Case # 6:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRESENCIANO CANAGURAN, GRACIANO BOLIVAR, JOEL SOBERANO, RENATO BALBON
and DIOSDADO BARRION, accused, GRACIANO BOLIVAR, JOEL SOBERANO, RENATO
BALBON and DIOSDADO BARRION, accused-appellants
FACTS:
DIOSDADO BARRION, JOEL SOBERANO, RENATO BALBON, GRACIANO BOLIVAR and
CRESENCIANO CANAGURAN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with
Frustrated Murder committed by means of conspiracy against the victims, HUGO CALLAO (deceased) and
Damaso Suelan, Jr.,

Rodney's wife, Gloria, prompted Damaso Jr. about a person she has seen outside the bamboo slat-fence. Damaso
Jr. looked over his back to find out who it was but resumed drinking saying not to mind the said person outside
the fence since he might just be there urinating. Rolly Brendia stood up and also looked at the direction of the
man outside the fence.

At this juncture, a shot burst and a spray of pellets hit Damaso Jr. on the shoulder and on the right forearm, while
four of the said pellets found its mark on the different parts of the body of Hugo Callao causing massive
hemorrhage resulting to the instantaneous death of the latter.

While Hugo slumped lifeless on the ground, Damaso Jr. asked Rolly to tie a handkerchief over his wounded arm.
Damaso Jr. then asked Rolly to fetch a tricycle but the latter refused because of fear leaving Damaso Jr. with no
other choice but to look for a tricycle by himself.

In the process, Damaso Jr. passed through the main gate of Rodney Balaito's premises, but while still there, he
sat down and hid beside the fence when he saw four persons running away from the place where the shot came
from. Damaso Jr. identified the four to be the accused Joel Soberano, Renato Balbon, Cresenciano Canaguran
and Graciano Bolivar

Pinpointing BARRION as the mastermind.

ISSUE: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS RENATO BALBON, JOEL
SOBERANO AND GRACIANO BOLIVAR (deceased) IN CONSPIRACY (BY MEANS OF
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE) WITH CRESENCIANO CANAGURAN (Assailant) IN KILLING HUGO
CALLAO (Murder) AND WOUNDING DAMASO SUELAN (Frustrated Murder).

II. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANT DIOSDADO BARRION AS THE
INSTIGATOR AND BRAIN (in conspiracy with all the accused) IN THE KILLING OF HUGO CALLAO.

III. THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING APPELLANTS' DEFENSE OF
DENIAL OR ALIBI TO PREVAIL OVER THE INCONCLUSIVE AND UNRELIABLE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE CONSPIRACY. 7

RULING:

The conclusion reached by the trial court with respect to the existence of a conspiracy based on the fact that
CANAGURAN was deliberately picked as a hitman; that SOBERANO through Agustin Bolivar acted as the
recruiting agents with BALBON; and that BOLIVAR brought CANAGURAN to Brgy. Vista Alegre to be
introduced by SOBERANO to BARRION is also not established by the evidence. The lower court deduced this
from the mere fact that most of the accused were related or were one way or another linked to each other
considering that Brgy. Vista Alegre was a small town. However, the mere fact that some of the accused are related
to each other by consanguinity or affinity does not prove conspiracy.

In the absence of any other convincing and competent evidence to prove the conspiracy and that BARRION was
a principal by inducement, we are constrained to reverse the decision of the lower court.
 Finally, the accused-appellant's denial that they were at the store of Balaito despite their being positively
identified as present thereat does not lead to the conclusion that the denial was resorted to in order to cover up the
conspiracy. It is but natural for a person to resort to any means to save himself. While we do not condone the
giving of false testimony in criminal proceedings, we also cannot discharge the prosecution from its primary duty
to prove the existence of the conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellants Joel Soberano, Renato Balbon and Diosdado Barrion are hereby ACQUITTED based
on reasonable doubt and are ordered released immediately from confinement unless they are held for some other
lawful cause. The criminal case against Graciano Bolivar is hereby DISMISSED

CASE # 9

People of the Philippines vs Abelardo Parungao

FACTS

The accused-appellant Parungao was arraigned and tried separately for the information filed against him and the
other 15 jail-breakers of the the Provincial Jail of Pampanga of the crime of robbery with homicide upon which
on the incident of the jailbreak 2 jail guards were killed on the discharge of their duties and of the missing 6
firearms and for serious physical injury caused to the other jail guard, he was convicted as a co-conspirator and
principal by inducement. Unsatisfied with the lower court's ruling hence the case was elevated to the court of
appeal upon which the accused- appellant contended that the testimonies of the 4 witnesses presented by the
prosecution are merely hearsays of which the witnesses testified and conveyed matters to court that are not of
their own personal knowledge and were merely narrated to them with the other detainees.

ISSUE

The admissibility of a hearsay evidence.

RULING

The court ruled in favor of the accused-appeallant, acquitting him of the crime charged against him, citing that
Generally hearsay evidence are inadmissible however when not objected may result in its being admitted, but
the same should not mislead into thinking that its admission is equated with weight evidence. That hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not be given credence for it has no probative value.

The court also emphasizes that the trial court gravely erred in giving weight to the hearsay evidence that was
presented since it it is violative of the hearsay rule and same was unconstitutional for said act-the accused was
not given an opportunity to meet the witnesses face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the
rigid test of cross-examination.

Conspiracy against the accused-appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

CASE # 12: People of the Philippines VS Butchoy de la Torres, et al; GR Nos 121213 and 121216-23; 13
January 2004

FACTS:
Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre employed Baby Jane Dagot as housemaid, That on or about the
2nd week of September, 1992 At around 12:00 o’clock midnight, appellant Fe de la Torre woke Baby Jane and
her husband Butchoy , Fe then ordered Butchoy to have sex with Baby Jane. The accused Butchoy de la Torre,
in conspiracy and confederating with his wife, Fe de la Torre, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with BABY JANE DAGOT, a girl of 16
years of age against her will and consent.
The rape was repeated once a week from the second week of September 1992 on to the fourth week of October
1992 and repeated again in the second week of December.
Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre were charged in nine (9) separate Amended Complaints with rape.
The appellant-spouses denied the allegations of rape; the appellants profess that the imputations of rape against
them may have been instigated by Baby Jane’s father, Rafael Dagot, who was also an employee of the spouse
appellants. She allegedly caught him stealing. The appellants also insist that Baby Jane was already married to
one Eddie Tabi when they took her as their maid. This explains why, according to them, Baby Jane was no longer
a virgin.
The nine criminal cases were consolidated and joint trial conducted before the Regional Trial Court, the Court
found the appellants guilty of all nine (9) counts of rape charged in the nine Amended Complaints and sentenced
them to reclusion perpetua for each count.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in believing the private offended party accounts of the supposed rape?

RULING:
From the outset it should be noted that while the appellants assail the credibility of the complainant’s testimony,
they actually do not point to specific inconsistencies or contradictions in her testimony. True, the trial court relied
solely on the testimony of the complainant regarding the rape incidents, but the determinative question before the
trial court was whether the complainant’s testimony is credible.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge
and consistent with the experience of mankind. Further, the credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the
basis of the substance of their testimony and the surrounding circumstances.
The greatest weight is accorded to the findings and conclusions reached by the lower court regarding the
credibility of witnesses and their testimony, owing to the court’s unique position to see, hear and observe the
witnesses testify. Unless it is shown that the court overlooked or misunderstood some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which would affect the outcome of the case, or that its findings of fact and conclusions on
the credibility of witnesses are not supported by the evidence on record, its determination is left undisturbed. In
the present case, we see no need to overturn this well-settled principle.
But then, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the appellants may be convicted only of the
rape committed in the first week of September 1992. The evidence for the prosecution proves only the first charge
of rape. Baby Jane’s testimony on the commission of the eight other charges does not satisfy the standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify the appellants’ conviction.
Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime; hence, each of the eight other rape charges should
be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED. In Criminal Case No. 11199, the
appellants are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape.

Case #13
People of the Philippines vs Dina Dulay ; GR NO 193854; 24 SEPTEMBER 2012

FACTS:
On 3 July 2005, AAA was introduced to the accused during the wake of a relative of AAA. Thereafter, the accused
convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paranaque City. However, before they went to
the wake, they went to look for the boyfriend of the accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port were they found
the boyfriend of the accused. They proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. Upon
arrival, the accused suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known only as “Speed” was waiting. AAA
saw “Speed” give the accused some money, then the latter left. “Speed” wielded a knife and tied AAA’s hands to
the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant’s help when she saw the latter peeping into the room while
she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, “Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell
anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her. AAA, accompanied by her sister and mother filed
a complaint for Rape. The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as a co-principal
by indispensablecooperation for the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused should be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of Rape

HELD:

No, in order to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished. The Supreme Court held that the
accused did not participate in the criminal resolution of the crime of Rape but merely delivered AAA to “Speed”
However, the accused is still liable for violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610 or a) Those
who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the
following: (1) Acting as a procurer of a childprostitute.

Case #14
Same as case #3 People of the Philippines vs Eduardo Jorge ; GR NO 99379; 22 APRIL 1994

Case #19:

Title: Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 166326

Subject Matter: Attempted v. Frustrated Murder, Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wi
fe for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the following day, when
Ruben and his three year old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo together with his brother Esmeraldo and Is
mael Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as
he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. The Rivera brothers fled when p
olicemen came. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed
had the police not promptly intervened.

Issues:

(1) WON there was intent to kill.

(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.

(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

Held:

(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows, while Edga
rdo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and co
uld not have produced his death, intent to kill is presumed.

(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when the offender commenc
es the commission of the felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for the victim to repel it
or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden attack to the victim caused him to be overwhelmed and had no chance t
o defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery.

Case #20

FACTS: On the fateful midnight of Christmas, 1997, while Alexander Flojo (Alexander) is fetching water, Alfredo de Guzman (
Alfredo) suddenly appeared and stab Alexander in the left part of his body causing him to sustain two stab wounds.

Cirilino Bantaya, Alexander’s son-in-law, who saw the incident, rushed him to the hospital. The attending physician said that
one of the stab wounds is fatal and would have caused Alexander’s death if he did not get rushed to the hospital quickly.

RTC found Alfredo guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of frustrated homicide and was sentenced six months and 1
day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that his intent to kill was not established, and that any person coul
d have inflicted the wounds. The petitioner also insisted that he should only be guilty of slight physical injuries, not frustrate
d murder.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the intent to kill, which is a critical element of the crime charged, is established in the case.

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide.

HELD: (1) YES. The wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuff-marks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result
of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. There is also to be no doub
t about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervent i
on.

(2) YES. With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that should pro
duce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the t i
mely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

Case 21:

Norberto Cruz y Bartolome v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014

Bersamin, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. The Re
gional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz guilty of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal.

Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their plastic wares and glass wares in La Union. Upon
reaching the place, they set up their tents to have a place to sleep. Petitioner’s wife and their driver went back to Manila to
get more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of her mashing her breast and touching her private p
art. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she will be killed. AAA fought back and Norberto was not able to pursue his lust
ful desires. AA left the tent to seek for help. When she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of
BBB. This prompted Norberto to leave the tent.

Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that he could not possibly do the acts imputed out in the open as th
ere were many people preparing for the “simbang gabi”. He further assails the credibility AAA for the crime of rape, allegin
g that the complaints were filed only for the purpose of extorting money from him.

ISSUE:

Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape against AAA?

HELD:

NO, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowled
ge is defined simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,” in other words, rape is consumm
ated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female. There must be su
fficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked
the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In attempted rape, t
he concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the sl i
ghtest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement
of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relati
on to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her b
reasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstan
ces that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal,
or “susceptible of double interpretation,” such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to caus e r
ape as the particular injury.

The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act of touchi
ng the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. Petitio
ner’s embracing and touching the victim’s vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of
evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inferenc
e about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not
easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts leadin g t
o rape.

Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.

Case #22

People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010

Self-defense- the burden of proof is on the accused

Facts:

On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts of attempted murder
were filed against appellant.

When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Trial on th e
merits then ensued.

Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated murder and attempt
ed murder on three (3) counts.
Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits having killed Regis
and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.

Issue:

Did the accused act in self-defense?

Ruling:

No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily proved. It re
quires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to
repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.

In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:

One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggr
ession on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of suff ici
ent provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accu
sed to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremo
st on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be su
ccessfully pleaded.

In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version of the events was u
ncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On the other hand, the surviving victims w
ere unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecuti
on witnesses had been weighed by the trial court, and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the appel
late court gives full weight and respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the t rial ju
dge has the best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such exceptions obt
ains in this case.

In Razon v. People, we held:

Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is
extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming sel
f-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-defense.

This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defe
nd themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victims.

The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery was employed by appellant.
The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected. Provocation on the part of the victims was not pro
ven, and appellant’s testimony that the victims were about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkli
ng that an attack was forthcoming and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated a
s a circumstance to qualify the crime to murder.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion p
erpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion per
petua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03
-3639 is correct.

We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated murder, in Criminal Case No. 03
-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal
and would have caused his death had medical help not been provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on t
he victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all th
e acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death.

Case 23

LEONIDAS EPIFANIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 157057 June 26, 2007

FACTS: On August 15, 1990, Crisaldo Alberto (Crisaldo) and his cousin, Allan Perez (Allan), were walking to their respective h
omes after spending time at the house of Crisaldo's father. Since the pavement going to Crisaldo's house followed a narro
w pathway along the local shrubs called banganga, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thru
st of a bladed weapon on his back, which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw his attacker,
petitioner, also known as "Iyo (Uncle) Kingkoy." Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the latter's left arm. When Alla
n heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo's side which caused petitioner to run away. Allan then brought Crisaldo to
his father's house where Crisaldo's wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was then brought to the Peñaplata Hospital
where he was given first aid and then transferred to the Davao Medical Center where he stayed for three weeks to recupera
te from his wounds.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. During his arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Petiti
oner's defense consisted mainly of denial. On July 5, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the petitioner. Petitione
r appealed his conviction to the CA, which affirmed the decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was guilty of frustrated murder.

HELD: No. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines whether a felony is attempted
or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the subjective phase in the commission of the offense.

In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mo
rtal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on an
other but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention t
o kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kil
l the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commi
ssion of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; a
nd (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim.

In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt through the unwavering
testimony of Crisaldo on the manner of execution of the attack as well as the number of wounds he sustained. Crisaldo was
stabbed from behind by petitioner. When Crisaldo turned around, petitioner continued his assault, hitting Crisaldo on the le
ft arm as the latter tried to defend himself. The treacherous manner in which petitioner perpetrated the crime is shown not
only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim but also by the deliberate manner in which the as
sault was perpetrated. Nonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution, because Allan came to the aid of C
risaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to stop
stabbing when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had not be
en completed.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds sustained by Crisaldo. No evi
dence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would have died from his wound without timely medical attendanc
e. It is well-settled that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically atten
ded to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime c
ommitted by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.