4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y.

| STATCON 

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

1. DEFINITION
Caltex v. Palomar
Facts:
Caltex conceived a promotional scheme which will increase its patronage for oil products called “Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest.” The contest calls for participants to estimate the number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. To participate, entry forms are only
needed which can be made available upon request at each Caltex station. No fee is required to be paid nor
purchase has to be made prior to participating. Foreseeing the extensive use of mails to publicize the
promotional scheme, Caltex made representations with the postal authorities to secure advanced clearance
for mailing. Caltex, through its counsel, posited that the contest does not violate anti-lottery provisions of
the Postal Law. The Postmaster General Palomar declined the grant of the requested clearance. Caltex
sought a reconsideration. Palomar maintained that if the contest was pursued, a fraud order will be issued
against Caltex. Thus, this case at bar.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief

2. Whether or not the proposed contest violates the Postal Law

Ruling:

The Court held that the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief since it
qualifies for the 4 requisites on invoking declaratory relief available to any person whose rights are
affected by a statute to determine any question of construction or validity.

1. There must be justiciable controversy

2. The controversy must be between persons whose interest are diverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination
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To the petitioner, the construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business while to the
respondent, suppression of the petitioner’s proposed contest believed to transgress the law he has sworn to
uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty.

Application of Statcon:

Using the rules of Statutory Construction in discovering the meaning and intention of the authors
in a case clouded with doubt as to its application, it was held that the promotional scheme does not violate
the Postal Law in that it does not entail lottery or gift enterprise. Using the principle “noscitur a sociis’,
the term under construction shall be understood by the words preceding and following it. Thus, using the
definitions of lottery and gift enterprise which both has the requisites of prize, chance and consideration,
the promo contest does not clearly violate the Postal Law because of lack of consideration.

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission

Facts:

A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. It consists
of one person only. An example is Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao.

On October 4, 1954, Rodis executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in Davao in favor
of Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao.

As a corporation sole covered by corporation code, they were required to submit affidavit
declaring that 60% of their members were Filipino citizens. Having only 1 incorporator and not meeting
the requirement, a resolution in view of the provisions of sec. 1 and 5 of art. XIII of the constitution,
R.C.A.A.D not qualified to acquire private lands in Philippines.

Sec. 5 Art. XIII: “In cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred except to those qualified to acquire lands of public domain in Philippines.”

Sec. 1 Art. XIII: All agricultural and other natural resources of Philippines belongs to the state
and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization shall be limited to citizens of Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by citizens, SUBJECT TO
ANY EXISTING RIGHTS, grant least or concessions AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF
THE GOV’T ESTABLISHED UNDER CONSTITUTION…

An action for mandamus was filed before the court which alleged that under corporation law, the
deed of sale executed by Rodis in favor of petitioner was actually a deed of sale in favor of Catholic
church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishments and maintenance of
places of worship.
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Petitioners maintained that a corporation sole is not prohibited to acquire properties irrespective
of the citizenship of the incumbent. That a corporation sole is not the owner of the property but only an
administrator of the temporalities. Another argument is that Filipino citizens forms 80% of the entire
catholic population of the entire catholic population. Based from Catholic directory of the Philippines,
Filipino clergy and women novices comprise of 60.5% which means it met the requirements.

However, Respondents argue that though petitioner is not the owner, yet he has control over the
same, to administer, take possession of, alienate, transfer sell or dispose of any or all the lands and their
improvements registered in their name of corporation sole and can collect receive, demand, or sue for all
money or values that may become due or owing to the corporation, vested with the authority to enter into
agreements with any persons, entities or concerns in connection with the said real property. Another is
that, case should be sustained because variety of people cannot just be pointed out as recipients of the
benefits from the property allegedly administered on their behalf. It cannot be said, therefore, that the
mass of people referred to as beneficiary exercise any right of ownership over the same. This set up falls
short of trust. Respondents tried to prove that beneficiaries are not the members but someone else.

Issue:

Whether or not the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to
acquire and register private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the sec. 1 and sec. 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution.

Held:

RCADI is qualified.

According to corporation law sec. 154:

“for administration of the temporalities… and management of properties… it shall be lawful for bishop or
other head priest to become corporation sole.”

Sec. 155:

In order to become a corporation sole the bishop or other head of the religious denomination must file
with the securities and exchange commissioner articles of incorporation setting following facts:

3. Bishop, elder is charged with administration, management… withing its territorial jurisdiction.

Sec. 163:

The right to administer all temporalities and properties be pass on the corporation to his successor in
office.

Sec. 159:
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

The power of corporation sole to purchase real property is not restricted although selling sometimes is.
Logically, if they can buy as well as sell it follows that they can register. As provided by law, lands held
in trust for specific purposes may be subject of registration and the capacity of corporation sole to register
lands to it is acknowledged and title thereto may be issued in its name.

Statcon Application:

The main problem of the case is the necessity of a proper and adequate interpretation of sec. 1 and
5 of art. XIII of the constitution.

The language it was expressed. Words employed to be taken in their natural sense except that
legal terms to be given their technical meanings. Imperfections of language results into ambiguities. To be
resolve in ways of discovering intent of the framers.

That framers of the constitution don’t have in their mind corporation sole when making sec. 1 and
5 of article XIII of the constitution. The dominating objective of the convention in drafting art. XII of the
constitution is the naturalization and conservation of our natural resources. Their desire to:

1. Insure their conservation of Filipino posterity

2. To serve as an instrument of national defense, helping to prevent the extension into the
country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration

3. To prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent
danger to its internal security and independence.

The main purpose it to wait for Filipinos to be ready to undertake it.

Respondents argument on the requisite of 60% of members shall be Filipino citizens not
applicable to corporation sole.

1. Corporation sole compose only of 1 person.

2. Corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner

3. Temporalities administered for the faithful residing inside its territory.

4. Corporation sole has no nationality.

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2. PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTION

City of Baguio v. Marcos

February 28, 1969

Facts:

On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings, Civil Reservation Case No. 1 involving the Baguio
Townsite, instituted to be reopened by Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio. On
November 13, 1922, Baguio Townsite was declared part of public lands and the land of private
respondent, Belong Lutes, was part of it.
On July 25, 1961, Lutes petitioned for the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1 claiming a parcel of
land was his and its registration be under his name on the grounds that (1) he and his predecessors have
been in actual and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish colonization & (2) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots who were not aware of the cadastral proceedings abovementioned.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco Joaquin Sr., Francisco Joaquin Jr., and Teresita
Buchholz opposed to the reopening and contended that (1) they have a legal standing in the proceedings,
(2) the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1 was not published, contrary to R.A. 931, and (3) the
petition to reopen has prescribed as provided by R.A. 931 (Joaquin based this on his contention that the
title and body (Sec. 1) of the law are in conflict with each other)

R.A. 931:
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS
OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, ​BY VIRTUE
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE
APPROVAL OF THIS ACT

Section 1 states that:

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…in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be
declared land of the public domain ​by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years
next preceding the approval of this Act, are
hereby granted.

Issues:
Whether or not filing for the reopening of said case was outside the 40-year period as provided by R.A.
931 which was enacted on June 20, 1953.

Held:
No, the filing for reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1 was within the 40-year period provided by
R.A. 931. With reference to the rules of Statutory Construction, laws should be construed liberally and
that the spirit and intent of the law should be reviewed and it must prevail over the text of the said law.
With that, R.A. 931 clearly expresses the substance of the law itself on the title and the intent of its
predecessor, Commonwealth Act 276 used the very same language in the title and its body, thus they are
to be construed relatively with each other otherwise, the Congress would have explicitly stated different
wordings making the former greatly different from the latter. In connection, the former is an act of
remedial legislation to the latter, as it gives an opportunity to anyone who has an interest in any parcel of
land which has been declared as public land to present his claim within the time prescribed. Hence, “By
Virtue of Judicial Decisions Rendered” from the title and “By Virtue of Judicial Decisions Instituted”
from Sec. 1 of the same law are not viewed as inconsistent by the Court. To conclude, Lutes’ petition to
reopen the said case is within the 40-year period provided by law.

MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation

Facts:

Petitioner, MCC Industrial Sales Corporation (MCC), is a domestic corporation situated at Binondo,
Manila, and is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. Respondent
Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong) is one of their suppliers with their head office situated in Seoul,
South Korea and a regional headquarters located in Makati City. The two companies conducted
businesses through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send ​pro
forma i​ nvoices containing the details of steel product order to MCC and if the latter conforms to such, its
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

representative will affix his signature on the faxed copy which will then be sent back to Ssangyong, again
by fax.

When ​Pro Forma​ Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and Nos. ST2-POSTS080-2 was finalized by both
parties, Ssangyong then sent 100MT of steel to MCC but failed to open a letter of credit (L/C) to pay
Ssangyong immediately. Several days upon failure to pay for the said steel, Ssangyong warned MCC that
they will be forced to cancel the contract because they are continuously incurring warehouse costs, cost
difference, interests and charges and other damages for breach of contract amounting to USD 170,000.
MCC failed to reply.

When Ssangyong’s case has been finished, MCC petitioned that the evidence presented against them for
breach of contract were inadmissible evidence because the ​Pro-Forma​ Invoices Re: ST2-POSTS080-1
and Nos. ST2-POSTS080-2 are merely photocopies of the facsimile printouts and such do not count as
admissible evidence under the law.

Issue:

Whether the photocopies of facsimile transmissions are considered as electronic evidence and thus,
admissible in evidence.

Held:

The photocopies of the facsimile transmissions are not considered as electronic evidence; thus, they are
inadmissible evidence. The ‘Electronic Commerce Act of 2000’ and the ’Rules on Electronic evidence’
adopted by the court defines “Electronic Data Message” and “Electronic Documents” as;

c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.

f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,

symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

xxx
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(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.

(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes
digitally signed documents and print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term
"electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message."

As such, the terms ​Electronic Data Messages​ and ​Electronic Documents​ are limited to those which are
“paperless” in form pursuant to the focus of the Electronic Commerce Law.

Since Facsimile Transmissions come from paper-based information which are scanned and sent through a
phone line or fax and are then re-printed by the receiving end, such is not considered as an “Electronic
Evidence”.
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3. WHEN CONSTRUCTION IS RESORTED TO

Garcia v. Social Security Commission
Facts: ​Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and
Consuelo Villanueva were directors of Impact Corporation. The corporation was engaged in the business
of manufacturing aluminum tube containers and operated two factories. Due to financial problems and
labor unrest, the corporation has not been able to remit contributions and premiums to SSS. Because of
this, SSS has filed numerous petitions to ask for the unremitted payments but the directors
aforementioned have not been able to respond. On 1 December 1995, the SSS-LCD led a petition wherein
the directors of Impact Corporation were directly impleaded as respondents, namely: Eduardo de Leon,
Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, Consuelo Villanueva, and petitioner. On 23 January 1998, Ricardo de
Leon died following the death, too, of Pacita Fernandez died on 7 February 2000. Petitioner averred that
Impact Corporation had ceased operations in 1980 and insisted that she was a mere director without
managerial functions, and she ceased to be such in 1982. Even as a stockholder and director of Impact
Corporation, petitioner contended that she cannot be made personally liable for the corporate obligations
of Impact Corporation since her liability extended only up to the extent of her unpaid subscription, of
which she had none since her subscription was already fully paid. The petitioner raised the same
arguments in her Position Paper. In a Resolution dated 28 May 2003, the Social Security Commission
ruled in favor of SSS and declared petitioner liable to pay the unremitted contributions and penalties.

Issue: ​Whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving director of Impact Corporation, can be made solely
liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium
contributions and penalties therefore.

Held : ​Yes, the petitioner can be made solely liable for the obligations. Corporation is a juridical entity
with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the
people comprising it. Following this, the general rule applied is that obligations incurred by the
corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Although as a rule,
the officers and members of a corporation are not personally liable for acts done in performance of their
duties, this rule admits of exception, one of which is when the employer corporation is no longer existing
and is unable to satisfy the judgment in favor of the employee, the officers should be held liable for acting
on behalf of the corporation. Therefore, the petitioner can be made liable for the corporate obligations of
Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties therefore.
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Statutory Construction Application: ​The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines construction of
a provision of law. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope
of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the
law, must be made.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

Date: April 30, 1985

- This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of First instance dismissing the petitioner's
complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Facts:

1. Petitioners were the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine.
2. Petitioners filed a case against Philex in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives
of its men working underground.
3. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the cause of action of the petitioner’s based
on “industrial accident” are covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and that the CFI has
no jurisdiction on the matter.
4. The petitioner replied that it was based on the Civil Code, particularly the provision that award of
actual, exemplary and moral damages.
5. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, because the case falls within the
jurisdiction of Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

Issue
1. Whether or not the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction in the case.

Ruling:
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The Supreme Court held that the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction on the matter. It should
be noted that the petitioners claim is based on the “actual, exemplary and moral damages” brought by the
incident to the petitioner. The petitioners did not recognize that what happened was an “industrial
accident”( as part of Workmen’s Compensation Act) but because of the gross negligence of the company
that is enshrined in the Civil Code.

Under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of
income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death
or injury is not due to the fault of the employer ( Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand,
damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity
recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through
the act or default of another.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CFI and remanded the case to the trial court.

-Reuben Jade Sobrevilla

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4. EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION
PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations

FACTS:
On February 27, 1976, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. held a certification election on who
would be the exclusive bargaining agent of all its employees. The National Federation of the Free Labor
Unions (NAFLU) won with 429 votes as against Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU)
with 419. 4 votes were cast wherein no union was preferred. The Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo
Noriel, then certified NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of Philippine Blooming Mills Company,
Inc.’s employees.

Despite winning by a majority, which is what is required under the Rules of Regulations implementing
the Labor Code, to be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, PAFLU sought to invoke the doctrine in
Allied Workers of Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations, wherein spoiled ballots
should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. As there were 17 spoiled ballots, PAFLU that there
was a grave abuse of discretion by Director Noriel in certifying NAFLU.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine in Allied Workers of Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial
Relations should be applied in this case.

RULING:
The law is on the side of respondent Director, not to mention the decisive fact appearing in the petition
itself that at most, only ten of the spoiled ballots "were intended for the petitioner Union," thus rendering
clear that it would on its own showing obtain only 424 votes as against 429 for respondent Union.

1. The essence of the certi fication process, "is that every labor organization be given the
opportunity in a free and honest election to make good its claim that it should be the
exclusive collective bargaining representative. It obtained a majority of the valid votes
cast. So our law prescribes. It is equally the case in the United States as this excerpt from
the work of Cox and Bok makes clear: "It is a well- settled rule that a representative will
be certifi ed even though less than a majority of all the employees in the unit cast ballots
in favor of the union.

2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at present embarked on a wide-scale

industrialization project. As a matter of fact, respondent is engaged in such activity.
Industrialization, "can thrive only as there is developed a stable structure of law and
order in the productive sector." That objective is best attained in a collective bargaining
regime, which is a manifestation of industrial democracy at work, if there be no undue
obstacles placed in the way of the choice of a bargaining representative. To insist on the
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

absolute majority where there are various unions and where the possibility of invalid
ballots may not be ruled out, would be to frustrate that goal. It is to avoid such a
contingency that there is this explicit pronouncement in the implementing rule. It speaks
categorically. It must be obeyed. That was what respondent Director did.

3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be imputed to respondent Director
presumably because of failure to abide by the doctrine or pronouncement of this Court in
the aforesaid Allied Workers Association case. The reliance is on this excerpt from the
opinion: "However, spoiled ballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or marked (Rules
for Certi cation Elections, Rule II, sec. 2) should be counted in determining the majority
since they are nevertheless votes cast by those who are qualified to do so. This
certi cation election is governed therefore, as was made clear, by the present Labor Code
and the Rules issued thereunder. When, as should be the case, a public o fficial acts in
accordance with a norm therein contained, no infraction of the law is committed.
Respondent Director did, as he ought to, comply with its terms. He took into
consideration only the "valid votes" as was required by the Rules.

4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support from the deservedly high repute
attached to the construction placed by the executive offi cials entrusted with the
responsibility of applying a statute. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation
thereafter embodied in the Rules. There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such
decision: "Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon
a statute by the executive o fficers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such
interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby."

Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds

Facts:
The petitioner, Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003 which classified the wheat to (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The memorandum provided for the
exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. The
corresponding tariff was 3% for food grade feed and 5% for feed grade. After the issuance, the respondent
filed in the RTC Las Piñas, alleging that the said memorandum summarily adjudged the wheat to be feed
grade without prior assessment and examination, despite it being food grade wheat and that it violates the
equal protection clause of the constitution as the flour millers and non-flour millers were treated
differently for no reason. The said memorandum subjected the respondents 7% tariff tax, forcing them to
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pay 133% of what was proper. However, the petitioners contend that claims of the respondent were
speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s
products. The RTC ruled that the memorandum order was invalid and of no force and effect.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in defense of CMO 27-2003 and was denied. The
petitioners now raised their petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue: ​Whether or not the said CMO 27-2003 is in violation of the equal protection clause of the
constitution.
(StatCon Issue): Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 is beyond the scope of powers of the Bureau of
Customs (as an administrative agency under the Executive Department).

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the said memorandum is in violation of the equal protection clause as there is no
reasonable classification. The court failed to see how the quality of wheat would be affected by who
imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
(StatCon): The court ruled that the CMO 27-2003 is beyond the scope of powers of the BOC and its
commissioner as he went beyond the powers limited in the Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law
which states that the Commissioner must first assess and determine the classification of the imported
article before tariff may be imposed. In this case, it is clear that the classification was not made by the
commissioner as it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the
proper classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by law.

Victorias Milling Co, Inc. v. Social Security Commission

Facts:
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On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all
employers in computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime time
pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration.

Victorias Milling Company, Inc. protest against the circular as it is contrary to a previous Circular
No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.

Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and the
employees’ respective monthly premium contributions. The counsel questioned the validity of the
circular. Social Security Commission overruled the objections

Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes before the supreme court on appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of
the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
this Act”

Held:

Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All remuneration for employment
include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash. Except:

1. that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month;

2. bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and

3. dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally
required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f) Compensation — All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than
cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned with the
interpretation of the law as amended which was Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce. The
Commission simply stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did
not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it
renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative
interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
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5. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
Article VIII, Section 1 and Section 4
Section 1. ​The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court
are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation
of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and
in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, 434-436

Source:
https://archive.org/stream/record-of-constitutional-commission-volume-1/fullRecordOfTheConstitutional
CommissionVolumeI_djvu.txt
434 ​The honorable Commissioner Concepcion is now recognized to sponsor the proposed Article on the
Judiciary.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER CONCEPCION

 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the
judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the
purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. But before I proceed, I would like to
present my regrets for being out, not being in the session hall when the Committee was called to report. I
thought we had a recess. And con- sidering our experience last night, when most of us were unable to
reach our homes until late in the evening, I thought it was an opportune moment to get some
reinforcement, if I may use the expression. And so, with the body’s indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says: The judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime
was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which
then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away
with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus^ that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: “Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it.” The Committee on
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request
an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for
the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with
a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case oi Javellanavs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not
mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated September
21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and
detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September
22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1986 435 not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also
because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of
the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or
22, had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed on the fundamentals of the Constitution. I
forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague. Commissioner
Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacanang.
In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to
accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the
operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public
discussions^of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion
on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may
use a word made famous by our colleague. Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the
draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacanang felt the
danger of its disapproval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15.
But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled
beginning, under the supposed supervision, not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then
designated as “citizens assemblies or barangays.” Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions
to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold
a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of
Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation
declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main
defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case.

Under the Constitution, the President may declare martial law in case of invasion, insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof. If public safety or public interest requires it, he may suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified
the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but
none of them had been notified of any referendum in the respective places of residence, much less did
they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wildfire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt
that there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum
and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of “political
question” was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

I hope the Commissioners who are not lawyers will bear with me as I explain further because the matter is
really a technical one. The Senate and the House had, under the 1935 Constitution, a House Electoral Tri-
bunal and a Senate Electoral Tribunal. Our friend, Mr. Lorenzo Tanada, was the only member of the
minority party in the Senate. The Constitution provided that electoral protests involving senators would be
a nine-man Senate Electoral Tribunal. Of these nine, three were to be members of the majority party in
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

the Senate and another three members for the minority party in the Senate; and lastly, three Justices of the
Supreme Court. After the majority party had elected its three representatives to the Electoral Tribunal, and
when it came to the nominations of the three senators for the opposition. Senator Taftada said that he
could not nominate any senator except himself because there was no other senator belonging to the
minority. The majority then nominated two senators belonging to the majority to form part of the group of
three to represent the minority. As a consequence, the majority would actually have had five members:
the Supreme Court, three and the minority, one. When the issue was brought to the Supreme Court, the
defense put up by the government was that the matter involved a political question. But in that case of
Tanada vs. Cuenco, the Court held that the Senate Electoral Tribunal was to consist of nine senators,
because the possible partisanship of the three members for the majority would be offset by that of the
three members of the minority. The group of three members of the Supreme Court constituting the third
group would ensure the impartiality in

436 THURSDAY, JULY 10, 1986 the decision of the Electoral Tribunal. The defense of the political
question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

We still had another important case. It was early after liberation. You probably remember that during
World War II, President Roosevelt of the U S announced over the television that the American
government would compensate or indemnify all damages we may suffer during the war up to the last
carabao. Liberation came and the American Congress apprpriated $1 billion for war damages but with
strings attached. We had to give them parity rights. The question was whether or not we should grant
these rights because of the issue in the election held in 1946. The majority party was in favor and another
political party opposed it, because there was $1 billion together with the parity rights.

In order to give parity rights to the Americans, it was necessary, however, to get a qualified majority in
both Houses of Congress. But the number of votes available to the majority party was a few votes short of
the required qualified majority. At that time there were half a dozen members elected in districts believed
to be dominated by leftists. By the way, the members of the minority belonged to what was known as the
Democratic Alliance. These members of the minority were suspended upon the ground that their election
was tainted with fraud and terrorism.

Then the constitutional amendment granting parity rights was taken and got the qualified majority
required by the Constitution. Assailed in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court held that the question
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

whether the suspended Members should be counted in the determination of the required qualified majority
was a political question. It was obvious that the members of the Democratic Alliance were suspended to
enable the ruling party to get the votes necessary for the approval of the bill calling a plebiscite on the
parity rights. When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following
questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law
but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: “We can tell your wife what her duties as such
are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity.”

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that: Judicial power includes the
duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable...

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system
of government, the Supreme Court has, also, another important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each
one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

Endencia v. David

August 31, 1953

FACTS:
A joint appeal was filed ordering Collector of Internal Revenue, Saturnino David, to refund the collected
income taxes of Justice Pastor Endencia in 1951 and Justice Fernando Jugo from January to October
1950, both as Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, respectively. The argument
of respondent is that the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer wherein it was decided that judicial
officer are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries during their continuance in office as
based from the Constitution was not received favorably by Congress. With that, they immediately enacted
R.A. 590 authorizing and legalizing the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. As
stated in Sec. 13, R.A. 590: No salary wherever received by any public officer... shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax. Payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by Constitution. Further, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is
not a decrease of compensation. Although, as expressly stated in Sec. 9, Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution:
The members of the SC and all judges of inferior courts... shall receive such compensation as may be
fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not imposing of income tax on the salaries of the Justices amount to a diminution
(2) Whether or not Sec. 13 of R.A. 590 is constitutional

Held:
(1) Yes, the imposition of income tax on the Justices’ salaries is a diminution. According to the decision
rendered in the Perfecto vs. Meer case, judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on
their salaries for it us an act of decreasing of a diminution of their salaries.
(2) No, Sec. 13 of R.A. 590 is unconstitutional. As clearly stated in Sec. 9, Art. 8 of the 1987
Constitution, imposing of income taxes on the judiciary’s salaries constitute a diminution, which shows
that the legislative department had their own interpretation of what the Constitution says and fully
disregarded the doctrine laid down in the Perfecto case. Such acts by the legislative in the enactment of
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

Sec. 13, R.A. 590 is an obvious case of encroachment of powers as the role of interpreting the
Constitution exclusively lie on the judicial branch.
To conclude, imposition of income tax on Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo amount to a diminution
which result to Sec 13 of R.A. 590 unconstitutional.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

July 15, 1936

Facts:

Petitioner, Jose Angara (Angara) and respondent Pedro Ynsua (Ynsua) were candidates for the position of
member of the National Assembly of the 1​st​ district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial board of
canvassers then proclaimed Angara as the member-elect of the National Assembly of his district for
receiving the most number of votes. However, when the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8
which allowed for protests to be filed against the elected members of the assembly, Ynsua filed for a
Motion of Protest against Angara to the Electoral Commission (ELECOM) that he be declared the elected
member of the National Assembly instead of Angara and the latter’s election for the contested position be
nullified. The ELECOM then adopted a resolution the following day that they will not be receiving any
complaints related to such matter.

Angara then filed for a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest” and argued that the ELECOM cannot set a
deadline for the resolution passed by the National Assembly because only the National Assembly has that
authority. Ynsua then answered by arguing that there is no legal or constitutional provision that prohibits
the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of a National Assembly after its
confirmation. Additionally, the Solicitor-General argued that since the ELECOM was created as an
instrumentality to decide on “all contests as to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly” they would naturally have the authority to set deadlines for such contests.

Issue:

Whether the ELECOM acted in without or excess of its authority when they decided to not receive any
further arguments or contests related to Resolution No. 8

Held:
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

The ELECOM acted within its authority when they decided to set a deadline to receive any further
arguments related to Resolution No. 8. The Constitution created the ELECOM as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department to decide “all contests as to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly”. Although Resolution No. 8 was passed by the National Assembly,
the ELECOM can set deadlines for such because of the power of necessary implication – that even if the
law does not expressly allow them to exercise the act of setting deadlines, since Resolution No. 8 is
directly related to their authority, it is only proper that they also have the authority to set deadlines for
such.

Marcos v. Manglapus
Facts: ​We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was
declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed,
has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from
various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

Issue: ​Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Held : Article VII Section I does not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President. It would not be accurate, however, to
state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as
head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated.

The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The matter at hand
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that once to safeguard
and protect general welfare. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The
preservation of the State — the fruition of the people's sovereignty — is an obligation in the highest
order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the
laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility. With these two arguments in mind, the President can prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of her executive power and fulfillment of
her duty to preserve the protection of the people.

Statutory Construction Application: ​When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established,
the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by
its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.

IBP vs Zamora
August 15, 2000

- This is a petition of prohibition against LOI

Facts

1. The President of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP
and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. Some of the crimes were robberies, kidnapping and carnapping.
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

2. In compliance, the PNP Chief, issued a Letter of Instruction which detailed the manner of the
cooperation of Marine and PNP in the project “Tulungan”, this will aim to a higher visibility of
both PNP and Marines in Metro Manila.
3. The IBP (Integrated Bar of the Philippines) filed the instant petition to the Supreme Court to
declare the LOI null and void as it is derogatory in Article II Section 3 of the constitution.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;

(2) Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review;

(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and civilian character of the PNP.

Ruling:

1. No, the IBP failed to sufficiently complied with the requisites to have a standing in the case. IBP
primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. It has failed
to show specific interest at stake because of this case.s
2. Yes, It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. It is
important to note that when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
3. No. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is
clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. In the performance
of this Court's duty of purposeful hesitation. before declaring an act of another branch as
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the President's judgment.​ To doubt is to sustain.

The petition was dismissed.

-Reuben Jade Sobrevilla

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti- Terrorism Council

FACTS:

Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the
Anti-Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto
Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito
Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief
Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should prosper.

RULING:

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the
discussion of the last two superfluous.

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that:
(1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government,
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the
government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in
that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questionable.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners
apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA
9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity,belies any claim of imminence of their
perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

interest in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied
by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest
is key.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and
(2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.

The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of
it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a
facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot
thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that
the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through
some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on
the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is
thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be
used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. DISMISSED.

David v. Arroyo
Facts: ​On February. 24, 2006, Pres. Gloria Arroyo declared P.D. 1017 which declared a state of national
emergency due to the series of action made by the extreme leftists (NDF-CPP-NPA). The PNP and AFP
were ordered to carry out the necessary actions and measures to suppress and prevent terrorism and
lawless violence in the country. However, after a week of the declaration and after all the petitions have
been filed, the PD. 1017 was lifted and Proclamation 1021 was issued which declared that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. In this case are 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and
prohibition which alleges the constitutionality of P.D. 1017 and G.O. no. 5. The respondents contend that
because of the issuance of 1021, the petitions made were rendered moot and academic, and that the Court
does not have the power to review factual cases of PD 1017 as it is beyond the scope of powers of the
Judiciary Department.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the issuance of PD 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
2. Whether Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PD 1017.

Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of PD 1021 does not render the petitions moot and
academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Even if the PD 1017 has ceased to exist,
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
In this case, all these exceptions are present, therefore the courts still have jurisdiction over the
petitions.
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In Marbury vs Madison, the concept of judicial review was enunciated, ​“The Constitution is the
supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It
confers limited powers on the national government. . . . I​ f the government consciously or
unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to oversteps
these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its
unconstitutional attempt, and thus to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional
attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in
vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This
power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.”
However, this judicial review may only be done by the courts if the following requisites are
present: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.
2. Yes. The Court ruled that the Supreme Court may review the factual basis of PD 1017. The
Supreme Court can only review the factual basis regarding the PR
PD 1017 itself but not the wisdom of the president in declaring the PD. Although the petitioners
contend that the issuance of PD 1017 is bereft of factual basis, the court ruled that it is not, as the
respondents showed a detailed narration of the events which led to the issuance of the said PD. In
the case of Integrated Bar vs Zamora, the court ruled that ​“it is incumbent upon the petitioners to
show that the President 's decision is totally bereft of factual basis that the President's decision is
totally bereft of factual basis" a​ nd that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then
"this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
In the same case, it is mentioned by the Court, under Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, that the power of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments, are strengthened. Under the new definition of judicial power, the
courts are authorized not only ​"to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
 4TH BATCH | A.C.M.R.S.S.Y. | STATCON 

government." ​Since the petitioners failed to prove that the PD 1017 was indeed bereft of factual
bases, the court was therefore convinced that the issuance of PD 1017 in calling military aid, was
justified.