ONG CHIA vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a case for Naturalization before Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. Petitioner, after
stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law the trial
ensued. Petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
When it was already the time for the state to present its evidence the public prosecutor manifested that he was
impressed by the testimony of the petitioner and they we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or
refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. The petition was granted
and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.

However, the State through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to include
all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation
of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in
the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have
been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence. Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, 5 in
which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood
as "Loreto Chia Ong."

Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with S7.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelant’s brief without having been
presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
justified the reversal of of the Trial Court’s decision.

HELD:

YES. The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."That is not the case
here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to
be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings
are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the
State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving
him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the
chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his
objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.

Doctrine: It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. The rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioner’s argument of “substantial compliance” with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.

[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to
afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State.
G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.*
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

FACTS:

Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the RTC of Manilawhichrendered judgment in favor of Alfredo Martin,
declaring him “the capital/exclusive owner of the properties and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta
and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the
documents and papers in question. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers obtained from the office of Martin were admissible in evidence

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE:

No, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.

The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for
any purpose in any proceeding.”

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

Doctrine: Privacy of communication and correspondence is inviolable. The only exception in the Constitution is
if there is a “lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as prescribed by law.”—
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.—The intimacies between husband and wife
do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while
the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other.
And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba, the victim, was left alone in the house of her grandmother, Isabel Dawang.
Judilyn Pas-a, victim’s cousin and her husband, together with Isabel, left for their farm in Nagbitayan.

At 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel and saw Joel Yatar at the back
of the house. Anita asked Yatar what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to
the house of his mother.

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw Yatar descend the ladder from the
second floor of the house of Isabel and run towards the back of the house. She later noticed Yatar, who was
wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house.

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw Yatar when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black
shirt without collar and blue pants. She noticed that Yatar’s eyes were "reddish and sharp."

In the evening of the same day, Isabel discovered Kathlyn’s lifeless body sprawled on the floor, her intestines
protruding out of her stomach. The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and
sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with
blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.

Yatar was caught and charged with Rape with Homicide. The RTC found Yatar guilty of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, and sentenced to Death. Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

ISSUES: (1)Whether the Court wrongly gave probative value to the DNA evidence presented.
(2) Whether the blood sample taken from Yatar as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of
his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.

RULING:

(1) NO. Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how
the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert
witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that
the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. 31 The
blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. 32 Verily,
a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open
court during the course of the trial.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn
Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received
from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4)
Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of
the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at
1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house
of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of
Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines
protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s
vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be
positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are
identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such
flight being indicative of guilt.35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To
determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 36

(2) In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there
is no testimonial compulsion involved. It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for
blood sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR
MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Austria-Martinez,Jr.

Statement of Facts:

The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.
The subject lot was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title. On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena
Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena.
She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon however the
land remained in possession of Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention
of selling the property and that the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the
subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her defray her business expenses. She later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan
nor mortgage the property and she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property
reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad,
Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner. In a letter dated
March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she
executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their
rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case
amicably proved futile.Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador,
filed a complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena,
and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.The trial court rendered a
judgement in favour of herein respondents, on appeal the CA affirmed the judgement of the RTC.

Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding that the
subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However,
petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering
that Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the
right to cross-examine her.

Issue: Whether or not a sworn statement/affidavit of a deceased may be given probative value for purposes of
deciding a complaint

Decision:

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance
and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits
are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For
this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is
already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for
purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Doctrine of the case: It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may
thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of
the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, Vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-
Appellant.
LEONEN, J.:

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Bolanon was stabbed near Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila past midnight on July 31, 1993.
Afer stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away. Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo
B. Estao in order to seek help. His uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab. On their way
to the hospital, Bolanon told Estao that it was Rod Salafranca who had stabbed him. Bolanon eventually
succumbed at the hospital at 2:30am despite receiving medical attention. The stabbing of Bolanon was
personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.
 Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest despite the warrant of his arrest being issued.
He stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest on April 23, 2003.

Salafranca was charged and tried for murder. The RTC found him guilty. The RTC appreciated
treachery based on the testimony of Mendoza on how Salafranca effected his attack against Bolanon, observing
that by encircling Salafranca’s left arm, while behind the victim on the latter’s neck and stabbing the victim with
the use of his right hand, Salafranca did not give Bolanon any opportunity to defend himself. On appeal, the CA
affirmed his conviction, citing that the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,
and Salafaranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. Salafranca’s denial and alibi of being in his
home during the incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after
the stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.

Salafranca reiterates his defenses and insists that the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the witness’ testimonies are credible.

RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE/S:

YES. Salafaranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza
as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith t such incrimination by Mendoza
considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify
against him unless it was upon the truth. The Court further notes Estao’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon
of statement identifying Salafaranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. Such circumstance
qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both dying declaration and as part of the res gestae considering that the
court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking
incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule.

DOCTRINE: An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions
of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration
or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the
cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the
declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death’ (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a
victim.

G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE
INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

SCC, through its chairman, Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo Bermundo, obtained a loan from
State Investment House Inc., (SIHI). The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2%
per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date. To secure the payment
of the loan, Arrieta and Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly
and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then
sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
 SIHI filed a case against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili. In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI’s lack of cause of
action. The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the
dispute amicably but no settlement was reached. The case then proceeded to trial. SIHI presented one witness
to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason or
another at the instance of either party. The lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI. Aggrieved by
the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by
SIHI to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no
showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof was shown of
the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these signatures
were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the original copies of the
documents were not presented in court.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the subject documents presented by SIHI were correctly admitted by the Regional Trial Court
considering that SCC was unable to cross-examine SIHI’s witness relative to the said documents
(2) Whether SIHI’s other pieces of evidence were correctly admitted

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES:

(1) Yes. The Court note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled
hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was
supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the
appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence of said
testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. Petitioner was afforded
several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to
take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained
the trial courts finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing partys witness. It is now
too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to
facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.

Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioners admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated
as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence rule advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no need
to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the
execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be
questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its
obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation.

DOCTRINE: Rule 130, Section 36 reads: SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of
an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for
this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to
cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right
to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied
waiver of such right.

RU L E 12 9 : W HAT NE ED N O T B E PRO V E D

[G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004]

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS
ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Spouses Banal owned a parcel of agricultural land dedicated mainly to coconut and partly to palay.
Their land was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), pursuant to R.A. 6657 or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Respondent Spouses rejected Land Bank's valuation, which
was made pursuant to Sec. 16 of R.A. 6657. A summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation. The PARAD affirmed Land Bank's
valuation. Spouses Banal filed with the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for determination of
just compensation, against DAR and Land Bank. During the pre-trial, the parties submitted these admissions of
facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to
farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) Land Bank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation made
by the DAR. The court dispensed with the hearing and directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. The trial court computed the just compensation, which was beyond Spouses Banal's valuation, as
well as awarded compounded interest in cash. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE/S: Whether the trial court is correct in concluding the valuation of respondent Spouses' property after
merely taking judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it, and in
applying the same to this case without conducting a hearing and without the knowledge and consent of the
parties

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE/S:

No. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard,
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court
takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a
party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive
of a material issue in the case. (emphasis added)

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228and R.A.
No. 3844, as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting compounded interest
pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers
private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold
relation between the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same. Here, the land is planted to coconut and
rice and does not involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula
in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
 As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No. 13,
Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 and
Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered by
R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated
during the pre-trial.

While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such
discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as
amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No.11).

In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the subject
land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein the parties may
present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall
consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula
prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order
No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the
instance of any of the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate
and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute

DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
same judge. They may only do so in the absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party

G.R. No. 100901-08 July 16, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JAILON KULAIS, et al.
Panganiban, J

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

5 informations for kidnapping for ransom and 3 informations for kidnapping were filed against Jailon
Kulais and several others. All of them pleaded not guilty during arraignment.

The RTC found Jailon Kulais guilty of of 5 counts of kidnapping for ransom, 1 count of kidnapping a
woman and public officer, and 2 counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico L. Saavedra and
Calixto Francisco.

Kulais and other accused who were convicted filed their joint Notice of Appeal. However, only the
appeal of Kulais remained for consideration, since the others withdrew their appeal in view of their application
for “amnesty.” Kulais argued that the RTC erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony by Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano in another case. Lt. Feliciano was the team leader of the government troops that captured
the accused. In taking judicial notice of the said testimony, Kulais alleges that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses against him.

ISSUE/S: Whether the RTC can take judicial notice of the testimony of Lt. Feliciano in another case.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE/S:

As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings,
even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are actually pending
before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
 However, in the case at bar, even if the court took judicial notice of the testimony of Lt. Feliciano, said
testimony was not used in deciding the cases against the accused. The conviction of Jailon Kulais was based
mainly on the positive identification of the kidnap victims, who have been subjected to meticulous cross-
examinations by his counsel. At best, the mention of Lt. Feliciano’s testimony is a decisional surplusage which
neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced Kulais.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

LAUREANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In 1982
however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano was one of them.
Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for illegal
dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to
illegal termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the
termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law. The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL
appealed the case raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel,
among others. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.

RULING:

No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court. As
such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed valid under Singaporean Law.
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to
prove such law hence Philippine law shall apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureano’s cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was
terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from 1982. Hence he is already
barred by prescription.

MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.On the same
day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Mayor. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor.

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating
the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American and showing as evidence a travel record that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that
Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

COMELEC ruled that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03
April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Arnado argues that section 349 of the immigration and naturalization act of the United States provides
that his execution of an affidavit of renunciation of American citizenship has the effect of expatriation and thus
was divested of all the rights of an American citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arnaldo’s argument regarding Section 349 of the immigration act of United States is
applicable in this case.

RULING:

The court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public documents of a
foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication thereof.” Mere reference to a foreign law in a
pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in deciding a case.

G.R. No. 188314, January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN

FACTS:

Herein accused were charged of multiple murder in relation to the Valentines Day bombing. The
prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the
explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group - Abu Solaiman - announced over radio station DZBB that
the group had a Valentine's Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing, he
again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview
sometime after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine's Day bombing incident. In another
exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing incident. Finally,
accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14
February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that
they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Accused were convicted largely due to the testimony of Asali who turned state witness and the testimony of the
conductor who identified the two accused to be those who alighted from his bus shortly before the bomb
exploded.

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a co-conspirator made during a televised interview and repeated during trial
may be admissible as evidence against a co- conspirator.

HELD:

The answer is in the affirmative. Section 30. Admission by conspirator. —The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
 While Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rule of Court provides that statements made by a conspirator against
a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy, if the declarant repeats
the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony
admissible as to both conspirators.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony
at trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
DOCTRINE: Distinction must be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarant's co-
accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L.

AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted
by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.
December 16, 2011
BRION, J.:

Facts:

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H.
Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and
Potenciano Ilusorio for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the
Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the
major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),
which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their
holdings and the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos.

Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130. The
present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.

In an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130,
among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the former merely an incident.

At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their
testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and the said
documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 0009.

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayanpromulgated a resolution denying the petitioners 1st motion.

The petitioner made its Formal Offer of Evidence. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as
part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice (2nd motion).

On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution denying the petitioners 2 nd motion.

Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled What Need Not Be Proved. Apparently,
this provision refers to the Courts duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The
duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is
upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the same is considered
redundant.
 On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal
offer of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on
grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice.

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the
Sandiganbayan.

On the issue of the Sandiganbayans refusal either to take judicial notice of or to admit the Bane
deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition
was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a child of the parent case, Civil Case No. 0009;
under this relationship, evidence offered and admitted in any of the children cases should be considered as
evidence in the parent case.

Petitioner’s third motion was again denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, petitioner filed the instant
moton alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to take judicial notice. Of or
to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.

Issue:Whether or not the Bane deposition is admissible under the principle of judicial notice.

Ruling:

The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts
that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them. Put
differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The
principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are
not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129
either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of the official acts of the judicial departments of
the Philippines, or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. On the other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of
any matter and the court may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter
involved. In the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the
respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. This rule
though admits of exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the
knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of
the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis
exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.

In this case, the petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all
likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioners argument, we would be
espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was
presumably found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases.
It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in
support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court.
 MONICO LIGTAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in the plantation of
belonging to Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00
at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where Ligtas pleaded not guilty, alleging himself as the
owner of the said property as he is the one who cultivated such, he further alleged the following defenses;
setting an alibi that the alleged taking did not happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres
attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting
happened but later on when confronted he admitted harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner,
being a tenant of 1.5 to two hectares of land that he just prevented the men to harvest from the land which he
himself cultivated.

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. On
January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. While
records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court,
records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and
without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the
Regional Trial Court held that “the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft” Ligtas’ “defense of
tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between
him and Anecita Pacate duly corroborated by any witness.”

Issue: Whether the DARAB Decision, finding Ligtas as tenant of the conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of
in a criminal case for theft?

RULING:

Yes. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and
private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner’s consent.
The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution,
therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. No less than the Constitution provides that the accused
shall be presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. “It is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to
convict one innocent person.” Thus, courts must consider “every circumstance against guilt and in favor of
innocence.” Equally settled is that “where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent
with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be
acquitted.”

In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge; Rule
admits of exceptions.

Doctrine:

Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial
notice of decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge.—It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of
decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge. In declaring that the DARAB’s findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner
and private complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals relied on Cornes, et
al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 560 SCRA 545 (2008).
RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

1. Object/Real Evidence

NARCISO SALAS VS. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

FACTS:

Annabelle Matusalem claimed that Narciso Salas is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas.
However, when Matusalem refused the offer of Salas’ family to take the child from her, he abandoned
respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Hence, she filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Salas in the RTC of Cabanatuan City. Petitioner filed his answer with special and
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose morals and denied
paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he
agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit
designed to “scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented
testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondent’s evidence. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
respondent. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently
proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner?

HELD:

Yes. We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Also, while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the child’s paternity. Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity. The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her
child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondent’s child as an act of charity. As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s
filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner
that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172
(2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. The testimonies of
respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner’s financial support while
respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with
details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence, documentary and testimonial”.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the
family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

DOCTRINE: A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that
it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
G.R. No. 212171, September 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MERCURY DELA CRUZ ALIAS "DEDAY," Accused-
Appellant.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

At around 7:15 o'clock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3 Batobalonos, PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and
their civilian asset proceeded to Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon. When the team went inside the
interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales together with the civilian asset approached the house of Mercury
Dela Cruz, while PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido were strategically hidden more or less ten (10) meters
away. The civilian asset called Dela Cruz and told her that they will buy shabu worth P200.00. Thereafter, Dela
Cruz handed PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline substance and in exchange he handed to
the former the P200.00 bills. Upon getting hold of the money, PO3 Batobalonos and PO1 Bullido, who saw the
consummation of the transaction rushed to the scene. When PO3 Batobalonos got hold of Dela Cruz, the latter
shouted for help and resisted arrest. Dela Cruz was able to run and so the team chased her, however, her
neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega blocked their way. The team introduced themselves as policemen but Ortega did
not listen. Dela Cruz was able to evade arrest. The team then arrested Ortega for obstruction of justice.

Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Batobalonos marked the seized item with "DDM 11/10/06. Afterwards, a
Request for Laboratory Examination of the seized item was prepared. The Request and the seized item were
delivered to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-7 by PO1 Reales at around 1:10 o'clock in the morning of
November 11, 2006. Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry Report with the finding that the
specimen gave positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Dela Cruz was charged for violation of Sec. 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. The RTC found Dela Cruz guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty life imprisonment and to pay a fine. The CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.

Dela Cruz appealed the case contending that the drugs were marked not at the place where she was
apprehended but at the police station and that there was no physical inventory made on the seized item nor was
it photographed.

ISSUE: Whether the police officer did not comply with the rules on Chain of Custody which renders the evidence
inadmissible.

RULING:

NO. The alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecution's case
because the apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

Relevant to the instant case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling of the seized dangerous
drugs as outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165.

The last part of the said issuance provided the exception to the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the
handling of evidence, "substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item" is
sufficient. This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items
seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records
or testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the time these were seized from the accused by the
arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their
composition; and up to the time these are offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.

In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was
satisfactorily explained by the apprehending officers. They testified that a commotion erupted when
accused-appellant resisted and shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion eventually gave
accused-appellant the opportunity to run and elude arrest. The arresting officers further alleged that the people
who gathered around them were already aggressive prompting them to decide to immediately proceed to the
police station for their safety. In fact, the arresting officers even had to fire a warning shot and arrest Arthur
Tabasa Ortega, the person who intervened in the arrest of accused-appellant, in order for them to pacify the
people around them.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will,
or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Accused-appellant bears the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the presumption of regularity in the handling of
exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers properly discharged their duties. 17 Accused-
appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting
officers. Thus, the testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit.18 In fact, accused-
appellant did not even question the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. She simply anchored her defense on
denial and alibi.

G.R. No. 230228, December 13, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL DELA ROSA Y LUMANOG @

"MANNY", Accused-Appellant.

GESMUNDO, J.:

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution

PCI Ojastro of the PDEA RO IV-B directed the conduct of a buy-bust operation against Manuel Dela Rosa with
IO1 Mary Grace Cortez as the team leader. IO1 Briguel was designated as poseur-buyer using a P200.00 and a
P100.00 bill, which were marked with "NSB." The team left for Puerto Galera at around 1:00 o'clock in the
morning of March 29, 2009 and they stayed for a while in Sabang. IO1 Briguel, however, testified that they
arrived at Puerto Galera on March 30, 2009. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, IO1 Briguel and
the informant proceeded to the Island Tattoo shop while the other operatives positioned themselves in the area.

Arriving thereat, IO1 Briguel asked Dela Rosa to put a henna tattoo on his right shoulder. As Dela Rosa was
doing the tattoo, IO1 Briguel told Dela Rosa that he was going to buy P300.00 worth of drugs, and handed the
marked money to Dela Rosa, who, in turn, handed to IO1 Briguel folded dried banana leaves. Thus, IO1 Briguel
made the pre-arranged signal of and immediately, IO1 Jabano and IO1 Echavaria arrived and arrested Dela
Rosa.

Subsequently, Dela Rosa was boarded into the service vehicle of the PDEA and while inside the vehicle, IO1
Briguel marked the seized marijuana with his initials and the date of the arrest. He then testified that he placed
the suspect dried marijuana leaves in his pocket.

The team then proceeded back to the PDEA IV-B Office. There, IO1 Briguel conducted the Inventory, which was
witnessed by Brgy. Captain Vergara and media representative Dennis Nebrejo. Photographs were likewise
taken during the marking and inventory of the seized item. IOI Briguel then brought the suspected marijuana and
the Request for Laboratory Examination to the PNP Crime Laboratory for forensic examination. Based on
Chemistry Report prepared by PCI..Alviar, the specimen weighed 0.682 gram and it tested positive for
marijuana.
Version of the Defense

The defense presented Dela Rosa as its sole witness. He testified that on the date of the said arrest, he was
inside his tattoo shop, located beside a bar and restaurant at White Beach, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro.
While accused-appellant was attending to several customers, a man suddenly approached him and asked if he
was Manny. When he replied in the affirmative, the said man asked him to go with him. When accused-appellant
refused, the man pulled out a .45 caliber pistol from his waist and threatened him that he would make a scene at
his shop. Reluctantly, accused-appellant accompanied the man to a van parked away from his shop. While
inside the van, the man handcuffed accused-appellant and brought him to the PDEA IV B Office. For unknown
reasons, accused-appellant was incarcerated therein for a month before a case was filed against him. He
presupposed that he was arrested and detained because he was associated with a certain Cris Pelino, who was
also arrested earlier due to drug related charges.

The RTC found Dela Rosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165. The CA dismissed the appeal. It held that the prosecution was able to prove that there was
substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.

ISSUE: Whether the guilt of Dela Rosa for the crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

There are inconsistent dates

when the alleged transaction
took place

The essential elements that have to be duly established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.

Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller
successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction
or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

In this case, the Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution witnesses presented inconsistent
dates regarding the occurrence of the alleged drug transaction. It is clear from the testimony of IO1 Briguel that
they met their confidential informant in the PDEA office on March 28, 2009. Then, on March 29, 2009, the buy-
bust team had a briefing regarding the operation and it was then that they prepared the pre-operation report.
Finally, on March 30, 2009, the team proceeded to Puerto Galera for the buy-bust operation. The said testimony
reflects the statements in the IO1 Briguel's Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated April 1, 2009. Likewise, the said dates
are reflected in the Magkasanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay, similarly dated April 1, 2009, of IO1 Jabano and IO1
Echavaria.

Later, on September 7, 2010, IOI Briguel retracted his statement and, instead, insisted that the buy-bust
operation occurred on March 29, 2009 based on his Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay. The Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay of IOI Briguel, however, contains questionable circumstances. The said document was
simply dated April 2009 without indicating the exact day of execution. It was also notarized on April 2, 2009.
Assuming arguendo that the said Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay was notarized on April 2, 2009, then it is
dubious as to why IO1 Briguel did not mention the said document at all when he initially testified on March 3,
2010. It was only on September 7, 2010 that IO1 Briguel suddenly remembered that he executed such crucial
affidavit. The only plausible explanation is that the incomplete affidavit did not exist as of March 3, 2010.

The chain of custody rule

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately
conduct a physically inventory; and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the persons
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a
representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In addition, Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides that the physical Inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures. It further states that non-compliance with these requirements shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over the confiscated items provided that such non-compliance were under justifiable
grounds and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.

Notably, in the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team is now required to conduct a physical
inventory. of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the presence of the accused or the persons
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an
elected public official and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The records of the case show that the physical inventory of the confiscated drug and the photographs of the
same where only done in the presence of the accused-appellant, Brgy. Captain Vergara and media
representative Nebrejo. Clearly, a representative of the DOJ, as required by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, was
not present during the inventory of the seized item.

More importantly, the apprehending team did not immediately conduct the physical inventory and the
taking of the photographs at the time the suspected drug was confiscated or at the nearest police
station. Instead, they travelled fifty four (54) kilometers from Puerto Galera, the place of the seizure, to Calapan
City before they conducted the inventory of the seized drug.

In this case, the prosecution failed to recognize its procedural lapses and give a justifiable ground for the non-
compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Particularly, they were not able to explain the absence of a
representative of the DOJ and the distant conduct of the inventory of the seized item. IO1 Echavaria attempted
to explain that the said inventory was not done at the place of the arrest at Puerto Galera because they could
not secure a representative of the media or the DOJ and, thus, went back to their office in Calapan
City. Nevertheless, upon their arrival in Calapan City, there was still no representative from the DOJ to witness
the inventory of the confiscated item.

As can be gleaned from the witnesses' testimony, the excuses they proffered to justify the distant conduct of the
inventory fifty-four (54) kilometers away from the place of seizure, are: (1) it was the team leader's discretion to
conduct the inventory in Calapan City; (2) to avoid commotion at the place of seizure; and (3) they could not
secure the witnesses required by law in the said place.

The Court finds that these excuses are unmeritorious. First, Section 21 of the IRR is clear that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place of the seizure or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending team. In this case, the apprehending team did not even bother to look for the
nearest police station at the place of seizure to conduct the inventory. Instead, they leisurely took their time and
travelled 54 kilometers away from the said place to secure an inventory of the seized item.

Second, another reason stated by the prosecution witness - that the inventory was done in Calapan to avoid a
commotion at the place of the seizure - is unavailing. Evidently, there is no need to travel fifty four (54)
kilometers away from Puerto Galera simply to avoid a commotion. As stated in IO1 Echavaria's testimony, the
apprehending team had eight (8) hours to prepare before the operation was conducted and they could have
easily identified the nearest police station in Puerto Galera for the inventory of the seized item. Certainly, the
PDEA office in Calapan City is not the nearest police station in Puerto Galera.

Third, the apprehending officers allegedly travelled all the way back to Calapan City because only there could
they secure the witnesses required by law. However, as discussed above, even when they travelled 54
kilometers to their office, they still failed to complete all the witnesses needed during the inventory. The RTC
even observed that it was impractical for the media representative, DOJ representative and the elected official to
travel from Puerto Galera all the way to Calapan City to simply witness the inventory. Indeed, the inventory
could have been done at the nearest police station in Puerto Galera and the required witnesses could have
conveniently attended thereat.

Aside from failing to provide a justifiable ground for the non-compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the
prosecution also failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item was preserved.

In the first link of the chain of custody, the apprehending officer acquires possession of the suspected drug from
the offender at the time of the arrest. The apprehending officer is required to mark the seized items — to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence — and
it should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator and(2) immediately upon confiscation. 30 In this
case, the marking was not done at the place of the seizure; rather it was done at the vehicle. While there may be
exceptions to the immediate marking of the seized item, 31 even a less stringent application of the requirement
would not suffice in sustaining a conviction in this case.

Aside from marking, the seized items should be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and
quantity of these items require a different type of handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall
accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over to the next officer in the chain of custody. 32 The
purpose of placing the seized item in an envelope or an evidence bag is to ensure that the item is secured from
tampering, especially when the seized item is susceptible to alteration or damage.

Here, as shown by its photographs,33 the seized marijuana was simply wrapped in a dried banana leaf; while the
marking was merely written on a strip of paper that was attached to the seized item. Evidently, the confiscated
marijuana was not placed in a secured container.

Further, there are also irregularities in the third link of the chain of custody. In the said link, there must be a
delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the
forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the substance.

In this case, while IO1 Briguel claims that he delivered the confiscated item to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Efigenio C. Navarro, Calapan City, it was not clear who received the confiscated drug thereat. From the
testimony, it can be gathered that PCI Alviar initially testified that the specimen was received by PO1 Carreon;
that PO1 Carreon, SPO1 Watson and PSI Niduaza were authorized to handle the specimen; that PCI Alviar
acquired the item from PSI Niduaza. Then on cross-examination, she then stated that it was PSI Niduaza that
actually received the same; that the latter was present in the crime laboratory but was not on duty; and that she
was on duty but cannot remember whether she was present at the crime laboratory. Accordingly, there is doubt
as to who actually received the seized item from IO1 Briguel. Within the crime laboratory, the said specimen was
handed from one person to another. It was even received by an officer who was not on duty at that time. The
changing of hands of the specimen is precarious considering that it was not placed in a secured container.

Conclusion

In fine, the Court finds that there are several errors in the prosecution of the case. There were inconsistent dates
on the conduct of the alleged buy bust operation because of the conflicting statements and affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses. Likewise, the requirement under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with
because a representative of the DOJ was not present at the time of the inventory of the seized item. Further, the
inventory was done fifty-four (54) kilometres away from the place of seizure. No justifiable reason was provided
for the non-compliance with Section 21.

The apprehending officers also failed to properly safe-keep the seized item because they did not place it in a
secured container. Finally, the forensic chemist did not give a consistent statement as to who received the
seized item and that the crime laboratory's arrangement made it possible for other personnel to contaminate the
evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
item were preserved.
Given the substantive flaws and procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized
marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully
prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of accused-
appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs JOEY SANCHEZ Y LICUDINE

G.R. No. 231383, March 07, 2018, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Members of the PDEA and the PNP Regional Public Safety Mobile Battalion organized a buy-bust operation
against a certain alias "Totoy" (later on identified as Sanchez), who was allegedly engaged in illegal drug trade
at the Bacnotan Public Market, Bacnotan, La Union. After a briefing where, inter alia, PDEA Investigation Officer
(IO) 1 RaymundTabuyo (IO1 Tabuyo) was designated as the poseur-buyer, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
target area. Thereat, IO1 Tabuyo was able to meet Sanchez, who, after receiving the marked money, handed
over a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to the former. After IO1 Tabuyo
examined the contents of the plastic sachet, he executed the pre-arranged signal, thus prompting the other
members of the buy-bust team to rush to the scene and arrest Sanchez. The buy-bust team searched Sanchez
and found two (2) other plastic sachets also containing a white crystalline substance.

The buy-bust team then conducted the markings, inventory, and photography on site before proceeding to their
office for documentation purposes. Thereat, the team was met with representatives from the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the media, both of whom signed the Certificate of Inventory. The seized plastic sachets were
then taken to the PNP Crime Laboratory where it was confirmed that their contents are indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

The RTC found Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sanchez is guilty for the crimes charged.

RULING:NO.

After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that the arresting officers committed unjustified deviations
from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Sanchez.

While it appears that representatives from the DOJ and the media were present during the conduct of the
inventory as evidenced by their signatures on the Certificate of Inventory, a more careful scrutiny of the records
shows that the buy-bust team conducted the marking, inventory, and photography where the arrest was
made, and merely made the aforesaid representatives sign the Certificate of Inventory upon the buy-bust team's
arrival at their office. Moreover, the said procedures were not done in the presence of any elected public official.

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, in People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must
show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for
"a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy
excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.
G.R. No. 234156, January 07, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.EMMANUEL OLIVA Y JORJIL, BERNARDO

BARANGOT Y PILAIS AND MARK ANGELO MANALASTAS Y GAPASIN, Accused-Appellants.

PERALTA, J.:

DOCTRINE: Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or
confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove
that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in
the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds."

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure
laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be
adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. The rules require
that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in
their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized item.

FACTS:

The Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task Group received a report regarding the sale of
dangerous drugs by a certain "Manu" in Barangay Cembo, Makati City. The PDEA formed a buybust team and
they proceeded to the exact location of "Manu" after it was confirmed by the confidential informant.

When they arrived at the target area, the confidential informant pointed to Emmanuel Oliva as "Manu," the seller
of dangerous drugs. PO3 Luisito Marcelo approached Oliva as a buyer who wanted to buy P500.00 worth of
shabu. He handed to Oliva the marked money and the latter showed four (4) transparent plastic sachets with
white crystalline substance.Meanwhile, Bernardo Barangot and Mark Angelo Manalastas were also at the target
area to buy shabu. Each of them took one sachet from Oliva.

Subsequently, PO3 Marcelo and PO1 Catabay arrested Manalastas, Oliva and Barangot and they were brought
to the barangay hall where an inventory was conducted and on the basis thereof, an inventory report was
prepared. The confiscated items were then marked and photographed, and a request for laboratory examination
was accomplished and the seized items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The substance found
inside the sachets were all tested positive for the. presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

Thus, an Information for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was filed against Oliva. On the other
hand, Barangot and Manalastas were separately charged with violation of Section 11.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them. The CA
affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in admitting the allegedly seized drugs despite the police officer’s non-
compliance with the rules on Chain of Custody.

RULING:

YES. To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:
(1) The apprehending team having in trial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 1064017 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it
essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is
invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to
amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people or
representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not automatically invalidate
the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible
especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.

In this case, the absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media during the
inventory of the seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A review of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes does not yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there was no
representative from the DOJ or the media. The only one present to witness the inventory and the marking was
an elected official, Barangay Captain Evelyn Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to show that any attempt
was made to secure the presence of the required witness.

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure
laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance
thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and
justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure
must be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. The rules
require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this
ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the
seized item. A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule
since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration.

People vs. Vibar

G.R. No. 215790. March 12, 2018

MARTIRES, J.:

FACTS:In an Information, Vibar was charged with the Crime of Rape committed against his very own daughter,
AAA. The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. Raul Alcantara as witnesses. On 4 August 2002, at around
11:00AM, while AAA was cooking lunch outside their nipa hut in Camarines Norte, Vibar came and asked her to
get his gloves from inside the house. When AAA refused to do so, he carried her inside and laid her on the floor
removed her shorts and panty, zipped open his pants, placed himself on top of her, and made push and pull
movements. During this time, AAA felt Vibar’s penis enter her vagina causing her pain. That same day, AAA
reported the incident to the police. After executing an affidavit at the police station, she appeared before the
judge of the MCTC of San Lorenzo Ruiz for preliminary investigation. AAA’s first complaint for rape, was
dismissed because she refused to speak during that time. She did not cooperate with the preliminary
investigation because she was afraid of her father who had threatened to kill her. After the incident, AAA left
Camarines Norte and went to Antipolo to work. On 7 July 2004, she returned to Camarines Norte to study.
Unfortunately, AAA was constantly harassed by Vibar. This prompted her to file anew the complaint for rape
against her father. AAA was subjected to a medical examination where it was discovered that she had an elastic
hymen that could be penetrated by a penis without causing any lacerations. The defense presented Vibar as its
lone witness, Vibar went home after attending Sunday worship. Once home, he asked AAA why she did not
prepare lunch, and the latter retorted in a disrespectful manner. Vibar scolded her and uttered other unsavory
remarks. After the verbal confrontation, AAA went to the police station and accused him of attempted rape. In
2004, however, AAA refiled the case against Vibar with the prodding of BBB, Arlene Rosinto, and a certain
Shirley. While in detention, Vibar received a letter from AAA in 2006 wherein she alleged that she was merely
coerced to refile the complaint for rape and that she regretted her decision to do so. the RTC found Vibar guilty
of rape. The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that AAA was indeed sexually abused noting
that AAA’s straightforward testimony trumped Vibar’s defenses of denial and alibi. Aggrieved, Vibar appealed
before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC’s judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the letter of AAA to Vibar is admissible in evidence.

HELD: NO. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that in order for any private document offered
as authentic to be admitted as evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (1) by anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or (2) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. The authentication of private document before it is received in evidence is vital
because during such process, a witness positively identifies that the document is genuine and has been duly
executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. A
plain reading of Vibar’s testimony immediately reveals that he miserably failed to comply with the authentication
requirement set forth under the Rules. Neither was there any witness who could testify that the alleged letter
was voluntarily and personally made by AAA nor was there anydocument from which her handwriting could have
been compared. Curiously, the person who purportedly handed to Vibar. AAA’s letter was not presented in court
to testify as to the genuineness of the document. Vibar merely relies on his self-serving testimony that he was
sure that the letter was AAA’s doing. Such hollow assurance, however, in no way proves that AAA had indeed
voluntarily executed the said document. He could have easily fabricated the letter and feigned that it was made.
As such, AAA’s professed letter is but a mere scrap of paper with no evidentiary value for lack of proper
authentication.

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP. vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP.

G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014

The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Facts:

MCMP leased heavy equipment from Monark for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a
Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Monark was able to deliver five (5) pieces of heavy equipment
to MCMP’s project site in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon as evidenced by invoices which contained
the details of the credit transaction. MCMP failed to fully pay the rental fees for the equipment. Thus,
Monark filed an action for collection of Sum of Money against MCMP. MCMP alleged in defense that
the complaint was premature as Monark has refused to give a detailed breakdown of its claims.
MCMP further averred that it had an agreement with Monark that it would not be charged for the
whole time that the leased equipment was in its possession but rather only for the actual time that the
equipment was used although still on the project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this agreement
was not contained in the Contract.

During trial, Monark was not able to present the original of the Contract. Instead, Monark presented a
photocopy of the Contract which the witness Reynaldo Peregrino (Senior Manager at Monark) had on
file, arguing that the original cannot be located despite diligent efforts. MCMP objected to the
presentation of secondary evidence but was nevertheless unable to produce their copy of the Contract
despite the court’s directive.
The RTC rendered its decision in favour of Monark. MCMP’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On appeal to the CA, the decision and order of the RTC was affirmed in toto, and motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

In challenging the decision of the CA, MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of
Peregrino, Monark did not diligently search for the original copy of the Contract as evidenced by the
fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented; 2) the alleged loss was not even
reported to management or the police; and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of the
document for the purposes of the instant case.

Issue:

Should the secondary evidence submitted in lieu of the original copy of the Contract which cannot be
located by Monark be admitted?

Ruling:

Yes. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract
in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but
to no avail.

The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

“Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is

the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) xxx

(d) xxx”

Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:

“Section 5. When original document is unavailable.—When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. (4a)

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control.—If the document is
in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce
it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.”

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down the requirements before a
party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document whenever the
original copy has been lost:
 Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original,
the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the
loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

LOON v. POWER MASTER

GR. No. 189404 December 11, 2013

DOCTRINE: While we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the
original documents for inspection.

FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the petitioners
as janitors and leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro
Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C
General Services and their officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the respondents). The
petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium,
service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the respondents made them sign
blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal
as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing
of their original complaint. Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents’
behalf. The respondents’ counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5, 2001.
However, the respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered pieces of evidence in their defense
despite their knowledge of the pendency of the case.

Labor Arbiter partially ruled in favor of the petitioners. Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the
National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioners disputed the LA’s denial of their claim for backwages,
overtime, holiday and premium pays. Meanwhile, the respondents questioned the LA’s ruling on the ground that
the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The respondents insisted that they were not personally
served with summons and other processes. They also claimed that they paid the petitioners minimum wages,
service incentive leave and thirteenth month pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied and computerized
copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal. They further maintained that the petitioners were
validly dismissed. They argued that the petitioners’ repeated defiance to their transfer to different workplaces
and their violations of the company rules and regulations constituted serious misconduct and willful
disobedience.

Respondents filed an unverified supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and computerized
copies of list of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also
showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees’ ATM cards. They also attached documentary
evidence showing that the petitioners were dismissed for cause and had been accorded due process.

Petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of the
supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly suffered from infirmities. First, the supplemental
appeal was not verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing of the respondents’ notice of
appeal with memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the respondents’ filing
of a responsive pleading until December 18, 2002. Third¸ the attached documentary evidence on the
supplemental appeal bore the petitioners’ forged signatures.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation with Reiterating Motion to Strike-Off the
Record Supplemental Appeal/Reply, Quitclaims and Spurious Documents Attached to Respondents’ Appeal
dated August 7, 2003.The petitioners argued in this last motion that the payrolls should not be given probative
value because they were the respondents’ fabrications. They reiterated that the genuine payrolls bore their
signatures, unlike the respondents’ photocopies of the payrolls. They also maintained that their signatures in the
respondents’ documents (which showed their receipt of thirteenth month pay) had been forged.

NLRC partially ruled in favor of the respondents. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s awards of holiday pay
and attorney’s fees. It also maintained that the LA acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents
through their voluntary appearance. However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the
first time on appeal on the ground that they had been deprived of due process. It found that the respondents did
not actually receive the LA’s processes. It also admitted the respondents’ unverified supplemental appeal on the
ground that technicalities may be disregarded to serve the greater interest of substantial due process.
Furthermore, the Rules of Court do not require the verification of a supplemental pleading. The CA affirmed the
NLRC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents by submitting photocopied documents prove the allegations sought to be
proven.

HELD: No. respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents’
photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is
a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for
purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in evidence and give probative value to photocopied
documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the
adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to
present the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures.
Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the
alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the
respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced.

It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRC’s proposition that "[i]t is of common knowledge that
there are many people who use at least two or more different signatures." The NLRC cannot take judicial notice
that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners themselves disown
the signatures in the respondents’ assailed documentary evidence. The NLRC’s position is unwarranted and is
patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.

Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that the employer’s cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the employee’s evidence.

DIMAGUILA V. MONTEIRO

G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014

The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.

FACTS: Spouses Monteiro, along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza filed their Complaint for
Partition and Damages before the RTC against the petitioners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo
and Gloria Dimaguila (the Dimaguilas) along with the Borlazas. The complaint alleged that all the parties were
co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential house and located at Laguna which the Monteiro’s bought
on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro.
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that the subject property was partitioned
equally between her two sons, Perfecto, owning the southern-half portion and VitalianoDimaguila, owning the
northern-half portion through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. They further claimed that the spouses Monteiro
had nothing to with the property as they were not the heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano. Hence, there is no co-
ownership.

During trial, spouses Monteiro presented 4 witnesses, 2 of which are CrisostomoArves, an employee from the
Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners
and DomingaTolentino, a record officer of the DENR, testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safe
keeps the records of surveyed land, including cadastral maps form the region. The RTC ruled in favor of
Spouses Monteiro which was affirmed on appeal with the CA.

ISSUE: WON the testimony of the two public officers is inadmissible for being violativeof the best evidence rule.

HELD: No. Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.Section 7 of the same Rule
provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents
may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of
the area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was
CrisostomoArves, Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such
documents. The second was DomingaTolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer,
certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral
maps and the list of claimants, as ce1iified true copies of original public records, fall under the
exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that
entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official
records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of
requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity
of performance of official duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that
the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records
as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to
the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
CARLINA P. ROBIÑOL, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, Respondent
A.C. No. 11836
November 21, 2017

Facts: Atty. Bassig rented a house from Complainant CarlinaRobiñol (Robiñol). It was agreed that Atty. Bassig
will pay a one month advance and another one month deposit. However, he did not comply with the same. He
paid his rents belatedly and subsequentlystopped making any payment. Believing that Atty. Bassig will remain
truthful to his promise, Robiñol allowed him to stay in the premises. However, when Typhoon Habagat struck,
Atty. Bassig left the house because of the heavy flood. When he left, he neither informed Robiñol of his intended
destination nor satisfied his unsettled obligation.4Robiñol then demanded payment from Atty. Bassig. As a
consequence, he executed a promissory note, undertaking to pay on installment basis. However, Atty. Bassig
reneged on his obligation.7

Robiñol filed a disbarment case against Atty. Bassig. In an unverified answer, Atty. Bassig acknowledged his
obligation to Robiñol and promised to pay the same within the next two months after the answer was filed. He
maintained that he had difficulty in managing his finances as· he was paying for his son's medical expenses and
his car's monthly amortizations.

Issue: Whether or not the complainant was able to discharge the burden of proof to hold Atty. Bassig
administratively liable.

Ruling: No.Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant16 and the proper evidentiary threshold is substantial evidence. 17Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis-neither purely civil nor purely criminal. They do not involve a trial of an action or
a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers.21 While these proceedings are sui
generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence may not be altogether dispensed with.

Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by
a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman19 , the Court held that:Before a party
is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the
following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. xxx 20

Here, the evidence submitted were inadmissible. It must be noted that the receipts showing payment of Atty.
Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig were photocopies of the
original.A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.Nowhere in the record shows thatRobiñol laid down the predicate for the admission of said
photocopies. Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any
evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from Robiñol.

SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS vs.

KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171601| April 8, 2015
FACTS: Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates"
(Agreement) where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted" by Lucia as supplier to Kimwa. Kimwa
was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia’s permitted area in Toledo City at ₱240.00 per truckload.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Sometime after this, however,
Kimwa stopped hauling aggregates.
Lucia filed the Complaint for breach of contract with damages against Kimwa. Spouses Paras alleged that in
December 1994, Lucia was approached by Kimwa to purchase gravel and sand from her. Kimwa allegedly
asked that it be "assured" of 40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates. Lucia countered that her concession area
was due to be rechanneled on May 15,1995, when her Special Permit expires. Thus, she emphasized that she
would be willing to enter into a contract with Kimwa "provided the forty thousand cubic meters would be
withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15 May 1995." Kimwa then assured Lucia that it would
take only two to three months for it to completely haul the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Convinced of
Kimwa’s assurances, Lucia and Kimwa entered into the Agreement.
Spouses Paras added that within a few days, Kimwa was able to extract and haul 10,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. However, after extracting and hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly transferred to the concession
area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their Agreement. They then addressed demand letters
to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses Paras filed their Complaint.
In its Answer, Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates from Lucia. It
argued that the controversial quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an upper limit or the maximum
quantity that it could haul. It likewise claimed that it neither made any commitment to haul 40,000 cubic meters
of aggregates before May 15, 1995 nor represented that the hauling of this quantity could be completed in two to
three months. It denied that the hauling of 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates was completed in a matter of days
and countered that it took weeks to do so. It also denied transferring to the concession area of a certain Mrs.
Remedios dela Torre.
Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum
limit and that May 15, 1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that
Spouses Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Paras noting that the Agreement stipulated that the allotted aggregates were
set aside exclusively for Kimwa. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision. It
faulted the trial court for basing its findings on evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the
Parol Evidence Rule. It noted that the Agreement was clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates by May 15, 1995.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Kimwa Construction and Development Corporation is liable to petitioners Spouses
Paras for (admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates from petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted
area by May 15, 1995.
To resolve this, it is necessary to determine whether petitioners Spouses Paras were able to establish that
respondent Kimwa was obliged to haul a total of 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
HELD: Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on
admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing.
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities observed, "forbids any addition to, or
contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract."
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in deferring to the contracting parties’ articulated intent. In choosing
to reduce their agreement into writing, they are deemed to have done so meticulously and carefully, employing
specific — frequently, even technical — language as are appropriate to their context. From an evidentiary
standpoint, this is also because "oral testimony . . . coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of
the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language." As
illustrated in Abella v. Court of Appeals:
Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is
not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. "I would sooner trust the smallest slip of paper for truth," said
Judge Limpkin of Georgia, "than the strongest and most retentive memory ever bestowed on mortal man." This
is especially true in this case where such oral testimony is given by . . . a party to the case who has an interest
in its outcome, and by . . . a witness who claimed to have received a commission from the petitioner.
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the four(4)
items enumerated in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, "a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the agreement[.]" Raising any of these items as an issue in a pleading such that it
falls under the exception is not limited to the party initiating an action. In Philippine National Railways v. Court of
First Instance of Albay, this court noted that "if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract
mentioned in the complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is
admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties[.]" Moreover, as with all possible objections to the
admission of evidence, a party’s failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be
entertained.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol evidence sought to be introduced
points to the conclusion proposed by the party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief
in [the] existence of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by the party seeking to
introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of
the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse
party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion
proposed by the presenting party.
At the onset, two (2) flaws in the Court of Appeals’ reasoning must be emphasized. First, it is inconsistent to say,
on one hand, that the trial court erred on the basis of "evidence presented" (albeit supposedly in violation of the
Parol Evidence Rule),and, on the other, that petitioners Spouses Paras showed "no proof." Second, without
even accounting for the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9, the Court of Appeals immediately
concluded that whatever evidence petitioners Spouses Paras presented was in violation of the Parol Evidence
Rule.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed
before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s failure to express
the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through its Answer, also responded to petitioners
Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence.
It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint does not specifically state words and phrases such as
"mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is evident that the
crux of petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint is their assertion that the Agreement "entered into on 6 December
1994 or thereabouts" was founded on the parties’ supposed understanding that the quantity of aggregates
allotted in favor of respondent Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered
impossible by the rechanneling of petitioner Lucia Paras’ permitted area. This assertion is the very foundation of
petitioners’ having come to court for relief.
Considering how the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to express the parties’ true intent
was successfully put in issue in petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint (and even responded to by respondent
Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties’
true intent, may be admitted and considered.
Of course, this admission and availability for consideration is no guarantee of how exactly the parol evidence
adduced shall be appreciated by a court. That is, they do not guarantee the probative value, if any, that shall be
attached to them. In any case, we find that petitioners have established that respondent Kimwa was obliged to
haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. Considering its admission that it did not haul
30,000 cubic meters of aggregates, respondent Kimwa is liable to petitioners.
Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent Kimwa was well aware that a total of
only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted area, and
that petitioner Lucia Paras’ operations cannot extend beyond May 15, 1995, when the Special Permit expires.
The Special Permit’s condition that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by
petitioner Lucia Paras from the permitted area lends credence to the position that the aggregates "allotted" to
respondent Kimwa was in consideration of its corresponding commitment to haul all 40,000 cubic meters. This is
so, especially in light of the Agreement’s own statement that "the said Aggregates is for the exclusive use of
[respondent Kimwa.]" By allotting the entire 40,000 cubic meters, petitioner Lucia Paras bound her entire
business to respondent Kimwa. Rational human behavior dictates that she must have done so with the
corresponding assurances from it. It would have been irrational, if not ridiculous, of her to oblige herself to make
this allotment without respondent Kimwa’s concomitant undertaking that it would obtain the entire amount
allotted.
Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6) months from November 14,1994
lends credence to petitioners Spouses Paras’ assertion that, in entering into the Agreement with respondent
Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so because of respondent Kimwa's promise that hauling can be completed by
May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the Special Permit, petitioner Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently
clear to any party she was transacting with that she could supply aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that
the other party's hauling must be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with due diligence, for
otherwise, any contract she would enter into would be negated; any commitment she would make beyond May
15, 1995 would make her guilty of misrepresentation, and any prospective income for her would be rendered
illusory.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. GAYAM PASIMIO

G.R. No. 205590, September 02, 2015

FACTS:

Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, she alleged having a peso and dollar time
deposit accounts with PNB in the total amount of P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80, respectively; that both investment
placements have matured; and when she sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued interests, PNB refused to
oblige.

PNB admitted the fact of deposit placement but it claimed that Pasimio is without right to insist on their withdrawal, the
deposited amount having already been used in payment of her outstanding loan obligations to the bank. PNB narrated how
the set off of sort came about: Pasimio and her husband took out three "loans against deposit hold-out" from the PNB Sucat
branch, as follows: Three Million One Hundred Thousand Peso 26 of 99 (P3,100,000) loan on March 21, 2001; a One
Million Seven Hundred Thousand Peso (P1,700,000) loan on April 2, 2001; and a Thirty-One Thousand One Hundred US
Dollar (US$31,1 00) loan on December 7, 2001.

During the trial following the joinder of issues, Pasimio denied obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the
corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain documents which turned out to be the Peso Loans Against
Peso/FX Deposit Loan Applications, the Promissory Notes and Hold-out on Savings Deposit/ Peso/FX Time Deposit and
Assignment of Deposit Substitute and the Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction (Loan Documents), she
professed not understanding what they really meant. She agreed to affix her signature on these loan documents in blank or
in an incomplete state, she added, only because the PNB Sucat branch manager and Customer Relations Officer led her to
believe that what she was signing were related to new high-yielding PNB products. Pasimio would also deny re-lending the
loan proceeds to Paolo Sun.

The RTC ruled in favor of Pasimio. The disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio had proven by convincing
evidence that she did not obtain any loan accommodation from PNB. As a corollary, the trial court held that there was no
evidence showing the release by PNB of the loan proceeds to Pasimio. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting Pasimio's complaint for a sum of money

HELD: YES. In upholding the RTC's finding respecting Pasimio's never having received any loan proceeds, the CA
doubtless disregarded the rule holding that a promissory note is the best evidence of the transaction embodied therein; also,
to prove the existence of the loan, there is no need to submit a separate receipt to prove that the borrower received the loan
proceeds. Indeed, a promissory note represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal commitment to repay it on
the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower and the lender. As has been held, a person who signs such an
instrument is bound to honor it as a legitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the signature he affixes thereto as a
token of his good faith. If he reneges on his promise without cause, he forfeits the sympathy and assistance of this Court
and deserves instead its sharp repudiation.

The Court has also declared that a mere denial of the receipt of the loan, which is stated in a clear and unequivocal manner
in a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To overthrow the recitals of such instrument, convincing and
more than merely preponderant evidence is necessary. A contrary rule would throw wide open doors to fraud. Following
this doctrine, Pasimio's notarized promissory notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be upheld, absent, as
here, strong, complete, and conclusive proof of their nullity.

The promissory notes, bearing Pasimio's signature, speak for themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has not questioned the
genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the promissory notes, she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of the
corresponding loan proceeds. Withal, she cannot plausibly set up the defense that she did not apply for any loan, and
receive the value of the notes or any consideration therefor in order to escape her liabilities under these promissory notes.

But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that strengthened its allegation on the existence of the loan. Here, each
promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan application form and disclosure statement, all of which carried
Pasimio's signatures. Isolated from each other, these documents might not prove the existence of the loan, but when taken
together, collectively, they show that Pasimio took the necessary steps to contract loans from PNB and was aware of their
terms and conditions.

Finally, it is well to consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing.

Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change or vary a written document, except if
a party presents evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings:
(a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement; and (d) the existence of other
terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written agreement.

Such evidence, however, must be clear and convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written
agreement. Since no evidence of such nature is before the Court, the documents embodying the loan agreement of the
parties should be upheld. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94079 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Ligaya
M. Pasimio's complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0195 before the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 196 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa

G. R. No. 152807 - August 12, 2003

DOCTRINE: The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.

Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in
dispute.

Facts: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents before the Santa Cruz,
Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court. It alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of the
land. In 1960, he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren. Francisco Comorposa, being a close
family friend of Marcos, approached the late Saezs son, Adolfo, to occupy the land of Marcos Saez. He
occupied a portion of without paying any rental. He was succeeded in his possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through petitioners tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused
to vacate the same and claimed that they were the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessor of
the premises. An action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.

The Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao
del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision

Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, neither is there error on the
part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel
[Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self-serving.

Held: Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting that the Rule
on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file
their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.

The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question
of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.

While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses respective testimonies, the failure of
the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear
the burden of proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.