Definition and nature of agricultural tenancy

Agricultural tenancy is defined as "the physical possession by a person of land devoted to

agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household in
consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price
certain or ascertainable, whether in produce or in money, or both." (RA 1199 [1954], sec. 3)
In Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992), the Supreme Court held that agricultural tenancy is
not a purely factual relationship. The written agreement of the parties is far more important
as long it is complied with and not contrary to law.

Gelos vs. Court of Appeals 208 SCRA 608 (1992)

Facts: Rafael Gelos was employed by Ernesto Alzona and his parents as their laborer on a
25,000-sq. m farmland. They executed a written contract which stipulated that as hired
laborer Gelos would receive a daily wage of P5.00. Three (3) years later, Gelos was informed
of the termination of his services and was asked to vacate the property. Gelos refused and
continued working on the land. Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer. The lower court
found Gelos as tenant of the property and entitled to remain thereon as such. The decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals. DHACES
Issue: What is the nature of the contract between Gelos and Alzona?
Held: The parties entered into a contract of employment, not a tenancy agreement. The
agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. . . . The petitioner would disavow
the agreement, but his protestations are less than convincing. His wife's testimony that he is
illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary in another proceeding. Her claim that
they were tricked into signing the agreement does not stand up against the testimony of Atty.
Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a witness (and as an attorney and officer
of the court) that he explained the meaning of the document to Gelos, who even read it
himself before signing it. . . . Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement
and suggests that they are the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The
work specified is not peculiar to tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired
laborer working under the direction of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the
nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that determines the relationship
between them. As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely
factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed,
and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important."

In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974), the Supreme Court distinguished leasehold
tenancy from civil law lease.
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The
subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may
be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the
leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil
law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws (at 596).

Gabriel v. Pangilinan
Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm
fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was
entered between them. Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but
upon request was extended for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an
agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff,
the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally
leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted,
subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that
which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that
he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall
take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and
such, personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter,
Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her father in administering the leased
property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the
fishpond, defendant’s other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest
all residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the
present case is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of
his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship
between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and
therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No.
1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil
lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction,
the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:
Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban
property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally
attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally
cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful
pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas
leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and
prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an
agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec
4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as
above enumerated are complied with.
The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third
requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond
personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's
immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and
such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term
"immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available
from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not
actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays
for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned
the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and
ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between
the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy
under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

Bejasa v CA
Facts:
On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her
attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the disputed land. On October 26,
1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan,
Jaime’s wife with a term of one year. On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay
Victoria rent of P15, 000.00 in consideration of an "aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga"
agreement, with a term of one year. After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria’s demand
to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any
consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest. On February 15, 1988,
the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for
confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria
and Jaime Dinglasan, amd the trial court ruled in favour of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas
Held:
The elements of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria
and the Bejasas, between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner
never gave her consent. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law
lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did.

Anastacio Victorio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez G.R. No.
110012 (March 28, 2001)

Facts:

Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor), the fathers
of herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador Fernandez,
respectively entered into a lease contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobon,
Lingayen, Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the said contract expired in 1977, the same
was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10 years until 1987 but adopting the terms and
conditions of the original contract. When the second contract expired, private respondent
repeatedly asked petitioner to vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused.
Consequently, a case for ejectment was filed by respondent against petitioner but was
consequently dismissed by the trial court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision holding that the lease contract is a
civil law lease agreement and ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in question and
surrender peaceful possession thereof.

Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals turned down the appeal,
in effect, ratiocinating that the court is strongly convinced and hereby finds and holds that
the agreement entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease and not one under
the agricultural leasehold system as expressly termed under R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844 and thus
entitled to security of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee whose right
over the subject premises ceased upon the expiration of the contract of lease?

Held:

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280
SCRA 235 [1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court
of Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 [1995).

Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and
private respondent's father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and not
as a "tenant". Petitioner cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father because "the
spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no stipulation regarding the
sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One of the essential requisites for
existence of tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and
no proof of this fact has been shown in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as
established by the evidence, was for the petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly lease
rental, with an advance payment of 3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy
relationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it
becomes available, during harvest time.

Elements of Tenancy Relations:

Teodoro vs. Macaraeg 27 SCRA 7 (1969)
Facts: Macaraeg had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past seven (7) years
when he was advised by the latter to vacate the property because it would be given to
another tenant. Thereafter, a new tenant was installed who forbade Macaraeg from working
on the riceland. On the other hand, Teodoro denied that Macaraeg was his tenant and
claimed that he had always leased all of his 39-hectare riceland under civil lease. He further
claimed that after the expiration of his "Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in 1961, the latter
did not anymore renew his contract.
Held: The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements of a
leasehold tenancy agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land
devoted to agricultural production. More specifically, the parties stipulated that "the
property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural enterprise only." Furthermore, the
parties also agreed that the farmland must be used for rice production as could be inferred
from the stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one
agricultural year . . . must be of the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE."
The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area of only
four and a half (4-1/2) ha. This court has held that even a bigger area may be cultivated
personally by the tenant, singly or with the help of the members of his immediate farm
household.
From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the
LESSEE," it can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg
personally work the land, which he did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant
case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding belonging to said
respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a fixed annual
rental." (italics supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg did not personally
cultivate the land in dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg
availed of outside assistance in the cultivation of the said riceland.
Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the possession
thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce. Evidently,
there was a valid leasehold tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision that the rental be
accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans per hectare — is an unmistakable earmark,
considering the other stipulations, that the parties did actually enter into a leasehold tenancy
relation (at 16-17; underscoring supplied).
Agricultural tenancy relation is different from farm employer-farm employee relation. The
Court clarified the difference in the case ofGelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992), as follows:
On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4)
the power to control the employee's conduct — although the latter is the most important
element.
According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished
from farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker
relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services
and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who
is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for
the farm employer and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the
employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the
agricultural produce or harvest." (at 614)
VALENCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122363, 401 SCRA 666
April 29, 2003
BELLOSILLO, J.:

Facts:
The property in dispute involves two (2) parcels of land situated in Canlaon City in Negros
Oriental. On 7 May 1957 Valencia acquired the first parcel from Bonifacio Supnet, on 22
October 1962 Valencia entered into a ten (10)-year civil law lease agreement over his two (2)
parcels of land with Henson. Before the ten (10)-year lease expired, without objection from
Henson, Valencia leased the property for five (5) years to Fr. Flores under a civil law lease
concept beginning 21 August 1970 or until 30 June 1975 after which the lease was cancelled
.The lease agreement between Valencia and Fr. Flores was subject to a prohibition against
subleasing or encumbering the land without Valencia's written consent.
During the period of lease, Henson instituted Cresenciano and Marciano Frias to work on the
property, also during the lease of Fr. Flores he designated 13 persons as overseer and when
the lease agreement between the Petitioner and Fr. Flores expired, Petitioner demanded to
vacate the property and instead the private respondents continued cultivating the premises
and refused to comply. On March 20, 1976, Valencia filed a letter to protest to DAR Regional
Office in Cebu City, while the private respondents without the knowledge of the Petitioner,
applied for the Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program pursuant to PD No. 27 claiming they were bona fide tenants of the property. Upon
issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer to the private respondents, the Petitioner
instituted the filing of the second letter contending the cancellation of CLTs.

Issue:

Whether or not a contract of civil law lease prohibits a civil law lessee from employing a
tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement? Otherwise stated, can petitioner's
civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without express authority to
do so under Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from
doing so, as in the instant case?

Held:
Contrary to the impression of private respondents, Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, does
not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of the
landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But certainly
nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically
authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse and
absurd situation where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this
perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to become a civil law lessee of the
landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right over the property
than the landowner himself. This tenant would then gain security of tenure, and eventually
become owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair to the hapless and
unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to
realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation
of a tenant by the civil law lessee.
On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee
cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary. In the case before us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary; the lessee is
expressly prohibited from subleasing or encumbering the land, which includes installing a
leasehold tenant thereon since the right to do so is an attribute of ownership. Plainly stated
therefore, a contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant
on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An extensive and correct discussion of the
statutory interpretation of Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the minority
view in Bernas v. Court of Appeals.
When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person
who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is
already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., a tenant or agricultural lessee already
works the land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural
Leasehold Relations," which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land; not
until then.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 32669 dated 27 July 1995 and its Resolution dated 22 September 1995 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Leopoldo Jeremias v. Estate of Mariano G.R. No. 174649. September 26, 2008 Chico-Nazario,
J.
Facts:
Irene P. Mariano (Irene), a widow, owned two parcels of land located at Barangay Balatas,
Naga City, Camarines Sur, with an aggregate area of a little more than 27 hectares. In 1972,
the 2 parcels of land were placed under the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27. The tenanted portion of the landholdings were subdivided among
identified tenant-beneficiaries, and a subdivision plan was made. Santiago Jeremias (father of
petitioner Leopoldo) was one the 40 tenant-beneficiaries. On June 26, 1988, Irene died
intestate who was succeeded by his two children, Jose P. Mariano and Erlinda M. Villanueva.
On 14 May 1989, Helen Mariano, Jose's wife, allegedly instituted Ruben Viñas (Ruben) as a
tenant, through an unsigned handwritten letter, despite the estate of the late Irene still
unpartitioned and under intestate proceedings.
In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed as administrator of the estate of Irene Mariano. He
lodged before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) separate complaints of
ejectment and damages against both Ruben Viñas and Leopoldo Jeremias for their refusal to
vacate despite oral and formal demands. Ruben's basis for saying he was a tenant is the
unsigned letter by Helen Mariano, while on the other hand, Leopoldo claims that by virtue of
succession, he lawfully acquired right to cultivate granted by Irene to his father Santiago
Jeremias.
Issue:
Whether or not Leopoldo Jeremias and Ruben Viñas are tenants of the lands belonging to the
late Irene Mariano which entitles them to security of tenure.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that they are not considered tenants entitle to security of tenure under
the law. Tenancy relationship arises if all the following essential requisites are present:
1)that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2)that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3)that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4)that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5)that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)that
the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Claims by one of the existence tenancy do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. In
this case, there is no substantial evidence that the petitioners were installed by the owner of
the lots in question as agricultural tenants on the property. There is, likewise, no evidence
that the petitioners shared with the landowner the harvest and/or produce from the
landholding. Hence, the Court reinstated the decision of the PARAD.

CENEZE VS. RAMOS

GR No. 172287; January 15, 2010

Facts:
1. Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of
agricultural land owned by respondent Feliciana Ramos, alleging that in 1981, Julian
Ceneze, Sr. (Julian, Sr.), petitioners father, transferred his tenurial rights over the
landholding to him with the consent and approval of respondent and that, since then,
petitioner had been in actual and peaceful possession of the landholding until April 12,
1991, when respondent forcibly entered and cultivated the land for the purpose of
dispossessing petitioner of his right as tenant.
2. Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed, arguing that she had never
instituted petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings. She averred that petitioner
had never been in possession of the landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr.
who was the tenant of the landholding. When Julian, Sr. migrated to USA in 1985,
respondent allowed Julian, Sr.’s wife to cultivate the land, but she herself migrated to
the USA in June 1988. Respondent later allowed Julian, Sr.’s son, Julian Ceneze, Jr.
(Julian, Jr.), to cultivate the landholding, but he likewise migrated to the USA in 1991
 without informing respondent. From then on, she took possession of the landholding,
cultivated it and appropriated for herself the harvest therefrom.

Provincial Adjudicator Ruling

Decision in favor of petitioner, declaring Ceneze a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding.

DARAB Ruling
Affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator’s ruling

CA Ruling
Resolved the petition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed petitioners complaint.
MR denied.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner failed to establish that he had a tenancy relationship with
respondent

SC Ruling

Yes.

Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon
the land; it is also a legal relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There
must be evidence to prove the presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest.[12] The absence of one element does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant.[13]

Petitioner submitted a Certification issued by the BARC Chairman attesting that the former is
a tenant of the landholding, but such certification is not binding on this Court. The
certification or findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of an authorized
representative) concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional in character.

To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the
tenants of the adjacent landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves, they do not show
that the elements of consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are present.
To establish consent, petitioner presented the Affidavit executed by Julian, Sr.However, the
affidavit which was not notarized cannot be given credence considering that it was not
authenticated.

The other tenants’ Joint Affidavit, likewise, fails to prove that petitioner is a tenant, more
particularly, that there was personal cultivation and sharing of the harvest. In this affidavit,
the affiants stated that they helped hand in hand with [petitioner] in harvesting and
threshing our palay products and helped him in delivering the share of [respondent] every
year. The affidavit is ambiguously worded, considering that the affiants are also tenant-
lessees of respondent and they could be referring to their own harvest.

The fact alone of working on a landholding does not give rise to a presumption of the
existence of agricultural tenancy.

To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented, because self-
serving statements are inadequate. In this case, petitioner failed to present a receipt for
respondents share in the harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing
of harvest.

Zamoras vs Su, Jr. ,184 SCRA 248 , 1990

Facts:
Victoriano Zamoras, was hired Roque Su, Jr., as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan. He
was made to supervise the coconut plantation and the sale of copra. He was paid a salary
plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of the copra. Another one-third of the proceeds went to
the tenants and the other third to Su. Sometime in 1981, Su entered into a loan with a certain
Anito and authorized her to harvest coconuts from his property while his loan was
outstanding. Zamoras was then laid-off temporarily until Su could obtain a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines with which to pay Anita. He was no longer allowed to
work as overseer of the plantation and without his knowledge and consent, Anita, harvested
the coconuts without giving him his one-third share of the copra sales. Zamoras filed a
complaint against Su, and Anita for illegal termination and breach of contract with damages
with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor and Employment in Zamboanga
City.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding that Zamoras, as overseer of the respondent's
plantation, was a regular employee whose services were necessary and desirable to the usual
trade or business of his employer and was thus illegally dismissed. Upon appeal to the NLRC,
the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed. It held that the relationship between the
parties was that of a landlord-tenant, hence, jurisdiction over the case rests with the Court of
Agrarian Relations.

Issue: WON Zamoras is an employee of Su, Jr. and thus jurisdiction of the case is with the
NLRC.
Ruling: Since Zamoras is an employee, not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC, not the Court of
Agrarian Relations,that has jurisdiction to try and decide Zamoras’ complaint for illegal
dismissal.

It was held that Su hired Zamoras not as a tenant but as overseer of his coconut plantation.
There is no evidence that Zamoras cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the
aid of his immediate farm household. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are
not present. Rather those of an employer-employee relationship exists between them. These
are the following: 1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut
plantation; 2. His duties were specified by Su; 3. Su controlled and supervised the
performance of his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced
from the plantation. And 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of
the copra sales every two months as compensation for managing the plantation.

Bernas vs. Court of Appeals 225 SCRA 119 (1993)

Facts: Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to her
brother, Benigno, so that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his children's
education in Manila. The property was leased by Bernas pursuant to a production sharing
arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad played no part in this
arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister but when the owners
sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish the property. Bernas was claiming
that he was an agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for
recovery of possession. The trial court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently
reversed by the CA.
Issue: Is consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of landowner, sufficient to
create tenancy relationship?
Held: Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity to enter
into an agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. "The law expressly grants him, as legal
possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property
he legally possessed." (at 125-126)

Facts: Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR)
alleging that he had been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land
previously owned by Socorro Vda. de Balagtas, and that the spouses Hilario have been
threatening him from entering and cultivating the land. Baltazar claims that he became the
tenant of Soccoro’s 2 hectare land by virtue of a “Kasunduan” executed between them,
stating that he built his own house on such land and planted “halaman”, the produce of which
was divided 70-30 and 50-50 in his favor. When Socorro died, Baltazar claims that he gave the
share pertaining to the landowner to her daughter, Corazon Pengson. On the other hand,
Petitioners aver that they acquired the land from PNB after it was foreclosed. Former owner,
Corazon Pengson, testified that at the time of partition, she declared the property for
classification purposes as “bakuran” and had no knowledge that there were other things
planted except bananas and pomelos. The CAR ruled that the subject land is not agricultural,
but plain bakuran hence, Baltazar is not a tenant. However, the CA remanded the case to the
lower court for further proceedings on the ground that the findings of CAR were not
supported by substantial evidence. Eventually, CAR found no tenancy relationship between
Baltazar and Pengson. Baltazar appealed to IAC, and the IAC reversed the decision of CAR.
Hence this instant petition for review filed by the spouses Hilario.

Issue: Did the IAC erred in not affirming the decision of CAR?

Ruling: Yes. The CAR is correct in ruling that Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding. The
partition of the subject lot resulted in the termination of the plaintiff’s tenancy relationship
with the previous landowner. Baltazar cannot claim that the landholding in questions is being
cultivated by him under the old contract. The law accords the landholding the right to initially
choose his tenant to work on his land. For this reason, tenancy relationship can only be
created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation. So, the mere cultivation of the land by the usurper cannot confer
upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of
tenure of the law. Therefore, Corazon Pengson had no tenancy relationship with him.

Disposition: Wherefore, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA is reversed and set
aside and the decision of the CAR is affirmed.

Hilario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

148 SCRA 573 (1987)
Facts:
Salvador Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract executed between him and
Socorro Balagtas involving a two (2)-ha property. According to Baltazar, in 1965, he
relinquished 1.5 ha to certain individuals and what remained under his cultivation was ½-ha
owned by Corazon Pengzon. After Socorro's death, no new contract was executed. Sometime
in 1980, the Hilarios started cultivating a 4,000-sq m portion of the property and enjoined
Baltazar from entering the same. The Hilarios claimed that they acquired the landholding
from the Philippine National Bank after a foreclosure proceeding. On the other hand, Corazon
Pengzon explained that she did not get any share from the produce of the land since 1964 and
she would not have accepted it knowing that she did not own the property anymore.
Held:
Baltazar is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As held in Tiongson v.
Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of
the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation.
"So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to
work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure of the law(Spouses
Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)."
Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the consent are
bound to recognize the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural land.
TIONGSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
130 SCRA 482
Facts:
Teodoro Macaya accompanied by Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went to the
house of Manotok in Manila and pleaded that he be allowed to live on the Balara property so
that he could at the same time guard the property and prevent the entry of squatters and the
theft of the fruits and produce of the fruit trees planted by the owner. Manotok allowed
Macaya to stay in the property as a guard (bantay) but imposed the conditions that at any
time that the owners of the property needed or wanted to take over the property, Macaya
and his family should vacate the property immediately; that while he could raise animals and
plant on the property, he could do so only for his personal needs; that he alone could plant
and raise animals on the property; and that the owners would have no responsibility or
liability for said activities of Macaya. Macaya was allowed to use only three (3) hectares. On
December 5, 1950, the property-owners organized themselves into a corporation. Sometime
in 1974, Macaya was informed by the Manotoks that they needed the property to construct
their houses thereon. Macaya agreed but pleaded that he be allowed to harvest first the
planted rice before vacating the property.
However, he did not vacate the property as verbally promised and instead expanded
the area he was working on. As he was being compelled to vacate the property, Macaya
brought the matter to the Department (now Ministry) of Agrarian Reforms.
Issue:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties
Held:
There was no tenancy relationship. The Court of Agrarian Relations found that Macaya is not
and has never been a share or leasehold tenant of Severino Manotok nor of his successors-in-
interest over the property or any portion or portions thereof but has only been hired as a
watchman or guard (bantay) over the same.
The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the landholder
and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural
production; and 5) there is consideration (Agustin, Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines, 1981, p. 19). As xxx All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant, as contradistinguished from a jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.
ENDAYA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 88113 October 23, 1992
215 SCRA 109

Facts:
The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of agricultural land
consisting of 20,200 square meters situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas, devoted to
rice and corn. As far back as 1934, private respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a
tenant of the Spouses respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the
Spouses San Diego under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. This fact, petitioners do not
dispute. On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners for the sum of
P26,000.00. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer
Certificate of Title was duly issued on January 7, 1981. Private respondent continued to farm
the land although petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately after the
sale to vacate the land. Due to petitioners’ persistent demand for private respondent to
vacate the land, private respondent filed in April 1985 a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Tanauan, Batangas praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of
petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the agricultural leasehold relationship between original owner and Pedro
Fideli was already terminated.

Held:
No, R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law
governing the events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971
and established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7 of the said
law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure by providing the following: "The agricultural
leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to
continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The
agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be
ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." The fact that
the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the subject landholding and gave the
lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is not among
the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. On
the contrary, Section 10 of the law provides:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — the
agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated
to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which agricultural leasehold
subsists resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as
lease, will not terminate the right of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law
by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor in
interest.

Reyes vs Joson
Facts of the Case: In 1962, Hilarion Caragay hired Loreto Reyes as caretaker/ watcher of a
fishpond and lot 1482 in Doña Francisca, Balanga, Bataan which he leased from Apolonio
Aguire. The contract of lease between Caragay and Aguire expired in 1973. Later on, Tomas
Aguire, son of Apolonio leased to Honorio Joson the same fishpond until it expires in 1982.
Tomas Aguire appointed Joson as administrator while Loreto Reyes continued to work as
fishpond/watcher. Joson as administrator leased the fishpond to Felizardo Maliboran for five
years. Reyes as bantay palaisdaan signed the contract as witness. Soon enough, same
contract of lease, expired. Joson reverted to the possession of the fishpond.
In November 1989, Caragay, the former lessee, re-entered the fishpond and proceed to
harvest bangus and prawn with the assistance of Reyes. Joson requested Caragay to vacate
the premise, but Caragay refused to that prompted Joson to file forcible entry in MTC Balanga
Bataan. They entered in a compromise agreement approved by the MTC that Caragay and
workers will vacate the property but Caragay failed to comply. MTC issued writ of execution.
With this, Reyes filed TRO in RTC Brach 3, Balanga, Bataan enjoining MTC from implementing
the writ.
RTC dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of jurisdiction and conferring upon the DAR
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate Agrarian Reform matters. MTC issued writ of
execution, ejectment of petitioner.
On October 1, 1990, Reyes filed in PARAB-San Fernando, Pampanga complaint for
maintenance of peaceful possession. Reyes alleged that he is agricultural tenant on the
fishpond, entitled to security of tenure and cannot be summarily ejected from property.
Additionally, he invoked that Caragay hired him as fishpond cultivator and he is an industial
partner, hence his share consist of 50% of the harvest. He also raised that when Caragay’s
contract of lease expired, Thomas Aguire hired him as caretaker-industrial partner and that
his status for 14 years ripened into bona fide tenant by operation of law. But Joson, denied
the allegations and according to him, Reyes is a mere fishpond watcher.
On August 18, 1992, PARAB rendered its decision, that Reyes is lawful owner the TRO is
permanent and awarded peaceful possession and actual occupation to Reyes. Joson appealed
in DARAB but of no avail. On November 2, 1996, DARAB affirmed the decision of PARAB and
reinstate back Reyes as tenant-tiller to the fishpond in question immediately without further
delay. The motion for reconsideration of Joson was denied. The case was elevate to CA and
disposed the case saying that DARAB erred in finding that petitioner is an agricultural tenant.
On March 20, 2000, CA granted Joson’s petition, set aside DARAB’s decision and conculsed
that circumstances contradicted by Reyes’ own averments in the complaints he filed with
PARAD but also incompatible with his act of signing the Malibaran lease contract in his
capacity as fishpond watcher and not as tenant.
Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Reyes is an agricultural tenant and therefore enjoys security of tenure.
Held:
No, Reyes is not and agricultural tenant.
Intent is the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists. Tenancy
Relationship is not purely factual relationship but legal relationship.
The requisites to establish tenancy relationship are the following: (1) that the parties are
landowner and tenant and agricultural lessee (2) subject matter of relationship is agricultural
land (3) consent between parties to relationship (4) purpose of relationship is to bring about
agricultural production (5) personal cultivation on the part of the tenant/agricultural lessee
(6) harvest is shared between the landowner and tenant/agricultural lessee.
Absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a de jure tenant, only when
established, he is entitled to security of tenure.
Consent of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is clearly absent. No proof that Aguirre
hired petitioner as tenant.
Crop sharing is not enough to establish tenancy as it is unusual for the landowner to receive
the production of the land from caretaker who sows.
Mere occupation of an agrarian landowner does not automatically convert a tiller or farm
worker into an agricultural tenant recognized under the agrarian law.
Tenancy status only arises if an occupant has been given possession of an agricultural
landholding for primary purpose of agricultural production.

Adriano vs Tanco
ADRIANO vs. TANCO, GR 168164

FACTS:

Respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692 hectares
located in Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned
among the respondents (Alice and her three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and
Patrick), each receiving 7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare.

Controversy arose when Alice sent letter to petitioner Vicente informing him that subject
landholding is not covered by CARP and asked him to vacate the property as soon as
possible. Seeing the letter as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland which
might impair his security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the regional office of
DARAB a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession. He averred that in 1970, the
husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since
then, he has been performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging,
and spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally between them. He
also alleged that he was allowed to improve and establish his home at the old building left by
Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the plantation. Presently, he is in actual possession
of and continues to cultivate the land. Respondents denied having instituted any tenant on
their property. Insofar as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant
but a mere regular farm worker.

PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente. It opined that since Vicente was performing
functions more than just a mere caretaker and was even allowed to live in subject
landholding with his family, he is therefore a tenant. Thus, respondents appealed to the
DARAB which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since the landholding is an
agricultural land, that respondents allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees, and that
they divided the fruits equally between them, then an implied tenancy was created. The case
was then elevated to CA via a Petition for Review. They contended, among others, that the
essential elements of tenancy relationship are wanting in the instant controversy. They
claimed that their property is not an agricultural land, but lies within a mineralized area; Alice
hired Vicente as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of their relationship is that of an
employer-employee relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties share in the
harvest. The CA rendered a Decision in respondents’ favor. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a bonafide tenant-farmer.

HELD:

Laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice are not
only meant to favor the poor and the underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those
who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of
protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in
the guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against
them.

The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy relationship exists are not supported by
substantial evidence.

Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once
they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to
the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue
working on and cultivating the land.

The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a
tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy relationship to exist,
the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4)
the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6)
there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the requisites must concur in order to
establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is
fatal.

After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm the findings of the CA that
the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.

Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform

168 SCRA 248 (1988)
Facts:
Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale, Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental to the owner.
Abajon was also allowed to plant on a portion of the land and that the produce thereof would
be shared by them on a 50-50 basis. When the new owners took over, they told Abajon to
transfer his dwelling to the southern portion of the property because they would be building a
poultry near Abajon's house. Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they needed
the property. Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that Abajon
dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation.
Held:
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker
who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and
to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said
portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is
clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes.
Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private
respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.

ANTONIO EVANGELISTA Y LISING, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, LUZ CASTAÑEDA and
HEIRS OF BENEDICTO SANCHEZ, Respondent.

1. AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM LAW; AGRICULTURAL LESSEE DISTINGUISHED FROM CIVIL

LESSEE. — A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee (under Rep. Act
No. 3844) is entitled to security of tenure over the landholding he works at. Not even the
expiration of any term or period fixed in the leasehold contract, in the case of an agricultural
lessee, will cause the lessee’s ejectment from the land. On the other hand, a civil lessee, under
a contract of civil lease, does not enjoy security of tenure over the land object of the contract.
A civil lessee can be ejected from the land after the expiration of the term provided for in the
contract.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, GENERALLY

FINDING AND CONCLUSIVE. — The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner
was not a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land in question, which are based on the evidence
on record, is final and conclusive. The salient characteristic which would make the
relationship between the petitioner and Sanchez one of agricultural leasehold, and which is
personal cultivation by the petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household, is
absent in the case at bar. As cited in the decision of the respondent court, petitioner’s own
witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted that petitioner used to hire many plowers, harrowers and
planters as well as farm laborers, who were paid by him, and that he himself (Maclang)
helped the appellee work on the land for 3 years. This Court is aware of the practice of many
landowners, as a way of evading the provisions of tenancy laws, to have their tenants sign
contracts or agreements intended to camouflage the real import of their relationship. But in
the case at bar, the grounds cited in the decision of the respondent court indicate that the
contracts entered into were bona fide civil lease in nature, and that they were entered into by
the petitioner voluntarily.

3. AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM LAW; TENANCY; PERSONAL CULTIVATION, INDISPENSABLE

REQUISITE. — As held in Carag v. Court of Appeals, absent the requisite of personal
cultivation, by the alleged tenant, no tenancy relationship can be said to exist between him
and the landowner. Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee. He has
not personally or by his farm household, cultivated the land in question.

4. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; LEASE; LESSEE WHO ENTERED INTO THREE CONTRACTS OF LEASE
CANNOT LATER BE HEARD TO CLAIM THAT HE IS AN AGRICULTURAL LESSEE. — A person who
signed for three consecutive times a contract of lease (Kasulatang Option and Kasulatan ng
Buwisan), with the intent of establishing a civil lease contract, cannot later be heard to claim
that he is a tenant or an agricultural lessee.

The only issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Rep. Act
No. 3844, and therefore entitled to security of tenure over the landholding, in question, or a
mere civil law lessee, who does not enjoy security of tenure in the sense that he may he
ejected from the landholding upon the expiration of the term provided in the contract of
lease.

A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an agricultural lessee (under Rep. Act No. 3844) is
entitled to security of tenure over the landholding he works at. Not even the expiration of any
term or period fixed in the leasehold contract, in the case of an agricultural lessee, will cause
the lessee’s ejectment from the land. On the other hand, a civil lessee, under a contract of civil
lease, 11 does not enjoy security of tenure over the land object of the contract. A civil lessee
can be ejected from the land after the expiration of the term provided for in the contract.

The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-
farmer on the land in question, which are based on the evidence on record, is final and
conclusive. 12 The salient characteristic which would make the relationship between the
petitioner and Sanchez one of agricultural leasehold, and which is personal cultivation by the
petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household, is absent in the case at bar. As
cited in the decision of the respondent court, petitioner’s own witness, Nicolas Maclang,
admitted that petitioner used to hire many plowers, harrowers and planters as well as farm
laborers, who were paid by him, and that he himself (Maclang) helped the appellee work on
the land for 3 years. Even the decision of the trial court showed that petitioner did not
personally cultivate the land in question. It held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Nicolas Maclang declared that he saw plaintiff (Evangelista) work on the land in question
from 1962 to 1965; . . .; that he (Maclang) helped the plaintiff work the land in question by
plowing and harrowing the same for 3 years under the suyuan system; that the Plaintiff used
his 2 carabaos and own farm implements in the cultivation of the land in question and that
the plaintiff had other companions in plowing and harrowing the landholding under the
suyuan system (tsn, hearing of September 26, 1969, pp. 47-60). Defendant Domingo declared
that during the time he was working the land of his mother which is adjacent to the land in
question, he saw Nicolas Maclang, Pedro Caparas and Felipe Bernardino plowing and
harrowing the landholding in question and cleaning the dikes thereon (tsn., hearing of
January 8, 1970 pp. 22-23)." 13 [Emphasis supplied]

As held in Carag v. Court of Appeals, 14 absent the requisite of personal cultivation, by the
alleged tenant, no tenancy relationship can be said to exist between him and the landowner.
Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee. He has not personally or by
his farm household, cultivated the land in question.

The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate that the land
holding should be personally cultivated by the petitioner and the immediate members of his
farm household, indicates the intent of the parties to establish only a civil lease relationship.

A person who signed for three consecutive times a contract of lease (Kasulatang Option and
Kasulatan ng Buwisan), with the intent of establishing a civil lease contract, cannot later be
heard to claim that he is a tenant or an agricultural lessee.

DE Jesus vs IAC: Absent the requisite of personal cultivation, petitioner de Jesus cannot be
considered an agricultural lessee. In the case of Evangelista v. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court
held that one cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee if he has not personally or by his
farm household cultivated the land in question. Moreover, it is an undisputed fact that
petitioner is cultivating an adjacent fishpond with a size of 11-1/2 hectares which further
proves that he is not a small farmer but a businessman. De Jesus is not a small farmer but a
businessman. To consider him an agricultural lessee despite the fact that he is cultivating
another fishpond with an area of 11-1/2 hectares, and furthermore despite the fact that he
does not cultivate the fishpond personally and/ or with the help of his immediate farm
household as defined by law, would render nugatory the letter and intent of the Agricultural
Reform Code.

Rosalinda Bonifacio et. al., v. Judge Dizon

G.R. No, 79416
FERNAN, C.J.:

FACTS:
Olimpio Bonifacio as the owner of a land which the private respondent, Pastora San Miguel,
was an agricultural lessee. On July 1, 1968, Olimpio filed a complaint seeking the ejectment of
private respondent from Bonifacio’s 2-hectare agricultural land. The CAR granted the
ejectment of Pastora San Miguel. On appeal by the private respondent, the CA modified the
judgement with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio to pay her in P1,376.00. Still
dissatisfied, private respondent sought relief to SC. During the pendency of the case, Olimpio
died andwas succeeded by his heirs. However, no notice of such death was given to the Court,
hence no order of substitution of his heirs was made. SC resolved to deny the petition of the
private respondent for lack of merit, SC affirmed the decision of CA. Subsequently, petitioners
(heirs of Olimpio) moved for the execution of the decision by RTC of Bulacan. The Deputy
Sheriff submitted his report stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by the
private respondent which the latter refused the vacate. Private respondent moved to quash
the execution. RTC held the decision of the sheriff to be null and void, and that the motion for
demolition was denied. Petitioners conteded that the judge committed grave abuse of
discretion. They assert that the CAR case, being an ejectment case survives the death of a
party. Private respondent, on the other hand, stress on the fact that the action is not an
ordiary ejectment but an agrarian case for the ejectment of the agricultural lessee.

ISSUE:
Won, the compulsory heirs inherit the favorable judgment obtained by the decedent, thereby
vesting to the former, all rights conferred by the judgment to the decedent.

RULING:

Petition is granted.
SC reads Sec. 36 (1), R.A. 3844, which provides, for the continuation in the enjoyment and
possession of an agricultural lessee of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory. Under such provision, the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor
desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so
desired. The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner’s immediate family members
evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and
still) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. Whether used in
reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term “personal cultivation” cannot b given
restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either the lessor or lessee. In
either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor’s or lessee’s immediate family. The
CAR case not being a purely personal right, the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs
and successors-in-interest.
Oarde vs CA
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
harvests. All these must concur to establish the juridical relationship of
tenancy.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Markedly absent in the case of Petitioner Molar is the element of personal cultivation. Both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Molar herself did not actually cultivate the
land, nor did her immediate family or farm household. Instead, she hired other people to
do all phases of farm work.9 Even her co-petitioner testified that she did not actually till the
land and that she merely paid laborers to perform such task.10 Thus, public respondent aptly
held:11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The trial court noted that Presentacion made inconsistent answers when asked when she
began tilling the land, before she finally declared that she started tilling the property way
back in 1965 (tsn, July 1, 1989). However, the element of personal cultivation is essential for
an agricultural leasehold; that is, that there should be personal cultivation by the tenant or by
his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons who
are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities
(Evangelista v. CA, 158 SCRA 41). The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate
family to work the land (Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many
persons to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus v.IAC, 175 SCRA 559).
In this case, Zacarias Oarde, testifying for Presentacion Molar, (tsn, May 16, 1989) declared
that Presentacion does not actually till the land but she pays laborers to till the land (p. 12);
she is single, owns no working animals, nor farm implements (p. 9). Presentacion herself
admitted that she has the property tenanted on pakyaw basis meaning that she hires
different persons for harrowing, for plowing, and for harvesting and that she did not actually
till the land, but merely pays others because (I) am a woman; she owns a small store (tsn, July
11, 1989, pp. 16-19).
We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord is divested of his
landholding and somebody else is installed to become a new landlord. (Underscoring
supplied.)
We stress that both the respondent appellate court and the trial court found that Petitioner
Molar was not a tenant of Private Respondent Wilfredo Guerrero.

Matienzo vs Servidad
It is clear from Exhibit C that plaintiff was made an overseer of defendant, not a tenant. lt
was likewise expressly stipulated therein that "the conditions for clearing the land are these:
With respect to all your plants we will share no percentage for the land." And again, "all
those (coconuts) that we are to plant no share will be taken for the land. 13 The basic element
of sharing in agricultural tenancy, therefore, is absent. The one-third share plaintiff received
from copra-making constituted payments for the processing of copra. These are evidenced by
receipts 14. Plaintiff also got paid for clearing the coconuts as shown by Exhibits 7 and 7-A 15.
as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within his immediate household,
cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or
both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the above definition of a tenant, it is clear
that absent a sharing arrangement, no tenancy relationship had ever existed between the
parties. What transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he
was to supervise applications for loans from those residing therein; he was allowed to build
his house thereon and to plant specified plants without being compensated he was free to
clear and plant the land as long as he wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him
and defendant; and he was not obligated to pay any price certain to, nor share the produce
with, the latter.
Although Exhibit 6 states that plaintiff and his wife were made "caretakers" of the land, there
is a definite provision in both Exhibits C and 6 that defendant would not share in the produce
of plaintiff's plants. Because of this aspect, the ruling in Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88 (1966),
which holds that a I caretaker of an agricultural land is also considered cultivator of the land",
finds no applicability.

Isidro vs CA
Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In 1985,
Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed
petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a
portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon
demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into
a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the
return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land,
claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case
because it ruled that it is an agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts. Private
respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the
CA, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
Issue: Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil courts
Held: No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an
agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is
agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law
provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being
agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a
controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as
previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy
is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land.
It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is
installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not
contrary to law, are even more important.
Cornea vs Leal Realty
After a thorough evaluation of the records, we conclude that petitioners failed to adduce
substantial evidence to show the existence of all the indispensable requisites for the
constitution of a tenancy relationship. We shall address the elements of tenancy33 seriatim as
they apply to the instant Petition.
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it
appears that there was personal cultivation34 by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
of the subject landholding, what was established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy was
founded on the self-serving testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in
a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner
thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced.35 Such
claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on the
shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they
failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply
put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff
in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.36 The same rule applies to administrative
cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent
is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.37 While it might have been shown
and not contested that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely JACINTO, PABLO,
JUANITO and FRANCISCO38 occupied the subject landholding as tillers thereof, the records
support the fact that their occupancy was in the nature of hired laborers of JOSEFINA. This
was the factual finding of the Provincial Adjudicator which was seconded by the Court of
Appeals. On the other hand, there is evidence to support that the subject landholding was not
tenanted. As can be gleaned from the Entry No. E-17-7182,39 annotated on 2 June 1977 at the
back of TCT No. 103275, covering the subject landholding in the name of JOSEFINA, the same
was not tenanted. Moreover, Entry No. E-22-4361, dated 26 March 1982, also annotated on
the aforesaid certificate of title, is explicit that the subject landholding is not
tenanted.40 Further, the records reveal that petitioners' predecesssors-in-interest, namely
PABLO, JACINTO, FRANCISCO and JUANITO, executed an affidavit on 8 December 1988,
attesting that they were working on the subject landholding as "hired laborers
only."ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ These facts taken together were deemed
by both the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals to be corroborative of the entries
annotated on TCT No. 103275 that the subject landholding was indeed not tenanted, and that
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest were hired laborers of JOSEFINA. Such type of occupation
on the subject landholding does not create a presumption of tenancy in petitioners' favor.
Clearly, the fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of
the existence of agricultural tenancy.41
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests
in the context of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-
interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented.42 None was shown. No receipts
were presented as testaments to the claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence
submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests was the testimony of petitioner
Rodolfo Cornes. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the basis
alone of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value.
Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced.43If at all,
the fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. 44
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals
that the testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the
subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To
prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may be made upon the said public officer's testimony.
What cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of this Court that the findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in
a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the
courts.45 This ruling holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that
petitioners, as herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the indispensable
elements of tenancy.
The element of consent in the creation of the tenancy relationship was sorely missing. As was
seen earlier, even petitioners' predecessors-in-interest were unequivocal in their admission
that they worked as hired laborers on the subject landholding. The intent, if any, to institute
them as tenants of the landholdings was debunked by their very admission.
All the requisites46 must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties
and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal to petitioners' cause. It cannot even make
the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant.47 This is so
because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws.48

Association of Small Landowners v DAR Secretary

Facts:
These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian
Reform Program. The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the provision of
RA 6657 regarding the modes of payment of just compensation is unconstitutional insofar as
it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in
less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. RA 6657 allows the payment
of just compensation by means of LBP Bonds, Shares of Stocks in government-owned or
controlled corporations, and tax credits.
Issue:
Whether or not payment of just compensation other than money is allowed
Held:
It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation
is money and no other. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the
power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation. Agrarian Reform program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will
be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws
before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than
the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our
present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time. It is assumed
that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption
that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that
the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional
if more practical method.

Notice of Coverage

Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA

Facts:
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of
Nasugbu, Batangas. On May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer
to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and
Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance
with the CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda Caylaway but the sane was
denied. Thereafter, petitioner sought the conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural
to other use but the petition was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should observe due process
Held:
For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the
Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner,
the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties; and
(2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The taking
contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The
exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking
of private property.
Retention
Alita v CA
Facts: Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject parcel of lands
through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private
respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to
vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June 18, 1981, private
respondents instituted a complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees,
Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to
lands obtained through homestead law. The RTC dismissed the complaint but on motion for
reconsideration it declared that P.D. 27 is not applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to
the CA, the decision of the RTC was sustained.
Issue: Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are covered by CARP
Held: Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping
social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of
the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of
the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Philippine
Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of
the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. Provided, that the original
homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.

Daez v CA
Facts: Eudosia Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio
Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said
land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27
as amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by
the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers, Eudosia Daez
applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as
well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the
petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having
been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Regional Director allowed Daez to retain the
subject land but the DAR Secretary reversed that decision. She appealed to the Office of the
President which ruled in her favour. Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed the
decision of the Office of the President.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of application for exemption under PD 27 would bar an
application for retention under RA 6657
Held: The requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and
those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention are
different. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application
for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one
does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural
impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-
hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a
decision that became final and executory.

Exemption/Exclusion
Luz Farms v DAR Secretary
Facts: Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13,
Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof. Petitioner prayed that aforesaid laws,
guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. It argued that Congress in enacting the said
law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution in including land devoted to the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
Issue: Whether or not lands devoted to livestock and poultry business are included in the
coverage of CARL
Held: From the discussion of the Constitutional Commission that Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which
includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising
in the definition of commercial farms is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-
industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.
There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional.
 Classes of agricultural tenancy
Agricultural tenancy is classified into share tenancy and leasehold tenancy (M. A.
GERMAN, SHARE AND LEASEHOLD TENANCY, 13 [1995]).
Share tenancy means "the relationship which exists whenever two persons agree on a
joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the
other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of
production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between
the landholder and the tenant." (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963]. Sec. 166 [25]).
With the passage of RA 3844, share tenancy has been declared to be contrary to public
policy and abolished (Rep. Act No. 3844[1963], sec. 4) except in the case of fishponds,
saltbeds, and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian and other
similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of said Act (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec.
35). When RA 6389 (1971) was enacted, agricultural share tenancy has been automatically
converted to leasehold but the exemptions remained. It was only under RA 6657 when the
exemptions were expressly repealed.
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household undertakes to cultivate a piece of
agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by, another in consideration of
a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 4).
Under RA 6657, the only agricultural tenancy relation that is recognized is leasehold
tenancy. Said law expressly repealed Sec. 35 of RA 3844, making all tenanted agricultural
lands throughout the country subject to leasehold.
Leasehold tenancy may be established by operation of law, that is, through the abolition of
share tenancy under Sec. 4 of RA 3844; through the exercise by the tenant of his right to elect
leasehold; or by agreement of the parties either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly,
which was the condition before 1972 (M.A. German,supra, at 27).
Leasehold relation is instituted in retained areas with tenant(s) under RA 6657 or PD
27 who opts to choose to remain therein instead of becoming a beneficiary in the same or
another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. The tenant must exercise his
option within one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for
retention (Rep. Act No. 6657[1988], sec. 6). Leasehold relation also exists in all tenanted
agricultural lands that are not yet covered under CARP (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
The institution of leasehold in these areas ensure the protection and improvement of the
tenurial and economic status of tenant-tillers therein. (Rep. Act No. 6657 [1988], sec. 6).
Leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease
In Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974), the Supreme Court distinguished leasehold
tenancy from civil law lease.
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The
subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may
be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the
leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil
law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the
landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws (at 596).
Elements of Agricultural Tenancy
The following are the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relation:
a) The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
b) The subject is agricultural land;
c) There is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land, given either
orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;
d) The purpose is agricultural production;
e) There is personal cultivation or with the help of the immediate farm household; and
f) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in money and/or
produce. (Carag vs. CA, 151 SCRA 44 [1987]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590
[1974]; Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991])
The Supreme Court emphasized in numerous cases that "(a)ll these requisites must concur
in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de
jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws." (Caballes v. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988])
In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969), the Court found all the elements of an
agricultural leasehold relation contained in the contract of lease executed by the parties.

Parties: landholder and tenant

Tenant defined.
 A tenant is "a person who by himself, or with the aid available from within his immediate
household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder or for a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system." (Rep. Act
No. 1199 [1954], sec. 5 (a)).
An overseer of a coconut plantation is not considered a tenant.

Zamoras vs. Su, Jr.

184 SCRA 248 (1990)
Facts:
Zamoras was hired by Su as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan City. Zamoras was tasked
to have the land titled in Su's name. He was also "assigning portions of the land to be worked
by tenants, supervising the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, the harvesting
of coconuts and selling of the copra." As compensation, he was paid salary of P2,400 per
month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of the copra. Su got another 1/3 of the proceeds
while the other third went to the tenants. In 1981, Su obtained a loan from Anita Hortellano
and the latter was authorized by Su to harvest the coconuts. Meanwhile, he informed
Zamoras that he was being temporarily laid-off until the loan is settled. Zamoras filed a case
for illegal termination and breach of contract before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
Ministry of Labor. The Labor Arbiter held that Zamoras' dismissal was without just cause and
ordered Zamoras reinstatement. On appeal, the National Labor Relation Commission
reversed the Labor Arbiter by holding that there is no employee-employer relation existing
between the parties but a landlord-tenant relation hence jurisdiction rests with the agrarian
court. Zamoras assailed the decision of NLRC.
Held:
The NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Su and Zamoras is
not supported by the evidence which shows that Zamoras was hired by Su not as a tenant but
as overseer of his coconut plantation. As overseer, Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned
their respective portions which they cultivated under Zamoras' supervision. The tenants dealt
directly with Zamoras and received their one-third share of the copra produce from him. The
evidence also shows that Zamoras, aside from doing administrative work for Su, regularly
managed the sale of copra processed by the tenants. There is no evidence that Zamoras
cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the aid of his immediate farm
household.
The following circumstances indicate an employer-employee relationship between them: 1.
Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut plantation. 2. His duties
were specified by Su. 3. Su controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He
determined to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced from the plantation. 4. Su paid
Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of the copra sales every two months as
compensation for managing the plantation."
There is no tenancy relation because the element of personal cultivation does not exist.

Castillo vs. CA
205 SCRA 529 (1992)
Facts:
Alberto Ignacio filed a complaint for injunction against Castillo alleging that he is the
agricultural tenant of the latter. He claims that Castillo allowed him to construct a rest house
in the property and that, thereafter, Castillo started cutting fruit-bearing trees on the land
and filled with adobe stones the area intended for vegetables. On the other hand, Castillo
denied that Ignacio was his tenant but that the latter was only a "magsisiga" of the
landholding and that he did not ask permission from Ignacio when he constructed his rest
house. The trial court found no tenancy relationship between the parties but this was
reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Held:
The element of personal cultivation is absent in this case. The alleged tenant "is a
businessman by occupation and this is his principal source of income. He manufactures
hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and poultry farm as well as a hardware store on the land
adjoining the subject land. To add to that, the respondent farms the riceland of one Dr. Luis
Santos. It is thus evident that the working hours of the respondent as a businessman and his
other activities do not permit him to undertake the work and obligations of a real tenant.
This is further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent cannot even personally
perform the work of a smudger because on 22 October 1986, the respondent hired some 20
people who are not members of his family to cut and burn the grass in the premises of the
subject land." (at 535-536).
An owner tilling his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation of the
law (Baranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 194 (1990).
In Oarde vs. CA, et al., 280 SCRA 235 (1997), certifications of tenancy/non-tenancy issued
by DAR are not conclusive.
"The certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a
tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts, as ruled by this Court in Cuaño vs.
Court of Appeals, citing Puertollano vs. IAC. Secondly, it is well-settled that the "findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in
a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties is merely preliminary or provisional and is not binding upon the courts."
(at 246)
Landholder-lessor
A landholder-lessor is defined as "any person, natural or juridical, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land, who lets, leases or rents to another said
property for purposes of agricultural production and for a price certain or ascertainable either
in an amount of money or produce." (Rep. Act No. 1199 [1954], sec. 42). Thus, consent need
not be necessarily given personally by the registered owner as long as the person giving the
consent is the lawful landholder as defined by law.

Subject is agricultural land

For agricultural tenancy to exist, the subject of the agreement must be an agricultural land.
 RA 6657 defines the term "agricultural land" as "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land." (see discussion on scope of CARP, Chapter I). Under RA 3844, "agricultural land" refers
to land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds,
idle land and abandoned land.
The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit, but he should
cultivate the entire area leased. The three (3) hectare limit under RA 6657 applies only to the
award that may be given to the agrarian reform beneficiary.

Consent by landholder
As discussed earlier, consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder of the
property. In Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987), the Supreme Court held that tenancy
relation does not exist where a usurper cultivates the land.

Endaya vs. Court of Appeals

215 SCRA 109 (1992)
Facts:
Spouses San Diego owned a 2.0200-ha rice and corn land. The property has been cultivated
by Pedro Fideli as a tenant of the couple under a 50-50 sharing agreement. In 1974, a lease
contract was executed between spouses San Diego and a certain Regino Cassanova for a
period of four (4) years at P400.00 per ha per annum rental and gave him the authority to
oversee the planting of crops. The contract was subsequently renewed to last until 1980. In
both cases, Fideli signed as witness. While the contract was subsisting, Fideli continuously
worked on the property, sharing equally with Cassanova the net produce of the harvests. In
1980, the land was sold to spouses Endaya. Fideli continued tilling the land despite the
Endaya's demand to vacate the property. Fideli refused to leave and deposited with Luzon
Development Bank the landowner's share in the harvests. Fideli filed a complaint praying that
he be declared the agricultural tenant of the Endayas. The trial court ruled in favor of the
Endayas but the same was subsequently reversed by the CA holding that Fideli is an
agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure.
Held:
It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent
of the true and lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an
untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or
although permission to work on the farm was given, there was no intention to constitute the
worker as the agricultural lessee of the farm land. The rule finds no application in the case at
bar where the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a tenanted land over which an
agricultural leasehold has long been established. The consent given by the original owners to
constitute private respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds
private respondents who, as successors-in-interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the
latter's shoes, acquiring not only their rights but also their obligations. (at 118;underscoring
supplied).
Purpose is agricultural production
 Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession
for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform

168 SCRA 248 (1988)
Facts:
Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale, Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental to the owner.
Abajon was also allowed to plant on a portion of the land and that the produce thereof would
be shared by them on a 50-50 basis. When the new owners took over, they told Abajon to
transfer his dwelling to the southern portion of the property because they would be building
a poultry near Abajon's house. Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they
needed the property. Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that
Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation.
Held:
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker
who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and
to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said
portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is
clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes.
Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private
respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Personal cultivation
Cultivation
Under DAR AO 5 (1993), cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the
land, but also the husbanding of the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry, the taking care of the land and fruits growing thereon, fencing of certain areas, and
the clearing thereof by gathering dried leaves and cutting of grasses. In coconut lands,
cultivation includes the clearing of the landholding, the gathering of the coconuts, their piling,
husking and handling as well as the processing thereof into copra, although at times with the
aid of hired laborers.
Meaning of "Personal Cultivation"
"Personal cultivation" exists when a person cultivates the land by himself and with the aid
available from his immediate farm household.
In Oarde vs. CA, et al., supra, the Court held that the element of personal cultivation is
essential for an agricultural leasehold. There should be personal cultivation by the tenant or
by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons
who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities
(Evangelista vs. CA, 158 SCRA 41). The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot
hire many persons to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559). In Gabriel
vs. Pangilinan, supra, the Court held that the tenancy relation was severed when the tenant
and/or his immediate farm household ceased from personally working the fishpond when he
became ill and incapacitated.
Compensation in money and/or produce
In Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981), the Supreme Court held that:
A tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who, himself, and
with the aid available from within his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to
or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system. From the above definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing arrangement,
no tenancy relationship had ever existed between the parties. What transpired was that
plaintiff was made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was to supervise applications for
loans from those residing therein; he was allowed to build his house thereon and to plant
specified plants without being compensated; he was free to clear and plant the land as long
as he wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him and defendant; and he was not
obligated to pay any price certain to nor share the produce, with the latter. CaSHAc
Security of Tenure
Under Sec. 7 of RA 1199, "the agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer
upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of
tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for
causes herein provided."
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has been
established, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure. The tenant has a right to
continue working on the land except when he is ejected therefrom for cause as provided by
law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 [1989]).
Transfer of ownership or legal possession does not affect security of tenure.
In Tanpingco vs. IAC, 207 SCRA 653 (1992), the Court upheld the validity of donation but
the donee must respect the rights of the tenant and ordered the donee to pay the tenant
disturbance compensation.

Tanpingco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

207 SCRA 653 (1992)
Facts:
In 1985, Tanpingco filed a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation against
Benedicto Horca, Sr. Tanpingco alleged that he is the tenant-lessee in Horca's riceland under a
leasehold contract; that he was asked to desist from working on the land because it was
already donated to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports; and that he is willing to
accept disturbance compensation or in the alternative to remain as tenant-lessee of the
subject land.
Issue:
Is the security of tenure of a tenant affected by the transfer of ownership or legal possession
of an agricultural land?
Held:
Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership, therefore, there is
nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the land. However, the new
owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Sec. 7 of RA No. 3844, as amended, gives the
agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship is
established. It also entitles him to security of tenure on his landholding. He can only be
ejected by the court for cause. Time and again, this Court has guaranteed the continuity and
security of tenure of a tenant even in cases of a mere transfer of legal possession. As
elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the
leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is
extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 35 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However,
the donation itself is valid." (at 657-658; underscoring supplied).
Constitutionality of the provision on security of tenure
The constitutionality of the provision on security of tenure has long been settled by the
Supreme Court in the case of Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 101 Phil. 675 (1957).

Primero vs. Court of Agrarian Relations

101 Phil. 675 (1957)

Facts:
Primero owns a tenanted riceland in Cavite. Because of his desire to let the property to one
Porfirio Potente, he notified his tenant advising the latter to vacate the land. The tenant
refused. Primero filed a case with CAR which subsequently dismissed the same. On appeal,
Primero assailed the constitutionality of Sec. 9 and 50 of RA 1199 claiming that said
provisions are limitations on freedom of contract, a denial of equal protection of law, and an
impairment of, or limitation on, property rights.
Held:
The provisions of law assailed as unconstitutional do not impair the right of the landowner to
dispose or alienate his property nor prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they
only provide that in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy
relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure
the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the
transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to
maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them
protection against unjustified dismissal from their landholdings. Republic Act 1199 is
unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of
the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the state to promote the
commonwealth. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy laws enacted by our
lawmaking body, was passed by congress in compliance with the constitutional mandates
that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State" (Art II, sec. 5) and that "the state shall regulate
the relations between landlord and tenant in agriculture" (Art. XIV, sec. 6). (at 680).
In Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967), the Supreme Court also held:
Section 49 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, Republic Act 1199, as amended, enunciates the
principle of security of tenure of the tenants, such that it prescribes that the relationship of
landholder and tenant can only be terminated for causes provided by law. The principle is
epitomized by the axiom on land tenure that once a tenant, always a tenant. Attacks on the
constitutionality of this guarantee have centered on the contention that it is a limitation on
freedom of contract, a denial of the equal protection of the law, and an impairment of or a
limitation on property rights. The assault is without reason. The law simply provides that the
tenancy relationship between the landholder and his tenant should be preserved in order to
insure the well-being of the tenant and protect him from being unjustly dispossessed of the
land. Its termination can take place only for causes and reasons provided in the law. It was
established pursuant to the social justice precept of the State to promote the common
weal. (Primero vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-10594, May 29, 1957) (at 1456).
Rights and Responsibilities of the Parties
Rights and responsibilities of lessee
The lessee shall have the following rights:
a) To have possession and peaceful enjoyment of the land;
b) To manage and work on the land in a manner and method of cultivation and harvest
which conform to the proven farm practices;
c) To mechanize all or any phase of his farm work;
d) To deal with millers and processors and attend to the issuance of quedans and
warehouse receipts of the produce due him/her;
e) To continue in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of any homelot the lessee may
have occupied upon the effectivity of RA 3844;
f) To be indemnified for the costs and expenses incurred in the cultivation and for other
expenses incidental to the improvement of the crop in case the lessee surrenders, abandons
or is ejected from the landholding;
g) To have the right of pre-emption and redemption; and
h) To be paid disturbance compensation in case the conversion of the farmholding has
been approved (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 23, 24, 25, 11, 12, 36)
On the other hand, the lessee shall have the following responsibilities under Sec. 26 of RA
3844:
a) Cultivate and take care of the farm, growing crops, and other improvements on the
land and perform all the work therein in accordance with proven farm practices;
b) Inform the lessor within a reasonable time of any trespass committed by third persons
on the farm, without prejudice to his/her direct action against the trespasser;
c) Take reasonable care of the work animals and farm implements delivered to him/her
by the lessor and see to it that they are not used for purposes other than those intended, or
used by another without the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
d) Keep the farm and growing crops attended to during the work season; and
e) To pay the lease rental to the lessor when it falls due.
One of the rights of a lessee is to be entitled to a homelot. But only the tenant-lessee has this
right and that members of the immediate family of the tenants are not entitled to a homelot.

Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

278 SCRA 819 (1997)
Facts:
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty owns a parcel of land, a portion of which is occupied by
Herminigildo Pascual. Despite repeated demands, Herminigildo refused to vacate the
property and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is helping his mother, the
corporation's tenant, to cultivate the property.
Held:
Only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a
house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he is not petitioner's
tenant. In fact, he admits that he is a mere member of Ana Pascual's immediate farm
household. Under the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a homelot.
Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same
within the very small landholding of petitioner. . . . Thus, if the Court were to follow private
respondent's argument and allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm household
to construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than one thousand
(1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent wanted this Court to
dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses.
In sugarcane lands, the lessee shall have the following rights to be exercised by him
personally or through a duly registered cooperative/farmers' association of which he is
a bona fide member (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]):
a) To enter into a contract with the sugar central millers for the milling of the sugarcane
grown on the leased property;
b) To be issued a warehouse receipt (quedan) or molasses storage certificate by the sugar
central for the manufactured sugar, molasses and other by-products;
c) To have free access to the sugar central's factory, facilities, and laboratory for purposes
of checking and/or verifying records and procedures in the processing of sugarcane through
professional representation;
d) To be furnished a weekly statement of cane and sugar account showing, among other
things, the tonnage of the delivered cane and analysis of the crusher juice;
e) To be given 30 days notice in writing before the sugar and other by-products are sold
through public auction; and
f) To be provided with the standard tonnage allocation by the miller/sugar central.
Rights and responsibilities of lessor
The lessor shall have the following rights:
a) To inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and conditions of the
leasehold contract;
b) To propose a change in the use of the landholding to other agricultural purposes, or in
the kind of crops planted;
c) To require the lessee, taking into consideration his/her financial capacity and the
credit facilities available to him/her, to adopt proven farm practices necessary to the
conservation of the land, improvement of the fertility and increase in productivity; and
d) To mortgage expected rentals (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 29):
The lessor may propose a change in use but the change shall be agreed upon by the
landowner and the lessee. In case of disagreement, the matter may be settled by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), or in his absence the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993])
The lessor shall have the following obligations:
a) To keep the lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land; and
b) To keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the landholding at the
start of the leasehold relation (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 30).
Sec. 31 of RA 3844 provides that the lessor is prohibited to perform any of the following
acts:
a) To dispossess the lessee of his/her landholding except upon authorization by the
Court;
b) To require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment of the taxes or part
thereof levied by the government on the land;
c) To require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, any rent or obligation of the
lessor to a third party;
d) To deal with millers or processors without written authorization of the lessee in cases
where the crop has to be sold in processed form before payment of the lease rental;
e) To discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or growth of unions
or organizations of lessees in his/her landholding; and
f) For coconut lands, indiscriminate cutting of coconut trees will be deemed prima
facie evidence to dispossess the tenant of his/her landholding unless there is written consent
of the lessee and there is PCA certification, copy of the findings and recommendations of
which shall be furnished to affected tenants or lessees, or a resolution from the Municipal
Board allowing the cutting for valid reasons (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993] and DAR Adm. O. No.
19 [1989]).
Termination of Tenancy Relation
Causes for termination of leasehold relation
Section 8 of RA 3844 provides that agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished by
the following acts or omissions:
a) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
b) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of
which shall be served three months in advance; or
c) Absence of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of his/her death or permanent
incapacity.
Conversion of the land to non-agricultural uses also extinguishes the leasehold relation
because the subject land is no longer an agricultural land and the purpose is no longer
agricultural production. However, under Sec. 16 of DAR AO 1 (1999), the tenant affected by
the conversion is entitled to disturbance compensation which must be paid within sixty (60)
days from the issuance of the order of conversion.
 Abandonment
In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, supra, it was held that the word "abandon," in its
ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. "The emphasis is on
the finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the control of
another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to resume or
claim one's rights or interests." In other words, the act of abandonment constitutes actual,
absolute and irrevocable desertion of one's right or property. . . . Likewise, failure to cultivate
the land by reason of the forcible prohibition to do so by a third party cannot also amount to
abandonment, for abandonment presupposes free will." (at 19-20; underscoring supplied).
Voluntary surrender of property
The tenant's intention to surrender landholding cannot be presumed, much less
determined by mere implication, but must be convincingly and sufficiently proved.

Nisnisan, et al vs. Court of Appeals

294 SCRA 173 (1998)
Facts:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a 4.9774 hectare land in Davao del
Sur. Policarpio, the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of said land since 1961. In
1976, Gavino and Policarpio executed a leasehold contract which stipulates a sharing
arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978, Gavino sold two (2) ha of the land, including
the land tenanted by Policarpio, to spouses Mancera. As a result of the sale, Policarpio and
family were ousted. They then filed an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the
Manceras. The Manceras, on the other hand, countered that spouses Nisnisan have no cause
of action because they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
Issue:
Is the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding?
Held:
Other than their bare allegations, private respondents failed to present any evidence to show
that petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily after the private
respondents purchased the subject property. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for
reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-spouses against private respondents
before the CAR militates against the private respondents' claim that petitioners-spouses
voluntarily surrendered their landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be
convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to
surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication.
Effect of death or permanent incapacity of tenant-lessee on leasehold relation
Under Sec. 9 of RA 3844, in case of death or permanent incapacity, the leasehold relation
continues between the lessor and the person who can cultivate the land personally, chosen
by the lessor within one month from such death or incapacity, from among the following:
a) The surviving spouse;
b) The eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;
c) The next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of age.
 The age requirement is applied under the presumption that all heirs/successors are
qualified.
The leasehold relation is not terminated by death or permanent incapacity of the
landholder-lessor. It binds his legal heirs (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 9).
Also, Sec. 10 of RA 3844 provides that the mere expiration of the term or period in a
leasehold contract nor by sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding does not extinguished leasehold. In these cases, the transferee is subrogated to
the rights and substituted to the obligations of the lessor.
Dispossession of Tenants
Under Sec. 36 of RA 3844, dispossession of tenants may be authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
a) The lessee failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the contract
or with pertinent laws unless the failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;
b) The lessee planted crops or used the land for a purpose other than what has been
previously agreed upon;
(Note: Under DAR AO 5 [1993], the lessee is now allowed to intercrop or plant
secondary crops after the rental has been fixed, provided the lessee shoulders the expenses.)
c) The lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices necessary to conserve the land,
improve its fertility, and increase its productivity taking into consideration the lessee's
financial capacity and the credit facilities available to him;
d) There has been substantial damage, destruction or unreasonable deterioration of the
land or any permanent improvement thereon due to the fault or negligence of the lessee;
e) The lessee failed to pay lease rental on time except when such non-payment is due to
crop failure to the extent of 75% as a result of a fortuitous event;
f) The lessee employed a sub-lessee; or
g) The landholding is declared by the DAR to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes subject to payment of disturbance compensation to
the lessee.
(Note: Under Sec. 36 [1] of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, disturbance
compensation is equivalent to five [5] times the average of the gross harvest on his
landholding during the last five [5] preceding calendar years.)
In the case of Garchitorena vs. Panganiban, 6 SCRA 338 (1962), it was held that when non-
payment of lease rentals occurs for several years, said omission has the effect of depriving
the landowner of the enjoyment of the possession and use of the land.
Under Sec. 36 (1) of RA 3844, as amended, a lessor who ejects his tenant without the
court's authorization shall be liable for:
a) fine or imprisonment;
b) damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or imprisonment for
unauthorized dispossession;
c) payment of attorney's fees incurred by the lessee; and
d) the reinstatement of the lessee.
Determination of Lease Rentals
The lease rental shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average normal
harvest during the three (3) agricultural years preceding the following dates:
• 10 September 1971, the date of effectivity of RA 6389for tenanted rice and corn lands;
• 15 June 1988 or date the tenant opted to enter into leasehold agreement, whichever
is sooner, for tenanted sugar lands; or
• 15 June 1988 or date of leasehold agreement by the parties concerned, whichever is
sooner, for all other agricultural lands after deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost
of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing whichever is applicable (DAR Adm.
O. No. 5 [1993]).
DAR AO 5 (1993) defines "normal harvest" as the usual or regular produce obtained from
the land when it is not affected by any fortuitous event like drought, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, and the like. If there had been no normal harvest, the estimated normal harvest
during the three (3) preceding agricultural years shall be considered as the normal harvest.
"Agricultural year" refers to the period of time required for raising a particular product,
including the preparation of the land, sowing, planting and harvesting of crops and, whenever
applicable, threshing of said crops: Provided, however, That in case of crops yielding more
than one harvest from one planting, "agricultural year" shall be the period from the
preparation of the land to the first harvest and thereafter from harvest to harvest. In both
cases, the period may be shorter or longer than a calendar year.
The law states that only the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing,
loading, hauling, and processing, whichever is applicable, are considered allowable
deductions from the normal harvest in order to determine the lease rental.
The lease rental shall cover the whole farmholding attended to by the lessee. Computation
of lease rental shall include both primary and secondary crops existing as of 15 June 1988.
Secondary crops which are planted to an aggregate area of half a hectare or less shall not be
included in the computation of the lease rental (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
If the land has been cultivated for a period of less than three agricultural years prior to 15
June 1988, the initial rental shall be based on the average normal harvest during the
preceding agricultural years when the land was actually cultivated.

After the lapse of the first three (3) normal harvests, the final rental shall be based on the
average normal harvest during these three (3) preceding agricultural years.