VII.

Anti- Fencing Law of 1979

LIM VS. CA

FACTS:

 Sergio Pabilona, former Barangay Captain of Brgy. Tiglimao, Cagayan De Oro City, vacated his
house in the said barangay because of the worsening communist insurgency problem in that
barangay and had taken temporary residence in Barangay Pagatpat, also of Cagayan de Oro City.
 March 1, 1986, Pabilona and the eight men he had requested to help him retrieve his belongings in
his house, converged at the residence his Sgt. Bacalso at Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City; that Sgt.
Bacalso and nine other constabulary soldiers, with the former as leader, were to escort Pabilona
and his men in going to Barangay Tiglimao. Pabilona had earlier requested for such a military
escort. A Mercedes Benz truck, owned by accused Juanito Lim, arrived; Sgt. Bacalso was the one
who contracted for the truck since according to him, he too had some lumber to load in Barangay
Taglimao.
 Upon arrival at Brgy, Tiglimao, Pabilona then ordered his men to gather his belongings inside his
house, but he was stopped by Sgt. Bacalso who wanted that they first proceed to the next barangay,
Barangay Tuburan, because his lumber were allegedly there.
 Upon arriving in Barangay Tuburan, Sgt. Bacalso ordered the men of Pabilona to proceed to the
compound of ECG Mining Corporation and to remove from the heavy equipment found therein
their parts; that he also ordered them to unload and to carry with them the acetylene equipment
owned by Juanito Lim which was covered by canvass on board the truck. They brought the various
heavy equipment parts, among which were nine tires with rims, to the Mercedes Benz truck and
loaded them.
 Pabilona, his men and their military escort repaired back to Barangay Taglimao and loaded the
personal belongings of Pabilona; that they then drove back to Lapasan, stopping at the "bodega" of
accused Juanito Lim which was located a few meters away from the residence of Sgt. Bacalso; that
long after their arrival, accused Juanito Lim also arrived on board his pick-up vehicle; that Sgt.
Bacalso then ordered the men of Pabilona to unload items taken and to deposit them inside the
"bodega" of accused Juanito Lim, after which the latter ordered that his "bodega" be closed.
 Pabilona and his men then rode on the truck again and proceeded to barangay Pagatpat where they
unloaded the personal belongings of Pabilona; that the following morning, the men of Pabilona
went to the house of Sgt. Bacalso, as they were told by the latter to do so, but Sgt. Bacalso was out
of his house while waiting for Sgt. Bacalso, the men of Pabilona saw the accused arrived at his
"bodega" on board his yellow pick-up vehicle and saw Lim remove from his "bodega" the nine tires
with rims, load them on his yellow pick-up vehicle and then drive away.
 At the time the heavy equipment was being cannibalized, the President and General Manager of
BCG Mining Corporation, Loui Anton Bond, an Australian national, was being held captive by the
New People's Army, however, after his release in June 1986, he immediately reported to the police
authorities the thievery committed in his company's compound in Barangay Tuburan.
 Engr. Kionisala estimated the value of the items taken from the heavy equipment the total value
of the items taken at P470,310.00.
 Sgt. Dabatian, of the Cagayan de Oro City Police, conducted an investigation, which culminated in
the filing of the instant case by the City Fiscal against accused Juanito Lim for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612.
 ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING IN
CONVICTING LIM

HELD:
No. The prosecution has duly proved that the appellant had dealt with the stolen items and had
possession of the same because the said spare parts and tires which were the subject of thievery or robbery
for they were removed from the heavy equipment of Loui Bond, the private complainant, without the latter's
knowledge and consent, were unloaded from the truck of the appellant and kept in his bodega. And appellant
was present during such unloading and had even ordered the bodega closed after such unloading to his
bodega.
On the aspect of animus furandi, intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is
demonstrated by the overt acts of a person. When it was proved that petitioner committed the unlawful acts
alleged in the information, it was properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and
with criminal intent, and it was incumbent upon him to rebut such a presumption — a burden which
petitioner regrettably failed to discharge. Moreover, the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 that: Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. It must be upheld
in the light of petitioner's shallow demurrer premised on a denial and abili, since a disputable presumption
on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence.
Also, as to the civil indemnity Presidential Decree No. 1612, Section 3 (a) is too clear to need any
clarification:
Sec. 3. Penalties. — Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos
but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining
thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
 PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DE GUZMAN

FACTS:

 On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos,
Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken. An
information, dated 30 September 1985, was instituted against the perpetrators in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101.
 Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 93against herein respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita
Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo,
Rizal.4
 Spouses Alcantara filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to try
the offense charged. The motion alleges, that as per police investigation, the crime took place in
Antipolo, Rizal. For this reason, Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an independent crime,
separate and distinct from that of Robbery. The accused claims that jurisdiction to try the same is
with the Court within which territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing took place.
 The Solicitor General argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is the
commission of robbery, in this case committed in Quezon City, the information therefor filed in
said City accords with the provisions of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, and
the refusal of the Court a quo to assume and exercise jurisdiction thereover constitutes a serious
error of law and a grave abuse of discretion. He theorizes that fencing is a "continuing offense." A
"continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series ofacts arising from a single criminal
resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For it to exist there should be plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated;
unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose or aim.

ISSUE:
Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an information therefor
in the place where the robbery or theft is committed and not necessarily where the property,
unlawfully taken is found to have later been acquired?

HELD:

Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does
not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise
involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made
to depend on an act of fencing in order that it can be consummated. It is true that the object property in
fencing must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery
or theft occurs is inconsequential. Petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the orders
appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.

DIZON-PAMINTUAN VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

 Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and Highways has just arrived
at his residence located at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque at around 9:45 p.m. of February
12, 1988 coming from the Airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his
driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this
point that five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside
the house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house.
That the men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants,
namely his wife, the maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor.
 The robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties including
cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was
then interviewed by the Parañaque police and was informed that an operation group would be
assigned to the case. On February 15, 1988 he also reported the matter to the Western Police
District.
 Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked to prepare a
list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a sketch of distinctive items.
He was later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the
police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their participation, on February 14,
1988. He and his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen
displayed at the stall being tended by Norma DizonPamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring
studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud, 1 set of earring
diamond worth P15,000 and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000.
 ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third element: that the accused knew or should
have known that the items recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

HELD:

Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell
or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft."
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly
established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants who
afterwards reported the incident to the Parañaque Police, the Western Police District, the NBI, and the CIS,
and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry taken from them. Three of these items
stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000.00 (b) one set of earrings
worth P15,000.00 ; and (c) a chain with crucifix worth P3,000.00, were displayed for sale at a stall tended
to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale
clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the
items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for no
other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the
fundamental law. The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely
on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary,
even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy
from a certain Fredo. Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed
dealer or supplier of jewelry.

Dela Torre vs COMELEC

 COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying petitioner Rolando Dela Torre from running for the
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna for the May 8, 1995 election citing as the ground therefor,
Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which provides:
"Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

 In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that: "Documentary evidence established that
Dela Torre was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of P.D. 1612. Dela Torre
appealed the said conviction with the Regional Trial Court which however, affirmed his
conviction. Dela Torre’s conviction became final on January 18, 1991. There exists legal grounds
 to disqualify Dela Torre as candidate for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. Although there is ‘dearth of
jurisprudence involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 or P.D. 1612 the nature of the
offense under P.D 1612 with which the respondent certainly involves moral turpitude.
ISSUE: Whether the disqualification of Dela Torre to run for office was proper.
HELD: Yes.

 Fencing is defined as the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in
any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been deprived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
(1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
(2) The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the said crime;
(3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
(4) There is, on the part of accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

 When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of the high probability of its existence unless he
actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words ‘should know’ denote the
fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists
 Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element of the crime of fencing. Actual knowledge by
the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their
very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the
unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the "fence" and the actual
perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain — thus deliberately
reneging in the process "private duties" they owe their "fellowmen" or "society" in a manner
"contrary to . . . accepted and customary rule of right and duty . . ., justice, honesty . . . or good
morals."
Verily, circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object
of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the
time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The
nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged in the business
of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the
buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No 1612 that "mere possession of any
goods, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing" — a presumption that is, according to the Supreme Court," reasonable for no other
natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of possession of the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft." Thus, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that
the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving
moral turpitude.

DMCI vs Esguerra

 DMCI discovered that there was systematic pilferage of company properties by stock clerks and
drivers for almost a year. The pilfered materials were diverted and sold to hardware stores in
Cubao, Quezon City, identified as the MC Industrial Sales and the Seato Trading Company, Inc.,
owned by private respondents Ching and Spouses Say, respectively.
 By virtue of a search warrant, seized from Ching were three (3) pieces of phenolic plywood, and
from the Spouses Say, six hundred fifteen (615) pieces of such plywood. The seized items had an
estimated aggregate value of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00). These items were later identified
by petitioner corporation as among those stolen/pilfered from its warehouse in Cainta, Rizal.
 Complaints recommending the prosecution of private respondents for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law were filed by the NBI. However, Assistant City Prosecutor Semana recommended
dismissal of case against private respondents on the ground that private respondents purchased
said materials from duly registered and licensed establishment engaged in selling construction
materials and that they were duly given proper receipts/sales invoice for all the purchases that
they made. Hence, they could not have suspected that said materials were subject of thievery.
 Petitioner contends that mere possession by private respondents of the stolen materials constituted
prima facie evidence of fencing, according to Section 5 of PD 1612 and that the sales invoices
presented cannot overcome the said presumption
ISSUE: Whether private respondents may be prosecuted for violation of PD 1612
HELD: No. The elements of the crime of fencing are:
(1) A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
(2) The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
(3) The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and
(4) There is, on the part of accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

 Here, the first and second elements were duly established. Qualified theft had been committed.
Quantities of phenolic plywood were stolen and were discovered in the premises of private
respondents. However, the third element was not.
 Section 5 of P.D. 1612 expressly provides that "mere possession of any good article, item, object
or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing,"
 Here, it is uncontested that private respondents presented sales receipts covering their purchases
of the subject phenolic plywood. In respondent Ching's case, he alleges that he purchased the
phenolic plywood from agents of Paramount Industrial which is a known hardware store in
Caloocan City and that his purchases were covered by receipts.23 On the other hand, the Spouses
 Say likewise claim that they bought the plywood from MC Industrial Sales which is a registered
business establishment licensed to sell construction materials and that their purchases too were
covered by receipts.24 Thus, the prima faciepresumption was successfully disputed. The logical
inference follows that private respondents had no reason to suspect that said plywoods were the
proceeds of qualified theft or any other crime. Admittedly, there is not jurisprudence to the effect
that a receipt is a sufficient defense against charges of fencing. But logically, and for all practical
purposes, such receipt is proof — although disputable — that the transaction in question is above-
board and legitimate. Absent other evidence, the presumption of innocence remains.

Dunlao vs CA

 A case for violation of PD 1612 was filed against Dunlao after stolen farrowing crates and GI
pipes belonging to Lourdes Du, were found in his compound.
 For his defense, Dunlao argued that said items were left by men aboard a jeepney who failed to
come back so he merely keep the said items. Dunlao also contends that the prosecution failed to
establish the fact that, in receiving and possessing the subject items, he was motivated by gain or
that he purchased the said articles.
 Under Section 5 of PD 1612, mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.

ISSUE: Whether Dunlao succeed in rebutting the presumption under Sec. 5

HELD: No.

 First, contrary to Dunlao's contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a
special law such as P.D. 1612.
 Second, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by Dunlao, as mere
possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. It was incumbent upon
petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he failed to do
so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible testimony
that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and left them there.
 Further, the Supreme Court notes that the stolen articles were found displayed on petitioner's
shelves inside his compound. If petitioner were merely keeping the farrowing crates and G.I.
pipes for the men aboard the jeep, why did he display them? When a storeowner displays articles,
it is assumed that he is doing so with the intention of selling them. Also, some of the items
delivered by said strangers were distributed in and around petitioner’s compound and in cabinets
inside the building already cut in short pieces.
 That Dunlao cannot produce any proof of ownership by the persons who simply unloaded the
items then left without coming back — these are matters which common sense and sound
business practices would normally clarify in the face of the express provisions of the Anti-fencing
Law. And when the accused took it upon himself to protect and transfer inside his compound
items unloaded by total strangers without any agreement as to how the items would be sold or
disposed of nor how soon agreement would be compensated, a rather dubious aura of illegitimacy
envelopes and taints the entire transaction.
 RAMON TAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Complainant Rosita Lim is engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats.
Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her.
Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed
that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and
brass screws were missing.
She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less,
were missing.
Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion
Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainant's warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and
stainless propellers and brass screws.
Manuelito Mendez asked the complainant's forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one
who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and
they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case against Manuelito Mendez and
Gaudencio Dayop.
On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 19, an information against petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner.
RULING:
No.
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of fencing
as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said
crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole
those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the
police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking
of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de
oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element
of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
An admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the
person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the
assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so
admitting. Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of
counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such extra-judicial confession be considered
evidence against accused. There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of
guilt.
In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public
authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez,
who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to
petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen
articles were the ones sold him. "One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance,
consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with
facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity.
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he cannot be guilty of "fencing".
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and thus petitioner
is entitled to an acquittal.
 JAMIE ONG VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires. He acquired the same for the
total amount of ₱223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation. Private complainant marked the
tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse.
After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the
warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck
tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together
with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in
an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's
Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant
inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to which the latter
replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant
recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number
thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again
answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief
Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-
buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later,
policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen
tires.
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the
possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the
presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of
fencing are present in this case.
RULING:
Yes.
First. private complainant was able to prove ownership of the tires through sales invoice and an inventory
list. Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their
Sinumpaang Salaysay taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the
fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was
neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38)
missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of stolen tires
corresponds to those found in Ong’s possession. Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from
Go of Gold Link in the total amount of ₱45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact
that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong, who was in the business
of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have known the ordinary course of
business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the
thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from
the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one day. His experience from the business
should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time
to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the
streets.
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires
stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or
anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where
that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has
practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to
resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should
have exercised prudence.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong
was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence
of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the
subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.

VIII. Anti- Arson

IX. Bouncing Check Laws

LOZANO V. MARTINEZ
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing
Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for
decision.

FACTS:
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in
those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.

Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal
protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed
in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting
amendments to a bill on Third Reading.

ISSUES/RULING:

Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the
question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure
of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment
of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense?

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them
in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making
and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

Does BP 22 impair freedom of contract?

We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of
contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be
categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely
free from the regulatory power of the state.

Does it violate equal protection of laws?

Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws
or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the
payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of
the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

Does BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory that the offense
is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee

The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power." What
cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws,which means, as applied to the
present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no
stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty
therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that
can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The suggestion that
the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is farfetched.
Was Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution violated by the legislative body when it enacted
BP 22 into law

A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that, indeed,
there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the paragraph in
question which the body approved on Second Reading. 36 Part of the confusion was due apparently to the
fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the amendment period), amendments were proposed
orally and approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten
the complete text of the provisions of the bill as amended and approved on Second Reading. However, it
is clear from the records that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was
actually approved by the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved
Minutes for that day. In any event, before the bill was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the
Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report,
which was approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question was . . . an
authorized amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question
as approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore, find no merit in the petitioners’ claim that in the
enactment of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.
PEOPLE V. NITAFAN

FACTS:
Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before respondent court with violation of B.P. 22. Private
respondent moved to quash the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a
felony as B.P. 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which was
in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. On 1 September 1986, respondent judge,
ruling that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the questioned Order
quashing the Information. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General in
behalf of the government.

ISSUE:
Whether a memorandum check issued postdated in partial payment of a pre- existing obligation is within
the coverage of B.P. 22

RULING:
A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word "memorandum", "memo" or
"mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder
absolutely, without any condition concerning its presentment. 6 Such a check is an evidence of debt
against the drawer, and although may not be intended to be presented, 7 has the same effect as an ordinary
check, and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check.

From the above definition, it is clear that a memorandum check, which is in the form of an ordinary
check, is still drawn on a bank and should therefore be distinguished from a promissory note, which is but
a mere promise to pay. If private respondent seeks to equate memorandum check with promissory note, as
he does to skirt the provisions of B.P. 22, he could very well have issued a promissory note, and this
would be have exempted him form the coverage of the law. In the business community a promissory note,
certainly, has less impact and persuadability than a check.

A memorandum check must therefore fall within the ambit of B.P. 22 which does not distinguish but
merely provides that "[a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank . . . which check is
subsequently dishonored . . . shall be punished by imprisonment . . ."

A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the bank. Hence it does not matter
whether the check issued is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was
issued is partial fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of
a bouncing check 15 and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum
prohibitum.

DANAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
-Evangeline Danao was charged for violation of B. P. 22
-Arturo Estrada is one of the agents of Luzviminda Macasieb in the business of rediscounting checks.
-Evangeline Danao went to see Arturo Estrada at his office to seek an additional loan, being a depositor and
borrower of the bank. Estrada had to refuse appellant's request, considering that her existing loan had not
yet been fully liquidated.
-Appellant then asked Estrada if he knew a private lender. Estrada informed appellant that he knew one
who lends money with postdated checks as security. Estrada introduced Danao to Macasieb. Macasieb
talked with appellant over the phone and explained that the checks would be subject to a 10% interest every
month. After Danao received the money, she then issued a postdated checks.
-Upon the maturity of checks, the checks were dishonored for the reason that the account had been closed.
-Demand letter was sent but to no avail.
ISSUE:
Whether Danao shall be charged guilty for the violation of B.P. 22
HELD:
No. One of the elements in violation of B.P. 22 is that the accused knows at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment. In order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency
of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment.
In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of the checks was ever
presented during the trial. As found by the trial court itself, "(t)he evidence however is not clear when
Macasieb (private complainant) made the demands. There is no proof of the date when DANAO received
the demand letter (Exh. F)."
Obviously, in the instant case, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section
2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the presumption or prima facie evidence of knowledge by the
petitioner of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the times she issued the checks did not arise.
Petitioner is acquitted.
MERIZ vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
- Petitioner was engaged in the business of manufacturing garments for export using the name and style of
"Hi-Marc Needlecraft." During the course of her business undertakings, she obtained a number of loans
from Amelia Santos (Santos) and Summit Financing Corporation. Sometime in 1988, petitioner issued in
favor of Santos four Pilipinas Bank Checks in the aggregate amount of P188,400.00. Santos deposited the
checks with her bank. The checks, however, were later returned, with the notation "Insufficient Funds"
tamped on the dorsal portion of each check.
-On December 1988, a telegram was sent to petitioner. Also on January 5, 1990, a demand letter was sent
to the petitioner but the latter failed to comply.
-On January 12, 1990, petitioner acknowledged the demand letter but still, petitioner did not settle the
obligation.
- The trial court and Court of Appeals held petitioner guilty in violation of B.P. 22.
- Petitioner, in the instant appeal, would have it that there was an absolute lack of consideration for the
subject checks which were issued only as a condition for the grant of loan in her favor and that the requisite
element of notice was not complied with.
ISSUE:
-Whether Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
HELD:
-No. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of the check is
inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP 22. The Court has since said that a "check
issued as an evidence of debt, although not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any other
check" and must thus be held to be "within the contemplation of BP 22." Once a check is presented for
payment, the drawee bank gives it the usual course whether issued in payment of an obligation or just as a
guaranty of an obligation. The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares
the offense to be one of malum prohibitum.
Anent the notice of dishonor, petitioner bewails the inaccuracy thereof. She underscores the fact that the
questioned checks have not been sufficiently identified. There is nothing in the law, however, that
prescribes the contents of a notice of dishonor except that the same be in writing as opposed to a mere oral
notice.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that a telegram, dated 15 December 1988, and a demand
letter, dated 05 January 1990, were sent to petitioner. The latter, in reply to the 05 January 1990 letter,
acknowledged her liability and indeed sought an extension within which to satisfy her account. A review
of the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not a function that the Supreme Court undertakes, and
there is here no cogent reason to depart from the rule.

GRIFFITH vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
1985, Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln Gerard, Inc. for a term
of two years at a monthly rental of P75,000. When Lincoln Gerard, Inc. incurred rental arrearages, Geoffrey
F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued checks.
The voucher for these checks contained the following instruction:
These checks are not to be presented without prior approval from this Corporation to be given not
later than May 30, 1986.
Also written on the face of the voucher was the following note:
However, if written approval of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. is not given before May 30, 1986, Phelps
Dodge, Phils. shall present the cheques for payment. This is final and irrevocable.

On May 29, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present the said checks for payment on May 30, 1986
because they could not be funded due to a four-week labor strike that had earlier paralyzed the business
operations of Lincoln Gerard.
On June 2, 1986, when no further communication was received from Lincoln Gerard, Phelps Dodge
presented the two checks for payment but these were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard, however, the
latter still failed to fund the checks but Griffith sent a letter to Phelps Dodge, explaining Lincoln's inability
to fund said checks due to the strike. Subsequently, on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard
that its properties would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and auction sale on
June 20, 1986, despite Lincoln Gerard's protest.
The RTC and CA found accused as guilty for violation of BP. 22
ISSUE:
Whether Griffith be held as guilty for violation of B.P. 22
HELD:
No. The checks were dishonored, and Phelps Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against
petitioner. But this filing took place only after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with
more than one million pesos to spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerard's
properties earlier impounded by Phelps Dodge.
The Bouncing Checks Law "was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account user." It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich
themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.
Given the facts that Phelps had already sold Lincoln’s property through an auction, the aggregated amount
was already sufficient to cover the latter’s indebtedness. Two years after the auction, the two counts for
violation of BP 22 was filed. Upon the filing of the said information, the civil obligation of Lincoln was no
longer subsisting. The Court, under these circumstances, cannot see how petitioner's conviction and
sentence could be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge
has, in the Court’s view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale
as its chosen remedy.
Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the
letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a
debtor's criminalization would not serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having
collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via
auction sale, the Court finds that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P.
22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations

G.R. No. 152666 April 23, 2008

MARCIANO TAN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL
BANK, respondent.

FACTS: Marciano Tan, executive vice-president of the Master Tours and Travel (MTT), applied on 1990
for a Usance Letter of Credit (LC) with Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) for the
importation of 4 tourist buses with a total value of US$430,000 from Daewoo Corporation (Korea), which
was agreed upon by the parties amounting to P10 Million Pesos.

MTT issued 5 postdated checks each for P716,666.66 and another check in January 1991 for P716,666.70
or in the total amount of P4,300,000. Then, PCIB issued the Usance LC in favor of Daewoo.

The tourist buses were delivered to MTT, covered by Trust Receipts with PCIB as entruster and MTT as
entrustee.
Of the 6 checks that MTT issued to PCIB, the 1st 5 representing a total amount of P3,583,333 were cleared
but not the last one dated January 1991. PCIB soon demanded settlement of this dishonored check from
MTT.

MTT thus issued 14 postdated checks of P198,428.42, payable every 15 days.

Of the 14 checks, only the 1st 5 were honored, the proceeds of which totaled P992,142.10. The other 9,
those remaining in the total amount of P1,785,855.78, were dishonored.

MTT, having suffered financial reverses, surrendered the buses to PCIB which accepted them. By MTT’s
claim the buses were, at the time of surrender, estimated to be about 6.6 million.

Subsequently, PCIB sent MTT a letter of July 9, 1992, requested to remit to the remaining balance in the
sum of P10,327,591.21 within (5) days from receipt. As response, MTT sent a letter stating “As the buses
have been surrendered and delivered to PCIB, Tan’s obligation has been extinguished.”

PCIB filed in October 1992 a criminal complaint against Tan before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office
which resulted in the filing on 1993 of the 9 Informations against him for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before
the RTC of Makati.

RTC convicted Tan of all the nine charges. Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE: WON Tan violated BP 22 despite MTT’s surrendering of buses.

HELD: No.

Elements of B.P. Blg. 22:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment.

While issuing of a bouncing check is malum prohibitum, the prosecution is not excused from its
responsibility of proving beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense. Respecting the second
element of the crime, the prosecution must prove that the accused knew, at the time of issuance, that he
does not have sufficient funds or credit for the full payment of the check upon its presentment. The element
of "knowledge" involves a state of mind that obviously would be difficult to establish, hence, the statute
creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit coincidental with
the attendance of the 2 other elements.

In order to create such presumption, it must be shown that the drawer or maker received a notice of dishonor
and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or arrange for its payment.
The above-quoted provision creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists
when the first and third elements of the offense are present.

The presumption is not conclusive, however, as it may be rebutted by full payment. If the maker or drawer
pays, or makes arrangement with the drawee bank for the payment of the amount due within the 5-day
period from notice of the dishonor, he or she may no longer be indicted for such violation. It is a complete
defense that would lie regardless of the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution. In essence,
the law affords the drawer or maker the opportunity to avert prosecution by performing some acts that
would operate to preempt the criminal action, which opportunity serves to mitigate the harshness of the law
in its application.

It is a general rule that only a full payment at the time of its presentment or during the five-day grace period
could exonerate one from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 and that subsequent payments can only affect
the civil, but not the criminal, liability.

In the present case, PCIB already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh by receiving and keeping in
possession the four buses-trust properties surrendered by petitioner in about mid 1991 and 1992 pursuant
to Sec. 7 of the Trust Receipts Law, the estimated value of which was "about P6.6 million." It thus appears
that the total amount of the dishonored checks – P1,785,855.75 –, the undisputed claim of Tan of a mistaken
agreement to pay the exchange differential (which the same checks represented) aside, was more than fully
satisfied prior to the transmittal and receipt of the July 9, 1992 letter of demand. In keeping with
jurisprudence, the Court then considers such payment of the dishonored checks to have obliterated the
criminal liability of Tan.

Petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Tan is ACQUITTED
G.R. No. 133608 August 26, 2008
TIONG ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO CO, respondent.

FACTS: Tiong Rosario is the proprietor of TR Mercantile (TRM), a single proprietorship engaged in the
business of selling and trading paper products and supplies of various kinds; while respondent Alfonso Co
is the Chairman and President of Modern Paper Products, Inc. (MPPI). In the course of its business, MPPI
purchased from TRM a variety of paper products on credit. As payment for his purchases, respondent issued
the following China Banking Corporation checks in favor of TRM but were dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason that the payment was either stopped or that the checks were drawn against insufficient funds.

TRM demanded that respondent make good the checks and pay MPPI’s outstanding obligations within 5
banking days from receipt of the letter, otherwise, it would be constrained to file both criminal and civil
actions to protect its interest. Co, however, failed to heed the demand.

Rosario filed a complaint against Co for violation BP 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City.
Finding probable cause against Co, the investigating prosecutor filed 3 separate Informations against him
for violation of BP 22 before the (MeTC), Pasig City.

MPPI and its principal stockholders, the Spouses Alfredo and Elizabeth Co filed before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), under P.D. No. 902-A, a Petition for Suspension of Payments for
Rehabilitation Purposes with prayer for the creation of a management committee and for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. SEC issued an Omnibus Order creating a Management
Committee and consequently suspending all actions for claims against MPPI pending before any court,
tribunal, branch or body.

Meanwhile, in the criminal cases pending before the MeTC, respondent was arraigned, and the cases were
set for trial. Prior to initial trial, Co filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. SEC granted Co’s Motion to
Compel Compliance and For Issuance of Orders of Suspension in the Criminal Cases.

MeTC issued an Order denying respondent’s motion to suspend proceedings. It held that the issue raised in
SEC is not similar or intimately related to the issue involved in the criminal cases before it and therefore
the elements of a prejudicial question do not exist. Co filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.

Aggrieved, Co filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC questioning the orders. RTC enjoined the MeTC
from further proceeding during the pendency of the action before it. Rosario filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. However, upon agreement of the parties, resolution on the motion was held in abeyance
awaiting the RTC resolution in the main case, the issues raised being identical. RTC issued the assailed
Resolution granting the petition that the Court directed to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
18521-3 during the pendency of the petition in SEC.

ISSUE: WON a criminal case against a corporate officer for violation of BP22 could be suspended on
account of the pendency of a petition for suspension of payments filed by that officer’s corporation with
the SEC.

HELD: No.

The resolution hinges on the determination of the following: (1) the meaning of "actions for claims" against
the distressed corporation; and (2) the effectivity of the suspension.

Sec. 6 (c) of PD 902-A, as amended, provides:

Section 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following
powers:

c) XXX ... Provided, finally, That upon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation
receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships,
or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall
be suspended accordingly.

As early as Finasia Investment and Finance Corp. v. CA, SC clarified that the word "claim" used in Sec. 6
(c) of P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature and the assertion of a
right to have money paid. It is used in special proceedings like those before AN administrative court on
insolvency. In Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., "claim" was defined as an action involving monetary
considerations. Clearly, the suspension contemplated under Sec. 6 (c) of P.D. No. 902-A refers only to
claims involving actions which are pecuniary in nature.

The purpose of suspending the proceedings under PD 902-A is to prevent a creditor from obtaining an
advantage or preference over another and to protect and preserve the rights of party litigants as well as the
interest of the investing public or creditors. It is intended to give enough breathing space for the
management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business viable again, without having to
divert attention and resources to litigations in various fora.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is,
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is designed to prevent damage to trade,
commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v. Martinez, this Court declared that it is
not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal prosecution is designed to promote the
public welfare by punishing offenders and deterring others.

Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of BP 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined within the
purview of PD 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime could result in the
restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained
by reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of BP 22 is a criminal
action.

A criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended
party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The
civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is
that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and
to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the
offender. On the other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely
to indemnify the former.

The provisions of Sec. 6 (c) of PD 902-A should not interfere with the prosecution of a case for violation
of BP 22, even if restitution, reparation or indemnification could be ordered, because an absurdity would
result, i.e., one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere filing of a
petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer. At any rate, should the court deem it
fit to award indemnification, such award would now fall under the category of a claim under Sec. 6 (c) of
PD 902-A, considering that it is already one for monetary or pecuniary consideration. Only to this extent
can the order of suspension be considered obligatory upon any court, tribunal, branch or body where there
are pending actions for claims against the distressed corporation.

Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The MeTC Pasig
City, is ORDERED to proceed with Criminal Case.
G.R. NO. 191404 July 5, 2010
EUMELIA R. MITRA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELICISIMO S.
TARCELO, Respondents.
FACTS: Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the Treasurer, and Florencio L. Cabrera, Jr. (now deceased) was
the President, of Lucky Nine Credit Corporation (LNCC), a corporation engaged in money lending
activities. Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo S. Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in
LNCC. As the usual practice in money placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the
amounts he invested plus the interest on his investments. The following checks, signed by Mitra and
Cabrera, were issued by LNCC to Tarcelo.

When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored for the reason "account closed."
Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for the payment of these checks but he was frustrated.
Constrained, he caused the filing of 7 Informations for violation of BP 22 in the total amount of ₱925,000.00
with the MTCC in Batangas City. Cabrera and Mitra were found guilty of BP 22 and ordered to respectively
pay the fines for each violation and with subsidiary imprisonment.

Mitra and Cabrera appealed to RTC contending that: they signed the 7 checks in blank with no name of the
payee, no amount stated and no date of maturity; they did not know when and to whom those checks would
be issued; the 7 checks were only among those in 1 or 2 booklets of checks they were made to sign at that
time; and that they signed the checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC because they did not
regularly hold office there. RTC affirmed the MTCC decision and later denied their motion for
reconsideration. Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed this petition for review claiming, among others,
that there was no proper service of the notice of dishonor on her. CA dismissed her petition for lack of
merit.

ISSUE: WON whether or not the elements of violation of BP22 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
as against the corporation who owns the current account where the subject checks were drawn before
liability attaches to the signatories.

HELD: No. The convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect
confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure public interest.

The 3rd par. of Sec. 1 of BP22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act."
This provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence, its wording
is unequivocal and mandatory - that the person who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable
for a violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.

To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 violation exists where:

1. A person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or for value;
2. The person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment;
and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment.

There is no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank dishonored the checks because the account
had been closed. Notice of dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make
arrangements for their payment within 5 days from notice. With all the above elements duly proven, Mitra
cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.

Petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the CA is AFFIRMED.

Alferez v. People,
G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011

Facts: Jaime Alferez purchased construction materials from Cebu ABC Sales Commercial. As payment for
the goods, he issued three (3) checks for the total amount of ₱830,998.40. However, the checks were
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Petitioner was thus charged with three (3)
counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 before MTCC Cebu.

Instead of presenting evidence, Alferez filed a Demurrer to Evidence 10 months after the prosecution rested
its case, and he also averred that the prosecution failed to show that he received the notice of dishonor or
demand letter.

MTCC: finds Alferez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime.

RTC: affirmed MTCC ruling; modified – adding the penalty of imprisonment for 6 months.

CA: affirmed RTC ruling; the registry receipt and return card adequately show the fact of receipt.

Issue: Whether the Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt alone without presenting the person who
mailed and/or served the demand letter is sufficient notice of dishonor as required by BP 22.

SC Ruling: No, the Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt alone without presenting the person who
mailed and/or served the demand letter is not a sufficient notice of dishonor as required by BP 22.

Elements of the crime:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The prosecution failed to prove the second element. The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer
had received this notice, and that within five banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay the amount of
the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The full payment of the amount appearing in the check
within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due
process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the petitioner to afford the opportunity
to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.

A review of the records shows that the prosecution did not prove that the petitioner received the notice of
dishonor. Registry return cards must be authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of letters sent through
registered mail. The prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with the registry
receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to petitioner.

The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in
the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. In crim cases,
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. As there is insufficient proof that petitioner
received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot
arise.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action, thus, SC sustained
the RTC ruling as to Alferez’s civil liability.

Wherefore, Alferez is acquitted, however, civil liab is affirmed.

Resterio v. People,
G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012

Facts: Amada Resterio was charged with violation of BP 22 in MTCC Mandaue City. Resterio draw and
issue ChinaBank check in the amount of P50,000 payable to the order of Bernardo Villadolid to apply on
account or for value and when presented for encashment was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
ACCT CLOSED or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer..

According to the petitioner, she was "required to issue a check as a collateral for the obligation," and that
"she was left with no alternative but to borrow the check of her friend xxx and used the said check as a
collateral of her loan." She then contends that BP 22 was applicable only if the dishonored check was
actually owned by her, hence, she should not be held liable.

MTCC: Resterio is guilty as charged.

RTC: Affirmed MTCC decision.

CA: Affirmed RTC decision.

Issue:
1. Whether actual ownership of the check is material.
2. Whether the second element of the crime is present to warrant Resterio’s conviction.

SC Ruling:
1. No, actual ownership of the check is immaterial.

BP 22 punishes the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership
of the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee,
maker or issuer.

Considering that the law imposes a penal sanction on one who draws and issues a worthless check against
insufficient funds or a closed account in the drawee bank, there is, likewise, every reason to penalize a
person who indulges in the making and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with the
latter’s consent, which account has been closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee bank.

2. No, the second element of the crime is not present to warrant Resterio’s conviction.

For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following:
(a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check;

(b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee;
and

(c) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or
make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.

A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction
can ensue. The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second element
arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender due process. The
law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within five banking days
from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been paid.

To prove that he had sent the written notice of dishonor to the petitioner by registered mail, Villadolid
presented the registry return receipt for the first notice of dishonor dated June 17, 2002 and the registry
return receipt for the second notice of dishonor dated July 16, 2002. However, the Resterio denied receiving
the written notices of dishonor.

The authentication by affidavit of the mailer or mailers was necessary in order for the giving of the notices
of dishonor by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving of the notices of dishonor to
predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.

No attempt was made to show that the demand letter was indeed sent through registered mail nor was the
signature on the registry return receipt authenticated or identified. It cannot even be gleaned from the
testimony of private complainant as to who sent the demand letter and when the same was sent. In fact, the
prosecution seems to have presumed that the registry return receipt was proof enough that the demand letter
was sent through registered mail and that the same was actually received by petitioners or their agents.

In the instant case, the prosecution did not present proof that the demand letter was sent through registered
mail, relying as it did only on the registry return receipt. It merely presented the demand letter and registry
return receipt as if mere presentation of the same was equivalent to proof that some sort of mail matter was
received by petitioners.

Guilt of Resterio was not satisfied by the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, hence, she is acquitted.
However, she is still civilly liable in the principal sum of P50,000.00.

San Mateo v. People,

G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013

Facts: Erlinda C. San Mateo ordered assorted yarns amounting to ₱327,394.14 from ITSP International,
Incorporated through its Vice-President for Operations Ravin A. Sehwani. In partial payment thereof, San
Mateo issued 11 postdated Metrobank checks amounting to ₱134,275.00.

Upon maturity, San Mateo called Sehwani requesting not to deposit the check due to lack of sufficient
funds. Sehwani acceded but San Mateo continued to fail to settle her account. Thus, Sehwani deposited the
check but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo’s residence at Greenhills, San Juan but the security
guard of the townhouse complex refused to accept the letter in compliance with San Mateo’s order. Thus,
the liaison officer left the letter with the security guard with the instruction to deliver the same to San Mateo.
Thereafter, he sent a copy of the demand letter to San Mateo by registered mail which was returned to his
counsel’s office with the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that San Mateo did not claim it despite
three notices to her dated December 12, 2005, December 22, 2005, and January 2, 2006, respectively.

MeTC Taguig: charged San Mateo with 10 counts of BP 22. Peanlty – 6 mos imprisonment and ordered to
pay the total value of the 11 checks amounting to ₱134,275.00.

RTC: affirmed MeTC ruling.

CA: affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue: Whether the second element of BP 22 (the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment) is present.

SC Ruling: No, second element is wanting.

There is no basis in concluding that San Mateo knew of the insufficiency of her funds. While she may have
requested Sehwani in her letters dated to defer depositing the checks, such act did not amount to an
admission that, when she issued those checks, she knew that she would have no sufficient funds in the
drawee bank to pay for them.

The records show that Sehwani tried to serve the notice of dishonor to San Mateo two times. But the
prosecution failed to show that the letter ever reached San Mateo.

It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered letters including return receipts do
not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters,
claimed to be a notice of dishonor. Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the
notice of dishonor, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise.
San Mateo is acquitted; but civil liab remains, thus, she is directed to pay ₱134,275.00.

Yalong vs People (BP22)

Facts:

 Accused Fely Yalong was charged and convicted for violating the Anti-Bouncing Checks law in
the MTCC of Batangas. This stemmed from her alleged failure to make good the 450,000 check
she issued to private complainant Maj. Lucila Ylagan as payment for Yalong’s debt.
 The check was issued, drawn and delivered in Manila but was deposited and dishonored in
Batangas.
 Yalong’s defense was that she already paid the said obligation and that it was her husband who
owns the check and although she knew that it has insufficient funds, the same was already handed
over to Ylagan.
 After the accused motions were denied including her notice of appeal alleging that the trial was
done in her absentia, the MTCC rendered a judgment against her.
 RTC affirmed the lower court’s decision ruling that the trial in absentia is proper since the
accused failed to participate despite due notice.
 CA similarly dismissed her petition for appeal affirming RTC’s orders.
Issue:

 Whether the MTCC of Batangas has the jurisdiction over the case when it was only where the
check was deposited.
Ruling:

 YES. The SC held that it is well settled that violation of BP 22 is a continuing or transitory crime
which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality while some
occur in other territory. Thus, it is understood that the first court to take cognizance of the case
retains the jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other courts.
 In this case, although it is disputed that the subject check was issued, drawn and delivered in
Manila, the complainant deposited for encashment said check in Batangas where it was
dishonored due to being drawn against closed account.
 Hence, the MTCC of Batangas has properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Aside from the
procedural infirmities the petition incurred that warrants dismissal, SC did not find any reversible
error committed by lower courts that warrants the acquittal of the accused.
Lim vs People (BP 22)

Facts:

 Accused Ariel Lim was charged and convicted by the MeTC of Manila for violating BP 22. He
issued 2 checks of 100,000 each as a campaign donation to certain Willie Castor. Castor on the
other hand gave these checks as payment for some printed materials but later on told Lim to
STOP PAYMENT of said checks since the ordered printed materials did not arrive on time.
 When the bank staff was presented on the stand, he said that the check was dishored due to DAIF.
Private complainant Badiee filed a complaint before the Prosecutor’s Office after she sent
demand letters. After receiving the subpoena from the Prosecutor, Lim issued a replacement
check for 200,000 which Badiee later on encashed.
 Still, six months after Lim paid the amount, 2 Informations were filed in the MeTC of Manila.
The lower court convicted Lim but the RTC reversed the decision ruling that the MeTC does not
have jurisdiction to try and decide the cases since the essential requirements occurred in QC. It
also held that the accused can only be convicted of 1 BP 22 violation.
 CA on the other hand, affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Issue:

 Whether the payment made by the accused after receiving the subpoena from the Prosecutor
would extinguish his criminal liability for BP 22.
Ruling:

 YES. The SC ruled that BP 22 should not be applied mechanically as earlier held by the lower
courts who stood by prosecuting the accused since the gravamen of the said law is the mere
issuance of bad checks. The Court explained that when the reason for the law ceases, the law
ceases.
 In this case, since the obligation of the accused to make a payment of 200,000 to Badiee even
before the filing of Information, had already been satisfied, there is no further need to prosecute
him for BP 22 since doing so would not serve the end of justice but to subvert it.
 Accused Lim was exonerated.
Morillo vs People (BP 22)

Facts:

 Accused Natividad, Malong and Nanquil introducing themselves as contractors doing business in
Pampanga purchased construction materials worth 500, 054 from Amasea General Merchandise
owned by Petitioner Morillo. The payment of which will be via post dated checks after the last
delivery. The subject checks were issued and drawn in Subic.
 When said checks were received by Morillo, she presented and deposited the same in her
Equitable PCI account in Makati where they were dishonored having been drawn against a
closed account. After demanding payment, the accused issued other checks but were again
dishonored by the drawee bank.
 Informations were filed before the MeTC of Makati which rendered a decision against Natividad
and Nanquil while Malong was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
 They appealed to the RTC arguing the Makati MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case because
the checks were issued and drawn in Subic. They also pointed out that during the retaking of
petitioner’s testimony, the records of the case did not show that the prosecutor manifested his
presence in court, thus, there was no proper delegation of authority and that the proceedings
should be declared void.
 The RTC held that the failure to raise the issue of prosecutor’s appearance and doing so only
after obtaining an adverse judgment, the accused is now estopped. It also ruled that MeTC is
correct in acquiring jurisdiction of the case since violation of BP 22 is a continuing crime.
 On appeal, the CA, however, reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the case without prejudice
to refiling before the proper venue stating that all essential elements of the crime happened in
Pampanga and the mere depositing of check in Makati is not what is contemplated in the law.

Issue:

 Whether the presentment of subject checks in Makati despite them being issued in Pampanga
gives the MeTC the jurisdiction to hear the cases
Ruling:

 YES. The SC reiterated its earlier ruling that since BP 22 is a transitory or continuing crime, the
issuance, delivery, drawing and depositing of the same constitute the essential requisites of the
crime and that as they may occur in different places, the court which first took the cognizance of
the case will obtain it to the exclusion of the rest. Thus, when Morillo presented and deposited the
checks in Makati and thereafter filed a complaint for violation of said law, the MeTC has been
vested with the authority to try and decide the case.
 The Court also noted that although the appeal was improperly brought upon by the private
complainant and not the OSG, the petition may be dismissed. This is because in criminal cases, it
is the OSG who has the authority to appeal to the higher court in case of dismissal or decision in
favor of the accused for the State is the actual offended party. But because this particular case fell
into one of the exceptions of an action or petition without the OSG, the Court still decided on the
merits of the case and disregarded the procedural issues present. It further explained that since the
dismissal order of the CA is only limited to the venue and did not rule on the merits of the case,
the subsequent refiling of an Information will not be a violation of the double jeopardy rule.