MEMORANDUM

U.S. Department
of Transportation

Federal Railroad
Administration
___________________________________________________________________

Date: August 8, 2019

Subject: R1-2019-1339

From: John E. LaPrice

Railroad Safety Inspector (S&TC)

To: Leslie Fiorenzo

Regional Administrator - RRS-41

Synopsis

On May 25th, 2019, at 3:02 A.M. EDT, Long Island Rail Road (LI) Train No.8700
derailed in SK2 interlocking on Montauk No. 1 track, at milepost 71.1. SK2 is located in
Suffolk County, New York. The track is aligned geographically south west to north east.
Railroad direction is west to east. The track is tangent and level west of SK2. There is a 3
degree level left handed curve to east. There were no injuries reported. The accident did not
involve hazardous materials. At the time of the accident the temperature was 56°F, and it
was dark. There was no ambient or street lighting in the area. It was night. This accident was
not PTC preventable. The FRA's investigation determined the probable cause was a Loss of
Shunt.

Circumstances Prior to the Accident

The method of operation in SK2 interlocking is by Long Island operating rules, general
orders, timetable instructions and signal indications of a centralized traffic control system
operated remotely from Babylon. Long Island Rail Road Timetable No. 4, effective May 21st,
2018, authorizes a maximum track speed of 60 mph in the accident area.
The crew of LI No.8700 consisted of an Engineer, Conductor, Brakeman, and
Collector. The Engineer and Conductor reported to Jamaica Storage Yard at 12:39 am EDT.
The Brakeman reported at 12:34 am, and the Collector reported at 12:53 am EDT. All four
employees reported after having their statutory off duty period. Train No.8700 was the first
run of the day for the entire crew. The consist of train No.8700 was five C-3 coaches, and a
DM-30AC duel-mode locomotive at each end. LI engine No.511 was on the east end. The
crew performed the job briefing and all necessary tests prior to departing the yard for Jamaica
station. They departed Jamaica station at 1:09 am EDT. Train No.8700 was a revenue train
and made all local stops to Speonk, during which no exceptions were taken with the operation
of the equipment. The train arrived at Speonk seven minutes early. When it departed from
Speonk station, the engineer was alone in the cab of the locomotive, and the conductor was in
the third coach from the head end.
The crew of LI Train No.5785 consisted of an Engineer, Conductor, and Brakeman.
The Engineer reported to Jamaica storage yard on Friday, May 24th, 2019, at 6:58 pm EDT.
The Conductor and Brakeman reported at 6:53 pm EDT. They all reported after having their
statutory off duty period. The first run of the day for this crew was revenue train No.2718
from Jamaica to Montauk. In Montauk, they picked up different equipment. The new
equipment consisted of twelve C-3 coaches and a DM-30AC locomotive on each end. During
equipment testing before departure from Montauk, it was discovered that there was a door
issue in the eighth west car. This required the crew to cut out a door. This delayed their
departure by nine minutes. Train No.5785 was a non-revenue equipment train. Because of
their late departure, the Babylon East block operator informed the crew that their meet with
train No.8700 would now be in Speonk (SK2 interlocking), instead of at JJD interlocking,
where it had been scheduled to occur. The entire crew were positioned in the cab of the west
locomotive.

The Accident

Train No.5788 was informed by the Babylon East block operator that their train was
going to go into the South siding, and they would probably be fouling the main track on the
east end. The next part of the move would have train No.8700 pulling east on the main track,
and stopping at SK2 interlocking. Train No.5785 would then proceed west. The crew of train
No.5785 was aware that they should have been too long to fit into the siding. However, train
No.5785 showed clear in the siding on the block operator’s board. The block operator
contacted the dispatcher on duty, and informed him that the train was showing clear of SK2
interlocking, even with 14 units. The dispatcher then said he would update his book, no one
took any exceptions to occurrence. There were no further radio instructions to either crew, to
inform them of anything out of the ordinary. Train No.8700 received a proceed signal, and
began to move east.
The Engineer of train No.8700 did not notice the equipment in the foul of his track
until he was approximately five car lengths away from the impact. The engineer then initiated
an emergency brake application. The lead locomotive of train No.8700, Eng. 511, struck the
left side of train No.5785’s trailing Eng. No.500. The impact punctured and opened the fuel
tank of Eng. 511 on the right side, causing a fuel spill and several small fires. Eng.511
derailed to the north side of the main track, and continued approximately 150 feet. Coming to
rest at a 45° angle.
Train No.5785 received its signal to proceed less than 10 seconds later. Unaware that
their train had been struck, with the rear locomotive derailed, they proceeded west. The rear
locomotive was dragged the entire length of the south siding. The engineer did not come to a
stop until he was instructed by radio to do so.
 As of the date of this report, Long Island reports damage to equipment, track, signals,
and environmental from this accident are: Signal: 50,119.92. Track: 50,000; Equipment:
345,701.59, Fuel Clean Up: 26,731.75

Analysis and Conclusions

Analysis - Toxicological Testing:

There were toxicological tests performed on the operating crews of both trains and the
Babylon East Operator. Testing was performed under FRA Post-Accident Forensic
Toxicology guidelines.

Conclusion:
Intoxication was not a factor. All test results were negative.

Analysis– Transportation:
IIC LaPrice, Track Inspector Beck, and Operating Practice’s Inspector White
conducted interviews of the engineer and conductors of both trains and the Block Operator on
Tuesday May 28th, 2019. Training records, work observations records and discipline records
of these employees were reviewed by Inspector White.

Analysis – Engineer Train No.8700:

The Engineer for train No.8700, was hired November 17th, 1999 as a coach cleaner. He
entered engineer training and qualified as a locomotive engineer in approximately 2003. His
last recertification testing was on November 13th, 2018. He achieved a score of 100% on his
test. He currently works Job 3, and has worked it off and on for the last 9 years. His relief
days are Sunday and Monday. Job 3 for the engineer is a swing shift, where he was off duty
approximately 8 hours and 22 minutes from his previous shift. His discipline record shows
four infractions. The last infraction was in December 2016. His training records go back to
the year 2000 and shows numerous and diverse training scenarios in his background. His
actions before the accident indicate proper operation and procedural compliance. However, it
was noted that he did not give an emergency transmission over the radio in compliance with
CFR 220.47 after the collision and subsequent fire.

Conclusion - Engineer Train No.8700:

The performance of the engineer of train No.8700 did not contribute to the accident.

Analysis – Engineer Train No.5785:

The Engineer for train No.5785, was hired January 2nd, 2002 as an assistant conductor.
He entered engineer training and was promoted October 2005. His last recertification/testing
was December 4th, 2018. He received a score of 93. He currently works extra list job 1126
with relief days of Tuesday and Wednesday. His prior time off duty was 11 hours 28 minutes.
He reported for work at the Jamaica storage yard at 6:58 pm on May 24th, 2019. His discipline
record indicates no infractions. His training records go back to the year 2002 and shows
numerous and diverse training scenarios in his background. His actions before the accident
indicate proper operation, and procedural compliance. This includes radio communication
with the Babylon East block operator where instructions were given concerning the change of
meet location from JJD interlocking to SK2 interlocking. The Babylon East block operator
and engineer of train No.5785 had a job briefing that indicated the east end of the equipment
would probably be fouling the mainline track on the east end at Speonk. While in the South
siding, the engineer of train No.5785 observed train No.8700 proceeded past him, and travel
at a speed which he assumed meant that his train was clear of the interlocking.
The engineer of train No.5785 received a favorable signal to continue west off the
siding. He was unaware of train No.8700 striking the rear of his train, derailing the trailing
locomotive. His head end was two to three car lengths west of the Speonk station, before he
received the word to stop his train.

Conclusion – Engineer Train No.5785:

The Engineer of train No.5785, after the job briefing with the Babylon East block operator,
was aware that his train would not fit in the clear on the south siding at Speonk. However, due
to the circuit showing clear on the block operator’s board, there was no further
communication between the Block Operator and the westbound train crew. The Block
Operator assumed they were in the clear. This erroneous assumption contributed to the
severity of this accident. The performance or actions of the Engineer of Train No. 5785 did
not cause or contribute to the accident.

Analysis – Conductor Train No.8700:

The Conductor for train No.8700, was hired July 21st, 2004 as an Assistant Conductor.
He was qualified as a conductor in 2009. His last recertification testing was January 9th, 2018.
He received a score of 99%. He currently works Job 3, with relief days of Sunday and
Monday. His prior time off duty was 14 hours 43 minutes. His discipline record shows three
infractions. His last infraction was September 2018. His training records go back to the year
2004 and shows numerous and diverse training scenarios in his background. He reported to
Jamaica Storage Yard at 12:39 am EDT, on May 25th, 2019. His first train was train No.8700.
After the crew job briefing and initial testing of the equipment, the train departed the yard for
its initial stop at Jamaica Station. At 1:09 am EDT, train No.8700 departed Jamaica Station
and proceeded east making all scheduled stops to Speonk without incident or exception.
Train No.8700 was scheduled to arrive at Speonk at 3:00 am. However, the train arrived early
at approximately 2:53 am. After waiting for the proper departure time, the conductor gave the
engineer the signal to proceed. The conductor was positioned on the west end of the lead east
car. The conductor reports he felt the emergency brake application. He was on his way to the
radio to contact the engineer when he felt the impact. He looked out of the window on the
south side of the train and saw his train side swiping train No.5785. When the train came to a
stop, he instructed his brakeman and collector to check on the approximate thirty passengers
on board. He then got off the train on the north side and proceeded to check on his engineer.
After finding out the engineer was okay, he called the dispatcher to notify them of the
situation. There were a several small fires on the track, from the resulting fuel spill. He
instructed the collector to retrieve a fire extinguisher to extinguish the fires.

Conclusion – Conductor Train No.8700:

The performance of the conductor of train No.8700 did not contribute to the accident.
His actions after the accident were exemplary. Exception was taken to the conductor’s failure
to initiate an emergency transmission over the radio, in compliance with CFR 220.47 after the
collision and subsequent fire.

Analysis – Conductor Train No.5785:

The Conductor for train No.5785 (Job 71), was hired on June 4th, 2008 as an assistant
conductor. He was qualified as a conductor in 2010. His last recertification was on February
13th, 2018. He scored an 86% on the test. He currently works the extra collector list. His off
days are Monday and Tuesday. He had 17 hours 58 minutes of rest. His records show no
discipline assessed. His training records go back to the year 2008 and shows numerous and
diverse training scenarios in his background. On May 24th, 2019, he reported to the Jamaica
storage yard at approximately 6:53 pm to cover his assigned shift. After a job briefing with
his crew, and equipment testing, train No.2718 was his first train of the day, an eastbound
from Jamaica to Montauk. Upon arrival at Montauk, the crew picked up twelve cars and two
locomotives. This was the equipment used for train No.5785. Prior to departure from
Montauk all safety tests were performed, and the only exception was a door light on the
eighth car. This required the crew to cut out the door and delayed the departure by nine
minutes. The Babylon East block operator informed the crew that the scheduled meet at JJD
was now going to occur at Speonk instead, due to their late departure from Montauk. The
block operator was aware that the east end of the equipment would be fouling the
interlocking. The initial instructions and move, was to stop the eastbound train No.8700 west
of SK2 interlocking to allow the westbound train to continue, and clearing SK2 interlocking
for train No.8700. After an additional job briefing between him and the engineer they also
concluded that they would be fouling the interlocking. The Conductor saw train No.8700
proceed east on the mainline. As they passed him, he observed them proceeding east faster
than he anticipated, and figured that his train did in fact did clear the interlocking. At that
time there were no updates or changes from the block operator. Train No.5785 did not feel the
impact of train No.8700 into the rear locomotive. The crew received a favorable signal to
proceed west from the siding. Train No.5785 proceeded west, dragging its derailed east
locomotive the entire length of the South siding. They did not stop until they received a radio
transmission to stop their train.

Conclusion – Conductor Train No.5785:

No exceptions were taken with the actions of the Conductor of train No.5785. His
actions did not contribute to the accident. The Conductor did have knowledge of a possible
fouling situation for the rear of his train.

Analysis – Block Operator:

The Train Director (block operator) of Babylon East was hired June 23rd, 1993 as a
coach cleaner. He qualified as a block operator in 1995. His last recertification testing was
December 19th, 2018. (96%). His current job is BJ32 - East End Babylon. He has covered
this section of territory for almost 10 years. His relief days are Tuesday and Wednesday. He
had 16 hours rest from his previous shift. He took responsibility of his post at 9:50 pm.
During the pass down/job briefing from the second shift block operator, he was informed of a
false indication at Pete and Son crossings, and signalman troubleshooting a ground at SK1
signal hut. Between 10:30 pm and 11 pm, he received information from the signalman that
there was a shift change of signalmen at SK1. The oncoming signalmen were in periodic
contact with block operator, requesting time between trains for testing purposes. At no time
did the signalman indicate any issues or problems with the signals in the area. During his
shift, he spoke with train No.5785. He noticed that train No.5785 had not left Montauk at
their scheduled time. He then received a call from the trains conductor and was informed that
train No.5785 was running late due to a door issue. The conductor also informed the block
operator that they had contacted 204 about the issue. The block operator tracked the route of
train No.5785. He noticed they would not make up any time and were running approximately
11 minutes behind schedule by the time they reached Westhampton. Train No.8700 was
scheduled to meet train No.5785 at JJD, which is listed in the LI special instructions as
holding 16 units. After consulting with the Section C Dispatcher, the decision was made to do
the meet at SK2, using the South siding which holds 13 units, as noted in the special
instructions. The block operator informed the dispatcher that the train was 14 units and it
would not fit on the siding. The dispatcher then decided that they would perform a saw-by
move. A saw-by move is where a train that is too long to fit onto a siding would pull into that
siding, allow the opposing train to move forward on the adjacent track, clearing one end of
the siding, stopping short of the equipment in the foul. This will allow the train that is too
long, to continue, clearing the switch on the opposite end of the siding. This move is a routine
operation at this location. It has been performed many times prior without incident. The block
operator contacted train No.5785, informed them of the maneuver and that he was aware that
their train would not fit on the siding. The block operator did not contact train No.8700 and
informed them of the move because “the signals were going to direct the train what they
should do”. After train No.5785 reached the west end of the siding the model board showed
the train clearing, according to the signal indication, signal to signal. He had no indication
that the train was fouling the east end of the interlocking. The block operator then informed
the dispatcher that the train had cleared into the siding. The dispatcher said, he would “update
his book”, meaning that the siding held more equipment than previously thought, and as
stated in the special instruction.
All the signals were fleeted for subsequent moves. Train No.8700 proceeded east on
signal indication, from the Speonk station. The dispatcher’s board did not show any issues
with train No.8700 until it reached signal 2E, just west of the east switch for the south siding.
At that time, the dispatcher’s board started flashing red, indicating a switch out of
correspondence. He then heard a someone, who turned out to be an employee in the yard, on
the radio say, “mainline, stop your train”, with a following transmission, “Speonk, mainline
you’re dragging your engine”. The dispatcher immediately contacted train No.5785, the
westbound, and ordered them to stop. He then tried to contact train No.8700, the eastbound,
but was unable to raise them via radio.

Conclusion – Block Operator:

The block operator of Babylon East performed his duties according to proper, and
usual procedure. He did not convey the possible fouling of SK2 to the eastbound train
No.8700, and the subsequent anomaly of his board showing a 14 unit train, showing clear on
a 13 unit siding. If a verbal safety briefing or warning had been conveyed, this incident might
have been avoided.
A lack of communication between the block operator, relying solely on the signal
system, and not providing verbal instructions and updates, and eastbound train No.8700,
contributed to the severity of this accident.
Conclusion – Transportation:
While there were numerous factors involved in this accident, if questions were posed
about inconsistencies observed, the accident could have been avoided. Doubts were raised by
the block operator to the dispatcher, and those same doubts were raised by the crew of train
No.5785. However, all parties involved trusted the system despite their doubts.
No exceptions were taken to the performance of the train crews involved, working
with the information that they had at the time.

Analysis – Signal System:

This FRA Inspector went to SK2 Interlocking at the time of the derailment. SK2 is
equipped with a US&S M-3 switch machine’s, all track circuits operate on 91.6 Hertz
Alternating Current Tru-3 track circuits. SK2 is part of a traffic control system, with Safetran
color lights signals, and cab signals supplemented with Automatic Train Control. The switch
machine was lined and locked in the normal position, for the mainline. The switch machine
had been destroyed in the derailment when this Inspector arrived. Examination of the switch
area revealed a rail joint that had a single broken bond that showed minimal signs of
oxidation, indicating a relativity recent break. The track circuit for the switch utilizes shunt
fouling and this rail joint was in the turnout portion of the circuit, past the shunt fouling wires.
During the on-site investigation, all insulated joints for the on-switch track circuit were tested
and found to be in good condition. A visual inspection of the shunt fouling wires was done
prior to the removal of the derailed locomotive. The connections on both other rails was
observed to be intact and in good condition. The portion of the shunt wires that were visible
was observed to be intact and in good condition as well. Upon removal of the derailed
locomotive, the shunt wires were tested by the signal department and found to have good
continuity and near zero resistance. Interviews with the signal maintainers working at SK1 at
the time of the accident were conducted, and confirmed that they were not conducting any
work at the time of the accident and that the work they had been performing had no
connection to the accident.
A review of switch inspection records and tests was conducted by Inspector Weiler,
and revealed no exceptions. The signal system play back was reviewed as well. It
corroborates the sequence of events, as described by the employees involved.
On April 3rd, 2019, the signal maintainer performed the inspection and test per CFR49 Part
236.104. Dispatcher video play back confirmed the maintainer performing the physical
shunting parts of the test as the track circuits indicated occupied during the time the
maintainer and the assistant were performing the test. Additionally, railroad interviews with
the Assistant Signalman confirmed that the Maintainer properly performed the visual and
physical testing of the switch. As of this writing, the FRA has not been allowed to interview
the Assistant Signalman due to an on-going criminal investigation into the incident.
Therefore, the confirmation of the visual portion of the test, by the Assistant Signalman, as
per CFR49 Part 236.104, on April 3, 2019 cannot be made.

Conclusion – Signal System:

It was concluded that the Signal System is a factor due to loss of shunt in turnout
fouling, in this accident.
Analysis – Track:
 FRA Track Inspector Beck went to SK2 interlocking on Saturday May 25th, 2019.
While at the accident site he inspected the trackage, switches and components of said switch.
At that time, there were no exceptions taken in the derailment area. Prior to the derailment,
the most recent track inspection occurred on May, 22nd, 2019, which noted 1 non-class
specific defect, and was repaired immediately. On May 1st, 2019, there was a monthly switch
inspection performed which noted no FRA defects. On March 27th, 2019 a quarterly
Geometry car test was made with the LI Geometry Car No. TC82, and found no exceptions in
the derailment area. Rail weight is of 119 RE, mostly all bolted joints. There is no curve wear
or overflow on the rails in this switch, also no head checks, shelling, battered rail ends. The
rail has no corrosion, pitting, or nicks in the rail base.

Track Components Analysis:

Analysis - Switch No. 2-21:

Switch No. 2-21 is a No.10 left hand turn-out, remotely operated from Babylon Tower.
The rail weight is of 119 lb. RE CC, manufactured by Bethlehem Steelton in Pennsylvania in
March of 1975. The frog area is a rail bound manganese with guard rails on both sides of the
track.
Conclusion – Switch No 2-21:
Track components of this switch was not a factor in this accident.
Analysis - Joint Bars:
The type of joint used in the switch area is of the 119 LB design, with 6 bolt holes and
measuring 3 feet in length. There was no evidence of any wear or rail end mis-match.
Conclusion – Joint Bars:
The joint bars used in the track and the switch were not a factor in this accident.
Analysis - Bolts:
The number of bolts used in the joints was 6, all bolts were new, and torqued to specs,
with no bolts missing.
Conclusion - Bolts:
The bolts used on this track and switch was not a factor in this accident.
Analysis - Tie Plates and Fasteners:
This switch uses 1:40 cant tie plates both in the switch area and both the main and
siding tracks. The fasteners used on these tracks are of the Pandrol Type, with 2 clips on each
tie plate. These tie plates are screwed to the wood ties with standard track screw lags.
Conclusion – Tie Plates and Fasteners:
The fasteners and tie plates were not a factor in this accident.
Analysis – Ties:
The switch timbers used in this switch are standard creosote soaked oak ties,
measuring from 9 foot to 16 foot, standard ties measuring 8 foot 6 inch are used on both the
main track and the siding, there were no evidence of any swinging, pumping or center bound
ties. All ties were within the limits prescribed in 49 CFR Part 213, Subpart D, Section 109,
Track Structure.
Conclusion - Ties:
The ties at this site was not a factor in this accident.
Analysis - Ballast:
Type of ballast used in the switch and track area are is of the crushed granite type,
measured between 1 ½ and 1 ¾ inch in size. Depth of this ballast under the timbers and ties
was between 20 to 24 inches. All tie cribs were filled within 1 inch below top of tie, in
accordance with LIRR Standard Plan.
Conclusion - Ballast:
The ballast used in the switch and the track area was not a factor in this accident.
Conclusion – Track Components:
Track components were not a factor in this accident

Analysis -Track Geometry (Gage, Alignment, Curvature, Surface):

Track gage in the switch and track area was measured and was within the prescribed
limits of the 49 CFR Part 213, Subpart C, Track geometry. Track alignment was measured
and found to be within the limits of 49 CFR part 213 Subpart C. Track Curvature was
measured and found to be within the prescribed limits of 49 CFR Part 213 Subpart C, Track
Surface was measured and found to be within the prescribed limits of 49 CFR 213 Subpart C.
Conclusion -Track Geometry (Gage, Alignment, Curvature, Surface):
Track gage, alignment, Curvature, and Surface was not a factor in this accident.
Conclusion – Track:
It was concluded that the track components, turn-out, and track geometry were not a
factor in this accident.

Analysis – Mechanical:
FRA MP&E Inspector Tyrrell went to SK2 interlocking, and conducted post incident
inspections at the scene of the two locomotives that collided, and the consists of the two
trains. He also conducted an examination of inspection records, locomotive and car histories,
periodic inspection records and work orders. IIC LaPrice and Inspector Beck Went to Morris
Park Diesel Shops to observe testing of Eng. No.512 for wheel to wheel continuity.
Analysis – Train No.8700 Mechanical:
Post incident inspections at the scene of train No.8700 consisting of locomotives
No.511, No.514 and coaches 4108, 4104, 4082, 4027 and 4001. No defects were observed on
this equipment. An examination of the inspection records, locomotive and car histories,
periodic inspection and work orders on derailed and non-derailed cars and locomotives of
train No.8700.

Conclusion – Train No.8700 Mechanical:

Following a review of all work orders, inspection and repair records which failed to
reveal any reason that the equipment of train No.8700 played an active role for any
involvement in the cause of the accident. Locomotive No.511 did not contribute to the cause
of accident.

Analysis – Train No.5785 Mechanical:

An FRA Motive Power and Equipment Investigator performed post incident
inspections at the scene of train No.5785 consisting of locomotives No.500, No.512 and
coaches 4051, 4071, 4067, 4061, 4036, 4079,4084, 4025, 4022, 4053, 4118 and 4087 of the.
No defects were observed.
An examination of inspection records, locomotive and car histories, periodic
inspection and work orders was performed on derailed and non-derailed cars and locomotives
of train No.5785.
Conclusion – Train No.5785 Mechanical:
Following a review of all work orders, inspection and repair records which failed to
reveal any reason that the equipment of LI accident train 5785 played an active role for any
involvement in the cause of the accident. Locomotive No.500 did not contribute to the cause
of accident.

Analysis – Engine No.512:

Engine No. 512 was electrically isolated from both running rails by rolling all wheels
on to wooden skates. Each wheel and axle set was then checked for electrical continuity by
using a meter placed in Ohms setting and readings taken at three points on each wheel. All
wheel and axles sets showed low resistance values.

Conclusion – Engine No.512:

The wheels and axles of Engine No.512, showed no signs of foreign matter being
accumulated on them, or of any other cause of high resistance. The wheel/axle sets of the
engine did not contribute to the cause of this accident.

Conclusion - Mechanical:
It was concluded that the train equipment was not a factor in this accident.

Analysis – Locomotive Fuel Tank:

Long Island Engine No.511 is a DM-30AC, duel-mode diesel electric locomotive built
in 1998 and accepted in 1999. The manufacturer of the DM30AC locomotives is Electro-
Motive Diesel. The Long Island Rail Road uses Ultra Low Sulphur Diesel (ULSD) No.2
diesel fuel (UN# 1202) in their locomotives. No.511 has a fuel tank capacity of 2,400 US
gallons. The fuel tank received a gash on its right side from the raking action of the collision
with Eng. No.512. This resulted in fuel spillage and several small fire spots. The fuel spill
was limited to the immediate area of the locomotive, along the right of way. There was no
expansion of the spill or waterway contamination. The railroads contractor removed and
properly disposed 329 gallons of oily water, (6) 55-gallon drums (900 pounds) of oil soaked
debris from their cleanup efforts and twelve cubic yards (18 tons) of diesel contaminated
sand/soil from their excavation. The initial remediation effort was on May 5th, 2019. Three
cubic yards (4.5 tons) of ballast contaminated with diesel fuel were removed on May 5th,
2019. Additional cleanup was later required, and was performed on May 29th, 2019. On that
day, AB Oil excavated an area approximately 57 feet long by 2.5 feet wide by 3 feet deep
with a vacuum (guzzler) truck.

Conclusion – Locomotive Fuel Tank:

There were no citations issued against the railroad for this spill. All petroleum spills in
New York state must be reported to the New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation (NYSDEC), within two hours of discovery, which the LIRR did. NYSDEC
Spill # 1901955 was assigned. The fuel spill was a result of the impact between the two
locomotives. The small fire spots were extinguished by the Conductor of train No.8700 using
a portable fire extinguisher from the train. The fuel spill was not a factor in this accident.

Analysis – Emergency Response:

The evacuation of thirty-two passengers from train No.8700 was conducted by the
Eastport Fire Department, with assistance from the crew of train No.8700. Passengers were
brought to ground from the east end, south side vestibule of car 4104 (2nd car from the east).
The fire department opted for car 4104, as car 4108 (1st car from east) was derailed on the F
end, as well was positioned directly over the fuel spill from the engine fuel tanks. Passengers
were brought to ground using the emergency ladder from car 4104. Evacuation began at 3:43
am and was complete at 3:46 am. All passengers were staged on the southwest side of the
Jagger Path crossing, until Hampton Bays Fire Department bus arrived. Twenty-eight
passengers were sheltered in the fire department bus, until accommodations were made to
transport them to their destinations. Four passengers opted to leave either through paid
transportation (Uber/taxi) or family pick up. As reported by the LIRR Fire Marshal’s office,
all passengers evacuated claimed no injuries and did not require evaluation or treatment.
A total of six fire departments, one ambulance corps, three police departments and the
county emergency management responded. Responding departments were: Eastport FD, West
Hampton Beach FD, Manorville FD, Center Moriches FD, East Moriches FD, Hampton Bays
FD, West Hampton Beach Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Suffolk County Fire Rescue,
Southampton PD, West Hampton PD, and MTAPD. The primary response location SK2, was
accessed by Jaggers’ Path, a single lane, unlit, pathway that provides access to three property
lots. Adjacent to, and immediately before the tracks at SK2, is a clearing where responding
units were able to set up. This location has lighting for the interlocking and crossing.
Evacuated passengers were processed here. A secondary response location was Phillp’s Lane.
MTAPD responded here to provide traffic control, as train No.5785 was blocking the
crossing.
 Department Unit Time of arrival
Eastport FD 5-8-30 3:24:29
5-8-31 3:22:26
5-8-32 3:25:30
West Hampton Beach FD 7-8-11 3:56:11
7-8-32 3:53:20
7-8-33 3:49:47
Manorville FD 5-16-9 7:11:45
Center Moriches FD 5-4-1 4:09:17
5-4-10 4:29:08
East Moriches FD 5-7-4 3:58:58
5-7-30 3:46:54
5-7-31 3:48:43
Hampton Bays FD 5-7-30 5:41:55
(contacted later to provide 5-7-33 5:44:32
shelter)
5-7-20 5:49:58
West Hampton Beach 7-16-80 3:23:52
Volunteer Ambulance Corp
7-16-81 3:27:26
Suffolk County Fire Rescue 5-0-3 4:45:36
5-0-7 4:45:25
7-0-1 3:36:15
OEM-1 4:35:16
Southampton Town PD A20 3:21:00
A21 3:30:00
West Hampton PD 710 3:19:00
711 3:25:00
MTA PD 1G01A 3:38:15
ECAPT 4:14:30
Following units dispatched - 9DD2A 4:23:29
after initial response units 1G01B 4:40:00
3DSG1A 4:55:24
K940 4:57:42
2DSG1A 5:06:20

Conclusion – Emergency Response:

Three fire departments, the ambulance corps, and two police departments were
contacted to elicit feedback on communications with the railroad during this event. Contacted
agencies were: Eastport FD, Hampton Bays FD, West Hampton Beach FD, West Hampton
Beach Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Southampton PD, and West Hampton PD. The other
responding departments were relief departments. The Eastport Fire Department, Fire
Commissioner said they responded to Phillips Lane initially, as that is where the station is
located. They quickly moved to SK2 at Jaggers Lane on their own, as they are familiar with
the area. Speonk Station and yard are within the Eastport Fire Departments district. His other
concern was the length of time the evacuated passengers spent outside in the chilly morning
until shelter was obtained by a bus provided by the Hampton Bays FD. This was
approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes. This concern was also mentioned by the Chief of the
West Hampton Beach Volunteer Ambulance Corps. His units also went to the station area
first, before self-relocating to the Jagger’s Path location. He felt this delay was more a
concern for the Ambulance corps, as that time could impact timely passenger treatment. He
did say that otherwise communications were good, and that the railroad had since reached out
to hold a class for his department. The West Hampton Beach Police felt that the location
information, while good at describing where it was, could have been better if a direction of
approach, ie, come from the north or south, was included with the notification. The
responding officer knew where the location was but wasn’t sure the best way to approach.
She too was first sent to the station area, so that would be a concern for an event there.
Jaggers Path is only accessible from the south. She did add, that her department is not directly
contacted as they are not the primary police department, and they got their information from
radio notifications. The other departments contacted expressed no issue with communications
from the railroad, and no trouble in finding the location. Most employees of all these
departments are local people, who were raised in the area and know it well. This helped
greatly in finding and getting to the location. The West Hampton Beach Volunteer
Ambulance corp reached out to the railroad after this event to set up a training class. They
have scheduled two classes. This will include equipment familiarities.
The railroad does an excellent job of communicating with and providing training for
the FDNY in New York and Queens. They need to apply this approach to the eastern
communities in Suffolk county as well. The railroad operates many trains, several very
heavily used, through these areas, and the emergency respond departments have had little to
no training from the railroad, as to its operations or equipment.

Overall Conclusions

Probable Cause And Contributing Factors

FRA concluded the accident occurred because of the loose of shunt, which allowed the
main track side of the turnout to release (to become energized), allowing the eastward signal
on the main track to display at SK2. Examination of the turnout area of the switch revealed a
non-insulated rail joint that had a single broken bond. With Engine No.512 occupying the
track circuit, the track relay was able to energize. This released the interlocking and allowed
the Babylon East block operator to re-align the switch to the normal position, and establish a
proceed signal for train No.8700.

The FRAs investigation concluded that this was a signal caused accident and is using
accident cause code S009 – Interlocking Signal displayed a False Proceed. A secondary cause
code of H999 - Other Train Operation/human factors, is also being used. The Babylon East
Operator and the Dispatcher both noticed the longer train fit into a siding that should not have
been able to accommodate it, yet took no action to verify what was occurring in the field.
 U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # R1-2019-1339

1. Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 1a. Alphabetic Code 1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.
LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD LI 69826
2. Name of Railroad Operating Train #2 2a. Alphabetic Code 2b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.
LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD LI 69826
3. Name of Railroad Operating Train #3 3a. Alphabetic Code 3b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.

4. Name of Railroad or Other Entity Responsible for Track Maintenance (single entry) 4a. Alphabetic Code 4b. Railroad Accident/Incident No.

5. U.S. DOT Grade Crossing Identification Number 6. Date of Accident/Incident 7. Time of Accident/Incident
month day year
05/25/2019 3:02 AM PM
8. Type of Accident/Incident 1. Derailment 4. Side collision 7. Hwy-rail crossing 10. Explosion-detonation 13. Other Code
(single entry in code box) 2. Head on collision 5. Raking collision 8. RR grade crossing 11. Fire/violent rupture (describe in narrative) 4
3. Rear end collision 6. Broken train collision 9. Obstruction 12. Other impacts
9. Cars Carrying 10. HAZMAT Cars 11. Cars Releasing 12. People 13. Subdivision
HAZMAT 0 Damaged/Derailed 0 HAZMAT 0 Evacuated 0
Montauk
14. Nearest City/Town 15. Milepost 16. State 17. County
Speonk (to nearest tenth) 71.1 Abbr. Suffolk
NY
18. Temperature (F) ̊ 19. Visibility (single entry) Code 20. Weather (single entry) Code 21. Type of Track Code
(Specify if minus) 56 F 1. Dawn 3. Dusk 1. Clear 3. Rain 5. Sleet 1. Main 3. Siding
4 1 1
2. Day 4. Dark 2. Cloudy 4. Fog 6. Snow 2. Yard 4. Industry
22. Track Name/Number 23. FRA Track Code 24. Annual Track 25. Time Table Direction Code
Class (1-9,X) Density (gross 1. North 3. East
Montauk No.1 tons in millions) 2. South 4. West
4 3
OPERATING TRAIN # 1
26. Type of Equipment 1. Freight Train 5. Single Car 9. Maint./inspect. car D. EMU 27. Was Equipment 28. Train Number/Symbol
Consist 2. Passenger Train-Pulling 6. Cut of Cars A. Spec. MoW Equip. E. DMU Code Attended? Code
(single entry) 3. Commuter Train-Pulling 7. Yard/Switching B. Passenger Train-Pushing
3 1 LI 8700
4. Work Train 8. Light loco(s) C. Commuter Train-Pushing 1. Yes 2. No
29. Speed (recorded speed, Code 31. Type of Territory (enter code(s) that apply) 31a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
if available) Signalization (Mandatory) 0 = Not a remotely controlled operation
1
R - Recorded 1. Signaled 2. Not Signaled 1 = Remote control portable transmitter
30 MPH R
E - Estimated Method of Operation/Authority for Movement (Mandatory) 2 = Remote control tower operation
1
30. Trailing Tons (gross 1. Signal Indication 2. Direct Train Control 3. Yard/Restricted Limits 3 = Remote control portable transmitter
excluding power units) 4. Block Register Territory 5. Other Than Main Track - more than one remote control Code
Supplemental/Adjunct Codes (Mandatory*) transmitter
A B G 0
* Mandatory to the extent that all applicable codes are entered
32. Principal Car/Unit a. Initial and Number b. Position in Train c. Loaded (yes/no) 33. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/ Alcohol Drugs
(1) First Involved alcohol use, enter the number that were
LI 500 1 N 0 0
(derailed, struck, etc.) positive in the appropriate box.
(2) Causing (if mechanical, N/A N
34. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N)
Y
cause reported)
35. Locomotive Units 36. Cars
a. Head Mid Train Rear End Loaded Empty
(Exclude EMU, DMU, and Cab (Include EMU, DMU, and Cab
End
Car Locomotives.) b. Manual c. Remote d. Manual e. Remote Car Locomotives.) a. Freight b. Pass. c. Freight d. Pass. e. Caboose
(1) Total in Train 1 1 (1) Total in Equipment 4 4
Consist
(2) Total Derailed 1 (2) Total Derailed 0 1
37. Equipment Damage 38. Track, Signal, Way, 39. Primary Cause 40. Contributing
245,701.59 100,119.52 S009 H999
This Consist & Structure Damage Code Cause Code
Number of Crew Members Length of Time on Duty
41. Engineers/Operators 42. Firemen 43. Conductors 44. Brakemen 45. Engineer/Operator 46. Conductor
1 1 1 2 23 2 23
Hrs: Mins: Hrs: Mins:
Casualties to: 47. Railroad Employees 48. Train Passengers 49. Others 50. EOT Device? 51. Was EOT Device Properly Armed?
N/A N/A
1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
Fatal
52. Caboose Occupied by Crew?
Nonfatal 1 N/A
1. Yes 2. No
53. Latitude 54. Longitude

FRA F6180.39 (9/11)

 U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # R1-2019-1339

OPERATING TRAIN # 2
55. Type of Equipment 1. Freight Train 5. Single Car 9. Maint./inspect. car D. EMU 56. Was Equipment 57. Train Number/Symbol
Consist 2. Passenger Train-Pulling 6. Cut of Cars A. Spec. MoW Equip. E. DMU Code Attended? Code
(single entry) 3. Commuter Train-Pulling 7. Yard/Switching B. Passenger Train-Pushing
3 1 LI 5785
4. Work Train 8. Light loco(s) C. Commuter Train-Pushing 1. Yes 2. No
58. Speed (recorded speed, Code 60. Type of Territory (enter code(s) that apply) 60a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
if available) Signalization (Mandatory) 0 = Not a remotely controlled operation
1
R - Recorded MPH 1. Signaled 2. Not Signaled 1 = Remote control portable transmitter
0 R
E - Estimated Method of Operation/Authority for Movement (Mandatory) 2 = Remote control tower operation
1
59. Trailing Tons (gross 1. Signal Indication 2. Direct Train Control 3. Yard/Restricted Limits 3 = Remote control portable transmitter
excluding power units) 4. Block Register Territory 5. Other Than Main Track - more than one remote control Code
Supplemental/Adjunct Codes (Mandatory*) transmitter
A B G N/A
* Mandatory to the extent that all applicable codes are entered
61. Principal Car/Unit a. Initial and Number b. Position in Train c. Loaded (yes/no) 62. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/ Alcohol Drugs
(1) First Involved alcohol use, enter the number that were
LI 512 14 No 0 0
(derailed, struck, etc.) positive in the appropriate box.
(2) Causing (if mechanical, 63. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N)
No
cause reported)
64. Locomotive Units 65. Cars
a. Head Mid Train Rear End Loaded Empty
(Exclude EMU, DMU, and (Include EMU, DMU, and Cab
End
Cab Car Locomotives.) b. Manual c. Remote d. Manual e. Remote Car Locomotives.) a. Freight b. Pass. c. Freight d. Pass. e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment
(1) Total in Train 1 1 12
Consist
(2) Total Derailed 1 (2) Total Derailed 0
66. Equipment Damage 67. Track, Signal, Way, 68. Primary Cause 69. Contributing
100 000.00
This Consist & Structure Damage Code Cause Code
Number of Crew Members Length of Time on Duty
70. Engineers/Operators 71. Firemen 72. Conductors 73. Brakemen 74. Engineer/Operator 75. Conductor
1 1 1 8 4 8 9
Hrs: Mins: Hrs: Mins:
Casualties to: 76. Railroad Employees 77. Train Passengers 78. Others 79. EOT Device? 80. Was EOT Device Properly Armed?
2
1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
Fatal
81. Caboose Occupied by Crew?
Nonfatal
1. Yes 2. No
82. Latitude 83. Longitude

OPERATING TRAIN # 3
84. Type of Equipment 1. Freight Train 5. Single Car 9. Maint./inspect. car D. EMU 85. Was Equipment 86. Train Number/Symbol
Consist 2. Passenger Train-Pulling 6. Cut of Cars A. Spec. MoW Equip. E. DMU Attended? Code
(single entry) 3. Commuter Train-Pulling 7. Yard/Switching B. Passenger Train-Pushing
4. Work Train 8. Light loco(s) C. Commuter Train-Pushing 1. Yes 2. No
87. Speed (recorded speed, Code 89. Type of Territory (enter code(s) that apply) 89a. Remotely Controlled Locomotive?
if available) Signalization (Mandatory) 0 = Not a remotely controlled operation
R - Recorded 1. Signaled 2. Not Signaled 1 = Remote control portable transmitter
MPH
E - Estimated Method of Operation/Authority for Movement (Mandatory) 2 = Remote control tower operation
88. Trailing Tons (gross 1. Signal Indication 2. Direct Train Control 3. Yard/Restricted Limits 3 = Remote control portable transmitter
excluding power units) 4. Block Register Territory 5. Other Than Main Track - more than one remote control Code
Supplemental/Adjunct Codes (Mandatory*) transmitter
* Mandatory to the extent that all applicable codes are entered
90. Principal Car/Unit a. Initial and Number b. Position in Train c. Loaded (yes/no) 91. If railroad employee(s) tested for drug/ Alcohol Drugs
(1) First Involved alcohol use, enter the number that were
(derailed, struck, etc.) positive in the appropriate box.
(2) Causing (if mechanical, 92. Was this consist transporting passengers? (Y/N)
cause reported)
93. Locomotive Units 94. Cars
a. Head Mid Train Rear End Loaded Empty
(Exclude EMU, DMU, and Cab (Include EMU, DMU, and Cab
End
Car Locomotives.) b. Manual c. Remote d. Manual e. Remote Car Locomotives.) a. Freight b. Pass. c. Freight d. Pass. e. Caboose
(1) Total in Equipment
(1) Total in Train
Consist
(2) Total Derailed (2) Total Derailed
95. Equipment Damage 96. Track, Signal, Way, 97. Primary Cause 98. Contributing
This Consist & Structure Damage Code Cause Code
Number of Crew Members Length of Time on Duty
99. Engineers/Operators 100. Firemen 101. Conductors 102. Brakemen 103. Engineer/Operator 104. Conductor

Hrs: Mins: Hrs: Mins:

Casualties to: 105. Railroad Employees 106. Train Passengers 107. Others 108. EOT Device? 109. Was EOT Device Properly Armed?

1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No
Fatal
110. Caboose Occupied by Crew?
Nonfatal
1. Yes 2. No
111. Latitude 112. Longitude

FRA F6180.39 (9/11)

 U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # R1-2019-1339

Highway User Involved Rail Equipment Involved

113. Type C. Truck-trailer F. Bus J. Other motor vehicle Code 117. Equipment 5. Car(s) (standing) B. Train pushing - RCL Code
A. Auto D. Pick-up truck G. School bus K. Pedestrian 1. Train (units pulling) 6. Light loco(s) (moving) C. Train standing - RCL
B. Truck E. Van H. Motorcycle M. Other (spec. in narrative) 2. Train (units pushing) 7. Light loco(s) (standing) D. EMU Locomotive(s)
3. Train (standing) 8. Other (specify in narrative) E. DMU Locomotive(s)
4. Car(s) (moving) A. Train pulling - RCL
114. Vehicle Speed 115. Direction (geographical) Code 118. Position of Car Unit in Train
(est. mph
1. North 2. South 3. East 4. West
at impact)
116. Position of Involved Highway User Code 119. Circumstance Code
1. Stalled or Stuck on crossing 3. Moved over crossing 5. Blocked on 1. Rail equipment struck highway user 2. Rail equipment struck by highway user
2. Stopped on crossing 4. Trapped on crossing by traffic crossing by Gate
119a. Was the highway user and/or rail equipment involved Code 119b. Was there a hazardous materials release by Code
in the impact transporting hazardous materials?
1. Highway user 2. Rail equipment 3. Both 4. Neither 1. Highway user 2. Rail equipment 3. Both 4. Neither

119c. State here the name and quantity of the hazardous material released, if any.

120. Type of 121. Signaled Crossing Warning 122. Roadway Conditions

Crossing 1. Gates 4. Wig wags 7. Crossbucks 10. Flagged by crew A. Dry
Warning 2. Cantilever FLS 5. Hwy. traffic signals 8. Stop signs 11. Other (spec. in narr.) B. Wet
3. Standard FLS 6. Audible 9. Watchman 12. None C. Snow/slush
(See instructions for codes) Code D. Ice Code
E. Sand, Mud, Dirt, Oil, Gravel
Code(s)
F. Water (Standing, Moving)
123. Location of Warning 124. Crossing Warning Interconnected 125. Crossing Illuminated by Street
1. Both sides Code with Highway Signals Code Lights or Special Lights Code
2. Side of vehicle approach 1. Yes 1. Yes
3. Opposite side of vehicle approach 2. No 2. No
3. Unknown 3. Unknown
126. Highway 127. Highway User's Gender 128. Highway User Went Behind or in Front of Train 129. Highway User 5. Other (specify in narrative)
User's Age and Struck or was Struck by Second Train 1. Went around the gate 6. Went around/thru
1. Male Code Code 2. Stopped and then proceeded temporary barricade Code
2. Female 1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown 3. Did not stop 7. Went thru the gate
4. Stopped on crossing 8. Suicide/Attempted Suicide
130. Driver Passed Standing 131. View of Track Obscured by (primary obstruction)
Highway Vehicle Code 1. Permanent structure 3. Passing train 5. Vegetation 7. Other (specify in narrative) Code
1. Yes 2. No 3. Unknown 2. Standing railroad equipment 4. Topography 6. Highway vehicles 8. Not obstructed

132. Driver was 133. Was Driver in the Vehicle?

Casualties to: Killed Injured Code Code
1. Killed 2. Injured 3. Uninjured 1. Yes 2. No

134. Highway-Rail Crossing Users 135. Highway Vehicle Property Damage 136. Total Number of Vehicle Occupants
(est. dollar damage) (include driver)
137. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights? 138. Locomotive Auxiliary Lights Operational?
Code Code
1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No

139. Locomotive Headlight Illuminated? 140. Locomotive Audible Warning Sounded?

Code Code
1. Yes 2. No 1. Yes 2. No

FRA F6180.39 (9/11)

 U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # R1-2019-1339

141. DRAW A SKETCH OF ACCIDENT AREA INCLUDING ALL TRACKS, SIGNALS, SWITCHES, STRUCTURES, OBJECTS, ETC., INVOLVED.

Delete Sketch

FRA F6180.39 (9/11)

 U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Railroad Administration FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT FRA File # R1-2019-1339

142. SYNOPSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

143. NARRATIVE

FRA F6180.39 (9/11)