Art. 1088.
The last paragraph of the same document states:
Should any of the heirs
• sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition,
• any or all of the co-heirs
• may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser
• by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
• provided they do so within the period of one
month
• from the time they were notified
• in writing of the sale by the vendor. (1067a)
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Third Division, respondents.
Jose Gaton for petitioners.
Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 22179-R, promulgated on
August 31, 1966, reversing the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo ** in Civil Case No. 3489, and rendering a new
one dismissing the complaint of petitioner herein, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and another entered, dismissing plaintiff's
complaint. No pronouncement as to costs. (p. 29 Rollo)
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate,
leaving a parcel of unregistered land about 372 sq. meters,
situated in the Municipality of Tubungan, Province of Iloilo
(Exhibits, p. 19). On his death the property was inherited by his
nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of
his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos
(TSN, Sept. 6,1956, p. 3).
On December 3, 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin
Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia,
Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia,
Baltazar Garcia signed a document entitled, "Extra-judicial
Partition and Deed of Sale" (Exhibits, p. 19). The parcel of land
subject of the document was described as follows:
A parcel of residential land, about 372 square meters, lst
class, Identified as Assessor's Lot No. 107, Block No. 8,
bounded on the north by Paz and Federal Streets; on the
south by Tabaosares and Antonia Tacalinar; on the East
by Piedad Street; and on the West by Paz Street. This
parcel of land has no concrete monuments to indicate its
boundaries but there are dikes, stones and temporary
fences used as landmarks and boundary signals. This
parcel of land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 1149, S.
of 1947, in the name of Gelacio Garcia, and its assessed
value of P110.00. (p. 19, Exhibits)
1|Page
That for and in consideration of the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00), Philippine Currency, to us in hand paid
by the spouses, JOSE CALALIMAN, and PACIENCIA
TRABADILLO, all of legal age, Filipinos and residents of the
municipality of Tubungan, province of Iloilo, Philippines,
receipt of which we hereby acknowledged and
confessed to our entire satisfaction, do by these presents,
cede, sell, convey and transfer the above-described
parcel of land unto the said spouses, Jose Calaliman and
Paciencia Trabadillo, their heirs, successors and assigns
free from all liens and encumbrances whatever. (p. 19,
Exhibits)
The document was inscribed in the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
on February 24,1955, Inscription No. 20814, Page 270, Vol. 64
(Exhibits, p. 20).
On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia,
Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino, Resurreccion Tagarao,
Serafin Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata Garcia
and Simeon Garcia, all residents of Isabela, Negros
Occidental, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and
Paciencia Trabadillo through their attorney-in-fact, Juanito
Bertomo, their shares, rights, interest and participation in the
same parcel of land. The Deed of Sale was registered in the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo also on December 22, 1954,
Inscription No. 20640, p. 88, Vol. 64 (Exhibits, p. 2122).
On May 7, 1955 the heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and
Maria Garcia, petitioners herein, filed against the spouses Jose
Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, private respondents
herein, Civil Case No. 3489 with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of
land inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which
portion was sold by their co-heirs to the defendants. In the
complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 4) plaintiffs alleged, among
others:
5. That, plaintiffs' co-owners had never offered for sale
their interest and shares over the said land to the plaintiffs
prior to the sale in favor of the defendants, nor given
notice of such intention on their part; and that, no notice
in writing has been given by said co-owners to the
plaintiffs of the said sale, such that, plaintiffs came to
learn of it only from other source;
6. That, plaintiffs would have purchased the interest and
shares of their co-owners had the latter offered the same
to them prior to the sale thereof to the defendants; and
that, within 30 days after learning of the sale made to the
defendants under annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l', plaintiffs made
repeated offer to the defendants to allow them to
redeem said interest and shares acquired by the
defendants in accordance with the right granted to the
plaintiffs by law in such a case, offering a reasonable
price thereof of P300 taking into consideration the fact
that the defendants had acquired only 3/4 of the land of
372 square meters more or less, in area with assessed
value of P110 and a fair market value of 372 at Pl per
square meter, the price actually obtaining in the locality
at the time of the sale thereof under Annexes 'A', 'B' and
'B-l'; however, the defendants refused and have until the
present refused to grant redemption thereof giving no
reason why other than challenging the plaintiffs to bring
their case in court:
7. That, the circumstances surrounding the transaction
between the defendants and plaintiffs' co-owners, the
vendors, were such that defendants could not have
actually paid nor the vendors actually received the total
price of P800 as stipulated in the deeds Annexes 'A', 'B'
and 'B-l' while the said price fixed is grossly excessive and
 highly exaggerated and prohibitive for evidently ulterior
motive:
8. That, the land herein described is an ancestral property
and plaintiffs have actually a house standing thereon and
having lived thereon ever since, such that, the
defendants' refusal to allow redemption thereof has
caused the plaintiffs mental torture, worry and anxiety,
forcing them to litigate and retain services of counsel,
therefore, plaintiffs demand against the defendants P500
for moral damage, P500 for exemplary damage, P300 for
attorney's fees, aside from actual expenses incurred; and,
furthermore, P5 monthly as reasonable value of
defendants' occupation of a portion of the premises
counting from the filing of this complaint.
They prayed that the trial court render judgment:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs to be entitled to redeem from
the defendants for the price of P300 or for such
reasonable price as may be determined by this
Honorable Court the interest and shares over the land
described in this complaint of plaintiffs' co-owners,
Joaquin, Porfirio, Flora, Dioscoro, Consolacion, Remedios,
Trinidad, Baltazar, Rosario, Margarita, Dolores, Fortunata
and Simon, all surnamed Garcia, and Resurreccion,
Serafin and Buenaventura, all surnamed Tagarao, sold by
them to the defendants under the deeds of sale Annexes
'A', 'B' and 'B-l' of this complaint; and ordering the
defendants to execute the proper instrument of
reconveyance or redemption thereof in favor of the
plaintiffs; and, ordering them to vacate the premises;
2. Condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs
P500 for moral damage; P500 for exemplary damage;
P300 for attorney's fees and actual expenses incurred; P5
monthly from the filing of this complaint as reasonable
value of defendants' occupation of a portion of the land;
the costs of this action; and, for such other relief and
remedy as may be legal, just and equitable."
On the other hand, the defendants, private respondents
herein, alleged in their answer the following special affirmative
defenses (Record on Appeal, p. 14):
1. That plaintiffs have no cause of action against the
herein defendants;
2. That due notices in writing have been sent to plaintiff
Francisco Garcia at his residence at 2875 Felix Huertas St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, sometime last June 1953, in which
plaintiff Francisco Garcia was informed of his co-owners
signified intention to sell their shares, and likewise, the
other plaintiffs Paz and Maria Garcia were personally
notified of the same hence, for that reason, they are now
barred to claim legal redemption of the land in question,
having filed their belated claim too late."
The trial court rendered judgment on September 12, 1957 in
favor of the plaintiffs (Record on Appeal, p. 15), the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Sentencing the defendants to resell the property to
the plaintiffs for P800.00 which is the total consideration of
the two deeds of sale Exhibits A and B;
(b) In the event that the defendants fail to execute the
deed of resale within ten days from the date this decision
becomes final, the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
2|Page
execute the corresponding deed pursuant to the
provisions of Section 10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court;
(c) Without pronouncement as to costs.
On October 14, 1957 plaintiffs filed their notice of Appeal
predicated on "(a) failure of the Court to adjudge the real or
reasonable price of the sale or otherwise the redemption
value thereof; (b) failure of the Court to adjudge damages
including attorney's fees in favor of the plaintiffs and the costs."
(Record on Appeal, p. 18).
Defendants filed their own notice of appeal on October 15,
1957 (Record on Appeal, p. 19).
On appeal the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 31, 1966 reversed the decision of the trial court and
rendered another one dismissing plaintiff's complaint with no
pronouncement as to costs (Rollo, p. 22).
The instant petition for review by certiorari was filed with the
Court on December 12, 1966 (Rollo, p. 11). The Court at first
dismissed the petition in a resolution dated December 22,
1966, for insufficient supporting papers (Rollo, p. 35) but
reconsidered the said Resolution of Dismissal later in a
Resolution dated February 8, 1967 (Rollo, p. 97) as prayed for in
a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners on February 1,
1967 (Rollo, p. 38). The same Resolution of February 8, 1967
gave due course to the petition.
The Brief for the Petitioners was filed on June 9,1967 (Rollo, p.
106); the Brief for the Respondents was received in the Court
on August 31, 1967 (Rollo, p. 119).
Petitioners having manifested they would not file reply brief on
September 14,1967 (Rollo, p. 122) the Court considered the
case submitted for decision, in a Resolution dated September
21, 1967 (Rollo, p. 124).
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE 30-DAY PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN
ARTICLE 1088 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE FOR A CO-HEIR TO
EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF LEGAL REDEMPTION, HAD ALREADY
ELAPSED WHEN THE HEREIN PLAINTIFFS FILED THE ACTION
ON MAY 7,1955.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO OFFER TO REIMBURSE THE
DEFENDANTS FOR THE PORTION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
SOLD TO THEM BY THE CO-HEIRS OF THE PLAINTIFFS.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT, AND IN
NOT ADJUDGING DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS.
(Brief for the Petitioners, p. 1)
There is no question that the provision of law applicable in the
instant case is Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code (Art. 1067, Old
Civil Code) as the matter concerns heirs and inheritance not
yet distributed (Wenceslao v. Calimon, 46 Phil. 906 [1923]). Art.
1088 states:
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
 do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
The main issue is whether or not petitioners took all the
necessary steps to effectuate their exercise of the right of legal
redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil
Code.
kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the
intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or
any other means of information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, then there would have been no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New
Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for,
under the old law, a verbal notice or information was
sufficient (106 Phil. 1023 [1960]).

It is undisputed that no notification in writing was ever received

In the above-quoted decision the Court did not consider the
by petitioners about the sale of the hereditary interest of some
registration of the deed of sale with the Register of Deeds
of their co-heirs in the parcel of land they inherited from the
sufficient notice, most specially because the property involved
late Gelacio Garcia, although in a letter dated June 23, 1953
was unregistered land, as in the instant case. The Court took
petitioner Francisco Garcia wrote one of his co- heirs, Joaquin
note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale as
Garcia, who is an uncle of petitioners, proposing to buy the
sufficient notice of a sale under the provision of Section 51 of
hereditary interests of his co-heirs in their unpartitioned
Act No. 496 applies only to registered lands and has no
inheritance, (Exhibit, p. 3). Although said petitioner asked that
application whatsoever to a case where the property involved
his letter be answered "in order that I will know the results of
is, admittedly, unregistered land.
what I have requested you," (Exhibit, p. 14) there is no proof
that he was favored with one.
Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a
related provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court
Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the
had stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual
property on December 3, 1954 when one of the heirs, Juanito
knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the
Bertomo, asked Petitioner Paz Garcia to sign a document
redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to
prepared in the Municipality of Tubungan because the land
written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all
they inherited was going to be sold to private respondent,
uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet
Jose Calaliman (TSN, September 6, 1957, p. 60). The document
any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not
mentioned by petitioner Paz Garcia could be no other than
having provided for any alternative, the method of
the one entitled "Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale"
notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not
dated December 3, 1954 as it is in this document that the
prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
name of Paz Garcia, Maria Garcia and Amado Garcia
distinctive method for written notification of redemption
appear unsigned by them (Exhibits, p. 19).
(Conejero et al. v. Court of Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966];
Etcuban v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v.
It is not known whether the other heirs whose names appear in Villanueva, G.R. No. 75069, April 15,1988).
the document had already signed the document at the time
Paz Garcia was approached by Juanito Bertomo. Paz Garcia,
Petitioners fault the appellate court in not awarding them
however, testified that she immediately informed her brother
damages, attorney's fees and costs. After finding in favor of
Francisco that Juanita Bertomo wanted to sell the land to Jose
respondent spouses and against petitioners herein it is
Calaliman (TSN, September 6,1957, p. 62). On December 26,
untenable for petitioners to expect that the appellate court
1954 he wrote respondents giving them notice of his desire to
would award damages and attorney's fees and costs.
exercise the right of legal redemption and that he will resort to
However as already discussed, petitioners have not lost their
court action if denied the right (Exhibits, p. 8). The respondents
right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of
received the letter on January 13, 1955 but petitioner
the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even
Francisco Garcia did not get any answer from them. Neither
begun to run. Petitioners clearly can claim attorney's fees for
did respondents show him a copy of the document of sale nor
bad faith on the part of respondents, first, for refusing
inform him about the price they paid for the sale when he
redemption, and secondly for declaring the entire land as
went home to Tubungan from Manila sometime in March 1955
theirs, although they knew some heirs had not sold their shares.
and went to see the respondent spouse about the matter on
March 24,1955 (TSN, September 6,1957, p. 18).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED with
Because of the refusal of respondent Jose Calaliman to show
the modification that petitioners be awarded damages,
him the document of sale or reveal to him the price paid for
attorney's fees and costs in the amount prayed for.
the parcel of land, petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the
Office of the Register of Deeds on the same date, March
24,1955 and there found two documents of sale regarding the SO ORDERED.
same parcel of land (TSN, Ibid, p. 19).
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and
Petitioners filed the case for legal redemption with the trial Regalado, JJ., concur.
court on May 7, 1955. Respondents claim that the 30-day
period prescribed in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code for
petitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had
already elapsed at that time and that the requirement of
Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that notice would be in Footnotes
writing is deemed satisfied because written notice would be
superfluous, the purpose of the law having been fully served * Penned by then Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., and
when petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the concurred in by Justices Juan P. Enriquez and Edilberto Soriano.
Register of Deeds and saw for himself, read and understood
the contents of the deeds of sale (Brief for respondents, p. 6). ** CFI Judge Roberto Zurbano.

The issue has been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v.

[G.R. No. 160701. February 9, 2004]
Samonte, where this Court observed:

BAYLON vs. AMADOR

Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue
against any attempt to widen the scope of the notice
specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other THIRD DIVISION
3|Page
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated FEB 9 2004.
G.R. No. 160701 (em>Fulton Baylon vs. Terencio Amador.)
Petitioner assails the July 30, 2001 decision [1]cralaw of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54363 which modified the
January 22, 1996 consolidated decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Civil Cases 91-5653
(specific performance) and 92-5747 (certiorari).
On August 26, 1987, private respondent filed an ejectment
case against petitioner at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Bacon, Sorsogon, alleging that the latter defaulted in payment
of rentals and refused to vacate the subject property owned
by private respondent despite repeated demands.
On December 28, 1990, after the parties submitted their
respective position papers, the MTC decided in favor of
private respondent and ordered petitioner to vacate the
subject premises.
In retaliation, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 91-5663 before the
Sorsogon RTC for specific performance alleging that their
contract of lease also contained an option to buy through
which private respondent gave petitioner the preferential right
to purchase the subject property in the event the same was
put on sale.
In the meantime, private respondent's ex parte motion for
execution of judgment in the ejectment case was granted
and on April 19, 1992, the MTC issued an alias writ of execution.
To prevent imminent ejectment, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance
of temporary restraining order (TRO) at the Sorsogon RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 92-5747.
Meanwhile, without notice to private respondent, petitioner
acquired a "3/9 portion" of the subject property from one of
the co-owners.
Trial of both Civil Case Nos. 91-5653 and 92-5747 ensued.
Thereafter the Sorsogon RTC, Branch 52 rendered the January
22, 1996 decision. The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff (Civil Case No. 5633), the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 5747 and against the defendant in
(Civil Case No. 5633) and the respondent in (Civil Case No.
5747).
1.Finding that the plaintiff has .the preferential right to acquire
the property in question in the event defendant sells/alienate
the remaining portion of the property in question.
2.To permanently enjoin the lower court from enforcing the
alias writ of execution in Civil Case 183.
3.Declaring plaintiff to be co-owner of the house and lot in
question for having acquired by purchase at least 3/9 portion
of the questioned property.
4|Page
4.Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00
as attorney's fees and the sum of P5,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
5. The counterclaim of defendant is hereby dismissed.
6.Defendant shall pay the cost of the suit. [2]cralaw
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On July 30, 2001, the appellate court modified the decision of
the Sorsogon RTC:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision
dated January 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 52)
in Sorsogon, Sorsogon in Civil Cases Nos. 91-5653 and 92-5747,
is hereby MODIFIED in that:
(1)The plaintiff-appellee has lost his preferential right to buy the
property in question; and
(2)The defendant-appellant be given a period of thirty (30)
days from finality of this judgment within which to redeem that
portion which had been acquired by the plaintiff-appellee;
but AFFIRMED in all other respects. No costs. Let the records be
remanded to the court a quo for appropriate action.[3]cralaw
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on
November 6, 2003.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court committed
reversible error when it declared him to have lost his
preferential right to buy the subject property and gave private
respondent 30 days from finality of judgment to redeem the
"3/9 portion" of the disputed property acquired by petitioner
from private respondent's co-owner.
The petition is without merit.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, even if the parties
originally had a contract of lease with option to buy, when the
lease contract expired, the tacit renewal of the contract was
limited only to those terms of the contract which were
germane to the petitioner's right of continued lease over the
property and did not extend to alien matters like the option to
buy the leased premises.[4]cralaw
The Court has ruled that, in case of implicit renewal of a
contract of lease on a monthly basis, the terms of the original
lease contract which are revived in the implied new lease
under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code are only those terms
germane to the lessee's right of continued possession and
enjoyment of the property leased. Therefore, in this case, the
implied new lease did not ipso facto carry with it the revival of
petitioner's option to buy the leased premises because said
option was alien to the lease. Stated differently, petitioner's
right to exercise the option to purchase expired with the
termination of the original contract of lease. [5]cralaw
Regarding private respondent's right of redemption, Article
1088 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that, should any of
the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from
the time they were notified in writing by the vendor.

The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. This Court

has long established the rule that, notwithstanding actual
knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written
notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as well as
its efficacy and status.[6]cralaw

Private respondent was never given such written notice. He

thus still has the right to redeem said one-third portion of the
subject property. On account of the lack of written notice of
the sale by the other co-heirs, the 30-day period never
commenced.

All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the

appellate court in rendering the assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby denied due course.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS,
MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

5|Page
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated March 26, 2002,
and the resolution 2 dated December 17, 2002, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59869 entitled "Gloria A. Vargas,
Aurora Vargas, Ramon Vargas, Marites Vargas, Edelina Vargas
and Gemma Vargas v. Joseph Cua."
The facts are as follows:
A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters
located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by
the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among
Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas,
Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres
Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino
Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot
in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square
meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did
not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida
and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three
consecutive weeks.3
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale4 was again executed by and among the same
heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings.
Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario
signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55
square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas
and one of respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale dated November
16, 1994 only when the original house built on the lot was
being demolished sometime in May 1995. 5 She likewise
claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the
same property had been published in the Catanduanes
Tribune.6
After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner,
Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property, with the following
letter7 sent to petitioner on her behalf:
29th June 1995
Mr. Joseph Cua
Capilihan, Virac, Catanduanes
Sir:
This is in behalf of my client, Ms. Aurora Vargas, 8 (c/o Atty.
Prospero V. Tablizo) one of the lawful heirs of the late
Paulina Vargas, original owner of Lot No. 214 of Virac,
Poblacion covered by ARP No. 031-0031 in her name.
I understand that a document "Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale" was executed by some of my
client's co-heirs and alleged representatives of other co-
heirs, by virtue of which document you acquired by
purchase from the signatories to the said document, five
(5) shares with a total area of fifty-five square meters of
the above-described land.
This is to serve you notice that my client shall exercise her
right of legal redemption of said five (5) shares as well as
other shares which you may likewise have acquired by
purchase. And you are hereby given an option to agree
6|Page
to legal redemption within a period of fifteen (15) days
from your receipt hereof.
Should you fail to convey to me your agreement within
said 15-day-period, proper legal action shall be taken by
my client to redeem said shares.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JUAN G. ATENCIA
When the offer to redeem was refused and after having failed
to reach an amicable settlement at the barangay level, 9
Gloria Vargas filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial
Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner and
consigned the amount of P100,000 which is the amount of the
purchase with the Clerk of Court on May 20, 1996. 10 Joining her
in the action were her children with Santiago, namely, Aurora,
Ramon, Marites, Edelina and Gemma, all surnamed Vargas.
Subsequently, Carlos Gianan, Jr. and Gloria Arcilla, heirs of the
alleged primitive owner of the lot in question, Pedro
Lakandula, intervened in the case. 11
Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise alleged
that the 30-day period following a written notice by the
vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the right of
redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written
notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null and void and had
no legal and binding effect on them. 12
After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision 13 in favor
of petitioner, dismissing the complaint as well as the
complaint-in-intervention for lack of merit, and declaring the
Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid
and binding. The MTC upheld the sale to petitioner because
the transaction purportedly occurred after the partition of the
property among the co-owner heirs. The MTC opined that the
other heirs could validly dispose of their respective shares.
Moreover, the MTC found that although there was a failure to
strictly comply with the requirements under Article 1088 of the
Civil Code14 for a written notice of sale to be served upon
respondents by the vendors prior to the exercise of the former's
right of redemption, this deficiency was cured by respondents'
actual knowledge of the sale, which was more than 30 days
before the filing of their complaint, and their consignation of
the purchase price with the Clerk of Court, so that the latter
action came too late. Finally, the MTC ruled that respondents
failed to establish by competent proof petitioner's bad faith in
purchasing the portion of the property owned by respondents'
co-heirs.15
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, of Virac,
Catanduanes affirmed the MTC decision in a judgment dated
November 25, 1999. The matter was thereafter raised to the
Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts in the assailed
decision dated March 26, 2002, declaring that the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale, dated February 4, 1994 and
November 15, 1994, respectively, were void and without any
legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court, 16 the extrajudicial settlement made by the
other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the
latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their
consent to the same.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
filed the present petition for review.
The issues are:
Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and
bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by
an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when
the extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly
published; and,
Assuming a published extrajudicial settlement and partition
does not bind persons who did not participate therein,
whether the written notice required to be served by an heir
to his co-heirs in connection with the sale of hereditary
rights to a stranger before partition under Article 1088 of
the Civil Code17 can be dispensed with when such co-heirs
have actual knowledge of the sale such that the 30-day
period within which a co-heir can exercise the right to be
subrogated to the rights of a purchaser shall commence
from the date of actual knowledge of the sale.
Petitioner argues, as follows:
Firstly, the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property
subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid because the
partition was duly published. The publication of the same
constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their
implied acquiescence thereon. Respondents are therefore
estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at
this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.
Secondly, petitioner is a possessor and builder in good faith.
Thirdly, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint
because its subject matter was incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The complaint should have been filed with the RTC.
Fourthly, there was a non-joinder of indispensable parties, the
co-heirs who sold their interest in the subject property not
having been impleaded by respondents.
Fifthly, the appeal to the CA should have been dismissed as it
was not properly verified by respondents. Gloria Vargas failed
to indicate that she was authorized to represent the other
respondents (petitioners therein) to initiate the petition.
Moreover, the verification was inadequate because it did not
state the basis of the alleged truth and/or correctness of the
material allegations in the petition.
The petition lacks merit.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte
proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who
do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It contemplates a
notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of
settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed 19 as what happened
in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did
not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact
7|Page
of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In
this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing
of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they
are concerned.
This is not to say, though, that respondents' co-heirs cannot
validly sell their hereditary rights to third persons even before
the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated
in the execution of the extrajudicial settlements, which
included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the
subject property, are bound by the same. Nevertheless,
respondents are given the right to redeem these shares
pursuant to Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The right to redeem
was never lost because respondents were never notified in
writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the
provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period
of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing
him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the
period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be
reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by
the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable
and mandatory,20 actual knowledge of the sale acquired in
some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It
cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of
an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir
thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within
which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or
effect the redemption.21
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of
written notice nor any distinctive method for written
notification of redemption, the method of notification remains
exclusive, there being no alternative provided by law. 22 This
proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to
keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is
often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and
the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase
the share sold.23
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written
notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter
are in the best position to know the other co-owners who,
under the law, must be notified of the sale. 24 This will remove all
uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its
perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the
alienation is not definitive.25 As a result, the party notified need
not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the
alienation. 26
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to
comply with this requirement, there is no legal impediment to
allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner
given the former's obvious willingness and capacity to do so.
Likewise untenable is petitioner's contention that he is a builder
in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder
that the land the latter is building on is one's own without
knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's title. 27 Petitioner
derived his title from the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
With Sale dated November 15, 1994. He was very much aware
that not all of the heirs participated therein as it was evident
on the face of the document itself. Because the property had
not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of
Court, no particular portion of the property could have been
identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. This
is because the alienation made by respondents' co-heirs was
limited to the portion which may be allotted to them in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Despite this
glaring fact, and over the protests of respondents, petitioner
still constructed improvements on the property. For this reason,
his claim of good faith lacks credence.
As to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner is estopped from
raising the same for the first time on appeal. Petitioner actively
participated in the proceedings below and sought affirmative
ruling from the lower courts to uphold the validity of the sale to
him of a portion of the subject property embodied in the
extrajudicial settlement among heirs. Having failed to
seasonably raise this defense, he cannot, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, be permitted to challenge the
jurisdiction of the lower court at this late stage. While it is a rule
that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, an
exception arises where estoppel has already supervened.
Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a
case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.
One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after
voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative
relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such
relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the
undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. 28
Petitioner's fourth argument, that there is a non-joinder of
indispensable parties, similarly lacks merit. An indispensable
party is a party-in-interest without whom there can be no final
determination of an action and who is required to be joined as
either plaintiff or defendant.29 The party's interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought is so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties that the former's legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute
necessity. Hence, an indispensable party is one whose interest
will be directly affected by the court's action in the litigation. In
the absence of such indispensable party, there cannot be a
resolution of the controversy before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable. 30
In relation to this, it must be kept in mind that the complaint
filed by respondents ultimately prayed that they be allowed to
redeem the shares in the property sold by their co-heirs.
Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided
share in the property to petitioner is not in dispute.
Respondents concede that the other heirs acted within their
hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter
completely and effectively relinquished their interests in the
property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner thus stepped into the
shoes of the other heirs to become a co-owner of the property
with respondents. As a result, only petitioner's presence is
absolutely required for a complete and final determination of
the controversy because what respondents seek is to be
subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.
Finally, petitioner contends that the petition filed by
respondents with the CA should have been dismissed because
the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping
appended to it were defective, citing specifically the failure of
respondent Gloria Vargas to: (1) indicate that she was
authorized to represent her co-respondents in the petition, and
(2) state the basis of the alleged truth of the allegations.
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and
the signature of only one of them is insufficient. 31 Nevertheless,
the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote
8|Page
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert their
own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with
the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the
certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded.32 Under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the
submission of such certification considering that although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.33
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the rules. 34 The co-respondents of
respondent Gloria Vargas in this case were her children. In
order not to defeat the ends of justice, the Court deems it
sufficient that she signed the petition on their behalf and as
their representative.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 CA Rollo, pp. 193-209.
2 Id. at 331.
3 Records (MTC), p. 5.
4 Id. at 170-172.
5 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) dated January 16, 1997, pp. 9-
10; TSN dated January 17, 1997, pp. 2-4.
6 TSN dated January 17, 1997, p. 4.
7 Records (MTC), p. 166.
8 Aurora Vargas is the daughter of Gloria Vargas.
9 After the conciliation proceedings between the parties failed, a
Certification to File Action was issued by the Lupon Chairman of
Barangay San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes on November 14, 1995.
10 Records (MTC), p.176.
11 Id. at 34-57.
12 Records (RTC), pp. 86-87.
13 Records (MTC), pp. 380-396.
14 CIVIL CODE, Article 1088:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of
the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided
they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
15 Records (MTC), pp. 391-395.
16 RULES OF COURT, Section 1. Extra judicial settlement by agreement
between heirs:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. x x x The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by
public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or
the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of
an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent
to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond
with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of
the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties
concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that
may be filed under section 4 of this rule. x x x The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
17 Supra note 14.
18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 74, Section 1-
xxx
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof .
19 Pedrosa v. CA, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 620, 628.
20 Verdad v. CA, G.R. No. 109972, April 29, 1996, 256 SCRA 593.
21 Tolentino, Arturo M., "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code," Vol. III, pp. 606-607 (2001).
22 Garcia v. Calaliman, G.R. No. 26855, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 201.
 23 Hermoso v. CA, G.R. No. 108580, December 29, 1998, 300 SCRA 516,
quoting De Jesus v. Manglapus, 41 Phil. 188 (1948).
24 De Ape v. CA, G.R. No. 133638, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 193.
25 Verdad v. CA, supra note 20, quoting Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
L-75069, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 672.
26 De Ape v. CA, supra note 24.
27 Ongsitco v. CA, G.R. No. 121527, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 703,
quoting Pleasantville Development Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 79688,
February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 10, and Floreza v. Evangelista, G.R. No. L-
25462, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 130.
28 David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992. July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 384.
29 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Section 7-
Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
30 PNB v. Milita, G.R. Nos. 164801 and 165165, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA
377.
31 Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi, Inc., G.R. No.
150859, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 111; Andres v. Cuevas, G.R. No.
150869, June 9, 2005, 460 SCRA 38.
32 San Miguel v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392.
33 Olarte v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 165821, June 21, 2005, 460
SCRA 561.
34 HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes
Subdivision Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 139360, September 23,
2003, 411 SCRA 504.

9|Page
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150060. August 19, 2003]
PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP. represented herein by its President
ENGR. WILLIAM C. LIU, petitioner, vs. SPS. ANTHONY S.
VALENCIA and SUSAN T. VALENCIA, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On appeal is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59960, promulgated on 13 February 2001, which
has affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City dismissing the complaint of petitioners for legal
redemption over certain rural lots sold to respondents.
Petitioner is a private corporation based in Cebu City
and the registered owner of Lot 4523 situated in Liloan, Cebu,
with an area of 22,214 square meters. Adjacent to the lot of
petitioner are parcels of land, identified to be Lot 4527, Lot
4528, and Lot 4529 with a total combined area of 3,751 square
meters. The three lots, aforenumbered, have been sold by
Hermogenes Mendoza to respondent spouses sometime in
December 1994. Petitioner learned of the sale of the lots only
in January, 1996, when Hermogenes Mendoza sold to
petitioner Lot No. 4820, a parcel also adjacent to Lot 4523
belonging to the latter. Forthwith, it sent a letter to
respondents, on 30 January 1996, signifying its intention to
redeem the three lots. On 30 May 1996, petitioner sent another
letter to respondents tendering payment of the price paid to
Mendoza by respondents for the lots. Respondents, in
response, informed petitioner that they had no intention of
selling the parcels. Thereupon, invoking the provisions of
Articles 1621 and 1623, petitioner filed an action against
respondents to compel the latter to allow the legal
redemption. Petitioner claimed that neither Mendoza, the
previous owner, nor respondents gave formal or even just a
verbal notice of the sale of the lots as so required by Article
1623 of the Civil Code.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu dismissed
petitioners complaint and respondents' counterclaim; both
parties appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the assailed decision.
Basically, the issues posed for resolution by the Court in
the instant petition focus on the application of Article 1621
and Article 1623 of the Civil Code, which read:
ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands
shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of
rural land, the area of which does not exceed one
hectare, is alienated unless the grantee does not own
any rural land.
This right is not applicable to adjacent lands
which are separated by brooks, drains, ravines, roads
and other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other
estates.
If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise
the right of redemption at the same time, the owner of
the adjoining land of smaller area shall be preferred;
and should both lands have the same area, the one
who first requested the redemption.
ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption
or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective
vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes
that of adjoining owners.
10 | P a g e
Whenever a piece of rural land not exceeding one
hectare is alienated, the law grants to the adjoining owners a
right of redemption except when the grantee or buyer does
not own any other rural land.1 In order that the right may arise,
the land sought to be redeemed and the adjacent property
belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption
must both be rural lands. If one or both are urban lands, the
right cannot be invoked.2
The trial court found the lots involved to be rural lands.
Unlike the case of Fabia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court3
(which ruled, on the issue of whether a piece of land was rural
or not, that the use of the property for agricultural purpose
would be essential in order that the land might be
characterized as rural land for purposes of legal redemption),
respondents in the instant case, however, did not dispute
before the Court of Appeals the holding of the trial court that
the lots in question are rural lands. In failing to assail this factual
finding on appeal, respondents would be hardput to now
belatedly question such finding and to ask the Court to still
entertain that issue.
Article 1621 of the Civil Code expresses that the right of
redemption it grants to an adjoining owner of the property
conveyed may be defeated if it can be shown that the buyer
or grantee does not own any other rural land. The appellate
court, sustaining the trial court, has said that there has been no
evidence proffered to show that respondents are not
themselves owners of rural lands for the exclusionary clause of
the law to apply.
With respect to the second issue, Article 1623 of the Civil
Code provides that the right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. In stressing the mandatory
character of the requirement, the law states that the deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property unless the
same is accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The Court of Appeals has equated the statement in the
deed of sale to the effect that the vendors have complied
with the provisions of Article 1623 of the Civil Code, as being
the written affirmation under oath, as well as the evidence,
that the required written notice to petitioner under Article 1623
has been met. Respondents, like the appellate court, overlook
the fact that petitioner is not a party to the deed of sale
between respondents and Mendoza and has had no hand in
the preparation and execution of the deed of sale. It could
not thus be considered a binding equivalent of the obligatory
written notice prescribed by the Code.
In Verdad vs. Court of Appeals4 this court ruled:
We hold that the right of redemption was
timely exercised by private respondents.
Concededly, no written notice of the sale was
given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-
owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil
Code -
xxx
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had
yet to commence when private respondent
Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption
on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the
sale from the Office of the City Treasurer of Butuan
City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October
1987, before the trial court.
1 Article 1621, Civil Code of the Philippines.
2 Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465 citing Cortes vs. Flores, 47 Phil. 992.
3 133 SCRA 364.
256 SCRA 593.
4
 The written notice of sale is mandatory. This
Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner,
the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the
selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties
about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as
its efficacy and status.

Even in Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate

Court (150 SCRA 259), relied upon by petitioner in
contending that actual knowledge should be an
equivalent to a written notice of sale, the Court
made it clear that it was not reversing the
prevailing jurisprudence; said the Court:

We realize that in arriving at our

conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict
letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it
had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid
down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In
fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we
ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero
and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is
adopting an exception to the general rule, in view
of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

In Alonzo, the right of legal redemption was

invoked several years, not just days or months, after
the consummation of the contracts of sale. The
complaint for legal redemption itself was there filed
more than thirteen years after the sales were
concluded.5

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the

assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby given a period of thirty days from
finality of this decision within which to exercise its right of legal
redemption. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

5 At pp. 598-599.

11 | P a g e
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA,
respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal[2] of the petitioners
complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation
(FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan
agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was
intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view
thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five
equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement,[4] this time in the amount of
P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the
purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son,
Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in
favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement [5] for the loan dated
December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will.[6] Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch
7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981,
Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent. [7] During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a
Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one
(1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to
the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities[9] was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the
FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were
sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to
pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended
for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States
and there was no information on his address or the date of his
return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was
narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed
her Answer[13] and alleged that the loan documents did not
bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that
12 | P a g e
the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund
was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint
agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-
raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63. [14] Consequently,
trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently
rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. [15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner
should have been filed with the probate court before which
the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as
the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred
by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint
Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and
Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the
estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was
void, considering that it had not been approved by the
probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until
after the will has been probated. The trial court further
declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now
defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC
had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to
the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of
assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents
account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the
heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners
cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must
necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and
elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the
following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS
UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO
HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation
of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and
heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped
respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document; as the agreement had been
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no
longer necessary to present the same before the probate
court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement
was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will
made by the deceased; and the active participation of the
heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present
ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate
the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola
maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should
have been presented before the probate court. [17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not
meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its
claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and
5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition
made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid
partition may be had until after the will has been probated.
According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in
generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all
other properties. Moreover, the active participation of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a
waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the
following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE
HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO
HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE
LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE
SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE
AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS
BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the
deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article
774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate
court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed
the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is
now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto.
The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the
deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors
subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit
of the said will. The active participation and resistance of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action
against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right
to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and
to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint
agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors
under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said
heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both
the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that
respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund
executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or
the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs
to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the
Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980
executed by the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs,
13 | P a g e
Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation
solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner
also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes
executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held
liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no
need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the
probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving
heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities,
not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S.
Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of
money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim
should have been filed with the probate court. She points out
that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there
was already an existing probate proceedings of which the
petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the
probate court which might delay payment of the obligation,
the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA
did not err in declaring that the agreement was null and void.
She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she
had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in
the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate
court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is
in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had
not signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there
any document presented as evidence to show that she had
caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late
father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a)
whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the
heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the
petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court
has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. [21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a
will and the public requires it, because unless a will
is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will. [22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. [23] In
the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a
holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision
which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which
I own and may be discovered later after my
 demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-
quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties
he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3)
subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement [25]
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of
its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the
probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had
already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the
deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them
in any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount
to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. [26]
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs
and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. [27] Thus, in executing
any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within
the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity
of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no
showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the
only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the
probate of the will was still pending before the court and the
latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent
were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a
premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and
creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs
assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding.
We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it
provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession and use the
above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein
after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. [29]
The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the
agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive.
The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the
assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with
the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under
the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must
be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes
14 | P a g e
an action already commenced by the deceased
in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer
the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as
herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in
the administration proceedings. Claims not yet
due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate
in the probate court is mandatory. [30] As we held in the vintage
case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of
the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue. [32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could
hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for
any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the
petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court,
at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may
have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary
to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the
petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-
interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. [33] The petitioner in its
complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the
Philippines[34] However, the documentary evidence [35] clearly
reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine
Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation
therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or
testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its
decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention
of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The
power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by
the courts with caution; care must be taken that
the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the
complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its
cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the
complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby

DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-

Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with

Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased), and Marina L. Buzon,
concurring.

[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Julio R. Logarta.

[3] Records, pp. 8-12.

[4] Id. at 13-18.

[5] Id. at 19-20.

[6] Exhibit 7.

[7] Annex A of the Answer, Records, p. 48.

[8] Exhibit A.

[9] Exhibit G.

[10] Exhibits E and F.

[11] Records, p. 1.

[12] See Sheriffs Return of Service, Id. at 39.

[13] Records, p. 42.

[14] Id. at 83.

[15] Id. at 522.

[16] CA Rollo, p. 43.

[17] Id. at 76.

[18] Rollo, p. 30.

[19] Id. at 7-8.

[20] See Ortega v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 96 (1987); See also Morales v. CFI of
Cavite, Br. V, 146 SCRA 373 (1986).

[21] See De la Cruz v. Camon, 16 SCRA 886 (1966).

[22] Vda. de Kilayko v. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600 (1992).

[23] Ralla v. Untalan, 172 SCRA 858 (1989).

[24] Exhibit 7.

[25] Exhibit A.

[26] See Sandoval v. Santiago, 83 Phil 784 (1949).

[27] Article 1082, New Civil Code.

[28] See Reyes v. Ysip, 97 Phil 11 (1955).

[29] See Exhibit 7.

[30] See De Bautista v. De Guzman, 125 SCRA 676 (1983).

[31] 70 SCRA 130 (1976).

[32] Ibid.

[33] See Exhibit G. EN BANC

[34] Records, p. 4.

[35] Exhibit G.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

[36] Records, p. 521.

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA,
respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.

15 | P a g e
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious
conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice.
Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer
justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not
equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are
a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with
justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our
Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased
parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred
his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of
P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22,
1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the
same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de
Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after
the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said
lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees
subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with
their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs,
sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his
complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua,
another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same
right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to
a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do
so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared
that the notice required by the said article was written notice
and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing
the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied
by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for
written notice although no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente
of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of
sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the
requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter
(i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and
the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for
redemption start running. "
In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking
through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written
notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees,
conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623,
reading as follows:
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the
notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not
be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has
given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the
adjoining owners.

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article
that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within
1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving
thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although
notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor
of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
would not toll the running of the 30-day period.
7

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot
Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the
be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua,
petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there
lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square
was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-
meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8
heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to
Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the
only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the
same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed
30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less
redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the
expired in 1977.
private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose
children went to school together. 10
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by
in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon
legislature, is to render justice.
of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners'
son, which was done without objection on her part or of any of
the other co-heirs. Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but
in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct
that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked,
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our
respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as
nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
follows:
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a

16 | P a g e
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties
done even as the law is obeyed. sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her
complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
expired.
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to The following doctrine is also worth noting:
the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with
them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we
laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way
he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he
as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read
bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as
into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have
should have induced inquiry, and the means of
the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing
ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.
with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to
why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should
its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the
enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a
letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and
house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a
that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly
within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within
looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It
the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent
took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim
of the lawmakers. 14
the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are
that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and
deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the
to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of
respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court
rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin,
in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes
stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero
consisting of only a day or two.
and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an
exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
The instant case presents no such problem because the right circumstances of this case.
of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales
were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no
years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the
doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during
petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of
the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs
the period of redemption.
exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications
for this exception.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the
notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as
case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due."
writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for
16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed
the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
in 1977?
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By justice. So we have done in this case.
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our
eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this
ordered.
case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed,
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964,
and that such notice was sufficient. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera Gutierrez, Jr.,
Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

While we do not here declare that this period started from the
dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime
between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for Footnotes
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually
informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period 1 Rollo, p. 5.
started running and ultimately expired. This could have
happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when
17 | P a g e
 2 Ibid, p. 6.

3 Id, p. 64,

5 Id. p. 21

6 Id, p. 21.

* Presided by Judge Cezar D. Francisco.

7 Id, p. 65.

8 Id, p. 5.

9 Id, p. 64.

10 Id, p. 26.

** Gaviola, Jr., P.J., ponente, Caguioa, Quetulio-Losa & Luciano, JJ.

11 16 SCRA 775.

12 4 SCRA 527.

13 Dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438.

14 Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing Manila

Race Horse Trainers' Assn. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v. Go Cho, 96
Phil. 622; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23
Phil. 315; Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578: People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA
542; US v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.

15 Ater v. Smith 245 111. 57, 19 Am. Cases 105.

16 Institutes 1, 1, pr. as cited in Handbook for Roman Law, Miravite, Lorenzo F.,
p. 39, 1981,

FIRST DIVISION

NELSON CABALES and G.R. No.

162421
RITO CABALES,
Petitioners,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:

JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
Respondents.
August 31, 2007

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DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision6 of the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled Nelson
Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion
Feliano, which affirmed with modification the decision 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25,
dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, is likewise herein
assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the
appellate court are well established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-
square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod,
Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his
surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio,
Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano
Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight
(8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale
among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto
secured a note (vale) from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of
P300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son,
petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year
redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their
payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr.
Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto
de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased
son, Alberto, including his vale of P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children
Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject
parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion
Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last
paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and
understood that the amount of TWO
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS
(P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to
the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito
Cabales who are still minors upon the
execution of this instrument are held
6 Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Arsenio J. Magpale.
7 Penned by Judge Romeo M. Gomez.
19 | P a g e
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and
delivered only to them upon reaching the
age of 21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of
Southern Leyte issued Original Certificate of Title No. 17035
over the purchased land in the names of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4)
children executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner
Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from
respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21
considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the
obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66
for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro
as well as his vale of P300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales
acknowledged receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from
respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the formers share in the
proceeds of the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then
residing in Manila, went back to his fathers hometown in
Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle,
petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he
signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a
barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not
have sold their respective shares in subject property when they
were minors, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the
subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that
petitioners were estopped from claiming any right over subject
property considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already
received the amount corresponding to his share of the
proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that
petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total
amount of the redemption price necessary for legal
redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the
grounds of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial.
Trial ensued and on August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled
against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his death, any
of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject
land when not one of them repurchased it from Dr.
Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the
rights and interests of Alberto when she paid for Albertos share
as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner
Rito had no more right to redeem his share to subject property
as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section
7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it was
shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale
on July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the
decision of the trial court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of
petitioner Ritos undivided share to the property was
unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but
that the contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Ritos
receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court
also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of
one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not
subrogated to Albertos rights when she repurchased his share
to the property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the
estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount of P966.66,
representing the amount which the latter paid for the
obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto. Finally,
however, it denied petitioner Nelsons claim for redemption for
his failure to tender or consign in court the redemption money
within the period prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing
petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject land but
denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not
recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject
land with similar right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to
subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife
Saturnina and his six (6) children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded
him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that [i]f a
widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are
left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share
as that of each of the children. Verily, the seven (7) heirs
inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and
Alberto, petitioner Nelsons father, inherited in their own rights
and with equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected,
Alberto died. By operation of law, his rights and obligations to
one-seventh of subject land were transferred to his legal heirs
his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales
of subject land to the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by
the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was
valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When
Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and
obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs,
namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records
show that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother, and not his heirs,
who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos or his heirs
rights to the property when she repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,8 we held that a co-
owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did not make
her the owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition
of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a
mode of terminating a co-ownership.9 But the one who
8 G.R. No. 61584, November 25, 1992, 215 SCRA 867, citing Adille v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44546, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 455.
9 Id.
20 | P a g e
redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption
price and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due.10 Necessarily, when Saturnina
redeemed for Albertos heirs who had then acquired his pro-
indiviso share in subject property, it did not vest in her
ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed. But she
had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and
held a lien upon the property for the amount due until
reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his
wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over
their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject
property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-owners.
Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors and as indicated
in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held in
trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them
upon reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was
unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.
Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code11 state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence
the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the
child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and
obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the
mother, is considered legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority
without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the
property of the child does not exceed two thousand pesos. 12
Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of
Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without
need of any judicial appointment in case the latters property
does not exceed two thousand pesos,13 thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When
the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or
less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his
legal guardian x x x x14
10 Id.
11 Law applicable to the case. Executive Order No. 209 otherwise known
as the Family Code of the Philippines, which expressly repealed these
provisions, took effect on August 4, 1988.
12 See Badillo v. Ferrer, No. L-51369, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 407.
13 Id.
14 The New Rules on Guardianship of Minors, adapted in the May 1, 2003
Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, provide, inter alia:
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule
shall apply to petitions for guardianship over the person or
property, or both, of a minor.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
legal guardianship over the person and property of their
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a
court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be

Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian
without necessity of court appointment considering that the
amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property was
P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However,
Rule 96, Sec. 115 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship
shall extend. A guardian appointed shall
have the care and custody of the person of
his ward, and the management of his
estate, or the management of the estate
only, as the case may be. The guardian of
the estate of a nonresident shall have the
management of all the estate of the ward
within the Philippines, and no court other
than that in which such guardian was
appointed shall have jurisdiction over the
guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary
power of administration of the minors property. It does not
include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority.16 Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of
petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro-indiviso share in subject
land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of
another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-
indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However,
when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale
on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of
ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand,
the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of
the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were
not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or
encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly
sell his undivided share to the property. She did not.
Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject
property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold
and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that
part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
suppletory to the provisions of the Family Code on
guardianship.
15 Revised Rules of Court of 1964.
16 Revised Rules of Court of 1964, Rule 95.
21 | P a g e
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained
ownership over their undivided share of subject property.17
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from
respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil
Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the
period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or
redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in
the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-
owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by
the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his or their
pro-indiviso share in the property held in common. As
demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner
Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24,
1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the
undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not
valid such that they were not divested of their ownership
thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property
from respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty
days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners
vendors. In reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,18 thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that,
in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of
the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them
so. x x x x
17 Nothing on the records indicates that petitioner Nelsons mother
predeceased him.
18 No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
 x x x x While we may not read into the law a respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the
purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for
right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In the remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.
doing so, we defer not to the letter that killeth but to
the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers
will.
SO ORDERED.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and

Article 1623 for that matter)19 seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to
indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of
the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the
shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a
general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is
supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged
delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.

In the instant case, the right of redemption was

invoked not days but years after the sale was made in 1978.
We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a
minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records
show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was
informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was
noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson was
likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention
to redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation
process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption
and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty
days from learning about the sale.

In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson

cannot feign ignorance of the sale of subject property in 1978.
To require strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to
countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge
thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its
purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.

The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice

of the sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption
period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the
barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By
January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for
legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day
period had already expired.

As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of

the facts of the instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way
that will render justice.20

Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of

Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But he and
his mother remain co-owners thereof with respondents-
spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include
them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27,
2003 and February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is
ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and
to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of

19 Included for its application in the case at bar.

20 See note 3.

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