The crime of qualified theft was

committed with grave abuse of discretion

The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of
personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent;
(e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence. 18

All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s
instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway
and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took
construction materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.

G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013

ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

********************
Synthesizing the foregoing provisions, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of discretion, can simply be enumerated as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 5

As correctly observed by the appellatecourt, all of the elements of Qualified Theft are present in this case, viz:

There is no dispute that the items (transmission, boom arm, differential assembly, and I-beam) which are the subject matter of this case belong to the
CEO of Iligan City. There is no dispute that these items, although considered "heap of scrap," have not yet been declared unserviceable or waste by
1âwphi1

the proper authority or office. Nor have they been marked for proper disposal. Unless properly disposed in accordance with Section 379 of the Local
Government Code, these items are still government properties or owned by the City of Iligan.

There is also no dispute that these items were taken away from the CEO and were already under completeand effective control of the persons taking
the same. This is because these items were loaded onto the garbage truck driven by Tangian and brought to Tominobo at the Delfin Junk Store.

Apparently, the taking of these items was without the consent of the CEO of Iligan City because there was no gate pass issued to that effect. Evidence
shows that when the garbage truck left the premises of the CEO, no gate pass was surrendered by Tangian. Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate
pass on the pretext that there was another guard on duty at the gate.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject to asportation. Actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Since these items werebrought to the junk store, intent to gain becomes obvious.
The presumption of animus lucrandihas not been overturned.

It is equally patent that the taking of these items was done with grave abuse of confidence. The accused in this case, itbears stressing, were guards
and drivers with access tothe entrance and exit of the CEO premises. In other words,they enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their
employer (the City ofIligan) to haveaccess throughout the CEO premises on account of their respective duties. More so since the primary function of
the CSU is to guard the properties, including the said items, of the CEO. It was this trust and confidence that was gravely abused by them that makes
the theft qualified.
6

Concisely stated, the fact of taking without consent is indubitable. Indeed, petitioners hinge their plea for acquittal and supporting argument primarily on
their lack of criminal intent and the observed conspiracy

G.R. No. 209373 July 30, 2014

JOEL YONGCO and JULIETO LAÑOJAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209414

ANECITO TANGIAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 Qualified Theft

Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of Qualified Theft:

Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken froma fishpond or fishery, orif property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the
damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.

Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 8

It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these cases.

Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned
and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused." 9

Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves "handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from
WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the
1âwphi1

money entrusted into her care.

However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended
up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.

G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.

******************

x"45 The grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and
the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused. 46

G.R. No. 177761 April 18, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS TANCHANCO y PINEDA,

Here, it is undisputed that appellant was a close friend of Rebecca and her family. It was due to this personal relationship that appellant was employed
1âwphi1

by Rebecca as a legal secretary and liaison officer. The latter position necessarily entails trust and confidence not only because of its nature and the
functions attached to it, but also because appellant makes representations on behalf of Rebecca as regards third parties. By reason of this, all matters
essentially pertaining to the conduct of business of the law office were known by, and entrusted to, appellant. This included the safekeeping of
important documents and the handling of money needed for the processing of papers of Rebecca’s clients. It is thus safe to assume that Rebecca
relied on appellant when it comes to the affairs of her law office as to create a high degree of trust and confidence between them. And as Rebecca
trusted appellant completely, and by reason of her being the liaison officer, she handed the monies to appellant without requiring the latter to sign any
paper to evidence her receipt thereof. She also allowed appellant to liquidate the expenses incurred through mere handwritten liquidation statements
solely prepared by appellant and treated them, as well as the official receipts presented, as true and correct. It thus becomes clear that it is because of
the trust and confidence reposed by Rebecca upon appellant that the latter was able to make it appear from her liquidation statements that she spent
the sums she received from Rebecca for their intended purposes. To conceal this, she presented to Rebecca fake or altered receipts for the supposed
payment, all of which form part of the records as evidence. Unfortunately for appellant, she was not able to refute Rebecca’s allegations against her as
well as the evidence supporting the same since what she advanced during trial were mere bare denials. The Court has "oft pronounced that x x x
denial x x x [is] an inherently weak [defense] which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime."47 The Court therefore concludes that appellant took undue advantage of Rebecca’s confidence in her when she appropriated for
herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a different purpose. The theft in this case was thus committed with grave abuse of confidence.
Hence, appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as liable for qualified theft.

They are also grounds for loss of trust and confidence under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended. For there to be a valid dismissal
based on loss of trust and confidence, the breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without justifiable excuse.32 The basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold a
position of trust and confidence. It is the breach of this trust that results in the employer’s loss of confidence in the employee. In the instant
case, we note that petitioners were holding the following positions: Wilfredo Baron - operations manager, Jomar dela Rosa and Jefferson
dela Rosa - sales representatives, Cynthia Junatas and Marife Ballesca - accounting clerks, and Lourdes Rabago - warehouse checker.
Clearly, petitioners were holding positions imbued with trust and confidence, which are deemed to have been reposed on them by virtue of
the nature of their work.