Whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA No.
409 (Charter
III. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
(a) LGU’s and officials liability (Sec. 24, R.A. 7160);
SECTION 24. Liability for Damages. — Local government units and their
officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to property.
Article 2189, Civil Code
ARTICLE 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.
1. City of Manila vs. Teotico 22 SCRA 267 , January 29, 1968
FACTS:
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., respondent Genaro Teotico was
at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a
"loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down
town. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a
few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the
manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to
pierce his left eyelid. Teotico was then brought to the hospital. In addition
to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered
contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the
upper lip, apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These
injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-tetanus injections
administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by
a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
Teotico filed with the CFI a complaint for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief
of police. The trial court dismissed the complaint. This decision was
affirmed by the CA, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned,
which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
of the City of Manila) Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
HELD: Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reads:
"The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising
from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor,
Municipal Board, or other officers while enf orcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions."
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision."
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic
Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as
regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of
Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the
City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from
the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities x x x liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered
by, an by reason"—specifically—"of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective
condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the
streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes
thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who
"have been ever viligant and zealous in the performance of their
respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the
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City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its
control and supervision.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street
or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or
supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is
under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the
latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said
road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one
of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our
review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby
affirmed.
2. Jimenez vs. City of Manila 150 SCRA 510 , May 29, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner Bernardino Jimenez went to Sta. Ana public market to buy
"bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle
deep rainwater. After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to
return home but he stepped on an uncovered opening (drainage) which
could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty
four-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce his left leg
penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches. Jimenez felt ill,
developed a fever, and after his left leg swelled was rushed to Veterans
Memorial Hospital where he was confined for 20 days.
Upon his discharge, his injury prevented him from attending the school
buses he was operating. Jimenez sued for damages the City of Manila and
the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whom administration the Sta.
Ana Public Market has been placed by virtue of a Management and
Operating Contract. The lower court decided in favor of respondents. On
appeal, the IAC held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for damages
but absolved the City of Manila. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent City of Manila should be jointly and severally
liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner
suffered.
HELD: Yes.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for the
injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the Management and
Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all
responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for any
cause attributable to it.
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held liable under
Article I, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of
Manila).
In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while Article
2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public
buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore decisive
on this specific case.
In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article
2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the. liability therein
established to attach, that the defective public works belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either
"control or supervision" over the public building in question.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market,
despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent
City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the
former.
The fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public market
was admitted by Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of
Finance Cesar Virata which reads:
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"xxx It is believed that there is nothing incongruous in the exercise of these powers vis-a-vis
the existence of the contract, inasmuch as the City retains the power of supervision and
control over its public markets and talipapas under the terms of the contract."
In fact, the City of Manila employed a market master for the Sta. Ana
Public Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and
control of that particular market, more specifically, to check the safety of
the place for the public.
Sadly, the evidence indicates that long before petitioner fell into the
opening, it was already uncovered, and five (5) months after the incident
happened, the opening was still uncovered.
The City of Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article 2189 of the
Civil Code, respondent City having retained control and supervision over
the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code on quasidelicts.
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the
middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered.
Had the opening been covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it.
Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the
injury suffered, the City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the
petitioner.
Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint
tort-feasors, are solidarily liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED, making the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation solidarily liable.
3. Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan 171 SCRA 382 , March 21, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter, was about to board a
motorized tricycle at a sidwalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road,
under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) when she
accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing
her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be
hospitalized, operated on, and later confined in two different hospitals.
Despite her discharge, she is still wearing crutches and has difficulty in
locomotion.
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and ex-officio
Highway Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official
for Dagupan City, has admitted the existence of said manhole, that it was
owned by the National Government, and that he exercises supervision and
control over National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where the incident
happened.
The trial court found that the drainage hole is under the control and
supervision of the City of Dagupan. The appellate court reversed the lower
court findings on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove
that the City of Dagupan had “control or supervision” over Perez
Boulevard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of
Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in
accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.
Whether or not the drainage located in Perez Boulevard (a national road)
is under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan, hence, liability
should attach the city.
HELD: Yes.
We grant the petition.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries
suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is
expressed in Article 2189 of the the Civil Code.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only
requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective
road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter
of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer.
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and
sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the
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Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed
has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage
hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages
or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city
officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt
the city, as in the case at bar.
The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the
city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability
arising from “defective streets, public buildings and other public works."
Although these last two officials (Maintenance Foreman and Maintenance
Engineer) are employees of the National Government, they are detailed
with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision
from the city through the City Engineer.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or
supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the
city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Article 2180 (par. 6), Civil Code; Article 34, Civil Code
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
(b) Liability for Tort; Engaged in governmental functions
1. Palafox, et al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, District Engineer, and
Provincial Treasurer 102 Phil. 1186 , January 31, 1958
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants Palafox, et al. filed a case against defendants-
appellees Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer and the Provincial
Treasurer. The CFI quashed said case, except as far as Sabas Torralbaa was
concerned.
Torralba was employed a driver of Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte
detailed to the office of the District Engineer. In September 1948, while
driving his freight truck in compliance with his duties, he ran over
Proceto Palafox, father of appellants, and the victim died as a result.
Prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence, Sabas Torralba
pleaded guilty and was accordingly sentenced. Having reserved their right
to file a civil action, the heirs later began these proceeding against the
employer province, the District Engineer, the Provincial Treasurer and
Sabas Torralba.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not liability should attach the State for the negligence
of Torralba.
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2. Whether or not the the doctrine of respondent superior
concerning liability of municipal corporations for negligent acts of their
employees is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No.
To attach liability to the State for the negligence of Sabas Torralba a
declaration must be made that he was "a special agent,"—and not one
upon whom properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that
occasion. This is under Article 1903 of the Civil Code; but this ruling may
not be made, because the driver was not a special agent of the
Government within the scope of said article.
2. No.
Appellants invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior concerning liability
of municipal corporations for negligent acts of their employees.
It will be seen from the decision in the case of Mendoza vs. De Leon that if
the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of governmental
duties, as distinguished from corporate or proprietary or business
functions—the government is not liable. The construction or maintenance
of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the
accident are admittedly governmental activities. Hence, the death of
Palafox—tragic and deplorable though it may be—imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary compensation.
2. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Firme 195 SCRA 692 , April
08, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, is a municipality
corporation. Respondent Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his official
capacity as the presiding judge, while private respondents are heirs of the
deceased Laureano Banina, Sr.
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeep, a
gravel and sand truck, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union which was driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the jeep including Banina, Sr. died.
The heir of Banina, Sr. instituted a complaint for damages against the
owner and driver of the passenger jeep. However, the aforesaid defendant
filed a third party complaint against the petitioner and the driver of the
dump truck of the petitioner.
Thereafter, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the
petitioner and its regular employee Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the
first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative
defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the state,
prescription of cause of action, and the negligence of the owner and driver
of the passenger jeep as the proximate cause of the collision.
On October 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs,
and defendants Municipality of san Fernando, La Union and
Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. The
complaint against the driver and the owner of the passenger jeep was
dismissed.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial. However,
respondent judge issued another order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order for having been filed out of time. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the municipality is liable for the tort committed by its employee?
HELD: NO.
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the
driver acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. It has already been remarked that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not
liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they
were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the state merely gives the claimants the right to show the defendant
was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was inflicted
or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing
this, the claimants cannot recover.
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In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
that he was on his way to Naguilan River to get a load of sand and gravel
for the repair of the San Fernando municipal street.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the
performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump
truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
After careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we arrive at
the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger,
tragic and deplorable though, it may be imposed on the municipality no
duty to pay the monetary compensation.
Engaged in proprietary functions
1. Mendoza vs. De Leon. 33 Phil. 508 , February 11, 1916
FACTS:
The lease of an exclusive ferry privilege was duly awarded to plaintiff
Marcos Mendoza under the provisions of Act No. 1634 of the Philippine
Commission. After user of a little more than one year, plaintiff was forcibly
ejected in pursuance of a resolution adopted by defendants awarding a
franchise for the same ferry to another person. Plaintiff filed an action for
damages against the individual members of the municipal council of the
municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the said lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the municipal council personally are
liable.
HELD: Yes.
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal
Code have both governmental and corporate or business functions. Of
the first class are the adoption of regulations against fire and disease,
preservation of the public peace, maintenance of municipal prisons,
establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of the latter class
are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the
inhabitants, the construction and maintenance of municipal
slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves,
ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1634 provides that the use of each fishery,
fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging
to any municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually
or for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been
previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which the
municipality or township is located.
The twofold character of the powers of a municipality under our
Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is so apparent and its private or corporate
powers so numerous and important that we find no difficulty in reaching
the conclusion that the general principles governing the liability of such
entities to private individuals as enunciated in the United States are
applicable to it.
In Wilcox vs. City of Rochester (190 N. Y., 137), it was said:
"xxx 'two kinds of duties are imposed on municipal corporations, the one governmental
and a branch of the general administration of the state, the other quasi private or
corporate;' and 'that in the exercise of the latter duties the municipality is liable for the
acts of its officers and agents, while in the former it is not'"
In Cummings vs. Lobsitz (42 Okla., 704; L. R. A., N. S., 1915 B, p. 415), it
was said:
When the acts of its officers come within the powers which it has as agent of the state, it is
exempt from liability for its own acts and the acts of its officers; if the acts of the officer or
agent of the city are for the special benefit of the corporation in its private or corporate
interest, such officer is deemed the agent or servant of the city, but where the act is not in
relation to a private or corporate interest of the municipality, but for the benefit of the
public at large, such acts by the agents and servants are deemed to be acts by public or
state officers, and for the public benefit."
The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work on Municipal
Corporations (5th ed.) sections 38 and 39.
"The state cannot, without its consent expressed through legislation, be sued for injuries
resulting from an act done in the exercise of its lawful governmental powers and pertaining
to the administration of government. * * * Municipal corporations are agents of the state
in the exercise of certain governmental powers."
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the
performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative,
or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless it
be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, and with the express
purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. If they exercise their honest
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 6
judgment in the performance of their duties, their errors cannot be
charged against them. So it may be said that in so far as its governmental
functions are concerned, a municipality is not liable at all, unless
expressly made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as they perf
orm their duties honestly and in good faith.
From what has already been said, it should be clear that a municipality is
not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate
or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its
patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or
individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is
concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents
within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to
the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such
matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these
purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.
"Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort."
It often happens that the same agent or agency has both a governmental
and a corporate character. It is, also, sometimes the case that
considerable difficulty is experienced in determining whether a particular
municipal duty is governmental or corporate.
But questions such as these do not arise in the case at bar. Here it is clear
that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified
period of time is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a
lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee
which the municipality is bound to respect.
It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of the Municipal Code
and Act No. 1634, above referred to, the plaintiff had a vested right to
the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his
lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that
a judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the contract would
be proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of exacting damages, either
ex contractu or ex delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of
municipalities.
In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the
municipal council occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of
directors of a private corporation. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that
on occasion the councilors may have reason to believe that a particular
contract has been rescinded by the other party or has never been legally
entered into, in both of which cases, decisive steps must be taken to
safeguard the interest of the municipality. We think the rule of personal
liability should be with municipal councilors in such matters as it is with
the directors or managers of an ordinary private corporation.
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any
justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which
he had leased. The evidence is so clear that the ferry of which the plaintiff
was dispossessed was the one which he had leased that no reasonable
man would entertain any doubt whatever upon the question. Hence, we
cannot say that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby
making the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid reason
at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for the interests of
the municipality. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the defendants
are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the plaintiff
from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in
question.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
2. Torio vs. Fontanilla 85 SCRA 599 , October 23, 1978
FACTS:
In October 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed
Resolution No. 159, resolving to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta
celebration. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959
Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee."The council appropriated
P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzeula" and
another for the "cancionan." Jose Maracaeg the Chairman of the Town
Fiesta Executive Committee supervised the construction of the stage.
During the program, before the dramatic part of the play was reached in
the zarzuela, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla, one of the
members of the troupe, who was at the rear of the stage was pinned
underneath. Fontanilla was taken in the hospital where he died.
The Heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the CFI to recover
damages against the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of
Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Council. The Municipality
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 7
claimed that the holding of the town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the
negligence of its agents. The CFI dismissed the complaint, finding that the
Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised
due diligence, and consequently, were not liable for damages for the
death of Fontanilla. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court's decision
and ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Fontanilla.
ISSUES:
1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise
of a municipality’s governmental or public function or is it of a private or
proprietary character?
2. Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui and the members of
the Municipal Council of Malasiqui are liable for damages for a death
which occurred during the celebration of the town fiesta.
HELD:
1. Yes. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of
Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary
function of the municipality.
Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as
such as endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be
exercised by and through their respective municipal governments in
conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may, inter
alia, sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with.
The powers of a municipality are twofold in character—public,
governmental, or political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by
the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting
the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public, and
political. Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special
benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate.
This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining
the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in
an injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental
function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality
unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor from its officers, so
long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they
did not act wantonly and maliciously.
With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal
corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
“Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in
tort.”
We hold that the holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality
of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary
function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised
Administrative Code gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a
yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of
determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a
municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be
considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to
the public the undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence,
otherwise, the function becomes private or proprietary in character.
Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta.
2. Municipality of Malasiqui is liable for damages. The municipal
councilors, however, are absolved from any liability for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla.
It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-
municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality’s
officers, employees, or agents.
“Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. x x x”
“Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. x x
x”
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 8
On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was
negligence. Moreover, if a member of the “extravaganza troupe” removed
two principal braces located on the front portion of the stage, there was
indeed negligence as there was lack of supervision over the use of the
stage to prevent such an occurrence. The appellate court also found that
the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was
appropriate for the construction of two stages.
The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented
to it establish negligence as a matter of law and that the Municipality
failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family, will not
disturbed by Us.
Lastly, petitioner or appellent Municipality cannot evade responsibility
and/or liability under the claim that it was Jose Macaraeg who
constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal
council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on
entertainment and in charge of the construction of the “zarzuela” stage.
Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the
doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is
responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his
assigned tasks.
We absolve the municipal councilors from any liability for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as the Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned, and We
absolve the municipal councilors from liability and SET ASIDE the judgment
against them.
(c) Liability for Illegal Dismissal of employee
1. Civil Service Commission vs. Gentallan 458 SCRA 278 , May 09, 2005
FACTS:
In 1994, then Mayor Jose Salcedo appointed respondent Jocelyn Gentallan
as local civil registrar of the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. After
the lapse of fifteen (15) days without any action rendered by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jasaan, the appointment was eventually deemed
approved. Rosalina Asis protested the appointment, but the same was
later dismissed in a reoultion by the CSC. In the same resolution, however,
the CSC reviewed the appointment of Gentallan and it held that Gentallan
was not qualified as she failed to fulfill the required three-year experience
relevant to the position of local civil registrar. Gentallan, thus, filed a
petition for review before the CA.
Meanwhile, Mayor Paurom, pursuant to the CA resolutions ordered
Gentallan to vacate the post as Local Civil Registrar and directed her to
assume her former position. The CA set aside the questioned resolutions
and found Gentallan qualified to the postiion.
Despite being informed of the CA's decision, the mayor did not reinstate
Gentallan. Gentallan's request for reinstatement and payment of
backwages was not acted upon.
Gentallan then filed a case for mandamus with damages and indirect
contempt before the RTC. Consequently, the parties reached an
agreement. The Mayor later issued a memorandum directing Gentallan to
assume office as the local civil registrar, and a notice of her salary
adjustment was issued. Despite Gentallan's entitlement to back salaries,
the mayor did not give her back salaries, RATA and bonuses. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Jasaan in Resolution No. 302-99 deleted the items
of appropriations for her salaries. The CSC said that Gentallan was not
entitled to back salaries and other emoluments as she was not illegally
dismissed from the
service.
Gentallan filed before the CA a petition for review assailing the
resolutions. The CA set aside the the CSC Resolutions Nos. 001264 and
002305, and reinstated the Order of CSCRO-10 which granted the
entitlements. Hence, the instant petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not due to illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan
by her superior officers, the latter should be held personally accountable
for her back salaries.
HELD: No.
Petitioner municipality contends that Gentallan was not illegally removed
from her position; that the mayor was only following the lawful orders of
the CSC when he directed the reversion of respondent to her former
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 9
position as Assistant Registration Officer. Hence there is no basis to claim
the award of back salaries, RATA and bonuses.
Furthermore, petitioner municipality maintains that Gentallan’s
appointment as Local Civil Registrar had become ineffective by virtue of
the CSC resolutions, at least until the Court of Appeals reversed them.
Therefore, her salaries and other emoluments must be reckoned only
from the time she actually assumed the said office.
In the instant case, we note that there is no finding that malice or bad
faith attended the illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by
her superior officers. Thus, they cannot be held personally accountable
for her back salaries. The municipal government, therefore, should
disburse funds to answer for her claims resulting from dismissal.
We hereby sustain the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it
declares that Jocelyn S. Gentallan should be reinstated to her position with
backwages, RATA, and bonuses to be paid by the Municipality of Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental.
2. City of Cebu vs. Piccio 110 Phil. 558 , December 31, 1960
FACTS:
Caballero filed with the CFI a petition for mandamus against the City
Mayor, the Municipal Board, the City Treasurer and the City Auditor of
Cebu City for resinstatement to his former positiion of Caretaker,
Operation of Cemeteries, and for the payment of his back salaries.
Respondent Judge Piccio ruled in favor of Caballero, holding that Caballero
was separated without benefit of an investigation and determination of
sufficient cause, and that his reinstatement should be effected. The
judgment became final. A writ of execution was then issued. Pursuant to
the writ, the municipal board of Cebu City passed a resolution,
appropriating the amount of P3,224.00 for the payment of the back
salaries of Caballero, which City Mayor Rodriguez approved and the
amount was paid to Caballero.
His position having been abolished, Caballero was not reinstated. Judge
Picco then issued an order irecting the municipal board recreate
Caballero's position as Caretaker, with compensation of P4.00 per day,
which the municipal board did not comply with. Caballero filed a motion,
asking for an order to compel the members of the board to do so. The City
Mayor, members of the board, the treasurer and the Auditor, answering
the motion for complianee, alleged that the City of Cebu, not having been
made a party to the case (Mandamus), compulsion would be illegal and
unwarranted under the facts obtaining.
The lower court then amended its original order, excluding Caballero's
right to reimbursement of back salaries and directing the municipal board
to recreate Caballero's position.
The City of Cebu filed a petition with this Court to restrain Caballero and
Judge Piccio from executing the said order. The City of Cebu claimed that
the payment of the sum of P3,224.00 to Caballero was wrongful and
illegal, since it was not a party to the case. Caballero cited a number of
cases decided by this Court, ordering the payment of back salaries of
employees illegally ousted even though the municipality and/or city
concerned was not impleaded The CFI dismissed the complaint. Hence, the
appeal.
ISSUE:
Does the non-inclusion of the City of Cebu in the Mandamus case, make
the payment of the back salaries of Caballero wrongful or illegal and not
binding on said City?
HELD: No.
We are of the belief that the complaint was correctly dismissed. It is fully
established that Caballero had the perfect right to demand for the
payment of his back salaries during his illegal dismissal, that the sum of
P3,224.00 was paid to Caballero by virtue of a writ of execution lawfully
issued; and that the payment was not made through mistake. On
this score, alone, it would appear manifest that the complaint does not
state a cause of action.
The question of whether the City of Cebu was a party or not in the
mandamus case becomes unimportant, as it is immaterial. It is true that
in the mandamus case, only the City Mayor, the municipal Board, the City
Treasurer and the City Auditor, of Cebu City were included in the order of
the execution of the judgment, but we have declared that a municipal
corporation, whether included or not in the complaint for the recovery
of back salaries due to wrongful removal from office, is liable.
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 10
When a judgment is rendered against an officer of a municipal
corporation who sues or is sued in his official capacity, the judgment is
binding upon the corporation, upon the other officers of the municipal
corporation who represent the same interest and the effect of judgment
against a municipal officer is not lost by a change in the occupant of the
office.
In view hereof, the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merits and
the order of dismissal of the complaint, object of the appeal, is affirmed.
(d) Personal liability of local officials
1. City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals 261 SCRA 90 , August 28, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent Timog Silangan Development Corporation donated to
the City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated in Barrio Pampang, City of
Angeles, part of a bigger area also belonging to private respondent. The
amended deed of sale provided certain terms and conditions, such as the
properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the
Angeles City Sports Center. In 1988, petitioners started the construction of
a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon
learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for being
violative of the terms and conditions of the amended deed of sale. Private
respondent offered another site for the rehabilitation center, but it was
rejected.
Private respondent then filed a complaint with the RTC against petitioners,
alleging breach of the conditions imposed in the amended deed of
donation and seeking the revocation of the donation. The trial court issued
a temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from further
proceeding with the construction of the center, which at that time was
already at 40%. Petitioners alleged that the conditions imposed in the
amended deed were contrary to contrary to Municipal Ordinance No. 1,
Series of 1962, otherwise known as the Subdivision Ordinance of the
Municipality of Angeles. The trial court found no inconsistency between
the conditions imposed in the Deeds of Donation and the provision of the
Subdivision Ordinance of the City of Angeles. The RTC enjoined petitioners
from constructing the Drug Rehabilitation Center and declared the
amended Deed of Donation revoked and rescinded. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners mayor and members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Angeles City, having acted beyond the cope of their
authority and jurisdiction and with evident bad faith, should be held
personally liable.
HELD: No. Petitioners were sued only in their official capacities, hence,
they could not be held personally liable without first giving them their
day in court.
Both petitioners and private respondents are in violation of P.D. 957 as
amended, for donating and accepting a donation of open space less than
that required by law, and for agreeing to build and operate a sports
complex on the non-buildable open space so donated; and petitioners, for
constructing a drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area.
Removal/Demolition of Drug Rehabilitation Center
Inasmuch as the construction and operation of the drug rehabilitation
center has been established to be contrary to law, the said center should
be removed or demolished.
In theory, the cost of such demolition, and the reimbursement of the
public funds expended in the construction thereof, should be borne by
the officials of the City of Angeles who ordered and directed such
construction. This Court has time and again ruled that public officials are
not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising from acts
done in bad faith. Otherwise stated, a public official may be liable in his
personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the public officials concerned deliberately
violated the law and persisted in their violations, going so far as
attempting to deceive the courts by their pretended change of purpose
and usage for the center, and “making a mockery of the judicial system.”
Indisputably, said public officials acted beyond the scope of their
authority and jurisdiction and with evident bad faith. However, as noted
by the trial court, the petitioners mayor and members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City were sued only in their official
capacities, hence, they could not be held personally liable without first
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 11
giving them their day in court. Prevailing jurisprudence holding that
public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts
done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in
their official and personal capacities.
After due consideration of the circumstances, we believe that the fairest
and most equitable solution is to have the City of Angeles, donee of the
subject open space and, ostensibly, the main beneficiary of the
construction and operation of the proposed drug rehabilitation center,
undertake the demolition and removal of said center, and if feasible,
recover the cost thereof from the city officials concerned.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED:
(1) Petitioners are hereby ENJOINED perpetually from operating the drug
rehabilitation center or any other such facility on the donated open space.
(2) Petitioner City of Angeles is ORDERED to undertake the demolition and
removal of said drug rehabilitation center.
(3) The Amended Deed of Donation dated November 26, 1984 is hereby
declared valid and subsisting,
2. Rama vs. Court of Appeals 148 SCRA 496 , March 16, 1987
FACTS:
During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of Cebu,
Osmundo Rama as vice-governor and Pablo Garcia, Reynaldo Mendiola
and Valeriano Carillo as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
adopted Resolution No. 990 which appropriated funds for the
maintenance and repair of provincial roads and bridges and for the
operation and maintenance of the office of the provincial engineer and for
other purposes. To implement said policy, the provincial board resolved to
abolish around thirty positions the salaries of which were paid from the 'JJ'
Road and Bridge Fund thus doing away with the caminero (pick-shovel-
wheelbarrow) system. Consequently, around 200 employees of the
province were eased out of their respective jobs and, to implement the
mechanization program in the maintenance of roads and bridges, the
provincial government purchased heavy equipment worth P4,000,000.00.
However, contrary to its declared policy to economize, the provincial
administration later on hired around one thousand new employees,
renovated the office of the provincial engineer and provided the latter
with a Mercedes-Benz car.
Consequently, the employees whose positions were abolished filed
separate petitions for mandamus, damages and attorneys fees aimed at
the annulment of Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement and the
recovery of damages against the aforementioned provincial officials,
together with the provincial auditor, provincial treasurer, provincial
engineer and the province of Cebu. They were sued both in their official
and personal capacities as a result of their alleged unjust, oppressive,
illegal and malicious acts.
In Civil Case No. R-10704, the CFI declared Resolution No. 990 null and
void and ordered the respondent officials to re-create the positions
abolished, to provide funds therefore and to reinstate the dismissed
employees. The CA affirmed the lower court's decision with the
modification that the public officials were ordered to pay jointly and
severally in their "individual and personal capacity."
Meanwhile, the petition for mandamus filed by dismissed employees
Frondoso and Luna was elevanted to the CA, where it ruled that the the
wrong committed by the Public officials was a quasi-delict, and ordered
the reinstatement with back salaries of Frondoso and Luna. The appeal
filed by the Cebu Assistant Provincial Attorney, representing the Province
of Cebu and its Sangguniang Panlalawigan was later dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Provincial Governor and the members of the
Provincial Board should be held liable in damages in their personal
capacity arising from the illegal act of dismissing employees in bad faith.
HELD: Yes.
Proceeding now to resolve the issue, common to L-44484, L44591 and L-
44842, which is whether or not Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo
are personally liable for damages for adopting a resolution which
abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants thereof, this Court
has held that, at least, in principle, a public officer by virtue of his office
alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 12
illegal acts done in bad faith. A different rule would sanction the use of
public office as a tool of oppression.
We hold that the petitioners in the instant three cases are personally
liable for damages because of their precipitate dismissal of provincial
employees through an ostensibly legal means.
The Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are binding on this Court,
found that the provincial employees concerned were "eased out because
of their party affiliation." i.e., they belonged to the Liberal Party whose
presidential candidate then was Sergio Osmeña, Jr. Such act of the
petitioners reflected their malicious intent to do away with the followers
of the rival political party so as to accommodate their own proteges who,
it turned out, even outnumbered the dismissed employees.
Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously
or wantonly, and if the work which they perform is done rather to injure
an individual than to discharge a public duty.
As we have held in Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, a public officer is
civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the
performance of their duties as public officers or for wilfully or negligently
causing damage to another (Article 20, Civil Code) or for wilfully causing
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs and/or public policy (Article 21, New Civil Code).
3. Correa vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan 92 SCRA 312 , July 30,
1979
FACTS:
In a certain civil case, respondent CFI ruled in favor of private respondents,
the illegally dismissed policemen. It held that petitioner Correa and
Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray,
Bulacan respectively, should be ordered personally to pay the salaries
which the policemenfailed to receive by reason of their illegal removal
from office until they are actually reinstated. The CA affirmed the CFI's
decision. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and to
the direct execution to the Municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan, alleging
that at the time the writ was served on him, he was no longer mayor of
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment
is rendered against an officer of the municipal corporation who is sued in
his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of officers illegally
removed, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, whether or not
the same is included as party to the action. Respondent court denied said
motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not liability attaches even if, at the time of execution,
petitioner Correa is no longer the Mayor.
HELD: Yes.
It cannot be denied that both the judgments of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan and of the Court of Appeals categorically state that the liability
of herein petitioner is personal.
The jurisprudence relied upon by the petitioner in his effort to shift the
responsibility to the Municipality of Norzagaray appears inapplicable.
Here, the judgment of the trial court, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, found, petitioners Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento,
personally liable for the payment of the salaries which the dismissed
policemen failed to receive because of their illegal removal from office,
and ordered them “to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff Juanito
Sarmiento his salary for the period beginning January 15, 1968; plaintiff
Melanio Esteban his salary for the period beginning February 1, 1968; and
plaintiffs Candido Cruz, Isabelo Saplala, Tomas Palad, Antonio Ancheta,
Antonio Silverio, Eligio Punzal and Celedonio Principe their salaries for the
period beginning January 23, 1968, until they are actually reinstated to
their former positions.”
In the discharge of governmental functions, “municipal corporations are
responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the
extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity
with the requirements thereof.”
A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess
or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is
personally liable therefor like any private individual. This principle of
personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes
another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 13
saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in
respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their
official authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
4. Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals 81 SCRA 408 , January 31, 1978
FACTS:
Petitioner Arsenio Salcedo was first appointed Chief of Police of
Candelaria, Quezon, in 1955, and again reappointed to the same position
in 1956. In May 1957, his appointment was attested as permanent by the
Commissioner of Civil Service.
In July 1960, an administrative complaint for misconduct and serious
irregularities in the performance of his duties was filed against the
petitioner. Later, while the administrative case was pending, the
respondent mayor Venancio Dia terminated his services as Chief of Police.
The letter of termination stated that the petitioner was not a civil service
eligible because the attestation of his appointment as permanent was
erroneous and illegal, petitioner not possessing the appropriate eligibility
for the position of Chief of Police.
In 1965, petitioner was ordered separated from the service by a resolution
of the Municipal Council of Candelaria, Quezon, finding him guilty as
charged. On appeal, the Civil Service Commissioner found petitioner guilty
of conduct unbecoming a police officer. He was ordered reinstated, and
was imposed a fine of one month’s pay, with a warning against similar
offenses. Respondent mayor's motion for reconsideration was then
denied. Petitioner made repeated requests for reinstatement but were
refused by the respondent mayor. Respondent mayor continuously
ignored the CSC's series of indorsements ordering him to immediately
reinstate petitioner.
In 1967, petitioner filed mandamus proceedings before the CFI. The lower
court ordered the reinstatement of petitioner, with back wages, which the
CA affirmed. Respondent mayor moved to reconsider the said decision,
which the CA resolved by reversing its earlier decision, declaring
petitioner's appointment as provisional. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was then denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent mayor should be held personally liable for the
payment of back salaries, for his persistent defiance of the order of the
Civil Service Commission to reinstate petitioner.
HELD: Yes.
The attestation of petitioner’s appointment as permanent was not illegal
nor erroneous, and consequently, his services cannot be terminated on
this ground. The claim of respondent mayor to the contrary is without
factual or legal basis.
The respondent mayor persistently ignored the order of reinstatement
given by the Commissioner of Civil Service and thus defied the directive of
a superior body with final authority on the matter which is respondent’s
duty to comply. For acting arbitrarily and without legal justification in
terminating the services of petitioner and refusing to reinstate him as
Chief of Police, the respondent mayor must be held personally liable for
the back salaries of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is reversed and another is entered
ordering the respondent mayor to pay petitioner’s back salaries, at the
rate of P3,600.00 per annum, for 5 years from December 1, 1965, the date
when the Commissioner of Civil Service ordered his reinstatement,
without deductions whatsoever; and also to pay as and for attorney’s fees
in the amount of P1,000.00, and costs.
Petition granted.
(e) Liability for violation of law
1. Abella vs. Municipality of Naga, et al. 90 Phil. 385 , November 20, 1951
FACTS:
Defendant-Appellant Municipality of Naga passed a resolution ordering
the closing of a part of a municipal street which ran between the public
market and plaintiff-appellee Concepcion Abella's property, and used the
thoroughfare to expand the market. Consequently, after the passage of
time, permanent, semi-permanent, as well as temporary constructions
were allowed by the defendant municipality along the sidewalk of Abella's
property and abutting to said property, facing P. Prieto Street, and
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 14
extending out in the middle of the same street, hence depriving the
Abella's property of access to said street, and consequently retarding her
reconstructions. The CFI sentenced the municipality of Naga, now Naga
City, to pay Abella P300 damages resulting form the closing of a municipal
street. Hence, this appeal.
The municipality of or city of Naga claims it acted and exercised its police
power to promote the general welfare, thus, should be held liable for
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality of Naga should be held liable for damages
for closing a part of the municipal street without indemnifying the person
prejudiced thereby.
HELD: Yes.
The municipality or city of Naga was not charged with any unlawful act, or
with acting without authority, or with invasion of plaintiff's property
rights; the basis of the lower court's decision is Section 2246 of the
Revised Administrative Code copied in appellant's brief, which provides
that no municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof "shall be closed
without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby."
The question then for determination by the court below was reduced to
whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by defendant municipality's action.
That she was economically damaged, the stipulation of facts admits; and
that the indemnity assessed is within the bounds of the damages
suffered, there is no dispute. As a matter of fact, the damages awarded
seem to be nominal judged by the description of the plaintiff's interests
adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street into a market.
The appeal is absolutely without merit.
2. Moday vs. Court of Appeals 243 SCRA 152 , March 31, 1995
FACTS:
In connection with the petition for review involving the expropriation of
petitioners’ land by respondent Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur,
the Court in December 1993 resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order enjoining and restraining the respondent Municipality of Bunawan,
through its incumbent Mayor from using and occupying all buildings
constructed within and from further constructing any building on the land
subject of the herein petition. Petitioner, in his Omnibus Motion, alleges
that the municipal mayor continues to use the buildings on the subject
land and even constructed new “blocktiendas” thereon in October 1994.
Petitioner prays that municipal mayor and municipal officials be cited for
contempt. Respondent alleges that the buildings and the land were indeed
used, not for Mayor Bustillo’s personal purposes, but for public service
and public interest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipal mayor be cited for contempt.
HELD: Yes.
The explanation given by respondent municipality is unacceptable. The
purpose for which the buildings were used is immaterial. Respondent
was duty bound to obey the injunction issued by this Court. The TRO was
explicit in its language. Violating its purpose and language is patently
contemptuous and merits the corresponding punishment.
We reiterate the restraining order issued by the Court on December 8,
1993.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan Del Sur,
through its incumbent Municipal Mayor, is cited for contempt and is
hereby FINED in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) with the
WARNING that a repetition or continuation of the acts herein found to
constitute contempt of court will be dealt with more severely. The mayor
is hereby ordered to DEMOLISH the structures subject of the restraining
order.
(f) Liability for Contracts; Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability
1. Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 147 SCRA 447 ,
January 29, 1987
FACTS:
In 1964, while while then incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on official
business in Manila, the Vice-Governor, Priscillano Almendras and three (3)
members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to
LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION | Assignment No. 3 | 15
the City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots all located in the City of Cebu,
with an aggregate area of over 380 hectares, and authorizing the Vice-
Governor to sign the deed of donation on behalf of the province. The deed
of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu
by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by
Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. The document of donation was prepared and
notarized by a private lawyer. The donation was later approved by the
Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio. The City
of Cebu was given a period of one (1) year from August 15, 1964 within
which to dispose of the donated lots.
Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as illegal and
immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically all the
patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, considering that the latter’s
income was less than one fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu.
To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the officers and members of
the Cebu Mayor’s League along with some taxpayers, including Atty.
Garcia, filed a case before the CFI, seeking to have the donation declared
illegal, null, and void. Named defendants in the suit were the City of Cebu,
City Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. and the Cebu provincial officials responsible
for the donation of the province-owned lots. The court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest
in the case.
Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. announced that he would
borrow funds from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and would use the
donated lots as collaterals. Governor Espina, apprehensive that the lots
would be irretrievably lost by the Province of Cebu, decided to go to court.
He engaged the services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting
the case in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu. Garcia filed
the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation.
Sometime in 1972, the Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing
the Provincial Attorney, Alfredo Baguia, to enter his appearance for the
Province of Cebu and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor and
members of the Provincial Board in this case. Baguia, Provincial Attorney
of the Province of Cebu, then entered his appearance as additional
counsel.
Later, a compromise agreement was reached between the province of
Cebu and the city of Cebu, which was a pproved by the court and a
decision was rendered on its basis. Respondent Garcial then filed through
counsel a Notice of Attorney's Lien, which petitioenr Province of Cebu
opposed, stating that the payment of attorney’s fees and reimbursement
of incidental expenses are not allowed by law. The CFI ruled in favor of
private respondent and against petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that
the former is entitled to recover attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum
meruit and fixing the amount thereof at P30.000.00. The IAC affirmed the
findings of the trial court that private respondent is entitled to recover
attorney's fees. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a municipality may be represented by a private
attorney in the case at bar.
2. Whether or not an attorney can recover his fees from one who did
not employ him or authorize his employment (liability for
respondent counsel's services).
HELD:
1. Yes. Respondent counsel’s representation of the Province of
Cebu became necessary because of the Provincial Board’s failure
or refusal to direct the bringing of the action to recover the
properties it had donated to the City of Cebu.
The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has
been settled in Ramos v. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 728). Collaboration
of a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not
allowed.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code complemented by
Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality’s
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it as
when he represents the province against a municipality.
Every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid generaliter conceditur;
inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque (Where anything is
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granted generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary
to law and right). Indeed, equity, as well as the exceptional situation facing
us in the case at bar, require a departure from the established rule.
It is argued that Governor Espina was not authorized by the Provincial
Board, through a board resolution, to employ Atty. Pablo P. Garcia as
counsel of the Province of Cebu.
Admittedly, this is so.
However, the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are such that
the rule cannot be applied. The Provincial Board would never have given
such authorization.
A situation obtains, therefore, where the Provincial Governor, in behalf
of the Province of Cebu, seeks redress against the very members of the
body, that is, the Provincial Board, which, under the law, is to provide it
with legal assistance. A strict application of the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code on the matter would deprive the plaintiff s in the
court below of redress for a valid grievance. The provincial board
authorization required by law to secure the services of special counsel
becomes an impossibility. The decision of the respondent court is
grounded in equity—a correction applied to law, where on account of the
general comprehensiveness of the law, particular exceptions not being
provided against, something is wanting to render it perfect.
It is also argued that the employment of claimant was violative of sections
1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code because the Provincial
Fiscal who was the only competent official to file this case was not
disqualified to act for the Province of Cebu.
Respondent counsel’s representation of the Province of Cebu became
necessary because of the Provincial Board’s failure or refusal to direct
the bringing of the action to recover the properties it had donated to the
City of Cebu. The Board more effectively disqualified the Provincial Fiscal
from representing the Province of Cebu when it directed the Fiscal to
appear for its members in Civil Case No. R-8669 filed by Atty. Garcia, and
others, to defend its actuation in passing and approving Provincial Board
Resolution No. 186. The answer of the Provincial Fiscal on behalf of the
Vice-Governor and the Provincial Board members filed in Civil Case No. R-
8669; (Exhibit “K") upholds the validity and legality of the donation. How
then could the Provincial Fiscal represent the Province of Cebu in the suit
to recover the properties in question? How could Governor Espina be
represented by the Provincial Fiscal or seek authorization from the
Provincial Board to employ special counsel? Nemo tenetur ad impossibile
(The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility). Neither could a
prosecutor be designated by the Department of Justice. Malacañang had
already approved the questioned donation.
2. Yes. The doctrine of implied municipal liability is applicable in
the case at bar.
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: “that a municipality
may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable
value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the
general power to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has
been said to apply to all cases where money or other property of a party
is received under such circumstances that the general law, independent
of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do
justice with respect to the same.”
The petitioner can not set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and
still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for
purposes of reaping some benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question
its validity for the purposes of denying answerability.
Actually it was Governor Espina who filed the case against Cebu City and
Mayor Osmeña. Garcia just happened to be the lawyer. Still Atty. Garcia is
entitled to compensation. To deny private respondent compensation for
his professional services would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the questioned October 18,1985 decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is set aside.
2. De Guia vs. The Auditor General 44 SCRA 169 , March 29, 1972
FACTS:
G.A. Machineries, Inc. filed a civil action against the municipality of
Mondragon, now within the province of Northern Samar. Judgment had
been rendered dismissing the complaint for recovery of P18,609.09 and
instead awarding the defendant-municipality on its counterclaim the sum
of P42,000.00 as refund for excess payments made by it plus damages,
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etc. Plaintiff firm appealed to the CA. The municipal council passed stipulated contingent fee for legal services, since petitioner’s services were
resolution No. 63 authorizing the municipal mayor, Olympio de Guia, to contracted by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law.
hire the services of a counsel to defend the municipality in the under
It may be seen therefrom that the municipality’s authority to employ a
contingent fee basis the same not to exceed 15%. The mayor and
private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the
petitioner, Atty. Gabriel de Guia, having in an exchange of letters agreed
provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve and represent it. The record of
on the retention of petitioner’s services as attorney on a basis of 15% of
this case does not indicate, nor does petitioner make any claim, that the
whatever claim the municipality can get from the plaintiff corporation, the
provincial fiscal of Northern Samar was disqualified to handle the
municipal council confirmed the agreement for petitioner’s services as per
municipality’s case on appeal, so as to legally justify the municipality’s
its resolution No. 65. Petitioner prepared and filed the brief on behalf of
contracting the services of petitioner as private counsel.
the municipality as defendant-appellee in the appealed case.
It should be noted that the Court in Enriquez affirmed the disallowance of
The CA substantially affirmed with minor modification the appealed
therein petitioner’s contract for legal services notwithstanding the
judgment and sentenced the plaintiff-corporation to pay the defendant-
provincial fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality in its litigation
municipality on its counterclaim. G.A. Machineries, Inc. paid the
against the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, holding that the
municipality. The municipal council, as per its resolution No. 7, authorized
fiscal’s adverse views “not based on any of the conditions enumerated in
the municipal treasurer to pay 15% thereof as petitioner's contractual
the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse
contingent fee. The municipal treasurer prepared the corresponding
for inhibition or disqualification.” Here, there is no showing even that the
voucher but respondent provincial auditor suspended redemption by
provincial fiscal’s assistance had been sought by the municipality, and
virtue of the fact that all litigations entered into by the province or any of
the fiscal had therefore no opportunity to express his views on the
its political subdivisions should be handled by the Provincial Fiscal and of
municipality’s case on appeal against G. A. Machineries, Inc. In other
the further fact that there is no Municipal Attorney for Mondragon that
words, not even the fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality which
had been legally appointed under Republic Act No. 2264. Respondent
was present in Enriquez and which was nonetheless rejected by the
Auditor General sustained the provincial auditor' action, reiterating its
Court as a legal justification for engaging the services of private counsel
consistent opinion that in view of the express provisions of section 1683 of
can be invoked by petitioner at bar.
the Revised Administrative Code, a municipality “is not empowered to
engage the services of private counsel to represent it in a civil case unless The extra-legal considerations invoked by petitioner that he rendered
the provincial fiscal, who by law is the legal adviser and counsel, is services in good faith to the municipality which engaged him as a private
disqualified to represent the municipality.” attorney “upon [its] policy of expediency and economy,” even if assumed
for the nonce, have no relevance in the face of respondents’ finding, as
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was then denied. Hence, this
herein affirmed by the Court, that petitioner’s contract for services was
appeal.
executed without authority of law.
ISSUE:
ACCORDINGLY, the decision under review is hereby affirmed.
Whether or not a municipality may engage the services of private attorney
in the case at bar.
3. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals 233 SCRA 484 , June
HELD: No.
28, 1994
The Court finds no error in the appealed ruling.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Auditor-General correctly upheld the disallowance in audit
of the voucher for the payment of P7,-673.85 to petitioner as his
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The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Municipality of Pililla,
Rizal against private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC),
ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount representing
the tax on business due under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No.
1 of said municipality for the period from 1979 to 1983. In June 1991, this
Court affirmed the aforesaid judgment, with the modification that
business taxes accruing prior to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC because
the same have prescribed.
In October 1991, in connection with the execution of said judgment, the
Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality with
the RTC for the examination of private respondent's gross sales for the
purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the Local Tax
Code. When the municipality's motion was denied, Atty. Mendiola filed a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied.
Atty. Mendiola, in behalf of petitioner municipality, then filed a petition of
certiorari with the Court, which petition was referred to the CA for proper
disposition. Respondent PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola’s
authority to represent petitioner municipality. Consequently, respondent
CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the instant petition by the private counsel is in
violation of law and jurisprudence.
HELD: Yes.
We find the present petition devoid of merit.
The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no
authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the
Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a
private attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and
reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or
municipality in lawsuits.
Under Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, complemented by
Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or
municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited
only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent
it.
For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial
fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality’s case must appear on
record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality
of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is
without authority of law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to
include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case
cannot be sustained. The fiscal’s refusal to represent the municipality is
not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel.
Unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a
fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for
by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the
services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the
Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the
provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in
court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality
by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have
been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the municipal
mayor and without said counsel’s participation, entered into a
compromise agreement with herein private respondent
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
4. Mancenido vs. Court of Appeals 330 SCRA 419 , April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Eduardo Mancenido filed an action for mandamus and damages with the
RTC against the provincial board of Camarines Norte, the school board,
provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay the
teacher's claim for unpaid salaries. The trial court granted the mandamus
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and ordered the Provincial School Board to appropriate and satisfy due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private
Mancenido's claim in the amount of P268,800.00, as unpaid salary capacity.
increases. On appeal, the judge recalled his earlier order and granted the
The present case had its origins in Civil Case No. 5864 filed before the RTC
appeal of respondents. On appeal, the CA prohibited from enforcement
of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, for mandamus and damages.
the partial execution of the trial court's judgment. Hence, this instant
Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court granted mandamus,
petition.
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals since the trial court did not
Petitioners contend that Atty. Jose Lapak could not represent the award damages. In view of the damages sought which, if granted, could
respondents Provincial Treasurer and Provincial School Board, because result in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to have
both are instrumentalities of the National Government and may be been improperly represented by private counsel. No error may thus be
represented only by the Office of the Solicitor General pursuant to attributed to the appellate court when it recognized the right of
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title 3, Book 4 of the Administrative Code of 1987. respondents to be represented by private counsel.
Only the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Norte may represent the
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Provincial Governor and the Provincial Board in accordance with Section
481 11, par. B of the Local Government Code of 1991.
ISSUE:
Whether a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their
official capacities.
HELD: Yes. In view of the damages sought which, if granted, could result
in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to have been
improperly represented by private counsel.
After considering petitioners’ arguments, however, we find their
contentions far from persuasive.
The Court has previously ruled on the representation of a local”
government unit by a private attorney. In Municipality of Bocaue v.
Manotok, 93 Phil. 173 (1953), and succeeding cases, we held that only
when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be
authorized to hire the services of a special attorney.
But do these rulings equally apply to local government officials? In
Alinsug v. RTC, Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 559
(1993), we laid down the rule that, in resolving whether a local
government official may secure the services of private counsel in an
action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action
and the relief sought are to be considered. In Albuera v. Torres, 102 Phil.
211 (1957), we approved the representation by private counsel of a
provincial governor sued in his official capacity, where the complaint
contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if
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