18 HORJ\OS MYNATTY
Source: Hormis Mynatty, "The Concept of Social Sin,"
Louvain Studies 16 (1991): 3-26.
Guilt and Responsibility
Even though we have seen that people are not only the victims
but also the agents of sinful social structures, participation in them
need not be sinful in every instance and in the c�tse of every person.
The ambiguity that arises from the very necessity of social structures,
'sin of the world' and the very limitations of human life itself,
requires sometimes continued participation in thi! existing structures
because an alternative may not be immediately feasible. Ordinary
people are often ignorant of the global ramifications o( injustice
perpetrated through unjust social srruc,ures and institutions, and
even when they come to know about it, they often experience a
powerlessness to act agai nst them. If we do not r 1ke this predicamen t
of human life into consideration in the discu ;sion on the social­
structural dimension of sin, we would be makio � everyone guilty of
every social injustice. We also cannot forget the JJCt that situations of
injustice arise not only from malice bur also fro r 1 ignorance, inatten­
tiveness and other objectifications of the 'sin uf the world. '48 The
term moral always refers to intentionality, i.e. to ;:he sphere of human
freedom and responsibility. lf this fact is nor t.'1ken into considera­
tion, one gets into the absurd position of having to ralk about evems
as immoral which are not really so. In the contemporary discussion on
'social' or 'structural' sin, it is not difficult to observe that many do
not distinguish between ontic, premoral, moral and postmoral evil. Tt
would be absurd to characterize every evil or conAict in social reality
as social sin without proper ethical analysis. Unnecessary exaggera­
tion of the guilt aspect of this reality can become counter-productive
and lead only to paralyze the moral sensitivity of many people.
Therefore, one of the crucial problems which needs to be
clarified in the contemporary discussion on 'social' or 'structural' si n
is the question of guilt and responsibility. Only by bringing the
question of guilt and responsibility into a correct perspective, can we
speak realistically about the social-structural dimension of sin. On
the one hand, we should beware of wholesale imputation of guilt,
47· ]. Lois & J.L. Batbeto, "Erica cristiana de Ia liberaci6n en America
Latina," Moralia 10 (1988) 91-t18, p. 109.
48. J. Fuchs, "The 'Sin of the World' and Normati,·e Moralitr," Go-G1.
·rHE CONCEPT 01' SOCIAL SIN
making a few individuals or a group the sole protagonists of all
unjust structures. On the other hand, the question of guilt cannot be
ruled out absolutely in any discussion on the social-structural dimen­
sion of sin.
from the outset it seems necessary tO disti nguish between guilt
and responsibility. Someone can be really guilty of participating i n
sinful social structures o r social s i n only t o the extent that hefshe
consciously and willfully does that. Even in the case of conscious
participation in such situations, we have to take into consideration
the essential ambigu ity of the very necessity of social structures, the
ambiguity arising from ontic, premoral and posrmoral evil, the
inAuence of the 'sin of the world,' the ambiguity of motivarion and
so on. lo one can live withou� social structures. Everyone is born
into social structures, good or bad, and through socialization and
education they internalize and reproduce them. Often this process
goes ·on unconsciously. Therefore, an individual or a society cannot
be held guilty for every evil that is perpetrated through social
structures. In such a s it u ation , the discussion on the social-stn:ctural
dimension of sin should not be one that paralyzes people. But it
should be one that realistically recognizes the present condition of
human life and aims at motivating persons gradually tO recognize
structural injustice in society and their participation in it and their
responsibility ro act against it as far as possible.
Moral judgement on any participation in social sin should not
be made merely on the basis of an ' ideal' but on the 'concretely
possible' in the particular situation. If we disregard the present
condition of humankind and i ts concrete situation, and base our
moral judgments only on the ideal we want to realize , our moral
judgments will be unrealistic and we will make human Ufe unbear­
able.49 In the absence of eschatological perfection, the best course of
action will mean the best attempt to find a way beyond present
limitations ro a self-realization of persons and the development of the
society.
The very notion of 'social' or 'structural' sin was introduced
into theological discussion precisely because in the reality designated
by these terms, the configuration of guilt is so complex that it is not
possible to speak anymore of mere personal guilt. It seems that in the
case of the social-structural dimension of sin we have to avoid the
notion of guilt as far as possible. Many of the social evils perpetrated
49· Ibid., G4-GG. See also J. Fuchs, Ptrsonal Rupomibilii.J and Christian Moralii.J
{tr. \'(/. CJc,·es; \'\1ashington: Georgetown University Press, l!)8 3) 1 8 3·
20 HORMlS MYN1\ITY
in the community are beyond moral guilt, for n·)t all of rhem srem
from willful and deliberate moral action. But on rhe other hand, not
all of them arc determined by circumstances. i\fany sinful social
structures come about and are perpetuated because people willingly
opt for them, because of the privileges offered by them. Therefore, in
the consideration of guilt in this context we have to avoid two
extremes. To ignore any moral consideration of the social-srructural
dimension of sin because c.f the difficulty of setting responsibility or
to suggest that persons in a given society have little or no responsibi­
lity for the sinful social structures is equal w returning co the
individualistic approach of past moral reflecrion. But it is equally
dangerous to move to the other extreme of immediately blaming
individuals and groups for every instance of unjust structures. While
.
emphasizing the social-structural dimension of sin, we sho_uld not fall
into the same mistake of the manualists who extetnalized and
quantified individual sin, often imposing guilt on those who had not
incurred it.SO The very incorporation of the. social-structural dimen­
sion of sin into moral-theological discussion should be an apt
corrective to the exaggerated emphasis of the past on personal guilt.
More than guilt, the recognition of the socia'l-structural dimension of
sin should primarily point to social responsibility w deal with it
adequately.
Social Responsibility
The mere fact that someone happens to live and partiCipate in
an unjust structure does not mean that hefshe is guilty of social sin;
but at the same time, we can say that they have responsibility for it.
While speaking about moral responsibility for dealing with sinful
social structures, it seems appropriate to make a distinction between
accountability and responsibility. By accountability here we do not
mean blameworthiness or guilt as it is normally undersrood in ethical
discussions. As inheritors or participants in the sinful social struc­
tures which are detrimental to personal and social life, everyone is
accountable for them, even if one is not guilty for this participation
and inheritance. This accountability again calls for the positive
responsibility to co-operate actively to change these sinful social
structures or to set up more just social structures.
10. D.F. Kelly, "Aspects of Sin in Today's Th<'ology," '91·
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL SIN 21
\Vhile someone can be guilty only for the intended or foreseen
consequences of one's actions or omissions, he or she i s responsible
in a moral sense both for intended and unintended or unforeseen
consequences of rheir acrions and omissions, not necessarily in the
sense of being guilty but of being responsible to undo the damages
caused. There is a disproportion between our conscious acts and
their effects, between our subjective conscience and its objective
consequences. That means our acts have larger significance than our
inrenrion and knowledgeY Since both the inrended and unintended
consequences of our actions equally affect the social reality and other
people, we cannot simply disregard the unforeseen consequences of
actions and omissions as morally irrelevant, as the rationalist, manual
tradition did. The injusrice which a p'erson does has ramifications
beyond his/her intentions, especially when it is mediated through
social srrucrures. According to Emmanuel Levinas, even if the
intent1'on of the person does not accompany the act to its most
distant consequences, the person is responsibile for these unintended
consequences. He writes: "The intention does not follow the act all
the way ro irs ultimate consequences and yet, the I knows itself to be
responsible for these ultimate consequences."52 In rhe case of sinful
social structures, even though much of the evil is the result of
unforeseen and unimended consequences of human actions and
omissions, once ir is esrablished, they persist and assume a kind of
autonomous exisrence and continue their oppression. Because of this
reason, we think that even though a person is morally guilty only for
the intended consequences, he/she is also responsible to deal with the
unintended consequences of hisfher actions and omissions s3
.
In traditional moral theology, the extreme emphasis on 'full
knowledge' and 'full consent' as the sole criteria to define personal
guilt, paved the way for an extremely individualistic ethic without
any consideration for the evil perpetuated in society unintentionally
or through omissions. No one was responsible for social evils which
were the result of rhe unforeseen consequences of human action and
omissions, and so these did not come under the ambit of moral
consideration. The complete separation between physical and moral
evil, made by the rarionalist tradition, resulted in the fact that what
has traditionally been called physical evil no longer has any role in
1 1 . C. Uoff, "0 pecado social," 694.
p. E. Levinas, "Le moi cr Ia totalitc," Re�·11e de Mitaphpique tf de Morale 1 9
(1914) 313-n3, p. 36o.
H· R.A. McCormick, ";\lora! Theology since Vatican II: Clarity or Chaos,"
Crou Currtntr 29 (1979) l j -27, p. 19. <
 2.2. HORMIS MYNATTY
moral theological reflection and has nor even been considered as evil.
Thus, any evil caused indirectly or by omission was regarded as
unimportant. Only moral evil came under moral reflection. In this
approach, the notion of responsibility lost most of its mean:ng, ;tnd
consequently the possibility for abuse and n egligence grew out of
proportion. This negligence of responsibility was more pre valen t in
the field of social justice. Today moral theologians are becoming
more and more aware of the absurdity of this type of rigid moral
reflection.54 The natural result of such a traditi on is that the Catholic
community corporately is still under the grip of a dormant social
conscience.
Therefore, if we want to address structural injustice in the
society properly, which is often the unintended consequence of
human action or omission, we need to avoid rhe individualistic
'
notion of guilt and broaden our notion of rcspoosibility}s In tht: face
· of sinful social structures, we are responsible not only for conscious
and willful participation in social sin but also f0r dismantling those
structures as far as possible or setting up new structures that
guarantee the human dignity of all. Even though we have ro
realistically accept the possibility of ontic evil bein g caused or
premoral evil being allowed without guilt being arrributed, because
of the ambiguity arising from human life, hisrorical limir:nions and
the 'sin of the world,' the emphasis should be always on moral
responsibility to deal with this type of evil. \X.'e have to recognize
moral responsibility for social evil eve1 wher� there is no moral
guilt.
When we apply this notion of moral respons ibi lity co si nfu l
social structures, we hav e to admit the fact 1 hat we c:�rry moral
responsibility for them even when we are not ntorally gu il ty . Those
who are involved in such structures and partie: ?ate in them cannot
shirk responsibility, saying that they have not : carted them vr they
54· Joseph Selling observes: "In the area of social justice, it was 2pparenc
that many evils were being perpetrated by the maintenar:ce of the existing socio­
economic systems prevalent in the western world. The poveny of the majority of
the world's population was somehow linked to the economic stwcturcs of the rich
minority. The status of minority groups was kept low through the protection of the
privileges of the middle classes. And yet, all this was justified through the claim that
any such evil caused was not intended, was merely indirect, and was therefore
somehow not the responsibility of those who 'incidently' brought it about."'
J.A. Selling, "The Development of Proporcionalist Thinking," 170.
l l · P. Kerans, Si
nf111 Socia l Strut/11m (New York, 1974) n-�8; :-.l.J. Rigali,
"Human Solidarity and Sin in the Apostolic Exhortation, Reconciliation and
Penance," The Living Light 21 (t 98 �} 337-344, p. 344·
THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL SI�
are not in a posicion co change them. People often try to escape the
responsibility for unjust structures, saying that they have not opted
for them and are not in command of the situation. It is a fact that the
majority of the people have not opted for such structures and
insrittnions, bu t t hey arc: caught up in them. But it is also true that
L hc y inherited them, were socialized in them, now participate and
profi t from them, and at least unconsciousl y help to maintain them.
Regardless of their lack of choice, they are involved in them. These
's in ful' structures arc part and pa rcel of their life and culture. In this
sense we can say that they are accountable for such sinful social
structures and institutions. They are accountable for tpeir present
p:trriciparion and im·olvement, consciously or not, even though they
- did not scan them. Since the unjust social structures are negatively
affecting the life of everyone, the society as a whole, as the present
inheritor, is accountabJe. S6
._.(\ccountability i s an important elemenc of moral responsibility.
One must answer for or give account of what one d oes. There is an
important social dimension to accountability. It points to a process
by which one answers to others who question himfher about what
they arc doing. A person or a community is accountable to others
because what they do as individuals or as a community affects others
as indi,·iduals or groups, for good or evil. Therefore, accountability
in the last analysis points to the ultimate meaning of our acts, i.e. to
the contribution they make tO the development of the society as a
whole, for good or evil.5i
l n the case of participation in u njust structures, merely ac­
cepting accountability seems to be something passive. Once we
transcend the usual way of thinking that we arc not i n command of
tht: situation, that we can do nothing about unjust stru ctures, etc.,
we pass from the passive level of acknowledging accountability for
�6. Expbining our social responsibility arising from our essential 'solidarity'
Or 'connectedness' with others, Roger Burggraeve writes: "! have been made
responsible by someone else fvr something of which I was never the author. 1 must
give account for things which I did not desire and which were not born from my
creativity (fantasy, design, planning, etc.). I must justify myself beyond my own free
actions. This means I must justify myself outside the domain of my accountability,
which expresses the 'measure' vf my freedom." R. Burggraeve, "Responsibility
Precedes Preedom: In Search of a 13iblicai-Philosophical Foundation of Personalistic
Love Ethic," in J.A. Selling (cd.), Personalis/ lli[Orals: Euays in Honor of Professor
Louis ja nmns (Leuven : University Press, 1988) 109·tp, pp. 1 2 1 - 1 1 2 .
l 7· T.W. Ogletree, "From Anxiety t o Responsibility: The Shifting Focus of
Theological ReAection," in M.E. Marty & D.G. Peerman (eds.), New Thtolog, no. 6:
olence and Non· Viofenu, Peatt and Power (Lon'don:
On Rtvolution and i\.on·Rtvolulion, Vi
;\lac;\iillan, 1969) 35-6�, pp. 6r-62.
 T i ll \ CO:--JCEPT OF SOCIAL SIN
24 JIORMIS MYNATTY

unjust structures to rhe active level of responsib;lity to do something because this is contrary to the moral obligation to accept and fulfill

to rectify or transform them. If we do nothing :tbout them and pass the mandate ro be a person in the world. By the same reason, it

them on to the future generation unc.1anged, we may be found p;uilry would be immoral to develop and maintain social structures which

for perpetuating sinful social structures. J f soml one was respons1blc do not ultimately help the progress of all persons and the society.60 I f

in the past for unjust structures, we arc accolll t:tblc for them now w e d o not care to transform the unjust structures and reduce the evil

and should be responsible ro remove rhem as fa1 as possible. :\s Ivan they produce to the best of our abilities, we neglect our moral

Illich puts it: ''The present of one is the past of another, and the responsibility to ensure a truly human life and truly human society

future of yet another. We are called ro live, knowing ;lnd showing for each and every individua l .
Since no individual person i s i n a position t o deal with sinful
that the future exists and that each one of us C:t.1 cnll it in, if we.: arc.:
willing to redress the balance of the past."SS social structures adequately, we have to situate this responsibility in a

This positive obligation to do something ro better 1he situation social context. Even though individuals have the responsibility

when faced with structural injustice, is what can be called 'substan­ according to each one's ability, only through a societal action we can

tive responsibility,' which is entirely different from mere 'formal effectively transform such unjust structures and liberate the victims.

responsibility' or accountability. The affirmation of m�re formal Therefore, responsibility tO dismantle sinful social structures must be

responsibility or accountability is not a sufficient principle of mora­ situated in the society as a whole, because only such action can

lity, for it cannot supply the affective element for an ethical theory effecti'l'ely deal with them . As we have already mentioned, even

which is concerned with the presenting and motivating of positive though everyone has the responsibility to co-operate tO transform

ends directed toward the bon11m buman11m. Substantive responsibility the unjust structures so that evervone enjoys equal participation in

on the other hand, is not c..oncerned with an account of what has the socio-economic, political and cultural goods of the society, which

been done or what has happened, but with the forward determina­ is a prerequisite for the development of the person, this goal can be

tion of what is to be done. The 'what for' of this responsibility lies realized only by worldwide co-operation. As John Paul II says: "The

outside the agent. It confronts the person with its right to be and this obligation to commit oneself to the development of peoples is not

becomes a moral command. For example, the responsibility to just an individual duty and still less an individualistic one, as if it

transform sinful social structures and liberate the victims obligates a were possible to achieve this development through the isolated

person or a group to perform certain actions. Here, this commitment efforts of each individual. It is an imperative which obliges each and

to an end originates not from an abstract notion of responsibility but every man and woman as well as societies and nations."6t On the

from the perceived right-plus-need of the end, as it affects one's international level, the shape of the economic and political structures

sensibility. First comes the 'ought-to-be' of the end and then the of the Third World countries is frequently determined by the Pirst

'ought-to-do' of the subject who is called to take up responsibility. If \X1orld countries. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the rich and

this responsibility !s motivated by love, then it transcends the sphere powerful people and countries to stop different levels of domination

of mere duty.59 In our case, the end that motivates or commands this and exploitation of the poor and underdeveloped countries and allow

substantive responsibility ultimately is the victims of structural them to enjoy their fundamental rights and their equal share in the

injustice. It is the love for them and the solidarity with them that human community. At the same time, as John Paul II reminds them,

elevates responsibility to work for the transformation of sinful social the victims of unjust structures should not wait for the mercy of the

structures beyond duty. powerfu l who consciously or unconsciously are interested in main­

Josef Fuchs clearly points out that it would be unjustifiable and taining such structures. It is the responsibility and the right of the

thus immoral to be indifferent to the development of the society victims to engage in active struggle against the social structures and
institutions that dehumanize them. 62

S 8. I.D. Illic.1, Celebration of Awareness: A Call for Institutional Rt110lution

. (London: Calder and Boyars, 197 1 ) 18. Go. J. Fuchs, Hum an Valuu and Cbristi an Morality (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
S9· For details see H. Jonas, The lmperatillt of Responsibility: In Storrh of on 1970) 186; See also L. Janssens, "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics," 121·123.
. 61. John Paul ll, Sollititudo Rei Socialis, no. p.
Ethus for the Technological Age (tr. H. Jonas & D. Herr; Chicago/London: Uni\"cr­
sity of Chicago Press, 1984) 90·93· Gz. Ibid. no. 58.
z.6 HORl\HS MYNATTY

This emphasis on social responsibility is more important to(by

than ever, once we understand the structural causes of injustice and
misery in the world. But Catholic moral theology does not seem to
have adequately underlined this social responsibility. The subject of
many current moral treatises is still the individual person, loaded
with obligations toward God and neighbors, but nor the obligation
to engage in the construction of a world in solidarity with orhers.
The emergence of the notion of the social-structural dimension of sin
and the consequent demand of social responsibility seem to be
adequate reason to overcome this idealistic and narrow personalistic
approach in moral theology. This should be an opponunity to
. .
broaden the horizon of moral theological reflection beyond mdJvJ­
d ual personal morality and personal sin, even though social sin and
social responsibility do not seem to be the whole answer co the
question of deFivatizing christian morality. J usr a,s · �hc.:rc.: is a
continuity between sin and social enslavement, so there IS a conti­
nuity between personal liberation and concrete socio-political action
for the transformation of the sinful social structures and the libera­
tion of the victims. Therefore, social responsibility must be the major
and controlling motif of the attitude of christians toward personal
existence and toward social structures and institutions.

Hormis Mynatty, S.T.D., forme r assistant in the department of Mo�al

Theology (KU Leuven), is a rriest of the dioce�s of Ernakulam, Ind1a.
Current address : Renewal Centre, Kaloor Cochu: 68z.o!], Ernakulam,
Kerala, India.