URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.

G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006

FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an answer
averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation.
Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as
well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of
the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore
to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
for any fine imposed.

However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which provides that
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from probation
on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence.
The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect
his disqualification from running for an elective local office.

On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies
only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve
the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes
an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.

ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in public office?

HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus,
when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers
offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from
running for a local elective office.

Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local
Government Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local
elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a
canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing
a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.
MERCADO v. MANZANO and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Respondent was then declared the
winning candidate; however, its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code provides that
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.

Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. From
these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD: The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as
a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states. Considering the citizenship clause under Article IV of the Constitution, it is possible for
the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual’s volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate
of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification
he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other
hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and
taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
RODRIGUEZ v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996

FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr.
(Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province
in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez
challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that the
latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the elective
position.

Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from justice”, which includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded as expressing
the general and ordinary connotation of the term

In previous case, the issue of whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” under the definition
thus given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon
remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the
MARQUEZ Decision.

Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez
challenged Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based
principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”

The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of “fugitive from
justice”, found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate
in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor.

Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation which the COMELEC granted.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC decision suspending Rodriguez is valid?

HELD: No. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates
one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a
“fugitive from justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ
Decision was an appeal (the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant
petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly (Marquez’ petition for the
disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule
in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept
of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, which highlights
the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed
expanded definition, seem to trivialize or undermine.

To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly
has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.

To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a
person seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code,
should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision.

A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.

Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon
Province gubernatorial post.
SOBEJA-CONDON v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012

FACTS: Teodora Sobejana-Condon, petitioner, was a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born
of Filipino parents. She became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a foreign
national.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship pursuant to Section
3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."
The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,

which later issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.

Teodora sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections for the position of Vice-Mayor and
was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista,
(private respondents), filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility
before the RTC.

The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as
imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to
be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether Teodora is disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225.

HELD: Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective
public office.

Yes, Teodora was disqualified to run from elective office. Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels
natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired
or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.

Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, Teodora has validly re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. At that point, she
held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.

A year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC and CARDINO
G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012

FACTS: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte
in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009
a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos.

Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy
when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long
before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment
for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu
City.

The COMELEC granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. It
concluded that Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy. It ruled that Jalosjos “is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in
Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160

ISSUE: Whether Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City.

HELD: Yes. A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is
also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under the Revised Penal
Code, both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office.

The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment
of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration
of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. Once the judgment
of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be
holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict
becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually.

In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for any elective public office
from the time his judgment of conviction became final. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from
the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

FACTS: Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for
petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated
and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order
No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1. A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2. If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3. At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary,
or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13
of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

ISSUE No. 1: Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as
Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

HELD: No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII,
specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided
in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President,
the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in
those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?
HELD: The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials’ office. The reason is that
these posts do no comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The
term ex-officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” Ex-officio likewise denotes an “act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than
that conferred by the office.” The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the official’s primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely
incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of
a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of “any other office”
prohibited by the Constitution.

ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from
the offices they have held pursuant to EO 284?

HELD: During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto
officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that “in
cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the
office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the
office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached
to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of
actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
GAMINDE vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000

FACTS: Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. The
Commission on Appointments and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment on
September 7, 1993.

Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the President for clarification on the expiry date
of her term of office. In response to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her
term office will expire on February 2, 2000 instead of February 2, 1999.

Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office after February 2, 1999.

However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote COA requesting opinion
whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the
expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999.

The General Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Commissioner
Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the
constitutional intent.”

Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe issued a Notice of
Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminus staff
effective February 2, 1999.

Gaminde appealed COA’s disallowance but it was dismissed, and affirmed the propriety of the
disallowance; and held that the issue of Gaminde’s office term may be properly addressed by mere
reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the
Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President. Gaminde moved for reconsideration, but was denied by
COA.

ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission,
to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as stated in the
appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her.

HELD: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as appointed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-facto officer in good faith
until February 2, 2000 and entitled to receive their salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered.

The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the
1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2):

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another
Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.”

Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her
co-terminous staff.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created in 1994 by
then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process
and review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular members
appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.

After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said
responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident
auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives pursuant to
COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section
1, Rule II thereof provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits as may be authorized by law.

Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident
auditor and the National Government Audit Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio
members' representatives, to no avail.

ISSUES:

1. Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-
038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code

2. Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion disallowing the payment of honoraria on the
ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex officio
members

3. Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances?

HELD:

1. No. COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

We clarified this publication requirement in Tanada vs. Tuvera:

[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of
instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule
or regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing
prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official
family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and
receiving double compensation.

2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance
whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.

The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by
mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.

There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the

selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a
given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.

Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated
the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does
not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to
claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not
a mere designation.

In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who
hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because
their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices.
Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were
in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium,
allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's disallowance of the
payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or
alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex
officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply
with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving
additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise
restricted.

3. No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not appointed
but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something which
their own principals are prohibited from receiving.
TETANGCO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 215061. June 6, 2017

FACTS: This case stemmed from the COA's act of disallowing the Extraordinary and Miscellaneous
Expenses (EMEs) of the ex officio members of the Monetary Board (MBM), allegedly in violation of
their respective constitutional rights.

Petitioner Amanda M. Tetangco, Jr., (Tetangco Jr.) is the Governor of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP). Petitioners Peter B. Favila (Favila), Juanita D. Amatong (Amatong), Nelly A. Favis-Villafuerte
(Favis-Villafuerte), Alfredo C. Antonio (Antonio) and Ignacio R. Bunye (Bunye) were the MBM at the
time that the allowance for EMEs was approved. Petitioners Marie Michelle N. Ong (Ong), Bella M.
Prudencio (Prudencio), Esmegardo S. Reyes (Reyes) and Ma. Corazon G. Catarroja (Catarroja) were
employees of the BSP who participated in the processing and approval of the EME.

COA's March 23, 2010 Decision No. 2010-048, on the Performance Audit Report on the allocation
and utilization of EME of the MBM, stated, among others, that " x x x the ex-officio member of the
Monetary Board x x x shall not be entitled to additional EMEs other than that appropriated for him
or her under the GAA as a cabinet member x x x."

Pursuant to this Decision, COA conducted an actual audit of the specific accounts that allegedly
exceeded the prescribed limitations and/or were not properly documented/justified.

As a consequence, the EMEs of MBM Neri and Favila were disallowed and became the subject of
Notice of Disallowance (ND) dated August 13, 2010. Eventually, the MBM and BSP personnel, which
include the petitioners, were held personally liable under ND Nos. 10-004 GF (2007-2008) and 10-
004 GF (2007-2009).

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal with the COA Director on May 26, 2011,
but the same was denied. They filed a Petition for Review with the COA, but the same was likewise
denied in the COA's December 23, 2013 Decision No. 2013-227.

ISSUE: Whether the COA gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the EMEs of the ex officio
MBM.

HELD: The nature of EME, however, was not the foremost reason for the disallowance, but the
limitations imposed by law in availing such allowance. x x x the ex officio members of the Monetary
Board are entitled to EMEs to the extent of that appropriated in the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since the ex officio members already received their EMEs from their respective Departments (as
appropriated in the GAA), the additional EMEs from BSP are no longer necessary. It must be stressed
that the ex officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal office; hence,
the ex officio member is no longer entitled to receive any form of compensation, allowance or other
euphemism from the extended agency.

In fact, the ex officio membership of the cabinet member in the Monetary Board does not comprise
'another office' but rather annexed to or is required by the primary functions of his or her official
position as cabinet member. Of equal significance, too, is that the ex officio member of the Monetary
Board already receives separate appropriations under the GAA for EMEs, he or she being a member
of the cabinet. Being such, it is highly irregular that the said ex officio member of the Monetary Board,
who performs only additional duties by virtue of his or her primary functions, will be provided with
additional EMEs, which in this case, appear much higher than his or her appropriations for the same
expenses under the GAA as a cabinet member.

Absent any showing that COA capriciously, arbitrarily or whimsically exercised its discretion that
would be tantamount to evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at
all in contemplation of law resulting to the prejudice of the rights of the claimants, the Court finds no
reason to set aside its decision.
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the COA, which are undoubtedly
supported by the evidence on record, must be accorded great respect and finality. COA, as the duly
authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities
has acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized
jurisdiction.
IN RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE
A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC December 10, 2013

FACTS: Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas sought to invalidate the Resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as the
replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. He noted that on the IBP By-
Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any official of the IBP who files a
Certificate of Candidacy for any elective public office. Under the amended By-Laws, the resignation
takes effect on the starting date of the official campaign period.

Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, filed a Certificate
of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao. Hence, he is
considered ipso facto resigned from the IBP.

Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governors' approval of Atty. Chaguiles succession as IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as yet, no vacancy. Atty. Habawel was
himself present at the meeting where his replacement was named. There was, therefore, no need to
name a replacement. Second, the right to elect the successor of a resigned IBP Governor is vested,
not in the IBP Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the concerned region; thus, the IBP Board
of Governors approval of the nominee to succeed Atty. Habawel is ultra vires.

In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. x x x In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever
cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members
of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired
portion of the term.

In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first ground raised by Atty. Ubano by saying
that it was not necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant before a successor may be appointed
or elected. As for the second ground, the IBP Board of Governors argued that it has been the
"tradition" of the IBP that "where the unexpired term is only for a very short period of time, it is usually
the Board of Governors which appoint a replacement or an officer-in-charge to serve the unexpired
term."

Meanwhile, Atty. Ubano filed another motion seeking to prevent Atty. Chaguile from exercising the
functions as IBP Governor of Northern Luzon.

A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC: The second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of the election of the
IBP Executive Vice President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas was elected IBP Governor
for Southern Luzon.

Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election claiming that the IBP election of the EVP was
marred by inordinate haste, grave irregularities, patent hostility, manifest bias and prejudice, as well
as the presiding officers absolute lack of independence and that the election violated Section 47 of
the IBP By-Laws which requires that the EVP be elected by a vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty.
Ubano emphasized that Atty. Chaguiles vote in favor of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty. Chaguiles
appointment as governor was itself ultra vires, and therefore, void ab initio.

ISSUES: [1] Was the appointment of Atty. Chaguile as Governor ultra vires, therefore restraining her
to exercise functions relative to the position?

[2] Is the election for the IBP EVP void in violation Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws and restrained Atty.
Vicente M. Joyas from discharging his duties?

HELD: As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governors in its Compliance, "the term of Atty. Lynda
Chaguile as Governor for Northern Luzon expired on June 30, 2013."A new Governor for Northern
Luzon, Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected. As Atty. Chaguile is no longer serving as IBP Governor
for Northern Luzon, the matter of ousting or restraining Atty. Chaguile from exercising the functions
of such office is no longer an available relief.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered
to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.

(Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August 31, 2010)

However, we recognize that the validity of Atty. Chaguiles appointment as Governor for Northern
Luzon affects the validity of her actions as the occupant of this office, especially her participation in
the IBP Board of Governors election of the IBP EVP, which is the subject of the second Administrative
Matter.

We hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de facto capacity.

To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present: 1) There must be a de jure
office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must be
actual physical possession of the office in good faith. Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460

In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office, that of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon
exists. Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP Governor
for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that she is not a mere
volunteer, that is, not through her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Governors.
Thus, she did so under "color of authority. Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., 473 Phil. 844
(2004).

The IBP Board of Governors approval was secured through a process that it characterized as a
"tradition," allowing it to appoint a replacement for an officer who vacates his or her office shortly
before his or her term expires.

Although being in violation of the IBP By-Laws, this supposed tradition cannot earn our imprimatur.
Be that as it may, in all of the occasions cited by the IBP Board of Governors, the authority of
replacement governors was derived from a process, which, though irregular, enabled them to act as
and be accepted as governors.

Having said these, we agree with a point raised by Atty. Ubano. As with statutes, the IBP By-Laws
"violation or non-observance [ought] not be excused by disuse, or custom, or practice to the contrary."
CIVIL CODE, Art. 7. We do not validate the IBP Board of Governors erroneous practice. To reiterate
our earlier words: "We cannot countenance this. No amount of previous practice or "tradition" can
validate such a patently erroneous action."

Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de facto
capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer. Accordingly, all official actions of
Atty. Chaguile as de facto IBP Governor for Northern Luzon must be deemed valid, binding, and
effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed and qualified for the office. It follows that
her participation and vote in the election for IBP EVP held on May 22, 2013 are in order.
FUNA v. AGRA
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013

FACTS: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo
appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST
Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010,
President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity; that on
April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer,
commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or
designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that
during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his
duties as such on August 5, 2010.

Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was
then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor
General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice;
that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice
Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress
representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010 elections; that he then relinquished his
position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of his successor,
Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General.

Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding
the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving
the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

ISSUE: Whether Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.

HELD: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and
spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.

It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of
Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other
offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlled-
corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office,
or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra,
the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and
their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of
circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive Department
and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations of
Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government
agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.

It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested
with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the
general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent designations were still subject to
the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly pointed out in
Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to
hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the
case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices
was laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the other.
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 203372, 2015-06-16

FACTS: Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several
government offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

“Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public... service or endanger public safety.”

None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which... violated the
constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

The only known exceptions to this prohibition are (1)... temporary appointments in the executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety and in the
light of the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of De Castro, et al. vs. JBC and PGMA, G.R.
No. 191002, 17 March 2010, (2)... appointments to the Judiciary;

(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates prior to
March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office
on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in the executive... positions when
continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety as may be
determined by the appointing authority.

Atty. Velicaria-Garafil reported for work on 9 August 2010 without any knowledge of her termination.
She was made to return the office-issued laptop and cellphone, and was told that her salary ceased
as of 7 August 2010. On 12 August 2010, Atty. Velicaria-Garafil was informed... that her former
secretary at the OSG received a copy of a memorandum on her behalf. The memorandum, dated 9
August 2010, bore the subject “Implementation of Executive Order No. 2 dated 30 July 2010” and
was addressed to the OSG’s Director of Finance and Management Service.

Atty. Venturanza received via facsimile transmission an undated copy of DOJ Order No. 556. DOJ
Order No. 556, issued by DOJ Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Sec. De Lima), designated Senior Deputy
State Prosecutor Richard Anthony D. Fadullon (Pros. Fadullon) as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Quezon City. In a letter to Sec. De Lima dated 15 September 2010, Atty.
Venturanza asked for clarification of his status, duties, and functions since DOJ Order No. 556 did
not address the same.

G.R. No. 209138

The OP withheld the salaries of Villanueva and Rosquita on the basis of EO 2. On 3 August 2010,
Villanueva and Rosquita sought to intervene in G.R. No. 192991. Atty. Tamondong was removed from
the SBMA Board of Directors on 30 July 2010.

Rulings of the CA

Even though the same issues were raised in the different petitions, the CA promulgated separate
decisions for the petitions. The CA consistently ruled that EO 2 is constitutional.

In the cases of Attys. Velicaria-Garafil and Venturanza, the CA stated that the OP should consider
the circumstances of their appointments. In the cases of Villanueva, Rosquita, and Atty. Tamondong,
the CA explicitly stated that the revocation of their appointments... was proper because they were
midnight appointees.

ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioners’ appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
and (2) Whether EO 2 is constitutional.

HELD: The petitions have no merit. All of petitioners’ appointments are midnight appointments and
are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood
as both complete and effective) appointment:

(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws.
Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that
appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which
he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper
may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his
locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an
unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.

For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment
paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and
must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.

(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath
amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public
office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.

Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment
ban.

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

Principles:

The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to differentiate the
exercise of the President’s appointing power outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. The
Constitution allows the President to exercise the power of... appointment during the period not
covered by the appointment ban, and disallows (subject to an exception) the President from exercising
the power of appointment during the period covered by the appointment ban.

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood
as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of
the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and... evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant
position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
The concurrence of all... these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is
made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban.
SARMIENTO v. MISON
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987

FACTS: The Court in this case is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition
for prohibition, the petitioners, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of
Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent
Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of a Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by the President still
needs a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

HELD: No, the appointment of a Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs needs no Confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments.

Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, as amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree No. 34,
amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as
follows:

Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief and one
assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner)
and Deputy Commissioner of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance
with the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs
shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint:

1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with
the consent and confirmation of the Commission on Appointments;

2nd, all other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;

3rd, those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint; and

4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the
present bone of contention.

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

Also, in the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on
the President as an appointment he is authorized by law to make. Such appointment, however, no
longer needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
BAUTISTA v. SALONGA
G.R. No. 86439 April 13 1989

FACTS: The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes
the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights.
Commission on Appointments disapproved Bautista's alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson
of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUES: 1. Whether Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation. 2. Whether Bautista's

appointment is an ad interim appointment.

HELD: 1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides the appointments to be made with the
confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution
(2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoints executive officials without confirmation of CoA.

The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution
has reserved to the President alone.

2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for
the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution,
extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That
is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President
solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad
interim appointments.
CALDERON vs CARALE
208 SCRA 254

FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 (Herrea-Veloso Law) was passed, amending PD 442 or the Labor Code.
Section 13 of RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President, subject to the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed
by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be
subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.”

Pursuant to the law, President Corazon Aquino assigned Carale as Chairman and Commissioners of
the National Labor Relations Commission.

This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code
transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on
Appointments without constitutional basis.

ISSUE: Whether the Congress may, by law, require confirmation of the Commission of Appointments,
in relation to appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the CoA.

HELD: The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General. Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of
the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees, those whom
the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the
NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA
6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:

1. It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2. It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise
entrusted only with the President.

Therefore, Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect.
TARROSA v. SINGSON
G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994

FACTS: Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V.
Ramos on July 2, 1993, effective on July 6, 1993.

Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is null and void since it was not submitted
for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments.

The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which provides “The Governor
of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko
Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board,
he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the
Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as acting Chairman “.

In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which
have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, citing Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution. Respondents also aver that the Bangko Sentral has its own budget and accordingly, its
budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations Act.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Singson was subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

HELD: No, The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster
of respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a special civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor
General or by a "person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or
exercised by another"

In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637 (1992), we held that the petitioner therein, who did not
aver that he was entitled to the office of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not bring the
action for quo warranto to oust the respondent from said office as a mere usurper.

Here, it is obvious that the instant action was improvidently brought by petitioner. To uphold the
action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable
mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machinery.

Its capstone having been removed, the whole case of petitioner collapses. Likewise, the Court refrains
from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference to the principle that
bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable
for the determination of the case.

However, for the information of all concerned, we call attention to our decision in Calderon v. Carale,
208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting, where we ruled that Congress cannot
by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation
of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
MANALO VS. SISTOZA
G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999

FACTS: On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act
6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the PNP
Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through
Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the
Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers
took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget
and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for
their salaries and other emoluments.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject
appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation
of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The
PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA,
and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent
officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation.

2) Whether the PNP is akin to the AFP.
3) Whether Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional.

HELD:

1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government
to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in
the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which
shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force
necessary for the security of the State.”

On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to
be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives
over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military
are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents
of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on Appointments to
confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the Constitution
to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that
when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the
unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions,
the statute remains valid without its voided sections.
MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036

FACTS: Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV”
of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then
PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by
PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of
Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum

removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning
the appointment and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim
appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as
on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the Constitution.
(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character.

HELD: (1) No. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this
provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To
hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s
power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the
nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not provide
for ad interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away
with ad interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout
the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid
disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to
reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the
reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President was for
the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from
prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional commissions.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make ad
interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments
is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in
appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while
Congress is in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent
of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during
the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the
appointee to immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the
prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the
President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the
propriety of the choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown
in the instant case.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or
acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides
as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an

appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies
in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during
the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
PIMENTEL v. ERMITA
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

FACTS: President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while Congress is in their
regular session.

Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting
capacity.

Petitioners senators, assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that “while Congress
is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an
office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its
consent.

Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress
is in session.

EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the President’s power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:

SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials
as provided for in the Constitution and laws.

SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President may temporarily designate an
officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer
regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any
other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.]

ISSUE: Whether the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
while Congress is in session.

HELD: Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant
to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the
office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress
is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted
to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments
to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Note: Can Congress impose the automatic appointment of the undersecretary?

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it
to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to
the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person
to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on
the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
QUIROG v. AUMENTADO
G.R. No. 163443 November 11, 2008

FACTS: On May 28, 2001, Bohol Provincial Governor Rene L. Relampagos permanently appointed
Liza M. Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial
Agriculture (PGDH-OPA). The appointment was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a
Resolution.

In the Order dated June 28, 2001, the Director of CSCROVII invalidated Quirog's appointment as
PGDH-OPA upon finding that the same was part of the bulk appointments issued by then Governor
Relampagos after the May 14, 2001 elections allegedly in violation of a resolution dated June 4, 2001
on prohibition against the issuance of midnight appointments.

Both Relampagos and Quirog moved for reconsideration of the CSCROVII Order, alleging that when
the latter took her oath of office on June 1, 2001, CSC Resolution No. 010988 was not yet effective
as it took effect only on June 4, 2001. They argued that the subject appointment cannot be considered
a midnight appointment because it was made days before the expiration of Relampagos' term, and
that Quirog was already the acting Provincial Agriculturist a year prior to said appointment or since
June 19, 2000.

The CSC ruled that the promotional appointment extended to Quirog by Governor Relampagos was
not violative of the aforesaid CSC Resolution. This interpretation by the CSC of its own rules should
be given great weight and consideration for after all, it is the agency tasked with interpreting or
applying the same.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Quirog was a midnight appointment

HELD: No, Quirog was not a midnight appointee.

The constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically, those made within
two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or
Acting President.

However, the aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d'etre behind the prohibition
against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made by chief executives of local
government units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even
preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby
depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments
in line with its new policies. As held in Aytona v. Castillo, the steps taken being apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to
deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

Here, it is beyond dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant
with the subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto. Surely, the fact that
she was only permanently appointed to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting
Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the filling up of the position resulted from
deliberate action and a careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all
the more highlights the public need for said position to be permanently filled up.

A careful evaluation of the circumstances obtaining in the issuance of the appointment of Quirog
shows the absence of the element of hurriedness on the part of former Governor Relampagos which
characterizes a midnight appointment.

There is also wanting in the records of the case the subversion by the former governor of the policies
of the incumbent Governor Erico Aumentado as a logical consequence of the issuance of Quirogs
appointment by the latter.
Both elements are the primordial considerations by the Supreme Court when it laid down its ruling
in prohibiting midnight appointments in the landmark case of Aytona vs Castillo, et. al.

In any event, respondent Governor Aumentado, in a Memorandum, has reinstated Quirog to the
permanent position of PGDH-OPA. Such act of respondent bespeaks of his acceptance of the validity
of Quirog’s appointment and recognition that indeed, the latter is qualified for the subject position.
DE RAMA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001

FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado De
Rama wrote a letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees.
Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of said employees were
“midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution.

The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of
merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing
out that the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments
made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. The CSC opined
that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as
the appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.

ISSUE: Whether the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15
of the Constitution

HELD: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight
appointments,” specifically those made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential
elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective
officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
NAZARENO v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE
G.R. No. 181559 October 2, 2009

FACTS: Then Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in the May 14,
2001 elections, but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. Thereafter, on June 5, 7, and 11,
2001, outgoing Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall
employees, including the herein 52 petitioners.

On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag raising ceremony at the Dumaguete
City Hall grounds that he would not honor the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. On the
same day, he instructed the City Administrator, respondent Dominador Dumalag, Jr., to direct
respondent City Assistant Treasurer Erlinda C. Tumongha (now deceased), to refrain from making
any cash disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new positions.

Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from taking
any action or issuing any orders nullifying their appointments against the City of Dumaguete,
represented by Mayor Percides.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition, while the Civil Service Field Office in Dumaguete
revoked and invalidated the appointments of petitioners in violation of CSC Resolution No. 010988
prohibiting midnight appointments immediately before and/or after elections.

Unsatisfied, the petition was elevated to the CSC en banc and Court of Appeals. Petitioners argued
that the CSC Resolution is invalid because the Commission is without authority to issue regulations
prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level. However, this was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the CSC has the authority to prohibit midnight appointments, and apply the same
in the local government level.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the CSC has the authority to issue such resolution and that
the invalidation of the petitioners' appointments was warranted.

The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to
establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service.
Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of
the Commission, including the power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments.

There was substantial reason behind the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 010988. It is true that there
is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance of "mass appointments" by defeated local
government officials prior to the expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a "midnight
appointment," proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those appointments made within two
months immediately prior to the next presidential election, the prohibition is precisely designed to
discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan
purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments in line with its new policies. It does not only cause animosities between
the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance. Those
appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments instead of attending
to their functions.

NOTE: Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution
No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all "mass appointments." However, it must be shown that the
appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that
there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.
PROVINCE OF AURORA v. MARCO
G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015

FACTS: Governor Ong of the Province of Aurora, permanently appointed Hilario Marco as Cooperative
Development Specialist II five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the Province.
Thereafter, Marco's appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was submitted to the Civil
Service Commission. Annexed to Marco's appointment papers was a certification from Provincial
Budget Officer Clemente and Provincial Accountant Saturno stating there are funds available to cover
the position.

However, when the newly elected Governor Castillo called an executive meeting of all the department
heads of the Province, the Provincial Budget Officer Clemente allegedly manifested that the Province
had no funds available to pay for the salaries of Governor Ong's appointees. She subsequently issued
a Letter recalling the previously issued certification of the availability of funds.

Due to the recall of the certification, the CSC Field Office disapproved Marco's appointment. Marco
then wrote the CSC Regional Office, moving for the reconsideration of the disapproval of his
appointment. The Regional Office, however, affirmed the disapproval of Marco's appointment.

Thereafter, Marco appealed before the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission
granted Marco's appeal and set aside the Regional Office's decision. It ruled that Marco's appointment
was valid since it was accompanied by a certification of availability of funds.

The province appealed before the CA. For the first time, the Province argued that Marco was a
midnight appointee since Governor Ong appointed him during the last five (5) days of her tenure.
Therefore, Marco's appointment was void. The CA ruled in favor of Marco. On the claim that Marco
was a midnight appointee, the Court of Appeals said that Marco was fully qualified for the position
and underwent a screening process long before the election ban. Therefore, he was validly appointed.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Marco was considered a midnight appointment.

HELD: No, A midnight appointment refers to those appointments made within two months
immediately prior to the next presidential election. Midnight appointments are prohibited under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution

“Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is "duty bound to prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he [or she] should not do acts which
he [or she] ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his [or her] successor." An
outgoing President should not "deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments."

However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to presidential

appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.

In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, this court said that the prohibition on midnight appointments
"applies only to presidential appointments." The court noted that "there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure."
DE CASTRO VS. JBC
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
to Associate Justice Renato Corona as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio
T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the
last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,
respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from
its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended
the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so
in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department)
was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article
VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the
specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

All the petitions to the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President
can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. The question is undoubtedly
impressed with transcendental importance to the nation because the appointment of the Chief Justice
is any President’s most important appointment. The conflicting provisions are Art. VII, Sec. 15 and
Art. VIII, Sec. 9.

CONSIDERING, ART. VII, UNDER EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

ART. VII, SEC. 15. TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE
APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN
CONTINUED VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER PUBLIC
SAFETY.

IN RELATION TO ART. VIII, UNDER JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,

ART. VIII, SEC. 9. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDGES OF THE LOWER
COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST THREE
NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR EVERY VACANCY. SUCH
APPOINTMENTS NEED NO CONFIRMATION.
FOR THE LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENTS WITHIN NINETY
DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec. 15 (Midnight
Appointment Ban), does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.

HELD: Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the
powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt
with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and
defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Sec. 4(1) and
Sec. 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices. In particular, Sec. 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be
made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Sec. 4(1)
of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art. VII, Sec. 15 to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Taken into consideration also that the appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent
President is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the
Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly elected, and
whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective Departments.
However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of
the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs
functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no
obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the
incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification
to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD vs CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018

FACTS: Blesilda Lodevico (Lodevico) was appointed by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
May 14, 2008 as Director III, Recruitment and Career Development Service, CESB.

Lodevico possesses a Career Service Executive Eligibility since November 29, 2001, as evidenced by
the Certificate of Eligibility issued by the CSC.

June 30, 2010: Office of the President (OP) issued Memorandum Circular 1 (MC1) which declared all
non-career executive service positions vacant.

July 16, 2010: OP promulgated the Implementing Guidelines of MC 1, which states that all non-
Career Executive Service Officers (non-CESO) in all agencies of the Executive Branch shall remain in
office and continue to perform their duties until July 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been
accepted and/or their replacements have been appointed or designated, whichever comes first.

Pursuant to MC 1, Abesamis of CESB issued a memorandum informing Lodevico that she shall only
remain in office until July 31, 2010.

Lodevico filed her appeal on the memorandum issued by Abesamis before the CSC. CSC ruled in favor
of Lodevico and declared the memorandum null and void.

Career Executive Service board filed an MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari under
Rule 62.

Respondents aver that the petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of appeal as Rule 43 is the proper
remedy.

ISSUE: Whether Certiorari and Prohibition under rule 65 is proper? No

HELD: It is well-settled that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition are resorted to
only where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the second requirement is absent as petition for review under Section
118 of Rule 43 is available to petitioners. However, there are exceptions to the aforementioned rule,
namely: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader
interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order
amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In the case of Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees Union-ALU, We relaxed the
application of the rules of procedure to meet the ends of justice. In Leyte IV, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of filing a petition for review under Rule 43, but We gave
due course to the petition to accommodate the broader interest of justice.

In allowing the liberal application of procedural rules, We emphasized in the case of Obut v. Court of
Appeals, et al. that placing the administration of justice in a straightjacket, i.e., following technical
rules on procedure would result into a poor kind of justice. Thus, a rigid application of the rules of
procedure will not be entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice
in the light of the prevailing circumstances of the case under consideration.
Considering the foregoing and the circumstances obtaining in this case, We allow the application of
liberality of the rules of procedure to give due course to the petition filed by petitioners as the broader
interest of justice so requires.
Main Ruling of the Case: Lodevico’s appointment is merely temporary so her services may be
terminated with or without cause. Hence, her discharge was proper. CES Eligibility and her
appointment as Director do not automatically mean that her appointment is permanent.
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD vs CSC
G.R. No. 197762 March 7, 2017

FACTS: On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the CES Occupancy
of the Department of Justice (DOJ). This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled
positions in the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility.

In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Public Attorney Silvestre A. Mosing (Deputy Chief Mosing)
sent a letter to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V. Allones. He informed her that the
positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional Public Attorneys
(subject positions) were already permanent in nature pursuant to Section 68 of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9406, which accorded security of tenure to the occupants thereof.

A second letter dated 9 November 2010 was sent to the CESB by Deputy Chief Mosing to reiterate its
earlier communication. The letter also contained supplementary arguments in support of the
assertion that the subject positions were permanent posts; hence, their occupants may only be
removed for cause provided by law. Based on the foregoing premises, the PAO requested the deletion
of its office from the Data on CES Occupancy for the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 18 November 2010, the PAO received the reply sent to Deputy Chief Mosing by the CESB, through
Deputy Executive Director Arturo M. Lachica. The latter informed Deputy Chief Mosing that the CESB
would conduct a position classification study on the specified PAO positions to determine whether
they may still be considered CES positions in the DOJ.

It appears that while waiting for the CESB to respond to its letters, the PAO wrote to the CSC to
request a legal opinion on the same matter. The PAO thereafter informed the CESB of the former's
decision to seek the opinion and requested the latter to issue no further opinion or statement, oral or
written, relative to the qualifications of the PAO officials.

The CSC issued the requested legal opinion stating that Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorney and Regional Public Attorney, no third level eligibility is required but only RA 1080 (BAR)
civil service eligibility.

On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No, 918 denying the PAO's request to declassify
the subject positions. Citing the Position Classification Study submitted by its secretariat, the CESB
noted that the positions in question "require leadership and managerial competence" and were thus
part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts
cannot be considered permanent.

Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of Appeal and an Urgent Notice of
Appeal with the CSC.

On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be in
violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case, third-level
eligibility - for purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO positions.

On 9 August 2011, the CESB filed the instant Petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to
respondent CSC. It asserts that (a) the CSC has no jurisdiction to review the Resolution of the CESB,
given the latter's autonomy as an attached agency; (b) CESB Resolution No. 918 should have been
appealed to the Office of the President, and not to the CSC, in accordance with Article IV, Part III of
the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

ISSUE: Whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO and to reverse
CESB Resolution No. 918.

HELD: Yes. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given the comprehensive
mandate to administer the civil service under Article IX-B, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution; and
Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has also been expressly granted the
power to promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; and to render opinions
and rulings on all personnel and other civil service matters.

Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil service
matter falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering the
repercussions of the issue concerning the appointments of those occupying the posts in question, the
jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions is implicated.

It must likewise be emphasized that the CSC has been granted the authority to review the decisions
of agencies attached to it under Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code:

SECTION 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall
be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory.
Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;

Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC,72 the former's decisions are expressly subject to
the CSC's review on appeal.

Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the contention of the CESB
that its decisions may only be appealed to the Office of the President must fail. We note that the
supporting provision cited by the CESB in support of its argument refers only to administrative cases
involving the discipline of members of the CES:

5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall
set up the organization and operation of the Service in accordance with the following guidelines:
xxxx

h. Discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against members of the

Career Executive Service shall be governed by Article VI, Chapter II and Paragraph I (d) of Article II,
Chapter III of this Part; provided that appeals shall be made to the Career Executive Service Board
instead of the Civil Service Commission. Administrative cases involving members of the Service on
assignment with the Board shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Board with the right to appeal
to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)

In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary cases
involving members of the CES. It is evident that this special rule was created for that particular type
of case, because members of the CES are all presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint
generally carries with it the power to discipline, it is only reasonable for the president to be given the
ultimate authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this special rule cannot apply to the
matter at hand, because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not involve a disciplinary case. Since it was
clearly outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the Resolution did not come within the jurisdiction
of the Office of the President. It was therefore correctly appealed to the CSC.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved
the PAO's appeal. The arguments of the CESB on this point must perforce be rejected.
MOHAMMAD v. SAQUETON
G.R. No. 193584, July 12, 2016

FACTS: Mohammad in this case was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II (PARO II) of
the Department of Agrarian Reform in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DAR-ARMM).
His appointment was temporary as he had no Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or eligibility
in the Career Executive Service (CES).

Mohammad requested the regional secretary of DAR-ARMM to change his appointment status from
temporary to permanent. His request was pursuant to an RTC decision concerning the change in
status of division superintendents. He opined that his position was the same as that of petitioners
therein, whose petition for mandamus had been granted by the trial court.

Respondent Grace Belgado-Saqueton (respondent), Director IV of CSC RO No. XVI, denied the request
on the ground of the inapplicability of the RTC Decision, which was binding only on the parties to
that case.

Petitioner did not elevate the case to the Civil Service Commission proper. Instead, he filed a special
civil action for mandamus before the RTC. He invoked an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies since the question is purely legal.

RTC maintained that it had jurisdiction over the case which presented a pure question of law. The
court further held that had petitioner taken the route of appealing to the CSC proper, it would have
been an exercise in futility, since issues of law cannot be decided with finality by the commission.

On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed the RTC Orders. It agreed with respondent that
petitioner had prematurely brought the case to the RTC without exhausting all the remedies available
to him.

ISSUE: Whether the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: when the
question is purely legal is applicable

HELD: No, this case was not among the exemptions of applying the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

The Court has laid down tests to distinguish questions of fact from questions of law: when doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, or when it becomes clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question is one of fact.

In this case, the question is whether petitioner was eligible for a permanent appointment to the PARO
II position, which had already been classified as a third-level position requiring CSEE or CES. The
issue is therefore not one of law, but of the merit and fitness of the appointee, which is a question of
fact.

Hence, the Petition was dismissed outright.

Mohammad pleads for a liberal construction of the rules owing to the nature of the case as one of
first impression involving a position in the ARMM vis-a-vis the application of CSC rules. His plea has
been mooted, however, by the promulgation of Buena, in which the Court highlighted Section 4, Art.
XVI of the Organic Act for the ARMM which states that "until the Regional Assembly shall have
enacted a civil service law, the civil service eligibilities required by the central government or national
government for appointments to public positions shall likewise be required for appointments to
government positions in the Regional Government."
BUENA, JR. v. BENITO
G.R. No. 181760, 14 October 2014

FACTS: Regional Governor Dr. Parouk S. Hussin of the ARMM appointed Dr. Sangcad D. Benito as
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education (DepEd) Division on Lanao
del Sur in a temporary capacity. In 2005, Hussin reappointed Dr. Benito in the same position but in
a permanent capacity. Hussin requested the Civil Service Commission Regional Office of the ARMM
to attest to Dr. Benito’s appointment. However, Regional Director Anacleto B. Buena (Buena) declined
on the ground that Dr. Benito did not possess the career executive service eligibility required for the
said position. The latter filed a petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial Court to compel the
Regional Office to attest to his permanent appointment arguing that the position does not belong to
the Career Executive Service under the Administrative Code of 1987, thus, the position does not
require Career Executive Service eligibility. He further claimed that under RA 9054, Regional
Governor of the ARMM is the appointing authority for positions in the civil service in the region. Since
Hussin already exercised his discretion, the Regional Office had no choice but to attest to his
appointment.

Buena claimed that the permanent appointee must have career executive service eligibility. According
to Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the autonomy of the ARMM. However, until the region enacts
its own regional civil service law, the Regional Office shall carry on with the Civil Service Commission’s
mandate
under the Constitution to promote and enforce civil service laws and rules.

ISSUE: Is Dr. Benito validly appointed as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent
capacity by the Regional Governor of ARMM?

RULING: No. The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the Career
Executive Service. Appointment to the position is based on merit and fitness and gives the appointee
an opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, such as Schools Division Superintendent.
If permanently appointed, the appointee is guaranteed security of tenure. The position is above
Division Chief. An Assistant Schools Division Superintendent has a salary grade of 25. As to functions
and responsibilities, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent assists the Schools Division
Superintendent in performing executive and managerial functions under Governance of Basic
Education Act of 2001. In fact, the law recognizes that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive Service. Section 7 of the said law explicitly provides
that an appointee to the position must be a career executive service officer. In this case, Dr. Benito
does not possess the required career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be appointed
to the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a permanent capacity. The Civil
Service Commission cannot be compelled to attest to the permanent appointment of Dr. Benito.

The Regional Governor has the power to appoint civil servants in the ARMM under Republic Act No.
9054. In Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 279 or the ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010, the
Regional Assembly set the qualification standards of Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of
Divisions of the Department of Education in the Autonomous Region. Nevertheless, when Dr. Benito
was appointed Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in 2005, there was yet no regional law
providing for the qualifications for the Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of Divisions of the
Department of Education in the Autonomous Region.
DE CASTRO vs CARLOS

FACTS: In this case, petitioner Emmanuel de Castro filed a petition for quo warranto under Rule 66,
seeking to oust respondent Emerson Carlos from the position of Assistant General Manager for
Operations (AGMO) of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). The controversy
arose from the issuance of OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2, which applies to all non-CESO's
occupying CES positions in all agencies of the executive branch. Petitioner, being a non-CESO, avers
that he is not covered by these OP memoranda considering that the AGMO of the MMDA is a non-
CES position.

On July 29, 2009, PGMA appointed de Castro as AGMO.

On 2010, De Castro was reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General
Manager. The service vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and
assigned to other employees. Subsequently, Carlos was assigned as OIC of the Office o the AGMO.
Thereafter, the name of the petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he did not receive his
salary beginning November 2010.

Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services
and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank.

Demanding payment of his salary and reinstatement in the monthly payroll, petitioner sent a letter
on 5 December 2010 to Edenison Faisan, assistant general manager (AGM) for Finance and
Administration; and Lydia Domingo, Director III, Administrative Services. For his failure to obtain an
action or a response from MMDA, he then made a formal demand for his reinstatement as AGMO
through a letter addressed to the Office of the President on 17 December 2010.

However, on 4 January 2011, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) appointed
respondent as the new AGMO of the MMDA. On 10 January 2011, the latter took his oath of office.

Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to the position of AGMO.

RULING: No, an AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management
over people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application
of managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving
functional guidance, leadership, and supervision.

For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.

With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil service
eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the
subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires
eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has
previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position
provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily, it is clear that
the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career
executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be
said that his appointment to the position was permanent.

Petitioner undisputedly lacked CES eligibility. Thus, he did not hold the position of AGMO in a
permanent capacity or acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment
was temporary and "co- terminus with the appointing authority."
AGYAO v. CSC

FACTS: Agyao was re-appointed as Department Manager II of PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone
Authority) The renewal of Agyao’s appointment was submitted by PEZA to the CSC.

However, Agyao’s re-appointment was invalidated by the CSC Field Office, through a letter of Director
Tabao. The letter stated that Agyao lacked the prescribed Career Executive Service Office (CESO)/
Career Service Executive Examination (CSEE) eligibility, and there were qualified eligibles actually
available for appointment.

Thereafter, PEZA Director-General Lilia B. De Lima appealed to the CSC seeking a reconsideration of
its action on the appointment of Agyao. The CSC issued Resolution denying Director-General De
Lima’s appeal and affirming the invalidation by the CSC Field Office of Agyao’s appointment as
Department Manager II of PEZA. On appeal, the CA rendered a decision affirming the resolution of
the CSC.

Hence, this petition. Agyao contends that the position of Department Manager II of PEZA is not among
those covered by the Career Executive Service (CES) also known as presidential appointees. The
appointment to the position is made by the PEZA Director-General. Accordingly, he does not need to
possess the required CESO/CSEE to continue acting as Department Manager II.

The CSC, on the other hand, argues that although the position of Department Manager II does not
require a presidential appointment, it is a third level position which requires either a CESO or CSEE
eligibility. The rank of Department Manager II falls under the coverage of CES as the same is a third
level career position above the division chief level and performing executive or managerial functions.

ISSUE: Whether the position of Department Manager II of PEZA requires CESO or CSEE eligibility.

RULING: No, In a plethora of cases decide by the court it consistently held that the CES covers
presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of the PEZA does
not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES.

Under the Administrative Code of 1987 “"Positions in the CES include those of Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. Simply put, third-level positions in the
Civil Service are only those belonging to the Career Executive Service, or those appointed by the
President of the Philippines.

To reiterate, the Third Level covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative
Code of 1987 and those identified by the CESB as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by
the President of the Philippines.

Here, the position of Director Manager II at the PEZA is not among the enumerated positions in the
Career Executive Service, much less, a position that requires presidential appointment. Even the CSC
admits that the position of Director Manager II does not require presidential appointment.

For said reason, Agyao only needs the approval of the PEZA Director-General to validate his
appointment or re-appointment. As he need not possess a CESO or CSEE eligibility, the CSC has no
valid and legal basis in invalidating his appointment or re-appointment as Department Manager II.
OMB vs CSC
(Pontimayor)
ARAOS, ET. AL. v. HON. REGALA
G.R. No. 174237; Feb. 18, 2010

FACTS: Petitioners are SSS employees who, in 1999, were appointed and/or promoted to CESO
(Career Executive Service Officer) Ranks. Respondents are a judge of the RTC together with the SSS.

Laws Relevant:
PD 847 (ADOPTING A COMPENSATION SCHEME FOR THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE AND
RELATED MATTERS)
*said law made a distinction of salaries between Career Executive Service Officers (CESO) and Non-
CESO whereby the former shall start at Grade 2 of the corresponding rank while the latter shall
start at Grade 1 of the corresponding rank. (Meaning: refer to Reso No. 94-5840 below)

MEMO order No. 372 ("MODIFYING THE RANKING STRUCTURE AND SALARY SCHEDULE IN THE
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE (CES) - only gave a ranking structure and corresponding salary
schedule.

Resolution No. 94-5840 (CSC)

*providing that a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) is entitled to the second step of the salary
grade of his rank.

Reso No. 129 (Career Executive Service Board)

*Career Executive Service Officers (CESOs), who were already receiving at least the second step of the
salary grades of their ranks due to merit or longevity prior to the issuance of CSC Resolution No.
5840, otherwise known as "Rules on Compensation in the CES including those of Graduates of NDCP
and CESDP", are entitled to a one-step adjustment as provided for in the Paragraph 3.1.4 of subject
Resolution, the spirit of which is to set apart the CESOs and non-CESOs.

Circular No. 12 (CESB)

*Laying down guidelines on grant of a one-step adjustment in the Salary of the CESOs.
*A CESO whose salary at the time of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 94-5840 is already on the
second or higher step of the salary grade of his rank by virtue of step increments earlier granted based
either on merit or length of service, shall be entitled to a one-step adjustment in the salary grade of
his rank effective 26 November 1994…

R. A. 9282 (Social Security Act of 1997)

*Section 3(c) 4 of which EXEMPTED respondent Social Security System (SSS) from the application of
RA No. 6758, "THE COMPENSATION AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACT OF 1989" or the Salary
Standardization Law.

*Sometime in 2001, the SSC approved Resolution No. 483 appropriating funds for the grant of a one-
step salary increment to nine SSS CESOs (PETITIONERS).

MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 12 (OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT)

* said Memo directed all heads of GOCCS, GFIs and Subsidiaries as EXEMPT from the SALARY
STANDARDIZATION LAW. Sec. 1 thereof states “Immediately suspend the grant of any salary
increases and new or increased benefits….”

The corporate auditor of the Commission on Audit thus advised the President of the SSS, by
Memorandum dated June 29, 2001, against the implementation of a onestep salary increment for
SSS CESOs in view of Memorandum Order No. 20 of the President. The Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) likewise issued, on August 13, 2001, an opinion, that unless approved by
the Office of the President, a one-step salary increment for SSS CESOs may not be implemented.
Acting under the OGCC's advice, the SSS recommended, on April 9, 2002, to the Office of the
President the approval of a one-step salary adjustment for SSS CESOs. DBM, however, was of the
opinion that:
[T]he CES pay under CSC Resolution No. 94-5840 is based on SSL. The S[alary] G[rade] equivalence
for each CESO rank and the automatic 2nd step adjustment are all based on the salary schedule and
position classification and compensation system prescribed under SSL. Since SSS is exempt from the
SSL, we believe that CSC Resolution No. 94-5840 does not apply to SSS and other SSL-exempt
agencies.

Petitioners made repeated demands to SSS management for the release of the one-step salary
adjustment but was of no avail causing them to file a petition for mandamus praying that the SSS be
ordered to implement the one-step salary increment due them by virtue of their CESO rank. BOTH
RTC AND CA dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on Certioari.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for Mandamus will lie.

HELD: No. For mandamus to issue, it is essential that the person petitioning for it has a clear legal
right to the claim sought. It will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty,
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. Thus, unless the right to the relief
sought is unclouded, it will be denied.

As to the issue of Clear legal right to the Claim sought, The Court said that the intention of the law
was to make a distinction between CESOs and Non-CESOs (per P.D. 847). To maintain such, CSC
Reso 94-5840 required that CESOs were already receiving at least the second step of the salary grade
of their rank due to longevity or merit. Without the increment, a CESO who, due to longevity or merit,
is already receiving the second step of the salary grade of his rank as of the effectivity of CSC
Resolution No. 94-5840, would be no different from a similarly situated non-CESO within the same
salary grade.

THEREFORE, PETITIONERS HAVE NO CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT BECAUSE they must thus establish
that when they were appointed or promoted to CESO ranks in 1999, they were already receiving the
second step of the salary grade of their ranks. Petitioners failed to do so, however.

CESB CIRCULAR NO. 12 is UNENFORCEABLE for failure to file three (3) copies of said circular with
the Office of the National Register (ONAR) of the UP Law Center as required under the Administrative
Code of 1987. As such it has yet to take effect and therefore, unenforceable.
CSC vs CA
(Sarda)
CARINGAL v. PCSO
G.R. No. 161942, October 13, 2005

FACTS: Caringal in this case was appointed Assistant Department Manager II in the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), respondent as Assistant Manager in the Legal Department.
Subsequently, a new Chairman issued a Special Order re-assigning Caringal to the Assets and
Investment Department. Caringal protested this re-assignment, the same being a constructive
dismissal.

With this, the Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) wrote to the Manager of the PCSO
Administrative Department, stating that his office inadvertently omitted to stamp on petitioners
appointment the collatilla that the appointee does not have security of tenure until he obtains CES
eligibility. However, Director of CSC could not effect the necessary correction since petitioner has the
original copy of his appointment.

Caringal then filed with the CSC an administrative complaint for constructive dismissal and culpable
violation of the Constitution on civil service appointments. However, CSC dismissed the complaint,
affirming the complaint. Also, the Appellate Court issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition
and affirming the Resolutions of the CSC. Thus, this complaint

ISSUE: Whether Caringal is guaranteed its right to security of tenure

DECISION: No, Caringal was not guaranteed a right to security of tenure.

Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service La[9] provides:

(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof.

Career Executive Service Eligibility

Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of CES eligibility and the
inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board
through a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation is done of the examinees performance in the
four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.

Appointment to CES Rank

Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the
Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to
a CES rank is made by the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process completes
the officials membership in the CES and most importantly, confers on him security of tenure in the
CES.

In this case, there is no question that petitioner does not possess the required CES eligibility. Hence,
he has no security of tenure as his appointment is merely temporary. To be sure, his appointment
did not attain permanency. Such being the case, it can be withdrawn from him anytime without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

COLLANES vs CA
(Gultiano)
AMORES vs CSC

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Pepito M. Amores was the Deputy Director for Hospital Support Services at
the Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP). His civil service career began in 1982 when he was initially
engaged at the LCP as a resident physician. In the course of his service, he had been promoted to the
position of Medical Specialist, then to Department Manager,and finally to Deputy Director. Dr. Calixto
Zaldivar was then the Executive Director of the LCP and when he retired from service in 1999,
petitioner was designated as officer-in-charge of the LCP by the Department of Health (DOH) Secretary
Alberto Romualdez, Jr.

Petitioner had taken charge of the LCP in the interim that the DOH selection board was in the process
of selecting a new executive director.

Petitioner was caught by surprise when, on August 27, 2002, he received a letter from the LCP Board
of Trustees informing him of his separation from service as Deputy Director effective September 30,
2002. To the said letter was attached a copy of the Boards Resolution[16] dated August 23, 2002,
principally directing petitioners termination from service after consultation with the Career Executive
Service Board (CES Board). Petitioner brought an appeal from the resolution to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).

Resolving the appeal, the CSC declared that the LCP Board of Trustees had properly and validly
separated petitioner from his post as Deputy Director. It pointed out that petitioners separation from
service was anchored on his lack of a CES eligibility which is required for the position of deputy
director and, as such, he enjoyed no security in his tenure.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is eligible for the position

RULING: We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent
appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position
to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto.

Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service, which presupposes a permanent appointment,
takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. It is that which
entitles the examinee to conferment of CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of
CES eligibles. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board, conferment of the CES
eligibility is done by the CES Board through a formal board resolution after an evaluation has been
done of the examinees performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. Upon
conferment of CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board,
an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES
rank is made by the President upon the Board’s recommendation. It is this process which completes
the officials membership in the CES and confers on him security of tenure in the CES. Petitioner does
not seem to have gone through this definitive process.

At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the fact that because petitioner lacked the proper
CES eligibility and therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity, there could not
have been any violation of petitioners supposed right to security of tenure inasmuch as he had never
been in possession of the said right at least during his tenure as Deputy Director for Hospital Support
Services.
NTC vs Hamoy

FACTS: The National Transmission Corporation President and CEO Alan Ortiz, appointed Venusto
Hamoy as Vice President VisMin Operations & Maintenance (SG 28)

On January 2004, Ortiz issued Office Order detailing respondent to petitioners Power Center-Diliman,
under the Office of the President and CEO, to handle Special Projects. The Office Order No. was later
amended by another Office Order under which Ortiz assigned respondent additional duties of
providing over-all supervision, monitoring and control of all activities related to the sale of petitioners
sub-transmission assets and placed under his supervision certain personnel of the Sub-Transmission
Divestment Department.

Thereafter, Human Resources Department notified respondent of the impending expiration of the
temporary appointment of some key officials and the fact that he was being considered for one of the
positions to be vacated. Yet another Office Order was issued designating respondent as OIC of the
Power Systems Reliability Group (PSRG), concurrent with his duties as Vice President for Special
Projects.

Respondent then wrote Ortiz, asking that he be returned to his original assignment as Vice President
of VisMin Operations & Maintenance. He reasoned that his detail under the previous Office Orders
already exceeded one (1) year, and that his designation under this current Office Order violated
Section 2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 2002 because he did not give his consent thereto.

On March 2005, Ortiz issued a memorandum informing respondent that his detail to the Presidents
Office was no longer in effect and, in view of the vacancy created by the expiration of the temporary
appointment of the Vice President of the PSRG, respondent was designated as its OIC.

Respondent appealed to the CSC praying for the annulment of the Office Order on the ground that
the reassignment violated his security of tenure. The CSC denied respondents appeal. According to
the CSC, the position to which respondent was appointed was classified as a third-level position,
which was not station-specific, and thus he could be reassigned or transferred from one
organizational unit to another within the same agency, without violating his right to security of tenure.

On appeal to the CA. The CA disagreed with findings of the CSC. The CA held that only presidential
appointees belong to the third-level or career executive service. Thus, respondent, having been
appointed by petitioners president and not the President of the Philippines, occupies a second- level
position only.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the position of the respondent belong to the third level position or career executive
service.

RULING: No, The Administrative Code specifies the positions in the Civil Service as follows: (c) The
third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.

Positions in the CES under the Administrative Code include those of Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service
Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. Simply put, third-level positions in the Civil Service
are only those belonging to the Career Executive Service, or those appointed by the President of the
Philippines

In this case, Respondent was appointed Vice-President of VisMin Operations & Maintenance by
Transco President and CEO Alan Ortiz, and not by the President of the Republic. On this basis alone,
respondent cannot be considered as part of the CES.
To reiterate, the Third Level covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative
Code of 1987 and those identified by the CESB as of equivalent rank, all of whom are appointed by
the President of the Philippines