court to set aside procedural rules. Whether an issue is of transcendental importance is a
matter determined by this court on a case-to-case basis. An allegation of transcendental
importance must be supported by the proper allegations. None of the determinants in
Francisco are present in this case. The events feared by petitioner are merely speculative
and conjectural.
In addition to the determinants in Francisco, it must also be shown that there is a clear or
imminent threat to fundamental rights.
FINAL NOTE (This part discusses about the fiscal autonomy granted by the
Constitution to the Judiciary): The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It is
true that courts have power to declare what law is given a set of facts, but it does not
have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not have the power of the purse. Except for a
constitutional provision that requires that the budget of the judiciary should not go
below the appropriation for the previous year, it is beholden to the Congress depending
on how low the budget is.Despite being the third co-equal branch of the government, the
judiciary enjoys less than 1% of the total budget for the national government.
The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from the national
government. The Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its
independence.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional
offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but
especially as regards the SC, of the independence and separation of powers upon which
the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary
Development Fund, used to augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted
for by this court on a quarterly basis. The financial reports are readily available at the SC
website. These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts
and guarantee credible compensation for their personnel. The reality is that halls of
justice exist because they rely on the generosity of local government units that provide
additional subsidy to our judges. If not, the budget for the construction, repair, and
rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department of Justice.
As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low
levels of budgetary outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and
the reliance on local government units and the Department of Justice.
Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a
co-equal department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments are
legal, not political. The Courts are best when they lay down all our premises in the finding of
facts, interpretation of the law, and understanding of precedents. They are not trained to
produce a political statement or a media release.
Because of the nature of courts, that it has to decide in favor of one party, the Court may not
have a political base. Certainly, the Court should not even consider building a political base.
All it has is an abiding faith that it should do what it could to ensure that the Rule of Law
prevails. It seems that it has no champions when it comes to ensuring the material basis for
fiscal autonomy or judicial independence.
For this reason, the SC appreciates petitioner's concern for the judiciary. It is often only
through the vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed
in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court.
But his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a
proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in Congress. There,
he may discover the representatives and senators who may have a similar enthusiastic
response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014 [Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government
funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam,"as the money
was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the
House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all
over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of
certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers"who
are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of
an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly
transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the
Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-
dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions
and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to
Page 38 of 52
the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as
the one receiving and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the NBI on August 29, 2013, part
of which reads: In the sixteen years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and
other special occasions. One of these personalities who would either visit our office or
join our events and affairs is Justice Gregory Ong. Before the warrant of arrest was issued
against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could take four to five years to clear. She
said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko
kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
The following day, Rappler published an article entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with
Anti-Graft Court Justice"showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada, one of the
main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and
respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs.
Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties
frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also
supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a
different context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary,
and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in
connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the
Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding
Justice.
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " wherein
she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have
visited their office or attended their events. In her testimony before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula confirmed her statement regarding
Justice Ong.
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised
questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision
rendered by the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which
convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles. Respondent explained that he
could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to
prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party.
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been
advising Mrs. Napoles, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother,
Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by
the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the
Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the
decision.
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu
proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the
judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were
alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with
Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs]
involved in the scam).
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to
submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the
affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's
Comment. Respondent categorically denied all the allegations against him.
The Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, it re-docketed and
assigned the case to retired SC Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report
and recommendation within a period of sixty days from notice hereof.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez submitted her report with the following recommendations: that
respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment
to any government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
ISSUE:Whether or not Justice Gregory S. Ong is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
and be dismissed from the service.
HELD:YES. Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice
formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:
Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was
pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in
her acquittal;
Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her
acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll)
checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of ₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for
his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and
Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and
Napoles.
Justice Ong thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery
during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and
socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to
disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited
Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any
social event hosted by her.
Page 39 of 52
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong
behavior; while ·"gross"has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." The Court agrees with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and
after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of
corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
The Court emphasizes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with
respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles'
trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and
personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case.
She revealed to them that she has a "connect"or "contact"in the Sandiganbayan who will
help "fix"the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely
observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in
contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy
categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not
disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they
even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan,"which reached Pl 00
million. Napoles' information about her association with respondent was confirmed
when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her
office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with
the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received. A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the
court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the
strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one charged
with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and
surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant
must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what
is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of
proof required should be more than substantial. Concededly, the evidence in this case is
insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both
Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in
exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged
bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, the
Court finds credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of
the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly
indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of
anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on
two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles.
That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body
did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by
the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy
Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel"controversy, made all
the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative
proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they
know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the
Judiciary.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was
grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing
with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the
appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
In Caneda v. Alaan, the Court held that: Judges are required not only to be impartial but also
to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but
even the mere appearance of impropriety. They must conduct themselves in such a manner
that they give no ground for reproach. Respondent's acts have been less than circumspect.
He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to
distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of
partiality and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that
"propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge."Section 2 further provides: as a subject of constant public scrutiny,
judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of
justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation,
respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently
denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that
Page 40 of 52
he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that
respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy
and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact"of Napoles in the
Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles.
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a
violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that
has no place in the Judiciary.
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a
serious charge may be penalized with dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part
of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱40,000.00.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and
IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or -controlled corporations. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2010-21-SC September 30, 2014
Re: ANONYMOUS LETTERCOMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT AND FOR
ENGAGING IN THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT USURIOUS RATES OF
INTEREST OF MS. DOLORES T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, AND MR.
FERNANDO M. MONTALVO, SC SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, CHECKS
DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE.
PONENTE: J. BERSAMIN
FACTS: A letter-complain addressed to the Complaints and Investigation Division (CID)
of the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) of the SC triggered this administrative
matter. The letter complaint, purportedly sent by an anonymous employee, assailed the
profitable money-lending with usurious interest scheme engaged in by respondents
Dolores T. Lopez, an SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, and Fernando M. Montalvo, an SC
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, both of the Checks Disbursement Division of the Courts
Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO). It stated that the respondents had been
involved in the money-lending activities targeting the low-salaried employees of the Court
like the drivers and employees of the janitorial services; that such money-lending had been
going on with the help of the personnel of the Checks Disbursement Division of FMBO by
enticing employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming benefits at a discounted rate; and that
around 300 ATM cards were surrendered by the borrowers to the respondents as collateral
for the individual borrowings.
In her memorandum dated September 30, 2010, Lopez neither denied nor admitted the
allegations against her. She dared the OAS instead to allow her to confront the complainant
head on and to openly address each issue, and, in turn, she would waive the filing of the
comment because the comment would be unnecessary due to anonymous complaints being
a dime a dozen. She insinuated that despite anonymous complaints of more serious nature
against employees, officials, and even the Justices of the Court having abounded, the OAS did
not pay attention to, and did not dignify such complaints by requiring the individuals
complained against to comment.
In his memorandum dated September 30. 2010, Montalvo dismissed the letter-complaint as
maliciously sent for the purpose of tarnishing his reputation and the reputation of his office.
He denied being engaged in the lending business in the Court. Like Lopez, he insinuated that
the OAS had not required any comments from other employees and officials of the Court
against whom more serious accusations had been raised.
During the clarificatory hearing, Lopez relented and revised her earlier statements by
clarifying that she was not denying all the allegations against her.
Specifically, Lopez denied the allegation that she had lent money to around 300 court
employees, and that she had held their ATM cards in her custody as collateral; but admitted
having lent money to only about 20 personnel of the janitorial agency and to some low-
ranking employees of the Court, like the utility workers and messengers for a period of two
years. She said that she would receive only ₱10.00 for every ₱100.00 borrowed that she did
not consider as interest. She insisted that she did not require her borrowers to pay her the
₱10.00 for every ₱100.00 borrowed because they voluntarily gave her the amount; and that
she did not engage in money lending because she did not offer to lend money to anyone. She,
however, acknowledged that she was the only person in the Checks Disbursement Division of
FMBO who had lent money, absolving Montalvo and the other members of the staff of that
office by saying that they had nothing to do with her transactions.
After completing its investigation, the CID received a second undated but still anonymous
letter-complaint, which alleged that Lopez had continued her lending activities at usurious
rates of interest despite the pendency of the first complaint.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the complaint filed should be dismissed due to its anonymity. – NO
2. Whether or not the complaint against Montalvo should be dismissed. – YES
Page 41 of 52
3. Whether or not the complaint against Lopez should be dismissed. – No
HELD: 1. No. An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating
as it does from a source unwilling to identify himself or herself. It is suspect for that
reason. But the mere anonymity of the source should not call for the outright dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of its being baseless or unfounded provided its allegations
can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by competent evidence, like public
records of indubitable integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered
by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the
matter involved is of public interest," or the declarations by the respondents themselves
in reaction to the allegations, where such declarations are, properly speaking, admissions
worthy of consideration for not being self-serving.
Here, therefore, the anonymous complaint has to be dealt with, and its veracity tested
with utmost care, for it points the finger of accusation at two employees of the Court for
engaging in money-lending activities at unconscionable rates of interest, with low-
ranking employees of the Court as their targets. That such a complaint, albeit
anonymous, has been made impacts on their reputations as individuals as well as on
their integrity as personnel of the Court itself. We cannot ignore the complaint, hoping
that it will be forgotten, but must inquire into it and decide it despite the anonymity of
the complainant. Any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice that violates the norms of public accountability and diminishes
or even just tends to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary cannot be
countenanced. It is for this reason that all anonymous but apparently valid complaints
are not quickly dismissed but are justly heard and fairly investigated and determined by
this Court.
The respondents are both responsible fiduciary officers in the FMBO, the office that is in
charge of all the financial transactions of the Court, including the preparation and
processing of vouchers to cover the payment of salaries, allowances, office supplies,
equipment and other sundry expenses, utilities, janitorial, and security services, and
maintenance and other operating expenses, and the issuance of corresponding checks
therefor. Indeed, the respondents discharge the delicate task of handling the payment of
employeessalaries and allowances.
2. Yes. The Court concurs with the findings of the OAS that the complaint against
Montalvo had no factual basis. His involvement in money lending was not shown to be
habitual, going on only as far as accommodating his friends during their personal
emergencies without imposing any interests. The statement in the letter-complaint to the
effect that both respondents have been in the forefront of syndicated lending activities
was not supported by any proof. It is notable that Montalvo firmly denied the allegations
against him, and that Lopez corroborated his denial.
3. No.The Court agrees with the observations and findings of the OAS about Lopez having
engaged in money-lending activities. Her various admissions entirely belied her
insistence that her activities did not constitute money lending. Her claim that the
amounts voluntarily given to her by the recipients had not been interests on the loans
extended to them was plainly insincere. The fact of her parting with her money in favor of
another upon the condition that the same amount would be paid back was exactly what
constituted a loan under the law. In a contract of loan, according to Article 1933 of the
Civil Code, "one of the parties delivers to another, either something not consumable so that
the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it, in which case the contract is
called a commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition that the
same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply
called a loan or mutuum."
Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re: Prohibition for All Officials and Employees of the Judiciary
to Work as Insurance Agents), dated October 4, 1988, has prohibited all officials and
employees of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or
profession, even outside their office hours. The prohibition has been at ensuring that full-
time officers and employees of the courts render full-time service, for only thereby could any
undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of court cases be
avoided. The nature of the work of court employees and officials demanded their highest
degree of efficiency and responsibility, but they would not ably meet the demand except by
devoting their undivided time to the government service. This explains why court employees
have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or moment of
such time to serving the public.
Although many "moonlighting"activities were themselves legal acts that would be permitted
or tolerated had the actors not been employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not
usually treated as a serious misconduct, can amount to a malfeasance in office by the very
nature of the position held. In the case of Lopez, her being the Chief of the Checks
Disbursement Division of the FMBO, a major office of the Court itself, surely put the integrity
of the Checks Disbursement Division and the entire FMBO under so much undeserved
suspicion. She ought to have refrained from engaging in money lending, particularly to the
employees of the Court. We do not need to stress that she was expected to be circumspect
about her acts and actuations, knowing that the impression of her having taken advantage of
her position and her having abused the confidence reposed in her office and functions as
such would thereby become unavoidable. There is no doubt about her onerous lending
activities greatly diminishing the reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the esteem
of the public.
Considering that the official and personal conduct and deportment of all the people who
work for the Judiciary mirrored the image of the Court itself, they should strive to comport
themselves with propriety and decorum at all times, and to be above suspicion of any
misdeed and misconduct. Only thereby would they earn and keep the publics respect for and
confidence in the Judiciary. Asa public servant, therefore, Lopez knew only too well that she
was expected at all times to exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity. No less that
the Constitution itself impresses this expectation in Section 1 of its Article XI, to wit:
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times, be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
Lopez was quite aware that the foregoing declarative language of the Constitution on the
nature of her public office and her responsibilities as a public officer was not mere rhetoric
expressing idealistic sentiments, but a definite working standard and a statement of
attainable goals that the actual deeds of the public officers and employees should match. She
plainly disregarded the Constitution.
Page 42 of 52
Misconduct in office refers to any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the
duties of his office that is willful in character. The term embraces acts that the office
holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face
of an affirmative duty to act. The Court has invariably imposed commensurate sanctions
upon court employees found and declared to be violating Administrative Circular No. 5.
The sanctions have depended on the gravity of the violations committed and on the
careful consideration of the personal records of the employees concerned, like their prior
administrative cases.
Based on the foregoing, Lopez committed simple misconduct, a less grave offense that is
punishable under Rule IV, Section 52 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service by suspension from one month and one day to six months for
the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Yet, although a first-time offender,
she could not be punished with the minimum of the imposable penalty because she
clearly abused her being a high-ranking officer in the FMBO in conducting her private
transactions within court premises during office hours, thereby putting the image of the
Judiciary in a bad light. Hence, her appropriate penalty is suspension from office for three
months without pay.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent DOLORES TAN LOPEZ, SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer of the Checks Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office,
GUILTY of violating Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988, and hereby
SUSPENDS her from office for a period of three (3) months without pay, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely;
2. DISMISSES the anonymous complaint against FERNANDO M. MONTALVO, SC
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, Checks Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management
and Budget Office, for lack of evidence; and,
3. ORDERS respondents FERNANDO M. MONTALVO and DOLORES TAN LOPEZ to
show cause in writing and under oath within ten (10) days from notice why they
should not be disciplined or otherwise sanctioned for their censurable statements
against the Court and its Members in directing their investigation upon an
anonymous complaint but ignoring the "far more serious accusations"against other
"employees, officials and justices even."
Let this decision be noted in the personal records of the respondents. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167916 August 26, 2008
SARAH P. AMPONG, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, CSC-Regional Office
No. 11, respondents.
FACTS: During the 1991 Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET), a certain
Evelyn Junio-Decir applied for and took the examination. She passed with a rating of
74.27%.
At the time of the PBET examinations, petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public
school teachers under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS). Later, on August 3, 1993, Ampong transferred to the RTC in Alabel, Sarangani
Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
On July 5, 1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn Decir went to the Civil Service
Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI, Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of
Eligibility. During the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed that the woman
did not resemble the picture of the examinee in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further
probing, it was confirmed that the person claiming the eligibility was different from the one
who took the examinations. It was petitioner Ampong who took and passed the
examinations under the name Evelyn Decir.
The CSRO conducted a preliminary investigation and determined the existence of a prima
facie case against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
On March 21, 1996, the CSC found petitioner Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty,
dismissing them from the service.
Petitioner Ampong moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of
jurisdiction. She argued that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary
lies with the Supreme Court. The CSC denied the motion for reconsideration. The CA denied
the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC can properly assume jurisdiction over administrative
proceedings against a judicial employee involving acts of dishonesty as a teacher, committed
prio to her appointment to the judiciary.
HELD: No. But the SC ruled against the petition on the ground of estoppel.
It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under
the Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch,
agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the
power to "control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations." This authority
grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with
the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judgesand court personnels
compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this Court
ruled that the Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted
to it by the Constitution. It violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the
Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts and their personnel; it undermines the
independence of the judiciary.
Page 43 of 52
In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that impersonating an examinee of
a civil service examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a
judicial employee under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC
filed the necessary charges before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a
procedure which this Court validated.
Compared to Sta. Ana, the present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service
Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed
the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission,
petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS
and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously
took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that, she
became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.
Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial
employee before the OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure in
the present case.
However, the SC is constrained to uphold the ruling of the CSC based on the principle
of estoppel. The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the
jurisdiction of the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an affirmative relief may not
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party may not be permitted to adopt a different theory
on appeal to impugn the courts jurisdiction. Petitioner was given ample opportunity to
present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She filed with it her
answer to the charges leveled against her. When the CSC found her guilty, she moved for a
reconsideration of the ruling. These circumstances all too clearly show that due process
was accorded to petitioner.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO
ORDERED.
#116
ESTIPONA VS LOBRIGO
FACTS: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality
of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, " which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision
on plea-bargaining.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The
Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding
license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his
possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance,
which when examined were found to be positive for (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of
guilty for violation of Section 12 of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of
his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession.
Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations
of said law violates:
The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and
The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure. (YES)
HELD: While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court..
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now SC’s exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence,
for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts
will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this
Court for it enhances its independence.
Page 44 of 52
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the
Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared
with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court.
Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and,
instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the
phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise
formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or
supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and
(b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase
with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby
leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional
participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was
that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent
powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x. 24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches
trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive
or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on
plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of
the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,”
and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and
the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues
of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining
neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by
trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers
to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not
any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion
should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or
after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The
only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in
the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on
record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance
of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Page 45 of 52
#117
RE: COMPLAINT OF PARREÑO
FACTS: Complainants Wenefredo Parreno and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca,
filed a protest in the DENR-NCR against the issuance of Transfer Certificates in favor of
Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal Village, Taguig.
The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest, but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by
the DENR. Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the President
(OP), which denied their appeal. With their motion for reconsideration having been
similarly denied, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for review 7
and it is such appeal from which this administrative complaint arose.
CA.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision on June 26, 2012 by the Special 16 th
Division of CA. However, the complainants lament that from the issuance of the
resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents, who
comprised the Special 16th Division of the CA, had not rendered the decision, which the
complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory period within which the
respondents should decide under 1987 Constitution.
An administrative complaint was brought against CA Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanñ ez and Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro- Javier for
their alleged undue delay in rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807.
In her comment, Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the Chairperson of the
CA 16th Division effective June 4, 2012 and she served as such until July 5, 2012 in
accordance with the successive reorganizations implemented in the CA. Citing the 2009
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA), Justice Librea-Leagogo denied
liability for incurring any undue delay because of her short stint as the Chairperson of the
16th Division, and considering further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed Justice
Ybanñ ez as the assigned ponente in his transfer to the Fourteenth (14th) Division and
eventually to the Thirteenth (13th) Division, the Division that ultimately promulgated the
awaited decision on February 28, 2014.
Justice Ybanñ ez admitted in his comment that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his
initial caseload following his transfer to Manila in December 2009. He stated that he had
conscientiously complied with the Zero Backlog Project (ZBP) initiated by Presiding
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to the older cases assigned to him;
that he had already assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but
the latter had meanwhile fallen seriously ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy
caseload, he had hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon being offered a
permanent position in another agency of the Government; that after disposing of the
older cases assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 on
February 28, 2014 before becoming aware of the administrative complaint; and that he
had not been remiss in his duty and responsibility to promptly administer justice by
virtue of his disposing a monthly average of 15 cases.
Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the
adoption and promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution submitting the case for
decision because only filled in the brief vacancy occasioned by the temporary absence of
Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then the regular Member of the 16th Division. She pointed
out, however, that she had nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice
Paredes; hence, she could not be administratively liable for any delay in deciding the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Justices are liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807. (NO)
HELD: The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case
within 12 months from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court
itself. Pursuant to 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the assigned
Justice and the Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged. Determining who
should be administratively accountable must consider the specific role each of the
respondents played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807. Under the
applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 108807 might devolve only on the Members of the 13th Division who actually
promulgated the decision.
Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in
rendering the judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in the case
because the reorganization of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the
Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15th Division terminating
her responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated
because her participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16th Division
in lieu of Justice Paredes. Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th Division,
and conformed to the procedure stated 2009 IRCA.
Justice Ybañez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him
when he was transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he was
administratively liable for the delay of eight months should depend on the relevant
circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse
a Judge from disposing his cases within the reglementary period, the Court has applied this
rule by considering the causes of the delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, the Court relieved the
respondent judge from liability because the delay had been caused by the sudden
deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the municipal
trial courts. In Lubaton v. Lazaro, the Court, in sparing the respondent from the sanctions
earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the judge, the motivation of the
complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload which involved
detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her cases and the resolution of pending
incidents and issuance of the proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed
that "it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard
respondent Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule.”
The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice
Ybañez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He
assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen
seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose.
The latter subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent
Page 46 of 52
basis. Thus, Justice Ybañez could promulgate the decision only on February 28,
2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative complaint against
Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybanñ ez and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
#118
PROSECUTOR ROMANA R. REYES VS JUDGE JULIA A. REYES
FACTS: Five administrative cases against Judge Julia A. Reyes (Judge Reyes), Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69 and one
administrative case which Judge Reyes filed against her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo
Migrinñ o were consolidated and referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, consultant of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for investigation, report and recommendation,
by this Court’s Resolutions of September 28, 2005 2 and December 12, 2007.
Earlier, the Court preventively suspended Judge Reyes "effective immediately and until
further orders.
Records show that Judge Reyes’ whereabouts have remained unknown. She was issued
an Authority to Travel to the United States for the period from November 16 to 30, 2004.
She appears to have left the country in December 2004 but there is no record showing
that she sought the Court’s permission therefor or filed any leave of absence for
December 2004.
From an August 17, 2005 Certification from the Bureau of Immigration, the only entry in
its database relative to the travel of Judge Reyes was her departure to an unknown
destination through Korean Air.
Due to her absence, the Court declared Judge Reyes as having waived her right to answer
or comment on the allegations against her and to adduce evidence.
By Consolidated Report of June 27, 2004, Retired Justice Romulo S. Quimbo evaluated the
first five administrative cases. Justice Quimbo thereupon recommended that Judge Reyes
be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Reyes shall be dismissed from service. (YES)
HELD:
Reproduced below are the salient parts of the decision of the Court:
1. Thus, the carelessness and lack of circumspection on respondent Judge’s part, to say
the least, in peremptorily ordering the arrest and detention of complainant, warrant the
imposition of a penalty on respondent Judge as a corrective measure, so that she and others
may be properly warned about carelessness in the application of the proper law and undue
severity in ordering the detention of complainant immediately and depriving him of the
opportunity to seek recourse from higher courts against the summary penalty of
imprisonment imposed by respondent Judge.
2. It is also well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all
courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the administration of
justice. Judges, however, are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation
of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindication. The salutary rule is that the
power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
Only occasionally should the court invoke the inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
3. Being a dispenser of justice, Judge Reyes, a lady judge at that, should have demonstrated
finesse in her choice of words. In this case, the words used by her was hardly the kind of
circumspect language expected of a magistrate. The use of vulgar and curt language does not
befit the person of a judge who is viewed by the public as a person of wisdom and scruples.
Remarks such as “Ano kaya kung mag-hearing ako ng hubo’t hubad tapos naka-robe lang,
pwede kaya?”; “Hayaan mo, Farah, pag natikman ko na siya, ipapasa ko sa iyo, ha ha ha!”; and
“Alam mo na ang dami intriga dito; nireport ba naman na nakatira ako dito, ano kaya
masama dun? Alam ko staff ko rin nagsumbong eh, PUTANG INA NILA, PUTANG INA TALAGA
NILA!” have no place in the judiciary. Those who don the judicial robe must observe judicial
decorum which requires magistrates to be at all times temperate in their language,
refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting to the language of
vilification.
4. Judge Reyes failed to heed this injunction, however. Her inability to control her emotions
her act of walking out of the courtroom during hearings, and her shouting invectives at her
staff and lawyers indicate her unfitness to sit on the bench. They betray her failure to
exercise judicial temperament at all times, and maintain composure and equanimity. Judge
Reyes’ questioned actions reflect her lack of patience, an essential part of dispensing justice;
and of courtesy, a mark of culture and good breeding. Her demonstrated belligerence and
lack of self-restraint and civility have no place in the government service.
5. Respecting Judge Reyes’ frequent nocturnal “gimmicks,” suffice it to state that her
presence in the above-mentioned places impairs the respect due her, which in turn
necessarily affects the image of the judiciary. A judge is a visible representation of the
judiciary and, more often than not, the public cannot separate the judge from the judiciary.
Moreover, her act of bringing some of her staff to her weekday “gimmicks,” that causes them
to be absent or late for work disrupts the speedy administration of service.
6. As for Judge Reyes’ act of borrowing money from her staff, the same constitutes conduct
unbecoming a judge. While there is nothing wrong per se with borrowing money, it must be
borne in mind that she exerted moral ascendancy over her staff, who may not have had the
means but may have been forced to find a way in order not to displease her.
Page 47 of 52
7. Judge Reyes’ comments like “Armie, ang hina mo naman sumingil sa ex-parte, buti pa si
Leah. Dapat pag tinanong ka kung magkano, sabihin mo at least P2,000.00” and “Sino pa
ba ibang pwedeng pagkakitaan dito? O ikaw Oswald, sheriff” smack of commercialism.
This is not expected of a judge, knowing that the aim of the judiciary is to deliver speedy
and inexpensive justice.
8. Respecting Judge Reyes’ failure to put into writing her judgment, she having merely
required the accused to read it from the computer screen in camera without the presence
of counsel, she violated the Constitution. She could have simply printed and signed the
decision. Offering to a party’s counsel a diskette containing the decision when such
counsel demands a written copy thereof is unheard of in the judiciary. A verbal judgment
is, in contemplation of law, in esse, ineffective. If Judge Reyes was not yet prepared to
promulgate the decision as it was not yet printed, she could have called the case later and
have it printed first. A party should not be left in the dark on what issues to raise before
the appellate court.
In fine, this Court finds Judge Reyes unfit to discharge her functions as judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Julia A. Reyes, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69,
Pasig City, is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations.
#119
CSC VS DBM
FACTS: The CSC via the petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002.
At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional
concept of fiscal autonomy.
CSC claims the amount of ₱215,270,000.00 that was appropriated for its Central
Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the
same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to ₱285,660,790.44. It
complains, however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office
during the fiscal year 2002 was only ₱279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased
balance of ₱5,807,392.30.
The balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its "no report, no
release" policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission
of the certain documents mentioned in National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines
on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds.
Petitioner contends that the application of the "no report, no release" policy upon
independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal
autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. On the merits, respondent, glossing over the issue raised by
petitioner on the constitutionality of enforcing the "no report, no release" policy,
denies having strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested with fiscal autonomy, it
claiming that it has applied by extension to these offices the Resolution of this Court in
A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC (Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy) issued
on June 3, 1993 and contending that it’s act of withholding the subject balance was valid
since it was due to revenue shortfall.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s act of withholding the subject balance of funds from
petitioner is unconstitutional. (YES)
Whether or not the Constitutional provision that Congress cannot issue budget
lower than that it issued the previous year for the Judiciary similarly applies to
Constitutional Commissions such as CSC. (NO)
HELD: The "no report, no release" policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal
autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides: Sec.
5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
In analogy, Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines "automatic" as "involuntary either
wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex
nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton." Further, the word
"automatically" is defined as "in an automatic manner: without thought or conscious
intention." Being "automatic," thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the "just
share" accruing to them from the national coffers. x x x"
By parity of construction, "automatic release" of approved annual appropriations to
petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion
is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively
prohibited the enforcement of a "no report, no release" policy against the Judiciary which
has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
Respecting respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a
shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally
unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall,
that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. If respondent’s
theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month that there is a
shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering
insignificant altogether, such mandate.
Page 48 of 52
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the
Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or reduction
of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place petitioner
and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others
which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the
distinction established by the Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not
similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.
The provision of the Year 2002 GAA, specifically applied to offices vested with fiscal
autonomy, stated:
Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for the
Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the Commission on Human Rights, the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit and the
Commission on Elections shall be automatically and regularly released.
Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally
allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity
with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the appropriations for entities vested
with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as
respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioner’s funds without
violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the
Year 2002 GAA.
This Court is not unaware that its June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a guiding
principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy that:
4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically
and regularly released subject to availability of funds.
This phrase "subject to availability of funds" does not, however, contradict the present
ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and
regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the
said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are
not sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal
autonomy. In such event, it would be practically impossible to fully release the
Judiciary’s appropriations or any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that
matter, without violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their
own appropriations. It is under that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional
mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion
of the total national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the total
revenue collections fall short of the requirements of such agencies. To illustrate, in
the Year 2002 GAA the budget for agencies vested with fiscal autonomy was 2.53% of the
total. In Year 2003 GAA, which was re-enacted in 2004, the budget for the same agencies was
2.27% of the total appropriations. And in the Year 2005, the budget for the same agencies
was only 2.28% of the total appropriations.
(2) Finally, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower
than that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected.
For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and,
after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional
Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the
amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states: Section
5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of
appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited
from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount
appropriated for them for the previous year.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing discussions, GRANTED.
Respondent’s act of withholding the subject funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
#120
G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012
FUNA VS THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR
** Sorry mahaba yung digest – tingin ko kasi super helpful sya sa pag-intindi ng rule about
appointment sa Constitutional Commissions – pero if masyado mahaba may summary
naman nung rule sa last part  ***
FACTS: On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-
Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N. Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit
(COA) for a term of seven (7) years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to
end on February 2, 2008.
Page 49 of 52
Meanwhile, on February 7, 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A.
Villar (Villar) as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting
February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of
Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008,
the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA
Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an
obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his
appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7) years which
is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to
February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to
that position.
Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenaventura) was appointed as COA
Commissioner to serve the unexpired term of Villar as Commissioner or up to February 2,
2011.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from
office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his
position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan
(Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the
main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
*** there are procedural issues regarding the locus standi of petitioners and the remedy
of certiorari which may not be important to include***
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of
commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio. Villar’s promotional appointment, so it is argued,
is void from the start, constituting as it did a reappointment enjoined by the Constitution,
since it actually needed another appointment to a different office and requiring another
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Central to the adjudication of the instant petition is the correct meaning to be given to
Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) of the Constitution on the ban against reappointment in relation
to the appointment issued to respondent Villar to the position of COA Chairman.
Without question, the parties have presented two (2) contrasting and conflicting
positions. Petitioner contends that Villar’s appointment is proscribed by the
constitutional ban on reappointment under the aforecited constitutional provision. On
the other hand, respondent Villar initially asserted that his appointment as COA
Chairman is valid up to February 2, 2015 pursuant to the same provision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and
after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner
member, is constitutional. (NO)
HELD: Let us dissect and examine closely the provision in question:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one
commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. x x x
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer
be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who
was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from
being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the
full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of
Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the
president from "dominating" the Commission by allowing him to appoint an
additional or two more commissioners.
The same purpose obtains in the second sentence of Sec. 1(2). The Constitutional
Convention barred reappointment to be extended to commissioner-members first appointed
under the 1987 Constitution to prevent the President from controlling the commission.
Thus, the first Chairman appointed under the 1987 Constitution who served the full term of
seven years can no longer be extended a reappointment. Neither can the Commissioners first
appointed for the terms of five years and three years be eligible for reappointment. This is
the plain meaning attached to the second sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D).
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2),
Article IX (D) that "the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor." In addition, such promotional appointment to
the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of
terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of
Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the
aforestated circumstances or conditions.
Far from prohibiting reappointment of any kind, including a situation where a commissioner
is upgraded to the position of chairman, the 1987 Constitution in fact unequivocally allows
promotional appointment, but subject to defined parameters. The ensuing exchanges during
Page 50 of 52
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission (CONCOM) on a draft proposal
of what would eventually be Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the present Constitution amply
support the thesis that a promotional appointment is allowed provided no one may
be in the COA for an aggregate threshold period of 7 years:
The phrase "upgrading of position" found in the underscored portion unmistakably
shows that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution, for all its caveat against
reappointment, does not per se preclude, in any and all cases, the promotional
appointment or upgrade of a commissioner to chairman, subject to this proviso:
the appointee’s tenure in office does not exceed 7 years in all. Indeed, such
appointment does not contextually come within the restricting phrase "without
reappointment" twice written in that section. Delegate Foz even cautioned, as a matter of
fact, that a sitting commissioner accepting a promotional appointment to fill up an
unexpired portion pertaining to the higher office does so at the risk of shortening his
original term.
Moreover, jurisprudence tells us that the word "reappointment" means a second
appointment to one and the same office. "[T]he occupant of an office obviously needs no
such second appointment unless, for some valid cause, such as the expiration of his term
or resignation, he had ceased to be the legal occupant thereof." The inevitable
implication of Justice Dizon’s cogent observation is that a promotion from commissioner
to chairman, albeit entailing a second appointment, involves a different office and, hence,
not, in the strict legal viewpoint, a reappointment To reiterate, the word "reappointment"
means a second appointment to one and the same office; and Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
1987 Constitution and similar provisions do not peremptorily prohibit the
promotional appointment of a commissioner to chairman, provided the new
appointee’s tenure in both capacities does not exceed seven (7) years in all. A
promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to that of Chairman is
constitutionally permissible and not barred by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX (D) of the Constitution.
The Court is unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7-year term––from
February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner
devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court.
To be sure, Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman partakes of a promotional
appointment which, under appropriate setting, would be outside the purview of the
constitutional reappointment ban in Sec 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution. Nonetheless,
such appointment, even for the term appearing in the underlying appointment paper,
ought still to be struck down as unconstitutional.
The promotional appointment as COA Chairman of Villar for a stated fixed term of less
than seven (7) years is void for violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional
prescription. There can be no denying that the vacancy in the position of COA
chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the
expiration of his 7-year term. Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created
ought to have been one for seven (7) years in line with the verbal legis approach of
interpreting the Constitution. It is to be understood, however, following Gaminde, that in
case of a belated appointment, the interval between the start of the term and the
actual appointment shall be counted against the 7-year term of the appointee.
Posing, however, as an insurmountable barrier to a full 7-year appointment for Villar
is the rule against one serving the commission for an aggregate term of more than
seven (7) years.
Where the Constitution or, for that matter, a statute, has fixed the term of office of a
public official, the appointing authority is without authority to specify in the
appointment a term shorter or longer than what the law provides. If the vacancy calls
for a full seven-year appointment, the President is without discretion to extend a
promotional appointment for more or for less than seven (7) years. There is no in
between. He or she cannot split terms. It is not within the power of the appointing authority
to override the positive provision of the Constitution which dictates that the term of office of
members of constitutional bodies shall be seven (7) years. A contrary reasoning "would
make the term of office to depend upon the pleasure or caprice of the [appointing authority]
and not upon the will [of the framers of the Constitution] of the legislature as expressed in
plain and undoubted language in the law."4
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7-year appointment,
as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate
rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A
shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the
corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the
Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of
commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner
like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be
appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration
of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not
valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7)
years under the constitutional ban.
On the other hand, a commissioner who resigned before serving his 7- year term can
be extended an appointment to the position of chairman for the unexpired period of
the term of the latter, provided the aggregate of the period he served as commissioner
and the period he will serve as chairman will not exceed seven (7) years. This
situation will only obtain when the chairman leaves the office by reason of death,
disability, resignation or impeachment. Let us consider, in the concrete, the situation of
then Chairman Carague and his successor, Villar. Carague was appointed COA Chairman
effective February 2, 2001 for a term of seven (7) years, or up to February 2, 2008. Villar was
appointed as Commissioner on February 2, 2004 with a 7-year term to end on February 2,
2011. If Carague for some reason vacated the chairmanship in 2007, then Villar can resign as
commissioner in the same year and later be appointed as chairman to serve only up to
February 2, 2008, the end of the unexpired portion of Carague’s term. In this hypothetical
scenario, Villar’s appointment to the position of chairman is valid and constitutional as the
aggregate periods of his two (2) appointments will only be five (5) years which neither
distorts the rotational scheme nor violates the rule that the sum total of said appointments
shall not exceed seven (7) years. Villar would, however, forfeit two (2) years of his original
seven (7)-year term as Commissioner, since, by accepting an upgraded appointment to
Carague’s position, he agreed to serve the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.
As illustrated earlier, following Mr. Foz’s line, if there is an upgrading of position from
commissioner to chairman, the appointee takes the risk of cutting short his original
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term, knowing pretty well before hand that he will serve only the unexpired
portion of the term of his predecessor, the outgoing COA chairman.
In the extreme hypothetical situation that Villar vacates the position of chairman for
causes other than the expiration of the original term of Carague, the President can only
appoint the successor of Villar for the unexpired portion of the Carague term in line with
Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution. Upon the expiration of the original 7-year term of
Carague, the President can appoint a new chairman for a term of seven (7) full years.
Lastly, Villar’s appointment as chairman ending February 2, 2011 which Justice Mendoza
considers as valid is likewise unconstitutional, as it will destroy the rationale and
policy behind the rotational system or the staggering of appointments and terms in
COA as prescribed in the Constitution. It disturbs in a way the staggered rotational
system of appointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution.
Consider: If Villar’s term as COA chairman up to February 2, 2011 is viewed as valid and
constitutional as espoused by my esteemed colleague, then two vacancies have
simultaneously occurred and two (2) COA members going out of office at once, opening
positions for two (2) appointables on that date as Commissioner San Buenaventura’s
term also expired on that day. This is precisely one of the mischiefs the staggering of
terms and the regular intervals appointments seek to address. Note that San
Buenaventura was specifically appointed to succeed Villar as commissioner,
meaning she merely occupied the position vacated by her predecessor whose term
as such commissioner expired on February 2, 2011. The result is what the framers of
the Constitution doubtless sought to avoid, a sitting President with a 6-year term of
office, like President Benigno C. Aquino III, appointing all or at least two (2) members of
the three-man Commission during his term. He appointed Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan as
Chairman for the term ending February 2, 2015 upon the relinquishment of the post by
respondent Villar, and Heidi Mendoza was appointed Commissioner for a 7-year term
ending February 2, 2018 to replace San Buenaventura. If Justice Mendoza’s version is
adopted, then situations like the one which obtains in the Commission will definitely be
replicated in gross breach of the Constitution and in clear contravention of the intent of
its framers. Presidents in the future can easily control the Commission depriving it of its
independence and impartiality.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be
for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of
the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability
or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this
will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment
to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission
under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term
of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that "reappointment"
found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner
to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a
movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the
Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or

acting capacity.

WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner

Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace
Guillermo N. Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

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