Art. 1062.
Serious studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to
Collation
 shall not take place among compulsory heirs
 if the donor should have so expressly provided,
or
 if the donee should repudiate the inheritance,
 unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious. (1036)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46903. July 23, 1987.]
BUHAY DE ROMA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de
Roma, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; DONATION; THE FACT OF ITS
IRREVOCABLE CHARACTER DOES NOT EXEMPT PROPERTY FROM
COLLATION. — We agree with the respondent court that there is
nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of
the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the
phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli"
merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
construed as an express prohibition against collation. The fact that a
donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; COLLATION; INTENTION TO EXEMPT PROPERTY
FROM COLLATION SHOULD BE EXPRESSED PLAINLY AND
UNEQUIVOCABLY. — Anything less than such express prohibition will
not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion
that there was an implied prohibition because the properties
donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedent’s estate
merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor
is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is
whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we
see none. The intention to exempt from collation should be
expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general
rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of
that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule, which is
categorical enough.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; MAXIMUM PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH TO DECIDE A CASE, MERELY DIRECTORY. — There is no need
to dwell long on the other error assigned by the petitioner regarding
the decision of the appealed case by the respondent court beyond
the 12-month period prescribed by Article X, Section 11 (1) of the
1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v. Cruz, the said
provision was merely directory and failure to decide on time would
not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their
decisions invalid. It is worth stressing that the aforementioned
provision has now been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the
1987 Constitution, which also impresses upon the courts of justice,
indeed with greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of
the cases that have been clogging their dockets these many years.
1|Page
meet that need.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de
Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971,
and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of
Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed
an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included. 1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut
land worth P10,297.50. 2 There is no dispute regarding their
valuation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these
lands are subject to collation. The private respondent vigorously
argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code.
Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation
to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the
donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition."cralaw virtua1aw library
"Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs
if the donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee
should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious."cralaw virtua1aw library
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court, *
which held that the decedent, when she made the donation in favor
of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation. Moreover, the donation did
not impair the legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be
accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free portion of
Candelaria’s estate. 3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent
court ** holding that the deed of donation contained no express
prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it
ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the
decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between
Buhay and Rosalinda. 4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as
follows:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
"IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal, pagtingin at
pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay
Arabella Castaneda, may karampatang gulang, mamamayang been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious studies and
Pilipino at naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod ng efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that need.
San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay kusangloob kong
ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs
ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng
lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay siya Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at kanya nang
maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa Endnotes:
kanyang pangalan, datapwa’t samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay
ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa
mga nasabing lupa;
1. Record on Appeal, pp. 14-23.
"IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang mga pag-
aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi
2. Ibid., pp. 69-73.
masisira ang legitima ng mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin,
sapagkat ang mga lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagi ng aking
* Judge Manuel T. Reyes.
kabuhayan na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na
kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion." 5
3. Rollo, pp. 16-25.
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the
** San Diego, J., ponente, and Busran and Jimenez, JJ.,
above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa
4. Ibid., pp. 31-35.
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely
described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
5. Id., pp. 15-16.
construed as an express prohibition against collation. 6 The fact that
a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
6. Tagalog Forms for Notaries Public, Rosendo Ignacio, 1967, 2nd.
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
Ed., pp. 21, 23, 26, 28, 31.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free
7. 121 SCRA 51; New Frontier Mines v. NLRC, 129 SCRA 502;
portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer,
Federation of Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41222,
and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of
Nov. 13, 1985.
the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the
precise language of the document, that he would have included
therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’s
intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under
the clear language of Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an
implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable
to the free portion of the decedent’s estate merits little
consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed
that the disputed donation is officious. The sole issue is whether or
not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly

and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in
Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we
apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.

There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the

petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the
respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by Article
X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held in Marcelino v.
Cruz, 7 the said provision was merely directory and failure to decide
on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction
or render their decisions invalid.

It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now

been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution,
which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with greater
urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases that have

2|Page
[ GR No. 193374, Jun 08, 2016 ]
HEIRS OF LATE GERRY* ECARMA v. CA +
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
We here have another case of heirs quarrelling over inherited
properties, some of them refusing their partition.
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the twin Resolutions[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 92375 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. The
appellate court dismissed outright the appeal of petitioners, heirs of
Gerry Ecarma for a number of procedural defects, including failure
to comply with Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court on the
contents of their appellants' brief. Petitioners sought to appeal the
two (2) Orders[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 220,
Quezon City in SP PROC. No. Q-90-6332 which approved the Project
of Partition proposed by respondent Renato Ecarma, administrator
in the intestate proceedings to settle the estate of decedent
Arminda vda. de Ecarma covering four (4) properties.
Because of the outright dismissal of their appeal before the CA, we
have a dearth of facts we had to glean from the bare pleadings of
petitioners.
The decedent Arminda was married to Natalio Ecarma who
predeceased her on 9 May 1970. During their marriage, they
acquired several properties and begat seven (7) children: (1)
Angelita; (2) Rodolfo; (3) respondent Renato; (4) Maria Arminda; (5)
Gerry Anthony Ecarma, husband and father respectively of herein
petitioners Avelina Suiza Ecarma, Dennis Ecarma, Gerry Lyn Ecarma
Pena, Antonio Ecarma and Natalia Ecarma Sangalang (collectively
petitioners and/or heirs of Gerry Ecarma); (6) Fe Shirley; and (7)
Rolando.
After Natalio's death, his heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate[4] covering four (4) properties designated as Kitanlad,
Cuyapo and Lala (consisting of two separate lots), half of which was
specifically noted as pertaining to herein decedent Arminda's share
in their property regime of conjugal partnership of gains. In the
same Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate signed by all the heirs, the
four (4) properties were partitioned among them: Arminda was
assigned an undivided two-ninth's (2/9's) proportion and all their
children in equal proportion of one-ninth (1/9) each. Significantly,
despite the partition agreement, no physical division of the
properties was effected, Natalio's heirs remaining in co-ownership
(pro indiviso) even at the time of their mother's, decedent
Arminda's, death on 17 April 1983.
On 18 May 1990, after his petition for the probate of Arminda's will
was dismissed by the RTC, Branch 86, Quezon City, respondent
3|Page
Renato filed the subject intestate proceedings before the RTC,
Branch 220.
On 30 January 1991, Renato was appointed Special Administrator by
the RTC, Branch 220.
After what appears to be continuing conflict between Gerry Ecarma
and the other heirs of Natalio and Arminda over actual division of
their inherited properties, by 9 March 2005, Renato unequivocally
moved to terminate their co-ownership: he filed a Project of
Partition of the Kitanlad Property, alleging that:
1. This probate case has been left unresolved for 16 years now
because of the incessant opposition by Oppositor and legal heir,
Jerry Ecarma, the only legal heir who stays in Kitanlad, for reasons
they had ventilated already in this Court in their previous pleadings,
xxx
2. This, Court has ordered the sale of the assets of the estate in an
earlier order, but efforts to sell the Kitanlad property, the most
contentious issue, by the Regular Administrator, [Renato Ecarma |,
has been thwarted by Jerry for reasons already known by this Court,
xxx
3. The law frowns on the indivision of property held in common
indefinitely. Furthermore, the legal heirs, except Jerry and perhaps
the Oppositor, have expressed their desire to have the Kitanlad
property partitioned. The fairest legal way to partition the property
without any legal heir getting a share bigger than the others is to sell
the property and divide the net proceeds, but Jerry's objection to its
sale at a price which will attract interested buyers has rendered
nugatory this option. The next best option, with no legal heir getting
an undue advantage over the others, is to divide the property
longitudinally from the frontage down to the other end in seven
equal parts. Although this option will render the improvements
unusable, it must be realised that these improvements are now fully
depreciated. The. duplex house is 57 years old, while the apartments
are now 40 years old. All seven parts will be equal to each other in
all their aspects: the measurements, length and width, will be the
same, each part will have a frontage to the street. Each legal heir will
have complete control over his/her portion. Me/she may keep it if
he/she wishes, or sell it if he/she desires. Allocation of these seven
parts will be by lot.[5]
On 7 April 2005, Renato filed another motion, Omnibus Motion:
Project of Partition of the Lala and Cuyapo Properties.
Finding the motions impressed with merit, the RTC, Branch 220, on
28 July 2005,[6] issued a lengthy Order approving the proposed
partition of the properties:
That the property be divided longitudinally from the frontage down
to the other end in seven (7) equal parts. The shares of Jerry Ecarma
and Rodolfo Ecarma shall be contiguous to each other on one side of
the property nearest the main entrance, while the shares of the
other five (5) legal heirs shall comprise the balance thereof.
Following this general guideline, Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma
The other oppositor to the partition, Rodolfo Ecarma, likewise filed a
shall determine among themselves their respective share. Similarly,
Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 July 2005 Order of Partition on
the five (5) remaining legal heirs shall determine among themselves
the main ground, akin to the 3rd ground raised by Gerry in his
by draw of lot their respective shares. They shall submit to the
motion, that the RTC, Branch 220 acted without or in excess of
Petitioner/Regular Administrator their choice of their specific shares
jurisdiction by ordering the partition of the subject properties,
not later [than] fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this Order. Should
portions of which do not belong to the intestate estate of Arminda.
they fail to comply, the Regular Administrator is hereby directed to
assign the respective share of each legal heir.
After Renato filed his Comment/Opposition to the two motions for
reconsideration, the RTC, Branch 220, finding no cogent reason to
xxxx
reverse or modify its prior order of partition, issued an Order
denying Gerry's and Renato's motions.
II. Cuyapo Property
Thereafter, Gerry filed both a Notice of Appeal and a Record on
Appeal before the RTC, Branch 220 to bring up on appeal to the CA
The Cuyapo farm lot shall be partitioned into seven (7) equal parts
the trial court's partition order.
substantially in accordance with Annex "A" of the "Partial Project of
Partition of Estate" dated 22 June 1992. Lots 1 and 2 will be
allocated to Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma, so that the remaining
It appears that sometime before 4 May 2009, counsel of Gerry
balance will remain contiguous to one another. The remaining
Ecarma filed a Notice of Death of Gerry Ecarma before the appellate
balance, as prayed for, can now be donated by the five (5) other
court and was subsequently required by the latter to submit a
legal heirs to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This manner
certified true copy of Gerry Ecarma's death certificate within a
of partition will effectuate the desire of the five (5) remaining legal
prescribed period.[8]
heirs to donate their share to the AFP.

Meanwhile, herein petitioners, presumably in substitution of the

The Regular Administrator is hereby directed to cause the partition
deceased Gerry Ecarma, filed their Appellants' Brief pursuant to the
and titling of the property.
order of the appellate court. From this incident of herein petitioners'
Appellants' Brief before the CA, and its contents, the controversy
has reached us.
Expenses for the partition and titling of the property shall be for the
personal account of each legal heir, which shall be deducted from
their share of the estate.
Renato forthwith filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellants' Brief, to
which the CA required a comment from petitioner.[9]
III. Lala Property
The Resolutions of the CA finding insufficient herein petitioners'
Appellants' Brief are now before us. The CA ruled that:
The Lala Property consisting of two (2) farm lots contiguous to each
other, one consisting of more than six (6) hectares and the other
more than 13 hectares shall each be partitioned into seven (7) equal
The Court xxx finds [petitioners'] submission [that their brief
parts substantially in accordance with Annex "B" of the aforecited
substantially complied with the requirements under Section 13, Rule
"Partial Project of Partition of Estate" dated 22 June 1992, as
44 of the Rules of Court] to be utterly devoid of merit. Indeed,
submitted by the Regular Administrator. Lots 6 and 7 of the six-
[petitioners'] brief does not contain a subject index, table of cases
hectare lot will while Lots 1 and 2 of the 13-hectare lot will be
and authorities, statement of case, statement of facts and page
likewise allocated to Jerry Ecarma and each other. The remaining
references to the record in violation of Section 13, Rule 44 of the
balance can now be donated by the five (5) other legal heirs to the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure xxx.
AFP. This manner of partition will effectuate the desire of the five (5)
remaining legal heirs to donate their shares to the AFP.[7]
xxxx
Gerry Ecarma filed a motion for reconsideration on the following
grounds: (1) the project of partition of the Kitanlad properties is not Non-compliance with these requirements warrants the dismissal of
feasible, impractical and detrimental to the interests of the heirs of appeal under Section 1(1), Rule 50.
the Spouses Natalio and Arminda Ecarma; (2) the planned partition
is not in accordance with the wishes of the decedents, the spouses
Natalio and Arminda; and (3) the RTC, Branch 220, as the court xxxx
settling the intestate estate of Arminda, has no jurisdiction over part
of.the subject properties which do not form part of Arminda's
estate, such undivided share already pertaining to the other heirs as [Petitioners] could have easily cured these multiple defects in the
part of their inheritance from their deceased father, Natalio. same manner their counsel did with his MCLE compliance and SPA.

4|Page
But, they opted not to. Instead, they stubbornly insist, albeit
erroneously, that their appellants' brief substantially complied with
the requirements. They failed, however, to point out with specificity
what part or parts of their brief contain their so-called substantial
compliance. Surely, the Court cannot countenance [petitioners']
careless attitude, if not irreverent disregard, of the procedural rules
intended precisely to ensure orderly administration of justice.
xxxx
Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.[10]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of their
appeal, attaching a Supplemental Appellants' Brief[11] to their
motion. However, the appellate court again deemed the
Supplemental Appellants' Brief to be unsatisfactory and non-
compliant with the rules and denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration:
Notably, the new appeal brief, just like the original one, does not
contain reference to the relevant portions of the record pertaining
to its statement of facts. Further, the subject index does not contain
a summary of arguments and reference to the specific pages of the
brief, and the supporting laws and authorities.[12]
From that denial, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court almost sixty (60) days from the time
they received the appellate court's denial of their motion for
reconsideration.
At the outset, we see through petitioners' obvious ploy to avoid the
necessary consequence of their failure to file, within the required
fifteen-day period, the correct remedy of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45[13] of the Rules of Court, from the assailed ruling of the CA.
On this score alone, the present petition should have been
dismissed outright.
Petitioners simple allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the CA's
dismissal of their appeal cannot substitute for the correct remedy of
a lost appeal.[14]
Notably, as they have stubbornly done so in the appellate court,
petitioners urge us to reverse these adverse rulings of the appellate
court without abiding by the rules therefor.
First. An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. A
special civil action for certiorari may be availed of only if the lower
tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. 5 Simply imputing in a petition that
the ruling sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave abuse of
5|Page
discretion does not magically transform a petition into a special civil
action for certiorari.
The appellate court's outright dismissal of therein appellants' appeal
was a final order which left it with nothing more to do to resolve the
case.[16] That disposition is a final and executory order, appealable
to, and may be questioned before, this Court by persons aggrieved
thereby, such as herein petitioners, via Rule 45.
Moreover, the dismissal of therein appellants', herein petitioners',
appeal before the CA is expressly allowed by Section 1(f),[17] Rule
50 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court, therefore, cannot be
charged with grave abuse of discretion as there is no showing that,
in the exercise of its judgment, it acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Absent grave abuse of discretion, petitioners should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The soundness of the ruling dismissing
petitioners' appeal before the appellate court is a matter of
judgment with respect to which the remedy of the party aggrieved is
a Rule 45 petition. An error of judgment committed by a court in the
exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse
of discretion. Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while
those of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari.[18]
Even if we were to take a liberal stance and consider this present
petition as that filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
grave error in the appellate courts' ruling, such cannot cure the
unavoidable consequence of dismissal for failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary fifteen-day period provided under Section
2[19] of Rule 45.
Second. The CA correctly dismissed herein petitioners' Appellants'
Brief for failure to comply with the content requirement specified
under Section 13[20] of Rule 44.
Petitioners are adamant, however, that they complied with the
required content specified in the rules even attaching a sample copy
of an Appellant's Brief found in Guevarra's Legal Forms which was
purportedly their guideline in revising and submitting their
Supplemental Appellants' Brief to the appellate court.[21]
We assiduously went through the Supplemental Appellants' Brief of
herein petitioners and as the CA have, we likewise find it wanting, a
lame attempt at compliance through superficial changes, devoid of
substance.[22]
In fact, the Supplemental Appellants' Brief could only cite Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court as its sole legal authority in questioning
the RTC, Branch 220's Order of Partition.[23] Petitioners, even in
their present petition before us, are unable to grasp the necessity of
supporting and anchoring their arguments with legal basis. They
cannot simply cite one section of one rule without expounding
thereon.
In the recent case of Lui Enterprises, Inc., v. Zuellig Pharma
Corporation, et al. ,[24] we reiterated the faithful adherence to the
rules on the specific contents of an Appellant's Brief as provided in
Section 14, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court:
Lui Enterprises did not comply with the
rules on the contents of the appellant's brief
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court of Appeals may, on its own motion or that of
the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellant's brief lack
specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c),
(d), and (f):
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of
the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief,
or of page references to the record as required in Section 13,
paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44[.]
These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief,
page references to the record, and a table of cases alphabetically
arranged and with textbooks and statutes cited:
Section 13. Contents of the appellant's brief. - The appellant's brief
shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the
arguments and page references, and a table of cases alphabetically
arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages
where they are cited;
xxxx
(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise
statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the
proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the
nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise
statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties
and of those in controversy, together with the substance of the
proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly
intelligible, with page references to the record;
xxxx
(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on
each assignment of error with page references' to the record. The
authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report at
which the case begins and the page of the report on which the
citation is found;
xxxx
6|Page
Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page
references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes
cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises' appeal.
Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a "purely
statutory right."The right to appeal "must be exercised in. the
manner prescribed by law" and requires strict compliance with the
Rules of Court on appeals. Otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed,
and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law.
In Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc., this court
sustained the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Mendoza's appeal.
Mendoza's appellant's brief lacked a subject index, assignment of
errors, and page references to the record. In De Liano v. Court of
Appeal, this court also sustained the dismissal of De Liano's appeal.
De Liano's appellant's brief lacked a subject index, a table of cases
and authorities, and page references to the record.
There are exceptions to this rule. In Philippine Coconut Authority v.
Corona International, Inc., the Philippine Coconut Authority's
appellant's brief lacked a clear and "concise statement of the nature
of the action, a summary of the proceedings, the nature of the
judgment, and page references to the record. However, this court
found that the Philippine Coconut Authority substantially complied
with the Rules. Its appellant's brief apprise[d] [the Court of Appeals]
of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the issues
raised and the laws necessary [to dispose of the case]." This court
"[deviated] from a rigid enforcement of the rules" and ordered the
Court of Appeals to resolve the Philippine Coconut Authority's
appeal.
In Go v. Chaves, Go's 17-page appellant's brief lacked a subject
index. However, Go subsequently filed a subject index. This court
excused Go's procedural lapse since the appellant's brief
"[consisted] only of 17 pages which [the Court of Appeals] may
easily peruse to apprise it of [the case] and of the relief sought." This
court ordered the Court of Appeals to resolve Go's appeal "in the
interest of justice."
In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially
complied with the rules on the contents of the appellant's brief.
Thus, this court excused the appellants' procedural lapses.
In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the
rules on the contents of the appellant's brief. It admitted that its
appellant's brief lacked the required subject index, page references
to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited.
However, it did not even correct its admitted "technical omissions"
by filing an amended appellant's brief with the required contents.
Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises' appeal.
Rules on appeal "are designed for the proper and prompt
disposition.of cases before the Court of Appeals." With respect to
the appellant's brief, its required contents are designed "to minimize
the [Court of Appeals'] labor in [examining] the record upon which
the appeal is heard and determined."
The subject index serves as the briefs table of contents. Instead of
"[thumbing] through the [appellant's brief]" every time the Court of
Appeals Justice encounters an argument or citation, the Justice
deciding the case only has to refer to the subject index for the
argument or citation he or she needs. This saves the Court of
Appeals time in reviewing the appealed case. Efficiency allows the
justices of the appellate court to substantially attend to this case as
well as other cases.
Page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the
appellant's brief are supported by the record. A statement of fact
without a page reference to the record creates the presumption that
it is unsupported by the record and, thus, "may be stricken or
disregarded altogether."
As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is
required so that the Court of Appeals can easily verify the
authorities cited "for accuracy and aptness."
Lui Enterprises' appellant's brief lacked a subject index, page
references to the record, and a table of cases, textbooks, and
statutes cited. These requirements "were designed to assist the
appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to
enhance the orderly administration of justice." This court will not
disregard rules on appeal "in the guise of liberal construction." For
this court to liberally construe the Rules, the party must
substantially comply with the Rules and correct its procedural
lapses. Lui Enterprises failed to remedy these errors.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui
Enterprises' appeal. It failed to comply with Rule 44, Section 13,
paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
on the required contents of the appellant's brief.
Third. While we sustain the appellate court's dismissal of herein
petitioners' appeal, we find it imperative to rule on the merits of the
RTC, Branch 220's Order of Partition to forestall any further delay in
the settlement of decedent Arminda's estate which has been
pending since 1990 where Order of Partition of the subject
properties was issued on 28 July 2005. We note also that petitioners
themselves pray for a ruling thereon.
There is no quarrel from any of the parties that the subject
properties were originally part of the conjugal partnership of gains
property regime of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda.[25]
The nature of these properties as part of the spouses' conjugal
properties was confirmed in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of Natalio signed by all his heirs, his spouse Arminda and their
children, including predecessor of herein petitioners, Gerry
Ecarma.[26]
7|Page
Essentially, pursuant to this Extrajudicial Settlement, Arminda was
apportioned two-ninth's (2/9's) share, while her children were
equally ascribed one-ninth (1/9) portion, of the subject properties.
Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession (covering
Arminda's share in the subject properties) vested and their co-
ownership over the subject properties has consolidated by
operation of law.[27] Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and
as Arminda's compulsory heirs,[28] herein parties (specifically Gerry
Ecarma prior to his death and substitution by herein petitioners) all
ipso facto co-owned the subject properties in equal proportion
being compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and
Arminda.[29]
There appears to be no clear objection, therefore, to the RTC,
Branch 220's Order of Partition approving the proposal of the
administrator, herein respondent Renato, for the equal division of
the properties:
1. The Kitanlad property: longitudinally from the frontage down to
the other end with the shares of the [oppositors to the partition]
Jerry Ecarnia and Rodolfo Ecarma contiguous to each other on one
side of the property nearest to the main entrance; and
xxxx
2. The Cuyapo and Lala properties: partitioned into seven (7) equal
parts with Jerry's and Rodolfo's respective shares contiguous to each
other, and the remainder to be donated by the other legal heirs, as
manifested by them, to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding, herein
petitioners and even Rodolfo Ecarma cannot compel the other co-
heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership over the subject
properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a
certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This
term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall
not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the
estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its
partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed
twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power of the testator to
prohibit division applies to the legitime.

Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates

when any of the causes for which partnership is dissolved takes
place, or when the court finds for compelling reasons that division
should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.

The impasse between the parties is due to herein petitioners'

persistent objection to proposals for the partition of the subject
properties. The deceased Gerry Ecarma, Rodolfo Ecarma and herein
petitioners consistently opposed the proposed partition of the
administrator, respondent Renato, since such is ostensibly "not
feasible, impractical and renders detrimental use of the Kitanlad
property." However, it is apparent that Gerry Ecarma and his heirs
(herein petitioners) completely object to any kind of partition of the
subject properties, contravening even the proposed sale thereof.

We note that petitioners have been careful not to proffer that the
subject properties are indivisible or that physical division of thereof
would render such unserviceable since Article 495[30] of the Civil
Code provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership in
accordance with Article 498[31] of the same Code, i.e. sale of the
property and distribution of the proceeds. Ineluctably, therefore,
herein petitioners' absolute opposition to the partition of the
subject properties which are co-owned has no basis in law. As mere
co-owners, herein petitioners, representing the share of the
deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other owners likewise
compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda,
from exercising all incidences of their full ownership.[32]

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeal's

dismissal of the Appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 92375 is FINAL. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

8|Page
G.R. No. 143027 October 11, 2005
ENCARNACION L. CUIZON and SALVADOR CUIZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MERCEDES C. REMOTO, LEONIDA R. MEYNARD, CELERINA R.
ROSALES and REMEDIOS C. REMOTO, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The parties in this case are vying for ownership of a 4,300 square
meter-land located in Barangay Basilisa, Remedios T. Romualdez,
Agusan del Norte.
Petitioners-spouses Encarnacion L. Cuizon and Salvador Cuizon rely
on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3121 in the name of
"Encarnacion L. Cuizon, married to Salvador Cuizon," issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Agusan del Norte on March 15, 1984,1 pursuant
to a notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale dated August 3,
1983 (1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale) executed by the
heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo (Placida), wherein they adjudicated
unto themselves the one-fourth share of Placida, and, at the same
time, sold said portion to their co-heir, Encarnacion L. Cuizon.2 TCT
No. RT-3121 is a transfer from TCT No. RT-183 which originally
covers 16 hectares in the name of Placida (married to Gervacio
Lambo), Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia Tabada,
each being one-fourth shareowner.3
On the other hand, respondents have in their favor a notarized Deed
of Sale of Real Property dated September 19, 1968, (1968 Deed of
Sale) involving a portion of the same property covered by TCT No.
RT-183, measuring 4,300 square meters, executed by Placida in
favor of Angel Remoto (Angel), husband of respondent Mercedes C.
Remoto, and father of the other respondents, Leonida R. Meynard,
Celerina R. Rosales and Remedios C. Remoto.4
In a Decision dated March 9, 1990 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Butuan City (Branch 3) in Civil Case No. 2846, which is an
action for reconveyance filed by respondents against petitioners on
August 13, 1984, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents and
ordered that the property be reconveyed to them. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
Wherefore, judgment is rendered in favor of herein plaintiffs
Mercedes Remoto and children Celerino R. Rosales, Leonida R.
Meynard, Candelaria and Remedios both surnamed Remoto, and
against defendant-spouses Salvador and Encarnacion Cuizon
ordering the latter:
1) To immediately reconvey the lot in question to herein plaintiffs;
9|Page
2) To pay the sum of Two Thousand (₱2,000.00) Pesos as litigation
expenses;
3) To pay the sum of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s
fees; and
4) To pay the costs (sic) of suit.
Done in Chambers this 9th day of March, 1990, at Butuan City,
Philippines.5
In awarding the property to respondents, the trial court made the
following findings and conclusion, which the Court quotes with
approval, viz.:
. . . a careful examination of the evidence on record shows that the
evidence of the plaintiffs is strong, substantial convincing and
worthy of belief than that of the defendants. The plaintiffs can
legally claim possession and ownership of the lot in dispute covered
by the one—paged duly notarized but unregistered Deed of Sale of
Real Property (Exh. A, Rollo, p. 45 or 89). A perusal of this document
discloses that it was duly notarized and signed by vendor Placida
Tabada, together with [h]usband Gervacio Lambo, and vendee Angel
Remoto. Incidentally, the defendants-spouses utterly failed to prove
any defect and irregularity in the exec[u]tion of this Exh. A.
It is the posture of the defendants-spouses that this "state" (sic) and
unregistered deed of sale (Exh. A) "has lost its due execution and
genuineness and the fact of its being a public document"; that it
cannot defeat the duly registered Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Absolute Sale (Exh. 1-B); and that the issuance of TCT No. RT-
3121 in favor of defendants-spouses (Exh. 3) conferred the latter a
better right to the litigated lot under the Torrens system.
This Court is not in accord to (sic) these posturings of defendants-
spouses. Exhibit A, which is duly notarized, is a public document.
Although it is not registered, it is still enforceable and binding not
only between the parties but also their successors-in-interest. …
It is likewise [the] stance of defendants-spouses that they are
purchasers in good faith and for value of the lot in question. This fact
is vividly rebutted by the straight forward and credible testimonies
of plaintiffs Mercedes O. Remoto and Candelaria Remoto. Both
testified that it was in September, 1982, not in 1983 as defendant
Salvador Cuizon wants this court to believe, when defendants-
spouses went to the residence of the Remotos and learned of the
existence of Exhibit A; that it was on this occasion that defendants-
spouses were actually shown the document, and that they read and
examined the same (Vide, tsn. December 28, 1984, 284-289; tsn.
April 24, 1986, 32, 34-37).
Besides, defendants-spouses could not feign ignorance of the
unrebutted fact that the plaintiffs had enjoyed continuous, open,
adverse and public possession of the litigated lot in the concept of
an owner for a duration of fourteen years or more, i.e., from
September 19, 1968, the date of execution of Exhibit A, to the
present (tsn. December 28, 1984, 283-284) or until September, 1982
when they became aware of the existence of Exhibit A. Nor could
the defendants-spouses deny the unrebutted fact that they never
had taken possession of the litigated lot (tsn. id., 274-275).
Despite their knowledge of the existence of the Exhibit A and of the
continuous public and adverse possession for fourteen years of the
lot by the plaintiffs, defendants-spouses had caused the execution of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale on August 3, 1983 by
the Heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo in their favor (Exh. 1-B), and the
consequent issuance of TCT RT-3121 in the name of defendant
Encarnacion-Cuizon (Exh. 3). Hence, defendants-spouses were
buyers in bad faith. They could not pretend a lack of knowledge of
plaintiffs’ claim and interest in the land. They also acted in bad faith
in the registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
(Exh. 1-B) and in their acquisition of TCT RT-3121 (Exh. 3).
… written notice was given to all possible co-redemptioners, co-heirs,
Since defendants-spouses knew of the existence of the first deed of
sale, Exhibit A, this first unregistered deed of sale prevails over the
registered second deed of sale, Exhibit 1-B.
… dispute?
It is also stressed herein that the claim of defendants-spouses that
they bought the disputed lot in 1964 on installment basis from
Placida Tabada and Gervacio Lambo cannot be given credence. This
claim of theirs is self-serving and an afterthought in their last
attempts to bolster their defense. In the absence of a written
document embodying the supposed deed of sale, the latter is
unenforceable contract. This conclusion is in pursuance to sub-
paragraph (e), paragraph 2 of Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. …
Furthermore, it is the submission of the defendants-spouses that
Exhibit A is a simulated contract because the questioned lot was
intended for donation as a barrio site. This submission of their (sic)
cannot be sustained in the absence of a written deed of donation. …
In fine, this Court finds and so holds that the Deed of Sale of Real
Property of September 1968 (Exh. A) can be the legal basis not only
of the possession and ownership of the lot in litigation, but also for
the reconveyance of the same in favor of the plaintiffs.6
On appeal by petitioners, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 31587, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings and conclusion of the
trial court in its Decision7 dated December 16, 1999, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal
being devoid of any merit in fact and in law, is hereby ordered
10 | P a g e
DISMISSED; and the decision appealed from hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
With cost to Defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it
per Resolution dated March 31, 2000.9
In the present petition for review, petitioners insist that they are the
rightful owners of the property based on TCT No. RT-3121, and that
the 1968 Deed of Sale is void, fictitious, unenforceable and has no
legal effect. Petitioners also argue that: (1) the property is covered
by TCT No. RT-183 issued on June 21, 1930, and every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the title; (2) at the time the 1968 Deed of Sale was executed, no
and co- owners, as provided for under Articles 1620 and 1623 of the
Civil Code; (3) respondents’ possession is ineffectual against a
torrens title; and (4) respondents’ action is barred by prescription
and laches.10
The issue in this case is: who has a better right to the property in
As a rule, the Court cannot review the factual findings of the trial
court and the CA in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.11 It should be stressed that a review by
certiorari under Rule 45 is a matter of discretion. Under this mode of
review, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact. When supported by substantial evidence,
findings of fact of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are conclusive
and binding on the parties.12 This Court will not review unless there
are exceptional circumstances, viz.: (a) where the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures;
(b) where the information made is manifestly mistaken; (c) where
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) where the judgment is based
on a misapplication of facts, and the findings of facts of the trial
court and the appellate court are contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (e) when certain material facts and circumstances had
been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account,
would alter the result of the case.13 There exists no exceptional
circumstance in this case that would warrant a departure from the
factual findings of both the trial court and the CA.
As correctly ruled by both the trial court and the CA, the 1968 Deed
of Sale executed by Placida in favor of Angel should prevail over the
1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale made by the heirs of Placida
in favor of petitioners-spouses Cuizon. Prior tempore, potior jure. It
simply means, "He who is first in time is preferred in right." The only
essential requisite of this rule is priority in time, and the only one
who can invoke this is the first vendee.14 Records bear the fact that
when Placida sold her one-fourth portion of the property covered by
TCT No. RT-183 in 1968, the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale
was still inexistent, and more importantly, said portion was yet to be
transferred by succession to Placida’s heirs. The records also show
that after Placida sold her portion to Angel, the latter immediately
took possession of the same. Applying the principle of priority in
time, it is clear that Angel, and consequently his heirs, the
respondents herein, have a superior right to the property.
It must be noted that the sale by Placida to Angel is evidenced by a
duly notarized deed of sale. Documents acknowledged before
notaries public are public documents and public documents are
admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to
their authenticity and due execution. They have in their favor the
presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must
be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.15 Petitioners failed to present any clear and
convincing evidence to prove that the deed of sale is "void, fictitious,
unenforceable and has no legal effect."
Petitioners harp on the fact that the 1968 Deed of Sale dated
September 19, 1968, while notarized, was not registered or
annotated on TCT No. RT-183. Petitioners must be reminded that
registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as
between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to
bind third persons.16 Petitioners are not third persons within the
contemplation of the registration rule. The conveyance shall not be
valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2)
his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice or
knowledge thereof. Petitioners are both related to the original
owner of the property, Placida. Petitioner Encarnacion Lambo-
Cuizon is an heir of Placida, while Salvador Cuizon is Encarnacion’s
husband. Hence, registration is not required to bind petitioners.
Furthermore, where the party has knowledge of a prior existing
interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the
same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the
effect of registration as to him.17 As was found by the trial court,
before petitioners bought the property in 1983, they went to the
Remotos’ residence in 1982 and were shown a copy of the 1968
Deed of Sale. While petitioners dispute the year, saying that it was in
1983 and not 1982 when they went to the Remotos’ residence, the
Court abides by the trial court’s finding considering that it was in the
best position to assess the respective testimonies of the contending
claimants.18
Petitioners rely heavily on TCT No. RT-3121 issued in their names. In
the first place, the issuance of the title was made pursuant to the
1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale. At the time this document
was entered into by the heirs of Placida, the latter was no longer the
owner of the property, having earlier sold the same to Angel. No one
can give what one does not have -- nemo dat quod non habet.
Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell,
and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally.19 Such being the case, the heirs of Placida did not acquire
any right to adjudicate the property unto them and sell it to
Encarnacion.
What’s more, the defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title does
not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with
notice of a flaw in his title. The principle of indefeasibility of title is
11 | P a g e
unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the
free patents and titles.20 As previously noted, petitioners knew of
the existence of the 1968 Deed of Sale as the Remotos showed it to
them in 1982, a year before the execution of the 1983 Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners are
transferees in good faith and therefore, the defense of
indefeasibility of the torrens title is not applicable to them.
Likewise, petitioners cannot complain that no written notice was
given to all possible redemptioners or heirs at the time of the
execution of the 1968 Deed of Sale. Under the provisions of the Civil
Code on Legal Redemption, it is stated:
Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of
them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they
may respectively have in the thing owned in common.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed
of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners.
Corollary to these, Article 1088 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor.
The right of legal redemption pertains to Placida’s original co-
owners, namely, Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia
Tabada, and their respective heirs,21 not to petitioners who are the
heirs of Placida. Also, the written notification should come from the
vendor or prospective vendor, Placida in this case, and not from any
other person.22 This is so because the vendor is in the best position
to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified
of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to
fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a
reaffirmation thereof, so that the party notified need not entertain
doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. This assurance
would not exist if the buyer should give the notice.23
Even if the property has not yet been formally subdivided, still,
records show that the particular portions belonging to the co-
owners have already been allocated and Placida’s co-owners have
already been exercising proprietary rights over their respective
allotments. Thus, inscribed on TCT No. RT-183 are several deeds of
mortgages executed by Placida’s co-owner Eugenio C. Tabada in
favor of the Butuan City Rural Bank with respect to his one-fourth
share, and a Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase dated May 13,
1968 executed by the spouses Eugenio G. Tabada and Trinidad
Ontong in favor of one Hernando R. Sanchez, also covering Eugenio’s
one-fourth portion of the property.24
The Court notes, however, that the property originally co-owned by
Placida, Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda Tabada and Patrecia Tabada,
covered by TCT No. RT-183, measures 16 hectares, while the 1968
Deed of Sale covers 4,300 square meters.
Neither can respondents be held guilty of laches. On the contrary, it
was respondents’ vigilance in protecting their right over the
property that gave rise to the present case. Their action for
reconveyance was filed only after one year and ten days from the
execution of the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale, one year
and three days after its registration, and four months and twenty-
eight days after the issuance of TCT No. RT-3121. Obviously, laches
has not yet set in.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated December 16, 1999 together with its Resolution
dated March 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 31587 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The right of Placida to sell her one-fourth portion of the property

covered by TCT No. RT-183 is sanctioned under Article 493 of the
Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

The sale to Angel affects only Placida’s pro indiviso share in the
property, and Angel gets only what corresponds to Placida’s share in
the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void; only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred,
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.25

Given the foregoing, the portion sold by Placida and bought by Angel
under the 1968 Deed of Sale should only pertain to one-fourth of
Placida’s share in the 16-hectare property, or 4,000 square meters.

Lastly, prescription and laches do not apply in this case. To begin

with, respondents have been in actual and continuous possession of
the property since Angel first bought it in 1968. If a person claiming
to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the
right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is
in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.26

12 | P a g e