Republic v.

Nolasco

G.R. No. 94053, 17 March 1993

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco
in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique.
They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter
from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his
contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several
letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive
death of Janet.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?

RULING:

There are 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee;

The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief
that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even
secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his
wife.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.

Facts:

On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.

At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He testified
that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He
told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply.
Alan narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later
in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño,
Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.

Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.

Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta
of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left
for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where
Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with
Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to no
avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.

On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The police authorities issued
an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9,
2001.

On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision
of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid

Ruling:

No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be
strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage
is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the petition for
declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not
define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde
en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief,
before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

Buccat v. Buccat

G.R. No. 47101, 25 April 1941

FACTS:

It was established before the trial court: The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After several interviews, both were
committed on September 19 of that year .On November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic
Cathedral in Baguio. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on
February 23, 1939. Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action
for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage because
the defendant assured him that she was virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Hence, this appeal. Basically, Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married on November
26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo filed for annulment of marriage before the CFI
because he was led to believe by Luida that she was a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE:

Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy
before the marriage?

RULING:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested
and where society rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach)
when they got married. As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she must have looked very pregnant
even before they were married. Thus, consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.

SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on
April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death?

RULING:

1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. The two marriages involved herein having
been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5
years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society
as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or
treated as non-existent by the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and
is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heir ship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.

BARCELONA V CA

412 SCRA 41 SEPTEMBER 24, 2003

FACTS: Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order dated 21 January 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to
dismiss private respondent’s Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

 March 29, 1995 – Tadeo Bengzon filed a petition for annulment against Diana Barcelona (petitioner). On May 9,
1995, Tadeo filed a motion to withdraw petition which the RTC granted on June 7, 1995

 July 21, 1995 – Tadeo filed annulment again but petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: no cause of
action and violates SC administrative circular 04-94 on forum shopping

 Ground for dismissal of the petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner (against deferring resolution) was the
complainant’s failure to state a cause of action but according to Judge Pison, petitioner was shown to have violated
the complainant’s right so there is cause of action.

 RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order denying petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence. It held that "[respondent]
established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert." After her Motion for Reconsideration 11
was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order, petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari, 13
docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.

ISSUE: Whether evidences presented are sufficient to invoke psychological incapacity in annulling said marriage

HELD: A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his
case or sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing
upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent
or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

The evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity
that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their
marital union. Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.

Medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of
evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by
respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical,
psychiatric or psychological examination. PETITION GRANTED. ANNULMENT CASE WAS DISMISSED

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent

G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004
FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After
33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated
through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the
husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner
was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in
Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the
trial court granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo,
citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real
address in his petition so she never received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court
of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.

HELD:

NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules
of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A grant of annulment of marriage or legal
separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration
of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for
the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.”

“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the
proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.”

Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the
petitioner “without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare
petitioner in default.”

The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.”

Petition is GRANTED.

Ocampo v. Florenciano

G.R. No. L-13553, 23 February 1960

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not living with
plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit
relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she
stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other men other than Arcalas. In
1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff
surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for
legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE:

Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.

RULING:
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery
other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is
prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted
since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which
has not yet prescribed.