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CRASH INVESTIGASTION
BY,
NISHIT RAKESH
REGISTRATION NO = (RA1811019010112)
DEPARTMENT- AEROSPACE ENGINEERING
YEAR- 2nd year, III sem
SECTION – AERO-C
INTRODUCTION
The Munich air disaster occurred on 6 February 1958
when British European Airways Flight 609 crashed on
its third attempt to take off from a slush-covered
runway at Munich-Riem Airport, West Germany. On
the plane was the Manchester United football team,
nicknamed the "Busby Babes", along with supporters
and journalists. Twenty out of the 44 on the aircraft
died at the scene. The injured, some unconscious, were
taken to the Hospital in Munich where three more
died, resulting in 23 fatalities with 21 survivors.
The team was returning from a European Cup match in
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, having eliminated Red Star
Belgrade to advance to the semi-finals of the
competition. The flight stopped to refuel in Munich
because a non-stop flight from Belgrade to Manchester
was beyond the "Elizabethan"-class Airspeed
Ambassador's range. After refuelling, pilots James
Thain and Kenneth Rayment twice abandoned take-off
because of boost surging in the left engine i.e. giving
more thrust then expected. Fearing they would get too
far behind schedule, Captain Thain rejected an
overnight stay in Munich in favour of a third take-off
attempt. By then, snow was falling, causing a layer of
slush to form at the end of the runway. After the
aircraft hit the slush, it ploughed through a fence
beyond the end of the runway and the left wing was
torn off after hitting a house. Fearing the aircraft might
explode, Thain began evacuating passengers while
Manchester United goalkeeper Harry Gregg helped pull
survivors from the wreckage.
An investigation by West German airport authorities
originally blamed Thain, saying he did not de-ice the
aircraft's wings, despite eyewitness statements to the
contrary. It was later established that the crash was
caused by the slush on the runway, which slowed the
plane too much to take off. Thain was cleared in 1968,
ten years after the incident. Manchester United were
trying to become the third club to win three successive
English league titles; they were six points behind
League leaders Wolverhampton Wanderers with 14
games to go. They also held the Charity Shield and had
just advanced into their second successive European
Cup semi-finals. The team had not been beaten for 11
matches. The crash not only derailed their title
ambitions that year but also virtually destroyed the
nucleus of what promised to be one of the greatest
generations of players in English football history. It
took 10 years for the club to recover, with Busby
rebuilding the team and winning the European Cup in
1968 with a new generation of "Babes".
AIRCRAFT AND CREW MEMBERS
The aircraft was a six-year-old Airspeed Ambassador 2,
built in 1952 and delivered to BEA the same year.
AIRCRAFT DETAILS-
The Airspeed AS.57 Ambassador is a British twin
piston-engine.
General characteristics
● Crew: 3
● Capacity: Up to 60 passengers
● Length: 81 ft (25 m)
● Wingspan: 115 ft (35 m)
● Height: 18 ft 4 in (5.59 m)
● Wing area: 1,200 sq ft (110 m2)
● Aspect ratio: 11:1
● Empty weight: 35,884 lb (16,277 kg)
● Max take-off weight: 52,000 lb (23,587 kg)
● Fuel capacity: 1,000 imp gal (1,200 US gal; 4,500 l) in two
integral wing tanks, with provision for 600 imp gal (720 US gal;
2,700 l) in two centre-section bag tanks
● Powerplant: 2 × Bristol Centaurus 661 18-cylinder air-cooled
sleeve-valve piston engines, 2,625 hp (1,957 kW) each
Performance
● Maximum speed: 312 mph (502 km/h, 271 kn) at 75% power
with 11,650 lb (5,280 kg) payload
● Cruise speed: 300 mph (480 km/h, 260 kn) at 20,000 ft (6,100
m) at 50,000 lb (23,000 kg)
● 279 mph (242 kn; 449 km/h) at 60% power
● Range: 720 mi (1,160 km, 630 nmi) with 11,650 lb (5,280 kg)
payload and no reserves at 280 mph (240 kn; 450 km/h)
900 (780 nmi; 1,400 km) at 220 mph (190 kn; 350 km/h)
1,560 mi (1,360 nmi; 2,510 km) with 7,900 lb (3,600 kg) payload
● max. fuel at 280 mph (240 kn; 450 km/h)
1,950 mi (1,690 nmi; 3,140 km) with 7,900 lb (3,600 kg) payload max.
fuel at 220 mph (190 kn; 350 km/h)
● Rate of climb: 1,520 ft/min (7.7 m/s) at 5,000 ft (1,500 m) at
maximum weight
● Rate of climb on one engine: 420 ft/min (130 m/min) after
take-off at maximum weight
● 360 ft/min (110 m/min) at 5,000 ft (1,500 m) at maximum
weight
● Wing loading: 43.3 lb/sq ft (211 kg/m2) at 52,000 lb (24,000 kg)
● Power/mass: 0.1 hp/lb (0.16 kW/kg) at 52,000 lb (24,000 kg)
● Take-off distance to 50 ft (15 m): 3,270 ft (1,000 m) at
maximum T.O weight
● Take-off distance to 50 ft (15 m) one engine: 4,950 ft (1,510 m)
at maximum T.O weight
● Landing distance from 50 ft (15 m): 2,565 ft (782 m) at max
landing weight
CREW MEMBERS
The pilot, Captain James Thain, was a former RAF flight
lieutenant. Originally a sergeant (later a warrant
officer), he was given an emergency commission in the
RAF as an acting pilot officer on probation in April
1944, and promoted to pilot officer on probation in
September that year. He was promoted to flight
lieutenant in May 1948, and received a permanent
commission in the same rank in 1952.He retired from
the RAF to join BEA.
Thain told the station engineer, Bill Black, about the problem with
the boost surging in the port engine, and Black suggested that since
opening the throttle more slowly had not worked, the only option
was to hold the plane overnight for retuning. Thain was anxious to
stay on schedule and suggested opening the throttle even more
slowly would suffice. This would mean that the plane would not
achieve take-off velocity until further down the runway, but with the
runway almost 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) long, he believed this would not
be a problem. The passengers were called back to the plane 15
minutes after leaving it.
On seeing flames around the cockpit, Thain feared that the aircraft
would explode and told his crew to evacuate the area. The
stewardesses, Rosemary Cheverton and Margaret Bellis, were the
first to leave through a blown-out emergency window in the galley,
followed by radio officer Bill Rodgers. Rayment was trapped in his
seat by the crumpled fuselage and told Thain to go without him.
Thain clambered out of the galley window. On reaching the ground,
he saw flames growing under the starboard wing, which held 500
imperial gallons (2,300 L) of fuel. He shouted to his crew to get away
and climbed back into the aircraft to retrieve two handheld fire
extinguishers, stopping to tell Rayment he would be back when the
fires had been dealt with.
The basis of the German authorities' case relied on the icy condition
of the wing’s hours after the crash and a photograph of the aircraft
(published in several newspapers) taken shortly before take-off, that
appeared to show snow on the upper wing surfaces. When the
original negative was examined, no snow or ice could be seen, the
"snow" in the original having been due to the sun reflecting off the
wings, which was clarified when examining the negative rather than
the published pictures which had been produced from a copy
negative. The witnesses were not called to the German inquiry and
proceedings against Thain dragged on until 1968, when he was finally
cleared of any responsibility for the crash. As the official cause,
British authorities recorded a build-up of melting snow on the
runway which prevented the "Elizabethan" from reaching the
required take-off speed. Thain, having been dismissed by BEA shortly
after the accident and never re-engaged, retired and returned to run
his poultry farm in Berkshire. He died of a heart attack at the age of
53 in August 1975.
SO BASICALLY, THE MAIN THINGS WHAT HAPPENED IN AIRCRAFT
BEFORE TAKE OFF.
TO THE POINT
● ENGINES WAS NOT PROPERLY CHECKED BEFORE THEY TAKE
OFF, boost surging in the left engine
● During take-off, the aircraft had reached 117 knots (217 km/h),
but on entering the slush, dropped to 105 knots (194 km/h),
too slow to leave the ground, with not enough runway to abort
the take-off. Aircraft with tail-wheel undercarriages had not
been greatly affected by slush, due to the geometry of these
undercarriages in relation to the aircraft's centre of
gravity,[notes 1] but newer types, such as the Ambassador,
with nose wheel landing-gear and the main wheels behind the
centre of gravity, were found to be vulnerable. The accident
resulted in the imposition of operating limits for the amount of
slush build-up permitted on runways.
PRECAUTIONS.
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