SEC. 2.

ALL LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, WATERS, MINERALS,

COAL, PETROLEUM, AND OTHER MINERAL OILS, ALL FORCES OF

POTENTIAL ENERGY, FISHERIES, FORESTS OR TIMBER, WILDLIFE, FLORA

AND FAUNA, AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES ARE OWNED BY THE

STATE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS, ALL OTHER

NATURAL RESOURCES SHALL NOT BE ALIENATED. THE EXPLORATION,

DEVELOPMENT, AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES SHALL

BE UNDER THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE STATE.

THE STATE MAY DIRECTLY UNDERTAKE SUCH ACTIVITIES, OR IT MAY

ENTER INTO CO-PRODUCTION, JOINT VENTURE, OR PRODUCTION

SHARING AGREEMENTS WITH FILIPINO CITIZENS, OR CORPORATIONS

OR ASSOCIATIONS AT LEAST SIXTY PER CENTUM OF WHOSE CAPITAL IS

OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS. SUCH AGREEMENTS MAY BE FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS, RENEWABLE FOR NOT MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, AND UNDER SUCH TERMS AND
CONDITIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. IN CASES OF WATER RIGHTS FOR IRRIGATION, WATER
SUPPLY, FISHERIES, OR INDUSTRIAL USES OTHER THAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER POWER,
BENEFICIAL USE MAY BE THE MEASURE AND LIMIT OF THE GRANT.

"191 SCRA 288, 296 (1990). The dissent in the case, however, was not without weight: "The petitioner's
contention that the BOI abused its discretion in approving the transfer ... in effect, yielded to the
investor's choice, is not well taken. The record shows that the BOI approved the transfer because "the
BOI recognizes the justification given by the proponent" of the project (p. 30, Rollo). The fact that the
petitioner disagrees with the BOI's decision does not make it wrong. The petitioner's recourse ... is by an
appeal to the President (Sec. 36,1987 Investment Code), not to this Court." The dissent added that the
Court "is not the judge of the wisdom and soundness of the actions of the two other co-equal branches
of the government, but only of their legality and constitutionality." There is no grave abuse of discretion
because grave abuse of discretion "implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Id. at 300-301.

1178 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 2

THE STATE SHALL PROTECT THE NATION'S MARINE WEALTH

IN ITS ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS, TERRITORIAL SEA, AND EXCLUSIVE

ECONOMIC ZONE, AND RESERVE ITS USE AND ENJOYMENT EXCLUSIVELY

TO FILIPINO CITIZENS.

THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, ALLOW SMALL-SCALE UTILIZA

TION OF NATURAL RESOURCES BY FILIPINO CITIZENS, AS WELL

AS COOPERATIVE FISH FARMING, WITH PRIORITY TO SUBSISTENCE

FISHERMEN AND FISH WORKERS IN RIVERS, LAKES, BAYS, AND LAGOONS.

THE PRESIDENT MAY ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN

OWNED CORPORATIONS INVOLVING EITHER TECHNICAL OR FINANCIAL

ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE-SCALE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND

UTILIZATION OF MINERALS, PETROLEUM, AND OTHER MINERAL OILS

ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS PROVIDED BY

LAW, BASED ON REAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ECONOMIC GROWTH

AND GENERAL WELFARE OF THE COUNTRY. IN SUCH AGREEMENTS,

THE STATE SHALL PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF LOCAL

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES.

THE PRESIDENT SHALL NOTIFY THE CONGRESS OF EVERY

CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PROVISION,

WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM ITS EXECUTION.

1. Jura regalia and limits on dominium.

In public law a distinction is made between imperium and dominium. Imperium is the government
authority possessed by the state expressed in the concept of sovereignty. Dominium is the capacity of
the state to own or acquire property. Dominium, which was the foundation for the early Spanish
decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia that all lands were held from the Crown, is also the
foundation of the first sentence of Section 2.

As adopted in a republican system, however, the medieval concept of jura regalia has been stripped of
royal overtones: ownership is vested in the State.' Section 2 says: "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife,10 flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State." Hence, any
person
•Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 372,377 (1972). "Wildlife" is already included in "fauna" but the word
is retained in order to emphasize need to protect especially threatened species. Ill RECORD 358.

ART. XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1179

claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be able to show title from the state
according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title."

It is importqant to note, however, that when the regalian doctrine was introduced into the Philippines
by colonizers, the colonizers did not intend to strip the natives of their ownership of lands already
belonging to them. As Carino v. Insular Government'2 said, "when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to
have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land."

One significant application of the regalian doctrine is that, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in
which minerals are discovered, the person's ownership of such land does not give him the right to
extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State. The minerals belong to the state.
Thus, once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the
time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted to mineral land. For the loss sustained, the
owner is entitled to compensation under the Mining Law or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.13

2. Limits on dominium.

While dominium necessarily includes the power to alienate what is owned, Section 2, following the lead
of earlier constitutions, limits the power of the State to alienate the natural resources of the public
domain. Only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated. All other natural resources may
not be.

The prohibition of alienation of natural resources dates back to at least Section 1, Article XIII, of the
1935 Constitution. Much of the 1934 Constitutional Convention debate on this provision, which took
place on January 31, 1935, centered around the prohibition of the alienation

of the natural resources. The arguments in support of the provision were summarized by Aruego thus:'4

... [u]nder the leasehold system, the government could direct better the development and exploitation
of the mineral resources; that monopoly would be eliminated; and that it would be easier for the
government to collect the dues that should go to it. They added that the natural resources, particularly
the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged not only to the generation
then but also to the succeeding generations and consequently should be conserved for them. They
expressed the fear that, if the freehold system was adopted, some of the mineral lands after they had
become private property through the grant of a patent might eventually get into the ownership or
control of foreigners to the prejudice of Filipino posterity; for there was no prohibition in the draft
against the transfer or assignment to aliens of private mineral lands.

3. Exploration, development and utilization of inalienable resources.

With regard to natural resources other than agricultural land, two questions need be answered. First,
who may participate in their exploration, development and utilization? Second, if natural resources,
except agricultural land, cannot be alienated, how may they be explored, developed, or utilized?

The answer to the first question is that only Filipinos and Filipino corporations may engage in the
development and utilization of these natural resources. The rational for this reservation, also found in
both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, was earlier summed up by Vicente G. Sinco thus:15

It should be emphatically stated that the provisions of our Constitution which limit to Filipinos the rights
to develop the natural resources and to operate the public utilities of the Philippines is one of the
bulwarks of our national integrity. The Filipino people decided to include it in our Constitution in order
that it may have the stability and permanency that its importance requires. It is written in our
Constitution so that it may neither be the subject

XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1181

of barter nor be impaired in the give and take of politics. With our natural resources, our sources of
power and energy, our public lands, and our public utilities, the material basis of the nation's existence,
in the hands of aliens over whom the Philippine Government does not have complete control, the
Filipinos may soon find themselves deprived of their patrimony and living as it were, in a house that no
longer belongs to them.16

There was extensive debate on what proportion of capitalization should qualify a corporation as Filipino.
First of all, it was made clear that capital meant subscribed capital, or its equivalent, if the corporation is
non-stock.17 The Committee report had initially recommended sixty-six and two-thirds Filipino
capitalization.18 Then followed a series of amendments which, starting from one hundred per cent
Filipino capitalization, to seventy-five percent, to two-thirds, were all defeated. Forty percent foreign
capitalization was successfully defended on the ground of the need for capital in an area of high risk."
Similarly, proposal to make governing boards 100% Filipino was voted down mainly on the argument
that there would be no point in giving foreigners a 40% share if they cannot share in governing the
corporation.20

The answer to the second question departed from earlier provisions which had prescribed that natural
resources could be explored, developed or utilized only by "license, concession, or lease." The 1987
Constitution no longer speaks of "grant, lease, or concession" but of either direct undertaking of
activities by the State or "co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements" with the
State and all "under the full control and supervision of the State." How this is to be achieved may be
seen from the following exchange:21

"With the 1946 Ordinance Appended to the 1935 Constitution or the Parity Amendment, the same right
extended to Filipino citizens and corporations was extended to citizens of the United States and
business enterprises owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States. The
Parity Amendment, however, extended only until July 3, 1974. The requirements for an American
business enterprise to qualify under the implementing Laurel-Langley Agreement are discussed in Palling
v. San Jose Petroleum, Inc., 18 SCRA 924 (1966). 17III RECORD 255. And the grandfather rule applies. Id.
Also at 357,583-584,590-591. 18W.at253. nId. at 360-365,367-368. The deleted portions of 367-368
were those which preceded the walkout of several Commissioners. mld. at 362-363. "Id. at 260.

Sec. 2

MR. DAVIDE. Under the proposal, I notice that except for the [inalienable] lands of the public domain, all
the other natural resources cannot be alienated and in respect to [alienable] lands of the public domain,
private corporations with the required ownership by Filipino citizens can only lease the same.
Necessarily, insofar as other natural resources are concerned, it would only be the State which can
exploit, develop, explore and utilize the same. However, the State may enter into a joint venture, co-
production or production-sharing. Is that correct?

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.

MR. DAVIDE. Consequently, henceforth upon the approval of this Constitution, no timber or forest
concessions, permits or authorization can be exclusively granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor to
any corporations qualified to acquire lands of the public domain?

MR. VILLEGAS. Would Commissioner Monsod like to comment on that? I think his answer is "yes."

MR. DAVIDE. So, what will happen now to licenses or concessions earlier granted by the Philippine
government to private corporations or to Filipino citizens? Would they be deemed repealed?

MR. VILLEGAS. This is not applied retroactively. They will be respected.

There are therefore two levels of control that must be considered. The first level is the control over the
corporation which may engage with the State in "co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements." If individuals, they must be Filipino citizens; if corporations, the ownership must be 60%
Filipino.

The second level is control of the "co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing" operation. This
must be under the "full control and supervision of the State." In this regard the question was raised
whether "full control" meant that the State could reverse decisions made by the entity running the "co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing?" The question was posed thus:22

"Id. at 255.
 . XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1183

MR. NOLLEDO. Suppose a juridical entity is given the power to exploit natural resources and, of course,
there are decisions made by the governing board of that juridical entity, can the State change the
decisions of the governing board of that entity based on the words "full control."

MR. VILLEGAS. If it is within the context of the contract, I think the State cannot violate the laws of the
land.

Nolledo evidently posed his question thinking in terms of the President's power of control over the
executive department. Villegas' reply, however, indicates that "control" in this regard meant control as it
operates in the corporate world. Nolledo, apparently satisfied with the answer, did not pursue the topic.
In another exchange, in fact, Villegas had indicated that what he had in mind was actually not 100%
control of the operation by the State. He said that even a 40% interest of the State could already
amount to control.23

What appears from these levels of control is that the 1987 rule is more strict than the 1935 and 1973
rules. What the new rule says is that whenever natural resources are involved, particularly in the case of
inalienable natural resources, the State must always have some control of the exploration, development
and utilization even if the individual or corporation engaged in the operation is Filipino. In the words of
Davide already quoted, "no timber or forest concessions, permits or authorization can be exclusively
granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor to any corporations qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain."

The new rule, however, is not retroactive. The non-retroactivity of this rule is respected in the Executive
Order No. 211 issued by President Aquino in the exercise of legislative powers and Executive Order No.
279 authorized the Secretary of Natural Resources to conclude joint venture, co-production, or
production sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources
applicable to contracts entered into after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. In upholding the
administrative regulations issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources, Miners Association of the
Philippines v. Factoran, Jr.u recognized the new Constitution assumes a more dynamic role in relation to
natural resources "No longer is the utilization of inalienable

lands of public domain through 'license, concession or lease'..." "The options open to the State are
through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements.

Further clarification of the rule was made in La BugalB'laan Tribal Assoc. v. DENR.25 The Court ruled that
financial and technical agreements are a form of service contract. Such service contracts may be entered
into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant of such service contracts
is subject to several safeguards, among them: (1) that the service contract be crafted in accordance with
a general law setting standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements; (2) the President be the
signatory for the government; and (3) the President report the executed agreement to Congress within
thirty days.
The service contract can necessarily include foreign contractors providing not just capital, technology
and technical know-how but also managerial expertise in the creation and operation of the large-scale
mining/extractive enterprise, and government through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises full
control and supervision over the entire enterprise. In other words, management authority may be
granted to foreigners to the extent necessary for the performance of the financial or technical
agreement.

It should also be recalled that in the past, limber licenses, permits and license agreements were the
principal instruments by which the State regulated the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare was promoted. They were not deemed contracts within the purview of the
due process of law clause. Even assuming arguendo that an Industrial Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA) could be considered a contract or an agreement, the alleged property rights that may have arisen
from it were not absolute. It was subject to the power of the state to protect the ecology.26

4. Other limitations.

Agreements for the exploitation of the natural resources can have a life of only twenty-five years. This
twenty-five year-limit dates

"La Bugal B'laan Tribal Assoc. v. DENR, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004. (On Reconsideration) and
February 1, 2005. "Republic v. Pagadian City Timber, G.R. No. 159308, September 16, 2008.

Sec. 2 ART. XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1185

back to the 1935 Constitution and is considered to be a "reasonable time to attract capital, local and
foreign and to enable them to recover their investment and make a profit."27 The twenty-five year limit
on the exploitation of natural resources is not applicable to "water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power." In these cases, "beneficial use
may be the measure and the limit of the grant." But in the case of water rights for waterpower, the
twenty-five year limit is applicable.

The 1987 Constitution introduced other limits still. First, a more strict rule is imposed regarding the use
and enjoyment of the nation's "marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone." These are reserved for the exclusive use and enjoyment of "Filipino citizens," that is,
Filipino natural persons. Thus, aliens would not be allowed even if they paid rent or fees for fishing
rights.28 But since the economic zone is part of the high seas, this is subject to general principles of
international law.29

Second, a special provision is made in favor of subsistence fishermen and fish workers: "The Congress
may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons."
The reference to subsistence fishermen and fish workers harmonizes the provision with that in the
article on Social Justice. The spirit of this rule is that "small-scale" should refer to single proprietorships,
with "camote mining" in the coal mines of Cebu given as an example.30

Third, a limitation on service contracts is imposed: "The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the develop

"Session of November 25, 1972. Mni RECORD 686. "Id. A special problem might arise with respect to
Japan because of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the Philippine in
1960. But there should be no difficulty if Japan is a signatory to the recent Convention on the Law of the
Sea which sets an exclusive economic zone of 200 miles. See TV RECORD 237. "HI RECORD 255.

ment and use of local scientific and technical resources." Further Section 2 prescribes that: "The
President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution." "Foreign-owned corporation" here means a corporation owned by
foreigners.31

Under the 1973 Constitution service contracts were more generously allowed. Section 9 of Article XIV
said: "The Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such [Filipino] citizens, corporations,
or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization
of any of the natural resources."32

Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution did not specify how the blessing of the Batasang
Pambansa could be obtained, that is, whether through franchise or by some other expeditious form of
approval. Presidential Decree No. 151, dated March 13,1973 implemented it thus:

1. Citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations which have acquired lands of the public
domain or which now own, hold or control such lands under the Public Land Act or any other law, are
hereby allowed to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity whenever and wherever such contracts are vital to achieve
sound and more expeditious exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of such lands owned,
held or controlled by such citizens or corporations.

2. For purposes of this Decree, a service contract with a foreign citizen or entity for financial, technical,
management and other forms of assistance shall be considered vital to national interest if, consistent
with requirements for national security the exploration, exploitation or utilization of land subject
thereof is

"Id. at 167-168. 'The original idea behind these provisions was to authorize the government, not private
entities, to enter into service contracts with foreign entities. The idea was borrowed, according to
Delegate Valera, from the methods followed by India, Pakistan and especially Indonesia in the
exploration of petroleum and mineral oils. As finally approved, however, a citizen or private entity could
be allowed by the National Assembly to enter into such service contract. The prior approval of the
National Assembly was deemed sufficient to protect the national interest. Session of November
25,1972.

necessary for carrying out agricultural, industrial and commercial development projects such as the
development of export oriented industries, import substitution and other dollar saving industries,
cottage industries, cooperative development, land reform, research projects, and such other activities
which may be certified by the President upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority as vital to national interest.

3. No service contract for financial, technical, management or other forms of assistance shall be valid
without the prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry this Decree into effect.

4. Service contracts for financial, technical, management or other forms of assistance that are valid and
existing as of January 17, 1973, shall be recognized and the terms and conditions thereof remain in full
force and effect unless modified by the parties thereto.

Service contracts under the 1973 Constitution and the implementing decree were generally regarded in
the Constitutional Commission as means of circumventing the prohibitions of the Constitution. For this
reason the new provision avoids the use of the phrase "service contracts."33 It has also put in stronger
safeguards against circumvention. Thus, any agreement entered into must be "according to the general
terms and conditions prescribed by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country." To make this always effective, the President must report to Congress
every contract he enters into. This will allow Congress to keep the law abreast of the needs of the
country.34 Furthermore, agreements can only be for "technical and financial assistance" and only in
relation to "large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils." These are the areas where local technical and financial resources are inadequate. Thus,
beyond the reach of such agreements are the development and utilization of timberlands, forests,
marine resources, fauna and flora, wildlife and national parks.35

"ID RECORD 278. MW.at351. "Id. at 355-356. "Large-scale" usually refers to very capital intensive
activities like petro
SEC. 3. LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ARE CLASSIFIED INTO

AGRICULTURAL, FOREST OR TIMBER, MINERAL LANDS, AND NATIONAL

PARKS. AGRICULTURAL LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE

FURTHER CLASSIFIED BY LAW ACCORDING TO THE USES TO WHICH

THEY MAY BE DEVOTED. ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

SHALL BE LIMITED TO AGRICULTURAL LANDS. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

OR ASSOCIATIONS MAY NOT HOLD SUCH LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

EXCEPT BY LEASE, FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING TWENTY-FIVE

YEARS, RENEWABLE FOR NOT MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, AND

NOT TO EXCEED ONE THOUSAND HECTARES IN AREA. CITIZENS OF THE

PHILIPPINES MAY LEASE NOT MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED HECTARES, OR

ACQUIRE NOT MORE THAN TWELVE HECTARES THEREOF BY PURCHASE,

HOMESTEAD, OR GRANT.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REQUIREMENTS OF CONSERVATION,

ECOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT, AND SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS

OF AGRARIAN REFORM, THE CONGRESS SHALL DETERMINE, BY LAW,

THE SIZE OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN WHICH MAY BE ACQUIRED,

DEVELOPED, HELD, OR LEASED AND THE CONDITIONS THEREFOR.

1. Classification of lands of the public domain.

Land is the single biggest major resource of the nation. This Section deals with the classification of lands.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a specific provision the sole purpose of which was to classify lands
of the public domain. Article XIII, however, mentioned "agricultural," "timber," and "mineral" lands in
Section 1. According to Krivenko v. Register of Deeds?6 interpreting the provision, "all lands of the
public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber, and mineral." It appears
therefore that Krivenko did not consider "lands adapted to grazing" mentioned in Section 2 of the same
Article as a separate category. In fact the context of Section 2 (1935) did suggest that the category
"lands adapted to grazing" was merely a sub-classification of agricultural lands.
Section 10 of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven separate categories:
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land. A final clause authorized the Batasang Pambansa to make other classifications.

The 1987 Constitution has returned to the classification of 1935 — agricultural, forest or timber, and
mineral — but with the addition of national parks. Moreover, Section 3 adds: "Agricultural lands of the
public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted."

The prerogative of classifying public lands pertains to administrative agencies which have been specially
tasked by statutes to do so and the courts will not interfere on matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government and/or quasi-judicial agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under their special technical knowledge and training.37

When President Aquino issued M.O. No. 415 conveying the land covered by the Smokey Mountain
Dumpsite to the National Housing Authority as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10, the
conveyance implicitly carried with it the declaration that said lands are alienable and disposable.
Otherwise, the NHA cannot effectively use them in its housing and resettlement project. President
Ramos made similar conveyances to the NHA.

Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as alienable or disposable, R.A. No. 6957 as
amended by R.A. No. 7718 provides ample authority. While R.A. No. 6957 as modified by R.A. No. 7718
does not expressly declare that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the project
proponent have become alienable and disposable lands and opened for disposition; nonetheless, this
conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else can the land be used as the enabling component for the
Project if such classification is not deemed made?38

In brief, therefore, the present law is that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks. But who classifies lands? In Director of Lands v. Court
of Appeals,39 the Court said: "The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification,
the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
This should be so under time honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the
regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in the land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony."
However, although the executive's power is exclusive, it is not inherent. The executive's power to
classify lands is delegated power given to him by C.A. No. 141. The President exercises it upon the
recommendation of the pertinent department head.

As to forest lands, the President has been given the power to withdraw forest reserves found to be
more valuable for their mineral contents than for the purpose for which the reservation was made and
convert the same into non-forest reserves. Unlike under earlier laws which required concurrence by the
legislative body, all that is required now is the recommendation of the DENR Secretary.40
The classification, moreover, is descriptive of the legal nature of the land and not of what it looks like.
Hence, for instance, the fact that a forest land has been denuded does not by that fact mean that it has
ceased to be forest land.41 Classifications, besides, must be categorical: that is, land is either completely
agricultural or completely mineral or completely forest or park. "The Court feels that the rights over the
land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification
must be categorical: the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the
instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so
and became mineral and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who
were unlawfully occupying the surface."42

Finally, agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.

In 2008, controversy arose over the classification of portions of Boracay. The main issue in the Boracay
land controversy was whether

private claimants had a right to secure titles over their occupied portions of Boracay. The argument of
the claimants was that earlier cases had declared the lands agricultural and alienable. They relied mainly
on Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands*3 a 1919 case which had declared the land being
claimed as alienable. The reliance on the case, however, was mistaken. Akron had been decided at a
time when judges had authority to decide on the nature of a land in dispute. But the authority of the
judge was only over land in dispute. Hence the decision did not affect other lands even if their occupants
could also go to court and ask for a similar judgment. The claimants in the Boracay case had not done
that and they were overtaken by the law which gave the authority to classify lands to the President.
Hence the land they were claiming was still unclassified public land.44 (At the time of this writing,
December 2008, the case was still on appeal.)

2. Disposition of lands of the public domain.

The first rule established by Section 3 is that only agricultural lands of the public domain may be
alienated. All others are inalienable and may be developed and utilized only according to the rules
established in Section 2. Until public land is classified into alienable land, it remains inalienable. Thus, for
instance, reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay are inalienable until classified as
alienable.45

The second rule is that only public corporations and qualified individuals may acquire alienable lands of
the public domain. Corporations can hold alienable lands of the public domain only by lease. This will be
discussed below.

The third rule establishes the size of the land which may be acquired by individuals or leased by
individuals or corporations.
The fourth rule limits the discretion of Congress to open public lands for lease or acquisition.

"40 Phil. 10(1919). "DENR Secretary v. Mayor Yap, G.R. No. 167707, October 8,2008. 45Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Corporation, GR. No. 133250, July 9, 2002. See also Laurel v.
Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990) on the attempted sale of the Roppongi property in Japan.

3. Disqualification of private corporations.

A radical departure from the 1935 Constitution made by the 1973 Constitution was the provision
disqualifying private corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain. This has been retained in
the 1987 Constitution.

It should be noted that the ban on acquisition of alienable public lands applies to private corporations. It
does not apply to public corporations. The acquisition of alienable public lands therefore is now open
only to public corpoations and qualified natural persons. It has been said by Justice Aquino in Lauson
Ayog v. Judge Cusi*6 that one purpose of this constitutional prohibition is to equitably diffuse land-
ownership or to encourage owner cultivatorship and economic family size farms and thereby prevent
the recurrence of huge land holdings by corporations or private persons. Or, as Justice Teehankee
suggested in Republic v. Judge Vdlanueva and Iglesia ni Kristo?1 it was aimed against undue exploitation
of our public lands and natural resources by large corporations. Apparently, however, these are not the
only reasons, because the same Iglesia ni Kristo case and a companion MERALCO case" refused to
corporations the right to acquire even small pieces of land.

4. From public agricultural land to private land.

While corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can acquire private land. Hence, it
becomes important to determine when land ceases to be of the public domain and commences to be
private. The answer to the question has evolved in recent years.

The first case to deal with this question was Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. Judge Bartolome.*9
MERALCO, a private Filipino corporation, had asked for confirmation of its title to two lots it had
acquired from private individuals. The land had been possessed by MERALCO's predecessors before
1941 and was transferred to MERALCO in 1976 after Section 3 [Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution] took
effect. MERALCO contended that since its private prede

"118 SCRA 492 (November 19, 1982). 4,114 SCRA 875,898 (June 29, 1982). "i\4 SCRA799 (June 29,1982).
4'114 SCRA 799 (June 29,1982). Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 (June 29. 1982) and Republic v.
Judge Gonong, 118 SCRA 729 (November 25,1982), raised the same issues and was decided the same
way.

cessors had possessed the property in concept of owner for more than thirty years, the land had
become private land and therefore segregated from the public domain. The government, however,
citing a long line of cases, answered that since MERALCO's predecessors could show no composition of
title from the Spanish government nor possessory information title nor any other means of acquiring
public land such as patents or grants, there was no proof that the land had ceased to be public.
In upholding the position taken by the government the Court said:50

This conclusion is supported by the rule announced in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, 892,
which rule is a compendious or quintessential precis of a pervasive principle of public land law and land
registration law, that "all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant,, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been
in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that
it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." (Carino v. Insular Government, 212
U.S. 449,53 L. Ed. 594,41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132).

Hence, the Court pointedly concluded that the act which segregates the lot from the public domain is
the actual grant of title: "hasta que el titulo se expida no tenian el concepto juridico de ser los
verdaderos dueitos del terreno. .. ."51

The dissent of Teehankee, however, was persuasive. Citing a long line of cases from 1909 to 1980 he
showed the teaching of the Court that pursuant to the Public Land Act52

[wjhere a possessor has held the open, exclusive and unchallenged possession of alienable public land
for the statutory period provided by law (30 years now under the amendatory Rep. Act No. 1942
approved on June 22, 1957), the law itself mandates that the

»W. at 806. 5IW. at 807, citing Uy Un v. Perez, 71 Phil. 508,510-11. Abad Santos concurred in the result
arguing that, while the land had been acquired by prescription, since the petitioners had relied on the
Public Land Act, they must be told that the use of the Public Land Act was not available to them.
Fernando, however, said that in such case, in order to save litigation time, let the suit be considered as if
filed not by MERALCO but by the predecessors. "Id. at 813.

1194 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 3

possessor "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and "by legal fiction [the land] has
already ceased to be of the public domain and has become private property. ..."

In fact the 1980 case of Herico v. Dan had said:53

As interpreted in several cases when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of Land to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
In other words, the document, be it patent or Torrens title, which evidences ownership is precisely that,
evidence of ownership; it does not grant ownership. The acquisition of ownership, from the tenor of
jurisprudence, antedates the issuance of the evidence of ownership; else, what would be there to
evidence?

The latter case of Lauson Ayog v. Judge Cusi5* can be read as accepting this position. In Lauson Ayog,
the sales patent was issued in August 14, 1975, after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. In
upholding the validity of the issuance the Court relied on a 1973 opinion of then Secretary Abad Santos
that where the applicant, before the constitution took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations
under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or
equitable justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent. The Court said that the
corporation had already acquired a vested right to the land and the 1973 prohibition was not meant to
be retroactive. It was perhaps for this reason that Justice Abad Santos, in MERALCO, concurred merely in
the result on the technical ground that the corporation could not appeal to the Public Land Act under
the 1973 Constitution, thereby suggesting that the corporation

could look for other avenues of protecting its right. It was also for this reason that both Justice Fernando
and Justice Teehankee suggested that the Court consider the prayer for confirmation of title as if filed by
the predecessors of MERALCO.

MERALCO had also argued that it had acquired its predecessor's right to perfect the title and that in
effect it was the predecessors and not MERALCO who were seeking perfection of the title. The argument
would hold should the issuance of the title be understood merely as the issuance of evidence of
ownership and not as the operative act which grants ownership. The predecessors of MERALCO could
not by contract confer on a private corporation a right which the constitution withholds from private
corporations.55

The Court had occasion once more to examine the problem in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court.56 After reviewing the line of decisions on the subject, the Court concluded:57

55It should be noted, however, that what is prohibited is acquisition of ownership; it does not prohibit
private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain by lease. The constitution says
that "private corporations or associations may not hold [alienable] lands of the public domain except by
lease" In light of this, it is strange that Justice de Castro should argue in his concurrences both in
MERALCO and in Iglesia that even if the land were private, a private corporation could not acquire it
because Section 14 [now Section 7] limits the right to acquire private lands to those "qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain." De Castro does not seem to see that corporations, although not
qualified to acquire lands of the public domain, are qualified to hold lands of the public domain, by
lease, and are therefore qualified to acquire private lands. Id. at 812 and 884.

Finally, in his dissent in the Iglesia case, id. at 885-886, Fernando argued that the Iglesia ni Kristo should
be allowed to acquire the lot since denial would run counter to the preferred position which the
constitution gives to freedom of religion. He argued that freedom of religion has been recognized in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), as superior even to the objectives of social
justice and protection of labor also proclaimed by the constitution. But the VIctoriano case was not a
simple case of labor versus religion. It was a case of a union's right to insist on a closed shop agreement
against an individual laborer's right both to work and to act according to his belief. In effect, religion was
used to bolster the individual worker's right to work and right to be protected in the spirit of social
justice against a stronger union. What gives Fernando's argument appeal, however, is that the land in
question was a mere 313 square meters on which stood a chapel. Perhaps what Fernando wanted was
the reversal of the ruling in Register of Deeds v. ling Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58, to the effect that
ownership of land is not essential to worship. Fernando also argued that since Iglesia ni Kristo was a
corporation sole and since the Catholic church in Davao, another corporation sole, had been allowed to
acquire private land in Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration Commission, 102
Phil. 596 (1957), to deny the same right to Iglesia would constitute violation of equal protection. It
would indeed be a violation of equal protection if the Catholic church were given such right today; but
the cited case was decided in 1957 under a different law and a different Constitution. "146 SCRA 509
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco
must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in
the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessorsin-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30
years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure.

5. Area limits on leases and acquisitions.

Private corporations are allowed to lease no more than one thousand hectares. When it was asked what
could be done about existing leases in excess of the allowable limit, the answer given was that the
Transitory Provisions should contain a provision on reversion proceedings.58 Nothing, however, is said
about reversion proceedings in the Transitory Provisions.

The allowable limit for lease by individuals is five hundred hectares.

Acquisition by individuals is limited to twelve hectares.

Section 11 .Article XIV, of the 1973 Constitution had provided that no individual may acquire "by
purchase or homestead [alienable public lands] in excess of twenty four hectares" This already was a
modification of Section 2, Article XIII, of the 1935 Constitution which provided that no individual may
"acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty four hectares,... or by homestead in
excess of twenty four hectares." The reduction had been made for the purpose of allowing greater
diffusion of land ownership. The 1987 Constitution has further reduced allowable acquisition, whether
"by purchase, homestead, or grant" to twelve hectares. The addition of the word "grant" was intended
to take care of every mode of disposition of land.5' The radical reduction in the allowable size is meant
to open acquisition to as many beneficiaries as possible. But applications for larger areas, if overtaken by
the ratification of the new limitation in size, would not be affected if

already perfected.60 Such a rule will conform with the decision in the already cited case of Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court.t[
Once title to alienable public land passes to a private individual, it is segregated from lands of the public
domain and becomes private land subject to the rights of private ownership. Nevertheless, for reasons
of public interest, the state may follow such lands into private hands and impose limitations on them.
One such limitation is found in Section 122 of the Public Land Act, passed prior to the 1973 Constitution,
which says:

Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any portion thereof originally acquired under the
free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any permanent improvement on
such land shall be transferred or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any permanent
improvement thereon be leased to such individual, when the area of such land, added to that of his
own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment or lease in violation
hereof shall be null and void.

The purpose of this limitation, which harmonized with the maximum area allowed under the 1935
Constitution, was to insure the attainment of the constitutional objective of preventing the
concentration of large tracts of land in the hands of a single individual. What effect did the 1973
Constitution have on the maximum limit found in Section 122 of the Public Land Act?

The answer of the Supreme Court in Guiang v. Kintanar,62 adopting the opinion of the Director of Lands,
was that the maximum allowed in Section 122 was amended by the 1973 Constitution and
correspondingly decreased to twenty-four hectares. (Following such ruling, the law must once again be
deemed amended by the 1987 Constitution.) The case was decided in division and carried the support of
only four Justices. One took no part and Abad Santos in a single paragraph concurrence was not
prepared to say that the Constitution had amended the statutory limit.

"W. at 596. There was no satisfactory answer to the question about those whose applications were not
yet perfected. There was mention of having a transitory provision on the subject, but no such transitory
provision was included. "146 SCRA 509. M106 SCRA49,63-67 (July 25,1981).

Agrarian reform laws may also further affect the allowable sizes. Section 6 of Article XIII says: "The State
shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with
law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain
under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands." Thus, even under the 1973
Constitution, a twenty-four hectare land acquired from the public domain could be reduced to a smaller
size if it comes under limitations imposed by land reform laws.63

6. Discretion of Congress in development of alienable lands.

The second paragraph of Section 3 says: "Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor." Thus, the discretion to determine how much of alienable public
land may be opened to private acquisition or lease is given to Congress — but subject to the
"requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform."

7. Citizenship limitation.

The impression might be given that Section 3 opens utilization of alienable lands to foreign individuals or
foreign corporations because Section 3 makes no mention of citizenship qualification. But alienable
lands are part of the natural resources and the general rule on the utilization of all natural resources can
be found in Section 2. "With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and under such terms and conditions as may

be provided by law." Thus, utilization of alienable land is open only to those qualified under Section 2
and in the manner prescribed by Section 2. However, as already indicated in the discussion of Section 2,
while corporations may not lease inalienable lands, the tenor of the discussion of Section 2 was that
alienable lands are open to lease to qualified corporations. The text of Section 3 clearly states that
corporations may may not lease inalienable lands, the tenor of the discussion of Section 2 was that
alienable lands are open to lease to qualified corporations. The text of Section 3 clearly states that
corporations may hold alienable land by lease

SEC. 4. THE CONGRESS SHALL, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, DETERMINE

BY LAW THE SPECD7IC LIMITS OF FOREST LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS,

MARKING CLEARLY THEIR BOUNDARIES ON THE GROUND. THEREAFTER,

SUCH FOREST LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS SHALL BE CONSERVED

AND MAY NOT BE INCREASED NOR DIMINISHED, EXCEPT BY LAW. THE

CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE, FOR SUCH PERIODS AS IT MAY DETERMINE,

MEASURES TO PROHIBIT LOGGING IN ENDANGERED FORESTS AND IN

WATERSHED AREAS.

1
1. Forest lands and parks.

This section deals with two classes of public land: forests and parks. It reflects a concern about forests
and the preservation of national parks. Discretion, however, is given to Congress about what should be
done in terms of delimiting areas and time limits for exploitation. Attempts to fix the limits in the
Constitution itself were resisted.64

That these two classes of land are dealt with together here should not be understood to mean that
logging may also be allowed in parks. Once forest lands are converted into parks, logging may no longer
be permitted in the area.65

Reclaimed land is public land. Before it can be registered as private property it must be classified as
alienable

SEC. 5. THE STATE, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS

CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS,

SHALL PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES

TO THEIR ANCESTRAL LANDS TO ENSURE THEIR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,

AND CULTURAL WELL-BEING.

THE CONGRESS MAY PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF

CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS IN

DETERMINING THE OWNERSHIP AND EXTENT OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN.

1. Ancestral lands and ancestral domain.

There are two concepts used in Section 5: "ancestral domain" and "ancestral land." The two concepts
are distinct from each other and they are defined by Section 3(a) and (b) of the Indigenous People's
Rights Act (IPRA), R.A. No. 8371, thus:

SECTION 3. a) Ancestral Domains. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by wax, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare.
It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war Jorce majeure or displacement by force,
deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.

The phrase "ancestral domain" is thus a broader concept than ancestral lands. Ancestral domain is an
all-embracing concept which refers to lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein
and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water and
other natural resources. They include lands which my no longer be exclusively occupied by indigenous
cultural communities but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and
traditional activities. Ancestral land is a narrower concept. It refers to those held under the same
conditions as ancestral domain but limited to lands that are not merely occupied and possessed but are
also utilized by cultural communities under the claim of individual or traditional group ownership. These
include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, farms and tree
lots.

The ancestral lands referred to in Section 5 of the Constitution include both those outside and those
inside autonomous regions. For the purpose of protecting indigenous cultural communities, the
provision in effect authorizes Congress to prescribe how priorities are to be determined in case of
conflict between civil law and customary law.67

The law passed by Congress. R.A. No. 8371, was assailed as unconstitutional on the ground that it
deprived the State of its ownership over lands of the public domain and the natural resources in them.
The vote of the Supreme Court on the subject, in Cruz v. Secretary? was equally divided, 7-7 and
therefore meant that validity was upheld.

The opinion defending constitutionality held the following: (1) Ancestral domain and ancestral lands are
not part of lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to indigenous people. Section 5
commands the State to protect the rights of indigenous people. Carino v. Insular Government69
recognized native title held by Filipinos from time immemorial and excluded them from the coverage of
jura regalia. (2) The right of ownership granted does not include natural resources. The right to
negotiate terms and conditions over natural resources covers only exploration to ensure environmental
protection. It is not a grant of exploration rights. (3) The limited right of management refers to
utilization as expressly allowed in Section 2, Article XII. (4) What is given is priority right, not exclusive
right. It does not preclude the State from entering into co-production, joint venture, or production
sharing agreements with private entities.

The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the following: (1) the law amounts to an
abdication of state authority over a significant area of the country's patrimony; (2) it relinquishes full
control of natural resources in favor of indigenous people; (3) the law contravenes the provision which
says that all natural resources belong to the state.

A significant aspect of the case was that the challengers were two individuals, former Associate Justice
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, suing as citizens and taxpayers, whereas the defenders of the law
included Senator Juam M. Flavier, one of the authors of the law, former Commissiner Ponciano
Bennagen of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and sponsor of the constitutional provision, various
members of indigenous tribes, various tribal associations, the Commission on Human Rights, and the
Haribon Foundation.

Notable too is that Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition did not
raise a justiciable controversy and that petitioners did not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8371.

SEC 6. THE USE OF PROPERTY BEARS A SOCIAL FUNCTION,

AND ALL ECONOMIC AGENTS SHALL CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON

GOOD. INDIVIDUALS AND PRIVATE GROUPS, INCLUDING CORPORATIONS,

COOPERATIVES, AND SIMILAR COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS, SHALL

HAVE THE RIGHT TO OWN, ESTABLISH, AND OPERATE ECONOMIC

ENTERPRISES, SUBJECT TO THE DUTY OF THE STATE TO PROMOTE

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND TO INTERVENE WHEN THE COMMON GOOD

SO DEMANDS.

1. Lands and the common good.

Section 6 embodies guidelines which are applicable not only to the utilization of land but to everything
which, in an agrarian economy, has special relevance to land. The Section in general is a rejection of
laissezfaire and adopts the principle of solidarity.70 Thus, where needed

for the common good, the state may intervene in the operation, e.g., of cooperatives.71
 SEC. 7. SAVE IN CASES OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION, NO PRIVATE

LANDS SHALL BE TRANSFERRED OR CONVEYED EXCEPT TO INDIVIDUALS,

CORPORATIONS, OR ASSOCIATIONS QUALIFIED TO ACQUIRE OR HOLD

LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

1. Meaning of "private lands."

For an understanding of Section 7, which substantially reproduces Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, four questions must be answered: (1)
What is the meaning of "private lands" in the provision? (2) Who may acquire private land? (3) What is
the effect of the Parity Amendment of 1946 on Section 7? (4) What is the status of conveyances made in
violation of Section 7 or its earlier counterparts?

Private land means any land of private ownership. This includes both lands owned by private individuals
and lands which are patrimonial property of the State or of municipal corporations. By using the term
"private lands" as was used in the 1973 text, instead of the term "private agricultural land" used in the
1935 text, Section 7 avoids the confusion which occasioned the litigation in Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds.72 In Krivenko, the Court had to decide whether the term "private agricultural land" used in the
1935 Constitution included residential lands. The Court decided that "private agricultural land" meant
any private land which was neither timber nor mineral land. Section 7, by modifying the 1935 provision,
more clearly reflects the doctrine laid down in Krivenko.73

2. Who may acquire private land?

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain."

This technique of making capacity to acquire private land dependent upon the capacity to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain merely copies the language of earlier formulations. Hence, because
aliens were disqualified from acquiring or in any way holding lands of the public domain (since the 1935
Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization" of all "lands of the public domain" and "other natural resources of the Philippines" for
Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos),
aliens, whether individuals or corporations, were also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The
landmark case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds1* was founded on this constitutional dogma. Krivenko,
as an alien, could not "acquire" land of the public domain. Neither could he in any way "hold" land of
the public domain either by lease or concession, unless such lease or concession was existing "at the
time of the inauguration of the Government established under this [1935] Constitution." Hence, private
land could not be transferred or conveyed to him.

The prohibition applies even to a regime of conjugal partnership in a marriage. Thus, when husband and
wife decide to buy land and the husband is an alien, he does not have the right of a conjugal partner to
consent or not to consent to the disposition of the land. In Cheesman v. Intermediate Court of
Appeals,1S the Court said:

... [a]ssuming that it was [the husband's] intention that the lot in question be purchased by him
and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right
over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.

... [e]ven if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the
considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against recovering and holding the
property so acquired, or any part thereof.

The time to determine whether the person acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to own it is
acquired and not the time to register ownership. Thus, a foreign national who, while still A Filipino
citizen, acquired land from a vendor who had complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA. No. 141) prior to the purchase, can validly register his title to the land.76

Section 7, moreover, contains an exception: aliens may acquire private land "in cases of hereditary
succession." In Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, the Court had occasion to say: "We are of the opinion that
the constitutional provision ... does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the provision
will be for naught and meaningless."77 The exception thus applies only to intestate succession. Thus, in
Zaragoza v. Court of Appeals,1" where partition of the properties had been done inter vivos, the Court
ordered the collation of all properties in order to determine whether a daughter who had become an
American citizen had been unlawfully deprived of her legitime.

When, however, an alien acquires land by hereditary succession, such alien cannot renounce the right to
inherit in favor of one who is not qualified. Thus in Halili v. Court of Appeals,19 S, an American citizen,
died leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, H, and his son, D, both of
whom were American citizens. The widow executed a deed of quitclaim conveying to D all her rights,
titles and interests in 6 parcels of lands she inherited from S. The Court held that the quitclaim in favor
of D was invalid. D could acquire land only by hereditary succession.
7'Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 (1994) "111 SCRA704,714 (February 15, 1982). 7,G.R. No.
106401, September 29,2000. See Art. 1080 of the Civil Code. The legitime of compulsory heirs is
determined only after collation. Article 1061 says: "Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition." "CR-No. 113539, March 12, 1998.

Sec. 7

The story, however, did not end there. D eventually sold the lot to C, a Filipino citizen. When the validity
of the sale to C was challenged, the Court reiterated an old doctrine to the effect that "if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." The Court also
repeated the rationale behind this rule: Since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation's land
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.

It should be noted, also, that what is proscribed by the Constitution is the vesting of title to lands in
favor of aliens. Hence, the prohibition of Section 7 does not extend to lease of private lands to aliens.80
Similarly, a usufruct over land, although it is a real right, does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary. Hence, usufructuary right over land may be conveyed to an alien.81

Moreover, the prohibition in the Constitution on aliens and alien corporations applies only to ownership
of land. It does not extend to all immovable or real property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil
Code, that is, those which are considered immovable for being attached to land, including buildings and
construction of all kind attached to the soil.82 Thus, a foreigner may own a unit in a condominium
because the prohibition on aliens is only from acquiring land. The land on which the condominium
stands is owned by the condominium corporation.83

As to corporations, a foreign corporation may buy shares in excess of 40% of the shares of the
corporation, but the effect would be that the corporation would lose its capacity to hold private land.84

Finally, it should be remembered that the Ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution said that until
final withdrawal of United States sovereignty, Americans and American corporations enjoyed the same
civil rights as Philippine citizens. Americans and American corporations therefore could validly acquire
private land until July 4,1946.85

•°79 Phil at 481. "'Ill SCRA at 714. S2J.G. Summit v. C.A., G.R. No. 124293, January 31,2005. B3Hulst
v. PR Builders, G.R. No. 156364, September 25,2008. MJ.G. Summit v. C.A.,G.R. No. 124293, January
31,2005. 8SMoss v. Director of Lands, 80 SCRA 269 (December 22, 1977). In Director of Lands v. Buyco,
GR. No. 91189, November 27, 1992, the heirs of an American citizen failed to show that their predecessor
had acquired title to the land.
3. Can a Filipino corporation acquire land?

A Filipino citizen may acquire private land through any of the modes of acquiring private property. May
a Filipino private corporation, however, acquire private land? Under the 1935 Constitution there was no
doubt about the capacity of a Filipino private corporation to acquire land because under the 1935
Constitution a private corporation was capacitated to acquire alienable land of the public domain.86
Under Section 3, however, as also under Section 11, Article XIV, of the 1973 Constitution, private
corporations can hold alienable lands of the public domain only by lease. Does this mean that private
corporations do not have the capacity to acquire private land?

The answer must be that private corporations can still acquire private land since Section 7 makes
capacity to acquire private land dependent on capacity to "acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
The provision uses the disjunctive conjunction "or." Either capacity to acquire lands of the public domain
or capacity otherwise to hold such land confers capacity to acquire private land. Private corporations
can "hold" lands of the public domain, albeit only "by lease." They are thus not in the same position as
aliens who cannot even "lease" land of the public domain. Incidentally, when Justice de Castro
suggested in MERALCO and Iglesia, already discussed under Section 3, that Section 7 [then Section 14]
bars acquisition of private lands by corporations, none of the other Justices noticed him except
Teehankee, and only to contradict him. Moreover, to date, sale of private lands to and between private
corporations is a thing of common occurrence.

Needless to say, the corporation must be a Filipino corporation. In the absence of capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of Filipinos.87

If it be said that this reading of Section 7 can nullify the purpose of the prohibition in Section 3 inasmuch
as there is nothing to prevent qualified citizens from transferring their private land to private
corporations, suffice it to say that the historical purpose of Section 7 was to close "the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources

"Article XIII, Section 2 (1935). "Bermudo v. Court of Appeals, 155 SCRA 8, 17 (1987), citing Register of
Deeds v. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58,61.

Sec. 7

may leak into aliens' hands."88 Or, as was held in Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She,"9 it "is an
expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos." Put negatively, it is not the purpose of
Section 7 to prevent private land from leaking into the hands of private Filipino corporations. Hence, a
change in constitutional policy on the capacity of private corporations to acquire land of the public
domain should not be construed to mean a change in the constitutional policy on the capacity to acquire
private land. The letter of the Constitution does not yield such a conclusion. Furthermore, to borrow the
rhetorical question of Quasha, which treated the parent provisions of Section 3 and Section 7 as
expressions of distinct policies, when the text of Section 3 was submitted for popular ratification, did the
voters understand that two sections of the Constitution were to be modified?*1
4. Effect of Parity Amendment on Section 7.

The background of the question posed in the landmark case of Republic v. Quasha9' was the Parity
Amendment of 1946, which gave to American citizens and corporations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which was owned by Americans, participation in the disposition, exploitation, development
and utilization of agriculture, timber and mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources
of the Philippines and in the operation of public utilities. Did this amendment also give to Americans
capacity to acquire land? The Supreme Court handled the question thus:

Respondent Quasha argues that since the amendment permitted United States citizens or entities
controlled by them to acquire agricultural lands of the public domain, then such citizens or entities
became entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the Philippines even without hereditary
succession, since said Section 5 of Article XIII only negates the transfer or assignment of private
agricultural land to individuals or entities not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Clearly, this argument of respondent Quasha rests not upon the text of the Constitutional

"79 Phil at 473. "21 SCRA 52,65-66 (1967). SCRA at 169. It may also be pertinent to note that the change
made in Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution was one of the last minute changes in the final draft of the
Constitution which were never discussed on the Convention floor 91 Id.

Sec. 7 ART. XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

1209

Amendment but upon a mere inference therefrom. If it was ever intended to create also an exception to
Section 5 of Article XIII, why was mention therein made only of Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV and of no other? When the text of the amendment was submitted for popular ratification, did
the voters understand that three sections of the Constitution were to be modified, when only two
sections were therein mentioned?

5. Consequences of conveyances made in violation of Section 7.91

The sale of private land made in violation of Section 7 is null and void. Of this there is no doubt. Thus, an
alien who buys a lot but, knowing that he could not acquire land in the Philippines, registers it in the
name of his wife, may not, upon the dissolution of the community of property, claim ownership of the
land and reimbursement in equity on the theory that the wife merely held the property in trust. To claim
equity the must come with clean hands.93

Much of the litigation on this subject has centered around the question whether the Filipino vendor may
annul the sale and recover the land sold. Jurisprudence on this subject has evolved two conflicting lines
of action.

The first line of action, established in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun,94 applied the pari delicto rule and
disallowed a Filipino vendor from recovering land sold to an alien. The Court explained its position
thus:95
The doctrine above adverted to is the one known as In Pari Delicto. This is well known not only in this
jurisdiction but also in the United States where common law prevails. In the latter jurisdiction, the
doctrine is stated thus: "The proposition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an
illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property
agreed to be sold, or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violations. The rule
has sometimes been laid down as though it were equally universal, that where the

nSee ELM A, "ANNOTATION: THE SCOPE AND EFFECTS OF THE QUASHA DECISION ON PRIVATE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS ACQUIRED BY AMERICANS UNDER THE PARITY AMENDMENT," 46 SCRA 180-259
(1972). ,3Muller v. Muller. GR. No. 149615, August 29,2006. "93 Phil. 827 (1953). nld. at 831-2.

parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be

given to one against the other." (POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. 3,5th Ed., p. 728.)

It is true that this doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is
considered as advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction" (idem., p. 733).
But not all contracts which are illegal because opposed to public policy come under this limitation. The
cases in which this limitation may apply only "include the class of contracts which are intrinsically
contrary to public policy, contracts in which the illegality itself consists in their opposition to public
policy, and any other species of illegal contracts in which, from their particular circumstances, incidental
and collateral motives of public policy require relief." Examples of this class of contracts are usurious
contracts, marriage-brokerage contracts and gambling contracts. (Idem., pp. 735-737.)

In our opinion the contract in question does not come under this exception because it is not intrinsically
contrary to public policy, nor one where the illegality itself consists in its opposition to public policy. It is
illegal not because it is against public policy but because it is against the Constitution. Nor may it be
contended that to apply the doctrine of pari delicto would be tantamount to contravening the
fundamental policy embodied in the constitutional prohibition in that it would allow an alien to remain
in the illegal possession of the land, because in this case the remedy is lodged elsewhere. To adopt the
contrary view would be merely to benefit petitioner and not to enhance public interest.

The Rellosa decision was not unanimous but it was followed in the series of cases that came
immediately after.96 Then, in 1967, came Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She,91 which re-
examined the application of the pari delicto rule and came to the following conclusion:98

It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they
will be left where they are, without relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a
violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their administrators
to whom it would

™See list of cases in 46 SCRA 180-1. "21 SCRA 52 (1967). "W. at 65-66.

Sec.7 ART. XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1211

be unjust to impute their guilt. For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important, Article
1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that, "when the agreement is
not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of
the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered." The
Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines" is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the
Filipinos. As this Court said in Krivenko:

"It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even
in the name of amity or equity.* * *

"For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs."

That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts
aside and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos, this Court
should apply the general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that
laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered as
pro tanto qualified.

Does the decision in Lui She mean that a Filipino vendor can always recover the private land sold to an
alien? The answer to this question, when the transferee is an American, is that the Filipino vendor
cannot question the American's title. Only the state can. This rule, tailor made for Americans in the
same position as Quasha, was embodied in Article XVII, Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution which said:
"Titles to private lands acquired by [Americans or American corporations] before [July 3,1974] shall be
valid as against other private persons only."

1212 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Sec. 7

It should also be noted that the reversal of Rellosa in Lui She was not couched in terms that sweep in all
cases of sale to aliens. The Court said: "To the extent that our ruling in this case conflicts with that laid
down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun and subsequent similar cases, the latter must be considered pro tanto
qualified."99 Lui She singled out two reasons for not applying the pari delicto rule: (1) the original
parties guilty of the violation had already died and had been succeeded by administrators to whom it
would have been unjust to impute guilt, and (2) recovery would enhance the declared public policy of
preserving lands for Filipinos. Hence, in the case of sales to aliens other than Americans, Lui She does
not exclude the possibility of barring recovery by the Filipino vendor where the buyer has acquired
Philippine citizenship or where the land has come to the hands of a qualified transferee in good faith.'00
Thus, where the Chinese buyer subsequently became a Filipino citizen, the seller was not allowed to
recover because in such a situation the aim of keeping land in the hands of Filipinos would not be
thwarted.101 Using the same argument, the Court did not allow the original seller to recover where the
Chinese buyer had sold the land to a Filipino.'02 Moreover, because of res judicata, the Lui She rule
cannot be applied to final judgments before Lui She.m

The Court has reiterated the doctrine that the transfer to a Filipino of land illegally acquired by an alien
cures the prior illegality.104 As held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority:

Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells
the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen.
Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was
validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been
achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the
land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.

""See Annotation, 46 SCRA 186,232-3. ""Vasquez v. Giap, 96 Phil. 447 (1955). l02Sarsosa vda. de
Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547,553 (April 16,1982). "°Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 26 SCRA 416 (May
4,1977). '"Republic v. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. 158230, July 16, 2008.

Sec. 8 ART. XII - NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY 1213

SEC. 8. NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF

THIS ARTICLE, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO

HAS LOST HIS PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE A TRANSFEREE OF

PRIVATE LANDS, SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS PROVIDED BY LAW.

1. Exception for former Philippine citizens.

A 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution created another exception in favor of "a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship." He or she "may be a transferee of private land, for
use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."105 This is now embodied in
Section 8. The 1987 provision, however, no longer contains the phrase "for use by him as his residence."
Has this changed the meaning of the law?

The original Committee report on the subject put down the exception as being "solely for residential
purposes, not to exceed an area of one thousand square meters."106 In response, however, to clamor
from former Filipinos who were living abroad and who expressed a wish now not only to own residential
land but also to participate in the development of the country, the strict requirement that the exception
be only for residential purpose and up to an area not exceeding one thousand hectares was deleted.
Instead, the matters of both purpose and area were left for the discretion of Congress to determine.107
The current law on the subject is Section 5 of R.A. No. 8179, amending Section 10 of the Foreign
Investments Act, says:

"Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII, Section 8 of the
Constitution. — Any [former] natural bom citizen who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract
under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand
(5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used
by him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the
privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.

"In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other purposes, he shall still be
entided to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for business or other purposes which when
added to those already owned by him shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

"A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which should be situated in
different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines: Provided, That the total land area thereof
shall not exceed five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of rural land for use by him for business
or other purposes. A transferee who has already acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring
rural land area and vice versa."

During the debates of the 1986 Constitutional Commission Commissioner Ambrosio Padilla vigorously
argued for making an exception in favor of foreign investors engaged in the manufacture of products for
export. The strong objection to the proposal was that there was no demonstrated correlation between
the influx of foreign investors and their capacity to own land, and that the preservation of natural
resources for Filipinos should not be compromised. The proposal was rejected by a vote of 27-8.108

If aliens cannot acquire private land, may they lease private land? A division of the Court in Lantino v. Co
Llong Chongm said that a lease for a reasonable period of time is valid. Then the Court in an obiter
dictum added:"0

The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid is if there are circumstances
attendant to its execution which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.

If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes
clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in
stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi.jus utendi.jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) —
rights, the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow
the use the next day disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up
are consolidated in the alien.