G.R. No.
165427, March 21, 2011 claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B.
Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14,
2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA
had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the
properties involved in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime
in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed
until petitioner gave birth to respondent's son on October 12, 1979.[3]
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three
more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company.[4] Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and
were registered in petitioner and respondent's names, ostensibly as husband
and wife. The lands are briefly described as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St.,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name
of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."[5]
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave.,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of
"Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan."[6]
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St.,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name
of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."[7]
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St.,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name
of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."[8]
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique
Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the
name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."[9]
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon
City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property
located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son
transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter
property in Don Enrique Heights.[10]
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part
ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said
properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition
Agreement.[11] Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner's proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while
the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.[12]
However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the
partition agreement, respondent refused.[13] Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a
complaint for judicial partition[14] of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon
City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and
worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to
P15,500,000.00.[15] Respondent, in his Answer,[16] however, denied petitioner's
personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.[17]
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost
24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife
usually in the wee hours of the morning.[18] Petitioner likewise claimed that they
acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which
she and respondent established.[19]
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his
personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.[20] He
countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with
petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his
legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his
legal wife was then a heavy gambler.[21] Respondent added that he also
purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later
on for the purchase or construction of a new building.[22]
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit.[23] In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC
decided to give considerable weight to petitioner's own admission that the
properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income
of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33%
share.[24]
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro
indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the
trial court's decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to
collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended
that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for
partition.[25]
Unimpressed with petitioner's arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal,
explaining in the following manner:
Appellant's harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the
subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said
certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record
shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the
subject realties - itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the
claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for
partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a
Torrens title applies only to original and not to subsequent registration as that
availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To our mind,
the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more
underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in
the parties' name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellant's imputation of reversible error
against the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation
between an action for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically
brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a
defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an
action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues,
i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property
sought to be partitioned and, second - assuming that the plaintiff successfully
hurdles the first - the issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff
and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of
ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide
the property without first making a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what
the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellant's claim of co-
ownership.[26]
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
 II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an
admission against respondent's interest as to the existence of co-
ownership between the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of
repudiating co-ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive
ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be
outweighed by respondent's self-serving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.[27]
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has
been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate
courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the
said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions
to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Court's
jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. The issues may be summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of
ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was
collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over
the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia[28] is definitive. There, we
explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is
necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition
is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with
a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the
other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to
agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be
done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the
real estate in question. x x x[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject
properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and
unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.[30] More importantly,
the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not
even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.[31]
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued
over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked,[32] but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.[33] The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as
the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more
often than not, represented by that document.[34] Petitioner apparently confuses
title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although
both are interchangeably used.[35]
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does
not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is
different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of
ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as
conclusive evidence of ownership.[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of
title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate,
or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have
acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate
of title.[37] Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property,
but may be the best evidence thereof.
Finally, as to whether respondent's assent to the initial partition agreement
serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to
have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we
rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the
facts alleged by him.[38] Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. - The act, declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law;
(b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be
adverse to the admitter's interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible.[39]
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates
that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of
questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties.
Moreover, to follow petitioner's argument would be to allow respondent not
only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who
may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent
is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the
disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[40]
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters.
Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she
intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial
court's view that respondent is entitled to attorney's fees. Unlike the trial court,
we do not commiserate with respondent's predicament. The trial court ruled
that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to
defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees.
But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed
upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly,
respondent's act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was
a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful
wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences
of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole
owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife
may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees in respondent's favor is DELETED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present complaint is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit and the defendant is hereby adjudged as the sole owner of the
properties which are the subject matters of this case. Furthermore, the plaintiff
is hereby directed to pay the defendant the amount of P100,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees and to pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED. (CA rollo, p. 39.)
[24] CA rollo, pp. 37-39.

No costs. [25] Id. at 23.

SO ORDERED. [26] Rollo, pp. 35-37.

Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Sereno, JJ., concur. [27] Id. at 17-18, 21-22.
Brion, J., see separate opinion.
[28]
G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576.

[29] Id. at 584-585.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-42. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with [30] See
Fabrica v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47360, December 15, 1986, 146 SCRA
Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Aurora Santiago-Lagman,
250, 255-256.
concurring;
[31]
[2]
Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109262, November 21, 1996, 264
CA rollo, pp. 35-39.
SCRA 534, 538.
[3] Records, p. 108. [32]
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
[4]
Registration Decree, states in full:
Rollo, p. 29.

[5]
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not
Records, pp. 7-8, 51-52.
be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except
[6]
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Id. at 9-10, 57-58.
[33]
Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA
[7] Id. at 11-12, 55-56.
544, 547.
[8]
Id. at 13-14, 53-54. [34]
Id.
[9] Id. at 15-16, 59-60. [35] Id. at 548.
[10] Rollo, p. 31. [36] Id. at 547-548.
[11]
Records, pp. 61-64. [37] Id. at 548.
[12] Id. at 63. [38]
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II., 2004 edition, p. 715, citing 31
[13]
C.J.S. 1022.
Rollo, p. 32.
[39] Id.
[14] Records, pp. 2-6.
[40] Art. 6, Civil Code.
[15] Id. at 2.

[16]
Id. at 26-28.

[17]Id. at 26.

[18]
TSN, Betty B. Lacbayan, October 20, 1999, pp. 52-54. SEPARATE OPINION

[19]
Id. at 57-58.

[20]
BRION, J.:
TSN, Bayani Samoy, Jr., December 10, 1999, pp. 22-23 and 27.

[21]
This case stemmed from a complaint for judicial partition of several properties
Id. at 28-31.
based on the petitioner's assertion of co-ownership. As in other civil cases, the
[22]
burden of proof rests on the party (the petitioner in this case) who, as
Id. at 29-32.
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative in
[23] The
the issue presented.[1]
dispositive portion of the February 10, 2000 RTC Decision reads:
Subject to my observations below, I find that the petitioner failed to discharge
by clear preponderant evidence her co-ownership of the subject properties to
warrant their judicial partition. I confine myself to this conclusion, however, as
the issue before us is solely on whether a judicial partition should be
made. Specifically and as articulated in my observations below, I cannot join the
ponencia's other rulings.
Article 148 of the Family Code which applies to the property relationship in a
cohabitation situation, is clear on the conditions it imposes. The first sentence of
this article states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. [underscoring supplied]
Thus, any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered
common property if two (2) conditions are met: first, there must be evidence
showing that the properties were acquired by the parties during their
cohabitation; and second, there must be evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties' actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry. Stated plainly, co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof
showing the acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the parties,
and the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same. These two
(2) conditions must concur.
On the contribution aspect of these elements, mere cohabitation under Article
148 of the Family Code, without proof of contribution, will not result in a co-
ownership; proof of actual contribution must be established by clear evidence
showing that the party either used his or her own money or that he or she
actually contributed his or her own money to purchase the
property.[2] Jurisprudence holds that this fact may be proven by evidence in the
form of bank account statements and bank transactions as well as testimonial
evidence proving the financial capacity of the party to purchase the property or
contribute to the purchase of a property.[3]
In this case, the presumption of co-ownership over the subject properties
between the petitioner and the respondent did not arise. While the first
condition was duly proven by evidence, the second condition was not.
The records sufficiently establish the first condition showing the acquisition of
the subject properties from 1978 to 1991 or during the cohabitation of the
petitioner and the respondent. The second condition is not similarly established
since no evidence was adduced showing the petitioner's actual contributions in
the acquisition of the subject properties.
Since the petition asserts an affirmative allegation (i.e., her co-ownership of the
subject properties to which she bases her action for judicial partition) she carries
the burden of substantiating her claim. She failed in this regard. The records
show that she did not present any evidence showing that the funds or a portion
of the funds used to purchase the subject properties came from her own
earnings. On the contrary, the petitioner presented contradictory evidence when
she admitted that the funds used to purchase the subject properties did not
come from her own earnings but from the income of the manpower business
which she managed. The Regional Trial Court found that she only owned 3.33%
of share in this corporation.
Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot
automatically be considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where
the income the petitioner referred to is corporate income. The petitioner should
have presented evidence showing that the income she referred to actually
accrued to her in the form of salaries, bonuses, commissions and/or dividends
from the manpower business. Otherwise, the rule regarding the corporation's
distinct legal personality from its officers, stockholders and members applies.[4]
Unless otherwise shown, the source of the earnings would be the corporation's,
not the petitioner's.
I additionally observe that except for one, all the subject properties name the
respondent as the exclusive registered owner. Although the mere issuance of a
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real properties covered thereby may be under co-ownership with the
petitioner and vice-versa, the fact remains that the subject properties are
registered in the respondent's name. The rebuttable presumption is that these
properties belong to the respondent or to the conjugal partnership of the
respondent, in line with Article 116 of the Family Code and Article 160 of the Civil
Code.[5]
In sum, the petitioner's case for judicial partition of the subject properties has no
legal basis in the absence of a clear evidence of co-ownership proven under the
circumstances. Consequently, we must deny the petition for lack of merit
without.
As final observations, I disagree with the Majority's conclusion declaring the
respondent as the sole owner of all the properties sought to be
partitioned. Records show that the petitioner is a registered co-owner of one of
the five (5) properties cited in this case, i.e., the real estate under TCT No. 23301
registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan." By the
tenor of its decision, the Majority effectively (and unnecessarily) introduced a
cloud over the petitioner's interests in this commonly-owned property. I note,
too, that the complaint underlying this petition is an action for partition; the
adjudication of this case should necessarily be limited to resolving the propriety
of the partition sought. Notably, the Majority itself recognizes that registration
in one's name is without prejudice to an action seeking to establish co-
ownership.
In light of the undisputed joint ownership of the property commonly registered
under the parties' names, this Decision should be without prejudice to an action
for partition to divide up this property - a remedy we cannot now provide in the
absence of any factual basis on how the parties contributed in acquiring this
property. Alternatively, the actual partition of this commonly-owned property
should be remanded to the trial court for determination of how partition should
be made.
The phrase, "without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may
file against him" in the last part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is
similarly objectionable. For one, no issue exists in this case between the
legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties they commonly or
individually hold. Additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the Court
is giving legal advice to the wife of the respondent on what course of action to
take against her husband. This statement is beyond what this Court should
properly state in its Decision given the facts and issues posed, and is plainly
uncalled for.
Subject to these observations, I concur with the opinion of the Majority.
G.R. No. L-44060, July 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BIENVENIDO
PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
Bienvenido Paragsa, alias "Benben", appealed to the Court of Appeals the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Judge Agapito Hontanosas,
presiding), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused Bienvenido
Paragsa of the crime of Rape as charged in the Information beyond reasonable
doubt and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum and to indemnify the complaining witness in the
amount of P8,000.00 (People vs. Rogato Rivera, 58, O.G. and People vs. Chan et
al., CA No. 03545-GR, August 11, 1967) with all legal accessories and to pay the
costs. Being a detention prisoner, he is entitled to the full credit of his preventive
imprisonment from the time of his confinement up to the date of the
promulgation of this judgment.
“x x x x x”
(pp. 10-19, rollo).
Because the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by the Court of Appeals
on the accused, this case is now before US for review pursuant to Section 34,
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimony of Mirasol
Magallanes, the alleged rape victim, her aunt-in-law, Mrs. Lita Parochel, and Dr.
Luis L. Gandiongco of the Bantayan Emergency Hospital, Bantayan, Cebu, who
examined the offended party and submitted Exhibit A embodying his findings
thereon.
Substantially, the records show that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, Mirasol,
who was then a little over twelve and a half (12½) years old (Exhibit B, p. 7, rec.),
was alone in her parents' house in Sitio Tabagac of Barrio Bunacan, Municipality
of Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed. Her parents were away at the time -- her
father was in Cadiz, while her mother was in Sagay, both in Negros Occidental (p.
16, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972) -- while the rest of the family were with Mirasol's
grandmother in Barrio Codia, also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol was a 6th grade
student of the Bunacan Elementary School (p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Upon
instruction of her mother, she did not go to school that afternoon so that she
could look after the pigs and cook their feed. Thus, she was alone in the ground
floor of their house cooking hog feed when the accused, Bienvenido Paragsa,
armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and closed the door after him.
Approaching from behind, he placed his left arm around Mirasol's neck, encircled
her abdomen with his right arm, at the same time pointing the hunting knife
with his right hand at her breast, and threatened her not to shout otherwise she
would be killed. Thereafter, the accused pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby,
rolled up her dress and, with his two hands, removed her panties. The accused
then placed his hunting knife on the bed by Mirasol's side, opened the zipper of
his pants while kneeling on the bed, opened Mirasol's thighs, picked up the
hunting knife again, placed himself on top of Mirasol, inserted his erect penis
into her sexual organ and then made four push and pull movements until he
ejaculated (pp. 7, 10-11, 12, 13, 14, t.s.n., ibid.). In the process, Mirasol's dress
and panties were not torn, since, because of fear, she allowed the accused to roll
up her dress and pull her panties without any resistance whatsoever. During the
intercourse, the accused was not holding the hunting knife. After the accused
had discharged, he ran to the storeroom of the house upstairs because he heard
Mrs. Lita Parochel, wife of the younger brother of Mirasol's father, calling from
outside the gate of the house, asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol did not
answer because she was then in the act of putting on her panties (p. 14, t.s.n.,
ibid.; p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972). After she had put on her panties, she opened the
gate and saw her aunt Lita, who asked her what the accused did to her, but she
did not answer because she was afraid as the accused was still inside the house.
She also did not tell her aunt Lita that the accused had sexual intercourse with
her under threats and against her will. Her aunt Lita then walked away.
Thereafter, the accused reappeared in the room and told Mirasol that if she
would tell her aunt Lita what he did, he would kill her (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., Dec. 3,
1971). After the incident, Mirasol went to Barrio Codia later in the afternoon of
the same day and joined her brother and sister and grandmother. She did not
reveal to any of them what transpired between her and the accused in Tabagac.
Mirasol's father returned from Cadiz, Negros Occidental that same day; but
Mirasol did not also reveal the incident to him because she was afraid her father
might punish her. Her mother returned home on July 16, 1971 from Sagay,
Negros Occidental; but Mirasol did not also tell her mother about what
happened to her on July 13 in Tabagac. It was her aunt Lita who revealed the
matter to Mirasol's mother, who thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol
had to reveal the incident of July 13 to her mother only when her mother asked
her about it; because, according to her, she wanted to take revenge on the
accused (p. 15, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971). Three days after her return from Sagay,
Negros Occidental -- on July 19, 1971 -- Mirasol's mother brought her to the
Bantayan Emergency Hospital in Bantayan, Cebu, where she was examined by
Dr. Luis L. Gandiongco, who submitted his findings as follows:
"Abrasion of inguinal region
"Abrasion, left thigh, medial side
"INTERNAL FINDINGS:
"1. Discharges sticky, milky in color, found at the anterior fornix but negative for
spermatozoa" (Exh. A, p. 8, rec.; p. 2, t.s.n., Nov. 16, 1971).
Mrs. Lita Parochel, the aunt-in-law of Mirasol, testified that she is the wife of the
younger brother of Mirasol's father. Her house is fifty (50) meters away from the
house of her brother-in-law, Ruperto Magallanes. In the afternoon of July 13,
1971, she went to the house of her brother-in-law in Tabagac. Arriving there, she
saw, through the gate which was made of split bamboos, the accused running
away when she shouted to Mirasol, who was then in the act of putting on her
panties, to open the gate (p. 10, t.s.n., Jan. 15, 1972). Mirasol opened the gate
after she had put on her panties. Entering the house, Mrs. Parochel asked
Mirasol what the accused did to her, but Mirasol did not answer. So, she hid and
from her hiding place she saw the accused emerge from his hiding place and run
away, passing through the gate of the fence. Thereupon, she told Mirasol to go
home to barrio Codia because she was also going there (p. 15, t.s.n., ibid.).
Mrs. Parochel met Mirasol's father at about 4:00 o'clock the same afternoon but
she did not talk to him about what she saw earlier in Tabagac. However, she
revealed the incident to her husband (p. 17, t.s.n., ibid.).
When Mirasol's mother returned from Sagay, Negros Occidental, Mrs. Parochel
had a conversation with her regarding the person of the accused and thereafter
Mirasol's mother filed the corresponding complaint against the accused (p. 18,
t.s.n., ibid.).
Incidentally, in support of the complaint of Bernandina Magallanes, mother of
Mirasol, Mrs. Parochel executed an affidavit which she subscribed and swore to
before the municipal judge of Madridejos, Cebu, on July 30, 1971, wherein she
stated, among other things:
“1. That at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, I went to the
house of Ruperto Magallanes, my neighbor;
“2. That when I entered their fence, I found out that one Benben Paragsa ran
from the bed where Mirasol Magallanes was sitting on while putting on her
panties;
“3. That she, Mirasol Magallanes, upon my arrival, did not say anything to me
about the happening; and that I was only thinking that something had
happened" (Exh. 1, p. 5, rec.).
In his typewritten brief, the appellant enumerated and discussed five errors as
having been committed by the trial court. These errors may, however, be boiled
down to the issue of credibility.
Appellant admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, the complaining
witness, but he stoutly denied that he did so by employing force or intimidation
against Mirasol. He claims he and Mirasol were sweethearts; that on the day of
the incident, it was Mirasol who invited him to the latter's house where they had
sexual intercourse after kissing each other; and that the intercourse they had "Q - And as a matter of fact, in your examination there was no laceration?
that afternoon was, as a matter of fact, their third sexual intercourse (pp. 2, 3, 5,
6, 8-9, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
"A - There was no laceration" (p. 5, t.s.n., November 16, 1971; emphasis
The foregoing testimony of the accused was substantially corroborated by two
supplied).
witnesses for the defense, Mercedo Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay (pp. 5, 6-
7, 12, 15-16, 17, 18-19, 20, 25, t.s.n., Feb. 1, 1972). Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she
must have been a virgin when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak,
did not state that she felt some pain as the accused tried to insert his organ into
unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction.
her private part. Neither did she state that she was bleeding during and after the
Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime alleged forced coition. Instead, she matter-of-factly narrated that the accused
charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the made four push and pull movements after which the latter ejaculated -
appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation indicating that he had an easy time doing it.
were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation
If WE are to believe her story, certainly the doctor who examined her could have
against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or
noticed the lacerations even after the lapse of three (3) days from the coition, if
resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not.
the intercourse on July 13, 1971 was in fact her first experience. WE believe the
She was allegedly raped din her own home, not far from her neighbors and
absence of lacerations in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, a testified to by Dr.
during the daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated
Gandiongco, supra, eloquently confirms the truth of the accused's assertion that
by her, she could have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted
before the incident in question, he and Mirasol had two prior copulations.
by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the
house immediately after the intercourse took place and when the accused ran And still another circumstance which casts serious doubt on the credibility of the
from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing and/or hearing complaining witness and her aunt Lita is the matter of the hunting knife. While it
the voice of her aunt Lita. Or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife by her is true that on the witness stand these two witnesses practically corroborated
side when the copulation was going on, and with it she could have possibly each other on this particular point, the matter of the accused having a hunting
prevented the accused from consummating the sexual act. But she did not. knife with him on the day of the incident was not, however, mentioned by Mrs.
Parochel in her affidavit, Exhibit 1, which she executed on July 30, 1971 - five
Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents
months before she testified in court. Besides, at the trial, the prosecution did not
that she was raped. It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros
bother to present such "hunting knife".
Occidental, three (3) days after the incident, and confronted her about the rape
incident that her mother learned through her aunt Lita that she eventually A last circumstance which also engenders serious doubt on the veracity of Mrs.
revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the afternoon of July 13, Parochel, whose testimony the trial court summarized, runs thus:
1971.

Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut
the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused “…… The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred
and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous door."
sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of which happened on June 29,
1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept together
in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and Mirasol had
“.... She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened.
returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu (p. 10, t.s.n., March 21, 1972).
Mirasol was very pale, trembling and in a state of shock, did not answer her
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the inquiries ……" (p. 3, Decision; p. 64, rec.; emphasis added).
truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases.
The Solicitor General adopted the above factual summary made by the trial court
But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it
by stating that -
must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at
liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some
matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling,
naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) "Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel .... found her niece in a state of shock" (p. 4, Brief
that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 49, rec.; emphasis OURS).
material to the issue (IV Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
1973 ed., p. 316). These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the A painstaking scrutiny of the record, particularly the transcript of stenographic
present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused notes, shows that contrary to the finding of the trial court, Mirasol answered the
and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such call of her aunt and opened the gate of the house after she had put on her
assertion. panties (p. 14, t.s.n., Dec. 3, 1971); and that Mirasol only seemed to be afraid,
besides trembling (p. 23, t.s.n., 1972); nowhere in the record is any evidence of
One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol having been in a state of shock.
Mirasol is the testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration
in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, thus - If Mirasol was in fact in a state of shock –

"Q - Doctor, you testified that according to your findings a foreign body might
have inserted the internal organ of the offended party?
1. How come she was able to put on her panties and thereafter open the gate of
the house when she heard her aunt Lita calling from the outside?
2. Her aunt Lita would feel so alarmed and so concerned that she would not lose
any time to bring her to a doctor or to a hospital for medical treatment or
assistance;

"A - Yes, sir

3. Her aunt Lita would have confronted the accused who was still hiding in the
closet in a corner of the ground floor, or she would have gone to the nearest
police authority or barrio captain, who could have easily apprehended the
accused;
4. Her aunt could have sought the assistance of their barriomates or neighbors;
or
5. She could have brought Mirasol to her own house which was only about 50
meters away (pp. 7, 20, t.s.n., Jan. 5, 1972).
But what did she do? She abandoned Mirasol "because she (Mirasol) had to feed
her hogs" (p. 24, idem.).
That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact
that her aunt discovered her having sexual intercourse at so young an age and
that she feared that her aunt would report the same to her parents.
And if Mrs. Parochel really believed that her niece Mirasol was raped by
appellant about 3 o'clock that afternoon of July 13, 1971, why did she not report
the outrage to Mirasol's father - her husband's brother - whom she met about 4
o'clock that same afternoon, just one hour after the alleged rape?
Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece -- daughter of her brother-in-law
vitiates her credibility.
Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of
the Revised Penal Code, for the same is not warranted by the wording of the
information, which does not allege deceit, although appellant testified that he
promised to marry Mirasol if "something happened to her body," Much less can
simple seduction include rape.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY
ACQUITTED, WITH COSTS DE OFICIO, AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY
ORDERED UNLESS HE IS BEING DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., Barredo, and Antonio, JJ., concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice R.C.
Aquino.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Muñoz Palma, J., votes for the affirmance of the judgment.
Aquino, J., see dissenting opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused-appellant in the light of the salient facts
and circumstances discussed in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar[1]
which justly cast serious doubts on the guilt of the accused and entitle him to a
verdict of acquittal founded on the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The ratio decidendi in the analogous case of People vs. Ramirez[2] (where the 15-
year old daughter of the accused's common-law wife charged him with double
rape and his defense was "that there was consent on her part, as indeed there
had been previous instances where he had access to her") is fully applicable to
the case at bar, thus: "The pronouncement in People vs. Dramayo[3] as to the
extent of the protection accorded by the Constitution to a person indicted for a
criminal offense once again possesses relevance. Thus: 'Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the
prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called
upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has
always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny
of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of
whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the
appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crimes had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should
the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate
the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.'[4]
There as in this case, we held that the accused could not be convicted of
seduction under the rape charge, citing the case of People vs. Castro[5] because
''the rape charge did not place [the accused] in jeopardy of being convicted for
qualified seduction. He is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him."
I have written this brief concurrence, principally, because I noted from the
decision[6] that this is a case where as against the prevailing view and practice
under section 34 of Republic Act 296, as amended (the Judiciary Act of 1948) and
incorporated in Rule 124, section 12 of the Rules of Court (whereby in any
criminal case submitted to a division of the Court of Appeals whenever said court
should be of the opinion that the higher penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed than the lesser penalty imposed by the trial court in the
decision subject of the appeal before it, said court "shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for
final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal") the
Court of Appeals rendered judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
instead of forthwith certifying by resolution the case to this Court as falling with
this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction under section 17 of the Judiciary Act.
Some members of the Court have asked for reexamination of the prevailing view
and practice and to set down as the proper procedure that followed by the Court
of Appeals in the case at bar. But since the Court's verdict is one of acquittal,
there was no need to take up the question in this case. I make this of record so
that the present decision may not be taken as impliedly sanctioning such
procedure, or as an indication of approval thereof on the part of any member of
the Court taking part herein. The question will be definitively resolved in several
cases pending before the Court where such reexamination has been squarely
raised, e.g. in Case L-40330, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Amado Daniel
@ "Amado Ato", submitted for decision on August 5, 1975.
[1] At pages 6-10.
[2] 69 SCRA 144 (1976) and cases cited, per Fernando, J.
[3] 42 SCRA 59 (1971).
[4] 69 SCRA at pp. 149-150.
[5] 58 SCRA 473 (1974), per Aquino, J.
[6] At page 2.
DISSENTING OPINION
AQUINO, J.:
The evidence for the prosecution was summarized by the Solicitor General in this
wise:
"Mirasol Magallanes, aged twelve-and-a-half, was alone in her parent's house in
Sitio Tabagak of Barrio Bunacan, in Madridejos, Cebu in the early afternoon of
July 13, 1971, cooking hog feed. Both of her parents were then away, in Negros
Occidental, and the rest of the family were with Mirasol's grandmother in Barrio
Codia, also in Madridejos, Cebu. Mirasol, although a six-grader in the Bunacan
Elementary School, was at home on this date, on instructions of her mother to "Q. - When there is a penetration but not deep, will it produce laceration of the
look after their pigs, and cook hog feed in the afternoon. vaginal tract of a woman?

"While thus alone on the ground floor of their house in Tabagak, innocently
cooking food for the family's pigs, the accused Bienvenido Paragsa, with a
hunting knife in hand, stealthily entered the house, barring the door as he A. - Yes, sir."
entered. And approaching Mirasol from behind, he hooked his left arm around
the young girl's neck and simultaneously thrust his knife at Mirasol's tender
breast, barking at the same moment for the girl not to shout, under threat of xxx xxx xxx
instant death.

"His left arm still hooked around the poor girl's neck, and the knife he held
perilously poised upon the girl's vulnerable breast, the accused pushed the girl to "Fiscal: Can you tell us what could have possibly caused the abrasion on your
the bamboo bed nearby, and there laid her down. He then removed her panties, external examination of the woman Mirasol Magallanes?
and opened the fly of his own pants. Forcibly, he opened the girl's thighs, and
himself in-between, he then penetrated young Mirasol's private part with his
erect private part, and hastily consummated his guilt ridden, forcible, physical
xxx xxx xxx
intrusion into the young girl's body.

"Mirasol's aunt, Lita Parochel, arriving later, too late to prevent the dastardly
abuse of her niece, nevertheless, saw the accused as he surreptitiously fled the "A. - Maybe the assailant used force." (3 tsn).
scene and found her niece in a state of shock. Subsequently, report of the crime
was made to the girl's parents, and a complaint lodged against the accused for
the crime of rape. (pp. 6-8, tsn Dec. 3, 1971; pp. 7-18, tsn Jan. 5, 1972; pp 1-3,
tsn Nov. 16, 1971; Exh. A)." The trial court and the Court of Appeals (Justice Lorenzo Relova, ponente) both
held that rape was committed. That conclusion is supported by the following
The accused admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant girl. testimony of the complainant:
His defense is that the copulation was voluntary. The doctor, who examined the
complainant, found that she sustained an "abrasion, left thigh, medial side" in
addition to an "abrasion of inguinal region" (Exh. A). He testified that there was
"Q. - You said that in the afternoon of July 13, 1971, you saw Bienvenido Paragsa
laceration of the hymen. The pertinent portion of his testimony is quoted below:
entered under your house where you were cooking the hog feeds, can you tell
this Honorable Court what was he doing when he entered your premises?

"Q. - Can you tell us your external findings?

A. - Yes, sir.

A. - My external findings is that there was an abrasion of inguinal region and

abrasion, left thigh, medial side.
"Q. - What did he do?

"Q. - How about your internal examination?

A. - When he entered under the house he immediately held my neck and then
embraced my abdomen and he was carrying a hunting knife.

A. - I was able to get some of the secretion found at the anterior fornix of the
cervic.
"Q. - When he grabbed your neck and hugged you, did he say anything to you?

xxx xxx xxx

A. - Yes, sir, he told me, 'Do not shout, if you will shout, I will kill you.'

"Q. - From your findings, Doctor, there was something foreign which got inside
"Q. - After hugging you and telling you not to shout, what did Paragsa do next?
the vaginal tract of the complainant.

A. - He pushed me to bed and he let me lie on the bed and he immediately pulled
A. - There might be foreign body which got inside the vaginal tract not so deep
out my panty.
that caused laceration of the hymen.

"Q. - After removing your panty, what next did Paragsa do?
"Q. - In your study of medicine, when a foreign object is penetrated but not so
deep, will that produce laceration of the vaginal tract or the hymen of a woman,
is that possible?
A. - He tried to open my thigh but I insisted closing them because I was ashamed.
"Q. - In effect, was he able to open your thigh? "Q. - Why?

A. - Yes, sir, because he threatened me with his hunting knife: 'You will not open, A. - I did not tell because I was warned by the accused that if I would tell he
if you will not open, I will stab you.' would be coming back to kill me.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

"Q. - After he succeeded in inserting his penis into your sexual organ, what did "Q. - And after that while he was holding your neck and embracing your
he do next? abdomen you were then sitting near the place where you were cooking your
hog's feeds?

"ATTY. FLORES: I want to make of record that witness is spontaneous in

answering the question, considering that she is minor and this is her first time. A. - When he entered under our house when he was nearing I immediately stood
up; I was no longer sitting.

"WITNESS: He made a push and pull movement.

"Q. - So, you recognized him before he took hold of your neck?

"ATTY. SALGADO:
A. - Yes, sir.

Q. - After he finished picking you, what was or where did Paragsa go?
"Q. - And when he took hold of your neck and embraced your abdomen, what
did he do next?
A. - He ran to one of the room of the house to hide.

A. - He told me: 'Do not shout, if you will shout I will kill you.'
xxx xxx xxx

"Q. - He was uttering those words when he was holding your neck and
embracing your abdomen?
"Q. - Did you have a conversation with your Tia Lita after you opened the door?

A. - Yes, sir.
A. - Tia Lita asked me what Benben did to me but I did not answer because I was
afraid.

"Q. - And after that he immediately carried you to the bed inside your house?
"Q. - That was the only question that was being asked on you by your Tia Lita?

A. - He did not carry me but he pushed me to the bed.

A. - Yes, sir.

"Q. - How far was the bed to the place where you were pushed by accused
Paragsa?
"Q. - You did not make any answer?

A. - One and one-half meters.

A. - I did not.

xxx xxx xxx

"Q. - Did you tell anybody of what had happened to you as what you had
testified?

“ATTY. FLORES:

A. - I did not.

Q. - And how long did your Tia Lita went home after the conversation?

A. - Tia Lita walked away passing thru our 'banguera' and Ka Benben appeared
and he told me that if I will tell Tia Lita he will kill me and I was afraid because he
was still holding the hunting knife.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. - You did not tell your father about the incident that evening?
A. - No, I did not tell because I was afraid, he might punish me and he might kill
me.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. - When your mother arrived home, did she inquire from you about the
incident?
A. - Yes, she asked me because Tia Lita related to her the incident.
"ATTY. FLORES:
Q. - You want to tell the Court that if your mother had not inquired from you
about the incident you have not told your (mother) about the incident?
A. - No, I will not tell.
"Q. - How would you reconcile your testimony when a moment ago you said that
you told the incident to your mother because you took revenge of what Ka
Benben had done to you?
A. - Because before she asked me of the incident I had in mind not to tell her of
the incident but after she asked me I (told her of the incident because I want to
take revenge on Ka Benben. (TSN, hearing on December 3, 1971, pp. 6 to 15)."
The trial court's vivid summary of the prosecution's evidence, which reveals how
the rape was committed and why the complainant did not disclose the outrage
right away to her aunt and parents and which mentions the flight of the accused,
and the trial court's reasons for convicting the accused are as follows:
"The prosecution thru the testimonies of the complaining witness and the other
State witnesses has established the following facts: That at about 1:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 13, 1971, the offended party, Mirasol Magallanes, aged 12
years, 6 months and 4 days as shown in Exhibit "B", was in the house of her
parents at Sitio Tabagak, Barrio Bunacan, Municipality of Madridejos, Province of
Cebu. She was alone and under the house cooking hog feeds. The house, the
lower portion of which, is fenced with bamboo strips, while the surrounding
lawn is likewise enclosed with fence. Her father at the time was in Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, where he was employed in one of the Fishing Outfits. Her mother
was in Sagay, Negros Occidental, while all her younger sisters and brother were
in they house of her grandmother at Barrio Codia, Madridejos, Cebu, where all of
the children were left for care when their mother left for Sagay on July 10, 1971.
"The girl Mirasol Magallanes was a grade six pupil in the Bunacan Elementary
School, and she did not attend her classes on that day upon instruction of her
mother not to attend her classes during the period of her (mother's) absence.
She was instructed to go to Bunacan in order to feed their pig in the morning,
cook its foods in the afternoon and after feeding return to the house of her
grandmother at Codia.
"While Mirasol was cooking the hog feeds, at about 1:30 in the afternoon of July
13, 1971, the accused Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife,
surreptitiously entered the fenced ground floor of the house, then barred the
door after him. The accused approached Mirasol from behind, hook his left
forearm around her neck, at the same time thrust the knife which was held by
his right hand at the breast of Mirasol Magallanes, and told her not to shout for
help under the threat of instant death.
"With his left forearm still around the neck of Mirasol and the knife's point at her
breast, the accused pushed the victim to a nearby bamboo bed and laid her. He
then placed the knife beside Mirasol, removed her panty, and opened his pants.
He forced the victim to open or spread her legs by placing his hands on the inside
portion of both thighs according to the testimony of Mirasol and corroborated
by Medical Certificate, Exhibit "A", indicating contusion.
"Placing himself between the legs, directly in front of the sexual organ of
Mirasol, the accused inserted his erected penis into her vagina and hurriedly
proceeded with the act of copulation by up and down movement. After
completing the act, the accused was about to leave when, unexpectedly, Lita
Parochel, aunt of Mirasol (wife of the younger brother of victim's father), arrived
outside the barred door. She called for Mirasol, who was already sitting at the
edge of the bamboo bed, putting on her panty, to open the door. On hearing the
call, the accused ran away and hid himself in a closet located at the corner of the
ground floor.
"The victim did not answer the call of her aunt nor did she open the barred door.
Lita Parochel, suspecting that something unusual had happened to her niece,
walked away from the door, making it appear that she was going out and hid
herself behind an outside projection of the ground floor where she could see and
observe the door. No sooner had she hidden herself when she saw the accused
came out of the door, holding a hunting knife in his right hand, and ran towards
the general direction of the seashore.
"She returned to the opened door and asked Mirasol what had happened.
Mirasol was very pale, trembling and in a state of shock, did not answer her
inquiries. Without pressing further, the aunt instructed her niece to return
immediately to her grandmother's home at Barrio Codia after feeding the pig,
then she (Lita) returned to her house which is about 50 fathoms away.
"At about 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon, before Mirasol Magallanes could
return to her grandmother's house, her father arrived from Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. Lita Parochel, having only her suspicion as she did not actually see
the accused abuse her niece, did not report the incident to her brother-in-law.
But she reported the incident to her husband at 7:00 o'clock that evening on his
return home.
"On July 15, 1971, upon the return of Mirasol's mother from Sagay, Negros
Occidental, Lita Parochel personally reported the matter to the mother. Acting
upon the report, the mother immediately investigated her daughter who, having
been given the assurance that she would not be subjected to physical
punishment, and who had already recovered from her fears and shock, readily
told her mother that she was raped by Bienvenido Paragsa. She was brought to
the Bantayan Emergency Hospital and subjected to an internal examination by
Dr. Luis L. Gandionco, M.D. Medico-Legal-Incharge, who found her positive of
having sexual intercourse.
"A complaint for rape was filed against Bienvenido Paragsa by the Chief of Police
of Madridejos, Cebu, at the instance of Bernardina R. Magallanes, mother of the
victim, who at the time she was raped was a little more than 12 years old as
stated above (Exhibit "B"). In the meantime the accused had left Madridejos,
Cebu, and was finally arrested at Danao City on the strength of a Warrant of
Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge of Madridejos, Cebu, before whom the
complaint for rape was filed.
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful consideration of the evidence of the parties in its totality, the
Court is of the view that the prosecution has been able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime of RAPE as charged in
the Information. It is true that the offended party did not exert strong and
effective efforts to thwart the attack of the accused in disgracing or dishonoring
her womanhood but considering that the accused was carrying with him a knife
which he used in threatening her to death, it is not unusual that the young and
innocent girl of over 12 years of age would just meekly submit for fear of her life.
xxx xxx xxx
"In the instant case, the accused admitted having sexual intercourse with the
complaining minor of a little over 12 years of age and his testimony regarding
their being sweetheart and especially as to the first intercourse he allegedly had
with the victim in their house in the first week of July 1971 and the second in the
first week of June 1971 is so unnatural, unbelievable and contrary to common
sense that this Court is of the opinion and so holds that his story is fabricated
and self-serving and untrustwothy for if it were true that the victim was his own
sweetheart and he was her boyfriend then there could have been no reason for
this young innocent girl of a little above 12 years to tell her mother about the
criminal attack by the accused upon her womanhood and virginity. Her story
regarding her being threatened to death by the accused who carried with him a
hunting knife is being corroborated by witness Lita Parochel who had no motive
whatsoever to declare falsely against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
"The Court had observed that Mirasol Magallanes is an intelligent, honest and
reliable witness notwithstanding the fact that she was of a very tender age and
the Court cannot accept the theory of the defense that the intercourse that took
place on July 13, 1971 was voluntary on her part. It would be very hard to believe
that the complainant would easily submit to such an intercourse if her will to
resist had not been overpowered or overcome by threat, intimidation and force
on the part of the accused who was armed with a knife."
The accused was twenty-one (21) years old while the victim was twelve years and
six months old. The act of the accused in taking advantage of the victim's
immaturity is a form of unpardonable sexual perversion which is worse than the
offense committed by Roman Polanski, the Hollywood director who was
convicted of cohabiting with a thirteen-year old girl.
To acquit the accused would be a miscarriage of justice. The lower court's
judgment of conviction should be affirmed and the accused should be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
G.R. NO. 155619, August 14, 2007
LEODEGARIO BAYANI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Leodegario Bayani (petitioner) was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 in an Information, to wit:
That on or about the 20th day of August 1992, in the Municipality of Candelaria,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously issue and make out Check No. 054924 dated August 26, 1992, in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) Philippine Currency, drawn
against the PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, Candelaria, Quezon, payable to "Cash"
and give the said check to one Dolores Evangelista in exchange for cash although
the said accused knew fully well at the time of issuance of said check that he did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment, the
same was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that the drawer
thereof, the herein accused, had no sufficient funds therein, and that despite
due notice said accused failed to deposit the necessary amount to cover said
check, or to pay in full the amount of said check, to the damage and prejudice of
said Dolores Evangelista in the aforesaid amount.
Contrary to law.[1]
After trial, petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena
City, Branch 55, in a Decision rendered on November 20, 1995, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the
accused Leodegario S. Bayani, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 1, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby sentences him to suffer one (1)
year imprisonment and a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He shall likewise pay the
complaining witness, Dolores Evangelista, the sum of P10,000.00, the value of
Check No. 054924 he issued and drew against PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, which
was subsequently dishonored by the said drawee bank for insufficiency of funds.
The accused Leodegario Bayani is further ordered to pay Dolores Evangelista the
amount of P5,000.00 representing attorney's fees. He shall also pay double the
cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[2]
In convicting petitioner, the trial court made the following findings of facts:
1. That the Philippine Savings Bank, Candelaria Branch, has issued to the
accused check booklet (Exh. "C") on December 12, 1991, with the
Check No. 054924 as one of those included in said booklet of checks;
2. That the said Check No. 054924 dated August 26, 1992, was drawn
and issued payable to Cash in the amount of P10,000.00; said drawn
check was made to apply to the account of the accused, Leodegario S.
Bayani whose name appears therein in bold print at the upper portion
of the said check;
3. That said Check No. 054924, is a post-dated check, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank, PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, for
insufficiency of funds;
4. That the checking account of the accused Leodegario S. Bayani with
PS Bank, Candelaria Branch, was closed on September 1, 1992 (Exh.
"B-3"), which at the time had only remaining deposit in the amount of
P2,414.96 (Exh. "B-4").[3]
The trial court also made the following findings:
The check in question is postdated, issued and drawn on August 20, 1992, and
dated August 26, 1992. It was presented to complaining witness, Dolores
Evangelista, for encashment by Alicia Rubia whom the former knows. After the
check was deposited with the bank, it was returned to Evangelista for
insufficiency of funds (Exh. "A-5"). Thereafter, she pursued the following events
to demand payment of the value of the check:
xxxx
After the confrontation at the office of Atty. Emmanuel Velasco, Evangelista has
had another confrontation with the accused Bayani and Alicia Rubia at
Candelaria municipal building before Brgy. Captain Nestor Baera, but again the
accused and Rubia pointed to each other for the settlement of the amount
involved in the check in question.
Of these two (2) confrontations Evangelista had with the accused Bayani and
Alicia Rubia, including the chances to have met or known the complaining
witness Evangelista since 1977 up to the filing of the instant case in the
Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, all what the accused Leodegario Bayani
could say were flat denials of having talked with, or otherwise met Evangelista,
regarding the latter's claim of payment of the value of Check No. 054924,
admittedly from the check booklet of the said accused Bayani issued by PS Bank,
Candelaria Branch.[4]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)[5] affirmed in toto the trial court's decision.
The CA's Decision dated January 30, 2002 provides for the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, and it appearing from the circumstances of both the offense and
the offender which does not indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact in
accordance with the Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the judgment appealed
from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Thus, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, with
the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN REFUSING TO ACQUIT
THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS UTTERLY BASED
ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE
CONSIDERATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CHECK WAS NOT DULY
ESTABLISHED;
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN THEY CONVICTED
THE ACCUSED BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE LATTER'S EVIDENCE AND NOT
ON THE STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE;
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALED (sic) ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED SOLELY ON THE BASES OF PRESUMPTIONS.[7]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent, argues that: (1) petitioner's denial of his liability for Check No.
05492 cannot overcome the primordial fact that his signature appears on the
face of such check; (2) want of consideration is a personal defense and is not
available against a holder in due course; and (3) the constitutional presumption
of innocence was overcome by the requisite quantum of proof.[8]
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court
and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain
facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the
case. Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the CA is limited to
reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the CA, whose factual findings are
conclusive and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of
the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support
in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion.[9]
The Court sustains the CA in affirming petitioner's conviction by the RTC.
Petitioner denies having issued the check subject of this case. He argues that the
evidence pinpointing him as the signatory on the check is merely hearsay.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the rule on hearsay
evidence, to wit:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.
- A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
Under the above rule, any evidence " whether oral or documentary " is hearsay if
its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, but on
that of some other person who is not on the witness stand. Hence, information
that is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is
considered hearsay.[10]
In the present case, complainant Evangelista testified that she was approached
by Alicia Rubia who told her that she was requested by petitioner to have the
check exchanged for cash, as he needed money badly.[11] Obviously, Evangelista's
testimony is hearsay since she had no personal knowledge of the fact that
petitioner indeed requested Rubia to have the check exchanged for cash, as she
was not personally present when petitioner supposedly made this request. What
she testified to, therefore, was a matter that was not derived from her own
perception but from Rubia's.
However, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Evangelista's
testimony even if the same is hearsay. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
requires that the trial court shall not consider any evidence which has not been
finally offered. Section 35 of the same Rule provides that as regards the
testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is asked
to testify. And under Section 36 of the same Rule, objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as
soon as the ground therefor becomes reasonably apparent.
Thus, it has been held that "in failing to object to the testimony on the ground
that it was hearsay, the evidence offered may be admitted."[12] Since no
objection to the admissibility of Evangelista's testimony was timely made - from
the time her testimony was offered[13] and up to the time her direct examination
was conducted[14] - then petitioner has effectively waived[15] any objection to the
admissibility thereof and his belated attempts to have her testimony excluded
for being hearsay has no ground to stand on.
While Evangelista's statement may be admitted in evidence, it does not
necessarily follow that the same should be given evidentiary weight.
Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.[16] In
this regard, it has been held that although hearsay evidence may be admitted
because of lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless
without probative value,[17] unless the proponent can show that the evidence
falls within the exception to the hearsay evidence rule.[18]
In this case, Evangelista's testimony may be considered as an independently
relevant statement, an exception to the hearsay rule, the purpose of which is
merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement. Independent of the truth or the falsity of the statement, the fact that
it has been made is relevant.[19] When Evangelista said that Rubia told her that it
was petitioner who requested that the check be exchanged for cash, Evangelista
was only testifying that Rubia told her of such request. It does not establish the
truth or veracity of Rubia's statement since it is merely hearsay, as Rubia was not
presented in court to attest to such utterance. On this score, evidence regarding
the making of such independently relevant statement is not secondary but
primary, because the statement itself may (a) constitute a fact in issue or (2) be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.[20] Indeed, independent
of its truth or falsehood, Evangelista's statement is relevant to the issues of
petitioner's falsehood, his authorship of the check in question and consequently,
his culpability of the offense charged.
In any event, petitioner's conviction did not rest solely on Evangelista's
testimony. There are other pieces of evidence on record that established his
guilt, to wit: the subject check was included in the booklet of checks issued by
the PSBank to petitioner; the subject check was made to apply to the account of
petitioner whose name appears on the upper portion of the said check; and
most telling is that petitioner never categorically denied that the signature
appearing on the check was his. What petitioner claimed was that the signature
on the check was similar to his signature, although there were "differences," viz.:
Q: I am showing to you a certain document purpurting
(sic) to be PSB Check No. 054924, will you please
look at this particular document and tell this
Honorable Court if this particular check is one of
those issued to you by the Philippine Saving's
Bank?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, there appears a signature above a line
located at the bottom of the said check which
 appears to be Leodegario Bayani, please tell this
Honorable Court if you know this particular
signature?
A: Although it is similar to my signature I could not tell
if this is my signature, sir.
Q: Please explain to this Honorable Court why is it so?
A: Because there are some differences, sir.
Q: Please tell this Honorable Court the particular
differences you are referring to?
A: At the middle of the signature I usually put my
middle initial and also the beginning of my family
name is almost connected with each other, sir.[21]
Neither did petitioner claim that the signature was a forgery. Had he done so,
then a forensic examination of the signature in appearing on the check and his
signature would have been made in order to determine the genuineness or
authenticity of the signature appearing on the check.
All these pieces of evidence, taken together, inevitably support the finding of
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Petitioner also argues that he cannot be convicted due to the prosecution's
failure to prove that the subject check was issued to apply on account or for
value.
The elements of the offense penalized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there
are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[22]
As regards the first element, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks and in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable
consideration.[23] Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that
every party to an instrument acquired the same for a consideration or for
value.[24] In alleging that there was no consideration for the subject check, it
devolved upon petitioner to present convincing evidence to overthrow the
presumption and prove that the check was issued without consideration.
Valuable consideration may consist either of some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract; or some forbearance,
detriment, loss of some responsibility to act; or labor or service given, suffered
or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do or not to do, in favor of
the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.[25] It was
shown in this case that the check was issued and exchanged for cash. This was
the valuable consideration for which the check was issued.
At any rate, what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to
its issuance. The law does not make any distinction on whether the checks within
its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee
the obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation.[26]
Thus, the Court cannot sustain petitioner's stance that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt. As ruled in Lee v. Court of Appeals:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty. Suffice it to
say the law requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in a prejudiced mind.[27]
After going over the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense in
this case, the Court finds no reason to overturn the judgment of conviction
rendered by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, as the prosecution sufficiently
proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119359, December 10, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROBERT CLOUD,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
The universal outcry and multinational campaign against child abuse can draw
added impetus from this extreme case of a little boy, just barely two and a half
years old, who was beaten to death by his own father. So it was alleged in an
information for parricide filed against accused-appellant Robert Cloud in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City.[1]
The case for the prosecution is presented by the Solicitor general[2] by adopting
the factual findings of the trial court, with the pages of the stenographic notes
being supplied by the People. Having painstakingly reviewed and analyzed the
evidence of record, we find that such findings merit reproduction hereunder:
At around 11:00 o’clock in the morning on August 2, 1988 while a certain Mrs.
Josephine Aguilar was at the emergency room of St. Luke’s Hospital, Quezon City
to have some stitches removed from her daughter’s head her attention was
called by a limpid boy being carried by a man followed by an old woman who
was shouting hysterically. The boy is John Albert Cloud. She noticed that the
face of the boy was swollen and bruised and his body covered with dry blood. A
nurse commented that the little boy - not more than three years old - must have
been hit by a truck (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1993, pp. 7-10, 14-15, 33).
But the words of the old woman - the lola - of the little boy, showed the cause of
the injury to be otherwise for she was repeatedly saying in a potpourri of cries
and tears: "Pinatay siya nf sariling ama!" The old woman told the people inside
the Emergency Room that the boy’s father - Robert Cloud - wouldn’t allow John
Albert to come with her and when the boy started to cry and wouldn’t stop
crying his father began to beat the boy hard, tied his hands, and made "tusok,
tusok" in his body. The father continued beating the boy even when excrements
were already coming out from the boy’s anus (tsn. J Aguilar, June 21, 1993, pp.
12-13, 22).
The male companion of the boy said to the old woman: "Hoy, tigil ka na!" "Wag
kang maingay." And told the people at E.R.: "Sira and ulo ng matanda, eh!" (tsn, J
Aguilar, July 12, 1993, pp. 8-9). But the old woman wouldn’t stop and continued
to say: "Putang-ina ang ama niya . . . Hayop siya!"
When the doctor pronounced the boy dead the old woman knelt before him and
cried like (Ix)ion (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1993, p. 10). His baptismal certificate
says that John Albert was born on October 2, 1987 to Janet Villagracia and John
Robert Cloud (Exh. ‘3’).
The ear-piercing would probably have ended there but for the fact that Mrs.
Aguilar’s conscience was bothered by what she saw and heard as narrated above
and decided to do something about it. She approached Atty. Remedios Balbin,
Chairman in Quezon City of a civil liberties organization. Atty. Balbin, after a few
weeks of research found out that Robert Cloud and family left his house at No.
69 San Isidro Street, barangay Sto. Niño, Quezon City[;] the boy’s body was
brought to Rey Funeral Homes[;] Dr. E. Cacas certified that the cause of death of
John Albert Cloud is broncho pneumonia with heart complications (exh. D-48) [;]
and that the autopsy on the cadaver was waived by Natividad Calpito Cloud who
claimed to be the boy’s mother per her "Affidavit" dated August 3, 1988 (Exh.
"D-47). Atty Balbin thereafter contacted the NBI and requested for the
exhumation of the boy’s cadaver (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1994, pp. 17-21, 32, 35-
37, 42; R. Balbin, March 8, 1994, pp. 6, 17-21, 23, 25-27, 29-30, 36, 50, 54-55).
The exhumation was done on November 8, 1988 by the NBI at the Manila South
Cemetery. The exhumation report stated the following findings:
"Upper incisor, right, missing.
Contusions; face, right side, 9.0 x 6.0 cm;
buttocks, right and left sides, 20.0 x 12.0 cm;
Knees, anterior aspect, right, 6.0 x 4.5 cm;
And left 8.0 x 5.0.;
Contused-abrasion: face, left side, 14.0 x 6.0 cm;
arm, left, postero-lateral aspect, 6.0 x 4.0 cm;
hand, right, dorsal aspect, 7.0 x 5.0 cm;
thigh, right posterior aspect,
extending to the lateral and anterior aspects 15.0 x 7.0 cm.
Hematoma - fronto-temporal region, left side 13.0 x 6.0 cm.
Hemorrhages, subdural and subarachnoidal, left cerebral hemisphere.
Heart chambers contain a small amount of embalmed blood.
Brain markedly congested and edematous.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, empty (Exhibits "E" and "E-1")
Although the crime was supposedly committed on August 2, 1988, for reasons
hereinafter explained the information dated May 10, 1990 was filed on June 5,
1990. The decision of the trial court states that the accused was arrested only
on April 15, 1993. That is why, with the proceedings that then had to be
undertaken and the trial which had to be conducted, it was only in a decision
dated November 11, 1994 that judgment was ultimately handed down,
decreeing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein accused ROBERT
CLOUD GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of PARRICIDE
for the violent death of his son JOHN ALBERT CLOUD and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as damages. Costs vs. the accused.[3]
That it took more than six years to obtain a verdict for the child’s death is a
distressing indictment of the criminal justice system, particularly its investigative
and prosecutory pillars. How the case managed to reach its logical denouement,
however, is a tribute and does honor to the other component of the system - the
community participation - which is the redeeming feature in this bizarre and
repulsive case of barbarity to an innocent, helpless victim who was just a stage
out of infancy.
As stated earlier, the events that later became the subject of testimonial
evidence for the prosecution unfolded before the eyes of prosecution witness
Josephine Aguilar who was then inside the emergency room of the hospital
having stitches removed from her daughter’s head. Although she was a perfect
stranger to the family involved, but haunted by the sight and memory of the
lifeless and battered child, she sought the help of Atty. Remedios Balbin,
chairperson of a civil liberties organization in Quezon City. It was through their
joint, unrelenting and selfless efforts that this case eventually wound up in the
court a quo for judicial action.
Atty. Balbin conducted an investigative research which enabled her to
coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigations (NBI). Her efforts led to
the discovery of the following facts: (1) Robert Cloud and his family left their
house at No. 69 San Isidro Street, barangay Sto, Niño, Quezon City immediately
after the death of John Albert;[4] (2) John Albert’s body was brought from the
hospital to the Rey Funeral Homes;[5] (3) a certain Dr. E. Gacas certified that the
cause of the death of John Albert was broncho pneumonia with heart
complications;[6] and (4) the autopsy of the cadaver was waived by a certain
Natividad Calpito Cloud who falsely claimed to be the mother of John Albert.[7]
Incidentally, despite her active participation in various aspects of this case, she
was never called upon by appellant to testify and corroborate his assertions
therein.
Atty. Balbin thereafter requested for the exhumation of the body of the little boy
for purposes of autopsy. The exhumation was made on November 8, 1988,
almost three months after the burial of John Albert. The exhumation report,
which has been quoted by the People in its brief and is set out in full at the start
of this opinion, revealed the grave and fatal injuries, internal and external, which
caused the boy’s death and could have resulted only from violence or strong
physical force. On the strength of that report of the NBI, the sworn statement of
Josephine Aguilar and the evidence gathered by Atty. Balbin, an information for
parricide was eventually filed against herein appellant.
A warrant for the arrest of Robert Cloud was issued on June 11, 1990 which was
returned unserved. Alias warrants were issued on June 29, 1992 and September
22, 1992 and finally on April 15, 1993. Appellant was arrested by the police at
No. 22 Lourdes Castillo Street, Galas, Quezon City and was thereafter committed
to jail. On April 26, 1993, duly assisted by counsel, he was arraigned and he
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution built up its case on the basis of a sworn affidavit and testimony
in open court of its principal witness, Josephine Aguilar. For a clearer
appreciation of what she actually witnessed and overheard inside the emergency
room of St. Luke’s Hospital, we quote her testimony:
FISCAL PONFERRADA:
Madam witness, do you recall where were you on August 2, 1998 at
Q
arounf 11:00 in the morning, madam witness?
A I was in the emergency room of St. Luke’s Hospital in Quezon City, sir."
xxx
While you were there after a couple of minutes, what happened? Do
Q
you recall any unusual incident, madam witness?
A An old woman came with a boy of dried blood, sir.
You said old lady with a little boy, what happened after that, madam
Q
witness?
Well she came in and she was crying, I heard the old woman, I heard
the doctor as(k) the old lady what happened and the old lady told the
A
doctor that it’s the father who bit (sic) him up again and the old lady
put the kid on the table and I saw the kid died, sir.
Q What happened next, what else did the old lady say, madam witness?
 The doctor told the old lady "wala na" then the old lady sitdown (sic) Q So at that time in the hospital you did not see the boy, madam witness?
A
on the floor crying and crying h(y) sterically, sir.
A Only dried blood, sir.[8]
Q Did you come to know the old woman, madam witness?
The defense, on the other hand, argues that at the time of the commission of the
A No, sir. alleged crime, appellant was not in his house and that the boy, John Albert, must
have fallen from the stairs leading to the second floor of the house. The defense
How about the boy, did you come to know the name of the boy who presented appellant and he testified that he left the house on the day in
Q
died, madam witness? question and only learned upon his return that his son was already dead, thus:

A Albert Cloud, sir. Q Do you know how your son died, Mr. Witness?

Q What happened after the boy died, madam witness? A I don’t know, sir.

The lola started shouting telling everybody there how it happened, to By the way where were you on August 2, 1988 in the morning, Mr.
A Q
the nurses and to the doctors. Witness.

You said the lola started telling the doctor what actually happenned, A I was at home, sir.
Q
did you hear these what the lola tell (sic) madam witness?
Q Did you leave that house on that day, August 2, 1988, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Please narrate before this Honorable Court what you hear(d) as
Q
narrated by the lola, madam witness? Q What time did you leave the house, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir. A Around 10:30, sir.

COURT: Q In the morning?

Q What did you hear when she tells (sic) everybody? A Yes, sir.

The father of the boy who died has burned in the skin, he was tie(d) Now, your son, where was he at the time you left the house, Mr.
A Q
and thrown against the wall, punch(ed) the boy, sir. Witness?

A He was upstairs, sir.

FISCAL PONFERRADA:
Q Do you know what he was doing at the time you left, Mr. Witness?
Did you have any occasion to see whether there are marks in the
Q
hands or the body of the boy, madam witness? A He was sleeping, sir.

A At that time the boy was full of dried blood, sir. Also, evidence already adduced in this case indicates that your son was
brought to the St. Luke’s Hospital, Quezon City by an old woman with a
Q
Q After that? male companion on or about (12:00 o’clock noon on August 1, 1988 and
by there (sic) your son died. Did you know that Mr. Witness?
A I see (interrupted)
A No, sir.
Q What did you see, madam witness?
Q Why not, Mr. Witness?
A He had dried blood here. The boy had dried blood in the forehead, sir.
A I was not at home that night, sir.
COURT:
xxx
Q What else did you see?
Did you ever come to know on that very day that your son, John Albert
Q
A He has bruises, blood inside the skin, "mga pasa". Cloud, died, Mr. Witness?

Q At that time? A Yes, sir.

A I only saw full of dried blood, sir. Q How did you come to know that your son died Mr. Witness?

Q Did you see the condition of the body of the boy? A My "tiyahin" told me "nadisgrasya raw po ang anak ko".

A No, I only saw dried blood from head to foot, sir. Q Who is this auntie, what is her name, Mr. Witness?

A Teresita Alconyes.
FISCAL PONFERRADA:
 Was that the old woman together with the male person (who) brought A That he was at the hospital, sir.
Q
your son to the hospital, Mr. Witness?
Did you ask her whether she was the one who brought the child to the
Q
A No, sir. hospital?

xxx A No, sir.

Where did this aunt of yours Ms. Alconyes tell you that your son died, Was she the one or was she not the one who brought (him) to the
Q Q
Mr. Witness? hospital?

A I was at Paco at that time, sir. A "Sila ho."

Is that the place where you were when you left your house at 10:00 Q Your Lola, is she your grandmother of your grandaunt?
Q
o’clock in the morning?
A Grandmother, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Mother of your mother?
Q By the way, what is the address of your house on August 2, 1988?
A Yes, sir.
A In Quezon City, sir.
xxx
Q What specific address?
Q Did you go to the hospital, Mr. Witness, to verify?
A No. 69 San Isidro St., Barangay Sto. Niño Santol, Quezon City.
A No, sir.
Did your aunt tell you how she came to know that your son died, Mr.
Q
Witness? Q Why not, Mr. Witness?

A No, sir. "Masama ang loob ko" that is why I did not go anymore to the hospital,
A
sir.[9]
Q When you learned that your son died from your aunt, what did you do?
The defense also alleged that John Albert was a sickly child from birth and was
A I went home immediately, sir. often hospitalized due to difficulty in breathing, as shown by some medical
records.[10] Further presented was the death certificate of John Albert Cloud
Q Did you see any person in your house or did you reach your house? issued by one Dr. Gacas and dated August 6, 1988, stating that the cause of
death was broncho pneumonia with heart complications,[11] and the report made
A Yes, sir. by Patrolman Ulep showing that he investigated the death of the child, John
Albert Cloud.[12]
Q Whom did you meet in your house upon your return?
On this aspect, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, the medical specialist at the NBI who
A None, sir. examined the exhumed body of the little boy, was presented as a prosecution
witness. His report[13] indicated "hemorrhage, intracranial, severe, traumatic" as
Q So what did you do, Mr. Witness? the cause of death. He testified that "the upper incisor, right was missing,
contusions on the face, right side, buttocks, knees and on the head. And the said
A I waited there, sir. injuries could have been caused by a hard blunt object, hitting by a fist or a piece
of wood." He did give hypothetical concession "that it was also possible that it
Q For whom did you wait, Mr. Witness? was the result of a fall from a building and as result of said injuries the suffered
internal hemorrhage which was the immediate cause of his death."[14]
A The one who brought my son to the hospital.
However, as to what would be the more credible cause of death, this is what he
had to say:
Q Were you able to wait for them, Mr. Witness?
In your best judgment as a physician, (h)is injury, could have been
A Yes, sir. Q
caused by any force applied, what about the handle of a gun?

Q Who were those persons whom you waited for, Mr. Witness?
A We do not rule out that possibility.

A My Lola and our houseboy, sir.

Could this finding also with (sic) the result of the excessive of physical
Q
hitting (sic)?
What did your Lola tell you upon their return, about your son, Mr.
Q
Witness?
A Yes, ma’am.

A My Lola told me that my son is dead.

COURT:

Q Did she tell where your son was at that time?

Q Both buttocks sustained injuries according to your findings?
A Yes, right and left side. not stop, appellant beat his son very hard, tied his hands, and continued beating
him until excreta came out of his anus.[17]
If baby boy like this boy fall on the high building would sustain injury
Q The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw does not
on the buttocks, the injury on the buttocks as well as the knees?
merely constitute an independently relevant statement which it considered as an
The contusion on the buttocks are very extensive. They are 20 by 20 "exception to the hearsay rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic truth
centimeters. So if the buttocks first (sic) is very different, if he falls it is or falsity of its contents."[18] We will clarify this. Insofar as the statements of
A Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are admissible as part of the res gestae they
very difficult for him and also on his knees. And the knees are anterior
portion it is highly improbable. having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome,
occurrence that she witnessed; and these were shortly thereafter uttered by her
with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. The report
FISCAL RAMOS: made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was actually there
and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she recounted in
So as far as the probabilit(ies) are concerned, are you looking for a court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes are admissible under the
Q doctrine of independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not
possibility that he fell on (sic) a high place?
the truth thereof, since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they are
A All in all the fall of (sic) a high place is very remot(e).[15] relevant to the issue on the cause of the death of the victim.

To recall, the court a quo rendered its decision on November 11, 1994 or six
years after the death of John Albert Cloud, and we find its observations therein
to be very perceptive and significant, to wit:
The court also considers as inculpatory, corroborative circumstances, the
following which the prosecutor elicited from the accused himself and which, in
the court’s opinion, do not constitute normal, reasonable or compatible with
innocent behavior of a father with respect to the horrifying death of his son;
(a) the accused was told that his son died from a fall and he did not even bother
to go to the hospital where his son lay dead;
Against the foregoing facts which came from the lips of these two women who
had no ill motives whatsoever against appellant and the circumstantial evidence
arising from his abnormal and inexplicable post-incident behavior, as well as the
physical evidence which will hereafter be discussed, we have merely the bare
denial of appellant and the testimony of his faithful houseboy cum driver,
Herminio Acosta. Since the latter is the star witness of the defense, we will
consider his testimony in extenso.
These are the pertinent parts of his representations in the trial court:
Q Mr. Acosta, where were you on August 2, 1988?

(b) he did not bother to see the medical records or the medical certificate when A I was at home, sir.
he knew already that his son did not die of an ordinary, natural cause. And
corollarily, said certificate is false and even the alleged doctor who made (it) is a Q Where was your home then?
false or non-existent doctor;
A At Santol but don’t know specific address.
(c) the accused took his entire household to Paco, Manila away from Quezon
City for years. There must have been some other reason than his alleged sorrow Q Do you know whose house was that?
over John Albert’s death. For, if it were just his sadness over it, then the Quezon
City house could have been rented out or a caretaker left thereat. As it is, even A Mr. Robert Cloud the accused.
Herminio Acosta left and did not return there anymore to date. Was there cause
to shudder about in the death of a 2-1/2 year old boy that the Quezon City house Q How long have you been staying there at that time?
of accused had to be abandoned thus like a haunted castle? Under the
circumstances, the court believes that it could only be the hounding darts and A About three years.
howls of the memory of what the accused did there rather than what he told the
court supposedly happened there, that can furnish such a strong reason for the Q What was your function in that house as a member of the family?
sudden abandonment of the house at 69 San Isidro St., Sto. Niño (quite an irony),
Quezon City; and
A I know a lot of things, cooking, taken child in the school, driving.

(d) despite the alleged unusual cause of death of his son, he allowed his wife
Q In other words you were utility man in that house
Natividad who is not the real mother of John Albert, to be the one to waive the
autopsy on his son. We thus find a father very much afraid to face his own baby
A Yes, sir.
son freshly lying cold and dead. This is another eerie but nonetheless clear sign
of circumstantial guilt.[16]
xxx
The prosecution’s primary evidence that it was appellant who beat up and killed
the boy was the testimony of its principal witness Josephine Aguilar who Let us go back to August 2, 1988, who were member(s) of the
Q
declared that she heard appellant’s grandmother herself shouting that it was household present, in the morning and afternoon?
appellant who killed his own son by beating him to death. The said
grandmother, Rufina Alconyes, was not presented in court, since at the time of xxx
the trial she was already dead.
A Myself, Natividad and Abet and Lola the old woman.
The Solicitor General posits the view that the outbursts of that grandmother
constituted exceptions to the hearsay rule since they were part of the res Q What is the full name of Naty?
gestae. Thise inculpatory and spontaneous statements were: (1) "Pinatay siya
ng kanyang ama" (he was killed by his own father); (2) Putang ina ang ama niya . A Natividad, the wife of Robert Cloud.
. . . walang awa sa anak niya . . . hayop siya" (His father is a son of a bitch . . .
without pity for his son . . . he is an animal); and (3) Appellant did not allow his COURT:
son, John Albert, to accompany her and when the boy started to cry and would
Q Who is this Abet? Q What were you doing there?

A The one who fell in the stairs. A I was preparing food and water for Jonald, the old brother.

xxx xxx

Who were inside that house, by the way what time of that day when Q While you were doing this work, do you know what happened.
Q
the boy fell from the stairs?
A As I said I heard "kalabog" as if something fell.
A It was still early maybe 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning.
Q But before that you did not know that Mr. Cloud left?
Now let us see, you said that there were six members of the
Q
household? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q What about Mr. Cloud, what time did he leave?

Q Where was Naty, was Naty still there when the boy fell in the stairs? A I don’t remember.

A She was there at that time. Q What about the old woman what time did she leave?

Q Why? A I could not remember the time.

A I did not notice that she left. Q Who left ahead Mr. Cloud or the old woman?

What about Mr. Cloud the accused here Robert Cloud, was he there xxx
Q
when the child fell from the stairs?
A The Lola first the one who left then Naty then Robert Cloud.
A He was not there also.
Now when you said that (they) left and you heard the "Kalabog" did
Q
Q What about the Lola? Was she there when the boy fell? you know what kalabog is that?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, I went to the stairway.

What do you mean there, when the boy fell the Lola was already Q And what did you find out?
Q
there?
A I saw Abet.
A No, sir.
Q So what did you do?
Q Where was she?
I held him, I don’t know how he fell and I don’t expect that he fall in
A
A She left perhaps she buy (sic) something, sir the stairway.

Q Who were there in that house Can you tell the Honorable Court the appearance of the boy if you can
Q
still remember?
I was there, Jonald also.
A A He had blood.

Q Where?
Q What about the boy?
A On the arms in the face I cannot remember the other.
A He was upstairs in the room.
Q While you were holding that boy what transpired next?
Now let us see at what time was that boy John Robert Cloud was
Q
upstairs? A Lola arrived.

A In the morning. Did the lola see what happened to the boy while you were holding the
Q
boy, did the lola see the boy in your arm?
Q What was he doing there?
A Yes, sir.
A I don’t know because I was in the grandfloor.
Was there any remark made by an old woman while you were holding
Q
xxx the boy?

Q What time were you at the groundfloor? A Yes, sir.

A Morning when I heard something "kalabog" that I went there

Q Please tell us as far as you can remember?
She was angry with the father because according to her "pinabayaan
A
daw and bata."
Q Can you represent all as you can the statement of the lola?
She was already angry and she was telling a lot of things that is all, I
A
don’t know what she said.
Q After that what happened?
A The baby was brought to the hospital.
xxx
COURT:
Q Who brought the boy to the hospital?
A The two of us, lola and I.
ATTY. MADAMBA:
Q What time?
A Pas(t) ten o’clock in the morning.
Q Do you know what happened in the hospital?
A I don’t know I just left there.
I am calling your attention to the testimony of one Ms. Aguilar,
according to her while she was attending to her child for treatment
inside the hospital she saw John Albert Cloud and the old woman and
Q eye, the inanimate remains of the dead give testimony of their own and, in the
according to her the old woman (was) hysterical and she was stating
aloud the following words or expression "Pinatay siya ngsariling ama,
pinatay siya ng sariling ama,"did you hear that?
xxx
A I did not hear that because I left already?
There is also here a statement by, I think this is alluded to you, you said
Q while the old woman (was) shouting you said "Hoy tumigil ka na at
huwag kang maingay?"
Yes, your honor because she was saying a lot of thing that is why I left
A witness are gravely imposing upon the patience and credulity of this Court.
already.
Q When you said he was telling a lot of thing, what do you mean?
A "Parang ano ho iyung matanda, kasi may pagkaulyanin iyun."
Q Now after that you left, where did you go?
A I went home to Santol.
Q Whom did you see there?
A Mr. Robert Cloud.
Q Did you notice what he was doing at that time?
A He was already crying.
Q Did you ask him why he was crying?
A No, sir.
Q Did he talk to you?
A He just asked me what happened to the child.
Q What did you tell him?
A I told him that the child was dead.[19]
Standing out in bold relief from this orchestrated story narrated by Acosta for
the first time after six years of silence is his clearly deliberate effort to make it
appear that appellent, his wife and grandmother were not in the house at the
time of the incident, thus paving the way for him to claim that he alone saw and
could testify to what happened to the victim. Yet, comparing his declarations
thereon and those of appellant, they could not even agree or be specific as to
when appellant supposedly left the house and stayed away in Paco,
Manila. There was not even an attempt on their part to explain why it took more
than two hours from the alleged accidental fall from the stairs to take the boy to
the hospital which was not a considerable distance away.
The second floor could not be more than four meters from the ground floor, not
so highly elevated even for a straight fall therefrom. In fact, as the trial court
elicited from appellant, the stairs from which the boy allegedly fell had only nine
steps. It did not even go straight down but went four steps to the first landing
then turned right where another five steps led to the ground floor.[20] Evidently,
if one merely fell down such stairs, that fall would be broken at the landing
where the stairs turned at a right angle, and even if he still continued rolling in
that new direction, the momentum would have been greatly reduced. That
would be true even if that person did not merely slip or fall, but was pushed or
thrown, down the stairs.
And this brings us to the irrefutable physical evidence which, as medico-legal
experts say, belies the adage that dead men tell no tales. Indeed, to the trained
present case, that is true even of the young victim who in life could not have
been as articulate. We refer to the report of the NBI after the exhumation and
autopsy which have taken pains to completely set out here.
It would be the nadir of gullibility to believe that a small boy with his nominal
weight could fall down the stairs above described with such velocity as to result
in the injuries which even the experienced hosptal staff initially believed were
caused by his being run over by a truck. One needs to merely look at the
description of the contusions on his face, buttocks and knees; the contused
abrasions on his face, hand and thigh; the hematoma on the temporal region of
his head; the severe hemorrhages on the cerebral hemisphere of his skull; and
the congestion in his brain and visceral organs, to see that appellant and his star
That is why when the victim was brought to the hospital, Acosta never even
mentioned at all that the boy merely fell down the stairs. The normal action of
any person bringing a patient to a hospital, especially a medico-legal case, is to
give informations even tentatively as to how the injuries were sustained. Yet,
although the grandmother was announcing to everybody that the boy was killed
through violent maltreatment by his own father, Acosta says he merely told her
to keep quite, and he forthwith left the hospital. He never dared to tell his
present cock-and-bull story or mention the conjured accident on the stairs,
especially to the medical staff whom he knew he could not delude, and yet he
has the effrontery to do so before this Court.
The circumstances which the court below considered as reactions betraying a
sense and knowledge of guilt on the part of appellant and his cohorts have
already been catalogued. One of them is the fact that immediately after the
death of the victim in the hospital, appellant took his entire household to Paco,
Manila, abandoned their house in quezon City and never came back until several
years later. This is admitted by appellant[21] and Acosta.[22] In fact, appellant
admitted that, while investigation into the death of his son were going on, he left
for Japan in 1990 and returned in 1993,[23] only to be arrested since the
investigation had by then zeroed in on his culpability. This circumstances was
even sought by the trial court to be clarified by Acosta, but this is what
transpired:
Do you know or did you come to know why after the death of this boy
Q in the house at Santol everybody left the house and did not return
anymore for a long long time?
A I don’t know.[24]
The Court is not unaware of the caution to be observed when circumstancial
evidence is to be considered as inculpatory indicia in a criminal
prosecution. That is why it has spent unusual time and effort to reflect upon all
facets of the circumstances which the lower court accepted as an unbroken
chain of events, reinforced by corroboration and yielding a conclusion of guilt, all
consonant with the requisites therefor.[25] But, from whatever angle we take the
view, the catena of facts cannot but produce an inference consisent with guilt
and not with innocence. All these, even aside from the tenet that flight bespeaks
guilt, a further strike against appellant in addition to the cover-up running the
gamut from falsification to false testimony.
From such ruminations, we are fully convinced that the conscience of the Court
can rest easy only by doing justice to an innocent child whose parents had
heartlessly failed him. Somehow, a mystical cause may have called upon two
good Samaritans -- a mother with a sense of humanity and a lady lawyer with a
passion for justice -- to seek redress for his untimely death. On this consoling
thought, we write finis to this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No,
Q-90-12660 convicting accused-appellant Robert Cloud of parricide is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38635, November 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE, VS. DANIEL HAY AG,
ACCUSED- APPELLANT.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
Daniel Hayag appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao
del Norte, Tagum Branch VIII, convicting him of rape, sentencing him to
"imprisonment for the rest of his natural life" and ordering him to pay to
Esperanza Ranga ten thousand pesos as moral damages (Criminal Case No.
1210).
Issue is the trustworthiness of the interpreter's verbalization of deaf-mute's sign
language. - In this alleged rape of Esperanza, 32, a farm girl and a deaf-mute, the
case has been simplified by the admission of the accused, Hayag, 50, a married
man with eight children, who finished grade six, that he had sexual intercourse
with Esperanza nine times between 1970 and December 4, 1972 in the town of
Carmen, Davao del Norte.
The ultimate issue is whether Virginia Ranga, 26, a public school teacher, a
college graduate and the victim's sister, correctly and credibly interpreted and
verbalized the sign language of Esperanza as meaning that Hayag raped
Esperanza on October 26, 1972 or whether credence should be given to Hayag's
story that the sexual intercourse on that occasion, as on other occasions, was
voluntary.
Attached to the complaint for rape was a certificate from the Davao General
Hospital that on December 7, 1972 Esperanza was examined and found to be
"positive for pregnancy" (Exh. C or 10). However, the record does not show
whether she gave birth. There was no medical examination of Esperanza
immediately after the rape allegedly perpetrated on October 26, 1972.
The prosecution labored under the handicap that it could prove the alleged rape
only through the sign language of the victim, Esperanza. The victim's sister,
Virginia, who has communicated with her since childhood by means of sign
language, was the sole available witness who could make known to her the
questions on direct and cross-examination and could articulate her alleged
answers for the record.
Because there was no means of checking the correctness and veracity of
Virginia's interpretation and because she herself believed that Esperanza was
raped by Hayag, it is not surprising that the defense counsel vehemently
objected to Virginia's role as interpreter. The defense regarded her as biased and
as lacking the cold neutrality of a third person acting as interpreter.
As Esperanza did not study in the school for deaf-mutes and as there was no
instructor in that school available as an interpreter, the trial court had no choice
but to use Virginia as the medium for communicating with Esperanza. Was she a
reliable interpreter? That is the intriguing question in this case.
This Court in two cases convicted an accused of having raped a deaf-mute but in
those cases an instructor in the school for deaf-mutes acted as an interpreter
and the conviction was not based solely on the evidence given by the victim. In
the instant case, the judgment of conviction was based exclusively on the story
of Esperanza that she was raped, a story made known through her sister,
Virginia, who signed the complaint for rape.
In People vs. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539, the accused was charged with having raped
his fifteen-year-old stepdaughter, a deaf-mute. The trial was held in the House,
called "Country Home", where the accused brought the girl. She testified in sign
language which was interpreted by a teacher in the school for deaf-mutes. The
accused was convicted on the basis of such testimony.
In People vs. Sasota, 52 Phil. 281, the accused was also charged with having
raped a fourteen-year-old deaf-mute. She testified with the assistance of an
instructor in the school for deaf-mutes. Her testimony was corroborated by her
seven-year-old sister who was present when the outrage was committed.
Seven days after the alleged rape, the victim, Rufina Barbuco, submitted to a
medical examination. The doctor "introdujo su especulum en la parte genital de
ella y dicha Rufina sintio' dolor por la introduccion de dicho instrumento". The
accused was convicted of rape.
But in People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, a homicide case, the testimony of a deaf-
mute, an alleged eyewitness, as interpreted by a teacher from the school for
deaf-mutes, who did not teach the witness (the latter never having studied in
such school) was not given credence. (See People vs. Nava, CA 40 O.G. 4327 and
People vs. Tejano, CA-G,R. No. 21954-R, May 25, 1959, 7 Velayo's Digest 724. As
to a deaf-mute convicted of robbery, see People vs. Nazario, 97 Phil. 990.)
Rules regarding communication with a deaf-mute. - At the outset, it is relevant to
state the jurisprudential rules for verbalizing the perceptions of a deaf-mute.
"Although in ancient times the rule was otherwise, deaf-mutes are now generally
accepted as competent witnesses. In any given case a showing must be made
that the witness has a of communication, and if he has and he witness has a
system of communication, and if he has and he is otherwise competent, his
testimony will be received" (81 Am. Jun. 2nd 116)
"The modern rule is to the effect that deaf and dumb persons are not
incompetent as witness merely because they are deaf and dumb if they are able
to communicate the facts by a method which their infirmity leaves available to
them, and are of sufficient mental capacity to observe the matters as to which
they will testify and to appreciate the obligation of an oath; but where the
person is not so educated as it is possible to make him understand the questions
which are put to him he is not competent" (97 C. J. S. 454).
"The method to be employed in eliciting the testimony of a deaf-mute should be
that which is best suited to attain the desired end, the particular method of
examination resting largely in the discretion of the trial court. Thus, a deaf and
dumb witness may be examined by means of written questions to which he gives
written answers, or he may be examined through the medium of an interpreter
who communicates with the witness by mean's of signs. The qualifications of a
particular person to act as an interpreter for a deaf-mute rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court" (98 C. J. S. 25).
The other statements of the procedure for taking the sign-language of a deaf-
mute are quoted below:
"The modern and generally accepted rule is to the effect that deaf-mutes are
competent witnesses where they have sufficient knowledge to understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath and comprehend the facts as to which they
wish to speak, and are capable of communicating their ideas with respect
thereto" (Annotation, 9 ALR 482).
"If deaf-mutes have sufficient understanding to comprehend facts about which
they undertake to speak, and appreciate the sanctity of an oath, they may give
evidence by signs, or through an interpreter, or in writing, and such testimony,
through an interpreter, is not hearsay" (Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 887, 9
ALR 480).
"It has been said that a court has the inherent power to elicit testimony from a
competent deaf-mute by whatsoever means necessary to the end to be
obtained, and that the manner in which the examination of a deaf-mute should
be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its
discretion.
"However, it has also been said that the best method should be adopted. And
there is authority to the effect that the method adopted will not be reviewed by
an appellate court in the absence of a showing that the complaining party was in
some way injured by reason of the particular method adopted.
"In fact it has been said that, in the absence of a showing as to what constituted
the best method of taking a deaf-mute's testimony, it will be presumed on
appeal that the trial court adopted the best method.
"As is stated in the authorities approved in Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387,
9 ALR 480, the general rule is that deaf-mutes who are competent to testify may
give evidence by signs, or through an interpreter, or in writing.
"More specifically it has been held that a deaf-mute who can read and write may
testify through that medium. Thus, in Ritchey vs. People (1896), 23 Colo. 314, 47
Pac. 272, a deaf-mute was examined by submitting to him written questions, to
which he replied in writing, which questions and answers were then read to the
jury.
"And the general rule is that the evidence of a deaf-mute who can be
communicated with by signs may be taken through an interpreter who
understands such signs and can interpret them to the court.
"And it has been held that it is permissible to take the testimony of a deaf-mute
through an interpreter by signs notwithstanding the evidence could have been
written. At least where there is no showing that the interpretation by signs is not
the better method.
"And especially where it appears that the witness is capable of relating the facts
'correctly' by signs, but, while able to read and write, can only communicate
ideas 'imperfectly' by writing. And it is not necessary that the witness be able to
read and write. However, it has been said that it would seem to be better in the
case of a deaf and dumb witness who can read and write to conduct his
examination in writing.
"With respect to the conducting of the examination of a deaf-mute itself, it has
been held that the allowing of leading questions is in the discretion of the court.
This discretion was said to arise out of the fact that 'there is always more or less
difficulty in eliciting testimony' where the witness is a deaf-mute" (Annotation, 9
ALR 482-484).
Procedure followed by the lower court in qualifying Virginia Ranga as an
interpreter of her sister's sign language. How to communicate with the victim,
Esperanza, was the problem of the municipal judge during the preliminary
examination. Esperanza knows how to sign her name and to read and write
figures. That was all.
The complaint for rape, filed in the municipal court on December 26, 1972, was
signed by Esperanza. Her sister Virginia certified under oath that she translated,
interpreted and explained the contents of the complaint "faithfully and truthfully
through sign language" to Esperanza (p. 1, Record)
At the preliminary examination, the municipal judge tested the capacity of
Virginia to communicate with Esperanza Virginia admitted that there were
deficiencies in her mode of communication with Esperanza. Virginia testified:
"17. Q: (by municipal judge). How adequate is the communication between
Esperanza Ranga and you? - A: Not too much but I think only a few things which
she wish to convey which I do not understand.
"18. Q: Would you tell me one or two of these few things which you don't
understand? - A: Those things which are very deep like for example those
invisible words.
"19. Q: What do you mean by invisible words? - A: For example, the meaning of
the word 'truth' whereby I could not explain to her in one sign only the meaning
of the word 'truth' but I could only explain that through other signs.
"20. Q: These signs that you employ in communicating between you and
Esperanza Ranga, are these conventional signs or the 'Deaf and Dumb' signs? - A:
No, sir.
"21. Q: What then are the signs? - A: Just like the actions.
"22. Q: In other words, you just contrived or improvised the signs? - A: Yes, sir.
"23. Q: For how long a time have both of you been at this means of
communication? - A: Since my birth.
"24. Q: You mean that when you were born you already communicate with each
other? - A: Not exactly but when I already learned to talk and she could not
understand.
"25. Q: Do you still employ the same improvised signs in communicating with
your older sister? - A: Yes, sir.
"26. -Q: Have you ever revised or modify (ied) these so-called improvised signs? -
A: No, sir.
"27. Q: You have improvised along the way, have you? - A: Yes, sir.
"28. Q: Suppose you wanted to convey to your older sister the meaning of: 'She
better dress up because you are going to bring her to the Court', How would you
communicate with your sister?
"A: (The witness demonstrated by raising her two hands from the head then
downward which would imply putting on the dress; her right hand placed over
the nose which means, 'good or beautiful' and touch her older sister (Esperanza)
on her shoulder and pointing towards her and touching both of them with the
same hand gesturing towards the road and a sign indicating a roof which implies
the Municipal Hall.)
"The Court is of the opinion that witness may adequately communicate with her
older sister Esperanza Ranga through their improvised sign language. In view
thereof, this Court hereby commissions Virginia Ranga to act as an interpreter
for her sister, Esperanza Ranga, in this preliminary examination" (pp. 15-16,
Record).
The municipal judge then asked Virginia to take an oath as an interpreter. After
taking the oath, the judge instructed Virginia to ask Esperanza whether the latter
understood the meaning of an oath. Esperanza replied by signs that she would
tell the truth.
According to the sign language of Esperanza, as interpreted by Virginia, the
alleged rape was committed in this manner:
sister is the interpreter in this case, she being not competent and expert witness.
"Court: Well, she is not presented here as an expert witness. She is just being
used now as an interpreter, and you are objecting to that?
"Defense counsel: xxx We are really seriously objecting.
"Court: xxx the appellate court will be guided by the stenographic transcript
whether you made your observation and your objection in time before a person
is allowed to be an interpreter in a case like this.

"While she (Esperanza) was walking, she was pulled away from the road and
"We cannot also ask say a teacher in (the) school for deaf-mutes to be an
then she resisted and (was) dragged until she was kicked on her leg whereby she
interpreter here because, probably, if that deaf-mute did not go to the school for
stumbled down.
deaf-mutes, she would not know the sign language of the teacher.
"The one (Hayag) who pulled her boxed her on her breast and on the legs and
"So, probably, this is my personal observation, that they should adapt
then she lost consciousness and then when she lost consciousness, she did not
themselves to the circumstances of the situation. Now, since their sister is dumb
know what happened.
and cannot hear, and because they were living together, they have to devise a
way by which they could communicate (with) each other, and,probably, not the
"When she regained consciousness, she found out that she was raped by the
same sign language in the school for deaf and dumb persons.
man who pulled her" (pp. 16-17, Record).

Esperanza identified the man who raped her as a person with a mole between "So, in the interest of justice, the Court will allow the sister to interpret the
his eyes just below his forehead. She pointed to Hayag as the rapist. Hayag and testimony of the offended party." (4-11 tsn June 11, 1973).
his counsel were present at the preliminary examination.
After Virginia had taken her oath and testified that she and Esperanza had been
communicating by means of sign language since childhood, she was directed to
The rape was not reported because Hayag told Esperanza that she would be
ask Esperanza's name.
killed if she divulged the rape to anybody (p. 18, Record).
Virginia made a sign to Esperanza to sign her name. Esperanza wrote on a piece
Hayag waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was
of paper "Esperanza Ranga May 3, 1972" (17-18 tsn June 11, 1973).
elevated to the Court of First Instance where the provincial fiscal filed an
information for rape dated February 12, 1973.
When the trial judge directed Virginia to ask Esperanza why she was in court,
Esperanza moved her head sidewise and placed a finger on her lips. She was not
The trial court tested Virginia's capacity to communicate with Esperanza in sign
able to answer that question in sign language because, as the private prosecutor
language improvised by the two sisters, a procedure opposed by defense
himself admitted, it is difficult to formulate a "why" question in sign language
counsel, as may be seen from the following transcript:
(17-19, 23 tsn).
"Private prosecutor: x x x since the complainant, your Honor, is a deaf-mute, we
will present her sister as an interpreter, and we will qualify the sister to act as an The fiscal noted that Esperanza could answer "what, where and when" questions
interpreter, x x x but it would be difficult to make her understand a "why" question because "there
were certain questions that she cannot easily understand" (26-27 tsn).
"Defense counsel: x x x we object to the competency (of Virginia) on tie ground
that this witness is not an expert witness to interpret the language of a deaf- The following portion of the transcript is a sample of of how Virginia
mute. She would not be competent as to the sign to be conveyed to her, and communicated with Esperanza on direct examination:
finally, it would be prejudicial and biased, your Honor, x x x
"Q. Alright. Tell her (Esperanza) to demonstrate to kick her right leg? - A. Yes, sir.
(Witness-interpreter's sister doing the same.)
"I believe, your Honor, that this case is so serious as it involves the liberty of the
accused, and if we will be hasty in proceeding . . . even granting that the witness
"Q. Tell her to repulse or fight back an opponent when she is attacked? - A. Yes,
can be able to perceive and communicate, there is no definite provision in the
sir. (The sister doing the same.)
Rules of Court that a sister could be qualified as an interpreter to a deaf-mute, x
xx
"Q. Let us be specific. Does your sister know how to look (up) a date in the
calendar? - A. Yes, sir.
"Court: xxx the Court will allow her (the sister) to be an interpreter in this case as
long as she can be qualified to interpret the signs of her sister.
"Q. You taught her. - A. She has an idea.
"Defense counsel: xxx And granting that the sister will be allowed to translate
"Q. Alright. Do you have ... a calendar? - A. Yes.
and interpret in behalf of the offended party, how will we be so sure that the
sister will convey the same translation as the offended party wanted to convey to xxx xxx xxx
her? xxx

"Private prosecutor: Good faith is presumed, your Honor please. Bad faith is not
presumed, xxx
"Court: Well, anyway, those are recorded already and in case of an appeal, those
can be taken up because those will appear in the transcript of the stenographic
notes, all the objections that you have raised insofar as allowing the sister of the
offended party to interpret her sign language.
"Defense counsel: x x x we will submit a memorandum to that effect that the
"Q. Will you tell your sister to point to figure 7? - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter
translating the same to her sister in sign language and the sister likewise pointed
to figure 7.)
"Q. Tell her to point to No. 23. - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter translating the
same to the sister and the sister pointing also to No. 23.)
"Q. What about the month appearing in that calendar, can she read? What is
that month there appearing there in that calendar for 1973,in her sign language?
xxx - A. She cannot read.
"Q. But she can read the days or the number? - A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Can she point to No. 18? (Witness-interpreter translating the same to the
sister, and the sister pointing also ft, to No. 18.)
"Q. Alright. Now, how would she communicate the month of a year. What month
is she referring when she refers to a date, for example. How will she
communicate that with you? - A. She will use the calendar, sir.
"Q. But she cannot read the month in the calendar, she said already. Is it not? -
A. She can understand, and at least she can point.
"Q. Alright. Will you tell your sister to see in that calendar the month of July? - A.
We still need to write the month, sir.
"Q. You give her a piece of paper and write there July. Then let her locate it there
in the calendar. - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter doing the same and the sister
located the month of July.)
"Q. Now, tell her to locate the month of November.- A. Yes, sir. (The sister
locating the same.)
"Q. Will you tell her whether she knows the days in the week, like Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, like that? - A. Yes, sir. I think she knows.
"Q. And what are the days in the week? Aide her.- A. She does not know, sir.
"Q. Do you know what day is today? Ask her. - A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter
translating the question to the sister, and she pointed to June 11 in the 1973
calendar.)
"Q. Now, can you point xxx there in the calendar any day? - A. (The sister pointed
to Tuesday after the question was properly translated to her by the witness-
interpreter.)
"Court: Make it of record that she pointed to Tuesday.
"Q: by Court: Do you know what day is today? (Witness pointing to June 11 in
the 1973 calendar.) - A: (by Witness-interpreter): She does not know, your
Honor.
"Q: by Court: Do you know what is today? - (Witness pointing to June 11 in the
1973 calendar.)
"Court: I think she can adequately communicate, perhaps not to our satisfaction.
Alright, xxx (To the Witness - Interpreter [Virginia]): Do you swear to interpret
faithfully and to the best of your knowledge the questions to your sister and the
answers that she gives to the questions? - Witness- Interpreter: Yes, your Honor.
"Court: Alright. (To private prosecutor) Your first witness.
"Private prosecutor: Our first witness is the complainant herself, your Honor.
"Court: Put her on the stand." (30-37 tsn.)
The oath was then administered to Esperanza. How it was administered is not
shown in the record. It should be recalled that Virginia testified that "invisible
words" like truth cannot be made known in sign language to Esperanza.
When Esperanza was asked as to her age, she wrote on a piece of paper "May 3,
1983 32" (39 tsn June 11, 1973).
Testimony of Esperanza as verbalized by her sister Virginia.- Esperanza resided in
Carmen and worked in the ricefield of her brother Dencio. She used to walk from
her house to the ricefield which was quite far. Upon being asked, Esperanza
pointed to the figure "26" in the calendar. She worked in the ricefield on October
26, 1972 up to the time in the afternoon when the sun was in a certain position
which, as calculated by the court, meant that it was approximately three o' clock.
She was on her way home alone. She sketched the road leading to the highway
which was taken by her and the scene of the alleged rape (Exh. A or 2). When
she reached a grassy spot along the road, her left hand was pulled by a man with
a mole between his eyebrows whom Esperanza identified as Hayag who was in
court. Hayag pulled her to the grassy bush. (At this point, defense counsel
manifested that Esperanza did not make any sign that she was pulled to the
grassy bush and that it was Virginia, the interpreter, who supplied that
allegation, 47 tsn).
Esperanza resisted but Hayag kicked her in the right leg and she stumbled. Hayag
choked her while she was prostrate on the ground. Asked if she was boxed,
Esperanza replied that Hayag boxed heron the chest while she was standing, At
this point, Esperanza went down the witness stand and demonstrated how she
resisted.
Hayag removed her short pants and kissed her and then, as stated by the
interpreter, she was raped. Asked the leading question of whether she was
unconscious when she was raped, she replied in the affirmative and added thai
she regained consciousness after she was raped. Her pants were on her side on
the ground. There was blood in her private part. She pushed aside Hayag.
Hayag stood up and told Esperanza not to tell anybody what happened or else he
would kill her, Hayag picked up her pants arid threw thern over her body and
left. She pat on her pants and went home crying. She was still crying when she
arrived home but she did not disclose to her mother the alleged rape because of
the threat made by Hayag.
Esperanza indicated in the sketch the spot where she was raped on October 26,
1972, identified as Exhibit A-2 or 2-A (63 tsn).
According to Esperanza, on December 4, 1972 she encountered Hayag in the
same place but she avoided him by passing near the central school and going to
the house of her sister-in-law, as indicated in the sketch, Exhibit A. She arrived
home at eight o'clock in the evening and reported the rape incident to her
mother.
Hayag's story.- To support his defense that his sexual intercourse with Esperanza
was voluntarily consummated and was not accomplished through force or
against her will, he testified that he and Esperanza, whom he had known for
more than fifteen years, loved each other. They were neighbors in the town of
Carmen. Hayag's daughter Ester is married to Antonio, a brother of Esperanza.
Their liaison allegedly started one morning in December, 1970 when Esperanza
appeared at the foot of the stairs of his house and made a sign that she wanted
to drink water. Hayag signalled her to go upstairs. He was absent from work on
that day.
He went to the kitchen where Esperanza followed him. After she had drunk
water, she made a sign by pointing to herself and to Hayag and placing her two
fingers side by side or juxtaposing them. Hayag said that by means of that sign
Esperanza wanted to convey that she and Hayag were sweethearts. Hayag
nodded to show his assent to Esperanza's offer of love.
Hayag said that thereafter Esperanza embraced him and they kissed each other.
After the embrace, Esperanza disengaged herself and formed a circle with her
left thumb and index finger and inserted into the circle the fingers of her right
hand, repeatedly making a push-and-pull movement. That signal meant that she
wanted sexual intercourse. In answer to that signal, Hayag nodded.
Esperanza took off her panties and because the kitchen floor was dirty Hayag
indicated to her that they would have sexual congress on the table which was
clean. They performed the sexual intercourse on the table and reached the
climax in about five minutes.
After they went down from the table, they embraced and kissed and Esperanza
allegedly made a sign that they should repeat the sexual act. At that juncture,
Florita, Hayag's daughter, barged in and saw them. They separated.
Four days later, Esperanza met Hayag at about six-thirty in the morning at the
crossing or intersection of the highway going to Tagum and the road going to
Tibal-og in the vicinity of the bridge and the chapel. There was a grassy spot in
that place (Exh. 9 and A). There, they had sexual intercourse for about five
minutes.
In the meantime, Florita reported to her mother, Adoracion, that she had seen
Hayag and Esperanza in a compromising situation. Hayag and his wife quarrelled.
Mrs. Hayag and her three daughters left the conjugal abode and took refuge in
her mother's house in Maco. Hayag was able to persuade his wife to return to
their house after he had promised not to have anything more to do with
Esperanza.
For more than a year, Hayag lived up to his promise. Then, in the morning of May
12, 1972, Hayag met Esperanza on the highway while he was waiting for
transportation to take him to his work as a foreman (capataz) of the Bureau of
Public Highways in Mawab, Nabunturan.
On that occasion, Esperanza allegedly made a sign to him that they should have
sexual intercourse, pointing to him the grassy spot where they had done it
before. Hayag made a counter-sign to convey to Esperanza the message that
they should have sexual intercourse after he had cleared a spot amidst the dense
talahib grass.
It took Hayag three days to prepare the place of assignation (See photographs,
Exh. 5 to 8). On May 15, 1973 he and Esperanza allegedly had sexual intercourse
in the spot which he had cleared. Thereafter, they had six other acts of sexual
intercourse in that place. A white plastic raincoat allegedly belonging to
Esperanza was used to cover the ground (Exh. 4).
Hayag specified that he had carnal intercourse with Esperanza on September 2
and 23, October 20 and 26, November 4 and December 4, 1972. Esperanza
allegedly advised Hayag to remember the dates bemuse she might become
pregnant. The last three acts of sexual intercourse took place in the afternoon
after Hayag had come from work and while Esperanza was on her way home
from the farm (13-14 tsn October 26, 1972).
After each sexual intercourse, Esperanza would take Hayag's ball pen and write
the date on the palm of his hand. Hayag himself did not make any record of the
dates of the sexual intercourse. He committed them to memory.
In the afternoon of December 4, 1972, after Hayag and Esperanza had sexual
intercourse in their usual trysting place (Exh. 5 to 8), they were seen in that
vicinity by Jose Santillan, a close friend of Hayag, and by Esteban Ranga, the
uncle of Esperanza, who appeared to be angry and who held her and brought her
home.
Two days later, or on December 6, Hayag was arrested by Patrolmen Rolando
Yambao and Samuel Casuga because Esperanza's mother and uncle had charged
him with rape.
Hayag's daughter Florita and his wife Adoracion corroborated his testimony as to
the quarrel between him and his wife when she learned that he had an affair
with Esperanza.
Florita testified that Esperanza cried when she learned that Hayag was in prison
and in sign language she allegedly made it known that she had voluntary sexual
intercourse with Hayag and that, to prove that she loved Hayag, she (Esperanza)
gave to Florita the plastic raincoat already mentioned (Exh. 4).
Jose Santillan, a farmer, a friend of Hayag and a neighbor of the Ranga family,
testified that as a Peeping Tom or voyeur, he witnessed the sexual intercourse
between Hayag and Esperanza in the afternoon of December 4, 1972 in the
grassy spot mentioned by Hayag in his testimony.
The trial court reacted in disbelief to Hayag's story, it branded Hayag's version as
unusual and bizarre. It concluded that Hayag took advantage of the physical
defect of Esperanza and that he was under the illusion that because she is a
deaf-mute she would not be able to communicate the outrage perpetrated
against her.
Ruling. - Hayag's counsel de oficio contends in this appeal that the trial court
erred in basing the judgment of conviction on the testimony of Esperanza in sign
language as verbalized by her sister, an alleged biased interpreter.
We have conscientiously examined the record. Our conclusion is that the
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The culpability of Hayag cannot be made to rest on the uncorroborated story of
Esperanza, as conjectured by her sister and mother. That story in itself is not
clear, convincing, positive and free from suspicion. It is not impeccable and does
not ring true throughout (People vs. Ariarte, 60 Phil. 326).
Lack of tenacious resistance on the part of Esperanza Ranga, her delay in
reporting the alleged rape to her mother and the absence of an immediate
medical examination of her private organ are circumstances creating reasonable
doubt as to the commission of the rape.
From Esperanza's version, as articulated by her sister, it is at once evident that
Esperanza did not offer much resistance to the alleged sexual assault made by
Hayag. She did not suffer any physical injuries. Her dress was not torn. She did
not attempt to free herself from the clutches of Hayag.
This is not a case of a teenage girl being raped by a strong and robust adult. This
is a case of a thirty-two-year-old farm girl who was allegedly forced to have
carnal inter-course by a fifty-year-old man. Her story does not contain details as
to how she repelled Hayag's attempts to ravish her. And that story was not
recounted by her directly in her own words but was made known by means of
sign language which was interpreted by her sister. The trustworthiness of that
interpretation is doubtful.
The defense objected to such interpretation. The probability of error or
fabrication in such a case is very manifest. As observed by Justice Villa-Real, that
is a dangerous procedure for ascertaining the truth especially in a,, case where
the liberty of an accused is at stake (People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, 390). The
court and the accused have no means of checking the accuracy of the
verbalization made by the interpreter who is herself interested in sending the
accused to prison.
It is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman without the help of confederates or
without terrifying her with a deadly weapon. If she makes a vigorous resistance,
the likelihood is that the lascivious desire of her assailant would be foiled.
The resistance would, as in this case, be more effective in an open field where
there are more chances of eluding the assailant or frustrating his advances. The
rape committed by a man without the assistance of other persons is possible but
is a rare case. (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 Ed., 588; People vs. Barbo, L-
30988, March 29, 1974, 56 SCR A 459, 467.)
Then, there is the fact that although the alleged rape took place on October 26,
1972, it was only forty days later, or on December 4, that Esperanza confided to
her mother (by means of signs, of course) that she was supposedly raped. Her
story was not corroborated.
The uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman may be sufficient under
certain circumstances to warrant a conviction for rape. Yet, "from the very
nature of the charge and the ease with which it may be made and the difficulty
which surrounds the accused in disproving it where the point at issue is as to
whether the cohabitation was had with or without the use of force or threats, it
is imperative that such testimony, should be scrutinized with the greatest
caution. " (Carson, J., in U. S. vs. Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268.)
"In all such cases the conduct of the woman immediately following the alleged
assault is of the utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of
the charge. Indeed it may well be doubted whether a conviction of the offense of
rape should ever be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the
woman unless the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that her conduct
at the time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter
was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances
of the case." (U. S. vs. Flores, pp. 268-269.)
Moreover, the case for the prosecution was irreparably impaired by the
inconsistencies committed by the complainant's mother, Mrs. Ranga. She first
swore that according to her interpretation of Esperanza's sign language five
rapes were committed on different dates.
Then, she rectified her first affidavit and swore in a second affidavit and during
the preliminary examination that only one rape was committed. (Exh. 1 and 3.)
On the witness stand, she declared that the rape was committed on December 4,
1972 but on cross-examination she declared that her daughter was abused on
October 26, 1972. Contrary to the prosecution's theory, Mrs. Ranga testified that
Hayag did not do anything to Esperanza on December 4, 1972 (56 and 65 tsn
August 6, 1972).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside.
On the ground of reasonable doubt or the insufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence, defendant Daniel Hayag is acquitted of the charge of rape. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. NO. 170470, September 26, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO,
APPELLANT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR HC No. 01139
promulgated on 2 September 2005, affirming with modification the Judgment[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 01-
188424 promulgated on 13 October 2003, finding appellant Edna Malngan y
Mayo (Edna) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Arson with
Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people," and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of death.
The Facts
As summarized[3] by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as follows:
From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the
area, as well as the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando
Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo
and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by
Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions, hurriedly
leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo,
Manila. She was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person
later identified as Rolando Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have
instructed that she be brought to Nipa Street, but upon her arrival there, she
changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead to Balasan Street
where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardo's group
later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid.
Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing
shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1-NCR
arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.
When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a
report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly
before the occurrence of the fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out
of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila and he received a
call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid) who was acting
strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo,
Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the
woman who was later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta
positively identified the woman as the same person who left No. 172 Moderna
Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman Bernardo and his tanods
apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the
Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose
house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-appellant EDNA who
was the housemaid of Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter
was found inside accused- appellant EDNA's bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant
EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes
of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her employer's house
on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a
broomstick in going home.
Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by
S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta.
Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained.
When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn
statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latter's
detention cell why she did the burning of her employer's house and accused-
appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked
permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer Roberto
Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: "Sige umuwi ka,
pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na"
(TSN, January 22, 2002, p.6) ("Go ahead, when you arrive your color would be
fair already. Ride a broomstick, when you arrive your color would be fair
already.") And when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA how
she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her: "Naglukot ako ng
maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng
lamesa sa loob ng bahay" (TSN, January 22, 2002, p. 7.) ("I crumpled
newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top of
the table inside the house.")
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network,
accused-appellant EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4 (sic)
Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how
she accomplished it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was able to hear the same
confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program "True
Crime" hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.
The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto Separa, Sr. and
other adjoining houses and the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa
together with their four (4) children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and
Roberto, Jr.
On 9 January 2001, an Information[4] was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch
41, charging accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-188424. The accusatory portion
of said Information provides:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of
ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at No.
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with
the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an
inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence
thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven
(7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the
occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,
 1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age A: I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.

2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age Q: What was that admission that you heard personally, when you were present,
when the accused made the confession to Carmelita Valdez?
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age

4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age A: "Naglukot po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at inilagay niya sa ibabaw
ng mesa 'yung mga diyaryo at sinunog niya."
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
xxxx
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
Q: Aside from that statement, was there any other statement made by the
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately
accused Edna Malngan?
thereafter.[5]

When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de oficio,
pleaded[6] "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.[7]
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, SPO4[8] Danilo Talusan,
Rolando Gruta, Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to
establish its charge that accused-appellant Edna committed the crime of arson
with multiple homicide.
A: Yes, sir. "Kaya po niya nagawa 'yon galit po siya sa kanyang amo na si
Virginia, hindi siya pinasuweldo at gusto na po niyang umuwi na (sic) ayaw
siyang payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa kanya na, "Sumakay ka na lang sa walis.
Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na". (sic) "Yon po ang sinabi ng kanyang amo."
Atty. Masweng:
That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your Honor.

SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of those who Court:
responded to the fire that occurred on 2 January 2001 and which started at No. "Sabi ni Valdes, ha?"
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. He stated that the fire killed Roberto
Separa, Sr. and all the other members of his family, namely his wife, Virginia, and Pros. Rebagay:
his children, Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.; the fire also destroyed "Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez," Your Honor.
their abode as well as six neighboring houses. He likewise testified that he twice
heard accused- appellant - once while the latter was being interviewed by Court:
Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN, and the other time when it was shown "Double hearsay na 'yon."
on channel 2 on television during the airing of the television program entitled
"True Crime" hosted by Gus Abelgas - confess to having committed the crime Pros. Rebagay:
charged, to wit: No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor, when that confession was
made by the accused to Carmelita Valdez.[9]
Pros. Rebagay:
Based on your investigation, was there any occasion when the accused Edna Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay tanods in the area,
Malngan admitted to the burning of the house of the Separa Family? testified:

Pros. Rebagay:
xxxx
Mr. Witness, what is your profession?

Witness:
A: Sidecar driver, sir.
Yes, sir.
Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall where were
Pros. Rebagay:
(sic) you?
When was that?
A: I was at the corner of Moderna Street, sir.
A: On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir. The one who took the
coverage was Carmelita Valdez of Channel 2, ABS-CBN. They have a footage that
Pros. Rebagay:
Edna admitted before them, sir.
And while you were at the corner of Moderna St., what happened if any, Mr.
Witness?
Q: And where were you when Edna Malngan made that statement or admission
to Carmelita Valdez of ABS-CBN?
A: I saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of Roberto Separa, sir.

A: I was at our office, sir.

Q: Do you know the number of the house of the Separa Family?

Q: Was there any other occasion wherein the accused made another confession
A: 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
relative to the admission of the crime?
xxxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family.
Q: When was that?
How far is that house from the place where you were waiting at the corner of
Moderna and Paulino Streets?
A: Last Friday, sir. It was shown in True Crime of Gus Abelgas. She was
interviewed at the City Jail and she admitted that she was the one who authored
A: About three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets where my pedicab was
the crime, sir.
placed. My distance was about three meters, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
xxxx
And where were you when that admission to Gus Abelgas was made?
Q: And how did you know that the house where Edna came out is that of the
house of the Separa Family? Q And then what transpired after she alighted from your pedicab?

A: "Mismong nakita po ng dalawang mata ko na doon siya galing sa bahay ng Witness:

Separa Family." I went home and I looked for another passenger, sir.

Q: How long have you known the Separa Family, if you know them? Pros. Rebagay:

A: About two years, sir. After that, what happened when you were on you way to your house to look for
passengers?
Q: How about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to) awhile ago? Do you know
her prior to January 2, 2001? A "Nakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa Moderna, naglalagablab na apoy."

A: Yes, sir. I knew(sic) her for two years. Q: From what place was that fire coming out?

Court: A: From the house of Roberto Separa Family, sir.

Why?
xxxx
Witness:
Pros. Rebagay:
"Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab." After you noticed that there was a fire from the house of Roberto Separa Family,
what did you do if any?
Pros. Rebagay:
How about the Separa family? Why do you know them? A: "Siyempre po, isang Barangay Tanod po ako, nagresponde na po kami sa
sunog. Binuksan na po ng Chairman naming 'yung tangke, binomba na po
A: They were the employers of Edna, sir. naming "yung apoy ng tubig."

Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family. What Q: After that incident, Mr. Witness, have you seen Edna Again (sic)."
happened when you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family?
A: No, sir.
A: "Wala pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar."
Pros. Rebagay:
Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out from the And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was apprehended or not?
house of the Separa family?
xxxx
A: "Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga."
A: I was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to identify Edna, sir.
xxxx
x x x x[10]
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire occurred,
A: "Nagpahatid po siya sa akin." stated:

Pros. Rebagay:
Q: Where?
On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that occurred somewhere in
your area of jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?
A: To Nipa Street, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
Q: Now, where were you when this incident happened?
A: Yes, sir.
A: "Kasi ugali ko na po tuwing umagang-umaga po ako na pupunta sa barangay
xxxx
Hall mga siguro 6:00 or 5:00 o' clock, me sumigaw ng sunog nirespondehan
namin iyong sunog eh me dala kaming fire."
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you go
(sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
Court:
You just answer the question. Where were you when this incident happened?
A: "Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po."
Witness:
Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
I was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan Street,
sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what did you do?
xxxx
Witness:
Q: What happened after that?
"Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh nakita ko iyong sunog mukha
A: When we arrived there, she alighted and pay (sic) P5.00, sir.
talagang arson dahil napakalaki kaagad, meron pong mga tipong ... Iyong testifying according to what he has heard.
namatay po contractor po iyon eh kaya siguro napakaraming kalat ng mga
pintura, mga container, kaya hindi po namin naapula kaagad iyong apoy, Court:
nasunog ultimo iyong fire tank namin sa lakas," sir. That's part of the narration. Whether it is true or not, that's another matter. Let
it remain.
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, will you please tell us where this fire occurred? Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are telling you this?
A: At the house of the six victims, sir.
A: "Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre may
Q: Whose house is that? sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan
hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and
A: The house of the victims, sir. namatay, kaya iyong mga tao kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-
pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa
xxxx barangay hall napakahirap awatin. Gustong-gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-
bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay hong nasunog." [11]
Pros. Rebagay:
You said that you responded to the place, what transpired after you responded For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the Separa Family and
to the place? whose house was one of those destroyed by the fire, recounted:

Pros. Rebagay:
A: "Iyon nga po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae po noon sa bahay na
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you recall where were you residing
nagmamadali habang may sunog, me isang barangay tanod po akong nagsabi
then?
may humahangos na isang babae na may dalang bag papunta po roon palabas
ng sasakyan," sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And so what happened?
Q: Where were you residing at?
A: "Siyempre hindi naman ako nagtanong kung sino ngayon may dumating
A: At No. 170 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.
galing na sa bahay naming, may tumawag, tumawag po si Konsehala Alfonso na
may isang babae na hindi mapakali doon sa Calle Pedro Alfonso, ke konsehal na
Q: Why did you transfer your residence? Awhile ago you testified that you are
baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito ganoon nirespondehan ko po," sir.
now residing at 147 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila?
Q: Where did you respond?
A: Because our house was burned, sir.
A: At Balasan, sir, but it's not the area of my jurisdiction.
Q: More or less, how much did the loss incurred on the burning of your house
(sic)?
xxxx
A: More or less, P100,000.00, sir
Q: What happened when you reached that place?
Q: Do you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan?
A: "Siya po ang nahuli ko doon," sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Court:
Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.
Q: Why do you know her?
Pros. Rebagay:
A: She is the house helper of the family who were (sic) burned, sir.
And what happened?
Q: What family?
A: I brought her to the barangay hall, sir.
A: Cifara (sic) family, sir.
Q: And what happened at the barangay hall?
Q: Who in particular do you know among Cifara (sic) family?
A: "Inembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me lighter siya eh. Inamin
A: The woman, sir.
niya po sa amin na kaya niya sinunog hindi siya pinasasahod ng more or less
isang taon na eh. Ngayon sabi ko bakit eh gusto ko ng umuwi ng probinsya ang
Q: What is the name?
sabi sa akin ng amo ko sumakay na lang daw po ako ng walis tingting para
makauwi," sir.
A: Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir.
Atty. Herman:
Q: Are you related to Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?
We would like to object, Your Honor on the ground that that is hearsay.
A: My husband, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor, straight from the mouth of the
Q: What is the relationship of your husband to the late Virginia Mendoza Cifara
accused.
(sic)?
Atty. Herman:
A: They were first cousins, sir.
It's not under the exemption under the Rules of Court, Your Honor. He is

Q: How far is your house from the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A: "Magkadikit lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan."
Q: You said that Edna Malngan was working with the Cifara (sic) family. What is
the work of Edna Malngan?
A: "Nangangamuhan po." House helper, sir.
Q: How long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper of the Cifara (sic)
family?
A: I cannot estimate but she stayed there for three to four years, sir.
Q: Do you know who caused the burning of the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
Witness:
Edna Malngan, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
Why do you know that it was Edna Malngan who burned the house of the Cifara
(sic) family?
A: When the fire incident happened, sir, on January 3, we went to San Lazaro Fire
Station and I saw Edna Malngan detained there, sir.
Q: And so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan as the culprit or the
one who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?
A: I talked to her when we went there at that day, sir.
Q: What transpired then?
A: I talked to her and I told her, "Edna, bakit mo naman ginawa 'yung ganun?"
Q: And what was the answer of Edna?
A: She answered, "Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa kanyang umuwi ng probinsya,
nagpapaalam po siyang umuwi ng probinsya ang sinasabi daw po sa kanya ni
Baby Cifara (sic) na, (sic)"Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay
ka sa walis pagdating mo maputi ka na."
Pros. Rebagay:
What is the basis there that she was the one who burned the house of the Cifara
(sic) family?
A: I also asked her, "Paano mo ginawa 'yung sunog?" She told me, "Naglukot ako
ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis niya sa
ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay". (sic)[12]
Lastly, the prosecution presented Rodolfo Movilla, owner of the house situated
beside that of the Separa family. He testified that his house was also gutted by
the fire that killed the Separa family and that he tried to help said victims but to
no avail.
The prosecution presented other documentary evidence[13] and thereafter rested
its case.
When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory evidence, instead of
doing so, accused- appellant filed a Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence[14] and
the corresponding Demurrer to Evidence[15] with the former expressly stating that
said Demurrer to Evidence was being filed "x x x without express leave of court x
x x."[16]
In her Demurrer to Evidence, accused-appellant asserts that the prosecution's
evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
following reasons:[17] (a) that she is charged with crime not defined and penalized
by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the witnesses of
the prosecution were hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence against her.
The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to accused-appellant's Demurrer
to Evidence.
On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC promulgated
its Judgment[18] wherein it proceeded to resolve the subject case based on the
evidence of the prosecution. The RTC considered accused-appellant to have
waived her right to present evidence, having filed the Demurrer to Evidence
without leave of court.
In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Arson with Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled that:
The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act not defined and
penalized by law is without merit. x x x the caption which charges the accused
with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide is merely descriptive of the
charge of Arson that resulted to Multiple Homicide. The fact is that the accused
is charged with Arson which resulted to Multiple Homicide (death of victims) and
that charge is embodied and stated in the body of the information. What is
controlling is the allegation in the body of the Information and not the title or
caption thereof. x x x.
xxxx
The second and third arguments will be discussed jointly as they are interrelated
with each other. x x x.
xxxx
[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the accused in the act of
burning the house or actually starting the subject fire, the following
circumstances that show that the accused intentionally caused or was
responsible for the subject fire have been duly established:
1. that immediately before the burning of the house, the accused
hurriedly and with head turning in different directions (palinga-linga)
went out of the said house and rode a pedicab apparently not
knowing where to go x x x;
2. that immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a
woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive
(balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there, found the
accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay hall
as shown by the testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo;
and
3. that when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay
officials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a
disposable lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the Barangay
Chairman.
[T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately
before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same
demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at the
same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter
in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.
If there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the circumstantial evidence
against her, the same is removed or obliterated with the confessions/admissions
of the commission of the offense and the manner thereof that she made to the
prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita
Mendoza and to the media, respectively.
xxxx
[H]er confessions/admissions are positive acknowledgment of guilt of the crime
and appear to have been voluntarily and intelligently given. These
confessions/admissions, especially the one given to her neighbor Mercedita
Mendoza and the media, albeit uncounselled and made while she was already
under the custody of authorities, it is believed, are not violative of her right
under the Constitution.
The decretal part of the RTC's Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby denied and judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the
death of six (6) people and sentencing her to suffer the mandatory penalty of
death, and ordering her to pay the heirs of the victims Roberto Separa, Sr. and
Virginia Separa and children Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr., the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim and the amount of
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as temperate damages for their
burned house or a total of Four Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos and to
Rodolfo Movilla the amount of One Hundred [Thousand] (P100,000.00) Pesos.
Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to
this Court for automatic review. Conformably with our decision in People v. Efren
Mateo y Garcia,[19] however, we referred the case and its records to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.
On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
decision of the RTC, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed October 13, 2003 Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, finding accused-appellant Edna
Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arson with multiple
homicide and sentencing her to suffer the DEATH PENALTY is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that she is further ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral
damages and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the victims
who perished in the fire, to be paid to their heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo
Movilla, one whose house was also burned, the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damage.
Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became
effective on October 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals, after rendering judgment,
hereby refrains from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certifies the
case and elevates the entire record of this case to the Supreme Court for
review.[20]
It is the contention of accused-appellant that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
the perpetrator of the crime charged. In support of said exculpatory proposition,
she assigns the following errors[21]:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED; and
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND UNCOUNSELLED ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY
THE ACCUSED TO THE WITNESSES BARANGAY CHAIRMAN REMIGIO BERNARDO,
MERCEDITA MENDOZA AND THE MEDIA.
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH (MULTIPLE) HOMECIDE.
The Information in this case erroneously charged accused-appellant with a
complex crime, i.e., Arson with Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are two (2)
laws that govern the crime of arson where death results therefrom- Article 320
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659,[22]
and Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613[23], quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code:
ART. 320. Destructive Arson. - x x x x
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this
Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Presidential Decree No. 1613:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasion of
the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the
provisions of PD No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one
penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d'être is that arson is itself
the end and death is simply the consequence.[24]
Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will have to be a
separate crime altogether, the joint discussion[25] of the late Mr. Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, on the subject of
the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is highly instructive:
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person
who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the
crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed by
means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a
means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life.[26] In
other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the
offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the
resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.[27]
xxxx
If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would not
be a qualifying circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate
offenses of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson.[28]
Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the
malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson,
and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main
objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when
fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and
in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed -
homicide/murder and arson.
Where then does this case fall under?
From a reading of the body of the Information:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of
ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at No.
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with
the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an
inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence
thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven
(7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the
occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,
 1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age
sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately
thereafter.[29] [Emphasis supplied.]
accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It it is clear from the
foregoing that her intent was merely to destroy her employer's house through
the use of fire.
We now go to the issues raised. Under the first assignment of error, in asserting
the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant argues that the prosecution was only able
to adduce circumstantial evidence - hardly enough to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. She ratiocinates that the following circumstances:
1. That immediately before the burning of the house , the accused
hurriedly and with head turning in different directions (palinga-linga)
went out of the said house and rode a pedicab apparently not
knowing where to go for she first requested to be brought to Nipa St.
but upon reaching there requested again to be brought to Balasan St.
as shown by the testimony of prosecution witness Rolando Gruta;
2. That immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a
woman in Balasan St. who appears confused and apprehensive
(balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there, found the
accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay hall
as shown by the testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo;
and
3. That when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay
officials and when her bag was opened, the same contained a
disposable lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the Barangay
Chairman.[30]
fall short of proving that she had any involvement in setting her employer's
house on fire, much less show guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given that "it is a
fact that housemaids are the first persons in the house to wake up early to
perform routine chores for their employers,"[31] one of which is preparing and
cooking the morning meal for the members of the household; and necessity
requires her to go out early to look for open stores or even nearby marketplaces
to buy things that will complete the early meal for the day.[32] She then concludes
that it was normal for her to have been seen going out of her employer's house
in a hurry at that time of the day and "to look at all directions to insure that the
house is secure and that there are no other persons in the vicinity."[33]
We are far from persuaded.
True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are required to start the day early;
however, contrary to said assertion, the actuations and the demeanor of
accused-appellant on that fateful early morning as observed firsthand by
Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the prosecution, belie her claim of
normalcy, to wit:
Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family. What
happened when you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family?
A: "Wala pa pong ano 'yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar."
Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out from the
house of the Separa family?
A: "Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga."
xxxx
Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?
A: "Nagpahatid po siya sa akin."
Q: Where?
A: To Nipa Street, sir.
Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you go
(sic) there at Nipa Street, if any?
A: "Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po."
Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?
A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan Street,
sir.
xxxx
We quote with approval the pronouncement of the RTC in discrediting accused-
appellant's aforementioned rationale:
[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to leave the house in such a
disturbed, nervous and agitated manner, demeanor and condition. The timing of
her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately before the fire when
she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and
mental condition when found and apprehended at the same place where she
alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag thereafter
when investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.[34]
All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellant's agitated appearance was
out of the ordinary. Remarkably, she has never denied this observation.
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe
them directly. The credibility given by trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an
important aspect of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its
unique opportunity to observe them, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsels. Here, Remigio
Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested witnesses
and there is not an iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are
suborned witnesses. The records of the RTC even show that Remigio Bernardo,
the Barangay Chairman, kept accused-appellant from being mauled by the angry
crowd outside of the barangay hall:
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are (sic) telling you this?
A: "Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre may
sunog nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan
hindi ko maibigay papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and
namatay, kaya iyong mga tao kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-
pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo iyong nakapaligid doon sa
barangay hall napakahirap awatin. Gusting-gusto siyang kunin ng mga taong-
bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay hong nasunog."[35]
Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses
presented would openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send
an innocent person to jail all the while knowing that the real malefactor remains
at large. Such proposition defies logic. And where the defense failed to show any
evil or improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses, the
presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and
credence.[36]
While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually starting
the fire that burned several houses and killed the Separa family, her guilt may
still be established through circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[37]
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts
from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.[38] It is founded on
experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection
between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved.[39] In
order to bring about a conviction, the circumstantial evidence presented must
constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.[40]
In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken
together, exemplify a case where conviction can be upheld on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. First, prosecution witness Rolando Gruta, the driver of
the pedicab that accused-appellant rode on, testified that he knew for a fact that
she worked as a housemaid of the victims, and that he positively identified her
as the person hurriedly leaving the house of the victims on 2 January 2001 at
4:45 a.m., and acting in a nervous manner. That while riding on the pedicab,
accused-appellant was unsure of her intended destination. Upon reaching the
place where he originally picked up accused-appellant only a few minutes after
dropping her off, Rolando Gruta saw the Separas' house being gutted by a
blazing fire. Second, Remigio Bernardo testified that he and his tanods, including
Rolando Gruta, were the ones who picked up accused-appellant Edna at Balasan
Street (where Rolando Gruta dropped her off) after receiving a call that there
was a woman acting strangely at said street and who appeared to have nowhere
to go. Third, SPO4 Danilo Talusan overheard accused-appellant admit to
Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of Channel 2 (ABS-CBN) that said accused-appellant
started the fire, plus the fact that he was able see the telecast of Gus Abelgas'
show where accused-appellant, while being interviewed, confessed to the crime
as well. The foregoing testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony of Mercedita
Mendoza validating the fact that accused-appellant confessed to having started
the fire which killed the Separa family as well as burned seven houses including
that of the victims, convincingly form an unbroken chain, which leads to the
unassailable conclusion pinpointing accused-appellant as the person behind the
crime of simple arson.
In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the admissibility of
her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to prosecution witnesses, namely
Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the media. Accused-appellant
Edna contends that being uncounselled extrajudicial confession, her admissions
to having committed the crime charged should have been excluded in evidence
against her for being violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.
Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution witnesses
Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for being hearsay and in the nature
of an uncounselled admission.
With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-appellant is of the
position that the remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in the main of
circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
We partly disagree.
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial
investigation - when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.[41] Said
constitutional guarantee has also been extended to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for
questioning.[42]
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions
made must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary;
(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.[43]
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this
particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-
appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001, she
was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several
houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was,
therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by
Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed
or applied to her. Accused-appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo was made in response to the "interrogation" made by the latter -
admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo,
as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence
against her as such were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant's confession to
Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not
automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the
constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those
not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the
offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted
to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having
started the fire in the Separas' house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza
recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in
evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional
guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the
relationship between the individual on one hand and the State (and its agents)
on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another private individual - as both accused-appellant and
prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are.[44] Here, there is no
evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority,
so appropriately, accused-appellant's uncounselled extrajudicial confession to
said witness was properly admitted by the RTC.
Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the testimony of SPO4 Danilo
Talusan. Contending that "[w]hen SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified in court, his
story is more of events, which are not within his personal knowledge but based
from accounts of witnesses who derived information allegedly from the accused
or some other persons x x x". In other words, she objects to the testimony for
being merely hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we agree with
what the Court of Appeals had to say:
Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay because he was not
present when Gus Abelgas interviewed accused-appellant EDNA, it may
nevertheless be admitted in evidence as an independently relevant statement to
establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that the
statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July 20, 1999, 310
SCRA 621 citing People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA
944.]. In People vs. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872-75, February 21, 2001,
352 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court ruled that:
"Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their
truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The
hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant
as to the existence of such a fact."[45]
As regards the confession given by accused-appellant to the media, we need not
discuss it further for the reporters were never presented to testify in court.
As a final attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant asserts that since the
identities of the burned bodies were never conclusively established, she cannot
be responsible for their deaths.
Such assertion is bereft of merit.
In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to
kill them particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As we have clarified
earlier, the killing of a person is absorbed in the charge of arson, simple or
destructive. The prosecution need only prove, that the burning was intentional
and that what was intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Again,
in the case of People v. Soriano,[46] we explained that:
Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred
from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately
set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence
of his wrongful intent.[47]
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1)
destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613.
Said classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property
burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused,[48] to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates
the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings,
edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.[[49]] The
classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-
evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly
crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent
people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair
in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this
heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes
into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious
burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its
commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater
impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the nation.
[Emphasis supplied.]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art.
320, death should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised
Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree
contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless
of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other
cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms,
mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments.[[50]] Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to
prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction,
protect the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political
stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders.
This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the
severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending
on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the
degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed
under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive
Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.[51] On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and
national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling
under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present. [Emphasis supplied.][52]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as
stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that
accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson - for having
"deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA
and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a
thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and
the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were
razed by fire." [Emphasis supplied.]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People
v. Soriano.[53] The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular
house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring
houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under
paragraph 1[54] of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which
imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of
arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as
houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law.
The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer
to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable
law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the
Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled
that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in
favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is
intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.[55]
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with
having intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa.
Said conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses.
Consequently, if proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and
sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple arson. Such is the case
"notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the information,
the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the
crime alleged therein."[56] "What is controlling is not the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violate, x x x, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited."[57]
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD
No. 1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson
is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasion of
arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information,
the imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current jurisprudence[58] dictate
that the civil indemnity due from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death
of each of the victims.[59] However, the monetary awards for moral and
exemplary damages given by the Court of Appeals, both in the amount of
P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims, have to be deleted for lack of material
basis. Similarly, the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages to Rodolfo
Movilla in the amount of P50,000.00 for the destruction of his house, also has to
be deleted, but in this instance for being improper. Moral damages cannot be
award by this Court in the absence of proof of mental or physical suffering on
the part of the heirs of the victims.[60] Concerning the award of exemplary
damages, the reason for the deletion being that no aggravating circumstance
had been alleged and proved by the prosecution in the case at bar.[61]
To summarize, accused-appellant's alternative plea that she be acquitted of the
crime must be rejected. With the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. It is indubitable that
accused-appellant is the author of the crime of simple arson. All the
circumstantial evidence presented before the RTC, viewed in its entirety, is as
convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negates accused-appellant's
innocence, and when considered concurrently with her admission given to
Mercedita Mendoza, the former's guilt beyond reasonable doubt is twice as
evident. Hence, her conviction is effectively justified. More so, as it is propitious
to note that in stark contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the
prosecution, accused-appellant neither mustered a denial nor an alibi except for
the proposition that her guilt had not been established beyond reasonable
doubt.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September
2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction
of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be
imposed and the amount of damages to be awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In
accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of each of the victims P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179535, June 09, 2014
JOSE ESPINELI A.K.A. DANILO ESPINELI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Jurisprudence teaches us that “for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to
support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent x x x.”[1] Thus, conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.[2]
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] is the July 6, 2007
Decision[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 which
modified the August 31, 1999 Decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, by finding petitioner Jose Espineli a.k.a. Danilo “Danny”
Espineli (petitioner) guilty of the crime of homicide instead of murder. Also
questioned is the CA’s September 14, 2007 Resolution[6] denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.[7]
Factual Antecedents
On June 24, 1997, an Information[8] charging petitioner with the crime of murder
was filed before the RTC,[9] the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996 in the Municipality of Imus,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and
three (3) other unidentified persons, whose real names, identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero Paredes having been earlier charged
with the same offense, and is now undergoing trial before Branch 90, of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, then armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot
one Alberto Berbon y Downie with the use of said firearms, thereby inflicting
upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds on his head and different parts of his
body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Alberto Berbon y Downie.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when arraigned on July 7, 1997 with
the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.[11]
The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y
Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station
DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of his house
in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime
scene on board a waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for
the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group
of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon
case. In due course, NBI Agent Dave Segunial (NBI Agent Segunial) interviewed
Reyes on February 10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing whereby
Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes
(Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite,
respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng
bukas yang si Berbon.”[12] Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on
February 14, 1997. Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard
of. NBI Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.
The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to her,
sometime in the third week of February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he
could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward
consequence that may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding
the death of Sabina’s husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00
and promised to help him in applying for the witness protection program. This
was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina’s brother, Bartolome
Pakingan. After that, however, Reyes never came back.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his
red Ford Escort car to three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon
of September 1, 1996. He later identified the said car from the photographs
presented to him by the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted a
post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy Report that the
victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and body. He also stated
that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or entrance, high-powered guns
were used in the killing.
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense. Instead,
he filed a Demurrer to Evidence[13] without leave of court. As no action
whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the
case be deemed submitted for decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision[14] dated August 31, 1999, the trial court adjudged petitioner guilty
of murder, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO
“Danny” Espineli, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the
crime of “Murder” as charged. He is, therefore, sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Alberto
Berbon y Downie, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, and actual and
compensatory damages in the total amount of P135,000.00 as funeral expenses
(Exhibit “H”), interment fee of P8,360.00 (Exhibit “C”), medical expenses in the
total amount of P1,519.45 (Exhibit[s] “D”, “D-1” and “D-2”) and for the contract
fees of Memorial Park Care the amount of P15,700.00 (Exhibit “E”).
Furthermore, considering that he is a high risk prisoner, his transfer to the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, is immediately ordered.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. Pursuant,
however, to the Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[16] the case was
ordered transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition through a
Resolution[17] dated March 22, 2006.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision[18] promulgated on July 6, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification
the findings of the trial court. It ratiocinated that since none of the prosecution
witnesses saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Neither can
nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance as the time of the commission of
the crime was not even alleged in the Information. In view thereof, the CA found
petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder. The decretal portion of the
appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
appealed Decision dated August 31, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 90 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-
appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In all other respects, the said decision STANDS.
In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be credited in full with the
period of his preventive imprisonment.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[20] which the CA denied
in its Resolution[21] dated September 14, 2007.
Hence, this Petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the Decision of RTC as the
latter erred:
1. x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative value to Exhibit
“A”, the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” of [Reyes] because [he] was not
presented in court to confirm, affirm and authenticate the contents
of his sworn statement. It resulted in the denial of petitioner’s
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.[22]
2. x x x [in convicting] the [petitioner] based on unproven, inadmissible
circumstantial evidence.[23]
3. x x x in not acquitting the petitioner for failure of the prosecution to
prove [his guilt] beyond reasonable doubt x x x.[24]
In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the
alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay[25] of Reyes
for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement
should not have been given probative value because its contents were neither
confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant. Thus, all circumstances emanating
from or included in the sworn statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking
any evidentiary and probative value. Petitioner emphasizes that as found by the
courts below, there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime; therefore,
he wants this Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence upon
which his conviction was based as he believes that the same failed to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent
People of the Philippines, concurs with the petitioner and recommends his
acquittal.[26] It is also of the view that the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Truly, “direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt.”[27] The rules of evidence allow a trial
court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of
guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence “which indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence
established.”[28] Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial
evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is more than one
circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii)
the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.”[29] All the circumstances must be consistent with one
another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances
proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty
person.[30]
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the exclusion of
all others, is the guilty person are the following:
1. In the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was heard telling his co-
accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) “ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si
Berbon” before boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while
petitioner was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo
to be the same car he had sold to Sotero for P10,000.00 in September 1996;
3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15, 1996) by
unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled riding a red car; and
4. Post-mortem examination of the victim’s body showed that he sustained
multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and characteristics of which
indicate that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly an armalite
rifle and .22 caliber pistol.[31]
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of
Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of conviction
on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 133[32] of the
Rules of Court. The central issue now confronting this Court is whether the
prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence petitioner’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon
by the Court of Appeals sufficiently support
petitioner’s conviction.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the
light of the standards discussed above and finds the foregoing circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons deserve
our acceptance of the circumstances upon which petitioner’s conviction was
based, to wit:
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced
the latter’s statement into writing declaring, among others, that in the morning
of December 15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero “Ayaw ko
nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and saw them armed with .45 caliber
pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car. The CA gave
weight to Reyes’ sworn statement in this wise:
The probative value of Romeo Reyes’ sworn statement as to the words spoken
by appellant to his co-accused Sotero Paredes in the morning of December 15,
1996 cannot be disputed. x x x[33]
Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said
sworn statement belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore
inadmissible. He asserts that its contents were never confirmed or
authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value.
The Court is unconvinced.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded.
– A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it
is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the
truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was
made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is
the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and
the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of
the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact.[34] This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.[35]
In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was
investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he (Reyes) heard petitioner
telling Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and that he
saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an
armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay
evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony was not
presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of
establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement
containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness’ oral
testimony.[36] Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement.[37] Verily then,
what the prosecution sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such
narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an
independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes
made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a
case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule
does not apply.[38] Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized
document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A.
Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie
evidence of the due execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant
to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-
Plaza,[39] a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome
such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of
Reyes’ sworn statement as testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the
1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero in
September 1996 clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red car
used in the killing of Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen
immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same car
previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered guns,
served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way in
establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner’s escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was
pending can also be considered as another circumstance since it is a strong
indication of his guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of
the alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same
circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have satisfied
the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the
incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain
of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for
the killing of the victim.
Besides, it is “[a]n established rule in appellate review x x x that the trial court’s
factual findings, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and
the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from
the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the
CA,”[40] as in this case.
The Crime Committed and the Proper Penalty.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of
homicide in view of the prosecution’s failure to prove any of the alleged
attendant circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime. As aptly
observed by the appellate court:

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is

inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation
of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the
latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. However, as none of
the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated, abuse of
superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Neither can nighttime serve
as an aggravating circumstance, the time of the commission of the crime was not
even alleged in the Information.[41] (Citations omitted)

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion

temporal.[42] In view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of
the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium
term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum should be
within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of an indeterminate
prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is in order.

Petitioner’s Civil liability

While the CA correctly imposed the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, it

failed, however, to award moral damages. These awards are mandatory without
need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact
of the commission of murder or homicide.[43] Thus, for moral damages, the
award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is only proper.

Anent the award of actual damages, this Court sees no reason to disturb the
amount awarded by the trial court as upheld by the CA since the itemized
medical and burial expenses were duly supported by receipts and other
documentary evidence.

The CA did not grant any award of damages for loss of earning capacity and
rightly so. Though Sabina testified as to the monthly salary of the deceased, the
same remains unsubstantiated. “Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the
absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-
employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.”[44] The exceptions find no application in this case.

In addition and in conformity with current policy, an interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum is imposed on all the monetary awards for damages from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated July 6, 2007 and Resolution dated September 14, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO “DANNY” ESPINELI
is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ALBERTO BERBON y DOWNIE
P50,000.00 as moral damages as well as interest on all the damages assessed at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.