UN Organs

General UN Principles

1. Neutrality and Impartiality

• The UN is to maintain a neutral stance to act as a fair mediator to resolve conflicts between countries. This neutrality,
if compromised, will lead to biased UN action as specific interests will be given special priority.
• This was particularly pertinent in the Cold War, where the UN had more often than not, been unable to navigate
effectively through superpower bipolarity.

2. Non-Intervention and the respect for sovereignty

• The UN must respect the rights of each country as a sovereign nation, only being able to intervene in conflicts should
the host country give its prior approval. This proved to be a limitation for earlier UN Peacekeeping Missions.
• Eventually, in the light of decolonisation and the fall of the Cold War seeing the rise of non-state actors, the UN
mandate had to evolve to better meet these challenges where there was no sovereign, legitimate authority in place.

How the UN works

• Collective security, requiring commitment and participation from all member states.
o In the Cold War era, conflicts with no clear superpower agenda were often not accorded the same attention
by the superpowers. With the lack of initiation from first tier powers, there were at best small-scaled efforts
for non-Cold War conflicts. (eg. Cyprus)
o Yet, this bipolar world, while tense, was stable, where both superpowers actively took up mandate of
leadership for most international conflicts.
o In the post Cold War era, with the fall of the Soviet Union ushering in a unipolar world, this had been largely
unstable and unpredictable. With the initial wave of US enthusiasm for Peacekeeping dying out after Somalia,
post Cold War UN missions had suffered greatly.
• Maintenance of international peace through respect of sovereignty and condemnation of hostilities.
• All councils can only make stances and recommendations. Only the UNSC is allowed to impose sanctions and lawful
actions in which all countries involved must abide by.
o The General Assembly and International Court of Justice relies on the UNSC to enforce its ‘verdicts’ with its
legally binding force.
 General Assembly

Strengths Limitations
Sets international values and principles the international Not legally binding – inability to legally enforce its
community can agree with and abide by. recommendations through force and legality. It also took
• UN Charter Chapter 4 Article 11: ‘Consider and secondary precedence to the Security Council.
make recommendations on principles of co- • UN Charter Chapter 4 Article 12: ‘Cannot
operation.’ recommend or discuss issues dealt by the SC,
• UN Charter Chapter 4 Article 13: ‘Initiate studies unless requested to do so.’
and make recommendations to promote
international co-operation in areas of politics,
economic, social, health, educational, human
rights and fundamental freedoms.’
Able to have the final decision over the UN’s administrative Unable to enforce any concrete action without backing of
matters, giving it the authority to shape UN agenda. superpowers / subservient to superpower interests
• Decides the admission of new members into the • While the GA is able to vote the Secretary-
United nations General, the candidature list is first VETOed by
• Appoints the Secretary-General into office the Security Council.
• Decides the UN budget and its allocations • USA funding holds 30% of entire UN budget, in
which enforces US influence over member states
in the GA. The GA was paralysed and left with no
choice to abide by US wishes when the US
refused to pay its regular contributions to the UN
budget in 1985.
Able to take command of peacekeeping missions when the This authority was largely still up to the discretion of the
Security Council is paralyzed (UNSC Resolution 377A), Cold War superpowers to transfer the matter to the UN.
allowing for more effective and efficient course of action to
be taken by second tier powers
All member states have ‘equal’ say as each member state Diversity in membership especially in later years where
is entitled to all voting procedures. Especially in the later newly independent states joined with national interests of
years of the UN, there was an ability to remain impartial socio-economic building as priority.
from superpower interests due to the large diversity of • Resolution 1514 ‘Declaration on the Granting of
membership and the rise of regional blocs independent of Independence to Colonial Countries and People’
superpower interests / spheres of influence. passed in 1960 that legitimised all anti-colonial
• By 1971, USA no longer had enough influence to struggles.
stop the GA vote that authorised VETO to be • The GA made the UN Conference on Trade and
granted to PRC in the UNSC, nor did it have Development a permanent subsidiary organ of
enough influence to stop the passing of Zionism the GA in 1964 to serve the economic needs of
as a form of racial discrimination. the developing countries. This saw proposals
such as the “New International Economic Order”
to solve third world trade problems.
Consensus building became difficult to achieve with
increasingly diversified membership.
• Rise of Afro-Asian bloc, along with OPEC, Latin
American bloc and the Western European bloc.
UNSC Resolution 377A – ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’
• Allowed the General Assembly to discuss and make recommendations on international peace and security in
the event that the SC fails to exercise its primary responsibility in doing so, with full authority to take legal
action and utilise armed forces if necessary. The General Assembly becomes centre-stage in the handling of
the crisis and takes over the function of the UNSC, especially when the General Assembly was able to take a
more impartial stance as compared to the Security Council polarised by superpower conflict.
• However, this resolution was drafted as a result of superpower rivalry, with the USA enacting this to
overcome the Soviet VETO in the Security Council over the Korean War, showing that without superpower
intervention, the amplification of the role of the General Assembly would not have happened.
• Superpower interests could still be served through the General Assembly due to superpower clout over blocs
of member states in the General Assembly, essentially causing the General Assembly to be subservient to
superpower interest and not entirely their own political will.
• 377A was born out of the Cold War and hence very influenced by the changing Cold War context and thawing
and deterioration of superpower relationships. Its importance varied in accordance to whether the
superpowers felt it was in their interest to sideline the UNSC or the UNGA. The onset of Détente and the
eventual end of the Cold War saw the demise in the importance of the General Assembly as the superpowers
were able to work together in the UNSC.
• Resolution 377A was only employed several times, such as in the Korean War and the Suez Crisis. Both were
examples of the GA being a resounding success. Yet, there was a constant superpower influence over the
conflict resolution negotiations and solutions in both crises.
o Suez Crisis: USA and USSR played critical roles in mobilising their allies in the General Assembly to
propose solutions to the crisis by mobilising and encouraging second tier powers to take initiative,
and also exerted pressures on Britain and France by condemning their aggression.
o Korean War: USA played heavy role in shaping the course of action – contributing 90% of
peacekeeping troops to the UNC and General McArthur commanding the UNC.

Superpower Influence in the General Assembly

• The early stages saw superpower dominance, especially that of the USA, in the General Assembly. This
saw waves of USA engagement in the GA to strengthen its mandate as an alternative vessel to the UNSC.
o 1947 ‘Interim Committee’ was a ‘Little Assembly’ with the same makeup as the General Assembly
in the USA’s attempts to bypass Soviet VETO in the Security Council. This allowed small states to
play a larger role in peace and security matters by creating preliminary agenda for any situation
given to its attention.
o The USA-drafted Uniting for Peace Resolution was introduced and passed in 1950 to allow the
GA to take centre stage should the UNSC be paralysed by VETO votes.
• Eventually, with the increasing bulk of Afro-Asian states that took up independent, nationalist stances that
did not align to superpower interests, the superpower influence in the General Assembly started to
decline.
o USA no longer had enough influence by 1971 to block the vote of the People’s Republic of China
(instead of Taiwan) as the fifth VETO power in the Security Council.
o USA no longer had enough influence to prevent Resolution 3379, which declared Zionism as a
form of racial discrimination, from being passed in 1975.
• This became a problem when the GA ran off tangent to superpower interests, but yet the United Nations
depended heavily upon superpower resources.
o Increasingly diverse membership in the GA meant that countries contributing 90% of the UN
budget were controlled by the countries who contributed the other 10% but held the majority
votes.
 o USA introduced the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment that threatened to drastically cut down the
US’ financial contributions to the United Nations, leading to the GA altering its stance of ‘equality’
of giving specific members more influence over budget issues.

Lack of Enforcement in the General Assembly

• With its non-binding abilities, the GA found it increasingly difficult to get its member states to pay for
peacekeeping operations, adding bureaucracies to the UN that delayed its ability to act effectively.
o USSR, France and Belgium had refused to pay the $400 million needed for the Congo Crisis.
o Member states refused to pay for the UNEF during the Suez Crisis, believing that the
responsible aggressors, France and Britain, should pay for it instead.
 Security Council

Strengths Limitations
Legally binding – internationally recognised to be the Polarised by VETO, a structural flaw that leaves the
policing body to condemn aggression through legal council vulnerable to superpower interests and changing
action, military mobilisation and economic sanctions. Cold War context.
• An especially potent problem in the Cold War,
where the USA and USSR had frequently
employed their VETO rights to block UN action
that ran against their interests.
Keeps P5 entrenched in commitment to the UN by P5 hold disproportionate amount of influence over other
ensuring their interests are preserved with heavy influence member states, rendering all efforts of the council void
in the council. should superpowers evoke VETO rights.
• Especially pertinent after the 1970s, where the
pick up of the pace of decolonisation meant that
superpower influence over the General Assembly
was diluted.

Cold War Context

• Polarised superpower interests meant that the UNSC often was in deadlock due to the rampant use of
VETO by USA/USSR to preserve each country’s national agenda.
• This deadlock changed during Détente and during the End of the Cold War, where peacekeeping efforts
and commitment often stepped up tremendously. This shows the potential of the Security Council in
achieving effective action should the superpowers and P5 be able to work together to consolidate their
efforts, expertise and resources towards solving the problem.
• Yet, the UNSC was not entirely paralysed and unable to act at all. There were several exceptions to the
rule that saw effective SC action implemented. However, this arguably only happened when there was a
convergence or lack of superpower Cold War interests in the event.
o UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) for Jerusalem in 1948
o UN Military Observer Groups to India and Pakistan (UMNOGIP) to observe and facilitate peace
o UNSC Resolutions 143, 161 and 169 authorised the use of force, if necessary, to deport
foreign military personnel from Congo and prevent civil war there.

Changing complexities of peacekeeping efforts in the Post Cold War Era

• Peacekeeping missions slowly started to evolve from maintenance of ceasefires and diplomacy to that of
non-state actors, intra-state conflicts, humanitarian aid, and peace building.
• This led to the breech in UN core principles, such as infringing on national sovereignty when permission
was not sought after before UN intervention due to non-state actors and civil war entrenching countries in
polarised governments. The use of force also became increasingly necessary to defend locals and UN
troops under attack.
o Peace Building: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and UN Transitional Authority in
East Timor were to oversee building of political and social institutions.
o Infringing sovereignty: Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in UNSC Resolution 940 and
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in UNSC Resolution 1088
• Ethnic divisions and internally polarised political factions made matters challenging due to local reluctance
to resolve the conflict peacefully, as well as assaults against UN troops.
• Yet, even in the increasing complexities of peacekeeping, the UNSC was arguably more able to meet the
demand than it used to be in the Cold War:
 o Fall of bipolar world meant the ability of the UNSC to convene and agree on a common course of
action: Gorbachev’s speech in 1989 to reinstate the USSR’s commitment to collective security,
the decreased use of VETO from both superpowers, and US leadership.
o Able to evolve its mandate and engage in a more ambitious definition of peacekeeping.

UNSC and the USA

• The USA funds 30% of the UN budget and devotes large amounts of troops to the peacekeeping forces,
causing the US to hold a lot of political clout in the UNSC and UNGA.
• This meant that the success of peacekeeping missions were highly dependent on how willing the US was
to commit to these missions, where they could easily withdraw involvement from conflicts they deemed
unbeneficial to US foreign policy. There is a direct relationship between USA involvement and success of
peacekeeping operations as the USA creates the backbone of influence and resources needed to
consolidate such large-scale intervention missions.
o US pull out from Somalia after Black Hawk Down saw exponential decrease in troops for
UNOSOM II and had ripple effects on influencing other UN members in the GA to follow suit.
• On the other hand, the USA is often accused of using the United Nations to run its own foreign agenda,
dominating UN efforts or side lining them completely in pursuit of unilateral measures.
o Former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright has stated that working in the UNSC serves the
US interests as it allows the US to advance its political will without having to provide full military
and financial commitment.
 Secretary-General

Strengths
Able to tailor the focus of the UN onto specific issues,
including structural reforms and new directions.
‘Good offices’ and use of neutrality to act as unbiased
mediator in brokering resolution to conflicts.
Limitations
Often subjected to harsh critic from superpowers and
restricted in ability to manoeuvre out of fear of upsetting
superpower interests. The Secretary-General functions well
when supported by BOTH superpowers simultaneously.
Vague job scope means the role of the Secretary-General
is very dependent on personal agency.

• The Secretary-General is first approved by the Security Council and hence subjected to VETO, making the
office of Secretary-General very dependent on superpower interests and favour. Hence, the success of an
incumbent Secretary-General depended heavily on his ability to navigate through superpower diplomacy.
• The Secretary-General rarely can successfully function individually, requiring co-operation from the
General Assembly and the Security Council to work cohesively to solve the crisis at hand.

Secretary-General Relations with Superpowers

• One of the main responsibilities of the Secretary-General is managing superpower relations, such that
they would be favourable in support of UN agenda. This required strong leaders able to retain impartiality
in crises without favouritism for either superpower.
• The inability to do so often had negative repercussions on the continuity of the incumbent’s term in office
and on the overall effectiveness of UN action.
o Trygve Lie was accused by the USSR as a US puppet / stooge for his wholehearted support of
UN/US intervention into Korea, made worse by his public condemnation against Soviet
aggression in North Korea. He was unable to understand the bipolar context and was too ready
to full-heartedly support the US agenda, hence losing the support of a key P5 member.
o Trygve Lie was later accused by the US for advancing a ‘disloyal’ agenda, with the UN Secretariat
subjected to American anti-Communist witch hunters due to the American administration’s
mistrust against him. The loss of support from both P5 powers forced his resignation halfway
through his second term.
o Dag Hammarskjold was accused by the USSR of being biased during the Congo Crisis, where he
supported UN action of recognising the US-supported regime as the legitimate government of
Congo over the USSR-supported one. This saw aggressive claims of the USSR proposing a Troika
system to replace the overtly independent office of the Secretary General.
o Kurt Waldheim was unable to overcome superpower influence from side lining the UN, evident in
how US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Shuttle Diplomacy playing a more critical role in
bringing an end to the Yom Kippur War rather than the UN and how Jimmy Carter’s
Administration ushering the 1978 Camp David Accords forged peace between Israel and Egypt
over UN course of action.
o Boutros Boutros-Ghali had failed to manage relations with the USA well, running his own agenda
of setting up a system for preventive diplomacy to avoid confrontations and setting up
independent UN rapid deployment units that ran contrary to US interests. This led to the US
cooking up many scandals against him and using the VETO against his second term.
o Boutros Boutros-Ghali had also charged forth with many policies and decisions that ran contrary
to US interests, to which earned him the ire of the United States. He insisted for the US tocommit
to long-term disarmament through UNITAF despite the reluctance of the US to commit troops to
a potentially dangerous situation, and in opposing NATO airstrikes in Bosnia in the Kosovo Crisis.
Good Offices of the Secretary-General
• The level of proactivity of Secretary-Generals depended very much on their individual personalities,
especially since the responsibilities of the office were vague. This depended crucially on the ability of the
Secretary-General to act as an impartial UN official rather than with an affiliation to any body or country.
o U Thant stepping in to mediate the conflict between USA and USSR in the Cuban Missile Crisis
o Dag Hammarskjold urging the Security Council to take more prompt action in the Congo Crisis
upon receiving an urgent cable from local government officials. He also took active steps to
intervene personally in the mediation of the issue by making multiple personal trips there to
broker peace between local leaders.
o Dag Hammarskjold used his good offices to request the Chinese to release Prisoners of War
from the Korean War in his ‘Peking Formula’, the first display of his famous quiet diplomacy, to
the delight of the international community and the USA. This was groundbreaking in displaying
his political strength and agility, especially since international diplomatic relations had not been
established with the insular PRC at the point of time.
o Dag Hammarskjold had used his good offices to maintain good relations with PM Nasser (Egypt)
and PM Ben-Gurion (Israel) and had been able to maintain strong and fair neutrality. This saw
his ability to broker for a ceasefire between the two sides in the small-scale border conflicts that
erupted in 1954.
o Kurt Waldheim effectively used his good offices to help the UN better understand the situation
occurring in Namibia over South African hegemony.
o Kurt Waldheim was the first Secretary-General to visit North Korea in the UN’s first attempts to
integrate North Korea into the international community.
o Javier Perez de Cuellar was able to issue a fair and neutral ruling against France and New
Zealand in their naval / nuclear issue, faulting both sides for their respective wrongs neutrally.
o Kofi Annan had helped to resolve a dispute between Iraq and the UNSC over weapons
inspections through his personal negotiations with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.

Reforms proposed of the Secretary-General

• Boutros Boutros-Ghali: ‘Agenda for Peace’
o Offered a new UN focus on humanitarian aid and peace building in the post Cold War era
• Dag Hammarskjold
o Insistence of creating a UN Secretariat free from superpower influence by evicting US Federal
Bureau from UN HQ in New York.
o Strongly rejected the USSR’s proposal for a Troika system to replace the SG office.
• U Thant
o Expanded UN recruitment of the Secretariat to developing countries, ensuring better
diversification and representation of the global population in the UN.
o Established many world-body development and environmental agencies due to his focus on
building the third world. This, however, was arguably at the expense of effectiveness in handling
international conflicts.
! Set up the UN Environment Programme, the UN Institute for Training and Research, and
the UN Development Programme.
• Kurt Waldheim
o Oversaw the 1974 World Food Conference and the issuing of the Universal Declaration on the
Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition
• Kofi Annan
o Due to his African background, Annan took the ‘personal priority’ of tackling the HIV pandemic very
seriously, setting up the Global AIDS and Health Fund and a 5-point action plan.
 Peacekeeping Operations
Superpower / US Involvement
• Superpower involvement was heavily influenced by the changing Cold War context, determining whether or
not superpowers were working together or working against each other. It also determined their extent of
involvement in the conflict as the willingness of participation depended heavily on whether the
superpowers saw the conflicts as beneficial to their interests to intervene.
• Superpower involvement was crucial as they provided the bulk of troops, financial budget and influence
needed to steer the UN forward in proactive action. This meant that most of the success of the crisis
management was dependent on whether or not the superpowers pulled their weight. Most crises of UN
success, such as the Suez Crisis and First Gulf War, had heavy superpower involvement and also unity in
the stance of both superpowers working towards a common goal.
• This was especially so for the United States. It was important for the General Assembly and the Secretary-
General to always take into account the US’ interests in order to ensure the alignment of agenda will
ground US interest in the event.

Event Beneficial Impediment Relationship

Korean War Strong US interest in the conflict, which it
viewed to be in line with its Cold War
interests of Containment, saw the UN
setting up its first ambitious military force to
strengthen its peacekeeping efforts with
consistent efforts by the USA to mobilise
international attention to Korea.
The British and French called for the
formation of the United Nations Command
through UNSC Resolution 84 – the first of
its kind and a groundbreaking expansion of
the UN Peacekeeping Mandate.
Suez Crisis Both US and USSR had actively worked
together in both the UNSC and UNGA to
condemn British-French hostilities in Suez,
pulling influence in the GA to see the setting
up of UNEF to maintain peace in the region.
This showed truly how effective the UN
could be when superpower interests
converged.
The return of the USSR to the UN displayed the Hostility between
first of many Cold War bipolar conflicts US and USSR
polarised by superpower interests. The UNSC
was left crippled with the employment of Soviet USSR boycott of
VETOs preventing any expansion of mandate in UN
Korea.
Strong US influence over the UN had made the
UN a puppet and political tool exploited by the
US to achieve its own political agenda
o US comprised almost 90% of the
international forces in UNC, with
troop commitment peaking to
930,000 in 1953.
o UNC led by General McArthur – a US
military general.
o US manipulation of the GA to expand
its mandate in Korea with
Containment through Resolution 498
and legitimise its presence in Korea
through Resolution 380 ‘Peace
through Deeds’
Both US and
USSR
shared common
goal

The USA sponsored resolutions in the SC

 and GA to condemn British and French
aggression and demand for the withdrawal
of all troops from Egypt. The USSR had
invoked 377A to transfer the matter to the
GA in hopes of averting the British VETO.

The USSR and USA had also worked closely

to encourage the initiative and action from
Dag Hammarskjold and second tier powers
to create and mobilise the UNEF.
Congo Crisis Superpower-backed regime further polarised Hostility between
local politics with all three leaders claiming US and USSR
sovereignty but none compromising due to
perceived backing from superpowers.

It also restricted UN course of action out of fear

of upsetting USSR interests, given its
accusations against Hammarskjold of his
favouritism of the US.

Rwanda Reluctance of superpowers to intervene in Focus on Cold

Genocide / conflicts they deemed too isolated War
Cyprus Crisis geographically and strategically from their rivalries narrowed
interests meant that the UN had dragged its superpower
feet on the matter with limited resources. interests

Rwanda suffered worse consequences due to

after effects of Somalia that shaped
superpower reluctance to contribute.
Middle East Peace was maintained in the region as UN action in both brokering of resolutions, Hostility between
Conflicts strong client-patron relationships allowed lobbying for funds and maintenance of peace US and USSR but
superpowers to forcefully exert influence were side lined by superpower unilateral united by
onto locals. actions. UN often only called in to facilitate common
actions already agreed by involved states and goal
Action and resolution to conflict often was superpowers through ‘Shuttle Diplomacy’ with
swift and effective attempts to find peaceful US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Focus on Cold
solutions for the conflict. Jimmy Carter’s Administration leading the War
o UNSC Resolution 242 “Land for ‘Camp David Accords’. rivalries
Peace” Resolution saw the ability grounded
of the UN to initiate a new wave of UNSC resolutions that requested Israeli superpower
efforts from the local parties to withdrawal or implicit recognition of the PLO interests
normalise relations with Israel. were consistently VETO-ed by the US, in the region
especially in the 1982 Lebanon War. This
The convergence of superpower aims upon impeded the ability of the UNSC to act swiftly in
the onset of Détente to prevent a full-scale the matter.
conflict from eruption ensured that there
was commitment to resolving the issue and
commitment of troops to UN Peacekeeping
Forces in the Middle East.
o Polish forces were sent by the
 USSR to be part of UNEF II.
o Both USA and USSR had supported
the establishment of UNEF II and
UNDOF to maintain peace after the
1973 Yom Kippur War, and
continued commitment to UNTSO
established in 1948.
Somalia Crisis The UN could effectively strengthen its Eventual US withdrawal of troops after Black
flailing humanitarian efforts in UNOSOM I Hawk Down also saw a quick diminishing of
through the US-led coalition of UNITAF, to presence and ability of UNOSOM II in Somalia,
further strengthen humanitarian efforts rendering its ineffectiveness.
through all means necessary. The US took
charge of the command and committed The success of the UN is too dependent on
28,000 troops. extent of superpower involvement as the
influence the US held over the GA had a
US reigns on UNITAF allowed for ‘all multiplier effect on Somalia, and the UNSC
necessary means’ to be utilised, no longer voted unanimously for the UN pull out of
bound by UN charter of non-use of force. Somalia. This change of heart affected future
UN peacekeeping missions.
First Gulf War Superpower interest in the region meant Constant US bypass of UN actions to ensue its Hostility between
that UN action was facilitated forward and own hard-line stance of demanding Iraqi US and USSR but
quickly. withdrawal, 230,000 troops in Saudi Arabia united by
and unilateral launching of Operation Desert common
US generosity in troops and financial Shield meant that the UN diplomatic ventures goal
resources allowed for a consolidated effort were side lined.
by the UN to ensue through Operation Focus on Cold
Desert Storm. The UN had no choice but to follow suit to US War
aggression, even if it was not beneficial to rivalries
negotiations and diplomacy. Javier Perez de grounded
Cuellar was forced by US belligerence to superpower
demand Saddam Hussein to unconditionally interests
and fully withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait, a in the region
proposal that was bound for rejection.
Cambodian With the eventual re-commitment of the The USSR VETO of a draft resolution calling for
Crisis USSR to collective security and the initial Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, with the
enthusiasm from the US to commit to sanctioning of the Vietnamese invasion under
peacekeeping post Cold War, the UNTAC the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation,
became the United Nations’ most ambitious bound the hands of the UN with the inability to
peacekeeping force to date with an overcome superpower interests of the USSR.
expansive mandate involving political,
military and humanitarian needs of
Cambodia for the long term.
Yugoslavia US reluctance to commit troops due to
isolation of US interests from European
politics meant inability of UN to commit up to
90% of initial projected troop commitment.
East Timor US pressures in the form of threatening to cut off US
economic aid to Indonesia had allowed for the UN to
gain authority from the Indonesian government to
enter East Timor.
 Secretary-General / Good Offices
• The Secretary-General as a personal agency can be rather effective if acting as an independent body free
from superpower influence or conflicts in the General Assembly and Security Council.
• However, this success was determined by the personal goals and proactivity of individual Secretary-
Generals, shaping their extent of involvement in international diplomacy.

Event Beneficial Impediment Secretary

General
Suez Crisis Clear stance against British and French Dag
hostilities that was backed by superpowers Hammarskjold
and compliant General Assembly, hence
strengthening his course of action.

Persuaded Egyptian President Nasser to

agree to host UNEF 1 troops in the Good
Faith Accords, critical for peacekeeping
mission to be implemented.

Facilitated the formation and mobilisation of

UNEF despite the polarity in the Security
Council.
Congo Crisis Hammarskjold was the one who responded The proactivity of Dag Hammarskjold, while Dag
to the President and PM’s requests to invite refreshing, had also earned him the ire of both Hammarskjold
UN action in Congo. superpowers, which believed he overstepped his U Thant
boundaries as Secretary General in interfering into
Insisted on power and independence of the a superpower proxy conflict with his own
Secretary-General from superpower independent UN agenda.
interests, paving his own paths of
diplomatic negotiations. This involved
multiple personal trips to Congo to facilitate
discussions, and a personal intervention to
prevent Lumumba’s government from
breeching the UNOC’s mandate.
Cuban Missile Secretary-General as middleman U Thant
Crisis facilitating conversations between
Washington D.C. and Moscow to de-
escalate tensions in the naval blockade
and in facilitating the withdrawal of Soviet
missiles from Cuba. Another strong display
of the ‘quiet diplomacy’ of the Secretary
General’s office.
Vietnam War U Thant remained relatively inactive in brokering U Thant
peace negotiations in the Vietnam War, besides
feeble attempts to initiate discussions in the 1968
Paris Peace Talks. He also refrained from making
any further public statements about the Vietnam
War after the US invasion in Vietnam in the 2nd
Vietnam War.
Cyprus Crisis No Secretary-General has been able to convince Kurt Waldheim
Cyprus’ leaders to reunite the country despite
 numerous attempts over 40 years. Javier Perez de
Cuellar
Kurt Waldheim visited Cyprus three times from
1975 to 1979 in attempts to bring local leaders Boutros
together to discuss, but nothing concrete was Boutros-
achieved. Boutros-Boutros Ghali proposed Ghali
confidence-building measures to end tensions but
this was rejected by both communities.

Javier Perez de Cuellar angered the Turkish

Cypriots by demanding all troops withdrawn from
Cyprus.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan had

initiated attempts for peace talks, but to no avail.

This confirms the ineffectiveness of the office of

the Secretary-General that holds no legal or
political weight, especially in intra-state affairs. All
have been unable to provide enough incentive for
leaders to reconsider reunification.
Falklands War Javier Perez de Cuellar was given the mandate by Javier Perez de
the Security Council to search for a peace solution Cuellar
between Argentina and Britain, yet had been
largely ineffective in simply issuing a statement of
appeal for both parties to refrain from violence.
Middle East All UN action and UN diplomatic action
Conflicts traditionally taken on the by the Secretary-
General were side lined by US dominance
over the region and US hard lined stance.
Brokering and lobbying were all done by
‘Shutter Diplomacy’ by Henry Kissinger.

The Secretary-General often has no

independence from superpower interests,
especially in such an intense Cold War arena
dominated by superpower influence in the
Middle East.
First Gulf War Secretary-General forced to follow suit to US hard Javier Perez de
line stance and propose to Iraqi President Saddam Cuellar
Hussein to unilaterally withdraw troops, a proposal
that obviously would not have been accepted. This
limited the possible success the Secretary-General
could have achieved if a less aggressive UN
stance was adopted free from US interests.

Brokering and lobbying done by US Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger and British Foreign
Secretary, touring Middle East and replacing the
traditional role of Secretary-General. The
 superpowers acted in independence from UN
systems to push forth their own action.
Somalia Crisis The misalignment of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and
the USA had led to different interpretations of the
American role in Somalia. While Boutros-Ghali
wanted the USA to have a long-term presence to
resolve the political conflict, the Clinton
Administration had pulled out all troops and
Bush’s Administration refused to comply with the
redeployment of troops.
 Maintenance of Ceasefires
• Maintenance of ceasefires often were largely successful when observed or enforced by the UN, but often
because of the focus on short-term peace results in the ineffectiveness of the UN in solving the
underlying root cause to the tensions.
• Long-term peace is consequentially not achieved and becomes counterproductive as UN presence
remains forcefully grounded there to maintain status quo. This not only becomes resource inefficient, but
also makes the region or country prone to resurgence in tensions and discord that in no way establishes
peace or order.
• Yet, it is crucial to recognise that these observer missions often only included the maintenance of peace
in their mandates, not to resolve the conflict. This thus meant that while UN action was not
comprehensive enough, these missions did not necessarily fail to achieve their mandates. The UN cannot
and should not be blamed for the inability to resolve the conflict through ceasefires, as there often lay
deeper underlying reasons.
• Especially for the earlier conflicts, where the UN was still largely inexperienced in managing security
crises, there was a focus on observing peace and its associated short-term measures. More often than
not, the full resolution of these conflicts often did not and could not lie within the UN’s purview.

Event Strengths Limitations

Palestine The 1949 Armistice Agreement by UNTSO brokered Three military truces in 1948 were almost immediately
by Ralph Bunche that saw almost 20 years of broken after they were brokered.
peace in the region with no eruption of major
conflict. This was a testament that the UN was able With underlying tensions still unresolved, the UN had been
to effectively stabilise military conflict between unable to prevent the eruption of further conflict such as in
hostile parties. the 1958 Suez Crisis, 1968 6-Day War and 1973 Yom
Kippur War.
Kashmir Short-term peace was preserved in the 1949 With underlying tensions still unresolved, the UN had been
Ceasefire by UNMOGIP, preventing further military unable to prevent the eruption of further conflict in the
hostilities from the First Indo-Pakistan War in the 1971 2nd Indo-Pakistan War.
following 2 decades.
Cyprus Crisis Ceasefire maintained by UNFICYP and war did not Arguably too effective in keeping the two peoples
break out. Furthermore, UNFICYP managed to polarised, such that the buffer zone has separated an
prevent the Turkish invasion from compromising entire generation away from each other such that there is
Cyprus sovereignty, with its preventing of Turkish reduced incentive for reunification.
takeover of Nicosia, the capital, and maintaining the
ceasefire in 1974. This was worsened by the inability of the UNSC and UNSG
from getting both peoples to reconcile.
Middle East UNTSO, UNDOF and UNEF II were successful in While peacekeeping missions were relatively simple in
Conflicts maintaining short-term peace brokered by the mandate, these UN missions were only successful in
superpowers to ensure the region does not re- supplementing the more critical role of unilateral peace
plunge into war and conflict. efforts from local parties and the superpowers.
o UNEF II effective in ensuring no further
eruption of violence between Israel and
Egypt from 1973 up till 1979 when the
Camp David Accords was signed.
o UNTSO and UNEF II worked co-operatively
to maintain the Israel-Egypt ceasefire.
o UNTSO and UNDOF worked together to
maintain the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire.
Somalia Crisis Despite the military mandate of UNOSOM II to engage in
 disarmament and maintaining ceasefire, UNOSOM II was
not effective in intimidating or forcing Aydeed to abide by
UN agenda. Instead, Aydeed continued to resist and fight
back, leading to a high death toll of peacekeeping troops.
More than 100 peacekeepers died by 1994 and the ugly
scene of Black Hawk Down saw US Marines brutally
murdered and humiliated by Aydeed’s forces.
Kosovo Crisis UNMIK was successful in maintaining ceasefire, that UNMIK was however, blamed as insincere in distributing
allowed for focus on political and economic power amongst different ethnic factions. Tensions still
development and humanitarian aid to be remained up to 2008 when Kosovo became independent.
distributed.
Cambodian The inability of the UNTAC to facilitate a full disarmament
Crisis and ceasefire from the Khmer Rouge thwarted the UN’s
attempts of finding a long-term political solution in
Cambodia. This saw the elections result holding little
ground in ensuring long-term peace, but instead a
resurgence of civil war and violence soon afterward.
 Compromised Neutrality
• One of the key UN principles includes that of neutrality and impartiality in order to remain fair when
brokering resolutions to conflicts and to not intervene or upset local or regional politics.
• In the light of increasing complexities, especially in non-state actors that result in local levels of polarity,
the UN often is forced to take a side and oppress others for the sake of effective action, but compromises
its neutral stance.
• This breech of neutrality holds severe consequences for the UN. It results in the loss of prestige for the
UN, especially amongst developing member states in strive for sovereignty and stability, the disapproval
and harsh critic of superpowers and future reluctance of countries to allow UN intervention.
• Yet, the post Cold War era saw the evolution of the UN’s directions for peacekeeping, allowing
peacekeeping troops to breech neutrality if it was necessary for the safety of civilians. This allowed
peacekeeping troops to not deal with each party ‘equally’ but act or use force when necessary.

Event Strengths Limitations

Korean War The dominance of US interests and the US monopoly
over the General Assembly caused UN troops to
breech neutrality and impartiality, mobilised to cross
the 38th parallel to attack DPRK aggressively through
Resolution 380. This is despite the fact that the
original mission was to resist DPRK aggression in
South Korea, not pursue Containment through
attacking the DPRK.
Congo Crisis Established the legitimacy of one government to be The Congo Crisis was the first intra-state crisis of
established and solve the problem of a polarised its kind in the decolonisation era that the UN
Congo once and for all. struggled to grapple with. Coupled with added
complexities of superpower rivalry, UN action was
largely marred with partiality.
o UNOC had blocked all Soviet supported
airlifts and closed all air bases to
marginalise Lumumba’s authority, to which
meant the UN implicitly supported the US-
backed Kasa-Vubu regime’s decision to
oust Lumumba from power. This had
brought Hammarskjold and the UN under
international fire.
o UNOC breeched its original mandate
stipulated in Resolution 146 to remain a
neutral party. Instead, it intervened into
local politics by choosing to end Katanga’s
secession through Operation Rumpunch
and Operation Morthor through the use of
force.
 Military Force
• One of the key UN principles includes that of non-use of force in order to preserve stability on the ground
without having to turn fire onto aggressors or civilians in the process.
• In light of the increasing complexities of ‘governments’ harming their own people and countries
entrenched in civil war or ethnic divide, the use of force becomes increasingly applied to tackle these
challenges more effectively.
• This is especially true when UN missions get transferred over to the jurisdiction of the US, where the UN
charter of non-use of force and non-intervention no longer bound these missions.
• Also, the UN charter eventually evolved to allow for ‘all means necessary’ to be used by all peacekeeping
forces, which included legal sanctions and military force. These were evolutions from the original UN
charter, but arguably justified to ensure effectiveness in UN action in light of more complex issues that
cannot be solved solely by diplomacy.

Event Use of Force Justifications / Effectiveness

Congo Crisis The expansion of ONUC’s through UNSC Resolution 161
allowed ONUC to use force to prevent the occurrence of
Civil War in Congo. This saw Operation Grand Slam and
Operation UNOKAT, which were military successes for
the UN able to force Tshombe to surrender.
The original mandate of ONUC was to not use force
except in self-defence, but its mandate was broken
with the increasing pressures on the ground to use
military force to quench the secession of Katanga.
However, the lack of foresight of the UN in gauging the
severity of the conflict led to its initially lacklustre and
inadequate mandate.

Eventually, the UN officially expanded its mandate to

allow the use of force in order to better tackle the
conflict on the ground.
Somalia Crisis Black Hawk Down triggered US peacekeeping forces to Not effective as Aydeed’s forces had still proved too
go on manhunt for radical warlord Aydeed, which had much for UNOSOM II to handle and Aydeed’s forces
caused large amount of civilian and warlord casualties were still not intimidated by UN troops.
at around 3000. This occurred under UNOSOM II,
under UN jurisdiction, where fire was turned onto
locals.
First Gulf War Initially through UNSC Resolutions 660 and 661, the
UNSC had attempted to find non-military solutions for
the conflict.

The forceful use of military means by Operation Dessert

Storm was largely the result of US belligerence.
 Role of General Assembly / UNSC Resolution 377A
• Although the General Assembly often acted swiftly to resolve crises when the UNSC is paralysed, it did not
necessarily act so effectively or independently.
• The General Assembly still remained very dependent on superpower influence, where both the US and
USSR had large enough blocs of alliances in the General Assembly to sway opinion towards their favour.
• The rareness of this being implemented (only twice) shows that the General Assembly in no way replaces
the importance or function of the UNSC.
• Especially pertinent for peacekeeping missions during the Cold War, there was a strong presence of
conflicting USA and USSR interests that often led to the inability to act effectively in coming up with a
possible resolution mechanism.

Event Strengths (Solutions to Superpower Conflict) Limitations

Korean War Swift and decisive action was taken in a bid at collective
security, including employment of means of military
force the UN had never seen before.
Furthermore, the GA was competent in expanding the
mandate of UNC to legitimise its presence in Korea
through Resolution 380 ‘Peace through Deeds’ which
promoted united action to be taken whenever
aggression rises and Resolution 498 that condemned
Chinese aggression in Korea and the continued
presence of UNC to meet this threat. All these were
swift responses in accordance to the developments on
the ground.
Suez Crisis Rise of second tier powers in light of superpower and
SC polarisation was evident. Canada drafted the
resolution passed by the GA to create UNEF I and the
efforts to mobilise UNEF was led by the Canadian
Representative to the UN, Lester Pearson. Other
second tier powers like India, Denmark, Indonesia,
Sweden and Norway played an active role in providing
soldiers and resources for the mobilisation and
commitment to UNEF I.
Entirely subservient to US influence, where the US both
invoked 377A to bypass the Soviet VETO in the UNSC
and contributed to the shaping of the agenda of the
various GA resolutions over the Korean War.
The General Assembly merely acted as a secondary,
alternative platform the US had wanted to achieve its
original outcome in but could not due to polarisation of
UNSC.
The effectiveness of the General Assembly was
propped up by consolidated and unified superpower
stance. The USA strongly condemned the British and
French in two resolutions in the SC and GA, while the
USSR invoked the 377A to overcome British VETO,
proving that alignment of superpower interest is critical
in determining success of crisis management.
The GA was also effective as result of the GA and SG
working in tandem together to find a solution for the
conflict, strengthened by superpower support.
 Increasing complexities of Intrastate Conflicts / Local context
• Intrastate conflicts brought about complexities of humanitarian aid and non-state actors, which introduced
ambiguity of how the UN should manoeuvre in compromise to the principles in the UN charter.
• Due to incompetency and general inexperience, the UN generally did underestimate the magnitude of
conflicts that resulted in troops being unable to carry out effective measures.

Event Impediment
Congo Crisis UN recognition of Mobutu-Kasa-vubu regime, limiting of resources reaching Lumumba’s troops and harsh arrests
on Tshombe’s governors was a key sign that the UN was not clear on what action was ideal to take in unifying the
country and could not take effective action by maintaining a neutral stance. It instead was rendered ineffective,
both internationally by compromising neutrality and risking its reputation and locally by seeding discord amongst
fragmented Congo population.
Somalia Crisis There was a potent UN failure to accurately gauge the magnitude of the conflict and the corresponding strategy
to tackle it due to the very foreign and new kind of intrastate conflict of anarchy emerging in Somalia.
o Underestimated the size of the threat, with an initial proposal of a 50 men observer force.
o The proposed UNOSOM I only had 500 troops to advance humanitarian causes with no mandate for the
use of force. With almost 1.5 million people facing starvation and the never-ending siege of warlords on
UN supplies with troops unable to defend or fight back, such as Aydeed’s siege over Pakistani troops
guarding UN food supplies in Mogadishu, there was a clear inadequacy of too small a peacekeeping
force working on too weak a mandate.
o The UN had continued to refrain from political and military intervention into Somalia, choosing to stick to
the narrow mandate of humanitarian aid through UNOSOM I and UNITAF. This is despite the inability to
engage in humanitarian efforts if the civil war was not first addressed. Only in UNOSOM II was the
mandate of the UN expanded to include forcing the disarmament and ceasefire of Aydeed.
Rwanda The UN had dragged its feet into intervening into Rwanda, with the consistent trend of having too late and too
Genocide little a response. This meant that international will stood still and effectively saw the genocide occur to
completion, with little to no attempts to manage the situation.
Cambodian The fluctuating and polarised stances of the local actors, including Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge and the
Crisis State of Cambodia had made it difficult for the UNTAC to establish a long-term political solution.

Furthermore, the Khmer Rouge was engaging in genocide activities and crimes against humanity, which further
complicated the situation.

Also, there was confusion on which local authority the UN should be accountable to: the local Vietnam puppet
regime or the CGDK government in exile.
Yugoslavia Lack of central government made it difficult for the UN to maintain neutrality or gain consent, with UN
incompetency further exacerbated by tense ethnic divisions amongst Serbs, Muslims and Bosnians. The lack of
mandate to use force, with preference to broker peace agreements with the Serbs / Milosevic despite the failure
of the Three-Fold Agreement, also meant that local violence continued.

Counter-example:
East Timor The lack of pre-existing localised conflict and the lack of any form of political system prior to UN involvement
gave the UN full sovereign control over East Timor, which simplified the local political situation as the UN did not
have to face complexities in neutrality or in gaining consent since there was none to be compromised to begin
with.
 Lack of international commitment
• In light of repeated UN failures, the US had a change in heart and had switched the focus of its foreign
policy to unilaterally withdraw all troops from UN activities.
• Likewise, many countries started to prioritise their national interests and preservation of troops’ lives
over UN missions. This led to exponential decrease in involvement of troops, hence impacting negatively
the ability of the UN in consolidating troops for peacekeeping operations.
• This weakness in military presence almost ensured the capacity and impact of the UN in the conflict would
be minimal since little could be enforced of enough weight to challenge hostile parties.
• The lack of international commitment was most prominent in domestic conflicts, where local events would
have little interest or impact on international stakeholders.

Event Impediment
Cyprus Countries like France and the USSR had refused to provide financial or resource help to the UN, viewing the
Cyprus issue as a domestic conflict rather than an international one that warranted their attention. Also, Cyprus
was not in the geopolitical or Cold War interests of the superpowers. However, it is critical to recognise how even
with the lack of initiation of the P5, the UNFICYP had still managed to carry out its necessary action.

Other UN members were initially unwilling to commit their troops due to the parallel occurrence of the Congo
Crisis, which saw many casualties as a result of peacekeeping.
Somalia Crisis 18 American lives lost in Black Hawk Down had altered the face of peacekeeping permanently as the UN reduced
presence in Somalia, with the Americans pulling out all troops in UNOSOM II by December 1994 and the UNSC
voting unanimously to withdraw from Somalia by March 1995.

This also had a multiplier effect on all other crises that followed. US lack of involvement had a multiplier effect on
the rest of the member states who followed suit to the change in US foreign policy.
Rwanda Crisis It took 5 months for the UN to assemble a 2,548 strong troop for UNAMIR I, which was too little to exert any force
enough intimidation to combat radical efforts at genocide. In fact, Belgium and Pakistan, the only two countries
who contributed, had only intended to commit 400 troops initially. This was further reduced to 27 lightly armed
personnel after local aggressors killed 10 Belgian peacekeepers. UNAMIR could not have coped with 2 million
refugees, 2 million internally displaced citizens and 800,000 dead.

The UN continued to drag its feet, only forced to respond to the humanitarian crisis after 200,000 Rwandans
were already killed in the genocide, through UNAMIR II. Yet, it took the UN another 6 months for 5,500 strong
troop for UNAMIR II to rebuild Rwanda, in which the genocide and damage was already done. Its impact then
remained very limited as it had idly allowed for the conflict to occur.

The United States even went as far as to avoid using the term ‘genocide’ to describe the Rwandan Crisis, so as to
avoid the need for UN commitment to Rwanda.
Cambodia The international community dragged its feet on Cambodia, with a somewhat unwilling attitude to be involved in
Cambodia’s domestic affairs:
o Did not stop the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge, with a genocide killing 2 million Cambodians
o Did not stop the Vietnamese invasion into Cambodia, apart from the passing of several UNGA resolutions
put up by ASEAN members in the 1970s
o Only engaged in efforts in 1991, upon the end of the Cold War ending Soviet support for Vietnam
Yugoslavia Lack of international commitment, coupled with US isolationist stance, led to the UN only being able to consolidate
10% of the targeted 14,000 troops for UNPROFOR. This led to the need for the UN to collaborate with NATO.
 Evolution and Effectiveness of UN Mandate
• Due to increasing complexities in the development of the conflict, the UN mandate in its peacekeeping
troops often was revised to better equip the troops with more leeway to enact action. However, this
sometimes was not the case.
• The UN Mandate often is severely restricted by its inability to breech neutrality and its non-use of force,
whereby only under special circumstances can the UNSC invoke troops with rights to use all force
necessary. This severely limited UN ability to deal with violence and hostilities.

Event Strengths Limitations

East Timor All 4 main UN operations had fulfilled their mandates
effectively without much hindrance, also evolving to
meet the different needs as East Timor progressed.
There was $520 million pledged by UN members for
East Timor.

UNAMET – Referendum organised smoothly

INTERFET – Multinational military force of 22 countries
was effectively consolidated to establish peace and
stability in East Timor, with the commander in charge
declaring 80% of the country being restored to order
by the 30-day mark of the mission.
UNTAET – Building of civilian infrastructures, free and
fair elections, police force and judicial systems
UNMISET – Secondary support role upon East Timor
independence being established to sustain political
stability

Congo Crisis Able to evolve its mandate to meet the changing needs UNOC’s mandate was vague and was interpreted
of the situation on the ground in Congo, strengthening differently by the GA, SG and local leaders.
its ability to manoeuvre in the violent conflict.
UNOC’s original mandate was to facilitate peace with
This saw the expansion with the UNSC Resolution 169 neutrality and non-use of force. However, Lumumba
that called for the SG to take vigorous action. This led wanted to use ONUC to suppress Katanga’s secession
to U Thant engaging in Operation UNOKAT, which and expressed his sentiments to the local UN
allowed for ONUC to use of ‘all force necessary’ to representative, to which broke both the UN’s neutral
force Tshombe to disarm, and Operation Grand Slam in stance and its non-use of force. This was eventually
the use of extreme military force that compelled achieved in Operation Morthor, where UN
Tshombe to surrender. representative O’Brien had authorised the arresting of
leaders to end the secession. This broke the original
mandate of ONUC to remain isolated from internal
party politics.

More alarmingly, Hammarskjold had been unable to

prevent local leaders and even his own UN
representatives from overstepping UNOC’s UN
mandate.

Furthermore, the UN’s recognition of the Mobutu-

Kasa-vubu regime that was US-backed through the
closing of all airfields to stop Soviet supported airlifts
 to Congolese troops was seen as a bridge of neutrality
that warranted USSR aggression and the implicit failure
of UNOC to adhere to its mandate.
Cambodian The UN Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) The failure of an adequate mandate for UNTAC, such
Crisis was the most ambitious peacekeeping operation of the that it could only engage in ‘dialogue, persuasion,
UN, with 22,000 deployed personnel and US$1.7 billion negotiation and diplomacy’ had impeded the ability of
in expenditure following the Paris Peace Agreement UNTAC to deal with local players and to prevent
o Disarmament of the Khmer Rouge continued violence and fighting with its lack of ability to
o Repatriation of 370,000 refugees use force in self-defence or to achieve its mandate of
o Rebuilding of political and social institutions maintaining a ceasefire.
o Temporary policing and military force to
maintain stability in Cambodia
o Facilitating of local elections and support for
the instatement of the new democratically
elected government
Yugoslavia The UN was able to learn from past mistakes in the The lack of proper UN-NATO collaboration prevented
creation of a stronger humanitarian mandate for the employment of NATO assistance to defend
UNPROFOR to engage in its necessary work. This saw Srebrenica from Bosnian Serbs more effectively. NATO,
the UNSC invoking Article 42 to allow for force if which often took a more robust stance on
necessary for the protection and delivery of peacekeeping, often engaged in airstrikes against
humanitarian aid, which saw the by and large Bosnian Serbs despite UNSC instructions not to do so.
smoothness of this aspect of the mandate.
This was made worse by miscommunication and
The UN mandate in Yugoslavia evolved to meet the diverging agenda between Boutros Boutros-Ghali and
needs of the increasingly violent and complex conflict. NATO.
o Resolution 713: Appeal for Ceasefire
o Resolution 752: Humanitarian aid
o Resolution 757: Economic sanctions on
Yugoslavia and boycotting of Serbia
Montenegro from the General Assembly
o Resolution 770: Sanctioned UN use of force
and intervention into Yugoslavia.
Kosovo Crisis The UN and NATO adopted increasingly hardliner The eventual UNMIK set up to resolve the Kosovo
international stance to press Milosevic, Serbian Crisis in its aftermath was weak in mandate with no
nationalist leader of Kosovo, to withdraw his troops and clarity over the political outcome. It was insincere in
end violence. transferring Kosovo sovereignty to the Serbs, even
though most of the political autonomy lay in the hands
This started with UNSC Resolution 1160 first to enact a of the Albanians.
comprehensive arms embargo against Kosovo, then
intervening forcefully for the first time by demanding an This meant that deep-rooted political and ethnic
immediate ceasefire with the threat of force, then the divisions were not resolved, even if the conflict was
UNSC Resolution 1199 that demanded both sides of temporarily stopped through ceasefire.
hostilities to reach a political settlement. NATO then
proceeded with using punitive measures of 78 days of
airstrikes to prevent Milosevic from continuing his
escalated campaign against Kosovo Albanians.
Rwandan While the mandate of UNAMIR I was to maintain the
Genocide ceasefire agreement from the earlier civil war, there
was no inclusion of any responsibility to stop violence
or prevent the genocide from occurring. UNAMIR I was
also not armed and unable to resist any violence
occurring locally.

UNAMIR II, despite being lightly armed, had no legal

mandate to fight back against local aggressors or to
stop the genocide. This arose from the general
unwillingness of the UN, post-Somalia, to commit to
large scale military missions for peacekeeping.
 US Unilateral Actions independent of UN Mandate
• In security crises with high Cold War stakes or of pertinent US interests, US often pursued its own foreign
agenda unilaterally with supplementary efforts from the UN in follow-up action.
• This often either led to the effective resolution of crises at the expense of the UN being entirely side lined
or compromised in principle and position.

Event Limitations
Korean War The US was often accused of using the UN as a means to advance its own Cold War policies. Besides pushing for
the United Nations Command multilateral effort, the US also had acted unilaterally in:
o Deploying US troops from Japan to Osan in July 1950 before UN intervention in the Korean Peninsular
o Deploying the US 7th Fleet to the Korean Peninsula
Lebanon War Beyond endlessly VETOing any and all resolutions that went against the interests of Israel in the UNSC, the US
took matters into their own hands to broker their own peace in the Lebanon War by creating the Multinational
Force in Lebanon comprising of Western allies.
o MNF had marginalised the work of UNFIL with its stronger mandate and more aggressive leadership.
o The MNF had allowed for continued Israeli occupation of Lebanon, while also served US-Israel interests
in removing 7,500 Palestinian fighters related to the PLO from Beirut to preserve Israel’s security
concerns.
Yugoslavia In the UN-NATO collaboration, the NATO made it very clear that it was not under UN direction, viewing its role
most robustly as a multilateral military intervention. NATO engaged in air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, which
contradicted instructions given by the UNSC.

The UNSC had used its VETO against NATO resolutions very frequently, due to the clashing of UN’s peacekeeping
stance with NATO’s military interventionist stance.
First Gulf War The US had very strong interests in the conflict, and hence engaged belligerently on a dominating, unilateral
policy advancing its own political agenda in Kuwait against Iraq. This more often than not saw the US overtly
dominating and controlling UN course of action, and often saw the US engaging in unilateral action.

US unilateral action:
o Unilateral launch of Operation Desert Shield, where 230,000 American troops were sent to Saudi Arabia
to deter any further invasion by Iraq into the territory its regional neighbours.
o Unilateral launch of Operation Desert Storm on 15th February 1991 in US military action against Iraq to
force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
o President Bush authorised a doubling of US troops to Iraq and Kuwait even before the deadline for Iraqi
withdrawal on 15 January 1991 could come to fruition.

US dominating / marginalizing the United Nations:

o The US drafted all 12 UNSC resolutions passed on the matter, directly faxed from Washington D.C, and
had with the efforts of the US Representative to the UN, Thomas Pickering, saw all 12 passed by the
Security Council with a comfortable majority and no use of VETO.
o The US, with personal efforts from President Bush, pushed the UN to form a military coalition of
international forces for Operation Dessert Storm. When the mission was launched, the UN Secretary
General was not informed of US military movements.
o The US ignored the Soviet-brokered UN proposal with Iraq to negotiate an agreement for the withdrawal
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and entirely overstepped Javier Perez de Cuellar’s personal attempts at
Baghdad to broker peace negotiations with Saddam Hussein. Instead, the US forcefully passed the UNSC
Resolution 678 to demand for full Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait or face ‘all forces necessary’ in an
ultimatum against Saddam Hussein.
 Analysis of Peacekeeping – Time Frames

Early Period Interim Period Later Period

(End of WWII & Origins of Cold War) (Détente & End of Cold War) (Post Cold War)
Nature of Interstate conflicts with persistence Interstate conflicts and intrastate
Intrastate or regional conflicts
Conflicts of violence. conflicts were evident. prevalent.
UN Approach Strong focus on peacekeeping. Increasingly complex challenges Strong focus on peace building and
• Early missions had involved with the rise of non-state actors
an expansion of the UN’s mandate.
small mandates focused on especially in newly independent • Catalysed by renewed
observer missions to maintain countries and intrastate conflicts. commitment from USA and
ceasefires and ensure the lack • Required the constant renewal USSR, along with the
of violence. and expansion of mandates to international community, to
handle increasingly tricky commit to multilateral
situations. peacekeeping.
• Budget increased from $230
million to $3.6 billion annually.
Cold War Teething challenges with USA and USSR friction and use of VETO in the No longer hindered by superpower
Context UNSC. This was overcome to a certain extent by the introduction of the conflict, but instead benefitted from
Uniting for Peace Resolution 377A. superpower co-operation.

Yet, there remained the pertinent responsibility of the Secretary General in

navigating through superpower relations to ensure that UN course of
action does not overtly favour either party to ground the commitment of
both superpowers in the UN.

Cold War interests also meant that some crises had more attention and
therefore more effective resolution than others.
UN International Laws
Characteristics of International Law

• International Law is discussed and agreed upon by consensus building amongst UN member states.
o Consensus building allows member states to exert indirect moral pressures on those who
breech these laws to conform to international standards.
o However, this may lead to a biased nature of conventions in only representing views of the
majority and neglecting the objections of the minorities.
• Disputed nature of international law due to the inherent considerations of national interests impeding
the formation of an international consensus on a complete definition of international problems.
o This undermines the effectiveness of international law by undermining its credibility. This then
makes it difficult for the UN to enforce these laws and see its abidance by it from the
international community.
o International Law often is only able to react to existing problems rather than pre-empting
them, limiting its effectiveness.
• Requires external enforcement by the UNSC.
o Although signing the UN Charter binds all 192-member states to be subjected to the rules
defined in the UN Charter, this does not guarantee that all countries will abide by it.
o All punishments for breeches of international law and rulings by the International Court of
Justice need to be enforced by the Security Council if the state does not accept them willingly.
 UN Organs of International Law

Effective Limitations
General Assembly Ability to conduct research and shed attention on Non-binding nature prevents its
areas of concern pertinent to international co- recommendations and resolutions as being
operation. This allows the arrangement of accepted as international law.
research and technical expertise to be made o Dependent on the voluntary abidance of
available to the UN for further development. member states to the General Assembly’s
o Article 13 of Chapter 4 of UN Charter: GA resolutions.
shall initiate studies and make o Upon ratification, these recommendations
recommendations for the purpose of become legally binding. BUT ratification is a
promoting international co-operation. voluntary process that member states must
o Setting up of the General Assembly Sixth be willing to take up.
Committee to make concrete
recommendations from legal advisors to
member states, creating a basis for
development of future international laws.
o Creation of special committees to examine
specific legal matters, such as SPECPOL and
DISEC.
International Law Does research and formulates information critical
Commission for the development of international law to be
sent to the General Assembly for further
consideration.
o Convention on the non-navigational uses of
international watercourses in 1997
o Convention of the Law of Treaties between
states and international organisations or
between international organisations adopted
in 1986.

Membership is opened to all states to become

parties by a voluntary basis.
o Direct role in contributing proposals
o Indirect role in shaping domestic behaviour
and modifying their practices to adhere to
international norms and standards.
International Court Enforcement of breeches of international laws can The ICJ can only deal with states, but not
of Justice be brought to a just, in-house mediation platform individual criminals.
where states can resolve their disputes fairly. o Renders it ineffective in later security crises
where non-state actors are involved.

Advisory opinions and ‘verdicts’ of the ICJ are

non-binding in nature, dependent on the
voluntary acceptance of states.
o It is dependent on the Security Council to
enforce its verdicts should countries not
comply. This becomes difficult when the
parties involved include P5 members.
 Effectiveness and Comprehensiveness

Strengths Limitations
1948 Genocide Responded quickly to the calls from Cuba, India and The ICC and Special Tribunals could
Convention Panama to consider genocide after the horrors of the be exploited as political tools to
(71% ratification) Holocaust in WWII. It was also a confirmatory codification of advance Western agenda, evident in
a well-established international norm that genocide was not its selective usage of it with only
to be tolerated and was a gross act of a breech of human criminals from African states tried.
rights.
Even though genocide was an
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the internationally recognised crime and
Crime of Genocide was adopted in 1948 only after two the convention had been up since
years of discussions. 1948, the UN could not prevent
future episodes of genocide in
Addressed a pressing concern that only states and not Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia etc.
individuals can be persecuted for the conduction of
genocide. Cumbersome process that would take
o Creation of Special Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia up to decades for research, fact
o Creation of the International Criminal Court check and for a fair verdict to be
issued.
Allowed the resolution of intra-state conflicts where o Criminal Tribunal for
governments embarked on genocides on its own people. Yugoslavia started in 1993
but is only due to complete
its mandate by 2014,
costing $271 million.
o Perceived biasness in
charging Serbians and not
Albanians for the conflict.
UN Convention on the Consistent attempt to address a pertinent area of need UNCLOS was non-binding and
Law of the Seas stemming from territorial, economic and defence concerns. depended heavily on the willingness
(UNCLOS) o Three conferences were held in a span of three of countries to ratify and abide by its
decades to improve UNCLOS. recommendations.

Responded to the need to address inconsistencies in sea

borders adopted by different countries and to address the
changing importance and usage of the sea with improved
technology and changing national interests.
Conference Focused on defining and creating a fixed set of consistent Definitions were thought to be unfair
ONE practices for the international community to abide by, by favouring technologically advanced
addressing previous inconsistencies. states.
o Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone o Convention on the Continental
established what an island was as naturally occurring Shelf was not precise in its
and able to exist during high tide. It also established definition, setting a limit of 200
that coastal states have sovereign control of metres of seabed that gave
approximately 12 miles from its baseline. technologically advanced states
o Convention on the High Seas defined what an advantage with the ability to
international waters were and the rights of landlocked explore greater depths.
countries to these waters.
Conference No new international agreements
TWO were achieved.
 Conference The GA responded relatively unanimously to Malta’s urge There was an ideological controversy
THREE that there was to be more clearly defined national over Part IX of UNCLOS III that led to
(80% ratification) jurisdiction of the waters in fear of superpower assertion of strong US objection.
interests in the seas as part of Cold War rhetoric. o Distribution of resources by the
o Passed with 108 votes, 1 objection (USA) and 14 International Seabed Authority
abstentions (from the USSR bloc). from seabed exploration was a
violation of free market principles
The process was accommodative of all countries, with over and favoured Socialist (USSR)
160 countries participating, in a long but comprehensive states.
process of 6 years of discussions. o Concerns over the use of
o Helped to gain almost universal consensus in an revenue to potentially harm US
international law that would be widely accepted by the security interests.
international community.
Favouritism of coastal states over
UNCLOS III worked on the ambiguities of UNCLOS I in landlocked countries
improving vague definitions, showing its ability to evolve o Coastal states were given up to
and adapt. 200 nautical miles of an
exclusive economic zone while
It was also effective in addressing more clearly the landlocked countries were only
boundaries, limitations and leeway of the rights of coastal given permission for navigation,
states to their surrounding waters. which was still subjected to
o Expansion of territorial waters from 12 nautical miles approval by these coastal states.
to 24 in a new contiguous zone. o This affected fishing yield and
o Expansion of exclusive economic zones and harvesting of natural resources
continental shelf to 200 nautical miles, with room for from the sea.
further expansion.
o Established the seabed exploration as the ‘common
heritage of mankind’ and allowed equitable distribution
of its resources.

Yet, it also ensured that the interests of landlocked states

would be protected.
o Establishment of the freedom of transit passages
through straits to allow the safety of international
waters for naval travel and commerce.
Laws against The GA responded to increasing worries from member
International states over the prevalence of terrorism globally.
Terrorism o 1960 – 1970: Frequent acts of terrorism through
Japanese Red Army 1972 massacre of 26 civilians on
an Israeli flight and the Munich Massacre. Kurt
Waldheim responded to the Munich Massacre by
placing terrorism on the agenda of the UNGA.
o 1990s: Increased acts of terrorism against the US with
Al-Qaeda / Hamas attacks.
International Civil Aviation Organisation’s Conventions on
Hijacking saw new conventions introduced to address
hijacking issues that were well-received by the international
community. These were effective with average skyjacking
dropping from 18 in 1969 to 1.5 in 1986.
Yet, there was increasing polarisation
of the global community and a
decrease in consensus building with
differing definitions of ‘terrorism’.
This also aroused disagreements on
the necessity behind the different
methods of terrorism and whether
they should be outlawed.
o West // Algeria and Libya divide
when Algeria and Libya wanted
to exclude populations attacking
colonial regimes from the 1979
Convention against the taking of
hostages.
 o 1963 Tokyo Convention defined jurisdiction for Also, there were bureaucratic
hijacking crimes and gave power to aircraft impediments and the lack of
commanders. practicality of some of the proposed
o 1970 Hague Convention obliged states to take measures.
measures against hijacking crimes. o Only 17 states ratified the 1997
o 1971 Montreal Convention on unlawful acts occurring Convention for the suppression
on the ground. of terrorist bombings, hence
o 1987 Protocol on acts of violence in airports rendering it unable to come into
o 1991 Convention on the marking of plastic explosives force.
o Only 2 states ratified the 1999
1997 Convention against taking of Hostages Convention for the suppression
o Referred to the Sixth Committee after West Germany of the financing of terrorism due
initiated discussion of this in 1976 after its embassy in to the controversy of bank
Sweden was under terrorist siege. secrecy.
o 94 countries ratified it by 2000.

1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist

Bombings
o Took a harsh stance in cracking down on terrorist safe
havens, requiring international extradition of terrorists.

There was the establishment of international organisations

such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the
International Atomic Agency and the International Maritime
Organisation to regulate terrorist activities.

The General Assembly Sixth Committee came up with 13

recommendations for the General Assembly to further
develop into conventions for discussions.
Laws to uphold Enjoyed large success due to the ready acceptance of the Such conventions would require
Human Rights international community over such principles. Many would international intervention into states
agree and not contend that human rights is an issue to be should there be breeches of human
addressed, and hence required little enforcement and rights, but this runs off tangent to the
sparked little controversy. principle of non-intervention
enshrined in the UN Charter.
The 1948 Proclamation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights soon became the international norm, with its While the UN can be lauded for its
terms widely accepted universally. long-term commitment to maintaining
o This was supplemented by the International Bill of and monitoring the ratification and
Rights that give other supplementary documents for abidance to international law, the
political rights, social rights and economic rights that effectiveness of committees in
entered into force in 1976. carrying out their stipulated duties is
impeded by the inability to enforce
The 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of countries to abide by its procedures.
Racial Discrimination was comprehensive in its attempts to o Incomplete reporting prevents
address racial discrimination universally. the UN Committee on the
o Urges countries to illegalise racial hatred and racial Elimination of Racial
discrimination domestically. Discrimination from carrying out
o Dispute resolution mechanism to be referred to the ICJ, its work. As of 2008, 20
as done so by Georgia against Russia. countries have failed to report in
 o Individual complaints were to be processed by the UN more than 10 years and Sierra
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Leone has not reported since
1976.
The 1984 Convention against Torture and other cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment of punishment had
obliged states to prevent torture in their countries and was
accepted as a principle of customary international law.
o Urges countries to prevent all acts of torture within
their territory.
o The Committee Against Torture monitors the
implementation of the convention by states, and can
consider launching complaints.
o As of 2010, there are 147 signatories for the
convention.

Enforcement

Limitations
1948 Genocide The rulings of the ICC and Special Tribunals were not legally binding. The verdicts were to be willingly
Convention acted upon by the states in which the crime happened to ensue punishment.

UNCLOS Newly independent states, which only participated as clients in UNCLOS I and II, were not legally
bounded to abide by the conventions established in UNCLOS I and II. This created ambiguities as to
the jurisdiction and the universality of UNCLOS I and II and whether UNCLOS could be enforced onto
them.

UNCLOS was only successful in managing international relations but could not force countries to
abide by its principles.
o South China Sea dispute: China reclamation of land to form ‘islands’ to lay claims using UNCLOS
on the surrounding waters of these islands
Laws against The UN is not an international policing body that could punish terrorists who breeched these
International international protocols, depending heavily on the states themselves to do so.
Terrorism

UN International Court of Justice

Effectiveness and Comprehensiveness

Strengths Limitations
Corfu Channel Able to determine an impartial ruling that
(1946) recognised the rights and the wrongs of both
parties in the case.
[Albania and UK] o Ruled that Albania was responsible for
compromising the right to innocent passage,
but its sovereignty was infringed by further
actions of the British.
o Ruled that Britain was responsible for
infringing Albania’s sovereignty, but should
receive reparations for its damages.
 Both parties accepted the rulings very readily
and the dispute was ended.
Anglo-Icelandic The ICJ had ruled that it had jurisdiction to rule
Cod Wars over the case brought to its attention by the
(1958 to 1974) United Kingdom, despite Iceland’s refusal to
confer jurisdiction to the ICJ.
[Iceland and UK]
The ICJ’s legitimacy and reputation was
undermined by the refusal of a small power like
Iceland to confer jurisdiction of the issue to the
ICJ. This set a precedence of other states’
behaviour towards the ICJ.
o Even after the ICJ’s ruling of its jurisdiction,
Iceland had not complied, with its absence
from hearings and refusal to co-operate.

Either party did not enact the final verdict,

although it was ruled in favour of Britain.
o ICJ’s rulings were side lined by NATO’s
concerns of Iceland’s threat of withdrawing
from NATO and shutting down a NATO
military base in Icelandic territory.

The ICJ also had to deal with Iceland’s unilateral

action of expanding its exclusive economic zone
while the developments and definitions were
ironed out in parallel events at UNCLOS
conferences.
Namibia’s Despite its inability to rule, the ICJ provided ICJ’s initial effectiveness was limited with its
Independence numerous advisory opinions on the matter to ruling to dismiss the case put forth by Liberia
(1950 to 1966) shape the course of action of GA and SC. and Ethiopia.
o Advisory Opinion 1971: Ruled that South o ICJ ruled that it had no jurisdiction, given
[South Africa and Africa’s presence was illegal and that she that Liberia and Ethiopia had no legal right
Namibia] was under legal obligation to withdraw from or interest to invoke compulsory jurisdiction
Namibia and respect its sovereignty. over the matter.
Phreah Vihear The willingness of both countries to refer the The initial 1962 ruling was vague and did not
Temple matter to the ICJ voluntarily was a sign of clearly state the jurisdiction of the temple and its
(1962) legitimacy of the ICJ. This had also helped to surrounding areas.
avert war between the two countries over border o 1962: Temple belonged to Cambodia, the
[Cambodia and disputes. direct route to it belonged to Thailand
Thailand] o Vagueness led to re-ignition of border
clashes between the two countries when
Cambodia tried to establish the temple as a
UNESCO World Heritage site.
o Required clarification in a second 2013 ICJ
hearing to rule that Cambodia was also
sovereign over the surrounding areas of the
temple.
Iran Hostage The ICJ rulings had little impact on the decision
Crisis of Iran to release the hostages. It was, rather,
(1979 to 1981) shaped by international circumstances and
pressures against Iran.
[Iran and USA] o Iran was compelled to resolve the issue due
to its agenda for UN help in the Iraqi
 invasion of Iran.
o International support for USA and
condemnation of Iran was in alignment to
their own national interests and an intuitive
response to reject such infringement of
international law
o Furthermore, with the UNSC’s unanimous
resolutions and the American government’s
actions of freezing US$13 billion worth of
Iranian assets in USA, the Algiers Records of
1981 between US and Iran took place.
Nicaragua The ICJ was clearly not a puppet of US interests Nicaragua eventually withdrew its complaints
(1984) and was able to rule impartially and against a from the ICJ, despite the ICJ ruling in favour of
superpower. Nicaragua over the USA.
[Nicaragua and o Upon Nicaragua’s referring of the matter to
USA] the ICJ, the ICJ ruled that it had jurisdiction
over the matter despite USA’s argument that
the ICJ had ‘neither the jurisdiction nor the
competence’ to take on the case.
o Both its initial and final rulings in 1984 and
1986 were against the USA, demanding for
the USA to stop its use of unlawful force and
the USA’s breeches of international law in
infringing the sovereignty of Nicaragua. The
ICJ had outlawed US’ financial support to the
Contras as an infringement of Nicaragua’s
sovereignty.
 Enforcement / Dependence on GA and SC

Strengths Limitations
Corfu Channel Did not require help from the GA or SC to enforce Could not enforce or speed up the repayment of
(1946) the rulings as both parties had voluntarily the 850,000-pound compensation Albania had
[Albania and UK] accepted the ICJ ruling. to pay the United Kingdom.
Namibia’s There was a clear alignment and co-operation Entirely dependent on GA and SC to mount
Independence between the GA, SC and ICJ to ensure that the international pressures on South Africa and
(1950 to 1966) issue would be resolved with proper verdicts. force its compliance to withdraw from Namibia.
o 1971 ICJ Advisory Opinion was reinstated
[South Africa and with SC Resolution 276, where the SC took The ICJ was limited entirely by the lack of South
Namibia] active steps to enforce ICJ’s ‘rulings’. Africa’s active referring of the case to the ICJ for
o Increased pressure from the GA saw the jurisdiction.
gradual breaking of diplomatic relations
between member states and South Africa in
1962. This was followed by further action in
1968 to recognise Namibia as an
independent country and call upon the SC.
o SC adopted sanctions against South Africa
and through Resolution 566 called for an
arms embargo against South Africa in 1985.
Phreah Vihear The ICJ could act independently from the GA and Thailand only accepted the 1962 ICJ ruling upon
Temple SC despite discrepancies over its ruling. international pressures that forced it to withdraw
(1962) its claims of the ICJ’s bias against Thailand.

[Cambodia and
Thailand]
Iran Hostage Strong dependence on the SC to enforce the
Crisis ICJ’s rulings against Iran.
(1979 to 1981) o SC passed unanimous resolutions, such as
Resolution 457 to call for the release of the
[Iran and USA] hostages and Resolution 461 to continue
condemning Iran.
Nicaragua The ICJ’s rulings could not be enforced upon
(1984) American unwillingness to accept it due to the
VETO rights the Americans held in SC.
[Nicaragua and o USA hence was not required to stop aid to
USA] the Contras and did not have to pay
reparations to Nicaragua.