INOCENCIO BASCO vs. JUDGE LEO RAPATALO [Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335. March 5, 1997.

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SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; DEFINED. — "Bail" is the security required by the court and
given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to
answer the charges brought against him or her.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNCTION THEREOF. — In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused in jail before conviction, it has been
observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is
only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the
verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the
extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also been used to prevent the release of an
accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges might not want to release." It is in view of
the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with
a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
action."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN THE GRANT IS DISCRETIONARY; REQUIREMENT FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE
THEREOF. — When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being
a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight
of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." To be sure, the
discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within reasonable
bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and the law has
wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge's rational latitude for
the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or
uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and
fanciful; but legal and regular."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARING REQUIRED; RATIONALE. — In the application for bail of a person charged with a
capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise
in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses
to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court. Corollarily, another reason why
hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the abovecited case, is for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This
Court, in a number of cases held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application
for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the strength of
the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then
formulate his own conclusion, as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the
accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of
evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY HEARING, CONSTRUED. — "A summary hearing means such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit
to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross-examination." If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of
procedural due process.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENUMERATION OF PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN CASE OF BAIL
APPLICATION. — In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this
Court reiterates the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed: (1) Notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended); (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra); (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995]); (4) If the guilt of the
accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition
should be denied. The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial
judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of
bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim
knowledge or awareness thereof.
7. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; JUDGES; REQUIRED TO KNOW MORE THAN JUST A CURSORY
ACQUAINTANCE WITH STATUTE AND PROCEDURAL RULES. — A judge owes it to the public and the
administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration
of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
ROMERO, J p:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M.
Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for
granting bail to an accused in a murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927) without receiving evidence and conducting a
hearing.
Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was filed against a certain Roger
Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for
May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8,
1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not
materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said
date as the prosecution's witnesses in connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to
reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He later learned that the
accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, complainant
discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29, 1995 1 was issued on the basis of a marginal
note 2 dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No
objection: P80,000.00," signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note
that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor
dated June 22, 1995 (when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when
another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
In his comment dated October 16, 1995, respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the
prosecutor's option not to oppose the petition as well as the latter's recommendation setting the bailbond in the
amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the
discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to
presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the
preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor
recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was
issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed
to and approved the motion for reconsideration. 3 To date, accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.
A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating its nature and purposes. "Bail" is
the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused appears before the proper court
at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against him or her. In theory, the only function of bail
is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused in jail
before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. 4 In other words, if the denial of bail is
authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed
should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. 5 In practice, bail has also
been used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the judges
might not want to release." 6
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the person is
charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal action."
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of
judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence
and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, 7 it is obvious that
a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal." 8
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised within
reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion and
the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational
latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or
uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the
discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means
sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and
fanciful; but legal and regular." 9
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually
be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing
means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.
On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination." 10 If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there
would be a violation of procedural due process.
That it is mandatory for the judge to require a hearing in a petition for bail is emphasized in the following cases:
(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981. 11 In this case seven separate informations for murder were filed against the accused
Sola and 18 other persons. After preliminary investigation, the municipal trial court issued warrants for their arrest. However
without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the court granted
them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Citing People v. San Diego, 12 we held: "We are of the considered
opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion
for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on that ground."
(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989. 13 In this case, an information was filed against the accused for murder, a non-
bailable offense. The judge, without conducting any hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not enough evidence to
warrant a case for murder because only affidavits of the prosecution witnesses who were allegedly not eyewitnesses to the crime
were filed. We held: "Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for
prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that the crime
was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong for each individual accused still has to established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted
or held. It is equally entitled to due process."
(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990. 14 In this case, the prosecution was scheduled to present nine witnesses at the
hearings held to determine whether the evidence against the private respondents was strong. After hearing the fifth
witness, the respondent judge insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The prosecution in the instant case was not
given adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt and to present within a reasonable time all
the evidence it desired to present."
(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 1991 15 which involved an administrative complaint against the respondent judge for
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any prior hearing,
directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged with murder, fixing at the same time the bail at
P50,000.00 each on the ground that the evidence against them was merely circumstantial. We held: "Where a person is
accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to allow the prosecution
to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a
hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due process." The respondent judge was
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more care in the performance of his duties.
(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992. 16 In this case, the judge issued an order admitting the accused in a kidnapping and murder
case to bail without any hearing. We held: "The prosecution must first be given an opportunity to present evidence
because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion
is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong." cdasia
(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992. 17 In this administrative case, the respondent judge granted bail to an accused
charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even before the accused had been
arrested or detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for bail from a person charged with a capital offense
(now an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both the defense and the
prosecution must be given reasonable opportunity to prove (in case of the prosecution) that the evidence of guilt of
the applicant is strong, or (in the case of the defense) that such evidence of guilt was not strong." The respondent
judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of
his duties.
(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993, 18 the respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest and also fixed the bail of an
accused charged with the non bailable offense of statutory rape without allowing the prosecution an opportunity to show that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge alleged that the only evidence on record — the sworn statements
of the complaining witness and her guardian — were not sufficient to justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is an established
principle that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it
may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of
bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of
due process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest was returned unserved and that after the case was re-raffled to
the complainant judge's sala, the warrant was set aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on record showing
whether the approved bail was revoked by the complainant judge, whether the accused was apprehended or whether
the accused filed an application for bail. Hence, the respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of
the usual P20,000.00 that the court imposes on judges who grant the application of bail without notice and hearing.
(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993. 19 In this case, a complaint for murder was filed against five persons. While the
preliminary investigation was pending in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of the accused
before the respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The respondent judge ordered the prosecutor to appear at the hearing to
present evidence that the guilt of the accused is strong. At the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed to appear prompting
the respondent to grant the application for bail. We held: "Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for
a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present within a reasonable time all evidence it may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail." The respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 and was warned that the commission of a
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994. 20 In this administrative case, the respondent judge issued two separate warrants of
arrest against two persons charged with murder and parricide, but fixed the amount of bail for each accused without notifying the
prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order granting the same. Citing People v. Dacudao, 21 we held: "A hearing is
absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong.
Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to
which it is equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the
existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec 6." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000
with a warning that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 1994 22 In this case, an administrative complaint was filed against the
respondent judge, alleging, among others, that she granted an application for bail filed by the accused charged with
murder. The grant was made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the evidence of guilt was strong and
without allowing the prosecution to present evidence in this regard. We held: "In immediately granting bail and fixing it at
only P20,000.00 for each of the accused without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence, the respondent
denied the prosecution due process. This Court had said so in many cases and had imposed sanctions on judges who
granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was dismissed from
service because the erroneous granting of bail was just one of the offenses found to have been committed by her in the
aforesaid complaint.
(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994. 23 In this administrative case the respondent judge issued warrants of arrest and, at
the same time and on his own motion. authorized the provisional release on bail of the accused in two criminal cases for
murder. The accused were still at large at the time the order granting bail was issued. We held: "A hearing is mandatory
before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense." The judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P25,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
He was meted a fine in a higher amount than the usual P20,000.00 because it involved two criminal cases wherein the
respondent judge, "was not only the grantor of bail but likewise the applicant therefor."
(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994. 24 In this administrative case, the respondent judge issued an order directing the
arrest of the accused charged with rape and, motu proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without
application on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the accused filed a motion to reduce bailbond, the respondent
judge again, without any prior notice and hearing, reduced the bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is explicit that when an
accused is charged with a serious offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as rape, bail may be granted only after
a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine
whether or not the prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar or the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 1995 25 involving an administrative complaint against the respondent judge for
granting bail to the two accused charged with serious illegal detention. When the two accused first filed a joint application
for bail, the petition for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused and the prosecution in opposition thereto were
properly taken into account. However, the respondent judge denied the application for bail on the ground that it was premature
since the accused were not yet in custody of the law. In a subsequent order, the respondent judge, without conducting any hearing
on the aforestated application and thereby denying the prosecution an opportunity to oppose the same, granted said petition upon
the voluntary appearance in court of the two accused. Respondent judge insisted that there was a hearing but the proceeding he
adverted to was that which was conducted when the motion for bail was first considered and then denied for being premature. We
held: "The error of the respondent judge lies in the fact that in his subsequent consideration of the application for bail,
he acted affirmatively thereon without conducting another hearing and what is worse, his order concededly lacked
the requisite summary or resume of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of bail."
The respondent judge was reprimanded because despite the irregularity in the procedure adopted in the proceeding,
the prosecution was undeniably afforded the benefit of notice and hearing. No erroneous appreciation of the evidence
was alleged nor did the prosecution indicate its desire to introduce additional evidence in an appropriate challenge to
the aforestated grant of bail by the respondent.
(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995. 26 In this case, an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge,
who, without notice and hearing to the prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder and illegal possession of
firearm. We held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is mandatory before an accused can be
granted bail. At the hearing, both the prosecution and the defense must be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in
case of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, and in the case of the defense, that
evidence of such guilt is not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning
that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe sanction.
(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995. 27 In this administrative case, the respondent judge, without affording the prosecution
the opportunity to be heard, granted with indecent haste the petition for bail filed by the accused charged with murder because the
accused ". . . voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as he was informed that he was one of the suspect (sic) . . ." We
held: "With his open admission that he granted bail to the accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity to
be heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this court holding that such act amounts to a denial of
due process, and made himself administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for which appropriate sanctions
may be imposed." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that commission of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996. 28 In this administrative case, the respondent judge, without
hearing nor comment from the prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail was recommended
in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of discretion, the judge is required to conduct a hearing and to
give notice of such hearing to the fiscal or require him to submit his recommendation. . . . Truly, a judge would not be
in a position to determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong unless a hearing is first conducted." A
fine of P20,000.00 was imposed on the respondent judge with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it,
against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion of the court. Hence:
(1) In the case of Gimeno v. Arcueno, Sr., 29 an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge for
granting bail to one of the accused in a robbery with homicide case without affording the prosecution a chance to be
heard. The respondent judge explained that he issued an order for the motion to fix bail but the public prosecutor
filed a comment instead which respondent judge thought was adequate compliance with law. Respondent added that
the evidence of guilt of the accused, as disclosed by the records, was not so strong as to deny the application for bail.
In fact, the accused who filed for bail, together with three others, were later dropped by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor from the information for failure of the witnesses to positively identify them. We held: "The grant of bail is a
matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is left to the sound discretion of the court.
That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a hearing should be held but in the appreciation and
evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of guilt against the accused. . . . A hearing is plainly indispensable before a
judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong."
Although the respondent judge's explanation was not enough to completely exculpate him, the circumstances,
coupled with his sincere belief in the propriety of his order warranted a mitigation of the usual sanction the Court
imposes in cases of this nature. The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
(2) In the case of Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 30 an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge for
granting bail to a person charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in five separate information. The
accused filed a motion to fix bail and the respondent judge instead of setting the application for hearing, directed the
prosecution to file its comment or opposition. The prosecution submitted its comment leaving the application for bail
to the discretion of the court. The respondent judge, in granting the bail of the accused rationalized that in ordering
the prosecution to comment on the accused's motion to fix bail, he has substantially complied with the requirement of
a formal hearing. He further claimed that he required the prosecution to adduce evidence but the latter refused and
left the determination of the motion to his discretion. This Court held, "It is true that the weight of the evidence
adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion may only be exercised after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or not he should
be granted liberty. . . In the case at bar, however, no formal hearing was conducted by the respondent judge. He could
not have assessed the weight of evidence against the accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail."
The respondent judge was dismissed from service because he was previously fined for a similar offense and was
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
(3) In the case of Baylon v. Sison, 31 an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge for granting
bail to several accused in a double murder case. The respondent judge claimed that he granted the application for bail
because the assistant prosecutor who was present at the hearing did not interpose an objection thereto and that the
prosecution never requested that it be allowed to show that the evidence of guilt is strong but instead, submitted the
incident for resolution. The respondent judge further claimed that the motion for reconsideration of the order
granting bail was denied only after due consideration of the pertinent affidavits. We held: "The discretion of the court,
in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight
of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a
hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused." The respondent
judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar offense
in the future would be dealt with more severely.
A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail. "The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein the court ruled that even if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the strength of the
evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused." 32
In the recent case of Tucay v. Domagas, 33 an administrative complaint was filed against the respondent judge for
granting bail to an accused charged with murder. The application for bail contained the annotation "No objection" of
the provincial prosecutor and the respondent judge, without holding a hearing to determine whether the evidence of
the prosecution was strong, granted bail and ordered the release of the accused from detention with instructions to
the bondsman to register the bond with the Register of Deeds within ten days. It was later found out that the assessed
value of the property given was short of the amount fixed for the release of the accused. We held: "Although the
provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge should have
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the
latter was not really contesting the bail application . . . Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish
to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g., for tactical reasons) and taking into account the factors
enumerated in Rule 114, Sec. 6 for fixing bail should respondent judge have ordered the petition for bail and ordered
the release of the accused." Respondent judge herein was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and was given a stern
warning that the commission of a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the abovecited case,
is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing
the amount of bail. 34 This Court, in a number of cases 35 held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in
opposition to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to
ascertain not only the strength of the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. 36 On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence
so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the
judge's evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense.
This court in the case of Carpio v. Maglalang 37 invalidated the order of respondent judge granting bail to the accused
because "Without summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the number of
prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence presented by the
prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny bail to Escano."
With the mounting precedents, this Court sees no reason why it has to repeatedly remind trial court judges to perform
their mandatory duty of conducting the required hearing in bail applications where the accused stands charged with a
capital offense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused without first
conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the offense charged is
a capital offense in disregard of the procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended
by Administrative Circular No. 12-94. cda
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecution's declaration not to oppose the
petition. Respondent's assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing
on account of the latter's familiarity with the case due to his having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty.
Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine
whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor.
In the case of Montalbo v. Santamaria, 38 this Court held that the respondent judge is duty bound to exercise judicial
discretion conferred upon him by law to determine whether in the case at bar, the proof is evident or the presumption
of guilt is strong against the defendant and to grant or deny the petition for provisional liberty. It also held that a writ
of mandamus will lie in order to compel the respondent judge to perform a duty imposed upon him by law.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court's
determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting bail.
Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutor's
recommendation. Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application for
bail without hearing since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented for or against the
accused's provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or fails to present
evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be traced to the case of Herras Teehankee
v. Director of Prisons 39 where this Court gave the following "instructions" to the People's Court, 40 thus:
"1) In capital cases like the present when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court
should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after the approval of the bail which
it should fix for the purpose;
2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions
to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;
3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that the answer
may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may
not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the
Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the
trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce — provided, of course, that
such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee." 41
The rationale for the first instruction was stated by this Court, as follows:
"If, for any reason, any party should abstain from introducing evidence in the case for any definite purpose, no law
nor rule exists by which he may be so compelled and the court before which the case is pending has to act without
that evidence and, in so doing, it clearly would not be failing in its duties. If the Constitution or the law plots a certain
course of action to be taken by the court when certain evidence is found by it to exist, and the opposite course if that
evidence is wanting, and said evidence is not voluntarily adduced by the proper party, the court's clear duty would
be to adopt that course which has been provided for in case of absence of such evidence. Applying the principle to the
case at bar, it was no more within the power — nor discretion — of the court to coerce the prosecution into presenting
its evidence than to force the prisoner into adducing hers. And when both elected not to do so, as they had a perfect
right to elect, the only thing remaining for the court to do was to grant the application for bail."
As for the second instruction, this Court stated that:
"The prosecutor might not oppose the application for bail and might refuse to satisfy his burden of proof, but where
the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a
gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court must possess a reasonable degree of control over him in the paramount
interest of justice. Under such circumstance, the court is authorized by our second instruction to inquire from the
prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor
to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, recommending bail."
As for the third instruction, this Court declared:
"It must be observed that the court is made to rely upon the official statement of the Solicitor General on the question
of whether or not the revelation of evidence may endanger the success of the prosecution and jeopardize the public
interest. This is so, for there is no way for the court to determine that question without having the evidence disclosed
in the presence of the applicant, disclosure which is sought to be avoided to protect the interests of the prosecution
before the trial."
It is to be recalled that Herras Teehankee was decided fully half a century ago under a completely different factual
milieu. Haydee Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration with the
enemy. The said "instructions" given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no longer apply due to the
amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
In the 1940 Rules of Court of the Philippines, the applicable provisions on "Bail" provides, as follows:
"Sec. 5. Capital offenses defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death.
Sec. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to
bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Capital offense — Burden of proof . — On the hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person
who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is
on the prosecution."
The above-cited provisions have not been adopted in toto in the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative
Circular No. 12-94, since some phrases and lines have been intercalated, as shown by the underscored phrases and
statements below:
"Sec. 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in these rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with
death.
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed by any person
who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearings
shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify."
It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 a crucial sentence not found in the counterpart provision,
Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored sentence in Section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules
of Court, as amended, was added to address a situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present
evidence to oppose the application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. In such a case,
the judge may well lose control of the proceedings. In a sense, this undermines the authority of a judge since all that
the prosecution has to do to "force" the judge to grant the bail application is to refrain from presenting evidence
opposing the same. In effect, this situation makes Sections 6 and 7 of the 1940 Rules of Court on "Bail" meaningless
since whether or not the evidence of guilt of a person charged with a capital offense is strong cannot be determined if
the prosecution chooses not to present evidence or oppose the bail application in a hearing precisely to be conducted
by the trial judge for that purpose, as called for in the two sections. In the event that the prosecution fails or refuses to
adduce evidence in the scheduled hearing, then a hearing as in a regular trial should be scheduled. In this regard, a
hearing in the application for bail necessarily means presentation of evidence, and the filing of a comment or a written
opposition to the bail application by the prosecution will not suffice.
The prosecution under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to prove whether
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail to the accused. "This also
prevents the practice in the past wherein a petition for bail was used as a means to force the prosecution into a
premature revelation of its evidence and, if it refused to do so, the accused would claim the grant of bail on the
ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong." 42
It should be stressed at this point, however, that the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be equated
with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were permitted to conduct a hearing
for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of the proceeding, which is to secure provisional
liberty of the accused to enable him to prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary
hearing, the prosecution witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits. 43
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, this Court reiterates the
duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution
(Baylon v. Sison, supra);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section
19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.
The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of
bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness
thereof. 44 A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 45
Respondent judge herein insists that he could exercise his discretion in granting bail to the accused since the Assistant
Prosecutor signified in writing that he had no objection to the grant of bail and recommended, instead, the bailbond in
the sum of P80,000.00. It is to be emphasized that although the court may have the discretion to grant the application
for bail, in cases of capital offenses, the determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong can only be
reached after due hearing which, in this particular instance has not been substantially complied with by the
respondent Judge.
While it may be true that the respondent judge set the application for bail for hearing three times, thus showing lack
of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate him because the
fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the
evidence against the accused is strong for purposes of bail. Normally, the Court imposes a penalty of P20,000.00 fine
in cases where the judge grants the application for bail without notice and hearing. In view however of the
circumstances of this case, a reprimand instead of the P20,000.00 would suffice. cdtai
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, is
hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Basco v. Rapatalo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-96-1335 (Resolution), [March 5, 1997], 336 PHIL 214-239)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PROCORO DONATO, RODOLFO SALAS, alias Commander Bilog.
[G.R. No. 79269. June 5, 1991.]
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BAIL; GOVERNED BY THE LAW AT THE TIME THE
COURT RESOLVED THE PETITION FOR BAIL. — At the time the original and the amended Informations for
rebellion and the application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which
the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for
bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally
provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the
time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
2. ID.; ID.; ABSOLUTE WHEN THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS PUNISHABLE BY ANY PENALTY LOWER
THAN RECLUSION PERPETUA. — We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private
respondent for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which
is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution and provides thus: Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE DENIED EVEN IF THE SECURITY OF THE STATE SO REQUIRES; PEOPLE VS.
HERNANDEZ, ET AL. (99 PHIL. 515) CITED. — And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99
Phil 515, despite the fact that the accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We
granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous
stand of the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the security of the State so requires, and because
the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held: . . .
Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is
such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first
paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHALL NOT BE IMPAIRED EVEN WHEN THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS
SUSPENDED. — The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling
in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit: "The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must,
indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be
enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and
those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt,
rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection."
5. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT IF THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS
PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA. — If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes
a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to
determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. (Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons [76 Phil. 756, 770] But once
it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. In the same case, We held:
"The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the Constitution of the
United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that: 'The Constitution of the United States and the
constitution of the many states provide that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital
offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of
right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the exceptions. Under such
provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof
is great!"
6. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PROSECUTION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO DENY THEREOF; WHEN AVAILABLE. — The
prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of
right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail.
7. ID.; ID. ; GUIDELINES IN FIXING BAILBOND. — We agree with petitioner that it was error for the respondent
court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the
fixing of the amount of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to
the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495: "Certain guidelines in the
fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it.
Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive
from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other case. . . ."
8. ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION THAT PERSON APPLYING FOR ADMISSION TO BAIL SHOULD BE IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE LAW; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation
that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty." When the parties in G. R. No. 76009 stipulated that: "b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having custody over his person." they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will
remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the
stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against
them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be
made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court having custody
over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine
distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should
remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private respondent and his
counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time the parties
orally manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and
signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been issued by the trial court against
private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be released, further confirmed the agreement that herein
petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
9. ID.; ID.; MAY BE WAIVED BY THE ACCUSED. — It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the
Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will." This Court has recognized
waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to
counsel and to remain silent; and the right to be heard. Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of
rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states : ". . . These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel." This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it,
nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such
waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the Constitutional
rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
10. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; IMPOSABLE PENALTY AS AMENDED BY R. A. NO. 6968. — It must be
stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision mayor and fine not
exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after publication in
at least two newspapers of general circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by
increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads: "Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection
or coup d'etat. — Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or
insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua."
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — Republic Act No. 6968 cannot apply to the private
respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; DEFINED AND PURPOSE. — In defining bail as: ". . . the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . ." Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The
purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial. It presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
liberty.
13. CIVIL LAW; WAIVER OF RIGHT; CONSTRUED. — Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except
for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a
right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of
its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an
act inconsistent with claiming it."
14. ID.; ID.; RULE. — As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled: ". . . the doctrine of
waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it
is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege
of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are
intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on
any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . . Although the general rule is that any right or
privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right
is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived. While it has been stated generally that all personal
rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional
provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to secure
personal liberty are subjects of waiver."
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of
Manila and the Judge a Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
restraining order/ preliminary injunction, to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail
to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for Rebellion, 1 and the
subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail
bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987
which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order
of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be denied to a
person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information 2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, later amended in an Amended Information 3 which was filed on 24 October 1986, private respondent Rodolfo
Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in
relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
"That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the
City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the New
People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its other subordinate organizations
and fronts, have, under the direction and control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the aforenamed
accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members and followers whose whereabouts and identities are
still unknown, risen publicly and taken arms throughout the country against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of which is in the City of Manila, or of
removing from the allegiance to that government and its laws, the country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of the aforenamed
organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged
themselves in war against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and
other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as . . . ."
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody following
their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from
military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his capture. 4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for private
respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court 5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail, was
dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties under which herein private
respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having custody over his person" and the
warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986, private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that:
(a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, 6 to which petitioner filed an Opposition 7 citing, among other grounds, the fact that in the Joint
Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
"Par. 2 (b) — Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his
person."
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for
bail, 9 which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the ground that since rebellion
became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a
rebellion, the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834
and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees.
Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which was
officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted private
respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the additional
condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period
thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge stated:
". . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the offense of rebellion, for which
accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now punishable with the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114,
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital offenses before final
judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same
rule. In view, therefore, of the present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail as a
matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a capital offense."
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private respondent considering his
stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy
and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release would allow his return to his organization to direct its armed
struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge
replied:
"True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to bail in a non-capital offense, which
right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the prosecution, 'the existence of the government that
bestows the right, the paramount interest of the state.' Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right
to bail, is a 'declaration of the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed by the
Constitution against impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action. Emphasis is placed on the dignity
of man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual,
which the government is prohibited from violating' (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984
Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of such conflict as now pictured by the prosecution, the same should be resolved
in favor of the individual who, in the eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as
against the State. Anyway, the government is that powerful and strong, having the resources, manpower and the
wherewithals to fight those 'who oppose, threaten (sic) and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and
political institutions.' The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that the accused may later on jump bail and
rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But,
then, such a fear can not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable
offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of right to bail. Dura est lex sed lex."
In a motion to reconsider 12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to increase the bail from
P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for
the provisional release of an accused should be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based
on the medium penalty imposable for the offense and explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the
private respondent "had in the past escaped from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he
is charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator
has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow
the government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the court to deny bail
to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability
that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail — to appear in court for trial," a conclusion it
claims to be buttressed "by the following facts which are widely known by the People of the Philippines and which
this Honorable Court may have judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to
substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were
also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982,a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his
arrest,"
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court for trial, if
released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers, are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion
against this government and threatens the existence of this very Court from which he now seeks provisional release,"
and that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original
penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that
of an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of the State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the
rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the
United States of America holding "that there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous
resident aliens pending deportation proceedings, 14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he presents
a risk of flight; 15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious felonies who are found
after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the community which no condition of
release can dispel." 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Orders 17 adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the 'supplemental' motion for
reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies it but finds the first motion for reconsideration to be
meritorious only insofar as the amount of bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 only to
increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and with the
additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten
(10) days of every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58)."
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the "sudden turn-
about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it conceded the
right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only a
reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the American precedents
are not applicable since the cases involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not
contain a proviso on the right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against excessive bail;
and quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-
4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil. 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the following issues:
"THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING
REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH
PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE
GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT
RODOLFO SALAS."
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is stopped from invoking his right to bail, having
expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz
and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is not absolute when there is prima facie
evidence that the accused is a serious threat to the very existence of the State, in which case the prosecution must be
allowed to present evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the
denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited its right to do so since during all the time that the
petition for bail was pending, it never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to adduce such evidence. And that
even if release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally
P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of private respondents' criminal background, the
gravity of the pending charge, and the likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987 19 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing his order of 30 July
1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the petition and
immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II. RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT
BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III. RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION PERPETUA), HENCE
HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IV. THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS
CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS NONEXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN
WAIVED.
V. THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY
RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent. 21 The reply was filed on 18 September
1987. 22
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November 24 and 23 November 1987 25 petitioner and private
respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that the petition and reply be considered as the
Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our
resolutions of 19 November 1987 26 and 1 December 1987, 27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand on the issues raised in
this petition, 28 which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29 wherein he manifests that he
supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be
annulled and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the right to bail in view of the agreement in G.R.
No. 76009; that granting bail to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break; in determining
bail, the primary consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the trial of the case against him, which
would be frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will jump bail of whatever amount"; and
application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the amount
of bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains that the right of the
petitioner to hearing on the application of private respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for bail were
filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private respondent was charged
was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by
the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for
bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the
crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides thus:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required."
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
"Bail, a matter of right: exception. — All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is absolute. 32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the accused was
already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murders,
arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of P30,000.00 during the
pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of the People that We must deny bail to the
accused because the security of the State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates
that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:
". . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be
derived upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is
such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first
paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom."
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs.
Enrile, et al., supra., to wit: LexLib
"The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to
bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to
bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the
course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection."
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It
shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
"The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in the Constitution of the
United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said that:
'The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many states provide that all persons shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great, and,
under such provisions, bail is a matter of right which no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced
in the exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is
evident or the presumption thereof is great!" 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where
bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later
at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for
in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated
in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:
"Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other case . . . ."
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be
heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of
Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by prision
mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect
after publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation, amended, among others, Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:
"Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. — Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
"Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua."
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its effectivity. It is
not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009. LLpr
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 with the
trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose
Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce
Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montaño, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among
others, that the petition be given due course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to produce the
bodies of herein private respondent and his co-accused before the Court and explain by what authority they arrested
and detained them. The following proceedings took place thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required respondents to make a return of the
writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00
o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To The Writ of Habeas
Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and Jose Milo Concepcion
alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the military on September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine
General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Manila, being leaders or members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, New People's Army and National Democratic Front, organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government through violent means, and having actually committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. After their arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their
arrest were issued and respondents continue to detain them because of the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the
criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that, contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private
respondent was not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the Government; neither is he
and his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any safe conduct pass issued by competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain agreements reached between them. We
issued a resolution reading as follows:
"When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and William Chua appeared for the petitioners with
Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C.
de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor General Ordoñez
arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in conformity with the agreement reached
with the government, the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under
custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, also in open Court, confirmed the foregoing statement made by petitioners'
counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be interposed to the
immediate release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of them,
but they will continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that they will not be rearrested on the
basis of the warrants issued by the trial court provided that they manifest in open Court their willingness to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel today relative to the compromise agreement
that they have previously undertaken to submit. prcd
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his oath as member of the Bar, the
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, the Court ordered their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements and required both parties to SUBMIT to
the Court their compromise agreement by 4:00 o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave."
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation and Motion duly
signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez, Assistant Solicitor
General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for respondents, which reads as follows:
"COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective counsel, and to this Honorable Tribunal
respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez on
October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be preserved and
human considerations may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will
be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al.,
Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926], Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed against
them under their personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view
of formal manifestation before the Supreme Court that they will submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction
over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity of the Government to the foregoing
terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic) and their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing on October 14 and the present
manifestation in compliance with the resolution announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed."
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
"G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montaño and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] — Considering the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed
by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for
petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial
Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states that they have entered into an agreement
whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs.
Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XII,
Manila], filed against them, on their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody
and face trial before the court having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for the person of Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of the formal manifestation before this Court that
they will submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person and in view of the said agreement, the
petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for habeas corpus but subject to
the condition that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his
commitment to ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the criminal case for
rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave."

It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the
pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail." 37 Upon the other hand, private
respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal basis, for in their petition for habeas corpus
they precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued detention of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not resolved by this Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but left
open for further determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by
either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent after the agreement
was reached, like the filing of the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were
clear and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not only provisional but final and
permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint
Manifestation and Motion simply means that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or
in custodia legis and nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"'Custody' has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also defined as the detainer of a person
by virtue of a lawful authority, or the 'care and possession of a thing or person.' (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed,
Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)"
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence, the
"constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
"b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his
person."
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the court, or in
actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to
be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a
fine distinction between legal custody and court having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court
having jurisdiction over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the
agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or
had this been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer
language. It must be remembered that at the time the parties orally manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986
the terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant
of arrest had already been issued by the trial court against private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that
only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be
released, further confirmed the agreement that herein petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or
confinement. cdrep
In defining bail as:
". . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . ."
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody
of the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably
waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
"Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law."
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right,
advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall
be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it." 41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
". . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges
rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided
the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is
recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or role made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may be
waived. prcd
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, it has also been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even
some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver." 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, 43 it was held:
"Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the
accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges.
Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be."
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be
invalid if taken against his will." 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; 45 the right to counsel and to remain silent; 46 and the right to be heard. 47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights. Section 12(1) of
Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his
own choice states:
". . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that the
other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil
Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is
personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. prLL
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and
Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Donato, G.R. No. 79269, [June 5, 1991], 275 PHIL 146-175)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AGUSTIN FORTES [G.R. No. 90643. June 25, 1993.]
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; RULES THEREON. — It is clear from
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that:
". . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if
the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . ."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTED ACCUSED NOT ENTITLED THERETO WHEN CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL
OFFENSE OR AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA. — Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs.
Ricardo Cortez, ruled that: "Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the
case to this court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable
by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently
sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus evident that the trial court correctly denied his application for bail during
the pendency of the appeal.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; NOT DISPROVED BY ABSENCE OF SPERMATOZOA. — It is settled that the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape. The important consideration is not the emission of semen,
but the penetration by the male organ.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1508; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON; RAPE, EXEMPTED
THEREFROM. — Under P.D. No. 1508, the governing law then, rape was not among the crimes which required
referral to the Barangay Lupon for the purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a matter of fact, it was among
those excepted from such a referral considering that the penalty imposable is more than thirty (30) days
imprisonment.
6. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; UNAVAILING WHERE IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE ACCUSED TO BE AT
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME DURING ITS COMMISSION. — The appellant's contention that the trial court
erroneously characterized his defense as one of alibi, is without any basis. The trial court actually characterized the
appellant's defense as one of "alibi and absolute denial." Besides, the "alibi" aspect thereof is not entirely inaccurate for
in fact, as shown by his own story, the appellant went back to the ricefield to retrieve his bottle of drinking water
before returning to the nipa hut at around 12:00 o'clock noon. In effect, he suggested that he was not at the scene of the
crime at the time the sexual assault was committed.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN A WOMAN ADMITS THAT SHE HAS BEEN RAPED, SHE SAYS IN EFFECT ALL THAT IS
NECESSARY TO SHOW THAT RAPE HAD BEEN COMMITTED. — When a woman admits that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape had been committed. A complainant would not make public
the offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the gory
details if she had not in fact been raped, for no decent Filipina would publicly admit that she has been raped unless it
is the truth.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; BOLSTERED BY ABSENCE OF IMPROPER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
TO TESTIFY FALSELY AGAINST ACCUSED. — When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive existed, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. Indeed, if an accused had really nothing to do
with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and against the presumption of good
faith that the prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.
9. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; INDEMNITY FOR RAPE RAISED TO P40,000.00. — We thus affirm the decision
appealed from except as to the matter of the indemnity, which is hereby increased from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00
pursuant to the current policy of the Court.
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
The conviction of Agustin Fortes y Garra for the rape of a young girl described the trial court as "a guileless lass of
only 13 [a] sixth grade pupil, bred in a barangay of rural atmosphere," and the denial by the trial court of his
application for bail pending his appeal from the judgment of conviction are questioned in these consolidated
cases. LexLib
In G.R. No. 90643, the accused appeals from the decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Irosin,
Sorsogon, in Criminal Case No. 219. The court a quo, in its Decision dated 18 November 1988 but promulgated on 25
January 1989, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim the sum of P20,000.00 to answer for damages and costs. 1
In G.R. No. 91155, the accused seeks to annul and set aside two (2) related orders of the said trial court denying his
application for bail, filed after his conviction, to secure his provisional liberty pending the resolution of his appeal.
The records disclose these antecedents:
On 26 November 1983, Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,
accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a rape
committed against the latter by the accused at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning of that day. Following this, the
accused was forthwith apprehended.
Thereupon, on 5 December 1983, Agripino Gine filed on behalf of Merelyn a complaint 2 for rape against the accused
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Matnog-Sta. Magdalena in Matnog, Sorsogon. 3 The accusatory
portion thereof reads as follows:
"That on or about 11:00 in the morning of November 26, 1983, at Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
deliberate intent and without the consent of the victim MERELYN GINE, and by means of force and intimidation did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) armed with a bolo threatened (sic) and dragged (sic) the
victim MERELYN GINE, and there the said accused committed the acts of rape inside the nipa hut owned by
Leobehildo (sic) Garra, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned offended party.
Act contrary to law." 4
Finding probable cause to exist after a preliminary examination was conducted, the MCTC issued on 9 December 1983
an order for the arrest of the accused. 5 The bond for the latter's temporary liberty was initially fixed at P30,000.00 but
was later reduced to P25,000.00 6 upon motion of the accused. The latter then put up the required bond; upon its
approval, the court ordered his release on 15 December 1983. 7
When the case was finally called for preliminary investigation on 5 December 1984, the accused, through his
counsel de oficio, informed the court that he was waiving his right thereto. The court then ordered the transmittal of
the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon. 8
On 25 January 1985, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, through 1st Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel C. Genova, filed
with Branch 55 of the RTC at Irosin, Sorsogon a complaint for rape against the accused, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
"That on or about the 26th day of November, 1983, in the Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation and
with lewd design (sic), and armed with a bolo and (sic) threatened her with harm and dragged to a hut the victim and
there have (sic) carnal knowledge with one Merelyn Gine against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 9
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 219.
Accused pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on 28 February 1985. 10 The protracted trial began on 26 June 1985
and ended nearly three (3) years later when the case was finally submitted for decision on 22 February 1988. 11 The
witnesses presented by the prosecution were Merelyn Gine, her father Agripino and Dr. Eddie Dorotan. The witnesses
for the defense, on the other hand, were the accused himself, Leovegildo Garra and Celso Gardon, the Barangay
Captain of Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon.
On 25 January 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the accused of the crime charged. 12 The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Merelyn Gine the sum of P20,000.00 as damages and to
pay the costs. The accused is ordered committed to the Sorsogon Provincial Jail through the Provincial Warden or
through any of his provincial guards and eventually committed to the National Penitentiary in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED." 13
On the same day, the accused filed his notice of appeal 14 wherein he requested that the amount of the appeal bond
be fixed by the trial court. The following day, 26 January 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal 15 but did
not resolve the request to fix the amount of bail. Thus, on 11 April 1989, the accused filed an "Application for Bail on
Appeal" 16 reiterating his earlier request that the bail bond for his provisional liberty pending appeal be set. This was
subsequently denied by the trial court in its Order of 19 June 1989 on the ground that ". . . the accused has already
been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and his appeal
from the decision already approved by the Court . . ." 17 Thereupon, on 10 August 1989, the trial court issued a
Commitment of Final Sentence turning over the person of the accused to the Director of Prisons in Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila. 18
On 25 August 1989, the accused filed a motion to reconsider the RTC's 19 June 1989 Order denying his application for
bail pending appeal, 19 but the same was denied in the Order of 6 September 1989. 20
In the meantime, the trial court, on 12 September 1989, transmitted to this Court the records of Criminal Case No. 219.
We received the same on 16 November 1989 and docketed the appeal as G.R. No. 90643.
On 9 December 1989, the accused filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the
aforementioned orders of the trial court denying his application for bail and his motion to reconsider the said denial.
The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 91155. In the Resolution of 20 December 1989, 21 this Court required the
respondents to comment on the petition. Then, on 18 June 1990, the said case was ordered consolidated with G.R.
No. 90643. The records of G.R. No. 91155 do not disclose if the respondents had actually filed the required comment.
G.R. No. 91155
We shall first resolve G.R. No. 91155. Accused assails the trial court's refusal to grant his application for bail pending
appeal on the ground that the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to bail. He contends that
before his conviction by final judgment, he enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence, and is therefore
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
There is no merit in the said petition.
It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution 23 and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
as amended, 24 that:
". . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
xxx xxx xxx
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It
shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter
of right. . . ." 25
The clear implication, therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is
convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the
accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that
the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would
have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted
to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People
vs. Ricardo Cortez, 26 ruled that:
"Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court
since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."
In the instant case, the rape for which the accused was indicted is punishable by reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code; he was convicted therefor and subsequently sentenced to serve that penalty. It is thus
evident that the trial court correctly denied his application for bail during the pendency of the appeal.
G.R. No. 90643
We now turn to the accused's appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The inculpatory facts, proven by the prosecution and upon which the trial court based its judgment of conviction, are
summarized by the trial court in its decision. Finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence adduced, We
hereby adopt the said summary as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"(3) The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of 26 November 1983, Merelyn Gine accompanied her
father Agripino Gine to Barangay Naburacan, Matnog, Sorsogon, where he was going to work in the farm of
Patrolman Nonito Galeria. Her father left her in the nipa hut of one Leovegildo Garra so she can cook his meal for
lunch. She was alone in the hut.
(4) While she was preparing to cook the meal, accused appeared from nowhere and inserted his T-shirt inside her
mouth. Accused also held her hands and tore her pedal pant (sic). She tried to kick him but to no avail. After he was
able to remove her pedal, she was threatened with a bolo and was warned that he will kill her if she shouted. The bolo
which was presented in evidence as Exhibit C (sic) was 23 1/2 inches long including the handle. The sharp end of the
bolo was pointed by the accused to her throat. Accused laid her down and it was in this position when (sic) the
accused had sexually abused her by inserting his penis through her (sic) panty she was wearing which was torn and
stained with her blood (Exhibits B, B1 and B2). She suffered extreme pain and her vagina started bleeding. She cried
and wished that her father were around so that she could ask him to kill the accused.
(5) Just as the accused consummated the rape, her father returned from the farm to inquire whether his meal was
cooked already. He called for his daughter but she did not answer during the first call and on the second call he heard
her answer 'po' (meaning yes). Suddenly, the accused jumped out of the window with his short pants on but leaving
behind in his hurry to escape, the T-shirt which he inserted inside the mouth of the victim and the bolo he used to
threaten her. Her father gave chase but was not able to catch up with the accused.
(6) When her father went inside the hut, he found her in a state of shock and (sic) was trying to get up but was
swaying for she could hardly stand. It was at this instance when his daughter narrated to him the dastardly act
perpetrated upon her by the accused.
(7) On the same day, she and her father reported the incident to the police authorities in Matnog, Sorsogon, and an
investigation was made. On that same day, the accused was apprehended.
(8) From the police, she went to the Irosin District Hospital for medical examination. Thereat, she was subjected to a
medical examination by a certain Dr. Tito Garrido but he did not issue her a medical certificate. So she had another
medical examination by Dr. Eddie Dorotan of the same hospital who issued her a medical certificate which was
introduced in evidence as Exhibit E and E1.
(9) At the time she was sexually abused, Merelyn Gine was only 13 years old (Exhibit D). She demonstrated to the
Court the position in which she was raped by the accused. She felt so ashamed after the rape and underwent so much
suffering and pain like her father, which could not be compensated with money alone and wants justice done." 27
On the other hand, the accused capsulated his version of the incident in this manner:
"On November 26, 1983 at about 8:30 in the morning, accused Fortes on his way to the Nipa Hut which he used as a
rest house met Agripino Gine, father of Complainant Merelyn Gine in the ricefield at Bgy. Naburacan, Matnog,
Sorsogon where they both work and cultivate their respective ricelands. In that meeting Agripino asked permission
from accused if her (sic) daughter, Merelyn, could cook their lunch at the Nipa Hut ('Payag' in local dialect), owned by
the grandfather of accused Leovegeldo (sic) Garra. Accused who is a neighbor and family friend of Agripino (sic) in
Bgy. Camachilis where they both reside gave his permission. Accused proceeded to the Nipa Hut owned by his
grandfather for the purpose of preparing his own lunch. When accused arrived in the Nipa Hut, he saw Merelyn
preparing their lunch.
Accused waited for his turn while Merelyn was preparing their lunch. Accused spent his waiting time in repairing the
plow (araro) which he used in the cultivation of the riceland. At this point in time his grandfather Leovegeldo (sic)
Garra arrived. Merelyn Gine and accused who are known to each other being neighbors and family friends exchanged
pleasanties (sic) and jokes. In the process, accused accidentally dropped the fish which he was about to cook for lunch
outside the window. Accused passed through the window which is about half (1/2) meter from the ground to pick-up
the fish.
At this juncture, Agripino (sic) arrived from the ricefield at about 11:00 in the morning and called his daughter,
Merelyn, to inquire if lunch was ready. Merelyn answered in the negative, Agripino got angry and scolded his
daughter, Merelyn for failing to cook the lunch on time.
In the meantime, accused-appellant returned to the ricefield to pick-up his bottle of drinking water. He returned back
to the Nipa Hut at about 12:00 noon and he saw inside the nipa hut, the following people: Agripino Gine, Joel,
Mondoy, sons of Agripino and Dick Galeria son of the owner of the riceland being cultivated by Agripino Gine eating
their lunch." 28
To bolster his defense, the accused presented two (2) other witnesses, namely Leovegildo Garra, his grandfather, and
Celso Gardon, the Barangay Captain of Naburacan, Matnog.
The trial court accorded full faith and credit to the prosecution's version; it was convinced beyond reasonable doubt
that Merelyn fell victim to a sexual assault on the morning of 26 November 1983 which was perpetrated through force
and intimidation. On that same day, both she and her father immediately reported the incident to the police
authorities. She then submitted to a medical examination.
There seems to be no logical reason for her or her father to concoct the charge of rape against the accused. During her
testimony, Merelyn "showed an unmistakable determination to exact justice, from the man who had forcibly violated
her and caused her early loss of virginity." She "has no motive other than to bring to justice the culprit who had
grievously wronged her." 29
In his Brief, the accused, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, urges this Court to reverse his conviction and acquit
him on the ground that the trial court erred in:
"I . . . GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE MEDICAL CERTIFICATE SHOWING THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WAS NOT SEXUALLY ABUSED ON NOVEMBER 26, 1983.
III . . . NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE BGY. CAPTAIN WHERE THE ALLEGED CRIME
WAS COMMITTED.
IV . . . NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." 30
For his first assigned error, the appellant contends that the rape for which he was charged and subsequently convicted
was not established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. He claims that the complainant's statement that she
had her panty on while she was being raped is incredible, as "[E]experience will show that it is physically
[I]impossible to perform and execute the act of sexual intercourse to a woman with her panty on." 31
In support of the second assigned error, he asserts that the medical examination conducted by Dr. Eddie Dorotan, a
government physician assigned to the Irosin District Hospital, which revealed that "there was no bleeding" and "no
spermatozoa" 32 present, conclusively proved that the accused did not commit the crime of rape. The latter further
contends that the trial court erred in believing the complainant's declaration that her panty was stained with her
blood because, as he points out, there was no "corroborated (sic) evidence to prove that indeed the alleged blood stain
is indeed the blood coming from the vagina of complainant." 33
As to his third ascribed error, the appellant faults the trial court for not giving due weight to the testimony of the
Barangay Captain of the locality wherein the rape was committed. He further contends that since Barangay Captain
Celso Gardon testified that he (Gardon) passed by the nipa hut and saw the complainant and her father Agripino
together with other persons at around lunch time — the time of the commission of the alleged rape — Agripino
should have immediately reported the sexual assault to him as he is the barangay captain. LLjur
The appellant additionally assails the credibility of Agripino Gine, claiming that the latter failed to corroborate his
daughter's story that there was blood on the spot where she was purportedly raped and that her panty and pants
were torn by the appellant. Moreover, it is averred that Agripino did not even describe to the court his daughter's
attire when he found her in the nipa hut. Appellant then faults the trial court for concluding that he had presented the
defense of alibi when the records reveal that no such defense was offered by him. LLpr
Appellant's last assigned error is but a summation of the previous three (3) errors; he concludes that the totality of the
prosecution's evidence creates sufficient doubt as to his guilt. Hence, he concludes that he is entitled to an acquittal.
Our careful review of the records and painstaking evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties yield nothing to
support the assigned errors, and lead Us to the inevitable conclusion that the culpability of the appellant has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. This appeal must therefore be dismissed for palpable lack of merit.
The victim narrated her ordeal in a simple, yet candid and straightforward manner as evidenced by the transcripts of
her testimony, the pertinent portions of which read:
"FISCAL GENOVA —
What happened while you were getting the kettle preparatory to cooking your meal?
A Suddenly, this Agustin Fortes appeared from nowhere and tried to embrace me.
Q In what part of your body?
A He tried to insert his T-shirt in my mouth.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after you were held and a piece of T-shirt put (sic) inside your mouth?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q Before he had sexual intercourse with you, what did he do?
A He torn (sic) my panty and my pedal.
Q Do you mean to tell this Court that you were dressed during that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q And how did Agustin Fortes tried (sic) to torn (sic) your pedal and panty?
A When he was trying to hold my hands, he was pulling my panty at the same time tearing my pedal and I was
kicking him.
Q I am showing to you clothes from the Police Station labeled 'Criminal Case No. 3226' which I presumed is the
criminal case number connection to what you just stated. This is from the Police Station of Matnog.
A This is the pedal I was wearing at the time.
Q When you were wearing this, was it already torn?
A Not yet.
Q How about this panty of yours, is this already in this kind (sic)?
A No, sir.
Q What is this dark stain here . . . which you could see?
A That is blood.
Q Whose blood?
A Mine.
Q How was this torn? The pedal . . . no the panty?
A He was the one who torn (sic) my panty.
Q And in the process this was removed from your body?
A Yes sir.
Q What happened now after this pedal also was removed?
A I was able to shout but he warned me that he is going to kill me.
Q When he stated that he was going to kill you, what was in his possession?
A A bolo.
Q I am showing to you a bolo wrapped in a coupon bond, 23 1/2 inches labelled 'People of the Philippines versus
Agustin Fortes November 26, 1983.' What is the relation of this bolo to the bolo that was used?
A This is the bolo that was used.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, how was this bolo being used in your body?
A He was trying to thrust it below my neck.
Q With what hand was the accused using this?
A Left.
Q When you say it was being poked in your body, which part of the bolo?
A The sharp end.
Q On what part of your body was it being poked?
A On my neck.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said you were sexually abused by Agustin Fortes, how was this sexual abuse made in (sic) your body?
A By holding my hands and laying me down on the floor and he lied (sic) down on top of me . . . and then he
performed the sexual intercourse.
Q When you said 'ikiti' (sexual intercourse), my question is, did the penis of the accused penetrate your vagina?
A Yes sir.
Q And while he was on that act of sexual intercourse with his penis inside your vagina, what happened then?
A I felt pain. And my vagina started bleeding.
Q And what happened next?
A And then I cried and I remembered that if only my father is there I will ask him to kill the accused.
Q Did your father arrive?
A Yes sir and Agustin Fortes jumped out of the window." 34
The jumping of the appellant out of the window was witnessed by Merelyn's father whose testimony thereon was
further bolstered during cross-examination:
"ATTY. ZULUETA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you returned to the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what happened?
A When I was about in a distance of (sic) three meters from the house of Leovegildo (sic) Garra, I called for my
daughter. My first call, there was no answer, and on my second call, there was an answer 'po', then, suddenly,
somebody jumped out of the window in the person of Agustin Fortes.
Q When you saw the alleged accused in this case jumped (sic) out of the window of the hut of Leovegildo Garra, what
did you do?
A Instead of trying to run after Agustin Fortes, I felt apprehensive, and so, I went to the succor of my daughter which
(sic) was speechless.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After you went to the house of Leovegildo Garra, what happened there?
A That (sic) my daughter was raped.
Q How come that you knew that your daughter was raped?
A Because my daughter herself told me." 35
Agripino's daughter was in a sitting position and could hardly stand when he saw her. 36 He thus decided to report
the incident to the police authorities immediately. Thus, both he and Merelyn proceeded to the police station where
they were consequently interrogated. Thereafter, the appellant was apprehended. 37
From Merelyn's testimony, it is evident that the appellant had carnal knowledge of her through force and
intimidation. He gagged her first with a t-shirt and then forced her into the sexual act by threatening to kill her with
his bolo. Her testimony on this point was even further strengthened and enhanced when, during cross-examination,
counsel for the appellant gambled on the fate of the latter by asking Merelyn to show how the rape was committed.
Merelyn then demonstrated how the appellant gripped her hands and pointed the bolt to her neck. 38

As to the alleged impossibility of the commission of the sexual act because of the fact that Merelyn's panty was not
actually removed, the appellant seems to have forgotten that it was he, through the cross-examination of his lawyer,
who elicited from Merelyn the declaration that his penis was inserted through a hole in the said panty. Thus:
"ATTY. ZULUETA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You have said that the accused had forcefully made sexual intercourse with you. How come that (sic) the penis
penetrated your vagina?
A When his right hand was holding my hands he unzipped his pants and put out his penis and inserted his penis to
(sic) my vagina.
Q When the accused conducted sexual intercourse with you, do (sic) you have your panty?
A Yes sir. There is a hole in my panty where he inserted his penis to (sic) my vagina.
Q While the accused was having sexual intercourse with you, what happened next?
A My vagina was bleeding because it was very painful." 39
Neither may the medical certificate (Exhibit "E") issued by Dr. Eddie Dorotan be of any help to the appellant. The said
certificate does not, contrary to the latter's claim, prove that Merelyn did not have sexual intercourse because of the
findings therein reported that there was no bleeding, the vagina admitted two (2) fingers and the vaginal fluid
contained no spermatozoa. Again, the appellant conveniently forgot that Dr. Dorotan examined Merelyn only on 28
November 1983 at 9:45 o'clock in the morning, 40 or two (2) days after the incident. By that time, the bleeding, which
had taken place earlier, may no longer have been noticeable and the spermatozoa may no longer have been present. It
is settled that the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape. The important consideration
is not the emission of semen, but the penetration by the male organ. 41 It must likewise be emphasized that Dr. Tito
Garrido of the District Hospital of Irosin, the physician who examined Merelyn in the afternoon of 26 November 1983,
did not issue a medical certificate, although he promised to deliver one to Matnog. It has been shown that Dr. Garrido
reneged on this pledge. Furthermore, during trial, complainant's father claimed that he had later learned that Dr.
Garrido is related to the appellant. 42 This assertion was not even rebutted by the defense.
Moving on, this Court is not persuaded by the appellant's contention that if Merelyn had in fact been raped, then
either she or her father should have first informed the barangay captain about the incident. Suffice it to say, reporting
the commission of a crime to a barangay captain is not a prerequisite for the formal institution of criminal charges.
Even under P.D. No. 1508, the governing law then, rape was not among the crimes which required referral to the
Barangay Lupon for the purpose of seeking an amicable settlement. As a matter of fact, it was among those excepted
from such a referral considering that the penalty impossible is more than thirty (30) days imprisonment. 43 If the
complainant and her father seemed to have "by-passed" the barangay captain and instead reported the incident
directly to the police, it is quite obvious that they wanted immediate action to ensure the appellant's arrest and
forestall any possible escape on his part. LexLib
Finally, the appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously characterized his defense as one of alibi, is without
any basis. The trial court actually characterized the appellant's defense as one of "alibi and absolute
denial." 44 Besides, the "alibi" aspect thereof is not entirely inaccurate for in fact, as shown by his own story, the
appellant went back to the ricefield to retrieve his bottle of drinking water before returning to the nipa hut at around
12:00 o'clock noon. In effect, he suggested that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time the sexual assault was
committed.
All told, We have in this case a 13-year old barrio lass who: immediately revealed the commission of the heinous
crime to her father just as the appellant consummated the act and jumped out of the window to escape; forthwith
reported it to the police authorities who, after having heard her story, apprehended the appellant; thereafter, in the
afternoon of the same day, voluntarily submitted to a medical examination of her private parts; submitted again to a
second medical examination of her private parts on 28 November 1983; underwent the ordeal of a public trial; and,
upon demand by the appellant's counsel, even demonstrated — as part of the cross-examination — how she was
raped. We need no further evidence to convince Us that indeed, the complainant was raped by the appellant. We have
repeatedly held that when a woman admits that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape had been committed. A complainant would not make public the offense, undergo the troubles and
humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the glory details if she had not in fact been raped,
for no decent Filipina would publicly admit that she has been raped unless it is the truth. 45 Moreover, the appellant
has not shown that the complainant and her father were actuated by any ulterior motives which could have induced
them to falsely implicate him in the commission of the crime. It is settled that when there is no evidence to show any
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against an accused, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive existed, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 46 Indeed, if an
accused had really nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and
against the presumption of good faith that the prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former. 47
We thus affirm the decision appealed from except as to the matter of the indemnity, which is hereby increased from
P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 pursuant to the current policy of the Court.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) In G.R. No. 90643, AFFIRMING the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No. 219 of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial
Court, Fifth Judicial Region, at Irosin, Sorsogon, with the modification of the indemnity which is increased from
P20,000.00 to P40,000.00; and
2) In G.R. No. 91155, DENYING, for lack of merit, the petition.
Costs against appellant Agustin Fortes y Garra in both cases.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Fortes y Garra, G.R. No. 90643, 91155, [June 25, 1993], 295 PHIL 683-705)

BGEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, et. al. v. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
[G.R. No. 93177. August 2, 1991.]
CRUZ, J p:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising
from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d'etat that took
place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the
Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General
Court Martial (GCM) convened to try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling
denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed
on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling
denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition
for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R.
No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant
to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948.
The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00
a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of
your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for viol of AWs ________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your
right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses,
and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI
Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing. This was done through a Motion for
Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27, 1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice
to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave
them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14, 1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71,
which provides:
ARTICLE 71. Charges; Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to military law,
and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that
the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have
been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and
what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity shall be
given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his own
behalf either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If
the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony
taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses
were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. While the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their right to
raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No. 14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D.
No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM No. 14.
He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for
provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by
the president and members of GCM No. 14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in contempt
the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobeying the said order. He later also complained that Generals De
Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc.
Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc.
Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia.
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined
exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders
of General Court-Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does
not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set
aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct
proceedings on the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons
facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its
orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and
Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus on
the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no
formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered
their release.
II. The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their side at
the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their
motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that
date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This
they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the
charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned in
the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall
be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their
motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting
for the petitioners to submit their defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that
"even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction." We so held
in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
"We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The Philippine counterpart is article of war
71, Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of Army
general court martial jurisdiction. The Article does serve important functions in the administration of court-martial
procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to
trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a court-martial
conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that
Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall
short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for
Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional
level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that where there had
been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly
repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The
War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress
amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under consideration."
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of
course be altogether irregular; but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is
similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than two
years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the requirements
of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets,
charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj.
Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the
pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the
testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the
manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is
only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided under said
decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood his affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D.
No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they
filed an untitled pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront
the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said
witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P.D. No. 77, as amended
by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constituted in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of
War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa
as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
ARTICLE 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a major
command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the
superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint
general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be
tried, the court shall be appointed by superior competent authority . . .
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he authorized it
because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be
spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of
Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that General
De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he would certainly have done if
his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M-6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
ARTICLE 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be challenged by the accused or the trial
judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall
not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be
presented and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory
challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1
(otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the
United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth
of officers learned in military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense program. Because of
these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that
only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth
Act No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to
any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused. After December 17,
1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in military
law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World
War II in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been
indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on
June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court
shall not be challenged except for cause."
On September 27, 1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them."
On November 7, 1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure,
and other matters relevant to Military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained to insure impartiality and good
faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members excluding the challenged
member. A tie vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be
immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a
compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to
the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in
this decree.
On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law
throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With the
termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence
of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante
ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its
soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. As a result,
the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn
under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January
17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under
the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous
regime."
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present
government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a
court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in
the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present
circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and
apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only the political
departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and mandamus and the
petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued
that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the
respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of
Yang v. Court of Appeals, 4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission are
now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals."
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the remedies
employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial,
and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But
it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to give rise to a defect
in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and
prohibition . . .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas
corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or
the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold
that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This
much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist."
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic
system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on
bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were sustained, on 'provisional' bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could
very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the
same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are
denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than one
year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and
the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent
court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications against the private respondents
dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created and
initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents
received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their counter-
affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and
preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
. . . The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete its pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as
other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge
investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered throughout
the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the
charges were completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the participation of petitioner in
several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and
no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military commission
is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release petitioner.
Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of
War, indefinite confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to
try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay
in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the government
filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on
March 4, 1991. The 48-hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after
notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private respondents'
contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No.
97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition
for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error
of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself
to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or
without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of
by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory
challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not
have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is
GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge
under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders
of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

RE: FIRST INDORSEMENT DATED JULY 21, 1992 OF HON. FERNANDO DE LEON, CHIEF STATE
PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. [A.M. No. 92-7-360-0. April 6, 1995.]
ALICIA BAYLON v. JUDGE DEODORO SISON
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTIONS; RULE ON NOTICE; VIOLATED IN PETITION FOR BAIL
FILED IN CASE AT BAR. — Complainant alleges that the prosecution was not given notice of the petition for bail at
least three (3) days prior to the scheduled hearing thereof. It bears emphasis that the petition for bail was filed in court
and a copy thereof served on the prosecution on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and was craftily set for hearing on
December 23, 1991, thereby giving the prosecution only one day, a Sunday at that, to prepare its opposition thereto.
The stratagem employed by the defense which virtually deprived the prosecution of an opportunity to adequately
counter the representations in its petition is too obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge condoned the same and
aggravated the situation by the unusual and precipitate haste with which the petition was granted by respondent
judge. On top of that, he exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of procedure by justifying his non-observance of
the three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the theory that the petition for bail is an
urgent motion and may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Such ratiocination, which espouses and reveals a
distorted notion as to the true nature and conditions of the right to bail, does violence to the well-established rule of
law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Given this contingency, respondent judge should have
carefully scrutinized the validity of the petition for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather than cavalierly
considering it outright as an urgent motion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the essence, since the ambient
circumstances obtaining prior to the grant of bail could not but have cautioned respondent judge to be more
circumspect in entertaining and resolving the petition therefore. First, the accused were charged with double murder,
each of which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not a matter of right. Second, no bail was
recommended in the information which was filed on the bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the
incident, thus constituting clear and strong evidence of the guilt of all the accused. Third, at the time of the application
for bail, there was still pending a reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It
must be noted that the reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any resultant delay caused
by the conduct thereof is naturally and logically attributable to them. And, finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of
the petition for bail on December 23, 1991, when the same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday,
readily casts doubt on the good faith in and the regularity of the procedure adopted by the defense. On the basis of
the foregoing considerations alone, we find no cogent reason whatsoever to justify respondent’s alacrity in ordering
the immediate release of the accused despite their somewhat extended confinement and, much less, could
respondent’s pretensions validly support a grant of bail.
3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; DISCHARGE OF DUTIES; RULE. — While the Court does not require perfection and
infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to fill the
position of administrators of justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to act with competence,
integrity and independence and should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. It is true that, generally, a judge cannot be held liable to account or answer criminally,
civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith. However, good faith
may be negated by the circumstances on record, as we have hereinbefore demonstrated. phil
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; ADMISSION TO BAIL; DISCRETION OF COURT MUST BE
GUIDED BY APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES. — While the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for
a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground." (Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206). Quintessentially, and as a
matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been
a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused. Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in
determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of
guilt against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHEN ACCUSED IS CHARGED WITH A SERIOUS OFFENSE PUNISHABLE
WITH RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH; HEARING, A REQUISITE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The
rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua to death, such
as murder, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing
thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution’s evidence of guilt is strong. Whether the
motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the court resolves the motion for
bail. It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence offered
by the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. In fact, such a summary with his
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense. The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein this Court has ruled that even if
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory
for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of
the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
REGALADO, J p:
The present administrative matter was initiated by a sworn letter-request 1 of Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City, dated June 18, 1992, charging Judge Deodoro J. Sison, presiding judge of Branch 40, Regional Trial
Court, Dagupan City, with utter disregard of judicial decorum by excessive display of interest in handling a case
assigned to and then pending in his branch. The said letter was sent to Chief State Prosecutor Fernando P. de Leon of
the Department of Justice who, in turn, indorsed the same to this Court for appropriate action as requested therein.
The records of this case show that on October 24, 1991, the Office of the City Prosecutor in Dagupan City filed an
information for double murder against several accused which was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10678, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Manolo Salcedo, et al.," and thereafter raffled to respondent judge.
Subsequently, the accused filed on November 8, 1991 a petition for reinvestigation which was granted by the trial
court in an order dated November 20, 1991, and the Office of the City Prosecutor was given until December 23, 1991 to
resolve the same. The reinvestigation was finally concluded by the said prosecutor on March 31, 1992. A petition for
review interposed therefrom by the accused was later dismissed by the Department of Justice in a resolution dated
May 8, 1992.
During the pendency of the reinvestigation, however, the accused filed a petition for bail on December 21, 1991, a
Saturday, and requested that it be set for hearing on December 23, 1991, the immediately following Monday. On this
latter date, according to an order handed down by respondent judge on June 8, 1992 2 the prosecution filed an
opposition to the petition for bail signed by Third Assistant City Prosecutor Chita Estrella D.N. Bonifacio and noted
by First Assistant City Prosecutor Silverio Q. Castillo, alleging inter alia, that the information was filed on the bases of
the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident which constitutes clear and strong evidence of the guilt
of all the accused; that to grant the petition for bail would preempt the outcome of the reinvestigation which was then
being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor at the instance of the accused, and also necessarily defeat the
purpose of said reinvestigation; and that the accused should at least wait for the outcome of the reinvestigation, which
they themselves sought, before any motion of the same import could be filed.
Nevertheless, on the very day and time specified by the accused, December 23, 1991 at 1:30 P.M., a hearing on the
petition was purportedly held by the trial court. Then, reportedly on the basis of a joint counter-affidavit of the
accused, an affidavit of one Oscar Villaga, a certification of entry in the police blotter, and the position paper
submitted by the accused, and allegedly because there was no objection on the part of the prosecution which was
supposedly represented by Third Assistant Prosecutor Rosita Castro, the court forthwith granted bail for the
provisional liberty of each accused in the amount of P40,000.00.
A motion for reconsideration of said order of December 23, 1991 was duly filed by the prosecution but the same was
denied by respondent judge on January 10, 1992. In his aforecited order of June 8, 1992 reiterating his denial of a
motion for his inhibition, he maintained that he had granted bail ostensibly "after due hearing and after a careful and
deliberate consideration of the pertinent affidavits and counter-affidavit, position papers and arguments advanced by
the parties." Respondent judge further stated therein that the prosecution did not ask for an opportunity to show that
the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.
Significantly, the aforestated orders of respondent judge of December 23, 1991 granting bail, and that dated January
10, 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, became the subject of a petition for certiorari filed by the prosecution and
were subsequently annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its judgment handed down in CA-G.R. SP No.
28384 on January 19, 1993.
In the meantime, immediately after the court had issued its order granting bail, Roberto Untalan, the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. D-10678, filed with the assistance of counsel on March 11, 1992 a motion for
respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case, 3 contending that such act of respondent judge "had invited our
serious doubt and less expectation of (an) impartial disposition of this case," and "that the instant case had plunged
(sic) into (a) network of intrigue and distrust creating thereby an animosity between us (litigants-complainants) and
the judicial system represented by the Honorable Court and in the last analysis, our grievance of justice is in grave
peril."
In an order dated March 25, 1991 (sic, should be 1992), respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit on the ground
that during the hearing on the petition for bail, the prosecution was represented by Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita
Castro who supposedly "interposed no objection to the granting of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which she
considered reasonable." He also argued therein that time was of the essence considering that all of the accused, except
for one Joel Doe, had been under detention since October 21, 1991 and that the City Prosecutor had not yet terminated
the reinvestigation as of December 23, 1991, hence "without determining whether the proper charge could be double
homicide," he granted said bail for the provisional liberty of the accused. 4
Private complainant moved for the reconsideration of said order contending that, aside from the court’s non-
observance of the three-day notice rule before the hearing, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro who happened to
be present during said hearing in Branch 40 was not duly authorized to appear for and in behalf of the prosecution in
Criminal Case No. D-10678 or to comment on the proceedings for bail, since she actually was sent by her office to
Branch 42 to move for the postponement of another case therein. 5 Attached thereto was an affidavit to that effect by
said assistant prosecutor. 6
On June 8, 1992, in an order of respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration and which has been earlier
adverted to, he insisted that in its opposition to the petition for bail and its motion for reconsideration of the order
granting bail, the prosecution never asked for an opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused
was strong; that during the hearing on the petition for bail, the assistant prosecutor did not raise any objection and
instead left the matter to the sound discretion of the court; that the alleged lack of due process had been cured by the
filing of the motion for reconsideration and the motion to inhibit; that the motion to inhibit constituted forum
shopping; and that from the narration of facts and events, the prosecution failed to convince the court that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.
Respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison stands charged with the now familiar malfeasance of granting bail in a non-
bailable offense without benefit of notice and hearing. Specifically, it is averred that the prosecution was not given
notice of at least three days before the scheduled hearing on the petition for bail, in violation of the mandate under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and, worse, with two non-working days between the filing and the hearing of
the petition. It is likewise contended that during the controverted hearing on December 23, 1991, the prosecution,
which was not even duly represented, was not given the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused
was strong.
Required to comment thereon, respondent judge tried to justify his assailed orders by claiming that he honestly
believes that he did not commit a serious and grave abuse of discretion; that he granted the petition for bail because
the assistant prosecutor present at the hearing did not interpose any objection thereto; that the prosecution never
requested, either in its opposition to the petition for bail or in its motion for reconsideration of his adverse order, that
it be allowed to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong but, instead, submitted the incident for
resolution; that the motion for reconsideration of the order granting bail was denied only after due hearing and after a
careful and judicious consideration of the pertinent affidavits, counter-affidavit, position papers and arguments
submitted by the parties; that the lack of previous notice was cured by the filing of the motion for reconsideration
since, in the application of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not the lack of previous notice but the
denial of the opportunity to be heard; that the claim of Assistant City Prosecutor Rosita Castro that there was no
hearing held on December 23, 1991 is negated by the testimonies given in A.M. No. RTJ-92-822 by defense counsel
Atty. Constante Rueca, Officer-in-Charge Gloria Beltran, Court Stenographer Tripina Tigno, and herein respondent;
that a judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith; and that the filing
of the complaint is pure and simple harassment. 7
In a resolution 8 dated May 4, 1993, this Court referred the administrative matter at bar to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records of this
case. However, it was only two (2) years thereafter, or on February 10, 1995 when, after repeated inquiries, the said
office submitted its report and recommendation with the explanation that it had to verify whether the issue raised in
the instant case is pertinent to another pending administrative case involving the same parties. It made no
manifestation or submission in the interim.
The Court views with displeasure and chagrin the chronology of events which, even if true, caused the supervenience
of a grossly unreasonable delay in the resolution of this simple administrative matter, to the inevitable prejudice and
frustration of the offended parties and the prosecution in the criminal case involved. This is a situation which this
Court has assiduously tried to avoid and obviate, since it tarnishes the judicial image, fuels suspicions and
speculations, and creates an unfair climate of misperception and distrust. We shall not clutter this decision with the
pointless mea culpae of the parties responsible, but this Court is not beyond expressing its profound regrets for this
distressing episode and shall redouble its efforts to prevent any repetition thereof.
Nonetheless, prescinding from the regrettably lackadaisical manner with which this case was handled by the Office of
the Court Administrator, we are constrained to agree with its finding that respondent judge is indeed guilty as
charged, as well as its recommendation for a much belated administrative sanction to be imposed on him.
Complainant alleges that the prosecution was not given notice of the petition for bail at least three (3) days prior to the
scheduled hearing thereof. It bears emphasis that the petition for bail was filed in court and a copy thereof served on
the prosecution on December 21, 1991, a Saturday, and was craftily set for hearing on December 23, 1991, thereby
giving the prosecution only one day, a Sunday at that, to prepare its opposition thereto. The stratagem employed by
the defense which virtually deprived the prosecution of an opportunity to adequately counter the representations in
its petition is too obvious to be ignored. Yet respondent judge condoned the same and aggravated the situation by the
unusual and precipitate haste with which the petition was granted by respondent judge.
On top of that, he exacerbated his disregard of settled rules of procedure by justifying his non-observance of the three-
day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on the theory that the petition for bail is an urgent
motion and may therefore be heard on shorter notice. Such ratiocination, which espouses and reveals a distorted
notion as to the true nature and conditions of the right to bail, does violence to the well-established rule of law
that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. 9 Given this contingency, respondent judge should have
carefully scrutinized the validity of the petition for bail and the veracity of its allegations, rather than cavalierly
considering it outright as an urgent motion.
There are two main arguments invoked and relied on by respondent judge to support and justify his grant of bail to
the accused, namely, that time was of the essence, considering that the accused had been detained since October 21,
1991; and that the prosecution failed to interpose an objection to the granting of bail and to ask for an opportunity to
prove the strength of the evidence of guilt against the accused.
We reject the first tenuous proposition that time was of the essence, since the ambient circumstances obtaining prior to
the grant of bail could not but have cautioned respondent judge to be more circumspect in entertaining and resolving
the petition therefore. First, the accused were charged with double murder, each of which is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death, hence bail is not a matter of right. Second, no bail was recommended in the information which was
filed on the bases of the sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the incident, thus constituting clear and strong
evidence of the guilt of all the accused. 10 Third, at the time of the application for bail, there was still a pending
reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor. It must be noted that the
reinvestigation was at the instance of the accused themselves, hence any resultant delay caused by the conduct thereof
is naturally and logically attributable to them. And, finally, the guileful setting of the hearing of the petition for bail on
December 23, 1991, when the same was filed only on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday, readily casts doubt on
the good faith in and the regularity of the procedure adopted by the defense.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations alone, and even without the further elaboration correctly advanced by
complainant in representation of her office, we find no cogent reason whatsoever to justify respondent’s alacrity in
ordering the immediate release of the accused despite their somewhat extended confinement and, much less, could
respondent’s pretensions validly support a grant of bail.
Respondent judge asseverates that he honestly believes that he did not commit a serious and grave abuse of
discretion. He hastens to add the handy and oft-invoked defense that he cannot be held administratively liable for an
erroneous decision rendered in good faith.
Respondent should not hide behind that axiom so often resorted to, it may be now be said, to the point of abuse.
While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge
of duty by those who are selected to fill the position of administrators of justice. Moreover, the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to act with competence, integrity and independence and should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 11 It is true that, generally, a judge cannot
be held liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or decision
rendered by him in good faith. However, good faith may be negated by the circumstances on record, 12 as we have
hereinbefore demonstrated. LLphil
We agree that bail in this case, not being a matter of right, must be addressed to the sound discretion of respondent
judge. But this does not mean, however, a lubricious and untrammeled exercise of such discretion. We have held that
admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the
applicable legal principles, to wit:
". . . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding
applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining
whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within
the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
"Accordingly, while the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in
a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may resolve the motion for
bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process,
and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." 13
Quintessentially, and as a matter of law, the discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be
exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused.
Peremptorily, the discretion lies, not in determining whether or not there will be a hearing, but in appreciating and
evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence
thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. 14
This brings us to the second and main contention of respondent judge. He would want to impress upon this Court
that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to seek permission from the trial court to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, and that when it failed to do so in any of its pleadings filed with the court, respondent
judge was left with no other recourse but to grant the application for bail. He likewise asserts that the prosecution
failed to interpose an objection during the hearing on the petition for bail. Such arguments are deplorably specious
and lamentably absurd.
The rule is explicit that when an accused is charged with a serious offense punishable with reclusion perpetua to death,
such as murder, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the accused and a hearing
thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the prosecution’s evidence of guilt is strong. Whether the
motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the
course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused, before the court resolves the motion for
bail. 15
It is accordingly settled that an order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence offered by the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused. 16 In fact, such a summary with his evaluation of
the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.
The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few cases wherein this Court has ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for
the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the
evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
Thus, in the aforecited case of Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., 17 it was there held that even where the prosecutor refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of the People’s evidence or judge the adequacy vel non of the amount of bail.
This was reiterated in the recent case of Aguirre, et al., vs. Belmonte, etc. 18 where we said that the error committed by
the therein respondent judge in granting bail cannot be corrected by the mere failure of the prosecution to file a
motion for cancellation thereof or a clarification of his order.
In Libarios vs. Dabalos, 19 we emphasized that irrespective of respondent judge’s opinion that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demands that a hearing be conducted before bail
can be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified. LLpr
Where the prosecutor does not oppose the application for bail and refuses to satisfy his burden of proof, but the court
has reasons to believe that the prosecutor’s attitude is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error
or a dereliction of duty, it has been ruled in the early case of Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, et al. 20 that, in the
paramount interest of justice, the court must inquire from the prosecutor as to the nature of his evidence to determine
whether or not it is strong, it being possible for the prosecutor to have erred in considering it weak and, therefore, in
recommending bail.
Finally, in the most recent case of Tucay vs. Domagas 21 it was categorically stressed that although the provincial
prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the
latter was not really contesting the bail application. Additionally, it must be borne in mind that a hearing is also
necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in
fixing the amount of bail. Only after respondent judge has satisfied himself that these requirements have been met can
he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.
The obstinate persistence of respondent judge in posturing that he did conduct a hearing on December 23, 1991 is
belied by the fact that the order granting bail, the contents of which could merely be deduced after a careful perusal of
the records of the case and the other orders issued by him in view of the parties’ failure to present the same, leaves
much to be desired. For one, it does not contain the requisite summary of the evidence presented by the parties and
necessary to support the grant of bail. What appears from the records is that the petition for bail was granted on the
basis merely of the joint counter-affidavit of the accused, and possibly of a witness, and the position paper of the
accused. The prosecution was not even given the chance to cross-examine the accused on their counter-affidavit. Mere
affidavits or recitals of their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence, hence they cannot legally
form the basis of an order granting bail. 22
As a final note, we take judicial cognizance of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28384,
promulgated on January 19, 1993, which annulled and set aside the orders dated December 23, 1991 and January 10,
1992 issued by herein respondent judge. The disquisitions therein of said appellate court serve to further strengthen
the merits of our findings and the necessity for the present administrative disciplinary proceeding.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of discretion. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE of P20,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will definitely be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to the personal records of respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison. cdll
Considering that the offense involved in this administrative matter was committed way back on December 23, 1991,
this judgment is immediately final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Baylon v. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, [April 6, 1995], 313 PHIL 99-119)
RICARDO MANOTOC, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986.]
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; PROHIBITION AGAINST LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES, A
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. — A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of
the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of
the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not
extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. — Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT. — Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping
him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. — The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the
prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their
charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original
imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the
person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court
is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he
would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHEPHERD CASE (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) DIFFERENTIATED FROM CASE AT
BAR. — To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs.
Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage: ". . . The law obliges
the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit such
undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the
Philippines and not demandable if the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of
bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the
granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring that
liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country." The faith reposed by petitioner on the
above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a
serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail
does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to show the
urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel
thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this
case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above.
6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; LACK OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WAS PREMISED ON THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO
SATISFY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE URGENCY OF HIS TRAVEL. — As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial
courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to
the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission
to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have
been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she
would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL; IMPAIRED BY ORDER OF
THE TRIAL COURT RELEASING PETITIONER ON BAIL. — The constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: "The liberty of abode and of
travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health." To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail
constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
FERNAN, J p:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a criminal
indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and the
Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of
professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former corporation. LexLib
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction, petitioner,
who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc
Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for
Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management
committee was organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then
Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect
was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake, six of its clients
filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president,
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the
investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400,
assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all
cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as
surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the
country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The
order of Judge Camilon dated March 9, 1982, reads:
"Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all embracing ground that his trip is '. . .
relative to his business transactions and opportunities.'
"The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is discerned to warrant judicial
imprimatur on the proposed trip.
"In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future until these two
(2) cases are terminated." 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
"6. — Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would allow the accused to leave the
Philippines the surety companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they could no longer be held
liable in their undertakings because it was the Court which allowed the accused to go outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to return.
"WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED." 3
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall or withdrawal of
the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4 seeking to annul the
orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-
request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security
Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.
On October 5,1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Pending
resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion
for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in
connection "with the obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8 He attached the letter dated
August 9, 1984 of the chief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W.
Miller 9 requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies who would be involved in its
investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the
ground that after verification of the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . (he) was not in any way
connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to
him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as
Judge Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases
before him, ordered merely the informations amended so as to delete the allegation that petitioner was president and
to substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder," 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. prLL
On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go abroad pendente
lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail
nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who
is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and
at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper
officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may
require of him." 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404
(1935).
". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts.
"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released
thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers
of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The
sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the
principal from leaving the state." 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the
sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite
the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion
for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs. Shepherd
(C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:
". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the pleasure of the Court. . . . The law
does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial
confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most important
consequence of bail, albeit provisional is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as without the
boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence
expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country."
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather broad and
generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly
declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason
suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to show the
urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel
thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this
case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his comment:
"A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it is solely predicated on
petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and
search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason
can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is
absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged business
transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner's
absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities
therein, nor is there any showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause him irreparable
damage or prejudice." 15
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner
merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the
accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the
government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the
sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be
discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result has
been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of other cases, or to
permit the principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge
Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before
said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration
thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their
having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary
results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to
leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution states:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in
the interest of national security, public safety or public health."
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by
the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court finds that no
gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, [May 30, 1986], 226 PHIL 75-85)
GOVERNMENT OF USA vs. Hon. GUILLERMO PURGANAN; and MARK JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO CRESPO.
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.]
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner US government filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the procedure adopted by the trial
court of first hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez, before issuing a warrant for his arrest under Section 6
of PD No. 1069. Petitioner contended that the procedure gives Jimenez notice to escape and to avoid extradition.
Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting of Jimenez's prayer for bail, which allows him to go on provisional
liberty while extradition proceedings are pending.
Petitioner no longer filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court, but resorted directly to the Supreme
Court instead of the Court of Appeals to obtain relief.
The Supreme Court allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to settle once and
for all the issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court held that the present extradition case validates the premise that persons
sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Prior acts of respondent eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all costs.
Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge to set the hearing for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest when it was already evident from the Petition for Extradition itself and its supporting documents that a prima
facie finding did exist and he may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused; that there is no requirement
to notify and to hear the accused before the issuance of a warrant of arrest under the Constitution which requires only
an examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce; and that since
accused were allowed to be heard and to present evidence at this early stage, the procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial, which is discordant with the rationale for the entire system
and anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
The Court also held that extraditee's immediate detention prior to his being heard does not violate the due process
clause; that the right to bail applies only in ordinary criminal proceedings; but that in extradition proceedings, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception. DScTaC
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; SUPREME COURT MAY ALLOW A DIRECT
INVOCATION OF ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRITS OF CERTIORARI WHEN THERE ARE
SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT REASONS THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. — [T]his Court has allowed a direct invocation
of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. In the
interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best
to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as
yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; PERSONS TO BE EXTRADITED ARE
PRESUMED TO BE FLIGHT RISKS; CASE AT BAR. — Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.
This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state. The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent — (1) leaving the requesting state
right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable —
eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at
all cost: These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has
the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing
a second time?
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEITHER TREATY NOR THE EXTRADITION LAW REQUIRE A HEARING BEFORE ISSUING A
WARRANT OF ARREST OF PROBABLE EXTRADITEE; REASONS; CASE AT BAR. — It is significant to note that
Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare
and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The
law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. By using the phrase "if it
appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not
expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing
of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good
first impression — a prima facie finding — sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused. Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon
failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that
stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. aECTcA
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; SETTING FOR
HEARING A REQUEST FOR THE ARREST OF AN EXTRADITEE AFTER HAVING ALREADY DETERMINED
FROM SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS THAT A PRIMA FACIE FINDINGS EXISTS, A CASE OF; CASE AT BAR. — It
is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to
make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to
"best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In
point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. We stress that
the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined
therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter
for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
5. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; NOTICE AND HEARING NOT
REQUIRED BEFORE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST. — Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution,
which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination —
under oath or affirmation — of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
6. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; PROPER PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE
JUDGE UPON RECEIPT OF A PETITION FOR EXTRADITION. — Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem
it wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable.
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the
petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is
determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same
time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best
serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
7. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; APPLIES ONLY TO ORDINARY
CRIMINAL CASES AND NOT TO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. — As suggested by the use of the word
"conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply
to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover,
the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue. IaSAHC
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.
However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power
to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process
is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the
"life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its
application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; SUFFICIENCY OF A SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
ONCE EXTRADITEE IS PLACED UNDER THE EXTRADITION COURT'S CUSTODY, EXPLAINED; CASE AT BAR.
— Contrary to the contention, of Jimenez his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We reiterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances — such as those present in an extradition case — call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his
right to due process and fundamental fairness. Contrary to his contention, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the
immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is
sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ's filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that
the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge's
independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court's custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-
initial-bail rule.
BELLOSILLO, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; POWER TO ADMIT BAIL EXISTS IN
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS UNDER "EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES." — The government maintains that
an extradition court has no power to authorize bail in the absence of any law conferring such power; and that the 1987
Constitution, as well as the Rules of Court, as amended, applies only to persons arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine Laws, but not to extradition proceedings in which courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. The argument is as ingenious as it is fallacious. It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in
extradition proceedings, although as a matter of policy it may only be granted under "exceptional circumstances."
This, quintessentially, has been the doctrine advocated in a cavalcade of American cases starting with Wright v. Henkel,
190 US 40 (1902); and worth mentioning, of course, are Paretti Y. United States, 112 F. 3d 1363 (1977), Bealieu v. Hartigan,
430 F. Supp. 915 (1977), and In re Kirby, et al., 106 F. 3d 855 (1996); which are also discussed extensively by Mr. Justice
Puno. . . . Truly, there is neither logic nor persuasion to the suggestion that bail should only be allowed in criminal
cases, or that class of cases where courts must "render judgments of conviction or acquittal." Bail as a remedy is
available where there is deprivation of liberty prior or during trial. In the 1909 case of United States v. Go Siaco, akin to
the situation confronting us, but involving a deportation proceeding, this Court allowed the potential deportee to post
bail although a deportation proceeding is not criminal in nature and there was then no law providing for bail in
deportation cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RISK OF FLIGHT DOES NOT IPSO FACTO CALL FOR DENIAL OF BAIL; CASE AT BAR. — We
cannot curtail a citizen's right to freedom on speculations and fears where there exist reasonable mechanisms
appropriate to address them. To my mind, the risk of flight does not ipso facto call for denying his right to bail. Trial
judges must henceforth weigh carefully and judiciously other methods to assure the presence of the accused during
the proceedings and right after, when he ought to be deported already. Bail may be set at huge amounts or passports
cancelled and hold-departure orders issued or border patrols heightened, in order that the extraditee may not flee
from our jurisdiction. In this regard, while I agree that it is the extraditee's burden to prove the least likelihood of
flight, the extradition court is also entitled to presume that the executive branch has done all it can to forestall his
sudden disappearance. The executive branch cannot plead its helplessness and inutility to defeat the grant of bail to
the extraditee. In any event, all things being equal, the personal circumstances of respondent Jimenez would negate
any idea of flight risk. He is a popular, even notorious, fellow whose face is more frequently than others plastered in
the tri-media. His stature as representative for a congressional district in Manila makes escape from Philippine
jurisdiction not only embarrassing for him but also constitutive of the offense of abandonment of duty. His family and
business interests are said to be strategically placed in this country. Indeed, where respondent Jimenez has more to
lose from flight, the possibility thereof appears remote and speculative. CIaHDc
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY; EXTRADITING JUDGE HAS THE
DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO NOTIFY AND HEAR A POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE 'BEFORE
ORDERING HIS ARREST. — I submit that the decision whether to send notice to an extraditee and hear him before ordering
his arrest should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge. This is crystal clear from section 6 of P.D. No.
1069. . . . Under this provision, the issuance of a warrant of arrest is dependent on a big "if" or to an all important
condition . . . if it will serve the ends of justice. The determination of whether a warrant of arrest against an extraditee
will serve the ends of justice is certainly not a cut and dried duty. It involves the appreciation of highly contentious
facts, both objective and subjective in nature. Their appreciation requires a judicial mind honed in the law of evidence.
The history of extradition will reveal that, initially, the task of determining whether an extraditee should be
immediately arrested was given to the executive authorities of the extraditing state. The matter, in other words, was
treated purely as an executive function but unfortunately, the practice was given to abuses. Recognizing that certain
human rights are universal in nature and beyond violation, the task of adjudging whether a potential extraditee
should be immediately arrested pending his extradition proceeding was transferred to judges. The office of the judge
was called upon to insure that fundamental fairness is not denied to a potential extraditee. The extraditing judge is
not to act as a stamp pad but has to exercise his sound discretion on whether to issue the warrant. Under our law on
extradition, P.D. No. 1069, Section 6, the discretion of the extradition judge on whether to order the arrest of the
extraditee is guided by the following consideration . . . whether the arrest will serve the ends of justice. The grant of
this judicial discretion will be rendered naught if we subject the action of the extraditing judge to unnecessary fetters.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE SILENCE OF OUR EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OUR
EXTRADITION LAW (P.D. NO. 1069) DOES NOT NEGATE THE RIGHT TO BAIL OF A POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE.
— The mere silence of our extradition treaty with the United States and our extradition law (P.D. No. 1069) does not
negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee. Our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as international norms, customs and practices support an
extraditee's right to bail. But while an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant depends on presentation of clear and
convincing evidence that the extraditee will not frustrate the ends of justice by fleeing from our jurisdiction.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; TREATIES; TREATY LAWS, LIKE ALL OTHER MUNICIPAL LAWS,
ARE SUBJECT TO THE PARAMETERS SET FORTH IN THE CONSTITUTION. — Treaty laws, particularly those
which are self-executing, have equal stature as national statutes and, like all other municipal laws, are subject to the
parameters set forth in the Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant and a circumscription of government
authority by the sovereign people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power and its limitation upon which an act of
government is justly measured. This instrument contains a rule for all agencies of the government and any act in
opposition thereto can only be struck down as being invalid and without effect. When the great Charter gives a
mandate, the government can do no less than to accept it; its rejection would be an act of betrayal. The edict in its Bill
of Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the fundamental right to bail, is clear. No statute or treaty can
abrogate or discard its language and its intent. . . . Nowhere in the Extradition Treaty with the United States is the
grant of bail mentioned but so also it is not prohibited. This obscurity must not be held to negate the right to bail; on
the contrary, it should be viewed as allowing, at the very least, the evident intendment and spirit of the fundamental
law to prevail. aSDCIE
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; MUST APPLY TO EXTRADITION
PROCEEDINGS WHICH HAS ALL THE EARMARKS OF A CRIMINAL PROCESS. — The draft ponencia would
assume that the Constitution confines the grant of provisional liberty to criminal cases, and that it has no application
to extradition proceedings. This assumption would have reason for being if it were solely in criminal cases that a
person could face an imminent threat of deprivation of his right to life or liberty, for indeed, it is this threat, rather
than the case nomenclature, that must be the focus, and it would be superficial to think otherwise. While defying a
neat definition, extradition has all the earmarks of a criminal process — an extraditee would suffer deprivations, be
denied his freedom and restricted in his movements, not much unlike a criminal indictee. Extradition proceedings
involve an extended restraint of liberty following arrest, peculiar to an accused in a criminal case, which can even be
more severe than an accompanying detention in a single state, for, at a minimum, it can mean protracted proceedings
in both the asylum state and the demanding state and a forced transportation in between. In Herras Teehankee vs.
Rovira, the Court observed that bail is constitutionally available to all persons, even those against whom no formal
charges are filed.
CARPIO, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL; RIGHT AVAILABLE TO AN ACCUSED
IN DOMESTIC CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS; EXTRADITEE CANNOT INVOKE RIGHT TO BAIL IN
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION. — The right to bail is a constitutional right available to an accused in domestic
criminal proceedings except in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher when evidence of guilt is strong. An
extraditee, however, cannot invoke this constitutional right in international extradition because extradition
proceedings are not criminal proceedings. Extradition proceedings are like deportation and court martial proceedings
where there is no constitutional right to bail.
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION; ESSENCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — In essence,
extradition is police assistance extended by a state to arrest a person charged with a crime in another state and
surrender him to the authorities of that state. The power to arrest by the assisting state is legitimized by a treaty, which
has the force of a statute and forms part of municipal law. The benefit of extradition is the mutual assistance between
states in criminal law enforcement across national boundaries. The assisting state acts as an arresting agent and in
some jurisdictions the extradition process is mainly an executive function. Even under our extradition treaties, the
final decision whether to extradite or not rests with the President of the Philippines, not with the courts. Thus
ordinarily an assisting state does not grant bail to the extraditee whose recourse is to apply for bail before the court of
the state where he is charged with a crime. The assisting state, however, for equity considerations may choose to
accord bail to the extraditee. One equity consideration is to put extraditees in one country in equal footing with
extraditees in the country of the treaty partner. Another equity consideration is to grant the right to bail, in carefully
limited exceptions, to preserve and enforce fundamental rights. This rule will not change the situation for extraditee
Mark B. Jimenez in the instant case because Jimenez has failed to establish that he is not a flight risk. Having fled the
United States just as he was about to be indicted for several serious crimes, Jimenez is presumed to be a flight risk for
extradition purposes in this country. Jimenez has not successfully rebutted this presumption before the extradition
court. Jimenez has also refused to honor his agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, made in August 1998
through his U.S. counsel, to return to the United States where he faces a maximum prison term of not less than 100
years if convicted on all counts, Given his resources, and the gravity of the charges against him, Jimenez remains a
serious flight risk.
YNAREZ-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; DUE PROCESS IS ESSENTIAL
IN ALL COURT PROCEEDINGS — CRIMINAL, CIVIL, INVESTIGATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE OR SUI GENERIS;
CASE AT BAR. — I submit that we must consider the implications of a ruling that in criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused must be protected, but in case neither criminal nor civil, one which we call "sui
generis," basic freedoms become irrelevant and non-available. A non-criminal proceeding, less onerous and repulsive
to society than prosecution for crime, and where the penalty is only to be brought for trial before the court with
jurisdiction, is stripped of guarantees and protections given to hard-boiled recidivists pending arrest and trial. We
have denied a prospective extraditee the right to be informed before trial of the nature and cause of the charges
against him. Due process is essential in all court proceedings — criminal civil, investigatory, administrative, or
even sui generis, a class the Court uses as an excuse to justify deprivation of that most elemental of rights, the right of
notice. The Court has ruled that respondent Mark Jimenez or any other person sought to be extradited must first be
exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public denunciation in court before he may be informed of what
the requesting State has against him. The right to notice before trial is denied. The majority opinion states that a
prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant of arrest can be issued against him.
Worse, he is denied the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. All the
jurisprudence explaining the parameters of the unreasonable searches and seizures provision of
the Constitution becomes inapplicable. The petition for extradition and its attachments take the place of probable
cause. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons including those not charged with
any crime. But now, we create an unusual exception. It is not available to one who may be seized against his will for
possible extradition to a country where his innocence or guilt will first be determined. Arrest and imprisonment will
become virtually certain in extradition proceedings. The only thing required of the Court is to go over the request for
extradition and its supporting documents. Arrest is virtually assured because of the absence of notice and hearing. It
is inconceivable that the officials of a requesting State would be so dense or careless as to fail to include in the request
for extradition a prima facie showing that the respondent deserves to be seized and forcibly brought to the foreign
country for trial. According to the majority opinion, from the forwarded documents, we expect the trial court to
"merely . . . get a good first impression sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused." This novel doctrine justifying the near certainty of automatic arrest and detention goes
against this Court's decision, too numerous to mention, protecting citizens and aliens alike from unreasonable arrests
or seizures. Can we expect anything other than a "good first impression" to arise from the mere reading of a request
for extradition? IcDCaT
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BAIL; SHOULD APPLY TO PERSONS FACING TRIAL FOR EXTRADITION. — The Court
should apply the same principles on the right to bail found in the Constitution to persons facing trial for extradition.
Thus, all persons; except those where the probability of flight is clear and present or the crimes for which extradition
is sought are heinous, shall before judgment in the extradition proceedings, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even where the
requesting country is one with which the Philippines maintains strong ties. Excessive bail shall not be required.
PANGANIBAN, J.p:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest
can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is "No." The explanation of and
the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated
May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed
Order set for hearing petitioner's application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B.
Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail
to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez.
Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration
Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for
respondent's temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
"Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez
into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to G.R. No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent
to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and
0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known
as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted
them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the
RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this
Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court — by a vote of 9-6 — dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered
to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an
identical vote of 9-6 — after three justices changed their votes — it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It
held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ,
filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case
No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection
with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to
commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections
441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for
the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-
Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner's application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001.
In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the
accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its
questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. "The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II. "The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty
because:
'1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.
'2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the
Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition
proceedings.
'3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
'4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not
a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
'5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence
of 'special circumstances' which may justify release on bail.
'6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief
that he will not flee.
'7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its
obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
'8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled 'Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs.
The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,' CA- G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in
granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders."' 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition
for Certiorari arising from petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the
Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that
will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues. SDIaCT
The Court's Ruling: The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters: Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1)
the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and
position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the
assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely
urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and
(4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition
is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the
parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a
binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but, the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other
courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will
render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity
to flee and, thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain
exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before
availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have
already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature,
the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there
are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
"[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero
vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
'. . . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. . . . .'
"Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by
the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, . . . requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court
of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
"That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
'Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly
to the merits of the case.'
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
"This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in
cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it
best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there
is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates
of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on
extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its
intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines
is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised
here.
1 . Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the
custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to
another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly,
governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international
boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective
instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system that has been devised
to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international
law. 31
"An important practical effect . . . of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction
competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the
extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime
within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. . . . . From an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious
criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
"The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are
becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization.
One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten
the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international
crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2 . The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
other's legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representative's signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic
rights of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given,
upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place
therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its
unconstitutionality.
3 . The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis — in a class by itself
— they are not.
"An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of
an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding
is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal
proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent
standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited 'upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.' Finally,
unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding,
our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The
United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the
equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of
the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in
needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a
person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not
part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 39
4 . Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch
ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other
hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community.
Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that
hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This
principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as
set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, where it has done all that the
treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the
other government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a
position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5 . There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to
flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent — (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of
his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable — eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to
an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee.
Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue: Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC — informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest — gives him notice to escape
and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that
those sought to be extradited — including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals — may invoke it in future
extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his
constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting
forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in
court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
"SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest, Hearing, Service of Notices. — (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer
the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having
received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date
for the hearing thereof.
"(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan's act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest? We rule in the negative.
1 . On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from
them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can
no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the
whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears,"' the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early
stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression — a prima facie finding — sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1)
Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage — trial attorney in the Campaign
Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary
Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to
120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the
Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix"
with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to
make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to
"best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In
point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second
questioned Order, he stated:
"In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein
respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against
the extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set
the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to
answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing"
is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law
could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in
nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
"It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If,
therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the
more reasonable to the less reasonable . . . ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and
setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been
defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
2 . On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination
— under oath or affirmation — of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify
and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a
hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we
required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing
a warrant of arrest:
"Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the
certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting
the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the
entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima
facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of
defenses at this stage — if he so desires — in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert
the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the
main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of
a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one
— not the opposite — would be justified in view of respondent's demonstrated predisposition to flee. aDHCAE
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon
as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with
the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the
submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in
spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
"Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons,
including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case
of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature
of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail
to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only
in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to
grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not
before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of . . .
liberty . . . without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. 64 Where the circumstances — such as those present in an extradition case — call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his
right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty
prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ's
filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the
requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge's independent prima facie determination that
his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once
he is under the court's custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws.
His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in
order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for
Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned
pales against the government's interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the
world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due
process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government
interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of
violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be
extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision — in the Constitution,
the law or the treaty — expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not
granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to
hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short
their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place
with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.
Exceptions to the "No Bail" Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to
protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to
include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or
property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been
arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the
nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the
courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral
interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to
grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now
discuss them.
1 . Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On
that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not
persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled
thus:
"When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a
person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may
no longer serve his full term in office.
"In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
"The Constitution guarantees: '. . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.' This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.
"Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as
all persons validly confined under law?
"The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the 'mandate of the people' are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties
of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending
on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a
mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
"A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in
favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
"The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
"We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have
been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention
pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule
against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2 . Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to
confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases
are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes
conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address
issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite
another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be
justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3 . Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition
request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of
the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward
to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet
fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has
been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with
the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The
parties — in particular, Respondent Jimenez — have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial
court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent's claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC
set for hearing not only petitioner's application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent's prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the
application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the
Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard their in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally
observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties —
particularly the potential extraditee — have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings — entitled
"Manifestations" by both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent — in which the main topic was
Mr. Jimenez's plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again
hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal
propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no
need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies
in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal
reasoning.
In short, this Court — as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions
written by the learned justices themselves — has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant
questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very
delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is
prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits,
not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and
breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential
extraditees.
Summation: As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to
assist the requesting state in bringing the accused — or the fugitive who has illegally escaped — back to its territory,
so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter
to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is
determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are
necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court's request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who
is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the
reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima
facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case
exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of
absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b)
there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved.
Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the
conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has
broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise
grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the
way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner's simple request to return a fugitive.
Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably
delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with
the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,
delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark
Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed
to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our
Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, [September 24, 2002], 438 PHIL 417-530)

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN

[G.R. No. 148571. December 17, 2002.]
RESOLUTION
Before the Court are private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 October 2002, petitioner's Comment
thereon dated 05 November 2002, private respondent's Motion for Leave of Court to File and to Admit Additional
Arguments in Support of Motion for Reconsideration dated November 6, 2002, and Reply (to petitioner's Comment)
dated November 26, 2002.
First,private respondent insists that the Extradition Court acted properly in granting bail to him. We have already
exhaustively discussed this issue in our Decision and in the Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
Thus, we will not belabor our ruling on this point. Suffice it to say that petitioner's repeated invocation of the
Extradition Court's grant of bail has not convinced us that he deserves bail under the exception laid down in our
Decision, namely, "(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exists special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein."
There has been no clear and convincing showing as to the absence of flight risk and the non-endangerment of the
community, or as to the existence of special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances justifying grant of bail.
Second,private respondent claims that our Decision did not make an express finding of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the lower court. This is incorrect. On page 24 of our Decision, we plainly stated: "Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez." Such grave abuse continued to characterize the
subsequent actions of Judge Purganan in illegally granting bail to private respondent. Again, we will not repeat here
why respondent does not deserve temporary liberty. This point has been already exhaustively taken up in our
Decision and in the Opinions individually written by the members of the Court.
Further, contrary to Jimenez's claims, the Extradition Court did not negate the flight risk posed by him. It did not
make a finding on flight risk as it considered the issue irrelevant, having already determined bail to be a matter of
right. Without making any finding on flight risk, it found the capacity to flee subservient to "the benefits that
respondent may be able to deliver to his constituents" despite the absence from the records of evidence showing the
existence of such benefits.
And in any event, in his Memorandum, private respondent submitted factual issues — i.e.,existence of special
circumstances and absence of flight risk — for the consideration of this Court. He even reiterated some of those
factual submissions in his Motion for Reconsideration. He is therefore deemed estopped to claim that this Court
cannot, on certiorari, address factual issues and review and reverse the factual findings of the Extradition Court.
Third,private respondent's arguments (1) that the Extradition Court exercised due discretion in its grant of bail and (2)
that our "ruling that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases is contrary to prevailing law and jurisprudence"
are neither novel nor deserving of further rebuttal. Again, they have been extensively taken up in Decision as well as
in Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions.
Fourth,private respondent argues that allegedly our Decision violates his due process rights. Again, we have
discussed this matter in our Decision saying that, in its simplest concept, due process is merely the opportunity to be
heard — which opportunity need not always be a prior one. In point of fact, private respondent has been given more
than enough opportunity to be heard in this Court as well as in the Extradition Court. Even his Motion for
Reconsideration has been given all the chances to persuade by way of allowing "additional arguments" in his Motion
dated November 6, 2002 and Reply. These latter pleadings are normally not allowed, but precisely because this Court
wanted to give him more than enough opportunity to be heard and to argue, we have bent backwards and admitted
these additional pleadings.
Finally,private respondent contends that as a member of Congress, he is immune from arrest "arising from offenses
punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment," saying that he cannot be prevented from performing his
legislative duties because his constituents would be disenfranchised. He perorates that a member of Congress may be
suspended or removed from office only by two thirds vote of the House of Representatives. TaEIAS
Citing People v. Jalosjos,our Decision (pp. 38-40) has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument.
Furthermore, our Decision does not in any manner suspend or remove him from office. Neither his arrest or detention
arising from the extradition proceeding will constitute his suspension or removal from office. That is clear enough.
While equal protection and reasonable classifications are not directly in issue in this case, we nevertheless stress,
paraphrasing Jalosjos,that respondent's election to the position of congressman, with the concomitant duty to
discharge legislative functions, does not constitute a substantial differentiation which warrants placing him in a
classification or category apart from all other persons confined and deprived of their liberty pending resolution of
their extradition cases. We reiterate that lawful arrest and temporary confinement of a potential extraditee are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
As we have stated, the procedure adopted by the Extradition Court of first notifying and hearing a prospective
extraditee before the actual issuance of the warrant for his arrest, is tantamount to giving notice to flee and avoid
extradition. Whether a candidate for extradition does in fact go into hiding or not is beside the point. In the final
analysis, the method adopted by the lower court was completely at loggerheads with the purpose, object and rationale
of the law, and overlooked the evils to be remedied.
As already suggested in our Decision (p. 32),private respondent can avoid arrest and detention which are the
consequences of the extradition proceeding simply by applying for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him in the USA. He himself has repeatedly told us that the indictments against him in the United States are
bailable. Furthermore, he is capable, financially and otherwise, of producing the necessary bail in the US. Why then
has he not done so?
Otherwise stated, Respondent Jimenez has the actual power to lift his arrest and detention arising from his extradition
by simply and voluntarily going to and filing bail in the USA.
AT BOTTOM, private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration presents no new or substantial arguments which have
not been presented in his prior pleadings and which have not been taken up in our Decision. His present allegations
and asseverations are mere rehashes of arguments previously presented to us or are mere restatements of the Separate
and Dissenting Opinions which were already adequately discussed in our Decision. In short, private respondent has
not given any compelling reason to warrant a reversal or modification of our earlier rulings.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571 (Resolution), [December 17, 2002])

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION v. HON. FELIXBERTO OLALIA, JR.

and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ [G.R. No. 153675. April 19, 2007.]
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing
Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were
issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no
provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. HESAIT
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People's Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting
an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong
Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same
day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520,
praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of
the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch
10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed in the same case a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for
bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post
bail, thus: CaDATc
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused's further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and
answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of
this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in
favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure
order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest
office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the
assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be
noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent
judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation
of one's liberty. HCaIDS
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this
Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and
Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, 1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
. . . . As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ).
It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only
in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that
the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. ScTIAH
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent's case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law
who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human
rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to
states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every
person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 2 this
Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3 the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights
enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court,
to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words,
the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Court's ruling in Purganan is in order. caADSE
First, we note that the exercise of the State's power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have
likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to
bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to
persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of
the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. HDAaIc
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco 5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the
necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee
had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the
most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings. aEcADH
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons 6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, 7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainee's right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government." aSATHE
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal proceeding. 9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal,
an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
different nations. 11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-
blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. 13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial
or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest
of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall
not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of
extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December
20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2)
years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which
prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter,
the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points
out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind
the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is
a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that
he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee's
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee
of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a
flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. cITCAa
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch. SO ORDERED.
||| (Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, [April 19, 2007], 550 PHIL 63-
77)
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.]
BERSAMIN, J p:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial
power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is
to ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions
dated July 14, 2014 2 and August 8, 2014 3 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion to Fix Bail and his Motion for Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). 4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion 5 and Supplemental Opposition, 6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause
be found against him. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition. 7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile's motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on
the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under
the custody of the law. 8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. 9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. 10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, 11 and his Motion to Fix Bail, 12 both dated
July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. 13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that
he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail, disposing
thusly:
. . . [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a determination
that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only
then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for
bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the
Court to fix his bail.
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder, "the
maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim
on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he
voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit. TIADCc
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical
condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused's age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are considered
in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of
bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed resolution to deny Enrile's motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution. 15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong. cSEDTC
xxx xxx xxx
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxx xxx xxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile's guilt (if ever) is strong; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxx xxx xxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk. 16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and
burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be
excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of
plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances — his age and
his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age
of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment, 17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile's right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital
offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. 18 The presumption
of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail, 19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused. 20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. 21 The purpose
of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The
amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused's interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society's interest
in assuring the accused's presence at trial. 23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
. . . All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death. 25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless
he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. 26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. 27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is
a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. 28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; 29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or SDAaTC
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion
of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 30 "such discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be
granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. 31 The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.: 32
. . . Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a
hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for
it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong
objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of
whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution submits the issue on
whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
xxx xxx xxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule
114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard. AaCTcI
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means: —
. . . such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent
with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. 33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes
v. Catral, 34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application
for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied. acEHCD
3. n
Enrile's poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should
be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. 35
Enrile's averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only
argued that —
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion
temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in
Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense
that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused's favor. 36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile's averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua, 37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial
court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile's petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.
The Court is further mindful of the Philippines' responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
. . . uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or
arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. 38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon
a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. 39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his
being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he
had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk. 40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history's judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but
which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, 41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH),
classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to
be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following: SDHTEC
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1,
1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
(Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound). 42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks to the
life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including
recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under
stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered
by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration
in patients with asthma or COPD. 43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile's advanced age and ill health required special medical
attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, 44 was not even recommended by
the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical
support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National
Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON: AScHCD
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in
your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we
have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor. 45
xxx xxx xxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger
his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The
People's Court: 46
. . . This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
. . . [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently
of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should,
regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the
prisoner to bail; 47 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is actually
suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that
in said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine
are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner's previous petition for bail was denied by the
People's Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the
implied purpose of the People's Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People's
Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases,
among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid
Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the
People's Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on bail. 48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only
aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail — whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice — that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting
the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of
the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age
of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail. Grave abuse
of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction. 50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ
of certiorari ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in
Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner
Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan;
and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for
some other lawful cause. AcICHD
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847 , [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL 147-215)