9 Llorente JR Vs Sandiganbayan

9/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 287
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
*
G.R. No. 122166. March 11, 1998.
CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN and LETICIA G. FUERTES,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Causing

Undue Injury to Any Party; Elements.—To hold a person liable
under Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, the concurrence of the following
elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution: “(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that said public
officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that
he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; and (4) that the public officer has
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in actions for torts, undue
injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a
violation of a right has been established—its existence must be
proven as one of the elements of the crime, and that the undue
injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral
certainty.—The solicitor general, in his manifestation, points out
that “undue injury” requires proof of actual injury or damage, citing
our ruling in Alejandro vs. People and Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan.
Inasmuch as complainant was actually paid all her claims, there
was thus no “undue injury” established. This point is well-taken.
Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be
presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been
established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of
the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016619889a00070006e9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/30
constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is

required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven
to the point of moral certainty.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Undue Injury,”
Explained.—In jurisprudence, “undue injury” is consistently inter-
_______________
* FIRST DIV ISION.
383
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 383
preted as “actual damage.” Undue has been defined as “more than

necessary, not proper, [or] illegal”; and injury as “any wrong or
damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or
property[; that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of
another.” Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin
to that in civil law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Fundamental in the law
on damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a
wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just
compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence
of the defendant’s act.—Fundamental in the law on damages is that
one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent
act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation
commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence of the
defendant’s act. Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as a
general rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance
of other kinds of damages. Actual damages are primarily intended
to simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong.
Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof, but must
be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. They
cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon
speculation, conjecture or guesswork. They cannot include
speculative damages which are too remote to be included in an
accurate estimate of the loss or injury.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; After an employee, whose
salary was withheld, fully received her monetary claims, there is no

longer any basis for compensatory damages or undue injury, there
being nothing more to compensate.—In this case, the complainant
testified that her salary and allowance for the period beginning
July 1990 were withheld, and that her family underwent financial
difficulty which resulted from the delay in the satisfaction of her
claims. As regards her money claim, payment of her salaries from
January 1991 until November 19, 1991 was evidenced by the
Sheriff’s Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D). She also
admitted having been issued a check on January 4, 1994 to cover
her salary from June 1 to June 30, 1990; her salary differential
from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990; her thirteenth-month pay; her
cash gift; and her clothing allowances. Respondent Court found that
all her monetary claims were satisfied. After she fully received her
monetary claims, there is no longer any basis for compensatory
damages or undue injury, there being nothing more to compensate.
384
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Undue injury entails damages

that are more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal.—
Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances
which were eventually received, the prosecution failed to specify
and to prove any other loss or damage sustained by the
complainant. Respondent Court insists that complainant suffered by
reason of the “long period of time” that her emoluments were
withheld. This inconvenience, however, is not constitutive of undue
injury. In Jacinto, this Court held that the injury suffered by the
complaining witness, whose salary was eventually released and
whose position was restored in the plantilla, was negligible; undue
injury entails damages that are more than necessary or are
excessive, improper or illegal. In Alejandro, the Court held that the
hospital employees were not caused undue injury, as they were in
fact paid their salaries.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence—it imputes a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will.—The petitioner’s failure to approve the complainant’s
vouchers was therefore due to some legal obstacles, and not entirely
without reason. Thus, evident bad faith cannot be completely

imputed to him. “Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through
some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
(Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes
(Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad
faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Causing” is not limited to
positive acts only—even passive acts or inaction may cause undue
injury.—The Court does not completely agree with petitioner’s
assertion that the imputed act does not fall under Sec. 3[e] which,
according to him, requires a positive act—a malfeasance or
misfeasance. Causing means “to be the cause or occasion of, to effect
as an agent, to bring into existence, to make or to induce, to
compel.” Causing is, therefore, not limited to positive acts only. Even
passive
385
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 385
acts or inaction may cause undue injury. What is essential is that

undue injury, which is quantifiable and demonstrable, results from
the questioned official act or inaction.
Same; Same; Neglect or Refusal to Act on Any Pending Matter;
Under Section 3[f] of R.A. 3019, the neglect or refusal to act within
a reasonable time is the criminal act, not the causing of undue
injury; Elements.—Here, the neglect or refusal to act within a
reasonable time is the criminal act, not the causing of undue injury.
Thus, its elements are: “1) The offender is a public officer; 2) Said
officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient
justification after due demand or request has been made on him; 3)
Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without
the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him;
and 4) Such failure to so act is ‘for the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some
pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested
party, or discriminating against another.’ ”
PETITION for review of a decision and a resolution of the

Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ruben E. Agpalo and Alexander G. Castro for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In a prosecution for violation of Section 3[e] of the AntiGraft

Law, that is, “causing undue injury to any party,” the
government prosecutors must prove “actual” injury to the
offended party; speculative or incidental injury is not
sufficient.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision

promulgated on June 23, 1995 and the Resolution
promulgated on October 12, 1995 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 18343, finding Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr.
guilty as charged.
386

Llorente, then municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga

del Norte, was charged with violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, under an Information
1
dated October
22, 1992, textually reproduced as follows:
“That in or about and during the period of July, 1990 to October,

1991, or for sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Sindangan, Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., a public officer, being then the
Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in the exercise of his
official and administrative functions, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and
approve the payrolls and vouchers representing the payments of the

salaries and other emoluments of Leticia G. Fuertes, without just
valid cause and without due process of law, thereby causing undue
injury to the said Leticia G. Fuertes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Duly arraigned on March 29, 1993, petitioner, with the2

assistance of counsel, entered a plea of “NOT3
GUILTY.”
After trial in due course, the Sandiganbayan
4
rendered the
assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as principal of the crime of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as
minimum to
_______________
1 Records, p. 1; the information was signed by Special Prosecution Officer II

Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
2 Records, p. 60.
3 First Division is composed of J. Minita Chico-Nazario, ponente; PJ. Francis
E. Garchitorena and J. Jose S. Balajadia, concurring.
4 Rollo, pp. 56-57.
387
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 387

SEVEN (7) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual

disqualification from public office; and to pay the costs.”
Respondent Court denied the subsequent 5 motion for

reconsideration in the assailed Resolution thus:
“WHEREFORE, accused’s ‘Motion for Reconsideration and/or New

Trial’ is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. His ‘Motion for Marking
of Additional Exhibits Cum Offer of Documentary Exhibits in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial’ is now
rendered moot and academic.”
6
Hence, this petition.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
As found by Respondent Court, 7the prosecution’s version of

the facts of this case is as follows:
“After appreciating all the evidence on both sides, the following

uncontroverted facts may be gleaned:
1. Accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., at the time the

alleged act was committed, was the Municipal Mayor of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
2. Private [C]omplainant, Leticia C. Fuertes, is the duly
appointed Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the same
municipality since October 18, 1985.
3. Starting 1986, private complainant was detailed to different
offices, as follows:
(a) Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte—

from April, 1986 to August, 1987 as OIC Municipal
Treasurer.
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 72.
6 The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon filing of the
memorandum for Respondent Court on December 11, 1997 by the Office of
the Ombudsman.
7 Rollo, pp. 39-44.
388

(b) Municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte—from

September, 1987 to March, 1988 as OIC Municipal
Treasurer.
(c) Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del
Norte—from April, 1988 to May, 1988.
(d) Municipality of Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte—from
June, 1988 to June, 1990 as OIC Municipal
Treasurer.
4. In July, 1990, she was returned to her post as

Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the town of
Sindangan. She was not provided with office table
and chair nor given any assignment; neither her
daily time record and application for leave acted
upon by the municipal treasurer per instruction of
accused Mayor (Exh. ‘G-2’; ‘G-3’).
5. On July 23, 1990, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, presided by
accused Mayor, passed Resolution No. SB-214 (Exh.
‘3’), vehemently objecting to the assignment of
complainant as Assistant Municipal Treasurer of
Sindangan.
6. On March 12, 1991, accused Municipal Mayor
received a letter (SB Resolution No. 36) from the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Piñan,
demanding from the private complainant return of
the amount overpaid to her as salaries (par. 9, p. 2 of
Exh. ‘4’—counter-affidavit of accused Mayor).
7. On May 22, 1991, private complainant filed a
Petition for Mandamus with Damages (Exh. ‘E’)
against the accused Mayor and the Municipality of
Sindangan before Branch II, Regional Trial Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 45, for the alleged
unjustified refusal of Mayor Llorente to sign and/or
approve her payrolls and/or vouchers representing
her salaries and other emoluments as follows: (a)
salary for the month of June, 1990 in the amount of
P5,452.00 under disbursement voucher dated
September 5, 1990 (Exh. ‘H’). Although complainant
rendered services at the municipality of Piñan
during this period, she could not collect her salary
there considering that as of that month, Piñan had
already appointed an Assistant Municipal
Treasurer. When she referred the matter to the
Provincial Auditor, she was advised to claim her
salary for that month with her mother agency, the
Municipality of Sindangan, [(]p. 12, TSN of August
9, 1994; 10th paragraph of complainant’s
Supplemental Affidavit marked Exh. ‘G’); (b) salary
differential for the period from July 1, 1989 to April
30, 1990 in the total amount of P19,480.00 under
disbursement voucher dated August, 1990 (Exh. ‘I’);
(c) 13th month
389
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 389

pay, cash gift and clothing allowance under

Supplemental Budget No. 5, CY 1990 in the total
amount of P7,275 per disbursement voucher dated
December 4, 1990 (Exh. ‘J’); (d) vacation leave
commutation for the period from October to
December 31, 1990 in the total amount of
P16,356.00 per disbursement voucher dated
December 3, 1990 (Exh. ‘K’); (e) RATA for the
months of July, August and September, 1990,
January and February, 1991 in the total amount of
P5,900.00 (pars. 12 & 16 of Exh. ‘E’); and (f) salaries
for January and February, 1991 in the total amount
of P10,904.00 (par. 17 of Exh. ‘E’).
8. Accused Mayor did not file an answer; instead, he
negotiated for an amicable settlement of the case (p.
24, TSN of August 10, 1994). Indeed, a Compromise
Agreement (Exh. ‘A’) dated August 27, 1991,
between the accused and private complainant was
submitted to and approved by the court, hereto
quoted as follows:
‘COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
‘That the parties have agreed, as they hereby agree, to settle this case
amicably on the basis of the following terms and conditions, to wit:
‘(a) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds

himself to sign and/or approve all vouchers and/or payrolls for
unpaid salaries, RATA, Cash-gifts, 13th month pay, clothing
allowance, salary differentials and other emoluments which the
petitioner is entitled as Assistant Municipal Treasurer of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte;
‘(b) That the parties herein hereby waive, renounce and relinquish
their other claims and counter-claims against each other;
‘(c) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds
himself to sign and/or approve all subsequent vouchers and
payrolls of the herein petitioner.’
9. On August 27, 1991, a Decision (Exh. ‘B’) was rendered by
Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena on the basis of the aforesaid

compromise agreement.
10. For his failure to comply with the terms of the compromise
agreement, private complainant, thru counsel, filed a
Motion for Execution on September 12, 1991. A Writ of
Execution (Exh. ‘C’) was issued by the Court on September
17, 1991, and served [on] the accused on September 23,
1991.
390

11. As shown in the Sheriff’s Return dated November

19, 1991 (Exh. ‘D’), private complainant was paid her
salaries for the period from January, 1991 to
August, 1991, while the rest of her salaries including
the RATA and other emoluments were not paid
considering the alleged need of a supplemental
budget to be enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sindangan per verbal allegation of the municipal
treasurer.
12. Complainant was not also paid her salaries from
July to December 1990; September and October,
1991; RATA for the period from July 1990 to June
1994 (admission of accused, pp. 8-9, TSN of June 27,
1994, a.m.; Exh. ‘E’; p. 17, TSN of June 27, 1994).
13. Sometime in 1993, accused municipal mayor
received from the Municipality of Piñan, Bill No. 93-
08 (Exh. ‘1’), demanding from the Municipality of
Sindangan settlement of overpayment to
complainant Fuertes in the amount of P50,643.93
per SB Resolution No. 6 sent on July 23, 1990. The
bill was settled by the Municipality of Sindangan in
December, 1993 per Disbursement Voucher No.
1019312487 dated December 2, 1993 (Exh. ‘2’).
14. Private complainant was able to receive complete
payment of her claims only on January 4, 1993 in
the form of checks all dated December 29, 1992 (as
appearing on Exhs. ‘H,’ ‘I,’ ‘J,’ ‘K’ of the prosecution,
Exhs. ‘6,’ ‘7,’ ‘8,’ of the defense) except her RATA
which was given to her only on July 25, 1994,
covering the period from July 1990 to December,
1993 amounting to P55,104.00, as evidenced by

Disbursement Voucher dated July 25, 1994 (Exh.
‘5’).”
Version of the Defense
While admitting some delays in the payment of the

complainant’s claims, petitioner sought to prove the defense
of good faith—that the withholding of payment was due to
her failure to submit the required money and property
clearance and to the Sangguniang Bayan’s delayed
enactment of a supplemental budget to cover the claims. He
adds that such delays did not result in “undue injury” to
complainant. In 8
his memorandum, petitioner restates the
facts as follows:
_______________
8 Rollo, pp. 259-266; the memorandum for the petitioner was signed by
Atty. Ruben E. Agpalo.
391
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 391

“1. Complainant x x x was appointed assistant

municipal treasurer of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte on October 18, 1985. However, starting 1986
until July 1990, or for a period of about four (4) and
one half (1/2) years, she was detailed in other
municipalities and in the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte. She returned as
assistant treasurer of Sindangan in July 1990.
(Decision, pp. 5-6).
2. As complainant had been working in municipalities
and offices other than in Sindangan for more than
four (4) years, her name was removed from the
regular payroll of Sindangan, and payment of past
salaries and other emoluments had to be done by
vouchers. When complainant x x x presented her
vouchers to petitioner, the latter required her to
submit clearances from the different offices to which
she was detailed, as well as a certificate of last

payment as required by COA regulations (Tsn, p. 11,
Aug. 10, 1994). Instead of submitting the required
documents, Mrs. Fuertes said that ‘what I did, I
endorsed my voucher to the mayor through the
municipal treasurer’ (Tsn, p. 13, June 27, 1994). The
municipal treasurer could not, however, process the
vouchers and certify as to the availability of funds
until after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed a
supplemental budget for the purpose (Exhs. D and 6-
c Motion), which came only in December 1992.
3. Petitioner, in the meanwhile, received on March 12,
1991 SB Resolution No. 36 from the Municipality of
Piñan, demanding from Mrs. x x x Fuertes the
reimbursement of P105,915.00, and because of this
demand, he needed time to verify the matter before
acting on Mrs. Fuertes’ claims (Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes
admitted that she had at the time problems of
accountability with the Municipality of Piñan. She
testified:
‘Q. Counsel now is asking you, when you went back to Sind
angan there was [sic] still problems of the claims either
against you or against the Municipality of Sindangan
by the municipalities had, [sic] in their minds, overpaid
you?
A. Yes, your Honor, that was evidence[d] by the bill of the
Municipality of Piñan to the Municipality of
Sindangan.’ (Tsn, p. 18, Aug. 3, 1994).
4. Petitioner also stated that he could not act on

complainant’s claims because she had not submitted
the required money and property accountability
clearance from Piñan (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10,
392

1994) and that at the time the Sangguniang Bayan

had not appropriated funds for the purpose. (Tsn, pp.
18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless, petitioner
included Mrs. Fuertes’ name in the regular annual
budget beginning 1991 (Exhs. 4-b, 4-d, 4-f), as a

result of which she had been since then receiving
her regular monthly salary.
5. On May 21, 1991, Mrs. Fuertes filed a complaint x x
x. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint,
alleging as a defense, that plaintiff did not exhaust
administrative remedies. (Annex B, p. 3, Petition;
Exh. 1-Motion). On August 27, 1991, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement, which the
trial court approved (Exh. B). x x x.
6. Upon motion of counsel for Mrs. Fuertes, the trial
court issued a writ of execution of the compromise
judgment. However, the writ of execution was
addressed only to petitioner; it was not served on the
municipal Sangguniang Bayan. x x x.
Thus, Mrs. Fuertes had been receiving her regular
salary from January, 1991 because petitioner had
included her name in the regular budget beginning
1991, which fact complainant did not dispute. With
respect to her other claims for past services in other
offices, Municipal Treasurer, Mrs. Narcisa Caber,
informed that a supplemental budget for such
purpose to be passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
was necessary before she could be paid thereof.
Being the municipal treasurer, Mrs. Caber knew
that without such supplemental budget, payment of
Mrs. Fuertes’ other claims could not be made
because the law requires that ‘disbursements shall
be made in accordance with the ordinance
authorizing the annual or supplemental
appropriations’ (Sec. 346, RA 7160) and that ‘no
money shall be disbursed unless x x x the local
treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the
purpose.’ (Sec. 344, RA 7160).
7. Petitioner had instructed the municipal budget
officer to prepare the supplemental budget for
payment of complainant’s unpaid claims for
submission to the Sangguniang [Bayan] for
enactment. (Tsn, pp. 32-33, Aug. 10, 1994). The
budget officer, Mr. Narciso Siasico stated as follows:
‘1. I am the budget officer for the Municipality of

Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a position I have
held since 1981.
x x x x x x x x x
3. Immediately after said mandamus case was settled

through a compromise agreement, Mayor Llorente
instructed
393
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 393

me to prepare the necessary budget proposals for the deliberation

and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan;
x x x x x x x x x.’
8. Instead of waiting for the Sangguniang Bayan to

enact the budget or of securing an alias writ of
execution to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to pass
the same, Mrs. Fuertes filed a criminal complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman under date of
October 28, 1991, admitting receipt of her salaries
from January 1991 and saying she had not been
paid her other claims in violation of the compromise
judgment. (Exh. F). She had thus made the Office of
the Ombudsman a collecting agency to compel
payment of the judgment obligation.
9. While the budget proposal had been prepared and
submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for action, it
took time for the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the
supplemental budget and for the Provincial Board to
approve the same. It was only on December 27, 1992
that the municipal treasurer and the municipal
accountant issued a certification of availability of
funds for the purpose. Petitioner approved the
vouchers immediately, and in a period of one week,
Mrs. Fuertes was paid all claims, as evidenced by the
prosecution’s Exhs. H, I, J and K, which were the
four vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes, x x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
11. Petitioner testified that he could not immediately
sign or approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for the
following reasons:
‘a) The Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated the

amounts to pay Mrs. Fuertes. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43,
Aug. 10, 1994).

b) Municipal Treasurer Caber, to whom Mrs. Fuertes
endorsed her vouchers for processing, and the
Municipal Accountant issued the certificate of
availability of funds only on December 27, 1992
(Tsn, p. 42, Aug. 10, 1994; Exhs. H, I, J and K); and
the delay in the issuance of the certificate of
availability of funds was due to the delay by the
Provincial Board to approve the supplemental
budget. (Tsn, p. 43, Aug. 10, 1994).
[c]) He received on March 12, 1991 a demand from the
municipality of Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte, where
Mrs. Fuertes last worked, for the reimbursement of
P105,915.00, and the matter had to be clarified first.
(Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had some
problem of accountability with the Municipality of
Piñan. (Tsn, p. 18, 1994). It took time before
394

this matter could be clarified by the Municipality of

Piñan reducing its claim to P50,647.093 and the
Municipality of Sindangan paying said claim. (Exh.
2; Decision, p. 9).
[d]) Mrs. Fuertes had not submitted the required
clearance from the Municipality of Piñan. (Tsn, p.
11, Aug. 10, 1994). He did not insist on this
requirement after the trial court issued the writ of
execution to implement the compromise judgment.
(Tsn, p. 23, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless, in the post
audit of Mrs. Fuertes’ accountability, the
Commission on Audit issued a notice of suspension
of the amount of P5,452.00 from Mrs. Fuertes for her
failure to submit: ‘1. Clearance for money & property
accountability from former office. 2. Certification as
[sic] last day of service in former office. 3.
Certification of last salary received & issued by the
disbursing officer in former office, certified by chief
accountant and verified by resident auditor.’ (Exh.
2-Motion).
12. The Information dated October 12, 1992 filed

against petitioner alleged that petitioner as mayor
did not sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs.
Fuertes for payment of her salaries and other
emoluments from July 1, 1990 to October 1991,
which caused her undue injury. However, the
prosecution’s Exh. ‘D,’ the sheriff’s return dated
November 19, 1991, stated that Mrs. Fuertes had
received her salary from January 1, 1991 ‘up to the
present,’ which meant that even before the
information was filed, she had been paid her regular
salaries from January 1, 1991 to October 1991. The
supplemental budget to cover payment of her other
claims for past services was passed only in December
1992 and the municipal treasurer and accountant
issued the certificate of availability of funds only on
December 27, 1992, and Mrs. Fuertes got paid of [sic]
all her other claims, including those not claimed in
the Information, within one week therefrom. (Exhs.
H, I, J and K).
x x x x x x x x x.”
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Court held that the delay or withholding of

complainant’s salaries and emoluments was unreasonable
and caused complainant undue injury. Being then the sole
breadwinner in their family, the withholding of her salaries
caused her difficulties in meeting her family’s financial
obligations like paying for the tuition fees of her four
children. Peti-
395
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 395

tioner’s defense that complainant failed to attach the

required money and property clearance to her vouchers was
held to be an afterthought that was brought about, in the
first place, by his own failure to issue any memorandum
requiring its submission. That the voucher form listed the
clearance as one of the requirements for its approval had
neither been brought to complainant’s attention nor raised

by petitioner as defense in his answer. In any event, the
payment of complainant’s salary from January to November
1991, confirmed by the sheriff’s return, showed that the
clearance was not an indispensable requirement, because
petitioner could have acted upon or approved the
disbursement even without it. The alleged lack of a
supplemental budget was also rejected, because it was
petitioner’s duty as municipal mayor to prepare and submit
the “executive and supplemental budgets” under Sections9
318, 320, and 444 (3)(ii) of the Local Government Code, and
the
_______________
9 “SEC. 318. Preparation of the Budget by the Local Chief Executive.

—Upon receipt of the statements of income and expenditures from the
treasurer, the budget proposals of the heads of departments and offices,
and estimates of income and budgetary ceilings from the local finance
committee, the local chief executive shall prepare the executive budget for
the ensuing fiscal year in accordance with the provisions of this Title.
The local chief executive shall submit the said executive budget to the
sanggunian concerned not later than the sixteenth (16th) of October of the
current fiscal year. Failure to submit such budget on the date prescribed
herein shall subject the local chief executive to such criminal and
administrative penalties as provided for under this Code and other
applicable laws.
“SEC. 320. Effectivity of Budgets.—The ordinance enacting the annual
budget shall take effect at the beginning of the ensuing calendar year. An
ordinance enacting a supplemental budget, however, shall take effect
upon its approval or on the date fixed therein.
The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental
budgets and the accountability therefor shall be vested primarily in the
local chief executive concerned.
“SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation.—x x x x The municipal mayor shall:
(3) x x x x x x x x x
396

complainant’s claims as assistant municipal treasurer, a

permanent position included in the plantilla for calendar

year 1990 and 1991, were classified as “current operating
expenditures” for the same calendar years, which were
chargeable against the general funds of the town of
Sindangan. Except for the representation and
transportation allowance, Fuertes’ claims for thirteenth
month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance were already
covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for calendar year
1990. Petitioner’s contention that funds covering
complainant’s claims were made available only in December
1992 was unbelievable, considering that an ordinance
enacting a supplemental budget takes effect upon its
approval or on the date fixed therein under Sec. 320 of the
Local Government Code.
The Sandiganbayan also ruled that the petitioner’s
evident bad faith was the direct and proximate cause of
Fuertes’ undue injury. Complainant’s salaries and
allowances were withheld for no valid or justifiable reasons.
Such delay was intended to harass complainant, because
petitioner wanted to replace her with his political protégé
whom he eventually designated as municipal treasurer,
bypassing Fuertes who was next in seniority. Bad faith was
further evidenced by petitioner’s instructions to the
outgoing municipal treasurer not to give the complaining
witness any work assignment, not to provide her with office
table and chair, not to act on her daily time record and
application for leave of absence, instructions which were
confirmed in the municipal treasurer’s certification. (Exh. G-
2).
The Issues
In his10 memorandum, petitioner submits the following

issues:
_______________
(ii) Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval the executive
and supplemental budgets of the municipality for the [ensuing] calendar
years in the manner provided for under Title Five, Book II of this Code.”
10 Rollo, p. 266.
397
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 397

“1. Could accused be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A.

3019 ‘in the discharge of his official administrative
duties,’ a positive act, when what was imputed to him
was failing and refusing to sign and/or approve the
vouchers of Mr[s]. Fuertes on time or by ‘inaction on
his obligation under the compromise agreement’
(ibid., p. 19), a passive act? Did not the act come
under Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019, of [sic] which accused
was not charged with?
2. Assuming, arguendo, that his failure and refusal to
immediately sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs.
Fuertes comes [sic] under Sec. 3(e), the questions
are:
(a) Did not the duty to sign and approve the same arise
only after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed an
appropriations ordinance, and not before? In other
words, was the non-passage of the appropriation
ordinance a justifiable reason for not signing the
vouchers?
(b) Did Mrs. Fuertes suffer undue injury, as the term is
understood in Sec. 3(e), she having been paid all her
claims?
(c) Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to
immediately sign the vouchers and implement the
compromise agreement until the Sangguniang
Bayan had enacted the appropriation ordinance and
until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the
Municipality of Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte?”
Restated, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to

establish the elements of undue injury and bad faith.
Additionally, petitioner submits that a violation of Section
3[e] of RA 3019 cannot be committed through nonfeasance.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious. After careful review of the

evidence on record and thorough deliberation on the
applicable provision of the Anti-Graft Law, the Court agrees
with the solicitor general’s assessment that the prosecution
failed to establish the elements of the crime charged.
First Issue: Undue Injury
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A.

3019, which states:
398

“SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x x x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.”
To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence

of the following elements must be established beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution:
“(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private

person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts
during the performance of his or her official duties or
in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident
11
bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.”
12
The solicitor general, in his manifestation, points out that
“undue injury” requires proof of actual injury or damage,
_______________
11 Ponce de Leon vs. Sandiganbayan, 186 SCRA 745, 754, June 25,
1990; Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 116, 128, November 14, 1994;
Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 254, 259, October 2, 1989; and
Medija, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 218 SCRA 219, 223, January 29, 1993.
12 Rollo, p. 140; the 30-page Manifestation in Lieu of Comment of the
OSG, dated March 6, 1996, was signed by then Solicitor General Raul I.
Goco, Asst. Solicitor General Romeo C. dela Cruz and Solicitor Karl B.
Miranda.
399
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 399

13
citing our ruling14 in Alejandro vs. People and Jacinto vs.
Sandiganbayan. Inasmuch as complainant was actually
paid all her claims, there was thus no “undue injury”
established.
This point is well-taken. Unlike in actions for torts, undue
injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or
a violation of a right has been established. Its existence
must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact,
the causing of undue injury or the giving of any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence constitutes the very act punished under this
section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be
specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral
certainty.
In jurisprudence, “undue injury” is consistently
interpreted as “actual damage.” Undue has been defined as
“more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal”; and injury as
“any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person,
rights, reputation or property[; that is, the] invasion of any
legally protected interest of another.” Actual damage,15in the
context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.
In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by
Article 2199 of the Civil Code as follows:
“Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is

entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.”
Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a

breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or

omission shall have a fair and just compensation
commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence of the
defendant’s act. Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded
as a general rule, except where the circumstances warrant
the allowance
_______________
13 170 SCRA 400, 405, February 20, 1989.

14 Supra.
15 Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 133.
400

16
of other kinds of damages. Actual damages are primarily
intended to17 simply make good or replace the loss caused by
the wrong.
Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof,
but must be actually proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and non-
substantial18 evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or
guesswork. They cannot include speculative damages
which are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate
of the loss or injury.
In this case, the complainant testified that her salary and
allowance for the period beginning July 1990 were withheld,
and that her family underwent financial difficulty which 19
resulted from the delay in the satisfaction of her claims. As
regards her money claim, payment of her salaries from
January 1991 until November 19, 1991 was evidenced by
the Sheriff’s Return dated November 19, 1991, (Exh. D). She
also admitted having been issued a check on January 4,
1994 to cover her salary from June 1 to June 30, 1990; her
salary differential from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990; her
thirteenth-month pay; her cash gift; and her clothing
allowances. Respondent Court found that all her monetary
claims were satisfied. After she fully received her monetary
claims, there is no longer any basis for compensatory
damages or undue injury, there being nothing more to
compensate.
Complainant’s testimony regarding her family’s financial
stress was inadequate and largely speculative. Without

giving specific details, she made only vague references to
the fact that her four children were all going to school and
that she was the breadwinner in the family. She, however,
did not say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and
the specific damage brought by such nonpayment. The fact
that the
_______________
16 Art. 2199, Civil Code; Nolledo, Civil Code of the Philippines, 10th
ed., Vol. V, p. 927; and Gonzales-Decano, Notes on Torts and Damages,
1992 ed., pp. 141 & 144.
17 Tolentino, The Civil Code, Vol. V, 1992 ed., pp. 633-634.
18 Ibid.
19 TSN, August 9, 1994, p. 3.
401
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 401

“injury” to her family was unspecified or unquantified does

not satisfy the element of undue injury, as akin to actual
damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, 20if not supported
by evidence on record, cannot be considered.
Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and
allowances which were eventually received, the prosecution
failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage
sustained by the complainant. Respondent Court insists
that complainant suffered by reason of the “long period of
time” that her emoluments were withheld.
This inconvenience, however, is not constitutive of undue
injury. In Jacinto, this Court held that the injury suffered
by the complaining witness, whose salary was eventually
released and whose position was restored in the plantilla,
was negligible; undue injury entails damages that are more21
than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. In
Alejandro, the Court held that the hospital employees were
not caused
22
undue injury, as they were in fact paid their
salaries.
Second Issue: No Evident Bad Faith
In the challenged Decision, Respondent Court found evident

bad faith on the part of the petitioner, holding that, without
any valid or justifiable reason, accused withheld the
payment of complainant’s salaries and other benefits for
almost two23 (2) years, demonstrating a clear manifestation of
bad faith. It then brushed aside the petitioner’s defenses
that complainant failed to submit money and property
clearances for her vouchers, and that an appropriation by
the Sangguniang Bayan was required 24
before complainant’s
vouchers could be approved. It said:
_______________
20 Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430, 438, February 9,
1996; People vs. Fabrigas, 261 SCRA 436, 448, September 5, 1996.
21 Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 259.
22 Alejandro vs. People, supra at p. 405.
23 Rollo, p. 56.
24 Ibid., pp. 65-68.
402

“Secondly, his reliance on the failure of complainant to submit the

clearances which were allegedly necessary for the approval of
vouchers is futile in the light of the foregoing circumstances: x x x
x x x x x x
b. The evidence on record shows that complainant’s salaries for

the period from January to November 1991 (included as
subject matter in the mandamus case) were duly paid, as
confirmed in the Sheriff’s Return dated November 19, 1991
(Exh. ‘D’). This means that accused, even without the
necessary clearance, could have acted upon or approved
complainant’s disbursement vouchers if he wanted to.
c. It may be true that a clearance is an indispensable
requirement before complainant will be paid of her claims,
but accused could not just hide behind the cloak of the
clearance requirement in order to exculpate himself from
liability. As the approving officer, it was his duty to direct
complainant to submit the same. Moreover, accused could
not just set aside the obligation he voluntarily imposed upon
himself when he entered into a compromise agreement
binding himself to sign complainant’s vouchers without any

qualification as to the clearance requirement. Perforce, he
could have seen to it that complainant secured the same in
order that he could comply with the said obligation.
x x x x x x x x x
Fourthly, accused’s contention that the delay in the release of

complainant’s claim could not be attributed to him because the
vouchers were only submitted to him for his signature on December
24-27, 1992; that the approval of the budget
appropriations/resolutions depends on the Sangguniang Bayan,
Budget Officer and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is unavailing.
As revealed in the alleged newly discovered evidence themselves,
particularly x x x SB Res. No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No.
035, both dated May 21, 1990 (Exh. ‘5-a’-Motion ), the
Sangguniang Bayan appropriated a budget of P5M in the General
Fund for calendar year 1991 [the Budget Officer does not approve
the budget but assists the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang
Bayan in the preparation of the budget (Sec. 475, Local
Government Code of 1991)]. Complainant’s claims consisted of her
salaries and other benefits for 1990 and 1991 which were classified
as Current Operating Expenditures chargeable against the General
Fund. It is undisputed that she was holding her position as
Assistant Municipal Treasurer in a permanent capacity (her position
was also designated
403
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 403

Assistant Department Head), which was included in the plantilla for

calendar years 1990 and 1991 (Exhs. ‘4-a’ & ‘4-b,’ Motion). In
Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object (Exhs. ‘4-c’ & ‘4-d,’
Motion), appropriations were made for current operating
expenditures to which complainant’s claims properly appertained. x
x x. Verily, complainant’s claims were covered by appropriations
duly approved by the officials concerned, signifying that adequate
funds were available for the purpose. In fact, even complainant’s
claims for her 13th month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance,
subject matter of Disbursement Voucher marked Exhibit ‘J’ which
would need a supplemental budget was covered by ‘Supplemental
Budget No. 5 for CY 1990 duly approved by the authorities
concerned’ as shown in the voucher itself. This means that the said
claim was already obligated (funds were already reserved for it) as
of calendar year 1990. x x x x. It is clear, then, that as regards

availability of funds, there was no obstacle for the release of all the
complainant’s claims.”
The Court disagrees. Respondent Court cannot shift the

blame on the petitioner, when it was the complainant who
failed to submit the required clearance. This requirement,
which the complainant disregarded, was even printed at the
back of the very vouchers sought to be approved. As
assistant municipal treasurer, she ought to know that this is
a condition for the payment of her claims. This clearance is
required by Article 443 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991:
“Art. 443. Property Clearances.—When an employee transfers to

another government office, retires, resigns, is dismissed, or is
separated from the service, he shall be required to secure supplies or
property clearance from the supply officer concerned, the provincial
or city general services officer concerned, the municipal mayor and
the municipal treasurer, or the punong barangay and the barangay
treasurer, as the case may be. The local chief executive shall
prescribe the property clearance form for this purpose.”
For her own failure to submit the required clearance,

complainant is not entirely blameless for the delay in the
approval of her claims.
Also, given the lack of corresponding appropriation
ordinance and certification of availability of funds for such
pur-
404

pose, petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers. As

chief executive of the municipality, Llorente could not have
approved the voucher for the payment of complainant’s 25
salaries under Sec. 344, Local Government Code 26
of 1991.
Also, Appropriation Ordinance No. 020 adding a
supplemental budget for calendar year 1990 was approved
on April 10, 1989, or almost a year before complainant was
transferred back to Sindangan. Hence, she could not have
been included therein. SB Resolution 27
No. 202 and
Appropriation Ordinance No. 035, which fixed the
municipal budget for calendar year 1991, was passed only

on May 21, 1990, or almost another year after the transfer
took effect. The petitioner’s failure to approve the
complainant’s
28
vouchers was therefore due to some legal
obstacles, and not entirely without reason. Thus, evident
bad faith cannot be completely imputed to him.
“Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it

imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v.
Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It
_______________
25 “SEC. 344. Certification on, and Approval of, Vouchers.—No money shall be
disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of
appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant
has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the
availability of funds for the purpose. V ouchers and payrolls shall be certified to
and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative
control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety, and legality of the claim
involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring
administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, x
x x approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself
shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
x x x x x x x x x.”
26 Records, p. 219.
27 Records, pp. 322-323.
28 Baldivia vs. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099, 1103 [1960]; and Discanso vs. Gatmaytan,
109 Phil. 816, 920-921 [1960].
405
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 405

contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive

design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes
(Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad
faith connotes a manifest deliberate29 intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage.”
In Jacinto, evident bad faith was not appreciated because

the actions taken by the accused were not entirely without
rhyme or reason; he refused to release the complainant’s
salary because the latter failed to submit her daily time

record; he refused to approve her sick-leave application
because he found out that she did not suffer any illness; and
he removed her name from the plantilla because she was
moonlighting during office hours. Such actions were
measures taken by a superior against an erring 30employee
who studiously ignored, if not defied, his authority.
In Alejandro, evident bad faith was ruled out, because
the accused gave his approval to the questioned
disbursement after relying on the certification of the
bookkeeper on 31
the availability of funds for such
disbursement.
Third Issue: Interpretation of Causing
The Court does not completely agree with petitioner’s

assertion that the imputed act does not fall under Sec. 3[e]
which, according to him, requires a positive act—a
malfeasance or misfeasance. Causing means “to be the
cause or occasion of, to effect as an agent, 32to bring into
existence, to make or to induce, to compel.” Causing is,
therefore, not limited to positive acts only. Even passive acts
or inaction may cause undue injury. What is essential is
that undue injury, which is quantifiable and demonstrable,
results from the questioned official act or inaction.
_______________
29 Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346, 349, May 14, 1990.
30 Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 260.
31 Alejandro vs. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 405.
32 Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 135.
406

In this case, the prosecution accused petitioner of failing or

refusing to pay complainant’s salaries on time, while
Respondent Court convicted him of unduly delaying the
payment of complainant’s claims. As already explained,
both acts did not, however, legally result in “undue injury”
or in “giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, [or] administrative

x x x functions.” Thus, these acts are not punishable under
Sec. 3[e].
It would appear that petitioner’s failure or refusal to act
on the complainant’s vouchers, or the delay in his acting on
them more properly falls under Sec. 3[f]:
“(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without

sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any
matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or
indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary
or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own
interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating
against any other interested party.”
Here, the neglect or refusal to act within a reasonable time

is the criminal act, not the causing of undue injury. Thus,
its elements are:
“1) The offender is a public officer;

2) Said officer has neglected or has refused to act
without sufficient justification after due demand or
request has been made on him;
3) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or
request without the public officer having acted on
the matter pending before him; and
4) Such failure to so act is ‘for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in
the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage in favor of an interested 33
party, or
discriminating against another.’ ”
_______________
33 Coronado vs. Sandiganbayan, 225 SCRA 406, 409-410, August 18,

1993; and Nessia vs. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615, 621-622, March 30, 1993.
407
VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 407

However, petitioner is not charged with a violation of Sec.

3[f]. Hence, further disquisition is not proper. Neither may
this Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without
violating his constitutional right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner is ACQUITTED of violating Section 3[e] of R.A.
3019, as amended. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and

Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Petition granted; Petitioner acquitted.
Notes.—The three modes of committing the offense

under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 are distinct and different from
each other, and proof of the existence of any of these modes
suffices to warrant conviction. (Fonacier vs. Sandiganbayan,
238 SCRA 655 [1994])
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as
Project Manager for a government undertaking falls under
the noncareer service category of the Civil Service and thus
is a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of R.A. 3019.
(Preclaro vs. Sandiganbayan, 247 SCRA 454 [1995])
——o0o——
408
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

9 Llorente JR Vs Sandiganbayan

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

9 Llorente JR Vs Sandiganbayan

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

9/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 287

382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., petitioner, vs.

Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Causing

constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is

* FIRST DIV ISION.

VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 383

Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

preted as “actual damage.” Undue has been defined as “more than

salary was withheld, fully received her monetary claims, there is no

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Undue injury entails damages

without reason. Thus, evident bad faith cannot be completely

VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 385

Llorente, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

acts or inaction may cause undue injury. What is essential is that

party, or discriminating against another.’ ”

PETITION for review of a decision and a resolution of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In a prosecution for violation of Section 3[e] of the AntiGraft

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Llorente, then municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga

“That in or about and during the period of July, 1990 to October,

approve the payrolls and vouchers representing the payments of the

Duly arraigned on March 29, 1993, petitioner, with the2

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

1 Records, p. 1; the information was signed by Special Prosecution Officer II

VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 387

SEVEN (7) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual

Respondent Court denied the subsequent 5 motion for

“WHEREFORE, accused’s ‘Motion for Reconsideration and/or New

As found by Respondent Court, 7the prosecution’s version of

“After appreciating all the evidence on both sides, the following

1. Accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., at the time the

(a) Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte—

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

(b) Municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte—from

4. In July, 1990, she was returned to her post as

VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 389

pay, cash gift and clothing allowance under

‘(a) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds

9. On August 27, 1991, a Decision (Exh. ‘B’) was rendered by

Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena on the basis of the aforesaid

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

11. As shown in the Sheriff’s Return dated November

1993 amounting to P55,104.00, as evidenced by

Version of the Defense

While admitting some delays in the payment of the

VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 391

“1. Complainant x x x was appointed assistant

she was detailed, as well as a certificate of last

4. Petitioner also stated that he could not act on

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1994) and that at the time the Sangguniang Bayan

budget beginning 1991 (Exhs. 4-b, 4-d, 4-f), as a

‘1. I am the budget officer for the Municipality of

3. Immediately after said mandamus case was settled

VOL. 287, MARCH 11, 1998 393

me to prepare the necessary budget proposals for the deliberation

x x x x x x x x x.’

8. Instead of waiting for the Sangguniang Bayan to