People v.
Manantan Civil Code Article 13:
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a
violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation
conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime
charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon
defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section
54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that
a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed
the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited
by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue:
Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code
Held:
Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The
maxim ‘casus omisus’ can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established. The application of the rule of ‘casus omisus’ does not proceed
from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense
the term 'judge' includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while
acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who
are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the
peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of
peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and
broader term ‘judge’, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts
of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of
Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set aside the
dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the
merits.
When the law speaks of years, months or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of 365 days each; months of 30 days; days of 24 hours; and nights from sunset to
sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of
days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress
to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as
two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a
vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the
National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive
with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional
Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral
legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding
adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of
Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of
representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing
balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most
likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object
of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two
(2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it
can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the
use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members
of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only
one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in
no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each
word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing
principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article
VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives
is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look
into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable
from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote
may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or
among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from
the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of
the records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of
JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are
still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two
houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by
the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be
taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the
three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have
more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak,
whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle
of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one
whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the
JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of
the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which
all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the
government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play
under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(
1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
TOPIC: Statutory Construction, Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)
FACTS:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12-
month Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla with beneficiary to Ana M.
Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued
with her active participation, which is not allowed because she did not possess a
certificate of authority to act as agent from the office of the Insurance Commission.
Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his
work, and that the policy was merely a renewal and was issued because her husband
was not around when Isidro called by telephone. Instead, appellant left a note on top
of her husband’s desk.
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s
decisions was affirmed by respondent appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a
violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of the insurance act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the
same section.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is
acquitted of the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits
a person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement
of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act
from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who an
insurance agent is within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph
thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189
is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs
of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly
provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid
three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize
and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine
of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or
phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive
compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section.
In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This
allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could
not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction,
every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items
in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the
case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number of
articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the
other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.

The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited
by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not require the
Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January 28 rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the
1961] intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of
Ponente: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J. construction.

FACTS: The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various

materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate
precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and
flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of these
materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special
excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation
and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended,
commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filed with the Central
Bank three applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The
auditor of the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the
Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste
stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the ruling of the
auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer and flavors”
mentioned in section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the
preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner
brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation
of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax
imposed by the Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601).

HELD: YES. The decision under review was reversed.

RATIO: General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term
“stabilizer and flavors” as used in the law refers only to those materials actually used
in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on
the principle of statutory construction that “general terms may be restricted by
specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the
specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose.” The rule,