To: Interested Parties

From: HPSCI, COR, and HFAC Majority

Re: Deposition of Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr.
On October 22, 2019, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform conducted a closed, unclassified
deposition of Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Chargé d’Affaires Ad Interim for the U.S.
Embassy in Ukraine. Highlights from that interview are below.

I. President Trump directed ambassadors to work with Giuliani

When Ambassador Taylor arrived in Kyiv, Ukraine on June 17, 2019, he discovered there were
two separate channels for making U.S. policy in Ukraine. As the Chief of Mission for the U.S.
embassy, Taylor administered the traditional, formal channel, including supporting “Ukraine
against the Russian invasion and to help it defeat corruption.” (pp. 22-23)

Taylor also became aware of “an irregular, informal channel of U.S. policymaking” that included
Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Kurt Volker, Ambassador to the
European Union Gordon Sondland, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, and Rudy Giuliani. (p. 23)
The irregular channel “was well connected in Washington” but did not work through traditional
State Department channels. (p. 24) So far as Taylor knew, the irregular channel “began” after a
May 23, 2019, meeting in the Oval Office following the inauguration of Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky. (p. 24)

Taylor heard from Volker that, at the May 23 meeting, Sondland, Volker, and Perry “were given
some responsibilities by the President to work on Ukraine policy.” (p. 58)

Taylor testified that, according to Volker and Sondland, after the May 23 meeting, “in order to
get President Zelensky and President Trump in a meeting” at the White House “they needed to
work with Rudy Giuliani so—and so they did.” (p. 113) Regarding Taylor’s initial view of
Giuliani’s role, Taylor noted that it is “not unusual to ask people outside the government to play
a role”. (p. 61)

However, Taylor became “worried” about Giuliani’s role in Ukraine policymaking because
Giuliani was discussing U.S.-Ukraine policy in his public statements. (p. 21) Taylor saw media
reporting regarding Giuliani’s plans to travel to Ukraine “to pursue these investigations” in order
to “use[] that information in political campaigns.” (p. 49) Giuliani’s efforts and the activity in
Washington were the “snake pit” that Taylor referred to in his April 29, 2019 text messages with
Volker. (p. 49)

According to Taylor, Ukrainian senior officials—as well as Volker and Sondland—paid attention
to Giuliani’s statements “because they understood” that “at President Trump’s direction, Rudy
Giuliani was influential, was influential with that team.” (p. 68)

In Taylor’s view, Giuliani “wanted to focus on one or two specific cases, irrespective of whether
it helped solve the corruption problem”. (p. 124) Taylor understood that the investigation into
1
Burisma and the Bidens and the 2016 election were sought by Giuliani because he believed it
would help his client, President Trump. (p. 124)

Damage done by the “second”, “irregular” track

Taylor’s “concern about the whole second track was that, apparently at the instigation of Mr.
Giuliani, Ambassador Sondland and Ambassador Volker were conditioning an important
component of our assistance on what would ultimately be a political action.” (p. 151)

By mid-July, it became “clear” to Taylor that the meeting between President Trump and
President Zelensky “was conditioned on investigations of Burisma and alleged Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 elections. It was also clear that this condition was driven by the irregular
policy channel I had come to understand was guided by Mr. Giuliani.” (p. 26)

By August and September of 2019, Taylor became concerned that the United States’ Ukraine
policy “was being fundamentally undermined by an irregular, informal channel of U.S.
policymaking and by the withholding of vital security assistance for domestic political reasons.”
(p. 18)

Taylor testified that “the whole thrust of this irregular channel was to get these investigations,
which [Ukrainian National Security Advisor Oleksandr] Danyliuk and presumably Zelensky
were resisting because they didn’t want to be seen to be interfering but also to be a pawn.” (p.
177)

According to Taylor, on September 7, Deputy Assistant to the President Timothy Morrison told
Taylor that he had “a sinking feeling” when he learned of the conversation from Ambassador
Sondland. Taylor thought Morrison meant that the irregular channel “has the potential to be
counter to the regular channel[.]” (p. 38) According to Taylor, Morrison got a sinking feeling
“anytime there is an activation of that kind of Giuliani-oriented channel.” Similarly, Taylor noted
that “whenever [Morrison] heard that there was an activation of that irregular channel, you know,
he was concerned.” (p. 238)

Taylor testified that Volker is “a man of integrity” but, when asked if Volker acted in the best
interests of the U.S., Taylor said “when he got involved with Mr. Giuliani, I think that pulled him
away from or it diverted him from being focused on what I thought needed to be focused on.”
However, while, “in general” Volker acted in the U.S.’ best interests “the Giuliani factor I think
affected Ambassador Volker.” (p. 110)

II. President Trump wanted to “hear about the investigations”

Taylor learned of “explicit” advocacy for investigations

On June 27, 2019, Sondland and Taylor spoke on the phone. Sondland said that “President
Zelensky needed to make clear to President Trump that he, President Zelensky, was not standing
in the way of investigations.” (p. 25) At the time, Taylor did not know what investigations

2
Sondland was referring to, though he knew that Giuliani was pursing some investigations. (p. 63)
Taylor had arrived in Ukraine ten days earlier and “hadn’t put this together.” (p. 63)

On June 28, Sondland, Taylor, Perry, and Volker participated in a phone call with President
Zelensky and others. (p. 26) According to Taylor, Sondland said he “did not wish to include
most of the regular interagency participants” on the call. At Sondland’s request, the State
Department Operations Center did not stay on the call to monitor and transcribe it, departing
from its usual practice. (pp. 26, 128)

Before the Ukrainians joined the June 28 call with Zelensky, Volker told Taylor, Perry, and
Sondland that he “planned to be explicit” with Zelensky about actions that Zelensky needed to
take to secure a White House meeting. (p. 26) The message that President Zelensky should make
it clear to President Trump that Zelensky was not standing in the way of investigations was not
conveyed on this call, though “Volker intended to pass that message in Toronto several days
later.” (pp. 64-65)

July 2 meeting in Toronto

According to Taylor, at a July 2, 2019 meeting in Toronto with President Zelensky, Volker was
in a broader conversation “with many officials on both sides.” In a smaller conversation with
Zelensky and his Chief of Staff Andriy Bogdan, “Kurt told [Taylor] that he had discussed how
President Zelensky could prepare for the phone call with President Trump. And without going
into -- without providing me any details about the specific words, did talk about investigations in
that conversation ... in Toronto with Zelensky and Bogdan.” (p. 65) Volker “suggested to
President Zelensky that President Trump would like to hear about the investigations” though
Taylor did not, at that point, know which investigations Volker was referring to. (p. 66)

Taylor testified that Volker’s July text message to Bogdan that Zelensky was intended to
“convince[]” President Trump that “[Zelensky] will investigate/’get to the bottom of what
happened’“ to “nail down date for visit to Washington”. According to Taylor, this was “the basic
message that … Ambassador Volker provided to President Zelensky and Bogdan in Toronto on
the 2nd of July, it’s very consistent.” (p. 79) Asked if the White House meeting was “conditioned
on” investigations by Ukraine, Taylor testified that “I am sure that happened based on all the
things I said.” (p. 79)

According to Taylor, Sondland “told me many times that President Trump said it was not a quid
pro quo. I observed that, in order to move forward on the security assistance, the Ukrainians
were told by Ambassador Sondland that they had to pursue these investigations.” (p. 152)

July 10 White House meeting

On July 10, 2019, Perry, Volker, National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton, Danyliuk,
and Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Andrey Yermak met at the White House. (p. 29) Taylor
testified that, according to National Security Council Senior Director for Europe and Russia
Fiona Hill, and NSC Director Alexander Vindman, in the meeting Sondland “connected”
investigations with an Oval Office meeting for President Zelensky, “which so irritated

3
Ambassador Bolton that he abruptly ended the meeting” and instructed Hill and Vindman that
they “should have nothing to do with domestic politics.” (p. 29) Bolton ordered Hill to inform
the NSC legal advisor’s office. (p. 29) Taylor testified that Hill said Bolton “referred to this as a
drug deal” and attempted to prevent a call between President Trump and President Zelensky “out
of concern that it would be a disaster.” (p. 29)

Taylor was asked who was responsible for setting a “drug deal” in motion. (p. 260) Taylor
replied that the “origin of the idea to get President Zelensky to say out loud he’s going to
investigate Burisma and the 2016 election, I think the originator, the person who came up with
that, was Mr. Giuliani” who was representing the interests of President Trump. (p. 261)

According to Hill and Vindman, the reference toward investigations was “maybe toward the
end” after a “regular channel conversation” regarding substantive policy issues like the war in
Eastern Ukraine and energy security. (p. 71) Bolton “understood what the [investigations]
reference was and walked out of the meeting, ended the meeting abruptly.” (p. 71) Bolton
“understood that this could lead to interference in U.S.-political life and he wanted nothing of it.”
(p. 71)

Lead up to July 25 presidential phone call and its aftermath

On July 20, 2019 Taylor spoke by phone with Sondland. Sondland said he “recommended to
President Zelensky that he use the phrase, ‘I will leave no stone unturned’ with regard to
investigations” when Zelensky spoke with Trump. (p. 30)

According to Taylor, in the lead up to the July 25 call between Presidents Trump and Zelensky,
Bolton was opposed to scheduling the call “because he thought it was going to be a disaster”
because of the potential mention of investigations. “Turned out he was right”, Taylor said.
Taylor believed that White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney scheduled the call. (p. 174)

On July 26, the day after the call, Taylor met with Zelensky and Volker. Zelensky said “he was
happy with the call” without elaborating and asked about the meeting in the Oval Office that
President Trump invited Zelensky to on May 29. (pp. 31-32)

III. Hold on security assistance

John Bolton’s visit to Kyiv

On approximately August 27 or 28, 2019, Taylor spoke to Bolton at the end of Bolton’s trip to
Kyiv to meet with President Zelensky. (p. 33) Taylor testified that the conversation took place on
the evening of Bolton’s second day in Kyiv, possibly the 28th of September. (p. 229; see also p.
230, clarifying that Taylor misspoke and the actual date of the meeting was August not
September)

Taylor shared his “serious concern” about withholding assistance “while the Ukrainians were
defending their country from Russian aggression.” (p. 33) Bolton recommended that Taylor send
a “first person” cable to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. (p. 34)

4
During the late August conversation, Bolton “indicated that he was very sympathetic”. (p. 230)
Taylor had heard “from earlier conversations” with Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and
Eurasian Affairs George Kent and others that Bolton was advocating reversal of the aid
withholding to “the two Secretaries” and the Director of the CIA. (pp. 230-32)

Taylor’s August 29 “first person” cable

On August 29, Taylor sent a cable “describing the folly I saw in withholding military aid to
Ukraine at a time when hostilities were still active in the east and when Russia was watching
closely to gauge the level of American support for the Ukrainian government.” (p. 33) The cable
was “NODIS” and therefore had “a very limited distribution”: it went to Secretary Pompeo but
other people would have to go to the State Department Operations Center to read it. (pp. 211-
212)

The cable was written in the first person, which “gets attention” because “there are not many first
person cables” written. (p. 211) In the cable, Taylor hinted that me might resign. (p. 228) The
concerns that Taylor laid out in the cable were very similar to the concerns that he laid out in his
September 8 “nightmare” text message to Volker and Sondland. (p. 211)

Taylor heard from Kent that Pompeo carried the cable with him to a White House meeting on
security assistance for Ukraine. (p. 212) Taylor also got feedback “from the sixth floor” of the
State Department, telling him that they were “glad” he sent that cable. (p. 233) According to
Taylor, that feedback came from Kent. (p. 284)

The July 18 call and its aftermath

On July 18, Taylor participated in a regular NSC secure video conference call. (p. 27) A staff
person from the Office of Management and Budget reported “that there was a hold on security
assistance to Ukraine”. (p. 27) That person “could not say why”. (p. 27)

Near the end of the call, a voice “said that she was from OMB and her boss had instructed her
not to approve any additional spending of security assistance for Ukraine until further notice.” (p.
27) That person said only that “the directive had come from the President to the chief of staff
[Mick Mulvaney] to OMB.” (p. 27) Taylor never saw who the OMB staffer was who announced
the hold, but he could hear that it was a woman. (p. 194)

After the call, Taylor participated in two meetings: a sub-Policy Coordination Committee (sub-
PCC) meeting, then a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) meeting. (p. 194) At the PCC, there
were “observations, information about the value of the assistance.” (p. 195)

On August 22, Taylor spoke with Morrison. Taylor asked if there had been a change in the U.S.
policy of support for Ukraine. Morrison said, “it remains to be seen.” (p. 33) President Trump,
according to Morrison, “doesn’t want to provide any assistance at all.” (p. 33) This “deepened”
Taylor’s “concern.” (p. 33) He prepared to resign. (p. 33)

5
Ukrainian outreach

On August 29, 2019, Yermak contacted Taylor “very concerned” to inquire about the security
assistance hold, which had just been reported in the press. Taylor was “embarrassed” that he
could not explain why the aid was held up. (p. 34)

Taylor said that the Ukrainians “thought that there must be some rational reason for this being
held up”, perhaps because Washington did not understand the value of the assistance. (p. 138)
“So they were just desperate. And I couldn’t tell them. I didn’t know and I didn’t tell them
because” there had “been no guidance that I could give them.” (p. 138)

As the Chargé, Taylor was “a representative of the United States Government out there” to
whom Yermak had put “a perfectly legitimate question, why are you holding up this assistance,
and I couldn’t tell him.” (p. 138)

September 1 meetings in Warsaw

On September 1, 2019, hours before the bilateral meeting between Vice President Mike Pence
and Zelensky, Taylor told Danyliuk that “the delay of U.S. security assistance was an all-or-
nothing proposition, in the sense that if the White House did not lift the hold prior to the end of
the fiscal year, September 30th, the funds would expire and Ukraine would receive nothing.” (p.
35)

Taylor was responding to a note from Danyliuk noting that the lack of assistance was “a
gradually increasing problem.” Taylor replied so that Danyliuk understood that if the assistance
was not provided “in particular by the end of the fiscal year, then it goes away”. (pp. 190-191)

On September 1, Pence met with Zelensky in Warsaw; Taylor received a readout from Morrison.
(p. 35) Morrison told Taylor that Zelensky “opened the meeting” with a question about security
assistance. (p. 35) Pence “did not respond substantively” but promised to talk to President
Trump “that night.” (p. 35)

Taylor agreed with a Member question stating that the Pence-Zelensky bilateral meeting would
be a large meeting with as many as two dozen people in attendance, so it stood to reason that the
exchange of investigations for aid would not have been discussed at that larger meeting. (p. 273-
74) Instead, such a discussion would have taken place in a small, private meeting between
Sondland and Yermak, “presumably without the Vice President.” (p. 274)

During that smaller meeting, according to Taylor, Sondland spoke with Yermak. (p. 36)
Morrison provided Taylor with a readout. (p. 36) According to Taylor, Morrison said that
Sondland told Yermak “that the security assistance money would not come until President
Zelensky committed to pursue the Burisma investigation.” (p. 36)

Taylor was “alarmed” by that readout which, according to him, was the first time he had been
told that the assistance—as opposed to the White House meeting—was “conditioned” on
investigations. (p. 36) Upon learning that, Taylor sent Sondland a text message asking “are we

6
saying that security assistance and WH meeting are conditioned on investigations?” (KV0039)
Sondland asked Taylor to call him. (KV0039)

When Taylor called, “Sondland told me that President Trump had told him that he wants
President Zelensky to state publicly that Ukraine will investigate Burisma and alleged Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 U.S. election.” (p. 36) Sondland said he had “made a mistake” by telling
his Ukranian interlocutors that an Oval Office meeting “was dependent on a public
announcement of investigations. (p. 36)

In fact, Ambassador Sondland said everything was dependent on such an announcement,

including security assistance.” (p. 36) Sondland said that President Trump “wanted Zelensky in a
box by making [a] public statement about ordering such investigations.” (p. 36)

At that point, Taylor’s “clear understanding” was that the United States would not provide
security assistance “until the President committed to pursue the investigation.” (p. 190) Taylor
agreed that the U.S. position was ‘if they don’t do this they are not going to get that’ and agreed
that that was the literal definition of quid pro quo. (p. 190)

Taylor agreed that, in general, the position of the irregular track was that, until Zelensky said
publicly that Ukraine would conduct the two requested investigations, he would not get a White
House meeting. (p. 129) Taylor further agreed that the state of affairs was that, if Zelensky made
public statements about the two investigations, he’d get the meeting, but if he did not, he would
not. (p. 130)

At this point, according to Taylor, Yermak understood what Ukraine had to do to get the military
aid released, because he had heard the conditions from Sondland. (p. 192)

Sondland’s September 7 call with President Trump

According to Taylor, Morrison told him that, in a September 7 phone call between Sondland and
President Trump, Trump said “he was not asking for a quid pro quo. But President Trump did
insist that President Zelensky go to a microphone and say he is opening investigations of Biden
and 2016 election interference, and that President Zelensky should want to do this himself.” (p.
39)

Later, Sondland and Taylor spoke on the phone about Sondland’s September 7 call with
President Trump. According to Taylor, Sondland said that he had spoken to Trump and
“President Trump was adamant that President Zelensky himself had to clear things up and do it
in public. President Trump said it was not a quid pro quo.” (p. 39)

Sondland told Taylor that “President Trump is a businessman. When a businessman is about to
sign a check to someone who owes him something, he said, the businessman asks that person to
pay up before signing the check.” (p. 40) The “check” referred to was the military assistance. (p.
146) Taylor was not surprised that Volker and Sondland used the same term because he
“concluded that they had had a conversation.” (p. 146)

7
Sondland had also spoken to Zelensky and Yermak to say that “although this was not a quid pro
quo, if President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would be at a stalemate.” (p. 39)
Taylor understood that “stalemate” meant “Ukraine would not receive the much-needed military
assistance.” (p. 39) Taylor received readouts of this call from both Morrison and Sondland. (p.
322) Those readouts “were pretty consistent.” (p. 322)

Taylor’s September 8 resignation threat

On September 8, Taylor texted Volker and Sondland to say that he had spoken with Sondland.
Taylor said that “[t]he nightmare is they [the Ukrainians] give the interview and don’t get the
security assistance. The Russians love it. (And I quit.)” (KV0053)

Regarding that text message, Taylor testified that the “nightmare” he referred to was that
Zelensky would announce investigations into Burisma and the 2016 election, “take all the heat
from that, get himself in big trouble in this country and probably in his country as well, and the
security assistance would not be released. That was the nightmare.” (p. 209)

Taylor referred to the Russians in the message because they were “paying attention to the
support the Americans are going to provide the Ukrainians.” (pp. 209-10) The Russians are
“leaning on” Ukraine in all sorts of ways—economically, in the Donbas, regarding a new gas
agreement—and they want to see the level of support Zelensky would get from the Americans.
(p. 210) The Russians “would love the humiliation of Zelensky at the hands of the Americans”
which would give them “a freer hand.” (p. 210)

Taylor testified that “radar and weapons and sniper rifles, communication, that saves lives. It
makes the Ukrainians more effective. It might even shorten the war. That’s what our hope is, to
show that the Ukrainians can defend themselves and the Russians, in the end, will say ‘Okay,
we’re going to stop.’ It’s that saving of life. That’s how we would save lives.” (p. 153)

Taylor testified that he would quit because it was “exactly the scenario” that concerned him
when he discussed taking the Chargé post with Secretary Pompeo: a change in the U.S. policy of
strong support for Ukraine. (p. 210)

That change would be a “nightmare” and would have amounted to “throwing Ukraine under the
bus.” (p. 210) If that happened, Taylor would come home because “I’m not going to defend” a
different policy. (p. 211) “I would say bad things about it. And you wouldn’t want me out there
doing that. So I’m going to come home on that. So that was the message about I quit.” (p. 211)

This message was conveyed to Secretary Pompeo in the August 29 cable. (p. 211)

IV. Plans for an interview in which Zelensky would announce investigations

At the end of the September 7, 2019, conversation with Sondland, Zelensky “agree[d] to make a
public statement in an interview with CNN.” (p. 39)

8
This was the first time that Taylor had heard about doing an interview on CNN specifically, but
the CNN interview “was going to be in [the United National General Assembly], which is at the
end of September.” (p. 208)

As UNGA was approaching in late September, “then they got more serious”, and Taylor began
to hear about a CNN interview. (p. 208)

On September 12, during a meeting in Zelensky’s office between Taylor, Zelensky and Yermak,
Yermak “looked uncomfortable” when Taylor sought to confirm that there were no plans for
Zelensky to give a CNN interview. Danyliuk confirmed that there were no plans. (p. 41)

On September 12, Taylor was still concerned that the CNN interview was on. (pp. 217-18)
Taylor had just reminded Zelensky that bipartisan support for Ukraine is a key strategic asset; he
said the same thing to Yermak in passing. “And the body language was such that it looked to me
like he was still thinking they were going to make that statement.” (p. 218)

V. The importance of Ukraine

Taylor testified that Ukraine is “profound[ly] important” to the United States for two reasons.
First, Ukraine breaking away from Russia will support the U.S. objective of a Europe “whole,
free, democratic, and at peace.” (p. 20) Second, Russian annexation of Crimea and aggression in
the Donbas “violated countless treaties, ignored all commitments, dismissed all the principles
that have kept the peace and contributed to prosperity in Europe since World War II.” (p. 20)

On July 26, 2019, Taylor and Volker visited the front line in northern Donbas. (p. 31) The
Ukrainian military commander thanked the Americans for security assistance. (p. 31) Taylor,
aware the security assistance was on hold, was “uncomfortable.” (p. 31) Taylor and Volker
“could see the armed and hostile Russian-led forces on the other side of the damaged bridge
across the line of contact. Over 13,000 Ukrainians had been killed in the war, one or two a week.
To this day, that continues. More Ukrainians would undoubtedly die without U.S. assistance.”
(pp. 31-32)

Taylor testified that the U.S. policy of Ukrainian corruption should not focus on individual cases.
“What we need to press on is strengthening the institutions in Ukraine, but in other countries as
well, so that the population, the society has confidence in it. So it’s more the institution than the
specific case.” (p. 89) Later on, he reiterated the point: “the way to fight corruption is to fix the
courts and fix the judges.” (p. 123)

The approach is “institutional” rather than focusing on “individual cases, which may or may not
get us to a reformed, less corrupt system.” (p. 123)

The “irregular channel” of U.S.-Ukraine diplomacy, however, “seemed to focus on specific

issues, specific cases, rather than the regular channel’s focus on institution building.” (pp. 123-
24)

9
Taylor testified that it struck him as “improper” for the United States to ask for Ukraine to
investigate an alleged violation of Ukrainian law. (p. 136) That stands in contrast to frequent
requests where the U.S. seeks Ukrainian “help to pursue an investigation of violations of
American law, of U.S. law. That’s what we have a mutual legal assistance treaty, an MLAT,
for.” (p. 136) Taylor agreed that it was also improper because the goal of the request was to
influence a U.S. election. (p. 136)

VI. Taylor’s note-taking practices

Taylor’s regular practice was to take contemporaneous notes, which he surrendered to the State
Department, but also brought with him to the deposition. (p. 266) [Those notes were not
provided to the Committees.] According to Taylor, anything in quotes in his opening statement
comes from a text message, a WhatsApp message, notes that he took “on my little notebook that
I carry around” or the notebook “that I keep in my office that I take notes on phone calls when
I’m in the office. So the answer is, yes, if I’ve got quotes on them, I can find them.” (p. 267)

10