B

The Inlormation siven In t i l l 9 document

is not to be fommnnlcated, either
directly or Inalrectw, to the press or to
any Person not holding an OmciQI
position In 8 1 8 MalesWa Senice.

AUSTRALIAN ARMOURED CORPS

PAMPHLET No. 6

D THE ARMOURED BRIGADE

PROVISIONAL, MAY, 1941

B y command of the
Military Board.

Secretary to the Military Board.

*A.M.R. & 0. 1588B

B
BY Autharltg: Arbuckk Waddell Ptp. Ltd.. 20 McKUIop St.. Melbourne.
(Reprinted with the perml8dOn Of .the Contlollel, HI8 Malesty's
stationery omce. Loneon):
 1
Notified in A . A . 0 8 . dated 31st May, 1941

I NOT TO BE PUBLISHED‘
he inroimstlon given In thls document
Is not to be communicated, either
directly or Indirectly, U) the Press 01 to
any person not holding an OWcISl
posltlon in Hb nralesws Service.

AUSTRALIAN ARMOURED CORPS

PAMPHLET No. 6 .

THE ARMOURED BRIGADE

PROVISIONAL, MAY, 1941

B y conitnand of the
Military Board.

Secretary to the Military Board.

‘A.M.R. & 0. 1588B

By AUthOrltY: ArbUCklC Waddell Pty. Ltd.. 20 MCKlIIop St.. MelbOtWne.

(Reprlntea Wlth the perml8sIon of the ContrOIIel. HIS MBJeStY’B
Statlonely OWce, London).
b
DISTRIBUTION .

A.H.Q. AS.C.
G Branch .................... 12 Cav . DIY. Sup. Col . . . . . .

ABranch ..................... 6 Cay . Div . Pet . Coy. ......

Q Branch .................. 6 .
Cav Div . Amm . Coy ....

H.Q. Comd ...................... 6 Div . Supply Col ..........

.... Dlsts......................
Cav.Dlv ................... 2
4 Div . A m . Coy .......... ... 1

Mixed Bde . Sup . Col .... ... 1

.. Cav.Bde ................... 2 .
Mixed Bde Pet . COY.... ... 1

... LH.Regts ................ 2

M.G.Regts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Mixed Bde . Amm . Coy . ... 1

Armd . Div . Tps. Coy ... ... 5

.... Armd . Reg& ............. 50

.
Caw . Trg Regts ....... 25
Armd . Bde . COY

..........
Supp . Gp . Coy............. ... 5

... 5

.
.. Armd Trx . Re& ..... 50 Div . Fa . Pk . Sec. . . . . . . . . ... 5

.
.. Armd . DIG .... .I .........20 Div . Amm . Pk Sec....... ... 5

.... Armd . Bde . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Support Group ......... 20
Div . Pet . Pk . See. . . . . . . ... 5

Corps Wkshop~Sec . . . . ... 5

,, Fd . & Med . Bde . and Armd . Div . Wkshop ... ... 5

Regt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 L.ADs. ........................ ... 1

Army Fd . Wkshop ...... ... 2

.. Fd . Regt . (25 pr.) ...... 10
.... A.T. Regt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 SCHOOL

A A . B t y ................... 2 R.M.C. ....................... 200

.. Lt.A.A.Bty ............. 5 C . & S . S...................... 20

... .
Fd Sqn . or Coy . . . . . . . 1
Fd.ParkCoy.......... 1
S . of A .....................
S . o f M E ......................
10

S~ Of sles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Armd . Div . F d . Sqn.......... 6 No. 1 1 2 0' .r s.............

io

. .
Armd . Div Fd Pk . Sec ....... 6 .
NO 2 Inf . O.T.S............. 10

.
Armd Div . Sigs................ 6 MM.G.S. ....................
.
A S C School ............... 5

10

CBV. Div . Slgs................... 2

School of Mech ................ 20

Dlv . SIes......................... 2 AP.V. School .............. 750

H.Q.Div ......................... 2

1 n f . B d e......................... 2 C.TS.

Northern Comd ............. 5

I n f . B n ............................ 2 Eastern Comd ................ 10

Motor Bn ......................... 10 Southern Comd ............. 10

Larry Bn ......................... 10 Western Comd ............. 5

D
3
 CONTENTS .
Page
Dlstribution ................................................................................................ 3

Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................. 7

2. Organization .......................................... .................. 10

3 . Formations and Movement .................................... 12

.
4 Intercommunlcation ........................ ..".. _ .............. 17

5. OperationsGeneral Role and Tasks .................. 20

.
6 Attack .............................................................................. 25

7 . Defence ........................................................................ 38

.
8 Tank versus Tank Action .......................................... 42

Appendix 1. Particulars of Armoured Vehicles in the

Armoured Brigade ................................................ 47

.
1A Composition of Units of an Armoured Brigade 48

2........................................................................................... 49

3........................................................................................... 50

4 .......................................................................................... 51

5 .......................................................................................... 52

 CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION.
1. The Evolution of Armoured Forces.
(a) The plan of campaign for the 1919 offensive-on the
Western Front WBS based on the conception of an initial attack
agalnst the enemy front. supported by a large number of hcaiy
ranks. and the subsequent launching of a m a s 01 lighter. laslel'
r a n k directed on oblectlves many mlles behuid the German
~ ~~~~
-
front IC is therefore blinnec lhst the iden of "sine ranks ~.~ fur
~~~~~~

any other purpose than t h i t for which they were origlnally

designed, i.e.. for close co-operation on the battleAeid. found no
place in post-war official tactical doctrine.
(b) But, curiously. although the role given to tanks in Field
Service Regulations after the war was that of the slow, heavily
armoured machine. when it came to re-eouiooinn the Roval
Tank, a very much smaller, lighter and comparatively fast type
of tank.
(c) This undoubtedly gave impetus to the development of
independent, as opposed to close co-operation tank tactics. The
possibilities of this type of action had been realized by ihe
manv o5cers who had taken uart in or studied the tank
operitions since the Battle of Cimbrai in November, 1911. and
particularly the many and varied engagements commencing
with the Battle of Amlens in August, 1918,which culminated in
the final defeat of the Germans in November of that year.
(d) Consequently, during the years 1925 to 1933, various ex-
perimental "armoured forces" were improvised, of which tank
units formed the basis. I n 1934 the permanent formation of
the Tank Brigade set the ofecial sea1 on the mobile role. The
decision. made in 1935,to form, outside the Tank Brigade, new
Army Tank Battalions to fulfil the original close co-operation
role, gave Anal rewgnition to the existence of two separate
and distinct tank functions requiring completely diflerent
machines, organlzation and training.
It is essential, therefore. to be clear as to their relative char-
acteristlcs. On the one hand we have the Army Tank Bat-
talions, with their thlck armour, Inevitable weight, slow speed
and limited range, and a complete reliance on the support of
other arms. On the other hand, the Tank Brigade battallons.
with compal-dtlvely light armour, speed, extreme flexibility,
extended clrcnit of action and self-containment as regards
reconnaissance, protection and supporting flre.
 The Tank Brigade, in the period 1935-1938 contained one
Light Tank Battalion and three Mixed Tank Battalions. The
latter were each organized into three mixed companies. Each
company contained a reconnaissance element (light tank sec-
tion,) a close support 'element (C.S. medium tanks), and the
4
medium tank section, well armed with 3-pr. gun and several
M.Gs. The armour of all these tanks was only proof against
heavy M.Gs.
(e) Since 1934. with the converslon of Cavalry units into
armoured regiments and the mechanization of other arms, the
logical development followed, and late in 1937 the Tank Bri-
gade was incorporated with two armoured cavalry brigades into
the Mobile Division, whose flrst commander was General Sir
Alan Brooke, now Commander-in-Chief in England.
The Armoured cavalry brigades each contained three light
tank cavalry regiments, whilst the Tank Brigade was shorn of
the Light Battalion. It was, of course, considered that recon-
naissance for the Tank Brigade could be carried out by a
regiment detached from an Armoured Cavalry Brigade.
The Mobile Division Contained, in addition, two motor bat-
talions of infantry and two R.H.A. regiments.
(f) Briefly, it was considered that the Mobile Division would
operate in hostile rear areas after a flank movement or by
means of a gap probably forced by an attack of 'Y" tanks sup-
ported by ail arms.
The Armoured Cavalry Brigades were thought capable of
overcoming with their light t a n k . hostile opposition which
was lightly held and hastily organized. and their main func-
tion would be that of attack o n enemy nerve centres and in-
stallations. The Tank Brigade would be available to support
them should stronger opposition be encountered, but its main
function was to "keen the Tina" and vrevent interference hv"
hostile armoured uniis, if necessary by'tank v . tank action.
The motor battalions were available to force a passage or
keep a gap open and for anti-tank defence and protection.
(g) 1938 saw a commencement being made in using bomber
and flghter squadrons R.AP. in co-operation with armoured
forces.
(h) A t this time, re-equipment of the Tank Brigade, long
overdue. was accelerated. The Cruiser Tank was introduced
in two types, light and heavy. The former were used to supply
the reconnaissance element, and the heavy cruisers provided
the flghting and close support AP.Vs.
The constitution of the Royal Armoured Corps led to the
Royal Tank Corps becoming the Royal Tank Regiment, and
-1-0 to a change of unit, etc., designation. Since then all
e
 armoured units except those equipped with "I" tanks have been
organized as troops, squadrons and regiments. The name
I
*'Mobile" has been changed to "Armoured' Division.
(j) The rapid increase in the proportion of anti-tank
weapons with foreign armies forced an equally rapid movement
to thicken the armour of cruiser tanks. I n this development
' the light cruiser disappeared as such, its role as regards close
reconnaissance being taken over by the ordinary cruiser tanks
of units.
(kl The disappearance of the lightly armoured tank and the
increase in numbers of anti-tank weapons has now brought the
motor battalion into the armoured brigade. where it has the
main functions of penetrating and dissolving hostile anti-tank
defences, and of protection and anti-tank defence of the
armoured regiments a t rest or in the passage of a defile. For
this reason the motor battalion may not always accompany
the armoured brigade.
(1) The role of the armoured brigade remains the Same, viz.,
decisive armoured action.

. ~ I ~
~~~~~ ~
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~~~~~~,~ ~ ~~ ~~~~

most dimcult operafion, a i d o n e a in which success brings in its

train the opportunity to inflict serious disorganization, damage
and defeat on the enemy's unarmoured troops and installattons.

9
 CHAPTEB 2.

ORGANIZATION.

1. Composition of a n Armoured Brigade.

An Armoured Brigade consists of :-
Headquarters.
Three Armoured Regiments.
One Motor Battalion,
One Sqn., Armd. Div. Signals will normally work under com-
mand. When the Armd. Bde. is acting more or le% indepen-
dently it may expect all or some of the following units to be
attached:-
Armd. Reconnaissance Regt. or Portion.
Field Regiment RA.A. (25-pdrs.) or portion.
Field Squadron R.AE.
Light Field Ambulance AAMC.
Bde. Company, Armd. Div. AA.S.C.
The detailed Composition of the units of a n Armd. Bde. is
given at Appendix 1.

2. TYPESof Armoured Vehicles.

(a) Cruiser tank. This is the principle assault weapon Of
the brigade. It carries a crew of four or Ave; i t is armed
with a high velocity gun which is provided primarily for
action against hostile tanks; it has also one or two
machine guns,
For further details see Appendix 1.
(b) Close support tank. The same machine as the Cruiser
Tank in all respech except armament. It carries a 3-in.
mortar instead of the Q.F. gun. The role of this tank,
as its name implies, is that of close support of the cruiser
t a n k s This is provided by means of smoke screens, but
it carries a proportion of HE.bombs as well.
tc) Armoured Car. A lightly armoured F.WD. vehicle, fast
on roads and with a reasonable cross country perform-
ance. Armed with medium and A. Tk. M.Gs. mounted in
a turret. Used in Armd. 0. Rgt. but carrier may be used
as alternative equipment.
(d) Scout Car. A small, inconspicuous armoured vehicle of
high performance which provides the equipment for inter-
communication troops of headquarters and regiments.
Carrier may be used as alternative equipment.
IO

 (e) Carrier, universal. An inconspicuous tracked and arm-

oured vehicle used in Motor Bns. for reconnaissance and
protective duties. Suitable also for use as Armoured Car
or Scout Car.

3. Brigade Headquarters.
Thls contains the necessary number of tanks to enable com-
mand to be exercised and for liaison and local protection.
It consists of:-
One Armoured command vehicle and four tanks, in whlch
are carried the wireless sets to communlcate with units, air-
craft, B. Echelon and H.Q. Armd. Div. (see Chapter 5 ) . They
are, however, fighting tanks in all respects.
Three tanks .................. Local protection troop.

Three tanks .................. Liaison officers.

Nine carriers or Scout

Cars ........................ Inter-communication duties.

4. The Armoured Regiment.

The basic idea of a tank is a mobile armoured gun platform,
and it is upon fire effect that it depends for its wwer in battle.
1) The Cruiser tank, with its powerful weapons and compara-
tively stable gun platforms, is the backbone of the offensive
power of the Armoured Brigade; it can engage both armoured
and "Soft" (i.e. unarmoured) targets with a high rate of fire
and considerable accuracy.
When the decisive phase of its action comes, ana particularly
in the presence of hostile tanks, it will usually be out of reach
of the support of the other arms although the motor battalion,
if not otherwise employed, may be within call.
The Armd. Regt. must, therefore, be self-supporting as regards
local reconnaissance, protection and Supporting fire. These
requrrements must be organired and grouped to give the maxr-
mum Rexibiliry. the highest degree of initial co-operation and
meed In setion In Conformiiv W i t h these onnc~olcsthc Armd
Rigts. are~organizedso that each o f t h e &rei .;quid& con-
tains sufficient cruisers for local recce. as well as for
their main task of providing hitting Power and accurale and
sustained fire power. In addition. close support tanks are
availablr In each sqn for supilorting flre niid smoke screens.

'
The whole squadron Is a complete and handy flghting
machine,
The detailed organisation will be seen at Appendix 1A.

11

 CHAPTER 3

FORMATIONS AND MOVEMENT.

1. Regimental Formatlons.
The basic formations used by Armoured Regiments are shown
in A.A.C. Pamphlet No, 1. Examples are given at Appendix 2.
For movement, any of the following formations may be Used.
It will, however. often be necessary to increase dispersion
greatly beyond the drill distance of 10 yds. between vehicles.
This will be ordered to suit the occasion.
Line Ahead ...... Tanks in single file.
Arrowhead ......... Narrow frontage (dispersed).

Column .............. Narrow frontage (concentrated).

Trident ............... Wide frontage (dispersed)

Line .................. Wide frontage (concentrated).

In operations, squadron leaders move their squadrons in the

formation best suited to the ground and circumstances. Troops
or protective duties will move a t protection stations as ordered.
The number of forward troops (or squadrons) is ordered in the
expression, "one-up," "two-up," etc. The remainder are under-
stood to be in reserve. Squadron leaders move where they can
best exercise control. Squadron rear link tank always accom-
panies squadron leader. C.S. Tanks, if not occupied by squad-
ron Leader, may be ordered to move independently if necessary.
A typical case is shown in the diagram a t Appendix 3.

2. Brigade Formations.
(a) Protection.
Three alternatives may be employed:-
(i) General protection afforded by Armoured Car Regiment
(Divisional Troops) -Armoured units respomible for local
protcction, but armoured brigade mainly concentrated.
,(ii) I n close country or when a defended obstacle is antici-
pated, or serious static opposition likely, close protection
will be afforded by Motor Battalion. Armoured Regl-
ments, although responsible for own local protection. may
be concentrated.
(iil) When opposition is likely to be sporadic or anti-tank
defences hastily organized and lightly held, or the
Armoured Car Regiment is not available, protection will
be provided by one or more Armoured Regiments. Motor
Battalion in this case will be concentrated and possibly
moving by bounds between concealment areas.
12

 (b) The Armoured Brigade on the move operating under

conditions of light opposition, (i) above, is shown diagrammati-
cally in Appendix 4. The following details as to depth, frontage
and distribution of headquarters may be taken as a guide.
The Armoured Car Regiment‘s role is, reconnaissance and
protection. With three squadrons up, it can operate on a fron-
tage of about 12 miles. giving a troop patrol per mile of frontage.
with one per squadron in reserve. Whether or not all three
squadrons are “up” will depend on circumstances. Often one
or part of one is retained as a reserve or for some special recon-
naissance mission to a flank or even to the rear of the Brigade.
The depth of the Armoured Car Regiment when deployed is
about 3 miles. Squadron Headquarters move about one mile
behind the leading patrols; Regimental Headquarters, with any
reserve there may be, about another mile behind the line of
Squadron Headquarters.
Behind Armoured Car Regimental Headquarters move Bri-
gade Headquarters. On the principle that the Commander
must be well forward, a principle which becomes more applic-
able as formations get faster, Brigade Headquarters will usually
ne only about one mile in rear of, and often in visual touch
with, Headquarters Armoured Car Regiment.
(c) At Brigade Headquarters will be, not only the tanks Of
Brigade Headquarters itself, but also No. 1 Party. This Party
consists of the three C.0s. of Armoured Regiments. each in his
own tank, and each accompanied by one tank of his Head-
quarters for liaison purposes, usually containing his Intelligence
omcer.
The formation of No. 1 Party is normal and it remains a t
Brigade Headquarters until deployment is imminent, when the
procedure described in paragraph 3 below takes place.
The formation and retention at Brigade Headquarters as
long as possible of NO. 1 Party is considered an essential feature
in the technique of command of a mobile formation such as the
Armoured Brigade. Not Only can C.0s. be kept fully posted
with first-hand news of the situation as it develops, but, when
the time for deployment comes, the Brigade Commander is
able to give his appreciation and orders verbally to C.0s. who
then go off,not only with immediate orders, but, what is even
more necessary in a rapidly changing and fluid operation, with
a knowledge of the Commander’s intentions and alternative
lines 01 action.
(d) In addition to NO. 1 Party, NO. 2 Party may be formed,
consisting of Squadron Leaders, each travelling in his own
tank.
13

 The situation may not always permit the formation of NO. 2

Party, as, for instance, when the Brigade is moving through
hostile country where the presence of Squadron Leaders with
their units is of more importance.
If NO. 2 Party is formed it will move some 3 minutes in time
behind No. 1 Party.
The responsibility for forming No. 2 Parties rests with Reg-
imental Commanders, unless specific orders are issued by Brig-
ade Headquarters.
(e) Moving some 20 minutes in time beNnd Brigade Head-
quarters comes the mass of the Brigade, the three Armoured
Regiments.
I n the absence of C.0s. with No. 1 Party, each Regiment is
comrnandcd by the Second-in-Command. I n a formation in
which the C.O. is as likely as anyone else to become a casualty,
if through nothing else than mechanical breakdown, the pre-
sence of an active Second-in-Command is an essential feature.
This applies equally to Brigade Headquarters, where a full
Colonel, a Brigade Second-in-Command, is now included in the
War Establishment of the Headquarters.
This procedure applies whether protection is being afforded
by Armoured Car Regiment, Motor Battalion, or one of the
Armoured Regiments.
The formation in which the Armoured Regiments move will
depend on circumstances. If moving on roads. the three regi-
ments will only move in one column when forced to do iio:
they will usually move in two, three, or even six or nine sepa-
rate squadron columns, depending on the roads available and
other factors.
The principle to be followed is to move in as many columns
on as wide a front as is consistent with control. By so doing
the danger from hostile air attack is reduced; accurate enemy
observation is minimized; the possibility of congestion and
delay is removed, and handiness and rapidity of deployment is
increased.
If movlng across country, the Brlgade may be in any of the
following formations:-
Column ,,. ... ... .One regiment behind the other.
One up ,., ... ,.. One regiment ahead, the other two abreast
following.
Two up .,. .. Two regiments abreast, the third following.
Three up ... .,. T h e e regiments abreast.
Regiments move in the formations descrlbed in paragraph 1
above.
14
3. Deployment of the Brigade.
When the time for the deployment of the armoured regiments
arrives, the following procedure takes place:-
(a) Each C.O., having received his orders, proceeds to the
regimental deployment area, followed by his squadron
commanders from NO. 2 Party, picks up his regimental
centre line and issues orders. The adjutant goes back to
the brigade mass, flying the regimental flag to indicate
his mission, and leads up the regiment. During this
period the latest information and orders are broadcast to
the regiment from the c . 0 ~tank.
. It is important that
there should be no delay. It should seldom be necessary
to check the advance of the brigade mass a t all.
If the brigade and regimental commanders have ex-
plained their appreciations and intentions properly to
their subordinates beforehand, and if intelligence has
been methodically disseminated by RfT, it may be un-
necessary for commanders to dismount a t all.
I n any case the dismounted conference should be con-
flned to the few items which cannot well be given by
RfT, such as indication of objects on the ground.
(b) As squadrons approach, each squadron commander will
drive down his squadron centre line, followed by the
squadron guide until the latter has picked up the squad-
ron centre line. Subsequent positions of squadron com-
manders will be where they can best control their
squadrons.
An essential factor to the success of this system is that junior
commanders should be kept in touch with the situatlon.

4. Dirianoes and Intervals.

I n open order, distances and intervals will be governed by the
following considerations:-
(a) On roads, the basic interval is 50 yards between tanks,
but particular care must be taken to avoid regularity, as
this renders movement obvlow to hostile aircraft.
(b) Across country, distances and intervals will depend on
the ground and visibility, but the maximum will be main-
tained consistent with control. Within sub-units, tanks
must move so that they can afford each other mutual
support.
 The frontage and depths of an Armoured Regiment, deployed
in open country, may be taken to be approximately 1000 yards
square, but this will vary very Considerably according to t h e . (
shape of the ground.

5. Speed of Movement.
(a) Units will march a t speedometer speed ordered for 100
minutes and halt for maintenance for 20 minutes. This two-
hourly maintenance halt is of the utmost importance, and, if
~~~~ ~~ ~~
-
it has to be neelected Owine to the ureencv of the tactical
~~
~~ ~
~ ~~

situation, it is the responsibility of unii CGd sub-unit com-

~~~~

manders to halt a t the first favourable opportunity for this

purpose
(b) To carry out their role of reconnaissance ahead of the
Brigade without impeding the movement of the main body
behind, individual armoured cars or tanks must move at 20-25
m.p.h. A very high standard of training, particularly in map
reading, is necessary amongst all ranks, especially junior
leaders, to maintain this rate of movement.

6. Maintenance of Direction.
The term “Direction” indicates the general direction of move-
ment of the brigade or a unit during operations; e.g., “Brigade
Direction SEYMOUR-SHEPPARTON.”
The term “Centre Line” refers to the more concise axis of
movement of the brigade or a unit during a phase of a n opera-
tion; e.g., “QUINTUS Centre Line COWRA-MILBURN
CREEK.” The centre line also refers to the road or route along
which the headquarters of the unit referred to is to move,
Ghould a unit headquarters And it necessary to leave its centre
line it will inform ail concerned so that, in the event of wire-
less Silence or a breakdown in wireless communications, touch
can be maintained by liaison officers or other means.

16
 CHAPTER 4.
D INTERCOMMUNICATION.
1. Means of Intereommunloatian.
The following means of intercommunication are provided:-
(1) Wireless.
(2) Visual:-
Signal Arms.
Lamp.
(3) Liaison Officers.
(4) Despatch Riders in carriers.

2. Wireless.
(a) The primary means of intercommunication is wreless.
Radio Telephony reverting to Wireless Telegraphy if and when
circumstances make this necessary.
Every tank is fltted with a transmitting and receiving set.
This is essential, for, if commanders' tanks only were provided
with sets, casualties to tanks either through mechanical break-
down or any other cause would seriously interfere with control.
0 Any commander must be able to tranship into any tank and
exercise command from it, It cannot be sufficiently emphasized
that the Armd. Brigade relies for success on speed in move-
ment and action and extreme flexibility. This demands per-
sonal voice control by all commanders from the Brigade Com-
mander downwards. Consequently all commanders actually
operate their sets, so far as speaking and receiving Is con-
cerned. The system of wireless communications is shown dia-
grammatically in Appendix V.
I t will be seen from this diagram that there are breaks in
through communications at Brigade and Unit Headquarters.
In order to avoid the necessity for halting to pass messages
verbally or in writing from one tank to another, all head-
quarters tanks are to be equipped with a second short-range
wireless sending and receiving set for local intercommunication.
(b) It will be noticed t h a t only one frequency is allotted
for internal communication within regiments.
Good training and wireless discipline are essential to work
such large groups of stations. Messages must be concise and
kept as short as is compatible with clearness. To cut down
wireless traific to a minimum, stations below Troop Leader In a

particularly urgent or important messages to send.

11
3. Visual.
Control within troops is, therefore mainly by visual methods.
These consist of a Simple code of signals given by hand-
operated arms and a code which is transmitted by daylight
signalling lamp, using the mOrSe alphabet. The latter code
can, on occasions, be sent over the wireless using WIT.

4. Liaison Personnel.
A further method of intercommunication is by liaison officers
travelling in tanks. As described in Chapter 2. three liaison
officers from a permanent part of H,Q. Armd. Bde. The scale
therefore allows one to be sent to each armoured unit of the
Brlgade.
No special provision is made for Liaison personnel with
armoured units except the Intercommunication Troop (see 5
below). They may. of course, be provided by units for any
special operation.
The Motor Battalion, however, carries a Liaison Officer on
Bn. H.Q.
This method of control can only be considered as an auxiliary
for use in emergency, such as when wireless silence is ordered
or when wireless communications are not operating owing to
mechanical breakdown or enemy action. But control by liaison
methods is possible and satisfactory for short periods, although
it must be realised that the speed and handiness of the for-
mation will be reduced considerably for the time being.
Liaison personnel may, of course, be employed to convey
verbal messages when necessary when wireless communications
are functioning. They are most useful for carrying marked
maps.

5. Intemommunicalion Troop.
A number of scout cars or carriers is provided on Brigade
and Armd. Regt. Headquarters for
(a) Conveyance of messages or marked maps,
(b) liaison duties: conveyance of lialson personnel.
(c) reconnaissance,
(d) minor protective duties,
(e) traffic control when necessary during operations.
The Motor Battalion does not have an Intercommutllcation
Troop of this type.
Motor cyclists are provided on the establishment of units for
message carrying and traffic control in safe a r e s in order to
avoid the use of the more expensive vehicle. T h e y accom-
pany B Echelon during operations.
18
B. Wireless Securlty.
(a) As inferred in p r a g r a p h 4 above, the imposition of
wireless silence is iikely to impede seriously the speed and
flexibility of the Brigade.
Despite frequent changes in call-signs enemy intercept
and direction Anding sets will usually identify and locate
armoured formations.
Wireless silence is therefore likely to be imposed in rear
areas and, in operations, until contact has been gained or it
is reasonably clear that the formation has been identified.
Constant practice with other means of intercommunication
is therefore important.
(b) When wireless is in use, the maximum possible degree of
signal security must be obtained. To this end, the following
methods are empioyed:-
(a) The use of code names for each unit,
(b) The use of substitution codes for map references.
, (c) The coding of place names, etc.
(d) Code words for operational reports. Codes must
necessarily be simple and are therefore capable of
being broken rapidly. Changes of code must be
frequent.

19
 CHAPTER 5.
4
OPERATIONS-GENERAL ROLE AND TASKS.
1. Duties of Armoured Forces.
The duties of all types of mobile and armoured forces may
be stated to be:-
(a) Reconnaissance of $3 strategic nature.
(D) Protective duties, e.g., covering the advance of other
forces or a withdrawal or a flank.
(c) Exploitation or pursuit.
(d) Offensive action in direct or indirect co-operation with
other forces.
2. The Armoured Division may be called on to carry out any
of these tasks in the course of its employment.
I t must be remembered, however, that its main role is one
of utilizing surprise, speed and fire power to achieve deep
penetration and effect increasing disorganization and destruc-
tion in hostile rear areas; thereby to cause a rapid reduction
in the morale and power of resistance of hostile formations,
to isolate them and to
~ ~ ~~~~~ ~. render their defeat Inevitable. This mav
~~~~
(1
take the form of exploitation of a Success or ma7 be initiitii
by armoured formations in offensive action.
To attempt this in modern war will involve contact with
hostile armoured forces. In much the same way as naval or
air suoeriaritv
~“ confers
~~~~~~~. freedom of action on those forces.
~~~~ ~~~ ~~~
~,the
~~~
~~~
~ ~~ ~ ~

gainin’g oi “tank superiority” may be a n essentii prelude. to

action in pursuit of the main task.
“Tank superiority” may be gained by tank v. tank flghting,
or temporarily by the threat of armoured action or by conflnlng
the hostile armoured forces into a certain area by means of
obstacles, anti-tank measures and air or artillery bombardmen:.
3. The Armoured Brigade is unlikely to be called upon to carry
out duties of a reconnaissance or protective nature otherwise
than for its own security except in special circumstances. It
will, however, be called on to undertake offensive operations
and exploitation or pursuit.
The operations of an Armd. Bde. may therefore be con-
veniently classifled as:-
(a) To operate in or near the battle zone to attack objec-
tives on or close behind the forward area or to exploit
((
success.
20
 (b) To operate at a distance from the battlefield in pwsult
or to attack deep objectives or to carry out Some 6pecia1
mission.
D (e) Action against hostile armoured formations.

4. Action close t o the maln battle.

The flrst role entails operations in a n area where the enemy
is deployed and prepared, It thus offers diminished Iwssibllities
of surprise and manoeuvre and of action by threat.
Organized opposition will be encountered and tanks will be
exposed to the fire of anti-tank WeaPOIIs.
In principle, the tank endeavours to avold anti-tank weapons
which may cause casualties even to well armoured vehicles. The
presence of the Motor Battalion In the Armd. Bde. offers a
means of overcoming anti-tank fire.
The types of objectives for the armoured units of the Brigade
may be-
(a) I n areas immediately behind the battle fronkenemy
artillery, reserves and headquarters.
(b) Further in rear, reinforcements forward installations
and communications and higher formation head-
quarters.
Every endeavour Should be made to launch the Armd: Bde.
at a time and from a direction which will give the maximum
degree of initial suprlse.
A prolonged action against an unbroken enemy must be
avoided as involving losses incommensurate with the results to
be achieved.

5. Aotion distant from main battle.

I n the case of the second role, although a t a dlstance from
the main battlefield. the action of armd. forces must form part
of the general plan and be timed and co-ordinated with the
operations of the main force.
Two essential conditions are necessary to enable such opera-
tions to be carried out:-
(a) The area of operations must be generally suitable for
armoured forces.
( b ) There must be choice of objectives, widely separated,
which wlll enable the speed and power of manoeuvre
of the Armd. Bde. to deceive the enemy and forestall
his counter measures.
21

 Types of objectives in this kind of operation are:-

(1) Retiring or reinforcing troops.
(ii) M.T.
Mi) Headquarters.
(iv) Centres of communication and other essential organha-
tion.
Although considerable damage may be done, the primary
purpose of such operations must be to dislocate the machinery
of command to delay and dlvert reinforcements for the main
battle front and to strike at a critical period of the battle.

6. Action against armoured formations.

Hostile armoured formations will be used;-
(a) Offensively.
(b) Defensively to prevent our armd. forces from achieving
their object. Should the enemy selze the initiative and
attack, tan& form the only striking force capable of
defeating his object. The best anti-tank defence is the
tank.
Where both sides possess armoured forces, it is therefore
logical to assume that tank v. tank fighting wlll occur.

7. Negotiation of Obstacles.
(a) It is unlikely that extensive areas will be found without
certain natural obstacles, impassable to tanks. Rivers and
railways will certainly be turned to advantage by the enemy.
Railways are usually passable at many polnts, such as bridges,
tunnels and the level places where cuttings and embankments
meet. It is unlikely that all such places will be strongly held.
Rivers, on the other hand, constitute serious obstacles. Al-
though the speed and power of manoeuvre of the force may
hope often to disclose weakly held or undefended crossings, the
negotlatlon of a defended rlver line may have to be undertaken.
In the Armd Bde the task of securing crossings Over Kuch
nn ob~laciewill usually be undertaken by the motor infantry.
supported by artrllery and engineers If allotted. When operatlng
indeoendentlv. or If the obstacle Is encountered after havlna
been launchid by the Armd. Divislon, the Armd. Brigade mus?
force a crossing with its own resource8. The provision of rapid
methods of bridging is, therefore. essential.
(b) It Is certaln that an enemy wlll use A/T mlnes for
blocking roads and similar defiles, either alone or in conjunc-
tlon with other artiAcial or natural obstacles. Mines will usuallv
be covered by Are.
22
 In mobile operations time is unlikely to permit of laying
extensive minefields. It is probable, therefore, that the flanks of
mined areas may be qulckly found. It will thus often be
quicker to move by alternative routes and avoid a mined area,
even though this may mean a considerable detour.
If circumstances make it necessary to force a passage through
a mine obstacle, untfl a mechanical means of clearing a passage
is evolved, personnel must be dlsmounted to remove the mines
by hand. A plan deploylng all available Support by machine
guns and smoke producing weapons (mortars and projectors)
must be made to cover the action of the dismounted party.

8. R.A.A.F. Co-operation.
For all types of Armd. Brigade operations co-operation by the
Royal Australian Air Force is a vital necessity.
The types of co-operation required are:-
(a) Army CO-oueration Aircraft.
t l P
~ rior to an operation. comprehensive and detailed
topographical reconnaksance will be rcqulred 10
supplement infomiation obtalned from maps and
other sources
These reconnaissances will be mainly photo-
graphic. but vlsusd reconnaissances will also be
necessary. Air reconnalssances by Commanders,
St,nff Officers and. -
~~ ~ Intellieence
.... OfRcers of the
~ ~

Armd. Brigade of the area of operations will ;IS0

be of great value.
(li) During an operation.
Changes of plan and of direction of movement
will make frequent demands for further topo-
graphical reconnaissance.
Tactical reconnaissance, particularly to rewrt
hostile armoured forces, will be required to
rllstance
~ ~ . .mlles
f 50
o.~ ~~ ..... xhend or
~. t
.o
. the
~~~.flank of
the Brigade. When contact with the enemy k
imminent, close co-operation uatrols will often be
of great value.
(b) Bombers.
Co-operation by bombing aircraft may take the form
of:-
(i) Bombing attack$ on targets timed and co-
ordinated with the attack of the Armd. Brigade
on other objectives in the vicinity, e.g., if an
attack is being made on enemy reinforcements
a3
 moving through a certain area, aircraft might
bomb columns moving through close country.
whi!st the Armd. Brigade attacked other c o l m s
moving in an area more suitable for tank opera-
tions.
(ii) Bombing attacks to provide support to Cover the
attack of the Armd. Brigade on a given objective
in circumstances when other forms of supporting
fire are impossible.
( e ) Fighters.
The co-operation of fighter aircraft will be invaluable:-
(i) To obtain local and temporary air superiority
during a critical phase of an.operation, e.g., to
prevent hostile air reconnalssance observing an
important change of direction or to drive off
hostile bombers attempting to attack the brigade
whilst it is passing a defile.
(ii) To carry out low-flying attacks on targets in
conjunction with the Armd. Brigade.

24
 CHAPTER 6.

ATTACK.
1. Information.

_, ~ . . ~ ~
~~

when Armd. Bdes. are operating independently. A i all- times

the value of C1.R. aircraft cannot be underestimated.
Before an Armd. Bde. is launched to the attack, and during
the attack, the G.O.C. Armd. Div. will keep the Bde. Comd.
fully posted with information regarding the general situation.
Once launched or in independent action the Armd. Bde. must
carry out its own recce. mainly with its own resources.
Tacricai informotion 1s required over an area which includes
the flunks and OfIen the renr of the brigade as well ns the front.
...--......
fwniirnrlv 10 .~ ~. rile
ronridernblr distances I t 1s IherPPOrC bevolld
.~
~~~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~

w w e r s of the Bde. Comd. to obtain this from his own resources

~~~~

which should be supplemented by placing Army Co-operation

Aircraft under the control of the Brigade.
Otherwise he must employ one or more Armd. Regts. or a
detachment of each.
When Armd. Cars are not available or are insufficient for the
task additional means may be found within the Bde. by Using
scout cars and carriers. The dmculties incurred in forming
impropised organizations are real. Such action therefore should
be employed only in emergency, and then confined as f a r as
posslble to the utilization oP these vehicles in suitable areas
under the control of their own units.
. (b) During battle, the Comd. will control his force by informa-
tion derived from his own observation and from unit reports.
If control is to be efficient a constant stream of information
must fiow from front to rear. This is the responsibility of all
Comds.
'A particular duty of C1.R. Aircraft recce. units and armd.
regts. or dets. engaged in recce. is to look out for the approach
of hostile troops and, if such are discovered. to keep the Armd.
Bde. Comd. fully informed of their movements.
(c) The reconnaissance duties required from Armd. regts.
other than dets. employed as in (b) above are limited to those
necessary to secure their own local protection and to obtain
additional topographical infomntion. Although some dispersion
Is'inevitable, it must be reducted to a minimum. The speed of
tanks enables protective dets. of this nature to rally once their
task is completed.
25

2. Reconnaissance.
(a) Three methods present themselves for use by recce.
detachments in endeavouring to supply information of enemy
movement and strength.
(i) Distant Observation by a stationary patrol. Armd. Cars,
Scout Cars or Carriers are suitable. C1.R. aircraft also
provide information of this type.
(11) BY fighting. Although the primary oblect is to gain
information and not to flght it will often be necessary
to fight to gain information. This is particularly true
where enemy armoured forces are in the area. I n such
cases vigorous aggressive action by detachments of
cruiser tanks will usually be the best c o m e as this wlll
establish a moral ascendancy over the enemy which will
facilitate further recce.
(ill) By stealth. The folward or flank elements of an enemy
force may be kept under observation; patrols may con-
ceal themselves and allow the enemy to pass them, or
they m a y inRltrate on the f l a w or shadow the enemy
from the rear. Light recce. vehicles are more suitable
for these tasks.
(b) Orders for reconnaissance will include-
(i) All relevant information as to the enemy and the
country.
(it) The comd. intention and plan.
(iii) Instructions regarding the information which is to be
furnished.

3. Reconnaissance by tbe Armd. Regt.

(a) On receipt of orders the c.0.'~ f irst consideration is to
decide the number of Sqns. which he will require to deploy.
This will depend on his general task, the nature of the country
to be searched and the degree of resistance to be expected. The
latter consideration affects the strength of the Sqn. and regtl.
reserves which it is desirable to maintain. I n addition, the
maintenance of reserves enables unexpected changes in the
direction of movement of the Brigade to be carried out without
confusion or delay. Ah a rough gulde, one Sqn. may be able
to cover 3-4 miles of frontage in favourable country.
Since the range of RIT is limited an important consideration
is his own Position. In general he should be well forward and
centrally placed, and his Sqn. leaders must be kept informed as
t D the route by which he is moving. I t is the duty of the
Brigade Commander to transmit to the Armd. Regt. Commander
any information obtained from aircraft or other sources which
26
 (b) The Sqn. is the normal reconnoitring detachment and
the Troop forms the normal patrol. The Sqn. Commander thus
has four patrols under his hand, and manoeuvres these i n order
to carry out the instructions which he has reccived from his
regtl. commander. He should try to maintain at least one patrol
in reserve. Although he will usually move behind the line of
his patrols, occasions will often arise, e.g., i n the reconnaissunce
of a tank obstacle, when his personal observation is essential.
tc) The success of a patrol depends principally on the leader
and the clearness of the orders he is given.
He should be told:-
(i) What is known of the enemy and the country over which
he is to operate.
(ii) Movements of neighbouring patrols so that he may not
duplicate their work and may know where to look for
assistance.
(ili) ais direction of movement, and in the case of protective
reconnaissance, the average speed ut which he is .to carry
this Out.
(iv) The direction of movement of his Sqn. Commander so
that he can flnd him if wireless communication fails.
(Centre Line).
( V I What information is required and the times by which
it should be sent.
He will obtaln information by means of his own observatlon
and is responsible for its timely transmission to his company
commander. It must be remembered that a11 patrols are worklng
on the Same wireless frequency, hence the vital importance of
short and concise messages.
(d) The normal method of movement of a patrol is t h e paint,
the commander, the reserve. The essential consideration is that
the Point should be far enough ahead to ensure that the whole
Patrol should not be ambushed at once. The value of conceal-
ment both on the move and a t rest should also not be forgotten.
If the point is held up the leader may attempt to overcome
resistance by making a flanking movement with his reserve
with the object of threatening the enemy's line of retirement
and so bringing about the enemy's withdrawal. A t the Same
time he must make such movement with due caution, as he may
find himself involved in a fight with an enemy force of superior
strength. Movement should be controlled as far as possible by
Visual signals, so that wireless may be left free for the trans-
27
mission of information-both of his own and that of other
patrols. Other patrol formations are-arrowhead. trident and
line. The two former cover a wider front than the line ahead
formation. Line is normally only needed when forced to cross
sky lines.

Armoured Regiments in Attack.

(a) The Armd. Brigade Commander directs the battle by the
manoeuvre of his armd. regts. AS in the case of other formation
commanders h e should maintain a reserve. Unlike other forma-
tions in which the resewe is kept out of the battle until
requred, 1" an armd brigade the reserve will usually be in
niovument on rhe battlefield For example. when movlng in
"column"
~.~~
~~~ the second and thlrd batlalions consrlrute the rcsewe.
and when movgg "two up: the rear battalion constltutes the
reserve. Again, when moving "two up" and the Brigade Com-
mander changes direction to form "two up" to the right, then
the original left leadlng regt. becomes the resewe.
(b) The role of the armd. regt. in the attack is the destruc-
tion of the enemy in the area laid down by the Brigade
Commander.
(c) (i) During the period immediately preceding a n attack
the regtl. commander will normally be moving with
No. 1 Party in readiness to receive the Brigade Com-
mander's flnal orders. His regt. will be under command
of the second-in-command. No. 2 Party may have
been formed, and the battalion will be ready for
deployment on the reception of flnal orders as des-
cribed in chapter 3, paragraph 3.
(ii) During the battle the regtl. commander will mave 60
that he can control his Sqns. without, if possible,
becoming embroiled i n the flght.
(iii) During both periods wireless forms the principal means
of inter-communlcation. Ten Scout cars or carriers
are avallable at Regimental Headquarters for message
carrying. Since all tanks in the regt.. excevt the rear
link-tanks. are on the same wireless frequency, the
foundation of control Is a high standard of wireless
dlscioline. and. econamv
.~~~~~~~
~
in .... use o
... the~~~~ -f.wireless.
~ ~ T-h..
e.
-.
lattgr is~deoendentnot onlv on the efficiencv of the
sets and operators, but on the trainlng of offiiers a i d
N.C.Os. with special reference to their abiilty to send
short, clear and concise orders, messages and reports,
and to keep silent unless speech is essential.
(iv) The regtl. commander will direct the battle by the
manoeuvre of his unit in the formation suited to the
ground and the tactical situation.
2s
 Column is suited for an attack against deep and narrow
objectives.
One-up is suited for attacking an area about which the
commander has limited information.
Two-up is suited for attack on an area about which the
commander has good information and where the attack is
being made on a broad front.
Line should rarely be used, as this formation does not permit

(v) As in the case of the brigadier, the regtl. commander

affects the battle by the manoeuvre of his reserve. This is
dependent on the formation in which he is moving: thus, if in
column or one-up he has a reserve of two sqns., if i n two-up a
reserve of one sqn.
(vi) After the capture of each objective the regt. will be
rallied in readiness for further action.
The term "rally" does not mean that the unit wlll be
assembled in close formation: sqns. will move to a named area
and halt disnersed under available cover.
~~, ~..~. .~..~
reoort their
~ ~
carry out miintence and prepare io; further action.
~ nosit,inn~
..-~
.., . ~

The regtl. Commander will carry out such re-organiz.atlon as

may be required and will inform the brigadier as to his
casualties and his degree of readiness for further action,
(Vii) During the action it is the duty of the regtl. commander
to forward to the brigadier any information likely to affect his
Plan. Early information as to the apnroach of hostile tanks Is
cspecially important.

4. Action of Armoured Squadrons.

(i) The role of the Squadron in the attack is the destruction
of the enemy in the area laid down by the regtl. commander.
(ii) During the period immediately preceding a n attack the
sqn. leader may be moving with No. 2 Party in readiness t o
receive hi> commander's f i i n l orders. On receipt of these he
will select hls sqn centre line and ulnce himself upon i t . 60 that
his sqn can i o n n up on him as it is led up from the position 01
deDloSmcn1. When it arrives all rank commanders will have
heard the regtl. commander's orders on the wireless and wili
similarly know the latest information regarding the situation.
1 A short wireless order or visual signal from t h e sqn. leader
indicating the objective and sqn. centre line should then be
29
sufacient to launch his sqn. to the attack. It should thus be
unnecessary to dismount tank commanders in order to give
verbal orders; this procedure should be avoided if possible.
(iii) During battle the sqn. commander will move so that he
can control his sqn. In the early stages of an attack he will
move well forward in close proximity to his front protection
commander. so that he can observe the sltuatlon &s l i develops.
A t a later stage when it becomes necessary to commit his
squadron, he will indicate to it the direction of its advance,
but he should avold becomina Involved in the flre flaht. Durina
this period he will move sothat he can obseNe,~controlth;?
action, and prepare for the next phase. Since the squadron
leader normally occupies a close support tank he has personal
control over the use of smoke.
(iv) After the capture of a n objective the Sqn. will be rallled
and re-organized in readiness for future action, and casualty
reports will be forwarded to the regtl. commander.
(VI Whilst the detailed method to be employed in each
operation depends on the ground and the nature of the opposi-
tion, the tactics of the squadron are dependent on a clear under-
standing of the characterlstics and roles of the close support
and cruiser tanks. A consideration of these leads to the follow-
ing fundamental Drincip1es:-
First, success dependS on the close co-operation of the recce.
patrols. close support ranks. cruiser tank troops &o that the
last-named can obtain a decision in accordance with the com-
mander's plan wilh rhe minimum of interference and casualties
from the eneilly's weapons Second, the CNISCT troops 6hould
never be commltted wilhout the eo-operatlon of close support
tanks. nor without protection againsr surprise

9. Action of Cruiser Tank Troops.

(1) The cruiser is the principal nssault weapon of the Gqn.
During the early stages of the attack the troops wlll advance
behind the protective patrols. Distance wlll depend on the
ground. the chief consideration being to avoid coming into the
effective range of unneulrallzed anti-tank weapons The troop
leaders wii1 occupy a frontage astride the sqn. C,L In accord-
ance wllh the formarion ordered. Wlthin t h b framework. each
troop leader u'ill lead his troop In the fom~aiion,and by the
route. which affords the maximum concealment from observa-
tion and protectlon from fire.
(ii) During the flnal phnse it should move so as to allow
the development of its maximum flre power whilst at the same
time affording the mlnimum target to the enemy. An important
factor is co-operation of the three tanks which form a troop;
the training Of the troop is therefore important.
30
 During this phase the troop commander should move SO that
he can rapidly regain control of his troop in order to deal with
unexpected situations, e.g., the approach of enemy tanks.
(lii) After the capture of a n objective he will rally his Troop
in the area ordered by his sqn. leader.
(a) The principal roles of protective patrols are:-
(i) To act as ground scouts for the squadron.
(li) To discover the enemy and locate his defence.
(iii) At all times to protect the remainder from the Are of
anti-tank weapons.
(iv) To overcome reslstance within their power and so avoid
delaying the advance of the sqn.
(b) I n the early stages of a n attack one or more protective
patrols precede the remainder. Since protection entails the
neutralization of anti-tank weapons on the flanks of the
medium section as well as to its front, this may involve con-
siderable dispersion unless the ground is exceptionally favour-
able. Some Cf this protection may be given by scout cars.
(c) Ciuiscr patrols rely on their speed. flre 2nd ability to
ptovide themselves wlth their own local smoke screen, to
penetrate n poslllon I1 wlll seldom be possible before a n attack
to C i v e derailed in~truclions ui nddilion disveiaion makes con-
troy by the troop leader diiucult. A h i i h standard of tactical
trnlning 16 therefore required by tank cimmanders. They must
nlso have R highly developed Sense of nndmg their own way
ncross counlt'), and understand that mulual co-operntion of the
tanks lomiin6 their lroop is at all times essentinl
(dJ When lhe squndron 1s ordered to attack a n objecrlve n
ProteLtive pntrol U111 keep the Oblectlve under Are In order 10
Drotecl the remnlnder durine lis movemenl -~
~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ IC nlso resoon-
I1 ~. ~.
~

iible for protection of the-squadron both when engage:-&

mopping-up a n area or in occupying a forward rallying area.
It will do this by taking up positions to prevent antl-tank
weapons from bringing effective flre on the squadron and to
give warning of attack by enemy tanks.
(e) The normal role of the close support tanks is the pro-
tection of the various troops of the squadron by screening with
smoke the enemy's anti-tank weapons. On occasions, close
support tanks may fire H E shell.
During the early stages of a n attack the close Support tanks
will usually be well forward, moving where they can quickly
support the protective patrols.
When the squadron commander decides to commit the
squadron, the close support tanks will assist its advance in
co-operation with the protective patrol.
31
 The indication of targets may be given to close support tanks
by the sqn. commander. Commanders of individual close
support tanks must, however. be prepared to support a n attack
on their own Initiative and without orders. The close support
tank is largely a weapon of opportunity in which the time
factor is of flrst importance. Its successful handllng thus
depends on the training and knowledge of its commander.

6. Special Considerations Regarding the Attack on Artillery

Areas.
(a) Although the Armd. Brigade can attack a hostile artillery
area and achieve a degree of success whlch will divert the guns
from their normal tasks of supporting the battle front, It is
probable t h a t such a n action would only be carried out at
considerable cost in casualties.
The decision to launch the A m d . Brigade agalnst such a n
objective, therefore, requires to be carefully weighed.
(b) In an attack by the Armd. Brigade against a n artillery
area, the mst requirement is information of the location of the
enemy batteries. The Armd. Brigade will be furnished with the
latest information In this respect before it sets out on its task.
after which further information will be supplied by the close
reconnaissance aircraft operating under control of the Brigade,
and by local reconnaissance.

The timing of the attack will depend on the ground. but a

simultaneous attack in all Unit areas will enable the maxmum
value to be obtained from surprise.
(c) In forming a repimental plnn I t must be remembered that
batteries are likely IO be situated in positions affording mutual
support to ench other nguinsl tank attacks. The maintenance
of a regtl reserve is, therefore. importanr.
td, The general mechanism of t h e attack on a bnlter) by a
squadron is:-
(1) The discorerg of the battery by the recce detachment.
based probably on information previously supplied.
( 1 1 ) Engnging the battery by the flre of the troop on recce.
(111) The employment of the close support Tanks l o smoke
the battery.
(iv, The assault by fire from a flank by the cruisers under
cover of the protection of the recce. and close support
troops.
32

 (v) Finally, a troop of tanks will probably be required to

clcse on the battery to complete the destruction of
material and prevent surviving personnel from re-
manning the guns.
Note --In order to avoid surprlse by a supporting battery the
squudron will always be covered by a protective detachment
durlnG its flanking movement

7. Special Considerations Regarding the Attack on Marching

Columns.
(a) There are two possible methods of dealing with this type
of 0bJective:-
(I) Threat of attack.
(ii) Actual attack.
The threat of attack is very likely to impose caution and may
cause columns to halt. This may, therefore, have a considerable
delaying effect and mav. in certain circumstances. achieve the
object to be attained
The most effective method. however, is undoubtedly actual
attack, to inflict serious physical and material damage and loss.
If columns halt and have time to deploy, and if the ground
offers facilities for A/T defence, attack may not be profitable.
The attainment of the maximum degree of surprise is, there-
fore, most important.
If columns continue to advance under cover of a system of
A/T picquets and protective detachments, attack may be
justified. Such protection will probably lack depth, and if the
ground lends itself to free manoeuvre by tanks, a concentrated
attack may break through with little loss.
(b) The method of attack varies according to the nature of
the column.
(i) Non-motorized troops.
The greater mobility of the Armd. Brigade enables the
Armd. Brigade commander to select the time of his
attack and the area in which he will carry It out. It is
thus unnecessary to stop the head Of the column. The
first requirement is information as to the enemy's
advance. This may be provided either by air or by
patrols.
The second requirement is the surprise of the enemy;
hence patrols. which have discovered the enemy and are
watching his advance. must take every precaution to
avoid being seen, and will usually not disturb the enemy
by opening fire on him.
33
 The brigade commander's plan will depend on the
nature of the country and the enemy's dispositions as
far as these are known t o him. I n general, an attack
against one or both flanks by. one or more regts. Is
usually the most effective method. I n the attack the
first step is the neutralization of the enemy's anti-tank
defence, the second is the destruction of his personnel.
This will be achieved primarily by advancing to
poslllons from which overwlielming fire cnn be brought
IO bear. A proponion of the tanks may. finally. char
with the coluniii to complete the destruction of materinl
(11) Attack against motorized troops.
Such columns are extremely vulnerable to attack by
tanks; but being faster than the tnnks. rely 011 their
speed for protection.
The firs1 essenlial is 10 stop the columil at or near its
head For this reason any pntrol which discovers such a
column should a t once attack it as far forwird ns
posslbie. lhus causing ic 10 hail and creating the oppor-
tunity for a n attack by the main body of the brigade
If the discovery of the column has been made by air
and it is desired to attack it, the first step is to send a
detachment of armd. cars or tanks a t full speed to attack
its head. This should be followed up by similar detach-
ments to prevent the diversion of the column.
If tile tanks are too far away to intervene, the column
will escape unless the air can impose sumcient delay on
it.

8. Special Consideralions Regarding the Forcing of a Defended

Raver Llne.
(a) When the Armd. Brigade is operating with the Armd.
Division the mechanized infantry and supporting arms Wlll
usually undertake the forcing of a defended river line. It Is to
be borne in mind that in such circumstances it will be the object
of the Divisional Commander to launch the Annd. Brigade
intact and in the best conditions.
(b) When the Brigade is operating independently, or if it
encounters the obstacle after it has been launched to the attack,
and is oup of support of other arms, it will be necessary for It
to negotiate the obstacle using its own resources which include
a Motor Battalion.
(e) Recce. detachments will reconnoitre on a wide front in
order to discover any undefended crossings and, if unsuccessful,
to provide the Brigade Commander with information as t o the
most favowable places a t which to force the obstacle.
34
 Speed to forestall any movement of enemy troops to reslst
the crossing is essential. The Armd. Brigade commander, having
foreseen the possibility, wlll, therefore, probably move one or
more re&. close behind the recce. troops t o take advantage
qulckly of the information gained. He wlll, himself. be well
forward in order to be able to make a qulck personal recon-
naissance and make his plan with the least posslble delay.
(dJ Having decided BL which point or polirts to ntiack. the
Brigade Commnnder may delcgarc 10 n subordinate commander
rhe executive command of the action nlacine nt his dlsoocal
the necessary troops. This wiliusually 'be C.O.uIiotor Battalion,
(e) The plan for forcing the crossing will usually embody the
following:-
(I) Recce. patrols in the vicinity of the area selected for
crossing should be placed so that they bring the
maximum fire to bear in support of the operation.

(iii) Troops of the Motor Bn. carry out the actual crossing
using, if available, existing bridges, or R . A E facilities
(recce. and folding boat equipment) the need for which
may have been anticipated.
(iv) Once across the obstacle. Motor Bn. should
(a) Clear immediate vicinity of crossing of defenders.
(b) If no suitable tank crossing exists at the bridgehead,
clear the nearest by flank and read attack to enable
tanks to pass over.
(c) Enlarge bridgehead and gain control of commanding
ground.
(VI As soon as possible, Armd. regts. will cross, assist Motor
Bn. if necessary but continue with normal task as
scon as possible.
(vi) To summarize, the main conditions are:-
Speed.
Supporting Are and smoke.
Clear plan and order of priority for crossing.

9. Special Conslderntlon Regardhg Attacks on Headquarters,

Depots and Installations.
(a) Such objectives may often be situated i n villages and
towns. They will UsuaIIy be defended. If small, the Motor
Bn. may be the best unit to employ.
35
 The Armd. Brigade should, as a general rule, avoid entering
towns, but its speed and power of manoeuvre may often make
surprise attacks possible. particularly If the general plan of the
operation includes a number of alternative objectives (vide
Chapter 5, paragraph 5)
(b) When the obJective is in a town the Armd. Cars or a n
Armd. regt. will penetrate any outlying AIT defences and will
surround the town and block all exits prior to the attack by
the remainder.
The town will be divided into sectors, each containing one or
more unit objectives.
The Armd. Regts. will then enter by as many roads as possible,
and simultaneously from all sides of the town. Detachments
of Motor Bn. will accompany them,
Liaison points between units must be fixed beforehand.
For street fighting mixed parties, each Including one close-
Support tank, a party of infantry and one or more cruiser
troops are most effective.
tc) The control of a large town for any length of t h e by
ail Aimd brigade is difficuit on nccount of th<smnll number
of personnel available. If [his is desired. the assistance of
addirional mechanized infsnrry may be necessary.
(d) I n dealing with a headquarters the following considera-
tions must be borne in mind:-
(i) The number of prisoners which a tank unit can take is
strictly limited.
(ii) The communications must be destroyed-these will con-
sist of wireless sets carried in vehicles. and distributed
around the headquarters. and a signal oflice from which
telephone wires radiate.
(iii) Valuable documents should be looked for and seized as
soon as possible.
(1") The number of personnel in the tanks is small. They
should not leave the protection of their armour, except
when necessary to enter buildings. I n such cases they
must always be covered by the fire of the tanks. The
moral effect of the presence of the tanks will enable
such men as have to dismount to carry out thelr tasks
with little fear of opposition.
(e) I n dealing with depots and installations it may be neces-
sary to carry out demolltions.
36

 Explosives may form part of the equipment OX tanks and

crews are trained in their use.
In the case of extensive demolitions being required the
attachment of R.E. personnel and special materials may be
necessary, The role of the tank units will then be to obtain
control of the area and protect the work of demolition.

prior to the coknencement of the operation,-so that detailed

plans can be formulated in advance and promulgated to unit.%
Air photography will be of value in this respect.
An intensive bombing raid timed to take place immediately
before the town is entered is likely to disorganize defensive
arrangements. The co-operation of bombing aircraft in such an
operation is, therefore, invaluable. I n many cases, objectives of
this nature should be allotted entirely to air force action.

37

 CHAPTER 7.

DEFENCE.

1. General Considerations.
The tank is primarily a weapon of offence and the Armd.
Brigade a powerful offensive organization. There will be
periods, however. in every campaign when the Army will be
farced to adopt the defensive. I n such circumstances the
Armd. Brigade will best fulfil its purpose if it is employed in
a manner in which its mobility and fire power are exploited
to the full.
The enemy may be expected to use two types of t,ank:
(i) A heavily armoured comparatively slow tank, proof
against fire of all field and AITk. guns and mounting a
heavy AITk. gun.
(ii) Cruiser type tank.
The former will have sumcient protection and m e power to
engage cruiser tanks with little risk. They will be utilized
largely in "breaking-in" operations in the forward battle zone.

2. Counter Attack.
(a) The major role of armoured units in defence by virtue
of their characteristics is one of counter attack. Tank counter
attack in the battle wne is the responsibility of Army Tank
Battalions.
(b) Cruiser units and formations form a powerful reserve in
the hands of a Commander.
Their value as a reserve lies partly in the fact that their
presence wlll be a factor influencing the enemy's plan, imposing
caution and Drovine a deterrent to certain courses of action,
Their value is furcher enhanced by mobility and range of
operation which enable rapid intervention to take place in any
selected area.
tc) Annourdd (cruiser) formations should not, therefore, be
split up into Small detachments and distributed to various
sectors of the defence for local counter attack but should be
retained in Large groups for definite counter attack on a major
scale.
(d) Counter attacks by armoured forces should form part of
a co-ordinated plan with the action of other formations.

3. The Armoured Brigade in the Counter Attack' Role.

(a) One of the tasks which the Armd. Division may be called
upon to carry out is to protect the withdrawal of the main
forces.
38
 When pressing forward rapidly, enemy columns are liable to
to become strung out and normal precautions are apt to be
neglected. I n these clrcumstances opportunities for an effective
counter-attack may occur. the support group being used to hold
or distract the enemy, whilst the Armd. Brigades are launched
to attack the flanks. Such counter-attacks will be rapid and
limited in scope.

I (b) In considering the employment of the Armd. Brigade in

defence, probably the chief pre-occupation of a commander will
t e to use it to neutralize or destroy hostile armoured formations.
The enemy may employ hls mobile armoured troops by deep
nenet.rnt.lnn t n st.t.ark t.he f l a n k s and rear of our forces. Tn
i be to avoid contact with

municati;ons and installations with a view to causing the

maximum confusion and casualties.
To accomplish this object a degree of dispersion by the enemy
is inevitable, and opportunities may occur for attacking him in
detail with concentrated Armd. Brigades.
Early and accurate information of the enemy movements is
essential. The co-operation of aircraft and, if available, other
armoured mobile troops is required for this purpose.
The Armd. Brigade will move to the attack covered by its own
protectlve recce. which will flnally and definitely locate the
b)
-, enemv and Drovide the Brieade Commander with information
on which to'make his detailid plan.
If the enemy does not disperse, but keeps concentrated, and is
in superior force, once he has been located, the aim of the
Armd. Brigade will be to hamper and delay his movements and
to draw him into areas where he can be engaged by established
AIT defences. In such operations the role of the Motor Bn.
will be as defined in Chapter 8.

4. Tank Infested Areas.

(a) To use tanks to occupy fixed positions is to sacriAce their
mobility and make them particularly vulnerable, when located,
to attack by AITk. weapons, by bombing aircraft and by artillery
fire. Tanks cannot, therefore, hold positions. or carry out a
static form of defence
On the other hand, by making use of their power of rapid
manoeuvre and ability to bring sudden and intense bursts of
fire from unexpected and constantly changing directions, tanks
can impose very considerable delay on an advancing enemy and,
under favourable conditions, force him to a standstill. The
Armd. Brigade can, therefore, deny areas of ground for limlted
periods of time.
This form of defensive action, which is best described as the
creation of a "tank infested area" can, when desirable, be
39

adopted as an alternative to counter-attack. It is a particularly

effective method of delaying hostile columns when conditions
are not favourable to attack.
(b) The detailed methods used arc:-
(i) One Regiment is deployed on a wide frontage. each Sqn.
being given an area in which it establishes piquets,
usually one patrol, on all the routes through the area.
These Patrols engage the enemy by fire. from concealed
positions, as he attempts to move through the area,
withdrawing subsequently to a succession of previously
selected positions in rear or to a flank from which the
action is repeated.
(10 The other regiments are held as a reserve in rear. They
w l i . accordlng 10 the frontage and the ground, be clther
conccnlmted 01 located sep3rately In P O S L ~ I O ~ irom S
which lhcv ciln strike at favourable l ~ r z e l which
s orcscnt
themselves; the object of the forwari~patrols~id~with-
drawing must be to draw the enemy into areas favour-
able for attack by the reserve regiments.
(iii) The Motor Bn. may be used to restrict hostile flank
movement, or for fiank recce. Its use in place of the
Armd. Regt. providing forward patrols is dependent on
the absence of hostile A.F.V.
tc) This type of action can be carried out by day or night.
The retention of a reserve a t nlght is not necessary. as such a
reserve could not be used effectivelv in the darkness. ~..
~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~
nizht.
At ...
therefore, all the Armd. Regts. h a y be employed In s&li
detachments of covering all routes. These detachments will
operate on the lines described above in the case of forward
patrols by day.
(d) The main considerations to be borne in mind are:-
(i) When the Armd. Brigade is employed to deny ground in
this way, it must commence Operating well in front of
the ground it is intended to deny.
(ii) Liberty of manoeuvre over a wide area and in depth is
essential.
(iii) Considerable dispersion of the Brigade is inevitable.
Consideration must be given. therefore, to the possi-
bility of attack by superlor hostile armoured formations.

5. Holding an Obstacle.
(a) The Armd. Brigade can hold an obstacle such as a river
or canal line for a limited time. The time well depend on:-
(I) The length to be held.
(li) The number of bridges and fords to be defended.
(iii) The suitability of the ground for fire positions covering
the defiles and for manoeuvre in rear of these positions.
40
 (iv) The composition of the enemy's advanced elements.
Against light AF.Vs.. light guns and lorry carried M.Cs..
considerable delay may be imposed. Against Infantry:
however, it will be dimcult to prevent a crossing being
forced at selected points, but a tank reserve should still
be able to impose considerable delay by operating against
the unsupported hostile elements which have succeeded
in crossing.
,VIThe Motor Bn will be invaluobie in potroiilng. parricu-
larly by night, nnd for preventing lnfiltrntlon
(b) The main points to consider are:-
(i) A.detailed reconnaissance by all commanders is vital, not
only of the obstacle but the ground in rear.
(ii) All crossings must be covered by adequate S.A. and A/T
fire from concealed positions, and the dispositions and
fire plans of neighbouring sub-units must be co-
ordinated.
1 1 1 1 , \Vhere l o n b and not motor mfnnlry are used in foraord
positions concealed routes for each tank up to and back
from the obstsclc should bc selected.. tonether
~~.~~~
~~~~ ~~~ ~ ~
- wlth
alternative fire positions.
(iv) An adequate mobile reserve must be kept in hand and
sufllciently far back to have liberty of manoeuvre.
(U) Adequate communication between the forward elements
and the reserves is essential.
(Vi) crossings should be blocked by obstacles and these should
be as inconspicuous as possible.
(c) The Brigade Commander will allot unit sectors and
decide on the strength and location of the reserve.
Squadron leaders will decide the number of tank piquets
required on their Squadron fronts, the position of these,
what obstacles should be made, what patrolling by day and
night is required, the position of Sqn. headquarters and the use
and position of close supporti tanks.
The Sqn. commander will select covered routes back and must
take e,very opportunity of allowing his personnel to reconnoitre
the ground in rear.
The use of wlreless, except in emergency, must be prohibited,
but all sets must be tuned and ready for instant use.
All ranks must be warned against unnecessary movement.
Special precautions must be taken against aeroplane observa-
tion. These matters are vital since once the defence has been
located, concentrated dive-bomblng and/or artillery fire will be
encountered. Light A A . artillery may be provided from Armd.
Div. resources but, in addition, every means of A.A. defence
must be organized and exploited.
41
 CHAPTER 8.

TANK VERSUS TANK ACTION.

1. Gaining of Information.
(a) Tank versus Tank actions may vary from combats
between tank troops and Patrols to action between complete
formations such as the Armd. Brigade.
( b i Whcn such an action 1- imminent. the Rrst requirement
01 a commandcr is early nnd accurate informallon as to the
enemy strength and movemcnt
The provision of this information wlll be the duty of:-
(i) Aircraft. Tac/R aircraft, under the control of the Armd.
Bilgndc Commander. must be made avaliable These
must operate nr considerable distances ahcad to give the
Ccmmnndcr llmc to acr on the Information received and
make a plnn avoiding or accepting battle. The task of
the aircraft will be to obtain informatlon of the strength
and direction of movement of the enemy's main forces.
One of the difEculties is likely t o be that of distinguish-
ing, from the air, between our own and hostile tanks.
(ii) Reconnaissance unlts, such as the Armd. C Regt. which
will be deployed on a wide front to conflrm and amplify
air information. The Commander of the Armd. Bde. or
unit requires to know the location, direction or move-
ment, speed and type of host,iie tank forces. Penetration
of hostlle protective detachments will u u a l l y be neces-
sary to discover these details.
(iii) Local protective detachments from Armd. Units. As the
forces close, patrols will be required to give detailed
information of the Cnemv from the local
~~~ ~~ .~ commander's
~ ....
~~ ~~~~ .
point of ;iew. Such protective detachments must be
pushed farther out than usual. They may consist of a
covering force of cruisers forming part or whole of a n
Armd. Regt.: or they may be comprised of scout cars
backed by only sumcient cruisers to cover their with-
drawal: again it may be possible to use scout platoons
from the Motor Battalion, although such employment
would be of a n emergency nature.

2. The Objecl of the Commander.

(8) Acting on the information received from the above
sources, and as a result of a careful study of the map and 8
personal reconnaissance of the ground, the Commander will
make a plan.
42
 (b) The Motor Battalion may be employed to restrict the
enemy's freedom of movement.
(e) Tank versus Tank actions are won by FIRE. The object
of a Commander will. therefore, be to manoeuvre his command
so that superior fire can be broughc to bear on the enemy under
the most favourable conditions. and, i f possible, from more than
one direction
The conditions which will produce the great degree of fire
superiority are:-
(i) Delivery of fire from a stationaiy platform.
(ii) Numerical superiority.
(iii) Favourable ground.
(iv) Superior gunnery.

3. Stationary Phtform.
Greater accuracy can be obtained if the tank is stationary.
The object of a commander will be, therefore, to deploy his
tanks so that they can bring fire ta bear from stationary,
concealed positions. This may not always be possible, and
ability to shoot accurately on the move is an essential part of
training.

4. Numerioal Superiority.
A general numerical superiority will seldom be obtainable
(8)
The shape of the ground and the nalural and uitificial obsrruc-
~~~~
~.~~~~
lions mUl irnoose restricrrons which will sddorn enable .~~~~~
~~~
~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ mure
~~~~

than one or two troops to deploy on a single feature. The action

of a regiment, and even more of a brigade, will therefore be
likely to take place over a wide area and to take the form of a
number of separate local combats.
Local and temporary superiority in numbers can.,however, be
obtained-
(1) By surprising the enemy in areas where the ground does
not allow him to adopt a formation which enables him
to bring all hls available guns into action, e.g., in a
defile or as he is in the process of crossing a n obstacle.
(ii) BY using light tanks and smoke to attract the enemy's
attention in a misleading direction, draw him into
unfavourable ground and, possibly, to cause him to make
detachments.
'(ill) BY superior control and fire discipline; all available
tanks fully deployed and opening fire simultaneously.
5. Ground.
The following factors will be taken into account by a com-
mander in making his appreciation of the ground prior to a
tank versus tank action.
(a) A ridge is a vital piece of ground in tank versus tank
fighting, as it offers OppOrtUnitY to occupy "hull down" positions
(i.e., positions in which tanks can move just below the crest so
that the ccmmander can observe and the gunner can engage
the target whilst only exposing the turret to the enemy): tanks
can move freely under cover of the crest, disappear and re-
appear a t different places: the enemy is unable to observe his
fire, except shorts, whilst conversely, conditions favour accurate
observation
.~~~~ of fire bv the tanks in Dossession of the ridpe:
~~

and, finaily, if it is desired to close t6e range, the- run of ;he

ground favours rapid movement
(b) Parallel ridges, or a main ridge with tributary spurs, offer
opportunities for bringing converging fire to bear from two
directions.
(c) Valleys and low ground (if overlooked by higher grounds)
are to be avoided.
(d) Rivers, railways, or a series of woods or villages which
create deflles which will force the enemy to bunch or divide his
forces, should be turned to account by covering the exits.

6. Gunnery.
Apart from individual skill in the use of his weapon by the
gunner, i.e., accuracy of aim, a high standard of judging dis-
tance, and ability to maintain a rapid rate of fire, superior
runner" can be achieved if the commander has manoeuvred
Lis tanks t o obtain the best conditions. Thus:-
(a) Accurate head-on shooting is extremely. dimcult. Every
effort must be made, therefore, to manoeuvre so that a broad-
side shoot is possible.
(b) The position of the sun must be taken into account: it is
disadvantageous if the sun is in the gunner's eyes.
(c) Background is important with a view to accurate observa-
tion of fall of shot.
(d) Fire should be opened at ranges which make full use of
the accuracy of the gun. At close ranges good gunnery is at a
discount. The 2-pdr. is an extremely accurate weapon and from
a Stationary p l a t f o m effective shooting up to 1.500 yds. is
possible.
44
 le, Effluent cor.lro1 is essential, producing simultaneous open-
mg of flre by all gum [hat can bear and ensurlng that flre IS
dlcrrrbutcd Over the whole taleet On Occasions it mav be
desirable to concentrate the fire'bf all tanks, e.g., when hostile
tanks appear piecemeal, or when the enemy H.Q. tank is
recognised.
( f ) Local or Temporary superiority of flre.

7. Control.
Commanders must concentrate on directing their units and
avoid becoming involved in the fire fight.
(a) The Brigade commander cannot control the action in
detail. Having made his plan and deployed his units, he will
exercise general control, check excessive dispersion, rally units
after a n engagement, influence the battle by the Use of his
reserves and plan the next move.
(b) A Regimental Commander, similarly, having deployed his
squadrons will ensure co-ordination between Sqns.. dlsseminate
information, but will seldom interfere with the executive action
of the Sqns.
He may retain control of the second close support of tanks of
squadrons as the danger of a n indiscriminate use of smoke in a
tank versus tank action is a very real one.
(e) A Squadron Leader's object will be to manoeuvre his
tanks so that they come into action in the most favourable
gunnery conditions. He Will use the minimum to reconnoitre
ground ahead, to gain information^ of the enemy and to screen
his movement. When the fire figkt opens, these will clear the
front and watch the flanks: opportunities may occur for them
to engage the enemy, but their role must be protective and not
offensive.
The Squadron Leader will use any Close Support Tanks left
under his Command to smoke parts of the enemy force whilst
t.he medium tanks concentrate on the remainder. He may also
use them to deceive the enemy by attracting hls attention in a
misleading direction or t o cover his own movements, always
providing that he does not use his own smoke in a way which
may Interfere with the action of neighbouring Squadrons.
Finally, the Squadron Leader wlll move himself so that he can
best observe and control the action of his command, and ensure
that its action is timed and is in co-ooeratlon with units in
his vicinity.

8. The Motor Battalion,

The Mitor Battalion, being unarmoured (except for a pro-
portion of lightly armoured carriers) will normally remain
concealed and at a distance from hostile AF.Vs. In addition,
45
the Motor Battalion has the armament only to engage lightly
armoured vehicles of the recce. type (Armd. cars) and not
cruiser tanks.

9. Other Arms.
The availabillty of field or AfTk. artillery in the vicinity of
an impending tank v. tank action may influence the Comd. to
endeavour to limit hostile freedom of movement by denying
certain areas with the flre of these weapons. Or alternatively,
an ambush may be laid and the enemy decoyed towards the
guns.
Unless a strong position, easily defended from any direction,
can be secured for the artillery, it must be remembered that
their lack of armour, vulnerability in movement and statlc role
are serious dlsadvantages which may e s i l y make artlllery a
liability to the Armd. Bde. Comd.
Engineers will frequently be requlred. A forecast of the type
of assistance which might be needed in a n operation will
eliminate delays. Engineer recce. parties travel in armoured
vehlcles and should move well forward when with the Armd.
Bde. in any operation.

46
 PARTICULARS OF ARMOURED VEHICLES IN
THE ARMOURED BRIGADE.
The following details are liable to alteration and should be
treated as approximate only:-

-1-1-
Crew ......... ._ -

Welght (tans)... -
Circuit ...............

0 Armament-
A . T k . g u n .....
3" Mortar ._< .:
A. Tk. M.G ......
A. Tk. Rifle... ..
,303 M.M.G. .....
,303 L.M.G. ..: ..
-l I -2 1 -2

Speed (max.).. .
Protected agahxt
1
35 1 70 1
A. Tk. gun except
-io
Ammunition (per close range.
A. Tk. gun .... -
-
150
3" Mortar . . . .
A. T!&.M.G. .... -
A. Tk. rifle ....
303 MM.G .....
303 L.M.G .....

..........

bl
.., :. . .. ,

4'1
 APPENDIX 1A

COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF AN ARMOURED

BRIGADE.
H.Q. Armd. Bde.

I
I
I I I
I I I I
Armd. Armd. Armd. Motor
Regt. Regt. Regt. Bn.

n.4. Armd. de. consisting of :-

Fighting G r o u p
10 cruiser t a n k .
9 carriers.
oface and Reconnaissance Group.
Administrative Group.
Armoured Regiment, consisting of-
R..
. -
H .~0.4 ~Cruiser tanks.
H.Q. Squadron-
Sqn. H.Q.
Intercommunication Trcwp-10 carriers.
Administrative Troop.
~ h r e eSquadrons each-
Sqn. H.Q.
Fighting portion (2 cruiser Tanks, 2 close support
Tanks).
Administrative portion.
Four troops each-
Three cruiser Tanks
Motor Battalion, consisting Of-
Battalion Headquarters.
H.Q. Company.
Coy. H.Q.
Signal Platoon.
Administrative and transport platoon
Four Motor Companies, each-
scout Platoon.
PI. H . Q . 4 carriers.
Three scout sections each of three carriers
Three Motor Platoons, each-
PI. H.Q-15 cwt. truck.
Three motor sections each carried in 15 cwt. truck
48
49

 . Appendix3

I 01AORAM

Dl>ecticn of
070"P!7lCk
S#OWlNC AN ARMOURED
aEcr DEPLOYED
C.L
1

I
NOTES:
1. Troops and squadrons shown in a variety of formations to
indicate that formation is controlled by the leader in
accordance with ground and situation.
2. Squadrons in reserve U not astride CL. must have a
detachment ,moving on CL. to intercept DE%,etc.
..
. .

,. , , ,

50
 I
Forum rd Parrols

I
0 0'0
000
, m,le g0 Sguadron J
e

HO B
Ucsenr 7ps. I 0
/ mile
O o 0
gI HQ. i.
lrmd. RTt

6 m;/rr

T
52