Case Digests in Pale

CASE DIGESTS IN PROBLEM AREAS IN
LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
Requirements “before admission to the bar” or for continuous

“practice of law”, etc. (Rule 138 Sec. 2, 6, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20, 21)
CASE # 1
A.C. No. 7269

Title:
ATTY. NOE-LACSAMANA vs. ATTY. Date: November 23, 2011
BUSMENTE
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Petitioner: Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana Respondent: Atty. Yolando F. Busmente
Facts:
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente
was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed
of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the
filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against
Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth
Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza DelaRosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as
Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil
Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further
alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating
counsel.Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Issue/s:
W/N respondent is in violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law”
Ruling:
It has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of the Bar misrepresented herself as
respondent’s collaborating counsel. There was also sufficient evidence to prove that respondent
allowed Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and give legal assistance to respondent’s
client. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela
Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb,
another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that
Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005.
Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that
Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one’s
self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as
attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of law.
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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 2: PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC
Title:
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO- Date: August 19, 2009
BUFFE
Ponente: BRION, J.
Petitioner: Respondent:
Facts:
Atty.Buffe was a former Clerk of Court from RTC Branch 81 of Romblon. She resigned from her
position on February 1, 2008. Thereafter she engaged in private practice of law, appearing in her
former branch several times and all of which are within prohibited period under the Section 7(b)(2)
of R.A. No. 6713.
Atty. Buffe alleges that the imposition in the said law is unfair and that it gives preferential
treatment to lawyers in the Government who are allowed to engaged in private practice of law so
long as it is not conflicting or tends to conflict with his official duties.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: Why may an incumbent engage in private
practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties,
but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7?
Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit,
but a non-incumbent like myself who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation cannot.
Because of her query, the Supreme Court ordered the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a
circular regarding practice of law and ordered the Executive Judge of Romblon to verify if Atty. Buffe
appeared as private counsel within the one year prohibition period. The Judge complied with the
order and submitted to the court a report containing Atty. Buffe’s appearance as private counsel,
which were a total of four (4) times since she resigned as Clerk of Court.
Issue/s:
Whether Atty. Buffe engaged in the private practice of law during the prohibitory period mandated
under R.A. No. 6713 Sec. 7(b) (2)
Ruling:
YES. In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we
ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under both provisions, a common objective
is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use
confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with court
personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A.
No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffes situation falls under Section 7.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together
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with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing other acts of
professional misconduct. This penalty reflects as well the Courts sentiments on how seriously the
retired, resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and observe the
prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used to work with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00),
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of
professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 3 (DIGEST FROM INTERNET)

B. M. No. 1036
Title:
Date: June 10, 2003
AGUIRRE vs. RANA
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Petitioner: DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE Respondent: EDWIN L. RANA
Facts:
Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-
taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that respondent, while
not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting
as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:
The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

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CASE # 4
A. M. No. 139
Title:
Date: March 28, 1983
RE: ELMO ABAD
Ponente: ABAD SANTOS, J.
Petitioner: RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978
Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO
Respondent: ELMO S. ABAD
S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc.
Facts:
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc. filed a
complaint against Mr. Elmo S. Abad alleging that the latter is practicing law without having been
previously admitted to the Bar. In his Answer, Mr. Abad admitted the practice, but provided an
explanation to such. According to him, prior to the taking of his Lawyer’s Oath, he has already
paid his Bar Admission Fee, Certification Fee, and Membership dues. That on the day of his Oath-
Taking, while waiting for his turn, he was made to sign his Lawyer’s Oath. However, then Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando told Mr. Abad that he needs to answer first the Reply of Mr. Jorge
Uy on his Answer to the latter’s complaint. As a result of which, Mr. Abad’s taking of the Lawyer’s
Oath was further suspended.
Upon the assumption that his signing of the Lawyer’s Oath and that the Supreme Court did not
order the striking of his name in the Roll of Attorneys, Mr. Abad paid his membership dues and
other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Quezon City Chapter. He likewise paid
his Professional Taxes and was even included as a qualified voter for the election of officers and
directors.
Issue/s:
Whether Mr. Abad has been admitted to the Philippine Bar.
Ruling:
No. The explanation of Mr. Abad does not constitute his admission to the Bar and the right to
practice law. It should be noted that there are two (2) essential requisites for becoming a full-
pledged lawyer. First, is the taking of the Lawyer’s Oath which shall be administered by the
Supreme Court, and the signing of the Roll of Attorneys. (Sections 17 & 19, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). In this case, one of the essential requisites is lacking, the taking of the Lawyer’s Oath.
Accordingly, the High Court held that Mr. Abad’s actions constitute indirect contempt of court for
assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority (Section 3
(e) Rule 71).

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 5: REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES

B.M. No. 1370
Title:
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. Date: May 9, 2005
AREVALO, JR.
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues
filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In 1961, he was admitted to the Philippine Bar, from 1962 to 1986 he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service and then he migrated to, and worked in the USA in 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He alleged that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he
was working in the Philippine Service since the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice of
profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.
The IBP commented that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of
the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9
and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members
has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program. Petitioner could
have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped.
Issue/s:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he
was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he
was working abroad from 1986-2003
Ruling:
NO. He is not exempted from the payment of IBP Dues. Payment of dues is a necessary
consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,
thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is
a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses.

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CASE # 6
Title: B.M. No. 2540

A IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE
Date: September 24, 2013
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A.
MEDADO Ponente: SERENO, C.J.
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 7
G.R. No. 169517
Title:
TAN & PAGAYOKAN vs. BALAJADIA
Ponente: ABAD SANTOS, J.
Petitioners: ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA
Respondent: BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA
TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN
Facts:
Respondent Balajadia was charged for indirect contempt by the petititioners, Tan, et al. Before
that, the respondent filed a criminal case against the petitioners with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City. In his complaint-affidavit, the respondent asserted that he is a
“practicing lawyer” based in Baguio City. However, certifications issued by the OBC and the IBP
showed that the respondent was admitted to the Bar.
Respondent asserted that the allegation that he was a practicing lawyer is an honest mistake. He
claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the complaint-affidavit patterned after
Atty. Aquino’s affidavit. Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, admitted the mistake of copying
Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit and instead of stating that Respondent Balajadia is a
businessman, he was erroneously referred to as a practicing lawyer.
Issue/s:
Whether Balajadia is liable for indirect contempt
Ruling:
NO. SC ruled that records support respondent’s claim that he never intended to project himself as
a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the
result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client; appearing
before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite
being previously denied admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law and
holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to
do so.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that
he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

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CASE # 8
Title:
IN RE: PETITION FOR
Date: February 20, 1981
REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS, JUAN T. PUBLICO Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Facts:
THREE PETITIONS (from Publico, faculty of Polytechnic University, Civic Association in
Manila):
Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination.
His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral
character for having misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was
eligible for 3rd year high school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan
M. Publico.
i. PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
ii. Tapel instituted an administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school records
or credentials.
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:

September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground that his witnesses had
turned hostile.
i. Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

i. Respondent falsified his school records
ii. Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which
require completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary, high,
pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never received,
for had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering
the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case against him.
He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to Manila.
Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct from the
time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or
commendations he received,
i. Court denied the Petition.
ii. Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the Court for lack of merit.

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5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was through the initiative
of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to school and enrolled him in a grade level
above his qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
i. Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his uncle; that being merely 16 year old,
he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of his uncle,
who later on caused his disbarment
ii. No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.
Issue/s:
WON PUBLICO can be reinstated, for being in exemplary moral character despite not completing
pre-law requirements
Ruling:
YES. Petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
REINSTATEMENT CRITERIA:
1. WON the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court,
2. Court action will depend WON it decides that the public interest in the orderly
and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law.
3. Applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he
is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law.
4. Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to
the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

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CASE # 9
SBC Case No. 519
Title:
Date: July 31, 1997
FIGUEROA vs. BARRANCO, JR.
Ponente: ROMERO, J.
Petitioner: PATRICIA FIGUEROA Respondent: SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.
Facts:
Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco should be denied admission to the
legal profession.He passed 1970 bar exams but failed 1966-1968 exams.
Patricia Figueroa and Barranco had been lover for several years and they had a child out of
wedlock. Barranco promised several times that he would marry Patricia however he failed to
fulfill his promise to marry her.
In 1971 she learned that he married another woman and therefore filed this petition on the
ground of gross immorality
Issue/s:
WON grounds invoked constitutes gross immorality
Ruling:
No. The Court find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. Barranco engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part
but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "
A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a willful, flagrant, or
shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.”

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 10
SB-04-0079-M
Title:
Date: December 07, 2005
IN RE: JAMES JOSEPH HAMM
Ponente:
Facts:
In 1974, James Hamm (defendant) committed two murders and pleaded guilty to first-degree
murder. Hamm was sentenced to life in prison, where he was a model prisoner. After being
paroled in 1992, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State University College of Law. Hamm
passed the July 1999 Arizona bar exam, but was denied admission to practice law by the
Character and Fitness Committee (Committee). The Committee conducted a formal hearing in
2004 and considered the following in reaching its conclusion to deny Hamm’s application to be
admitted to the Bar:
1) Hamm's unlawful conduct, which included the commission of two violent “execution style”
murders and his testimony as to the facts surrounding the murders.
2) Hamm's omissions on his Application and his testimony in explaining his failure to disclose all
required information.
3) Hamm's neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or violation of a longstanding child
support court order and his testimony as to his failure to comply with the court order.
4) Hamm's mental or emotional instability impairing his ability to perform the functions of an
attorney including his testimony as to any diagnosis and treatment.
The Committee concluded that Hamm had failed to establish the requisite character and fitness
for admission to practice law. Hamm petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Hamm has established the good moral character necessary to be admitted to the
practice of law in Arizona.
Ruling:
No. The ultimate question in cases such as this is whether the applicant has established good
moral character, In Walker, we described the principles on which we rely as follows:
‘Upright character’ * * * is something more than an absence of bad character. * * * It means

that he [an applicant for admission] must have conducted himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, should, or does. Such character expresses itself not in negatives nor in
following the line of least resistance, but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
Hamm's past criminal conduct and the serious nature of that conduct affect the burden he must
meet to establish good moral character. He must first establish rehabilitation from prior criminal
conduct, a requirement that adds to his burden of showing current good moral character. The
added burden becomes greater as past unlawful conduct becomes more serious. We noted there
that “the more serious the misconduct that led to disbarment, the more difficult is the applicant's
task in showing rehabilitation.” An applicant for initial admission to the Bar who is attempting to

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overcome the negative implications of a serious felony on his current moral character likewise
must overcome a greater burden for more serious crimes.
To show rehabilitation, Hamm must show that he has accepted responsibility for his criminal
conduct. Hamm fully recognizes his need to make this showing. Indeed, he states that his
rehabilitation could not have proceeded absent such acceptance. We recognize the Committee's
concern that Hamm has not yet fully accepted responsibility for the two murders. Hamm says
he has done so, repeatedly and strongly, but some of his other statements indicate to the contrary.
When an applicant has committed first-degree murder, a crime that demonstrates an extreme
lack of good moral character, that applicant must make an extraordinary showing of present good
moral character to establish that he or she is qualified to be admitted to the practice of law.
Even assuming that Hamm has established rehabilitation, showing rehabilitation from criminal
conduct does not, in itself, establish good moral character. Rehabilitation is a necessary, but not
sufficient, ingredient of good moral character. An applicant must establish his current good
moral character, independent of and in addition to, evidence of rehabilitation. We conclude that
Hamm failed to make that showing.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 11
A.M. No. P-220
Title:
ZETA vs. MALINAO
Ponente: BARREDO, J.
Petitioner: JULIO ZETA Respondent: FELICISIMO MALINAO
Facts:
The case revolves around an administrative complaint against Malinao, a court interpreter at CFI
Catbalogan. The charges are:
1. Illegally appearing at Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and Sta. Rita MTCs like an attorney,
when he is not authorized to do so. He makes it his means of livelihood since he collects
fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys but doesn’t pay anything.
2. Grave misconduct in office as he is instigating persons in order to grab land, rob or coerce
them. He incites them by telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has
influence over the judges.
3. The crime of falsification by unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI as present when
he is actually in the MTCs, thereby receiving salary for those absent days.
4. Violation of Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules which states that it is prohibited
for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any profession or business
without permission from the Department Head. Such permission was not obtained by
Malinao.
Malinao answered, saying that his participation was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality.
The incumbent judges of the MTC attested to the fact that Malinao was indeed
representing himself as lawyer at their benches during the days in the time record marked
present as well as the fact that he violated the aforementioned Civil Service Rules. Malinao had
no reasonable explanation for this.
The Inquest Judge then recommended that he be given a stern warning and severe
reprimand.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the defense of Malinao is proper
Ruling:
NO. The Court found that the conclusions of fact of the Inquest Judge to be amply supported by
the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the
judges before whom Malinao appeared.
The defense of Malinao cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing
as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his
time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the
number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate

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that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of
justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by Malinao is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by the Inquest Judge. We
find no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to
practice.
WHEREFORE, Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in
the CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the
government.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 12
G.R. Nos. 89591-96
Title:
Date: January 24, 2000
PEOPLE vs. MACEDA & JAVELLANA
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Respondent: HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA,
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE
Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial
PHILIPPINES
Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA
Facts:
Avelino Javellana is the counsel for the defendants in a criminal case, who was subsequently
implicated in the killing of an ex-governor in Antique. Javellana was arrested and by such arrest,
he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. When Javellana was brought before the trial
court, he informed the court that there exists a real and grave danger to his life if he were to be
confined in the Antique Provincial Jail. Thus, RTC Judge Maceda issued an order of giving to
Atty. Deogracias Del Rosario the custody of Javellana with the obligation “to hold and detain” him
in Atty. Del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the Clerk of Court of RTC.
However, the order was not strictly complied with as Javellana was not detained in the residence
of Atty. Del Rosario, instead, he went about his normal activities as a free man, including
engaging in the practice of law. RTC recalled the order of Judge Maceda.
Issue/s:
Whether Javellana is allowed to continue practice of law, despite his status as a detention
prisoner.
Ruling:
NO. As a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession
as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order was clear
that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a
detention prisoner."
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective
or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

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CASE # 13
AC 4749
Title:
SANTOS vs. LLAMAS
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
Petitioner: SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. Respondent: ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS
Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against
respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated
“IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the
following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover
his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admits that as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed
in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He
claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith
that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his
actions; and
2. Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited
practice of law and for being a senior citizen.
Ruling:
1. Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
2. No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment
covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from
the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in
“limited” practice of law. Moreover, while it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable
income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include
payment of membership or association dues.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we
believe the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 14

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME
PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.
DACANAY Ponente: CORONA, J.
Facts:
Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to Philippine Bar in March 1960. He practiced law in the
country but migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments to which he applied
and was approved for Canadian citizenship in order to avail the country's free medical program.
On 2006, He re-acquired his Philippine citizenship through RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003) and returned to the Philippines because he wants to resume his law
practice.
Issue/s:
1. Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship
2. Whether Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.
Ruling:
Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
“Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident
of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.”
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar
and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
Yes, Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.
Because of the exception;

When Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of [RA 9225]." Therefore a Filipino lawyer, who became a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA
9225
However, it doesn't mean that he will automatically resume his practice of law.
In this case as provided under RA 9225, before Dacanay can resume his practice of law he must
first secure from the Court the authority to do so by:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

-updating and payment in full of annual membership dues in the IBP

-paying professional tax
-completing at least 36 hours of mandatory continuing legal education and
-retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as
a lawyer and an officer of Court but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to Republic of
the Philippines.
Upon compliance with the conditions, it will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 15
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE
PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN Date: July 24, 2012
THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.
Ponente: REYES, J.
MUNESES
Facts:
1. Petitioner filed a petition with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be
granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines
2. Petitioner alleged that he became a member of the IBP in 1966 and lost his privilege to
practice law when he became citizen of the US in 1981 and reacquired his Philippine
citizenship in 2006 pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA.
3. Petitioner submitted documents in support of his petition.
a. Oath of allegiance before Consul General
b. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
c. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship
d. Letter evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP
e. Attendance forms from the MCLE – Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
4. The case is similar with the petition filed by Dacanay who migrated to Canada to seek medical
attention and eventually became Canadian citizen and re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. 9225 in Bar Matter 1678.
Issue/s:
Whether the petitioner may be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines
Ruling:
YES. Subject to re-take of lawyer’s oath and payment of appropriate fees.
The court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.
The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar and the privilege
to engage in the practice law.
Under R.A. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have reacquired their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance of the Republic.
A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later-re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 remains to be a member of the Philippine bar but such is not
automatic. The person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.
It is the power and duty of the State, through this court, to regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 16
G.R. No. 167886
Title:
LBP vs. PAMINTUAN DEVELOPMENT Date: October 25, 2005
CO.
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Petitioner: LAND BANK OF THE Respondent: PAMINTUAN DEVELOPMENT
PHILIPPINES CO., represented by MARIANO PAMINTUAN, JR.
Facts:
DARAB decided the Preliminary Determination of Just Compensation fixing the just
compensation of respondent Pamintuan Development Companys 274.9037 hectare lot covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4972 and located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato, at
P58,237,301.68.
Thereafter, the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied.
On June 4, 2004, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a Notice of Entry of
Appearance in behalf of petitioner. Within the period to appeal, or on June 15, 2004, said
counsels also filed a Notice of Appeal[6] via registered mail. The Certification attached to the
Notice of Appeal was signed by Loreto B. Corotan, Head of petitioners Agrarian Operations
Center.
Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the notice of appeal and notice of entry of
appearance should be denied due course because Attys. Montarde and Mesa failed to show that
their appearance was authorized by petitioner.
DARAB denied due course the notice of appeal grounded on the argument of the respondent.
Issue/s:
Ruling:
NO. The presumption in favor of the counsels authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong
one, in accordance with Section 21 of Rule 138. Furthermore, a lawyer is not even required to
present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of
appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients name. However,
the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party require a lawyer to adduce
authorization from the client.
In the case at bar, the filing of a notice of appearance by the lawyers, and the subsequent
presentation of Special Power Attorney and two memoranda from the department manager and
Head of CARP, respectively, are sufficient evidence to support this presumption.
Indeed, even an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyers first appearance and
validates the action taken by him.
It is also worthwhile to clarify that the case at bar doesn't involve a substitution of lawyer, but

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

the hiring of additional lawyer which may be made by the party at anytime.
It is evident therefore that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the
notice of appeal seasonably filed by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, the duly authorized counsel of
petitioner.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 17
B.M. Nos. 979 and 986
Title:
RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS, Date: December 10, 2002
MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.
Facts:
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. He was directed to
submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days
from the last day of the examinations.
Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations but the Court disqualified him from becoming a member
of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two (2) grounds: (a)
Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course and
(b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the
Philippine Bar when he made it appear that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine
Law School (PLS) when PLS had not offered such course since 1967.
Petitioner claimed that the statement that he enrolled in and passed the regular fourth year (law)
review classes at the PLS was a self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight. He,
in fact, took the said course at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) as evidenced by the
Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Dimayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law.
Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a ready-made form and affixing his signature on the
space provided therefor, he requested his friend Lilian Felipe to fill up the form, have it notarized
and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Being consumed with his
preparations for the upcoming bar examinations, petitioner admitted that he did not have the
opportunity to check the veracity of the information.
Petitioner further averred that a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar, he submitted
the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review to prove that he actually enrolled and
attended the pre-bar review course in UST. To corroborate his enrollment in UST, he submitted
various documents as proof of his enrollment.
Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the pre-
bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations because he thought
that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion.
The OBC conducted a summary hearing and held that petitioner should be given the benefit of the
doubt, citing the 1998 Case of Mr. Gingoyon who had a pending charge of Grave Threats but
unbeknownst to him, he was already convicted and in that case the Court believed his explanation
that he had no actual knowledge of his conviction.
It is submitted by the OBC that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in
Bar Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Adding that Three years deprivation of the privilege to
practice law may be considered an ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been
convicted of any crime. As regards petitioner’s failure to submit the required certification of

24

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
completion of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to submit
another certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not only
his enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with truth.
Issue/s:
Whether petitioner did enroll in and complete his pre-bar review course in UST as he herein
avows.
Ruling:
YES. The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the
subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of
the Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence
showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST.
It must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of the subject
Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence proferred by petitioner to establish
that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS.
Considering petitioners explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very

least, petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.
The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness,
it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioners father pleaded that the denial
of permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be enough penalty. It
is time to move on.
Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138
of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.
For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be
done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is
intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 18
G.R. No. 176278
Title:
PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE Date: June 25, 2010
PRESIDENT
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Respondent: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON.
Petitioner: ALAN F. PAGUIA HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as
Permanent Representative of the Philippines to
the United Nations
Facts:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the
writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to
the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that
time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner
grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that
Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent
Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and
employees.
Respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents)
raise threshold issues against the petition. They question petitioner’s standing to bring this suit
because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Issue/s:
Whether the Petitioner has a standing to bring the suit because of his indefinite suspension from
the practice of law.
Ruling:
No, the petitioner has no standing. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also
obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity,
in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience." Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section
23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

26

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 19
G.R. Nos. L-10236-48

Title:
PEOPLE vs. DE LUNA
Ponente: CONCEPCION, J.
Petitioner: THE PEOPLE OF THE Respondent: EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL.
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground
that the facts alleged in the amended informations, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of
contempt of court with which the defendants are charged.
The defendants Eustacio de Luna et al were accused of disobeying the Supreme Court Resolution,
obstructing or degrading the administration of justice, and disrespecting the Court by taking their oath
as lawyers before a notary public and making manifestations before the High Court.
Appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought admission
to the Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they
were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath
as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by
those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying the d petition of
appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or
injunction against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a
notary public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in
all the court of the Philippines,"
Issue/s:
Whether or not the acts of the defendants constitute contempt of court
Ruling:
Yes. Appellees herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the
authority of this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or
not they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration
of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in
particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of
said Rule 64.
The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of
court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by
means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such
without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be committed, under said
Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "'the oath of office as attorney-at-law"
and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the
Philippines", the appellees had for all intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-
at-law.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Law Student Rule (Rule 138-A Sec. 1-4; Rule 138 Sec. 34;
Canon 9 Rule 9.01; Rule 110 Sec. 4 & 15)
CASE # 20
G.R. No. L-44388
Title:
BULACAN vs. TORCINO
Respondent: FAUSTINO TORCINO and FELIPA
Petitioner: VICTORIANO BULACAN
TORCINO
Facts:
A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with
the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino Torcino and Felipa
Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the Plaintiff" but
was verified by the plaintiff-appellee himself.
When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the
complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr. Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case
amicably, the court rendered a decision ordering the Torcinos to demolish and remove the portion
of their house which was illegally constructed on the land of the plaintiff .The municipal court
stated that there is no doubt that Victoriano Bulacan is the owner.
The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
The appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint
was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and therefore must be considered as
sham and false.
Another motion to dismiss the complaint was filed with the additional discussion that the fact
that the complaint is verified, does not in itself cure the defect obtaining in the complaint.
Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to dismiss was not filed on time and the
defenses therein were not pleaded in the answer in the municipal court and therefore, are deemed
waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
The Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit. When the case was called for continuance, the parties presented to
the court a stipulation of facts. The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff Victoriano Bulacan,
his new counsel Atty. Diego A. Cala defendants Faustino and Felipa Torcino, and their counsel
Gerardo A. Pabello
The Court of First Instance of Leyte affirmed the decision of the municipal court.
The defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in a resolution
certified the appeal to us.
Issue/s:

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Whether or not a complaint should be dismissed by a municipal trial court on the ground that the
plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to sign and file it for him.
Ruling:
NO. Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct
his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar.
The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an
attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly
authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies only to cases filed with
the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 21
A.M. SDC-97-2-P
Title:
ALAWI vs. ALAUYA
Ponente: NARVASA, C.J.
Respondent: ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court
Petitioner: SOPHIA ALAWI
VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City
Facts:
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing
unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter
Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to render the contract void ab initio.
Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M.
ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law.
Alauya claims that he does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a
local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name.
Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the
title of an attorney which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Alauya's membership in the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney
Ruling:
NO. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

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CASE # 22
G.R. No. 154207

Title:
Date: April 27, 2007
CRUZ vs. MINA
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.
Respondent: ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO
Petitioner: FERDINAND A. CRUZ
F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES
Facts:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in criminal case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz,
is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En
Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.
However, in an order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence
over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.
Petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002
Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule,
which is the Supreme Court alone.
The MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
public respondent MeTC.
The RTC resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave
Threats, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
The petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration and argues that nowhere does the law
provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No.
730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of
the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed
a second Motion for Reconsideration with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the Denial Order of said
court on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial of the criminal
case of Grave threats pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
The RTC and MeTC both denied the Motions filed by the petitioner.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Issue/s:
Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a
party litigant
Ruling:
Yes. The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his
father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.
However, in Resolution in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer.
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed,
while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as
private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the
petitioner's appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may
flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is
not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying
the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil
liability by the private complainant for damages and that the records of the case do not provide for a
claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner's appearance as private prosecutor appears to be
legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation
of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the
civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene
to prosecute the civil aspect.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 23
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459
Title:
Date: October 14, 2003
MADERADA vs. JUDGE MEDIODEA
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
Respondent: Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA,
Petitioner: IMELDA Y. MADERADA 12th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo
Facts:
On September 7, 2001, Imelda Maderada filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabanatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo, presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol, an action for forcible entry with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, temporary restraining disorder (TRO) and damages, covered by the Rules
on Summary Procedure. Because the complainant was the court of the said sala, Judge Tersol
inhibited herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustillo designated Judge Ernesto
Mediodea to hear and decide the case. The case suffered delay as Judge Mediodea required the
defendants to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted, granted and
extension to file an answer and reset the hearing. The September 28 hearing was held in
abeyance after the defendant’s lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on
behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff. Respondent judge denied the defendants’ motion to
disqualify the complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Maderada filed a total of three Motions praying for judgement to be rendered on the civil case.
Mediodea denied the motions because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining
order and an injunction. He likewise denied the defendant’s motion for extension of time to file an
answer. Respondent judge contends that Maderada filed a petition for his inhibition after filing
two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of administrative charges
against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. He avers that the delay
in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him, considering that he was mandated by law
and the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before him. Besides, complainant
allegedly failed to present evidence necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for
preliminary injunction. Respondent judge likewise refutes complainant’s assertion that she
appeared as counsel on her own behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such
claim was allegedly without basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court
were more than enough to pay for the services of a counsel. He further alleges that she did not
secure authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of
absence every time she appeared in court.
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in the
Complaint should first be resolved before judgement should be rendered in the principal action.
However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been decided within 30
days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction and the
principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months had already lapsed
since the filing of the civil case. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be
fined in the amount of P1,000 with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would
be dealt with more severely. It did not find Maderada completely faultless as upon investigation it
has been found that she appeared in court as counsel for herself and in behalf of her co-plaintiff
without court authority. According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

devote their full time to government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of
justice. Although they are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession,
they should do so only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that engaging in any
private business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to
moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office. Thus, it recommended that
Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as counsel without
authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future would be
dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that she be directed to
Issue/s:
Whether or not the OCA is correct in penalizing both Maderada and Mediodea.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA but with modifications
on the penalty. The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered,
shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as promptly as
possible. Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure
to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary actions. Accordingly,
technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should be carefully
avoided. The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to provide expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. Both are
time procedures designed to bring immediate relief. Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA,
in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or
proceedings prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a
person to refrain from doing a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Since this
remedy is granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and
respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main
case of forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days
from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, “A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may,
within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the
filing thereof.” Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word shall
to evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there
was a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would
have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If
that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature. Respondent should have known
that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy in an action for
forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of the main case. This is the very reason
why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be decided
within 30 days from its filing.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy
adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from further damage
during the pendency of the original action. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is
appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence and Rule 140.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she
appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the practice of
law. We clarify. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law.
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In
the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress
-- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys,
they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law;
otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to
be in the practice of law. One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he
practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and
as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as
follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other
officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging
in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself
out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services.Hence, she
cannot be said to be in the practice of law. The law allows persons who are not lawyers by
profession to litigate their own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case
personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not
remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure,
the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable. However, it was also
clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below,
for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing oneself is different from
appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a
person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending the
rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that
complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-
plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service
once she appears for the latter without permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that she
appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we should
be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of
justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility. Given these circumstances, the penalty of
reprimand is sufficient.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
CASE # 24: Canon 9, Rule 9.01

Title: BAR MATTER NO. 730
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT
PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE Date: June 13, 1997
ACTUALLY SUPERVISED DURING
Ponente:
TRIAL
Facts:
Plaintiff Irene was represented by Mr. Cornelio. Carmona Jr, an intern at the office of legal aid of
UP-COL. Cornelio Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of plaintiff's
evidence-in-chief, without the presence of a supervising lawyer.
Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Carmona during hearing because the latter was not
accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. Later on, president judge Pastoral issued an order
requiring Carmona to be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law student who appears before the trial court under the Law Student Practice
Rule should be accompanied by a member of the bar during trial
Ruling:
YES. Supreme Court holds that a law student appearing before RTC should be at all times be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer.
Under Section 2 of Rule 138-A, the phrase "direct supervision and control requires no less than
the physical presence if the supervising lawyer during hearing.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 25
G.R. No. L-51813-14
Title:
Date: November 29, 1983
CANTIMBUHAN vs. HON. CRUZ
Ponente: RELOVA, J.
Respondents: HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR.,
Petitioners: ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.
Parañaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL
LUCILA
LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
Solicitation of Legal Services (Canons 2, 3

and 8 of Code of Professional Responsibility)
CASE # 1
A.C. No. 5299
Title:
Date: August 19, 2003
ATTY. KHAN JR. vs. ATTY. SIMBILLO
Petitioners: ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR.,
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Respondents: ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO
Public Information Office
Facts:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.
Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.
Ø Spoke to the wife of Atty. Simbillo’s wife and guaranteed a court decree within six
months for Php 48,000.
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the
Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for
improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Simbillo contends that, to wit:

Ø advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts;
Ø that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising; and
Ø that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 5 for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Ø Petitioner was held guiilty for violation of CPR and Rules of Court. 1 year suspension.
Hence, this petition.

Issue/s:
WON the petitioner’s contention was with merit
Ruling:
The Court held that, “We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV- 2002-606”.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: (1) A duty of public
service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money; (2) A relation as an officer of the court to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; (3) A relation to
clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; and (4) A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.
use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers , the office and residence address
and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data,
are permissible.

40

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 2
A.C. No. 6672
Title:
LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. TOLENTINO
Ponente: CORONA, J.
Petitioners: PEDRO L. LINSANGAN Respondents: ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
Facts:
Attorney Pedro Linsangan filed a disbarment case against Attorney Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services alleging that respondent, with the
help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation to
Tolentino with the promise of financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano convinced him
to sever his lawyer-client relations with Linsangan and use Tolentino’s services instead, in
exchange for a loan of P50,000.00. It was also added that Linsangan’s calling card was also
attached wherein it appeared that aside from legal services, financial assistance was offered as
well.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Tolentino is guilty of misconduct?
Ruling:
Yes. Tolentino is guilty of misconduct.
The Supreme Court held that the IBP’s finding of unethical conduct should be adopted. Whereby
it found Tolentino to have encroached on the professional practice of Attorney Linsangan by
violating Rule 8.02, which prohibits a lawyer from stealing another lawyer’s client or induce the
latter’s client to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his
services.
Also, the fact that Tolentino is also engaged in a money-lending venture with his clients as
borrowers, he violated Rule 16.04
The court further added that Tolentino violated Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provides “A LAWYER
SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT
LEGAL BUSINESS.” Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a
ground for disbarment. Moreover, Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the
CPR which provides: Rule 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE. This
rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.
The calling card contained with the phrase financial assistance, was clearly used to entice clients
to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. This crass commercialism

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession.
Additionally, the court said that a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective
immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
CASE # 3
53 Cal. App. 3d 216
Title:
GEFFEN vs. MOSS
Ponente:
Petitioners: Ralph J. Geffen Respondents: Russell J. Moss
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 4
204 N.E.2d 10
Title:
IN RE: DAVID P. KRASNER
Ponente:
Petitioners: Respondents:
Facts:
The Board of Managers and Committee on Grievances of the Chicago Bar Association have filed a
report recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five
years on the basis of findings that he had unethically engaged in conduct which constituted a
division of fees with laymen and the employment of solicitors to procure law business.
Respondent, a 50-year-old practitioner who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1938, has filed
exceptions to the report contending there is no evidence to support such findings.
The disciplinary proceeding was an outgrowth of an indictment returned to a Federal district

court wherein a man named David E. Vogele was charged with evasion of income tax. He
pleaded guilty, and at a hearing on the matter of his punishment it came to light that he was a
professional "ambulance chaser" and that the source of his unreported income had been payments
from some twenty lawyers, of whom respondent was one.
The trial judge brought the matter to the attention of the Chicago Bar Association and as a
consequence an inquiry was made and a complaint filed against respondent. At the hearing which
followed, the evidence on behalf of the complainant association consisted only of the testimony of
respondent and his partner, and certain ledger sheets and cancelled checks of the partnership.
For the respondent, two judges, numerous attorneys and a businessman testified to his good
character and reputation and to his professional integrity.
Issue/s:
Ruling:
Canon 34 provided: "No division of fees for legal services is proper except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service or responsibility.” Based upon the evidence substantially as
related, it was the finding of the commissioners that respondent had violated these canons.
Circumstantial evidence is legal evidence and neither the commissioners nor this court are
required to be naive or impractical in appraising an attorney's conduct. In this particular case, we
need not remain blind or insensitive to the reasonable and clear cut intendments arising from
respondent's own admissions and business records.
Equally without merit is respondent's rationalization that there is no proof to support the charge
that he had divided fees with laymen, first, because there was no direct evidence that he had in fact
collected a fee in any case . As to this premise, it is enough to say it is beyond human experience
and belief that respondent would have been generous. We are satisfied the proof fully supports the
charges and findings against respondent, and are likewise of the opinion that the Canons of Ethics
have been violated and that discipline is warranted.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

After some vascillation between suspension and disbarment, the Grievance Committee of the
Chicago Bar Association recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. The
Board of Managers, however, did not concur and in its report has recommended that he be
suspended from practice for a period of five years, the question now becomes what disciplinary
measure is warranted by the evidence presented, bearing in mind that the purpose of such a
proceeding is not punishment per se but the protection of the public from further misdeeds and
the preservation of the high standing and reputation of the bar.
We need not labor the point that solicitation or ambulance chasing is a conduct which
is reprehensible and inimicable to the traditions and best interests of the legal
profession. To permit such conduct to continue undeterred could only result in
unsavory competitions and consequences materially detrimental to the dignity and
honor of the legal profession as a whole. The division of fees which follows as a natural
outgrowth of solicitation or ambulance chasing is equally reprehensible and harmful in
that it encourages and promotes further solicitation.
Under all of the circumstances it is our opinion that the extreme penalty of disbarment is not
warranted; however, upon a careful consideration it is our opinion that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Respondent suspended.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 5
436 U.S. 412

Title:
Date: May 30, 1978
IN RE: PRIMUS
Ponente:
Facts:
Edna Smith Primus was a practicing lawyer in South Carolina and an officer and a cooperating lawyer
with American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Columbia branch. She receives no compensation as to his
work with ASLU but was paid a retainer as a legal consultant for the South Carolina Council on
Human Relations. The news that mothers were treated with sterilization as a condition for continued
receipt of medical assistanceunder the medicaid in Aiken, S.C. bothered Gary Allen an Aiken
businessman and requested the council to send representatives to address the women who were
sterillized. Primus at the councils behest, called the Allen and arranged a meeting in his office.
Willliams who has been sterillized after the birth of her child was in attendance together with her
grandmother. Primus advised all attendees of their legal rights and suggested a possibility of lawsuit.
ACLU then informed Primus that they are willing to represent the Aiken mothers. After Allen told
Primus that Williams wanted to institute a case, Primus decided to tell Williams of the ACLU’s offer of
free legal representation. Williams who visited the doctor due to her child sickness, met there his
lawyer and was asked to sign a release of liability in favor of the doctor. She then showed the letter of
Primus to them and they retained a copy. Williams then called Primus in the doctor’s office and
declared her intention not to sue. Thereafter the secretary of Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina filed a formal complaint with the board
charging solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics by sending the letter to Williams. Primus then
argued that her actions were protected inaccodance to the 1st and the 14th amendment and Canon 2 of
the code of professional responsibility of the American Bar Association, while the State's evidence was
the letter together with the complaint against the doctor and various state officials, and the testimony
of Williams. Primus then presented evidence and witness against the charge but the board found her
guilty of violating DR 2-103 (5) (a) and (c), and 2-104 (A) (5) of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina.The board issued a private reprimand stating that there was no conclusive evidence as to
solicitation on her behalf, but there was solicitation for ACLU which would benefit financially in the
event of successful prosecution of the suit for money damages. She was also was found to have violated
DR 104(A)(5) because she solicited Williams, after providing unsolicited legal advice, to join in a
prospective class action for damages and other relief that was to be brought by the ACLU. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina increased the saction to a public reprimand.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Primus was in violation of the disciplinary rules of the Southern Carolina Supreme
Court
Ruling:
NO. citing the case of Ohralik vs Ohio State Bar Association that the States may vindicate legitimate
regulatory interests through proscription, in certain circumstances, of in-person solicitation by lawyers
who seek to communicate purely commercial offers of legal assistance to lay persons.
Unlike the situation in Ohralik, Primus' act of solicitation took the form of a letter to Williams with
whom she had discussed the possibility of seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional
sterilization. This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an
offer of free assistance by attorneys associated with the ACLU, not an offer predicated on entitlement

46

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

to a share of any monetary recovery. And her actions were undertaken to express personal political
beliefs and to advance the civil liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive financial gain.
Using the case of NAACP vs Button in which the Supreme Court ruled that the solicitations which the
Supreme Court of Virginia thought was in violation of the state regulations where in fact protected by
the 1st and 14th amendments because it is done to further the civil right objectives of the organization.
The state rejected Primus' First Amendment defenses by distinguishing Button from it. Whereas the
NAACP in that case was primarily a political organization that used "`litigation as an adjunct to the
overriding political aims of the organization,'" the ACLU "`has as one of its primary purposes the
rendition of legal services.'" the court also intimated that the ACLU's policy of requesting an award of
counsel fees indicated that the organization might "`benefit financially in the event of successful
prosecution of the suit for money damages.
The record does not support the state court's effort to draw a meaningful distinction between the ACLU
and the NAACP. From all that appears, the ACLU and its local chapters, much like the NAACP and its
local affiliates in Button, "engage in extensive educational and lobbying activities"
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no pecuniary gain in the letter of Primus to Williams as she,
nor her associates nor any staff of the ACLU would be handling the case. That ACLU will not gain in
the event of money recovery because it will not get from the award to the litigant the fees it collects.
The fees are from the award the court give as compensation, and the award is not usually the fee does
not correpond to the fees in private litigation. That the fee would go directly to the find of ACLU
central fund which would in turn result to ACLU victories in important feilds of law. That the letter to
Williams thus comes within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for
associational freedoms. The ACLU engages in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression
and association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the public.Thatder did not
cause undue influence over Williams as it merely provides for assistance and optionsfpr her. The
Disciplinary Rules in question sweep broadly. Under DR 2-103(D)(5), a lawyer employed by the ACLU
or a similar organization may never give unsolicited advice to a lay person that he retain the
organization's free services, and it would seem that one who merely assists or maintains a cooperative
relationship with the organization also must suppress the giving of such advice if he or anyone
associated with the organization will be involved in the ultimate litigation.Notwithstanding appellee's
concession in this Court, it is far from clear that a lawyer may communicate the organization's offer of
legal assistance at an informational gathering such meeting in Aiken without breaching the literal
terms of the rules. Moreover, the Disciplinary Rules in question permit punishment for mere
solicitation unaccompanied by proof of any of the substantive evil. In sum, the Rules in their present
form have a distinct potential for dampening the kind of "cooperative activity that would make
advocacy of litigation meaningful,as well as for permitting discretionary enforcement against
unpopular causes.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 6: Rule 2.03 (Philippine Code of Professional Responsibility) - A lawyer shall not
do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
436 U.S. 447
Title:
OHRALIK vs. OHIO STATE BAR Date: May 30, 1978
ASSOCIATION
Ponente:
Facts:
• Ohralik, while picking up his mail from the Post Office, learned of an automobile accident
involving Carol McClintock, a young woman with whom Ohralik was casually acquainted.
Ohralik called McClintock’s parents who confirmed that Carol was in the hospital due to
the accident. Ohralik suggested visiting Carol in the hospital, but was told by the parents
to come to their home first.
• At the McClintock’s home, Carol’s parents explained that their daughter had been driving
the family automobile on a local road when she was hit by an uninsured motorist. Both
Carol and her passenger, Wanda Lou Holbert, were injured and hospitalized. In response
to the McClintocks' expression of apprehension that they might be sued by Holbert,
appellant explained that Ohio's guest statute would preclude such a suit.
• When appellant suggested to the McClintocks that they hire a lawyer, Mrs. McClintock
replied that such a decision would be up to Carol, who was 18 years old and would be the
beneficiary of a successful claim.
• Ohralik then visited Carol in the hospital, and after a brief chat, informed her that he
would be representing her as her lawyer and asked her to sign an agreement. Carol said
she would have to discuss the matter with her parents. She did not sign the agreement, but
asked appellant to have her parents come to see her. Ohralik also attempted to meet
Holbert, but learned that she was already released from the hospital.
• Before going back to the McClintock’s, Ohralik bought a tape recorder and went by the
scene of the accident to take photos. Upon speaking with Carol’s parents, he reexamined
their automobile insurance policy, discussed with them the law applicable to passengers,
and explained the consequences of the fact that the driver who struck Carol's car was an
uninsured motorist. Appellant discovered that the McClintocks' insurance policy would
provide benefits of up to $12,500 each for Carol and Wanda Lou under an uninsured
motorist clause.
• The McClintock’s told Ohralik that although Carol could sue, Carol swore she wouldn’t do
it. However, upon confirmation from Carol, Ohralik entered into an agreement with Carol
that he would represent her, provided he receives 1/3 of the recovered insurance claim.
• Ohralik, through his own investigations, found the address of the Holbert’s, and attempted
to get Wanda to be represented by him. She agreed verbally on his initial visit. However,
when Ohralik called the Holbert’s home, he was told by her parents that they were not
going to sue; and if they were, they would be seeking their own counsel. Ohralik was even
told by Holbert’s to inform the insurance company that he was not representing them, as
the Holbert’s were told by the insurance company that the check will not be released
without Ohralik’s confirmation.
• Carol also discharged Ohralik as her lawyer. However, even though another lawyer
represented her in concluding a settlement with the insurance company, she paid appellant
one-third of her recovery because Ohralik filed a suit against Carol for breach of contract.
• Both Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert filed complaints against appellant with the

48

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Grievance Committee of the Geauga County Bar Association. The County Bar Association
referred the grievance to appellee, which filed a formal complaint with the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
• The Board found Ohralik in violation of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, and
rejected Ohralik’s defense that his conduct was protected under his Constitutional rights.
Issue/s:
(1) W/N Ohralik’s in-person solicitation of business is protected by his First Amendment Right to
Freedom of Expression
(2) W/N actual harm is necessary before one can be found in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for in-person solicitation
Ruling:
(1) No, in-person solicitation is not protected by right to Freedom of Expression
The solicitation of business by a lawyer through direct, in-person communication with the
prospective client has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's ideal of the attorney-
client relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to the prospective client. Although
the State allows advertising of one’s practice, in-person solicitation is not similar to the advertising
approved of by the State.
First, appellant's solicitation imparted to Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert certain
information about his availability and the terms of his proposed legal services. In this respect, in-
person solicitation serves much the same function as an advertisement. However, unlike public
advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or
not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure, and often demands an immediate response, without
providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and effect of in-person solicitation
may be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed
decision making; there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of the
Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual.
It also is argued that in-person solicitation may provide the solicited individual with information
about his or her legal rights and remedies. In this case, appellant gave Wanda Lou a "tip" about
the prospect of recovery based on the uninsured motorist clause in the McClintocks' insurance
policy, and he explained that clause and Ohio's guest statute to Carol McClintock's parents. But
neither of the Disciplinary Rules here at issue prohibited appellant from communicating
information to these young women about their legal rights and the prospects of obtaining a
monetary recovery, or from recommending that they obtain counsel. The Code merely prohibited
him from using the information as bait with which to obtain an agreement to represent them for a
fee. The Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from giving unsolicited legal advice; it proscribes the
acceptance of employment resulting from such advice.
A lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with

First Amendment concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic and professional
regulation.
(2) No, actual harm is unnecessary as the rules are preventative measures so no harm need to
occur

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

The Rules prohibiting solicitation are prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of
harm before it occurs. The Rules were applied in this case to discipline a lawyer for soliciting
employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse consequences
the State seeks to avert. In such a situation, which is inherently conducive to overreaching and
other forms of misconduct, the State has a strong interest in adopting and enforcing rules of
conduct designed to protect the public from harmful solicitation by lawyers whom it has licensed.
On the basis of the undisputed facts of record, we conclude that the Disciplinary Rules
constitutionally could be applied to appellant. He approached two young accident victims at a time
when they were especially incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting
their own interests. He solicited Carol McClintock in a hospital room where she lay in traction, and
sought out Wanda Lou Holbert on the day she came home from the hospital, knowing from his
prior inquiries that she had just been released. Appellant urged his services upon the young
women and used the information he had obtained from the McClintocks, and the fact of his
agreement with Carol, to induce Wanda to say "O. K." in response to his solicitation. He employed
a concealed tape recorder, seemingly to insure that he would have evidence of Wanda's oral assent
to the representation. He emphasized that his fee would come out of the recovery, thereby tempting
the young women with what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer. He refused to
withdraw when Mrs. Holbert requested him to do so only a day after the initial meeting between
appellant and Wanda Lou and continued to represent himself to the insurance company as Wanda
Holbert's lawyer.
The court below did not hold that these or other facts were proof of actual harm to Wanda Holbert
or Carol McClintock, but rested on the conclusion that appellant had engaged in the general
misconduct proscribed by the Disciplinary Rules.

50

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 7
G.R. No. L-68838

Title:
FABILLO vs. IAC
Ponente: FERNAN, C.J.
Petitioners: FLORENCIO FABILLO and Respondents: THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
JOSEFA TANA (substituted by their APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Case Division) and
heirs Gregorio Fabillo, Roman Fabillo, ALFREDO MURILLO (substituted by his heirs Fiamita
Cristeta F. Maglinte and Antonio Fabillo) M. Murillo, Flor M. Agcaoili and Charito M. Babol)
Facts:
In her last will and testament, Justina Fabillo bequeathed to her brother, Florencio, a house and lot
in San Salvador Street, Palo, Leyte, and to her husband, Gregorio D. Brioso, a piece of land in
Pugahanay, Palo, Leyte. After her death, Florencio (brother) filed a petition for the probate of said
will, and the probate court approved the project of partition "with the reservation that the ownership
of the land in San Salvador Street and the house erected thereon be litigated and determined in a
separate proceedings.”
Two years later, Florencio contracted the services of Atty. Murillo in recovering the San Salvador
property. And in consideration for his legal services, in the two cases, Florencio promises and binds
myself to pay Atty. Murillo, in case of success in any or both cases the sum equivalent to 40% of
whatever benefit he may derive from such cases . In case the properties are sold, mortgaged, or
leased, Murillo shall be entitled respectively to 40% of the "purchase price, proceeds of the mortgage,
or rentals. However with respect to a situation wherein the properties are neither sold, mortgaged or
leased, Murillo is allowed to have the option of occupying or leasing to any interested party forty per
cent of the house and lot.
Consequently, Murillo filed for Florencio a Civil Case against Gregorio to recover the San Salvador
property. The case was terminated upon a compromise agreement, and declared Florencio Fabillo as
the lawful owner not only of the San Salvador property but also the Pugahanay parcel of land.
Thereafter, Murillo proceeded to implement the contract of services between him and Florencio.
However, Florencio Fabillo claimed exclusive right over the two properties and refused to give
Murillo his share of their produce. Thus, Murillo filed in the CFI of Leyte a complaint and prayed
that he be declared the lawful owner of 40% of the two properties.
In their answer, the defendants stated that the consent to the contract by the Fabillo spouses was
vitiated by old age and ailment; that Murillo misled them into believing that Special Proceedings on
the probate of Justina's will was already terminated when actually it was still pending resolution;
and that the contingent fee of 40% of the value of the San Salvador property was excessive, unfair
and unconscionable considering the nature of the case, the length of time spent for it, the efforts
exerted by Murillo, and his professional standing. They prayed that the contract of services be
declared null and void.
The lower court ruled that there was insufficient evidence that there was vitiation of consent. Ruling
that the contract of services did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code as said contract stipulated
a contingent fee, the court upheld Murillo's claim for "contingent attorney's fees of 40% of the value
of recoverable properties." However, the court declared Murillo to be the lawful owner of 40% of both

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

the San Salvador and Pugahanay properties and the improvements thereon.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue/s:
WON the contract of service between Florencio and Murillo violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
Ruling:
NO, the contract of services did not violate said provision of law. Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
specifically paragraph 5 thereof, prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at a public or
judicial auction, properties and rights which are the objects of litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession. The said prohibition, however, applies only if the sale or assignment of
the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property.
Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said
prohibition under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code because the payment of said fee is not made
during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled
by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien
over funds and property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements.
As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is committed or
imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion, a
contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.
However, we disagree that the contingent fee stipulated is forty percent of the properties subject of
the litigation. A careful scrutiny of the contract shows that the parties intended forty percent of the
value of the properties as Murillo's contingent fee.
Considering the nature of the case, the value of the properties subject matter thereof, the length of
time and effort exerted on it by Murillo, we hold that Murillo is entitled to the amount of P3,000.00
as reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered in the case which ended on a compromise
agreement. In so ruling, we uphold "the time-honored legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of
rendering service and securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that can ever
happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom all trust and confidence
were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy."

52

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 8
A.C. No. 5534
Title:
YU vs. BONDAL
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.
Petitioners: JAYNE Y. YU Respondent: RENATO LAZARO BONDAL
Facts:
Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal was charged by Jayne Y. Yu for gross negligence and violation of Canon
16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because of his alleged failure to attend
to the five cases Yu referred to him and to return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she
has paid him.
On 30 March 2000, Yu engaged in the services of Bondal as her counsel in five (5) cases and in the
Retainer Agreement of the same date, complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of
P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the said cases, with an Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per
hearing; and in the event that damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as
success fee. Complainant later issued two checks, dated 20 February 2001 and 5 April 2001 in the
amount of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, respectively. Despite receipt of above-said amounts,
respondent failed to attend on the said cases due to his negligence.
On 14 June 2001, complainant demanded from respondent for the return of all the records she had
entrusted him bearing on the subject cases. Through her counsel, she sent a letter in which she
demands for the return of the records of the cases. Respondent returned only two of the five records.
On 8 August 2001, she demanded the return of the rest of the files and in the same letter; she also
demanded the refund of the amounts covered by the two checks she issued. Respondent failed and
continues to refuse to comply with complainant’s valid demands. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether Atty. Bondal violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty
Ruling:
NO. The Court held that the complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. In the present case, the fact that complainant was dissatisfied
with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the retainer agreement for respondent
appears to have represented the interest of complainant. Moreover, litigants need to be reminded
that lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always win their cases for their clients no
matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause.
However, since respondent had been advised by complainant through her counsel that she intended
to terminate his services, he was obliged, under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to immediately turn over all papers and property which complainant entrusted to his
successor.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 9
G.R. No. 139542
Title:
Date: June 10, 2003
PEOPLE vs. GONZALEZ, JR.
Ponente:
Facts:
Pastelero Law office seeks to clarify whether the firm of Velasquez, Rodriguez, Respicio, Ramos,
Nidea, and Prado, counsel for the private complainant-appellee, may call itself "A law Firm Of St.
Thomas More and Associate Members".
Issue/s:
Whether the use of the name “St. Thomas More and Associate Members” proper
Ruling:
No. Rule 3.02 is clear. No name not belonging to any of the partners or associates may be used in
the firm name for any purpose. In one case[1], we have ruled that the use of the firm name of a
foreign law firm is unethical because that firm is not authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction. In this case, "The Law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate Members" is not a law
firm in this jurisdiction or even in any other jurisdiction. A "St. Thomas More and Associates" or
STMA is in fact the socio-political ministry or the couples for Christ, a Christian family-renewal
community.
"The Law Firm of St. Thomas More and Associate Members" indeed appears misleading. It
implies that St. Thomas More is a Law Firm when in fact it is not it would also convey to the
public the impression that the lawyers are members of the law firm which does not exist. To the
public, it would seem that the purpose or intention of adding "The Law Firm of St. Thomas More
and Associates Members" is to bask in the name of a Saint, although that may not really, be the
purpose or intention of the lawyers. The appellation only tends to confuse the public and in a way
demean both the saints and the legal profession whose members must depend on their own name
and record and merit and not on the name/glory of other persons living or dead.

54

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 10
455 U.S. 191
Title:
In re R.M.J.
Ponente:
Facts:
Rule 4 of the Missouri Supreme Court, regulating advertising by lawyers, states that a lawyer
may include 10 categories of information in a published advertisement:
1. name, address and telephone number;
2. areas of practice;
3. date and place of birth;
4. schools attended;
5. foreign language ability;
6. office hours;
7. fee for an initial consultation;
8. availability of a schedule of fees;
9. credit arrangements; and
10. the fixed fee to be charged for certain "routine" legal services.
Although the Rule does not state explicitly that these 10 categories of information are the only
information that will be permitted, that is the interpretation given the Rule by the State Supreme
Court and appellee Advisory Committee, which is charged with its enforcement.
An addendum to the Rule specifies two (2) ways in which areas of practice may be listed in an
advertisement,
1. the lawyer may use one or more of a list of 23 areas of practice, but may not deviate from
the precise wording stated in the Rule to describe these areas.
2. In addition, the Rule permits a lawyer to send professional announcement cards
announcing a change of address or firm name, or similar matters, but only to "lawyers, clients,
former clients, personal friends, and relatives."
An information was filed in the Missouri Supreme Court by appellee Advisory Committee,
charging appellant, a practicing lawyer in St. Louis, Mo., with violations of Rule 4.
The information charged that appellant published advertisements which listed areas of practice in
language other than that specified in the Rule and which listed the courts in which appellant was
admitted to practice although this information was not included among the 10 categories of
information authorized by the Rule.
In addition, the information charged that appellant had mailed announcement cards to persons
other than those permitted by the Rule.
Appellant claimed that each of the restrictions upon advertising was unconstitutional under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, but the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of Rule 4 and issued a private reprimand.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Issue/s:
Ruling:
None of the restrictions in question upon appellant's First Amendment rights can be sustained in
the circumstances of this case. Pp. 455 U. S. 199-207.
(a) Although the States retain the ability to regulate commercial speech, such as lawyer
advertising that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice, the First
and Fourteenth Amendments require that they do so with care and in a manner no more
extensive than reasonably necessary to further substantial interests. Pp. 455 U. S. 199-204.
(b) Because the listing published by appellant -- e.g., "real estate" instead of "property law" as
specified by Rule 4, and "contracts" and "securities," which were not included in the Rule's listing -
- has not been shown to be misleading, and appellee suggests no substantial interest promoted by
the restriction, the portion of Rule 4 specifying the areas of practice that may be listed is an
invalid restriction upon speech as applied to appellant's advertisements. P. 455 U. S. 205.
(c) Nor has appellee identified any substantial interest in prohibiting a lawyer from identifying
the jurisdictions in which he is licensed to practice. Such information is not misleading on its face.
That appellant was licensed to practice in both Illinois and Missouri is factual and highly relevant
information, particularly in light of the geography of the region in which he practices. While
listing the relatively uninformative fact that he is a member of the United States Supreme Court
Bar could be misleading, there was no finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court, there
is nothing in the record to indicate it was misleading, and the Rule does not specifically identify it
as potentially misleading. Pp. 455 U. S. 205-206.
(d) With respect to the restriction on announcement cards, while mailings may be more difficult to
supervise, there is no indication in the record that an inability to supervise is the reason the State
restricts the potential audience of the cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the only
solution, and there is no indication of a failed effort to proceed along a less restrictive path. P. 455
U. S. 206.

56

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 11
A.M. No. P-99-1292
Title:
SAMONTE vs. ATTY. GATDULA
Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J.
Petitioner: JULIETA BORROMEO Respondents: ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA,
SAMONTE Branch Clerk of Court
Facts:
Complainant, Ms. Julieta Borromeo Samonte, was allegedly the authorized representative of her
sister Flor Borromeo de Leon (plaintiff-lessor) in a civil case for ejectment filed with the QC MTC
Branch 37. The said court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff-lessor, who subsequently
filed a motion for execution of the same decision. To her surprise however, complainant Samonte
received a temporary restraining order (TRO) signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of QC RTC
Branch 220, where public respondent Atty. Rolando R. Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court. The
TRO enjoined the execution of the MTC decision.
Complainant Samonte alleged that the TRO issuance was hasty and irregular as she was never
notified of the application for preliminary injunction (PI). She further alleged that, upon her
inquiry as to the reason of the TRO issuance by RTC QC Branch 220, public respondent Atty.
Gatdula blamed her lawyer for the latter’s mistake in the complaint for ejectment, and told her
that she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent, the latter
simultaneously giving a calling card with the name “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera” with office address within Cubao, QC, if she wanted the execution to proceed. To her
dismay, RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the PI.
In his comment and/or version of the incident, public respondent Atty. Gatdula claimed otherwise:
(1) that the Notice of Hearing on the motion for TRO issuance was duly served upon the parties to
the ejectment case, and that the application for the injunctive relief was heard before the TRO
was issued; (2) that after the TRO and WPI was issued by the QC RTC Branch 220, complainant
Samonte went and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers
recommended the law firm of “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera”, with Samonte
simultaneously showing him a calling card, and asked him if he could handle her case - to which
he refused; and (3) that complainant Samonte repeatedly threaten to file an administrative case
against public respondent Atty. Gatdula and Judge Castillo if the WPI will not be recalled. To
sum, public respondent Atty. Gatdula claimed that complainant Samonte must have filed the
administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant-
lessee from the rented premises.
The administrative case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation to Executive
Judge Estrella Estrada of QC RTC who thereafter recommended that Atty. Gatdula be
admonished and censured for the minor infraction he has committed.
This recommendation was based upon her findings on record, that although the complainant
failed to prosecute the administrative case for failure to appear in four scheduled hearings despite
due notice, respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 otherwise known as the “Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and Employess” due to the fact that his

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

name appears on the attached calling card as partner in the “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera” Law Offices. According to Exec. Judge Estrada, this fact gives the
impression that his connection in the law firm may constitute an act of solicitation and private
practice which is declared unlawful under RA 6713. Thus, the violation committed may only be
considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be administratively sanctioned.
Issue/s:
Whether or not public respondent Atty. Gatdula engaged in the private practice of law.
Ruling:
Yes, public respondent Atty. Gatdula engaged in the private practice of law which is not only in
conflict with his official functions but is also in violation of Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713. The
respondent, though he vehemently denied the complainant’s allegations, did not deny that his
name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which admittedly came into the
hands of the complainant. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said
law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of
solicitation which violates Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 which declares it unlawful for a public
official or employee to, among others: (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with official functions.
The court reprimanded public respondent Atty. Gatdula for engaging in the private practice of law
with a warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is
further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the
private practice of law.
PS: Rule 3.03, Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is likewise applicable in
this case.
Rule 3.03, Canon 3 – Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the
firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to
practice law concurrently.

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CASE # 12
Adm. Case No. 2131
Title:
Date: May 10, 1985
DACANAY vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
Respondents: BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN
G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO,
VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
Petitioner: ADRIANO E. DACANAY EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA,
JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J.
CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and
JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR.
Facts:
Atty. Dacanay sought to enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the
name Baker and McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres
used the letterhead of Baker& McKenzie which contains the names of the ten lawyers asking
Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel,
a client. Atty. Dacanay replied denying any liability of Clurman and asking the lawyer his
purpose of using the letterhead of another law office.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondents should enjoin from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.
Ruling:
YES. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitledto practice law.
Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational
business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds
unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here.
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
McKenzie.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 13
A.C. No. L-1117
Title:
DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS Date: March 20, 1944
vs. BAYOT
Ponente: OZAETA, J.
Petitioner: THE DIRECTOR OF
Respondents: ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS
Facts:
The case involves Respondent Estanislao Bayot, an attorney-at-law, who is charged with
malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune, regarding marriage
arrangements; to wit:
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the

annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and Legal assistance service
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any 12 Escolta, Manila, Room,
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
105
Respondent asks for “the indulgence and mercy”of the Tel. 2-41-60.
Court, promising not to repeat it and that he published it
only once.
Issue/s:
Whether respondent’s act is in violation of the legal profession
Ruling:
YES. It is undeniable that the advertisement was a flagrant violation by the Respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from public.
That pursuant to section 25 of Rule 127, “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain constitutes malpractice”. It is settled that it is highly unethical for lawyers to advertise his
talent and skills. LAW PROFESSION IS NOT A TRADE.
"The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code
of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing
circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations
were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent. Considering his plea for leniency
and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court was of the opinion and so decided that
the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 14: Solicitation and business advertisements lower the standards of
the profession (Canon 2 Rule 2.03)
53 PHIL 37
Title:
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA Date: March 23, 1929
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Respondents: Duran & Lim, respondent Attorney-
Petitioner: Luis B. Tagorda General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose, for the
Government
Facts:
Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third member of the provincial board of Isabela.
He admits that prior to his election, he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which contains
a list of tasks he may undertake as a notary public, and a lawyer, as well as a general invitation to
consult with him for free.
Tagorda also admits that after he was elected into office, he wrote a letter to one of his hometown’s barrio
lieutenants. The letter basically informed the recipient of Tagorda”s intention to continue residing in
Echague, despite having to attend board sessions in Ilagan, in order that he may continue to serve his
hometown as a notary public and lawyer. The letter subtly offered information regarding Tagorda’s office
hours, together with an express request that the recipient spread the word as to his willingness to accept
land registration cases for a fee of P3.00 per title.
The government, through the provincial fiscal of Isabela, together with the Attorney-General, brought
this matter to the attention of the Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Luis Tagorda is guilty of advertising his legal profession.
Ruling:
YES. The Code of Professional Ethics provides that lawyers must not advertise or solicit their
legal practice, directly or indirectly. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personal or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The court reiterate that the “most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for young lawyers and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.”
This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
It becomes the duty of the court to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases
by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in
needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was
unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his
promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. Atty. Tagorda is suspended for one month.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B.
Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month
from April 1, 1929.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 15
Bar Matter No. 553
Title:
Date: June 17, 1993
ULEP vs. LEGAL CLINIC
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
Petitioner: MAURICIO C. ULEP Respondent: THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Facts:
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was
to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law
firms.
The petitioner, Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic. Petitioner contends that the
advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of
the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
following advertisements:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
Respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but claims that it
is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June
7, 1977.
Issue/s:

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

1. Whether or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes
practice of law and
2. Whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility
Ruling:
Both Yes. The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined
in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of
paralegal services in the Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefore.
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts.
Canon 3.01 adds that he is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04).
The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of the conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the advertisement
of a lawyer’s services. However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of
the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The
respondent’s defense with the case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception
to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stand therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by
such authority in that state.” The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and
from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or
the Code of Professional Ethics

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 16
G.R. No. 3593
Title:
US vs. NEY & BOSQUE
Ponente: TRACEY, J.
Respondents: C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA
Petitioner: THE UNITED STATES
BOSQUE
Facts:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt.
In the year 1902 this court decided that the defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to
admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for
admission to the bar.
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry
on business together, sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had
established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands and that Bosque
would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper
was headed "Law Office — Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque, jurisconsulto español— C.W.
Ney, abogado americano."
The defendant Bosque has not personally appeared in the courts, and with one exception, occuring
through an inadvertance, papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor
with any designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque — C.W.
Ney, abogado."
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the other on September 15, 1906, this court refused to
consider petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the practice being repeated, on
the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate
action thereon, and he thereupon instituted this proceeding.
The defendants disclaim any intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, providing that every pleading must be subscribed by
the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by implication prohibits, a subscription of the
names of any other persons, whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature containing the
name of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this section, nor was it
aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of the individual name of a licensed attorney.
It is to be noted that we are not now considering an application for the suspension or removal of
the defendant Ney from his office as attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an officer of the
court, could not be proceeded against in that way, and probably for that reason the Attorney-
General instituted this form of proceeding.
Issue/s:
Whether should either of these defendants be thus punished for contempt?

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Ruling:
YES. Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions.
As to the first subdivision of this section, no direct order or command of this court has been
disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the defendant Bosque can have
disobeyed is the one denying him the right to practice law. This order, however, was directly
binding upon him, notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his part of
ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had he been entitled under the
statute to practice law without any license from the court and without an application to it, yet its
order made on his own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The
irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his authorization and
constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the firm circular in setting forth
the establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands,
amounted to an assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he
would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. Spanish law plays
an important part in the equipment of a lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing
from the law of other foreign countries, in regard to which a skilled person might as a calling,
advise without practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that he was a Spanish lawyer did
not amount to a disclaimer of his professional character in the Islands. Independent of statutory
provisions, a foreigner is not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law.
Consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a
proceeding to which he was a party.
Under the second subdivision of the section cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch
as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision, the defendant
Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the
opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner Ney
participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally
responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of the law, and yet hold
guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive
character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from presuming on the hope of his
voluntarily conforming to the customary standard of members of the bar.
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to be
paid into the office of the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Attorney’s Fees and Compensation for Legal Services (Canons 20,
Rule 138 Secs. 24-26 and 37, Rule 9.02, Rule 16 and Rule 16.02)
CASE # 17
GR No. 183385
Title:
Date: 13 February 2009
MASMUD vs. NLRC
Ponente: NACHURA, J.
Petitioners: EVANGELINA MASMUD (as Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. COMMISSION (First Division) and ATTY.
MASMUD) ROLANDO B. GO, JR.
Facts:
Evangeline Masmud filed a complaint on behalf of her late husband Alexander against First
Victory Shipping Services for non-payment of (1) permanent disability benefits, medical expenses,
sickness allowances, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of his late husband.
Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. and they agreed to pay attorney’s fee
on a contingent basis comprising 20% of total monetary claims, additional 10% in case of appeal
and any award of Attorney;s Fees shall pertain to respondent’s law firm as compensation.
Nov. 21, 2003

Labor Arbiter: granted the money claims. Claim for medical expenses was dismissed for lack of
basis.
Employer appealed to NLRC, while the appeal is pending, Alexander died, thus, Evangelina
substituted as complainant.
April 30, 2004

NLRC dismissed the appeal and the MR. Hence, this appeal.
CA: affirmed LAs decision with modification (deleting award of moral and exemplary damages)
In a petition for certiorari, the Court issued a resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.
NLRCs decision became final and executory. Atty. Go moved for the execution. 20% of the surety
bond amounting to 680,000 was issued to Atty. Go as Attorney’s Fees leaving the balance of 10%
plus award pertaining to the counsel as Attorney’s Fees.
Evangelina opposed that Atty. Go’s claim for 40% of total monetary award is null and void based
on Art. 111 of the Labor Code. (fixed 10% AF- In case of unlawful withholding of wages, the
culpable party may be assessed AFs equivalent to 10% of the amount of the wages recovered.)
Issue/s:
W/N Atty. Go’s compensation is under the concept of attorneys fees governed by Section 24, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court (compensation) or under the concept governed by Art. 111 of the Labor
Code (indemnity for damages)
Ruling:
Atty. Go’s compensation should be governed by the Rules of Court. The retainer contract between
Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the

66

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
Attorney’s Fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness. The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of the amount will not
preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the
lawyer’s services. Canon 20, Rule 20 of CPR provides that a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a. The time spent and the extent of services rendered or required;

b. The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the case
f. The customary charger for similar services and schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which he belongs
g. The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service
h. The contingency or certainty of compensation
i. The character of employment , whether occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer
The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina’s
husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the AFs of Atty. Go and allowed
him to receive 39% of the monetary award. The issue of reasonableness of AFs is a question of
fact. Well settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of CA are entitled to great weight
on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are absent in the
case at bench.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 18
Title: 54 F 3D 150 ( Nos. 94-5132 and 94-5164)

The INDUSTRY NETWORK SYSTEM,
INC., v. ARMSTRONG WORLD
INDUSTRIES, INC. Ponente:
Petitioner: Steven M. Kramer Respondents:
Facts:
The case was by Network and Elliot Fineman, Network's majority shareholder, against
Armstrong, alleging antitrust, tortious interference and breach of contract claims. Kramer
ceased to represent Fineman and Network between the first and second trials. Kramer refused,
however, to turn his files over to Network's new attorneys. After Network sought an order
compelling Kramer to relinquish the files, Kramer moved to recuse the trial judge and, in a
separate motion, requested, inter alia, that, before relinquishing his files, Network be required to
post a bond to guarantee payment for his services. The district court ordered Kramer to
relinquish his files, allowed Network to substitute new counsel, but did not require that Network
post a bond or pay Kramer.
Kramer then filed a motion contending that he was entitled to a statutory attorney's lien for work
done defending the plaintiffs from Armstrong's counterclaims. Following an order by the district
court holding Kramer in contempt of its orders requiring him to relinquish his files, Kramer
obeyed.
Issue/s:
Whether atty. Kramer is entitled for attorney’s lien
Ruling:
No. RULE 138 Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain
the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof.
Kramer must show that he is or will become entitled to a fee before he is entitled to a lien. He
must relinquish the documents, files to the new hired lawyer of fineman otherwise the court shall
hold him in contempt.
In sum, Kramer’s right to a fees has not yet ripen because Fineman recovered nothing, and indeed
did not participate in the second trial, the condition precedent to Kramer's right to a fee-a verdict
in the antitrust case in Fineman's favor-has not occurred, and the entire basis of Kramer's
counterclaim lien theory collapses. On this record he simply is not entitled to either a fee or a lien.

68

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 19
G.R. No. 169079
Title:
RAYOS vs. ATTY. HERNANDEZ
Petitioner: FRANCISCO RAYOS Respondent: ATTY. PONCIANO G. HERNANDEZ
Facts:
Atty Hernandez was the counsel of Rayos in a Civil Case for damages against NAPOCOR. RTC
dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, CA reversed the RTC decision and awarded damages in
favor of Rayos. SC affirmed the CA Decision which became final and executory.
NAPOCOR issued a Check in the amount of ₱1,060,800.00 payable to Rayos which was turned
over to Atty. Hernandez as counsel. When Rayos demanded the turn over of the check, Atty.
Hernandez refused and justified his retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees.
Rayos initiated this complaint for disbarment for Atty. Hernandez’ failure to return the rest of the
award in the amount of ₱557,961.21.
In his answer Atty. Hernandez alleged that they had a contract for attorney’s fees on a contingent
basis on 40%-60% sharing of the court award. Atty. Hernandez was entitled to receive 60% of the
award – 40% as attorney’s fees and 20% as litigation expenses. He asseverated that he deposited
Rayos’ share of the 40% award in a bank under Rayos’ name.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether Atty. Hernandez is justified in retaining the amount awarded to Rayos to assure
payment of his attorney’s fees.
(2) Whether a contingent fee comprising of 40% as attorney’s fees and 20% as litigation
expenses is unreasonable and unconscionable.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute
trust funds and must be immediately paid over to the client. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
When Atty. Hernandez withheld and refused to deliver the check, he breached the trust reposed
on him. The claim that Rayos failed to pay his attorney’s fees is not an excuse for Atty.
Hernandez’ failure to deliver the amount. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his
client’s money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees. The
failure of an attorney to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as
well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney has the

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

following rights:
Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client,
does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct. Thus, what respondent should have properly done was to
provide the petitioner with an accounting before deducting his attorney’s fees and then to turn
over the remaining balance of the award collected.
The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust
and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his
relationship vis-à-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this standard when he failed to render
an accounting for the amount actually received by him on behalf of his client and when he refused
to turn over any portion of said amount to his client upon the pretext that his attorney’s fees had
not at all been paid. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest above that
of his client.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants. Law advocacy, it has
been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal
of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation.
A lawyer’s compensation for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the
court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and
commensurate with the services rendered, but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession to which he belongs. Upon taking his attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a
lawyer submits himself to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional
fees.
(2) YES. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as
valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent fee
agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.
Contracts of this nature are permitted because they redound to the benefit of the poor client and
the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with
which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent fee
arrangement is the only means by which the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries
sustained and have their rights vindicated."
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that
clients may be protected from unjust charges. Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
states that "a contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but
should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." Likewise, Rule

70

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138, Section 24, of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney’s; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of the courts. When
the courts find that the stipulated amount is excessive or the contract is unreasonable, or found to
have been marred by fraud, mistake, undue influence or suppression of facts on the part of the
attorney, public policy demands that said contract be disregarded to protect the client from
unreasonable exaction.
Stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable whenever the amount is by far so disproportionate
compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to fraud perpetrated upon the client.
Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is
conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation. A stipulation on a lawyer’s
compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees
that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount
unreasonable or unconscionable. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on
the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Courts may
ascertain also if the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances. In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is
reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a

claim for attorney’s fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2) labor,
time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the
services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience
called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of
the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being
recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than
when it is not; 35 and (10) the financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be
taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee.
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following factors
which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
The contingent fee claimed was grossly excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when
considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair
advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon him. Lawyers
should not be permitted to get a lion’s share of the benefits due the poor and the helpless.
Contracts for legal services between the helpless and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to
the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied to the former. This Court has the power to
guard a client, especially an aged and necessitous client, against such a contract.
Since Atty. Hernandez, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable decision for his client in his
efforts in litigating the case for 15 years and he took risk in representing petitioner on a
contingent fee basis, a fee of 35% of the amount awarded to petitioner would be a fair
compensation for respondent’s legal services.

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CASE # 20
G.R. No. 155224
Title:
PINEDA vs. ATTY. DE JESUS
Ponente: CORONA, J.
Respondents: ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE
Petitioner: VINSON B. PINEDA JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY.
EMMANUEL MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against her husband, Vinson
Pineda (VP). VP was represented by Atty. Clodualdo de Jesus, Atty. Ambrosio and Atty. Mariano.
Throughout the proceedings, the respondent counsels were well-compensated. They, including
their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatment from VP's dermatology
clinic.
When the marriage was declared null and void, respondents billed VP additional legal fees
amounting to P16.5M which the latter refused to pay.
Respondents filed in RTC motion for payment of lawyer's fees for P50M. RTC ordered VP to pay
P4M. CA reduced the amount to P2M.
Issue/s:
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.
Ruling:
No. The SC cites Rule 20.4 of CPR which advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients
concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice
and fraud.
In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment was not meant to collect what was justly due
them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 21
A.C. No. 502
Title:
JUNIO vs. GRUPO
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
Petitioner: ROSARIO JUNIO Respondent: ATTY. SALVADOR M. GRUPO
Facts:
Herein complainant, Rosario Junio, engaged the services of respondent Atty. Grupo for the
redemption of a parcel of land. For said services, complainant entrusted to respondent the amount
of ₱25,000 for the purpose of redemption. Respondent failed to redeem the property for no valid
reason, thus complainant lost the right of redemption and the property was forfeited.
Complainant demanded from the respondent the return of the money she entrusted to respondent,
but despite repeated demands, respondent refused to refund the money entrusted to him.
In respondent’s defense, he said that the said property cannot be redeemed anymore and that
complainant knew said fact that the mortgage had already expired and what respondent was
doing was merely a last ditch and desperate effort to redeem the property of complainant.
Respondent alleges that he had requested complainant to lend the entrusted money to him to
defray certain expenses. Respondent also alleges that a promissory note was executed and
complainant still has a copy of such.
Lastly Respondent alleges that the services he rendered we’re purely gratuitous and more than
pro bono, since their families were close and respondent’s family treated complainant and his
family as part of their own and that he helped complainant not as a lawyer but as a close personal
friend.
The case was then referred to the IBP for investigation. Two hearings were set but both were
postponed on the instance of respondent. This prompted the complainant to ask the Investigating
Commissioner to consider the case submitted for decision on the pleadings. Respondent was asked
to comment on the complaint but he failed to do so. Consequently the case was submitted for
resolution.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent liable for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless
the latters interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be simply reprimanded and ordered to
pay the amount of P25,000.00 loan plus interest at the legal rate.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners findings but
in addition to the fine imposed, respondent was likewise suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year from the date of payment of the borrowed amount.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging among others that there was no
actual hearing, that the decision was gravely modified from the actual recommendation of the
investigating commissioner and that the facts were not fairly appreciated.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

considering his argument that he did not act as a lawyer but as close personal friend of
complainant
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping redeem the
property of complainants parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a friend, hence there is no
client-attorney relationship between them. This contention has no merit. As explained in Hilado
v. David,
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should
have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity
with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits
or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as
established . . . .
Considering the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioners recommendation to impose on

respondent the penalty of reprimand and restitution of the amount loaned by him is clearly
inadequate. On the other hand, the penalty of indefinite suspension with restitution imposed by
the IBP Board of Governors is too harsh in view of respondents apparent lack of intent to defraud
complainant and of the fact that this appears to be his first administrative transgression. It is the
penalty imposed in Igual v. Javier which applies to this case. In that case, this Court ordered the
respondent suspended for one month from the practice of law and directed him to pay the amount
given him by his clients within 30 days from notice for his failure to return the money in question
notwithstanding his admission that he did not use the money for the filing of the appellees brief,
as agreed by them, because of an alleged quarrel with his clients.
Anent petitioners allegation regarding the lack of hearing during the IBP investigation, suffice it
to say that he waived such right when he failed to comment on petitioners motion to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings theretofore filed despite due notice to him, not to
mention the fact that it was he who had requested the postponement of the two hearings
scheduled by the Investigating Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds petitioner guilty of violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and orders him suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) month and to pay to respondent, within 30 days from notice, the amount of P25,000.00 with
interest at the legal rate, computed from December 12, 1996.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 22
G.R. No. L-29184
Title:
LEVISTE vs. CA
Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO,
Petitioner: BENEDICTO LEVISTE RITA BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMAN-
MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R.
DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and
ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN
Facts:
On September 7, 1963, Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the
Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the
late Maxima C. Reselva. It was agreed that the contigent fee would be 35% of the property Rosa
will receive upon the probate of the will. On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms.
Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his services as her counsel due to
“conflicting interest.” On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to Intervene to Protect His
Rights to Fees for Professional Services but was soon denied since he had not filed a claim for
attorney’s fees nor recorded his attorney’s lien. On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a formal
statement of Claim for Attorney’s Fees and Recording of Attorney’s Lien. Despite the denial of his
motion to intervene, Atty. LEviste kept on receiving copies of the court’s orders, as well the
pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. On November 23,
1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a motion To Withdraw
Petition for Probate. They alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise and agreed
that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all
the properties left by the decedent. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for
being contrary to public policy. The court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements
for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses. Atty. Leviste filed an appeal bond, notice
of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest. Atty. Leviste opposed the motion claiming
that he has a direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked
that he be substituted as party-petitioner but was denied. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, he
suffered the same fate. Leviste brought this case to the Supreme Court asserting Art. 1052 of the
Civil Code: ART. 1052: If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors,
the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. The
acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their
credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be
adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may
belong. Thus, Leviste asserts he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of
35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent
attorney’s fees.
Issue/s:
Whether an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees,
prosecute an appeal despite his client’s refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.

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Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal
provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del
Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the
holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency
did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee. Also, Article 1052 presupposes that the
obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. The contract
for contingent attorney’s fees neither gives, nor purports to give, to the lawyer any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in his client’s share of the properties. The amount thereof is simply a
basis for the computation of said fees. SC claimed that the lower court did not err in holding that
notice of an attorney’s lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his
client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his client is
awarded a certain sum by the court.
DENIED for lack of merit

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 23
G.R. No. L-19695
Title:
RUSTIA vs. JUDGE OF FIRST Date: November 17, 1922
INSTANCE OF BATANGAS
Ponente: OSTRAND, J.
Respondents: THE JUDGE OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Thirteenth Judicial
Petitioner: JUAN S. RUSTIA District, Honorable FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ,
ROSA H. DE PORCUNA and her husband JUSTO
M. PORCUNA and EULALIA MAGSOMBOL
Facts:
Justo and Rosa Porcuna contracted the services of Atty. Juan S. Rustia (petitioner) to represent
them in their case filed at the then Court of First Instance of Batangas against Eulalia
Magsombol. In their written contract, it was provided that the Spouses Porcuna should not
compromise their claim against the defendant without the consent of Atty. Rustia.
After trial, the Court ruled in favor of the Spouses Porcuna. Consequently, the defendant filed a
Motion for Exception from Judgment and Motion for New Trial, both of which were denied.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal and presented a Bill of Exceptions, which was
then approved. However, before the transmittal of the Bill of Exceptions to the Court, the Spouses
Porcuna, without the intervention of their counsel (Atty. Rustia), filed a motion to the Court
stating that the same have already compromised with the defendant and requested for the
dismissal of the case. Since the lawyer of the defendant assented to the said motion, the Court
then dismissed the action without notice to Atty. Rustia.
As a result of the dismissal of the case, Atty. Rustia filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari alleging
that Judge Francisco Dominguez of CFI Batangas exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing the
action without the intervention of the former.
Issue/s:
Whether Atty. Rustia is entitled to a notice of his client’s motion to dismiss the case.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 32 of the then Code of Civil Procedure (now Section 26, Rule 138), a client may
dismiss the lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, a client has an
undoubted right to compromise the suit without the intervention of a lawyer and there is nothing
to prevent the same from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation. In this case, the
personal appearance and the filing of the motion of the plaintiffs (Spouses Porcuna) have
impliedly dismissed the services of Atty. Rustia.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 24
G.R. No. L-24163
Title:
ARO vs. NAÑAWA
Ponente: BARREDO, J
Respondents: THE HON. ARSENIO NAÑAWA,
Presiding Judge of Branch IV, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, LUIS MAGTIBAY, PABLO
Petitioner: REGINO B. ARO
MAGTIBAY, AURELLO MARTINEZ, GREGORIO
LONTOK, MARIA MENDOZA, MAXIMO PORTO
and ROSARlO ANDAYA
Facts:
Petitioner Regino Aro, a practicing lawyer, engaged by respondents Luis Magtibay and Pablo
Magtibay for the prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their deceased uncle
Lucio Magtibay. During the period in which the petitioner services were rendered, the plaintiff
and the defendant of the case, handled by the petitioner, entered into an amicable settlement.
Plaintiffs and defendant made an extrajudicial partition of the properties and the plaintiff
waived their share in favor of the defendant Aurelio Martinez, thru which fraudulent
waiver, herein petitioner was deprived of his contingent fees agreed upon.
Issue/s:
WON the dismissal of the lawyer, without justifiable cause, said lawyer is entitled for payment in
full of attorney’s fees
Ruling:
The client cannot, by settling compromising, or dismissing his suit during its pendency,
deprive the lawyer of his compensation for the agreed amount, unless the lawyer consents
to such settlement, compromise or dismissal, for the lawyer is or hall be entitled to have and
recover from his clients a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance
of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the service rendered and the professional
standing of the lawyer. Albeit, under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Ethics, in fixing
fees it should not be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice
and not mere money getting trade. It must be emphasized that the same provision, which is
an incorporation of Republic
Act 636 into the Rules of Court, also provide that if the contract between client and
lawyer had been reduced into writing and the dismissal of the lawyer was without
justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client full compensation. In the case at
bar, by entering into the compromise agreement in question and even inserting therein a prayer
to the court to dismiss the case filed by the petitioner, petitioner’s client impliedly dismissed him.
Such implied dismissal appears to us to have been made without justifiable cause, none is
urged anywhere in the record, and so Section 26 Rule 138 applies here. Hence, the petitioner is
entitled to recover full compensation.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 25
G.R. No. 179892-93
Title:
OROCIO vs. ANGULUAN
Petitioner: ATTY. VICTORIANO V. Respondents: EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA
OROCIO T. DY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

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CASE # 26
G.R. No. 104600
Title:
RILLORAZA vs. EASTERN Date: July 2, 1999
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC.
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Respondents: EASTERN
Petitioner: RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and
OCAMPO and AFRICA PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY
Facts:
Eastern Telecommunications Phils Inc. represented by the law firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales
and San Agustin (SAGA), filed with the RTC a complaint for the recovery of revenue shares
against PLDT. Atty. Rilloraza, a partner of the firm, appeared for ETPI.
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed the amount. The latter was dissolved and the
junior partners formed the law firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa (RADA) which took
over as counsel in case for ETPI. ETPI signed a retainer agreement with counsel wherein it was
stated that in cases of collection or judicial action, “our attorney’s fees shall be 15% of the amounts
collected or the value of the property acquired or liability saved.”
The retainer agreement was terminated in 1988. The next day, RADA filed a notice of attorney’s
lien. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were negotiations toward a compromise
between ETPI and PLDT.
In 1990, the parties arrived at an amicable settlement and the same was entered as a judgment.
RADA file d a motion for the reinforcement of attorney’s lien.
Issue/s:
Whether RADA is entitled to the awards of attorney’s fees they are claiming
Ruling:
Yes. RADA is entitled to the attorney’s fees. Atty. Rilloraza handles the case from its inception
until ETPI terminated the law firm’s services in 1988. Petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees hinges
on two (2) grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case when he was
working for SAGA, and second, the retainer agreement.
Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable compensation which
lawyers may receive or their professional services.” “A lawyer has the right to be paid or the legal
services he has extended to his client, which compensation must be reasonable.” A lawyer would
be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be
determined on a quantum meruit basis.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 27
A.C. No. 1261
Title:
TAN TEK BENG vs. DAVID
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
Petitioner: TAN TEK BENG Respondent: TIMOTEO A. DAVID
Facts:
In 1970, Lawyer Timoteo A. David and Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer, entered into an agreement
where David agreed, among others: (1) to give one-half of his professional fees to Tan as
remuneration for the clients referred by him; (2) to give Tan a commission on a 50/50 basis from
domestic, inheritance and commercial or in any criminal cases where the clients are involved; and
(3) to not deal directly with the clients.
This business relationship did not last. There were mutual accusations of doublecross. For
allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan in 1973 denounced David to then Presidential
Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to the SC. He
did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager,
Tan as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier. When Jacinto
became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan should also
invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan refused. The case was
subsequently referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981, but none of these materialized due to the
nonavailability of Tan and his counsel.
In fact, Tan died in 1977 but it was only in 1981 that the Solicitor General was informed. In 1983,
a report was submitted by the Solicitor General to the SC.
Issue/s:
Whether or not disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David for not giving
Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer, one-half of the attorney’s fees received by David from the clients
supplied by Tan (This was the issue proposed to the court for resolution, but the actual issue
resolved was whether or not disciplinary action should be taken against David for entering into
such an agreement with Tan)
Ruling:
Yes, because he is guilty of malpractice. Where in the agreement lawyer David not only agreed to
give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound
himself not to deal directly with the clients, the agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138). Malpractice ordinarily refers to
any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer, and is in consonance with the
elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.
The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
a commercialisation of law practice and unprofessional (In Re: Tagorda, 33 Phil. 37).

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Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his
profession, or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. David should not have entered
into such an unethical and void agreement. The SC noted that David should have known better.
Thus, David was reprimanded.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 28
G.R. No. 46396
Title:
DE GUZMAN vs. VISAYAN RAPID Date: September 30, 1939
TRANSPORT CO., INC.
Ponente: LAUREL, J.
Respondents: VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT CO.,
Petitioner: ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN INC., NEGROS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,
and NICOLAS CONCEPCION
Facts:
Nicolas Concepcion, the president, general manager, and controlling stockholder of Visayan Rapid
Transit Co., Inc., and Negros Transportation Co., Inc., which were operating automobile lines in
the Province of Occidental Negros, engaged the professional services of Alejandro De Guzman,
who was then a law practitioner in the City of Manila. The employment was for the purpose of
obtaining the suppression, reduction and refund of certain toll rates on various bridges along the
line operated by the two transportation companies. Atty. De Guzman accordingly took steps to
obtain first the suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on tall bridges and also the
refund of P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province of Occidental Negros. As a
result of this reduction of tolls, the respondents have been benefited with an economy of
P78,448.00 for every eighteen months. However, respondents in their brief imply that the services
of the petitioner were unsolicited and unauthorized.
Issue/s:
WON respondent is entitled to reasonable compensation.
Ruling:
Yes. Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely administrative and
did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact remains that these
services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial results to his clients. It is
clear that for these services the petitioner is entitled to compensation, and the only question is the
reasonable amount to which he is entitled.
Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer....” The following are the circumstances to
be considered in determining the compensation of an attorney:
1. the amount and character of the services rendered;
2. the labor, time, and trouble involved;
3. the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered;
4. the responsibility imposed;
5. the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy, or involved
in the employment, the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services;
6. the professional character and social standing of the attorney;
7. the results secured; and
8. whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an
attorney may properly charge a much a larger fee when it is to be contingent that when it
is not.

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No hard and fast rule can be stated which will serve even as a guide in determining what is or
what is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts in each case.
Facts and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation of
the petitioner is P7,000, deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280 which the petitioner
had already received.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 29
G.R. No. 77439
Title:
Date: 24 August 1989
DEE vs. CA
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
Petitioner: DONALD DEE Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Donald and his father went to Amelito Mutuc’s residence with Amelito’s cousin, in order to seek
about the alleged indebtedness of Donald’s brother, Dewey to Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas.
Donald’s father was apprehensive over the safety of Dewey since he heard that there’s a link
between the mafia and Caesar’s Palace as well as the possibility that his son may be harmed at
the instance of the casino.
Amelito assured Donald and his father that he would inquire into it, and then contracted his
services for P100,000. Amelito found out that Dewey’s outstanding debt amounted to $1,000,000
and that the said account had been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey merely signing the chits.
Amelito communicated such facts to Donald’s father and assured him that there was no link
between Caesar’s Palace and the mafia. Amelito then had a private talk with the president of
Caesar’s Palace, telling him that for the sake and interest of the casino, it would be bettr to make
Ramon answer for the indebtedness. The president then said that if he can make Ramon pay for
the debt, Dewey would be free from his liability, which Amelito fulfilled.
In accomplishing his duty, Amelito then sent several demand letters to Donald for the P50,000
balance for attorney’s fees, which Donald ignored. Amelito then filed a complaint at RTC Makati
for collection of sum of money. Amelito claimed that Donald formally engaged his services for
P100,000 and that the services he rendered were professional services which a lawyer renders to a
client. Donald denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between
him and Amelito. He admits that he and his father visited Amelito for advice on the matter of
Dewey's debt. However, he insists that such visit was merely an informal one and that Amelito
had not been specifically contracted to handle the problem. On the contrary, Amelito allegedly
volunteered his services "as a friend of Donald's family" to see what he could do about the
situation. As for the P50,000.00 inceptively given to Amelito, Donald claims that it was not in the
nature of attorney's fees but merely "pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips to Las
Vegas and the said amount of P50,000 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly
voluntary services. RTC ruled in favor of Amelito.
Donald filed an MR in the IAC contending that (a) at the time Amelito was rendering services to
Donald and his father, he was actually working "in the interest" and "to the advantage" of
Caesar's Palace of which he was an agent and a consultant, hence the interests of the casino and
Amelito were united; and (b) Amelito is not justified in claiming that he rendered legal services to
Donald and his father in view of the conflicting interests. In Amelito’s testimony, IAC found out
that Amelito was Caesar’s Palace’s representative in PH “2 or 3 years ago”.
IAC ruled in favor of Donald, alleging that the sum of P50,000 already paid to Amelito was
commensurate to the services he rendered, considering that at the time he was acting as counsel
for Donald, he was also acting as the collecting agent and consultant of, and receiving
compensation from, Caesar's Palace. Amelito filed an MR to the IAC, which overturned its

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

previous Decision and affirming the RTC’s Decision.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not there was a conflict of interest in Amelito’s actions.
2. Whether or not there existed a lawyer-client relationship between Donald and Amelito.
Ruling:
1. NONE, (a) when Amelito gave the period 'about 2 or 3 years ago,' he was merely stating
an approximation. Considering that Amelito was testifying in August 1983, and his employment
with Caesar's Palace began in December 1981, the stated difference of 2 years is relatively correct;
(b) Amelito testified that he was working for the sake,' 'in the interest,' and 'to the advantage' of
Caesar's Palace, which the Court ruled that nothing supported IAC's conclusion that Amelito was
then in the employ of Caesar's Palace. What is gathered is that Amelito was simply fulfilling a
condition which he had proposed to, and was accepted by, Caesar's Palace, for the release of
Dewey from his obligation to Caesar's Palace; and (c) The fact that Amelito was able to secure a
favorable concession from Caesar's Palace for Donald does not justify the conclusion that it could
have been secured only because of Amelito's professional relationship with Caesar's Palace. It
could have been attributable more to Amelito's stature as a former ambassador of the PH to the
US, his personality, and his negotiating technique.
The main reason why IAC denied Amelito’s additional compensation was because the latter was
allegedly receiving compensation from Caesar's Palace, and, therefore, the amount of P50,000
Amelito had previously received is 'reasonable and commensurate’. This conclusion, however, can
only be justified if the fact and amount of remuneration had been established. These were not
proven at all. No proof was presented as to the nature of Amelito's remuneration, and the mode or
manner in which it was paid.
2. YES. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered.
Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An
acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his
client in pursuance of a request from the latter.
There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by Amelito to Donald and
his family. Through his efforts, Dewey’s account with Caesar's Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy
and Donald and his family were further freed from the apprehension that Dewey might be
harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For such services, Amelito is indubitably entitled to
receive a reasonable compensation and this right cannot be concluded by Donald's pretension that
at the time Amelito rendered such services to Donald and his family, the former was also the PH
consultant of Caesar's Palace.
Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, Amelito's role was not ethically or
legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with
contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a
lawyer may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A common
representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest
motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may well be better
situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties.
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services
rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good
faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just
fees.

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CASE # 30
97 Wn.2d 598
Title:
Date: July 8, 1982
ROSS vs. SCANNELL
Ponente:
Petitioner: LAWRENCE M. ROSS Respondents: WILLIAM G. SCANNELL
Facts:
Lawrence Ross is a lawyer practicing in Tacoma while William Scannell, a former business
partner and client of Ross, is a real estate broker in Pierce County.
Scannell entered into negotiations with Wayne Knight and others for the purchase of a 1,410
acres of land in Klickitat County and deposited $2500 as earnest money.
Scannell then contacted Ross and inquired if he knew of any investors who might be interested in
the property. Two of Ross' clients, Mr. Topel and Mr. Campbell, his law partner, Mr. Griffies, a
Mr. McKinney, and Ross decided to become partners in the joint venture for the purchase of the
land.
The land purchase was not completed due to the sellers’ refusal and/or inability to clear title and
sell to the joint venture, thus ending the joint venture. Acting upon Ross’ advice, Scannell
commenced an action against sellers in which Scannell sought specific performance and damages.
Scannell and Ross orally agreed at the outset of the action that Ross would receive a contingent
fee, which was later reduced in writing.
The trial court ruled in favor of Scannell, ordered specific performance for 960 acres of the 1,410
originally contracted for, awarded $32,000 damages plus return of the $2,500 earnest money.
When Scannell entered into negotiations for the sale of a portion of the property obtained in the
Knight litigation, Ross informed Scannell that he was entitled to one-third of the profits that
Scannell might derive from the sale, as well as one-third of the damages. Ross continued to insist
upon these profits even though, as he admitted, the contingency fee agreement letter that he
drafted made absolutely no mention of profits.
Scannell experienced difficulty in obtaining a contract for the conveyance of the property. In view
of their dispute over fees, Ross did not represent Scannell in clearing up this matter. Thus, in
December 1978 Scannell had still not obtained title to the property.
Scannell reluctantly paid Ross' unreimbursed costs and retained the services of another law firm.
Shortly after Scannell refused to agree to give Ross one-third of any profits from the future sale of
the property, Ross filed a claim of attorney's lien which included the legal *603 description of the
disputed. Then, with the admitted purpose of clouding title to the property, Ross mailed a copy of
the claim of lien and property description to the title company in Klickitat County and filed the
lien with the Klickitat County Superior Court after obtaining a new cause number in Klickitat
County and filing an abstract of the Pierce County judgment.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

At that time Scannell had entered into an agreement with prospective purchasers to sell 790 of
the 960 acres at a price of $456 per acre. However, due solely to the cloud on the title caused by
Ross' unadjudicated claim of attorney lien, Scannell was unable to deliver marketable title and
the purchasers canceled the transaction.
Ross sued Scannell in Klickitat County to collect the contingent fee and foreclose the attorney's
lien. Scannell counterclaimed for damages resulting from the loss of sale and for slander of title.
The property had not sold at the time of trial, and due to economic conditions and local
governmental restrictions, the land had a reduced value of $400 per acre.
The trial court found in favor of Ross attaching the lien and clouding title to the real property. The
court, however, did not uphold Ross' percentage-of-profits theory of attorneys fees for $92,551.61,
and instead awarded him $21,443 pursuant to the contingent fee agreement. The court
accordingly denied Scannell's counterclaim. This appeal by both parties followed.
Issue/s:
1. Does Washington's attorney lien statute allow an attorney to file a lien on the real
property of his client?
2. Can an attorney recover fees, based on a contingency fee agreement if, prior to full
completion of the contingency, the attorney ceases to render the required legal services for
his client?
Ruling:
1. No. An attorney has a lien for his compensation, whether specially agreed upon or implied,
as hereinafter provided: (1) Upon the papers of his client, which have come into his
possession in the course of his professional employment; (2) upon money in his hands
belonging to his client; (3) upon money in the hands of the adverse party in an action or
proceeding, in which the attorney was employed, from the time of giving notice of the lien
to that party; (4) upon a judgment to the extent of the value of any services performed by
him in the action, or if the services were rendered under a special agreement, for the sum
due under such agreement, from the time of filing notice of such lien or claim with the
clerk of the court in which such judgment is entered, which notice must be filed with the
papers in the action in which such judgment was rendered, and an entry made in the
execution docket, showing name of claimant, amount claimed and date of filing notice.
The statute in part is merely declaratory of the general or retaining lien recognized at
common law. This possessory and passive lien gives an attorney the right to retain papers
and documents which come into the attorney's possession during the course of his
professional employment. It is a possessory and passive lien and is not enforceable by
foreclosure and sale.
One of the states with a statute similar to ours has held that the attorney lien statute
must be strictly followed and not judicially expanded to reach real property as fruits of a
judgment. Keehn v. Keehn, 115 Iowa 467, 88 N.W. 957 (1902). We agree with this
analysis. If the Legislature had intended attorneys' liens to attach to real property as
proceeds of a judgment, it would have included a provision to that effect as other states
have done. We note that the Legislature has not left an attorney remediless in collecting
fees after the attorney-client relationship has been terminated. He has, among other
remedies afforded general creditors, the ability to reduce his fees to judgment and thus
subject his client's real property to a judgment lien pursuant to RCW 4.56. If additional
measures are necessary, *606 the attorney may post a bond and proceed with a writ of

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attachment pursuant to RCW 7.12.
The attorney must, of course, balance these rights with the Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 2-23:
A lawyer should be zealous in his efforts to avoid controversies over fees with clients and
should attempt to resolve amicably any differences on the subject. He should not sue a
client for a fee unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client.
In an age when the ethics of the bar are scrutinized in every quarter, we must hold that
the result reached by the trial court is one neither contemplated by the attorney lien
statute nor in accord with the public interest.
2. No. We hold that under the circumstances of this case an attorney may not recover on the
contract but must seek recovery of fees on the theory of quantum meruit.
The settled law in this state is expressed in Ramey v. Graves, 112 Wash. 88, 91, 191 P.
801 (1920):
The rule is that, where the compensation of an attorney is to be paid to him

contingently on the successful prosecution of a suit and he is discharged or
prevented from performing the service, the measure of damages is not the
contingent fee agreed upon, but reasonable compensation for the services
actually rendered.
Thus, we conclude that if Ross is entitled to attorney fees, the measure of those fees is not
the contingent fee agreed upon but the reasonable value of the services rendered. We
cannot determine the value of the services from the record and remand this matter to the
trial court.
In sum, we reverse and remand this action to the trial court to determine whether Ross' actions
constituted slander of title and what, if any, damages Scannell is entitled to receive. Upon remand
we also instruct the trial court to determine what, if any, fees are owed Ross upon a theory of
quantum meruit, and not on the ambiguous, uncompleted contingent fee agreement.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 31
A.C. No. 6210
Title:
RAMOS vs. NGASEO
Petitioner: FEDERICO N. RAMOS Respondents: ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO
Facts:
The complainant in this case, Federico Ramos, engaged the services of the respondent, Atty.
Patricio Ngaseo, as counsel in a case involving 2 hectares of land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. The
Court of Appeals rendered a favorable judgment ordering the land to be returned to Ramos and
his siblings (such decision having been final and executory in January 18, 2002).
Then on January 29, 2003, Atty. Ngaseo sent a demand letter to Ramos asking for the delivery of
the 1000 sqm. of parcel of land which the complainant allegedly promised as payment for
respondent’s appearance fees.
Thereafter, on February 14, 2003, Ramos filed a complaint charging Atty. Ngaseo of violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of the 1000 sqm. of parcel of
land which was the subject of litigation. The IBP Commissioner recommended Atty. Ngaseo to be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year having been found guilty of grave misconduct
and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the ruling of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner and, in its Resolution, affirmed the suspension but only for six
(months).
Atty. Ngaseo argued that he did not violate the Art. 1491 (par. 5) of the Civil Code because when
he demanded the delivery of the piece of land the case has already been terminated.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Ngaseo violated Art. 1491 (par. 5) of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
The Court held in the negative. Under Art. 1491 (par. 5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited
from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the
object of litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.
Art. 1491 - The following persons cannot acquire by purchase even at a public or judicial
action either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession.
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property
which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The prohibition on purchase

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is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view
of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the
peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his
office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and
unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.
The Court have already ruled that for the prohibition to operate the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, as in the instant
case, no violation of paragraph 5 of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the
respondent only made a written demand for its delivery, which the complainant refused to
comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of
ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.
However, the Court still found Atty. Ngaseo guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal
profession in violation of Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility so a
REPRIMAND has been imposed upon him. Rule 20.04 of CPR provides:
- A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to
judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them, unless
the consent of the principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been
entrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any
manner whatsoever, take part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation
or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a)

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 32
G.R. No. L-26868
Title:
IN RE: ATTY. ADRIANO
Ponente: SANCHEZ, J.
Petitioner: IN THE MATTER OF
ATTORNEY LOPE E. ADRIANO Member of
Respondent: REMIGIO ESTEBIA
the Philippine Bar. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
One Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape and Atty. Lope E. Adrian was appointed by this Court
as Estebia's counsel de oficio. In the notice of his appointment, Adriano was required to prepare
and file his brief within thirty days from notice. He was advised that to enable him to examine the
case, the record would be at his disposal. He moved for several motions for extension which were
all granted. The brief was due on April 26, 1967. But no brief was filed.
On September 25, 1967, Adriano was ordered to show cause within ten days from notice thereof
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for failure to file appellant's brief despite
the lapse of the time therefor. Adriano did not bother to give any explanation. For failing to
comply with the September 25, 1967 resolution, this Court, on October 3, 1968, resolved to impose
upon him a fine of P500 but Adriano disregarded again the Court.Finally, on December 5, 1968,
this Court ordered Adriano to show cause within ten days from notice thereof why he should not
be suspended from the practice of law "for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as
attorney." By express order of this Court, the resolution was personally served upon him on
December 18, 1968. He ignored the resolution.
Issue/s:
WON Atty. Adriano shall be suspended from the practice of law
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Adriano presented no excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's
brief. Despite the several motions for extension, no brief has ever been filed. It is true that he is a
court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the
accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he
must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care.
His is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation.We do not accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the
defended party is poor. A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for an indigent prisoner", our Canons of
Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's behalf.
Moreover, an attorney's duty of prime importance is "to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first Canon of the Code of Ethics enjoins a lawyer "to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." By the oath of office, the
lawyer undertook to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities."
Here we have a clear case of an attorney whose acts exhibit willful dis-obedience of lawful orders
of this Court. A cause sufficient is thus present for suspension or disbarment. Disrespect is here

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present. Contumacy is as patent. Disciplinary action is in order.
Controlling here is the 1961 decision In the Matter of Atty. Filoteo Dianala Jo. 10 There, as here,
In the present case, counsel's pattern of conduct reveals a propensity on the part of counsel to
benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that
should be accorded this Court.Therefore the Court voted to suspend Attorney Lope E. Adriano
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 33
A.C. No. 9872
Title:
NAVARRO & PRESBITERO VS. ATTY. Date: January 28, 2014
SOLIDUM
Ponente:
Petitioner: NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and
Respondents: ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR.
HILDA S. PRESBITERO
Facts:
Hilda S. Presbitero and Natividad P. Navarro filed a disbarment case against Atty. Ivan M.
Solidum, Jr.
Presbitero and her other daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, engaged in the services of
Solidum for each of their own cases concerning land. Yulo, pursuant to her land registration case,
convinced Navarro to finance the expenses. Navarro paid Php200,000 for the registration
expenses, but later learned that the property was already registered in the name of one Teodoro
Yulo.
Meanwhile, Solidum obtained two loans of Php1,000,000.00 from Navarro and one loan of
Php1,000,000.00 to finance his sugar trading business, securing them with postdated checks and
drafting a MOA in each.
Solidum was able to pay complainants a total of Php900,000.00. Thereafter, he failed to
pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. The checks issued by Solidum to the
complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn
were already closed. When complainants called Solidum’s attention, he promised to pay the
agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest for the
succeeding months.
Complainants alleged that Solidum induced them to grant him loans by offering very high
interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his
son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the
identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property
from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-
meter property to her for Php1,000,000.00 but he later sold it for only Php150,000.00.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to
her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were
already closed.
Issue/s:
Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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Ruling:
Respondent violated at least four provisions: Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of
the CPR. Solidum was disbarred from the practice of law.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on his loan from the complainants. He drafted the
MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on
the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent
mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for P1,000,000.00, but he later sold the
property for only P150,000.00, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not
distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed
that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they even
suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with the
IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro.
Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero
through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in
respondent’s name.
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client,
Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by, the client.
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to
a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate
mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged
and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his son.
Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground
that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by
respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The interest
of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged
by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his
dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well
as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead, respondent employed his knowledge
and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself that
warrants his removal from the practice of law.
Is conduct under Rule 1.01 confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties? No. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.

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CASE # 34
Title: G.R. No. 173188

CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF SPS.
VICENTE CADAVEDO vs. ATTY.
LACAYA Ponente: BRION, J.
Petitioner: THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES
VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA
ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased),
Respondent: VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA,
substituted by their heirs, namely:
married to Rosa Legados
HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs of
FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL,
EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and
ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO
Facts:
The spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant over in Zamboanga del Norte. They later sold
the same to the Spouses Ames and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was subsequently issued in
the latter’s name.
The issue arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the RTC of Zamboanga City
against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after
the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price.
The spouses Cadavedo engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal but withdrew from the case
for health reasons. He was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT in
the names of the spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The amended complaint
stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis and to be paid
Php2k for attorney’s fees.
The RTC upheld the sale to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo appealed the case to the
CA.
While the case is pending in CA, the spouses Ames sold the lot to their children and the same was
mortgaged with the DBP in the names of their children.
Meanwhile the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP and the latter caused the
publication of a notice of foreclosure sale. Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses
Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff.
Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with reference to the finality of
the judgment in Civil case filed in the RTC. And pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution, the spouses Ames field a complaint before the RTC against the
spouses Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo filed a motion to dismiss on the

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

ground of res judicata and toc cancel TCT under the name of the spouses Ame’s children.
The RTC granted the motion. And Atty. Lacaya asked for ½ of the subject lot as Attorney’s fees.
He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions and selected the more valuable
and productive half for himself and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, the portion assigned to respondents was entered and ejected them.
The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for forcible entry before the MTC.
One from the Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement and adjust the area
and portion obtain by each. The MTC approved the compromise agreement.
Meanwhile the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the DBP for injunction
but was denied the petition. The spouses elevate the case to the CA and likewise dismissed the
petition.
But in 1988, TCT was issued in the name of the spouses Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.
The spouses Caldavedo executed a Deed of Partition of Estate in favor of their 8 children and TCT
was issued in the names of the latter.
Issue/s:
WON the CA erred in granting the attorney’s fee consisting of ½ of the subject lot instead of
cofimring the agreed contingent fees of 2K.
WON the CA erred in not holding the respondents accountable for the produce, harvest and
income of the ½ of the subject lot.
Ruling:
The agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of ½ of the subject lot is void – the petitioners are
entitled to recover possession.
The written agreement for a contingent fee of 2K should prevail over the oral agreement for the ½
of the subject lot. The agreement of ½ of the subject lot was not reduced to writing and is contrary
to public policy.
The reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the lawyer is against public policy specially if he
has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have a part of
the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client which
is a violation under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
The attorney’s fee consisting of ½ of the subject lot is excessive and unconscionable. The long
years of the case was not a sufficient reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing
that special skills and additional work had been involved. However, this case was simple and did
not require extensive skill, effort and research.
The respondents acquisition of the ½ portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code which
forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject
of litigation in which they have taken part similar with Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics.
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis or as much as he

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deserves which is used in the absence of a contract. This is to prevent undue enrichment based on
equity.
Therefore the respondent is entitled to 2 ha or approximately 1/10 of the subject lot and ordered to
return the remainder of the disputed portion.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 35: Rule 138, section 37: Retaining lien entitled to respect by the courts.
GR L-27394
Title:
Date: July 31, 1970
AMPIL vs. JUDGE CORAZON
Ponente: TEEHANKEE, J.
Respondents: THE HONORABLE JUDGE
Petitioner: ARMANDO V. AMPIL CORAZON JULIANO-AGRAVA, ANTONIO
PEREZ AND BENIGNO PEREZ Y TUAZON
Facts:
Petitioner Atty. Ampil was the counsel of Angela Tuason de Perez in several cases. One of the
cases he handled was a civil case filed by herein respondents Antonio Perez (husband) and
Benigno Perez Tuason (son) asking that Angela be placed under guardianship because of her
alleged prodigality (she fell in love and thus was squandering and liquidating her properties for a
3rd party). The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement. However, the court did
not pass upon the validity of the compromise, but instead, dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction. The other civil cases filed by respondents were also dismissed (mostly for lack of
jurisdiction).
Thereafter, petitioner was discharged as counsel. Petitioner asserts that Angela, acting through
her daughter and agent, Angela de Staley, terminated his services without just and lawful case
and without paying him for his professional services. He presented his bill and asserted his
retaining lien over 3 titles entrusted to him by Angela in the course of his professional
employment as Angela’s counsel.
After counsel was discharged, developments ensued in one of the civil cases. The case (which
contained the compromise agreement) was dismissed by the domestic court. But upon appeal,
respondents submitted such to the SC, and the same was approved.
In the said compromise agreement, Angela ceded in full ownership to:

1. Her son, respondent Benigno Perez – Sampaloc property (covered by 1 TCT)
2. Her husband, respondent Antonio Perez – 7 other properties all situated in Sampaloc
(covered by 7 separated titles; 3 of which involved in the case herein)
In addition, Angela agreed to pay her husband P63,000 in full settlement of his claim for
damages.
In return, the respondents renounced any and all claims against Angela and acknowledged that
Angela owns in full ownership the interests and properties presently in her name in J.M. Tuason
and Co. & Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (family business maybe?), acknowledge that she is fully entitled
to administer/encumber/alienate, and that she may acquire the proceeds of the sale, exchange or
encumbrance of the same.
However, respondents failed to obtain from petitioner 3 out of 7 titles ceded in the compromise
agreement, as petitioner asserted his retaining lien over them. Respondents filed with the
domestic court a motion for partial execution, disputing such lien of retention and asking the
court to order petitioner to surrender the titles.

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Respondent court: Granted. Ordered petitioner to surrender the titles to the Perezes, stating that
as the compromise agreement has already been approved, the Court can have it enforced and
thus, compel Ampil to deliver the 3 TCTs; and that any lien should be enforced against his client,
Angela, not against the Perezes.
Thus, Ampil is seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the enforcement of
respondent court’s order, stating his right to lien is supported by Rule 138, section 37 of the ROC.
Issue/s:
W/N Ampil has a right of retaining lien as to the 3 disputed properties.
Ruling:
YES. Rule 138, section 37 of the ROC: Recognizes the lawyer’s retaining lien, present the
elements of lawyer-client relationship, lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and
papers and unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees. It has been stated that an attorney cannot be
compelled to surrender the muniments of title without prior proof that his fees have been duly
satisfied. The courts are bound to respect and protect the attorney’s lien as a necessary means to
preserve the decorum and respectability of the profession.
Inconvenience to the client: Such inconvenience is the reason and essence of the lien. The court,
however, can require the surrender of the title by requiring the client to first file proper and
adequate security for the lawyer’s compensation.
Retaining lien is only a passive right: It cannot be actively enforced. It is only a mere right to
retain the documents and papers as against the client, until he is fully paid. The exception being
that funds of the client in the attorney’s possession may be applied to the satisfaction of his fees.
Transfer of properties by Angela through the compromise agreement would not defeat petitioner’s
retaining lien over the same: Petitioner’s position is similar to that of a creditor who holds an
attachment lien over the properties, and the client-debtor must discharge lien before he can
dispose the properties to a third person, free of such lien. The lien was fastened to the titles and
respondent court was bound to respect and protect the same.
Properties involved were exclusively paraphernal properties of Angela prior to November 1966,
when the compromise agreement was entered into. Thus, said properties properly came into
Ampil’s possession as Angela’s counsel (which began long before November 1966).
The lien sought by Ampil was in no way interfering with the valid transfer of the properties nor
with the enjoyment of the fruits thereof. He merely asserts and exercises his passive lien of
retaining the muniments of the titles. The court is vested with authority to compel Angela to pay
the just fees.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 36
G.R. No. L-26137
Title:
VILLANUEVA, JR. vs. HON. Date: September 23, 1968
QUERUBIN
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.
Respondents: ON. Jose R. QUERUBIN, in his
Petitioner: EUGENIO V. VILLANUEVA, capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
JR. Negros Occidental, ELVIRA GUANZON and
MIGUEL MATTI
Facts:
Respondents Guanzon and Matti engaged the professional services of Petitioner Villanueva for
the purpose of filing an action against the Provincial officials of Negros Occidental. In his
preparation of the case, petitioner was able to acquire documents and papers which were
subsequently presented and marked as exhibits during the trial thereof. Respondents Guanzon
and Matti requested petitioner to allow them to have the records of the civil case under the
pretext that they would study them. Thereafter, during trial, petitioner was surprised when in
open court, his clients manifested before the respondent Judge that they were already
terminating the services of petitioner.
On June 1, 1966, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring petitioner to deposit with the Clerk
of Court all the documents presented by him and marked as exhibits during the hearing
conducted by him.
Petitioner contends that said documents and papers had lawfully come to his possession in the
course of his employment by his clients, and when respondents Guanzon and Matti terminated
petitioner's services without paying his lawful attorney's fees, petitioner acquired the right to
retain all these documents and papers until his fees are paid.
Respondent Judge filed an answer stating that at the time when the services of the petitioner was
dispensed with, he was allowed to continue his appearance as amicus curiae and that the
petitioner was allowed to have custody of the exhibits, consisting of public documents with the
understanding that said exhibits be made available when needed by the Court. Since the
documents consisted of public records, which were brought to Court in virtue of a subpoena duces
tecum, his defiance of the court orders to produce such exhibits amounted to contempt.
Issue/s:
W/N Petitioner had the right to retain said documents on account of non-payment of his fees
Ruling:
No. The documents and papers in question were introduced as exhibits; moreover, as set forth in
the answer of respondent Judge, they consist of public documents. There is no occasion, therefore,
for the privilege of a retaining lien granted an attorney to be availed of.
The disputed documents and papers were public in character. Moreover, they were introduced as
exhibits. They were properly subject to the court's custody. The intransigence of the petitioner in
his persistence to continue in possession of the same based on his erroneous belief as to the extent
of the privilege of a retaining lien, to impart a semblance of legality to his defiance, must not be
accorded the imprimatur of the approval of this Tribunal.

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Confidentiality & Privileged Communications between Lawyers and

Clients (Rule 21.04; Canon 15 rule 15.02; Rule 130 Sec. 24b; Canon 21
rules 21.01-21.07; Rule 138 sec. 20 Canon 17)
CASE # 1
262 SCRA 124 G.R. No. 105938
Title:
REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
Petitioner: ATTY. VICTORIANO V. Respondents: EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA
OROCIO T. DY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
Facts:
This case is an offshoot of the institution of the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as
one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares
of stocks in the several corporations in PCGG Case No. 33, entitled “Republic of the
Philippines vs Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.” Petitioners in this case are all partners in ACCRA
Regala, Angara, Cruz, Concepcion, Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta and Hayudini (hereinafter
ACCRA LAWYERS). Likewise, private respondent ROCO is also a partner in ACCRA.
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others,
the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the
correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders.
The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033 alleged that the ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy
funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of
UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA,
using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987.
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client
and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence,
ACCRA LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves,
among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant
breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of
the Philippines.
On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” which
EXCLUDED private respondent ROCO from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS still were included still as defendants.
ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that


LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants)
as accorded private respondent ROCO. PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the ACCRA
LAWYERS on the ff conditions: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
assignments ACCRA LAWYERS executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings. SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA LAWYERS in
PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG
ACCRA LAWYERS argue they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under
their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.
Issue/s:
WON the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose
the identity of clients (name of ACCRA LAWYERS' clients) under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case
Ruling:
Yes. As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of his client.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE: (1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer’s advice. (2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his
identity is privileged. (3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s
client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged.
Other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule: (a) Content of any client
communication to a lawyer relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the
client seeks legal assistance. (b) Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has
been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the
ambit of the privilege when the clients name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidence.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the
very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-
client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should
they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

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(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering
their respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their clients shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients
would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to
the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the
PCGG would exact from petitioners a link that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a crime.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 2
A.C. No. 4078
Title:
Date: July 14, 2003
GENATO vs. SILAPAN
Ponente: PUNO, J.
Petitioner: WILLIAM ONG GENATO Respondent: ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN
Facts:
Atty. Silapan rented a small commercial space in Genato's building in Quezon City. Atty.
Dacanay, Genato's retained lawyer, accommodated Silapan and even made him handle some of
Genato's cases. Silapan borrowed from Genato P200,000.00 which he intended to use as down
payment for the purchase of a new car. In return, Silapan issued a postdated check of approx.
P177,000.00 to cover for 6 months interest of the loan. Moreover, he mortgaged to Genato his
house and lot in Quezon City. In 1993, Silapan introduced to Genato a certain Romero, who
wanted to borrow money from him as well. Subsequently, Silapan failed to pay the amortization of
the car. The financing firm, City Trust Company, which financed the payment of the car,
demanded from Genato the payment of the car. Genato tried to encash the post-dated check, but it
was dishonored due to closed account. Genato filed a BP 22 case against Silapan and a foreclosure
case of the real estate mortgage.
In 1993, before paying for the next instalment on his car, Silapan asked Genato to execute a Deed
of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him. However, Genato said that he will do so after the
termination of his criminal case, where he wanted Silapan, his former counsel, to offer bribe
money to the members of the review committee of DOJ. He also wanted Silapan to offer bribe
money to the prosecutor assigned and to the presiding Judge.
Issue/s:
WON the respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant
illegal practices and disclosing complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in
connection with a pending case, and thus would be sanctioned
Ruling:
Yes, respondent’s allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity
sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.
A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a
manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-
established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in
his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents.-The obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection
given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.-However, the privilege
against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to

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communications which hare legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of
a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.
If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant’s alleged intention to bribe
government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as
the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to
advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for
hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment
in the strict sense.
WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this decision.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 3
G.R. No. 13626
Title:
US vs. CUETO
Ponente: MALCOLM, J.
Petitioner: THE UNITED STATES Respondent: ELIAS CUETO
Facts:
Thomas Venezia owned BH (BH VENDING/ACE MUSIC CORPORATION) a vending and
amusement business and operated an illegal video gambling business through a pattern of
racketeering activities and illegal gambling payouts. Venezia hired Amiel Cueto, an attorney, to
represent and defend him in the event of any arrest or criminal charges against their illegal
business. Venezia and BH were charged on federal racketeering charges and illegal gambling.
Cueto served as Venezia’s lawyer but not an attorney of record during trial. The FBI became
interested in the investigation of illegal gambling operations particularly Venezia’s gambling
business. FBI decided to use Illinois Liquior Control Commission (ILCC) Agent Bonds Robinson to
work with them. Soon thereafter, the police raided BH and seized video poker games.
After the raid, Venezia and BH supplied additional video games and continued with its
operations. In an attempt to gather evidence, Robinson indicated that Venezia could avoid
interruptions of his business if he were to offer a bribe and suggested to Venezia that they meet.
In an attempt to portray Robinson as a dishonest agent, they reported to the ILCC that Robinson
had solicited a bribe. A meeting was then scheduled. Robinson taped the conversation at the FBI’s
request. The tape was introduced into evidence in the case and at the trial.
Cueto filed a complaint against Robinson, alleged that he was a corrupt agent and file a
preliminary injunction against him. The court grant the preliminary injunction against Robinson.
Robinson visited and inspect another establishment associated with BH’s illegal gambling.
Upon learning the inspection, Cueto drafted a letter to the ILCC, State Attorney Haida, and FBI
claiming that Venezia was suffering damage as a result of Robinson’s “unlawful” interference.
Cueto continued to urge State Attorney Haida to indict Robinson for perjury.
He also contacted Congressman Jerry Costello and asked congressman to contact Haida and offer
him a seat on the judiciary in exchange that Cueto be appointed as the next State Attorney.
Months later, another case was filed against Cueto, Venezia, and Romanik (business partner) of
Count 1 Conspiracy to defraud the United States a) by attacking the reputation of ILCC Agent
Robinson b) by filing false motion, which attacked the operations of the FBI c) obstructing
proceedings in federal district court by persuading Venezia’s defense counsel to file various
motions and Obstruction of Justice Count 2, Cueto corruptly endeavored to influence the due
administration of justice by filing or causing to be filed pleadings. Count 6, Cueto corruptly
endeavored to obstruct the lawful function of the federal grand jury in his attempts to encourage
and to persuade State Attorney Haida to indict Robinson. Count 7, by influencing, obstructing,
and impeding the proceeding by urging the defense counsel to prepare and file false pleadings and
court papers.

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Issue/s:
Whether or not Cueto is guilty of conspiracy to defraud and obstruction of justice
Ruling:
YES. The court ruled in Count 1 that Cueto conspired with others and purposely and knowingly
participated in a corrupt scheme to defraud the US. The court cited Section 371 18USC: “If two or
more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the US, or to defraud the US, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than 5 years or both. They cited the case of US vs. Jackson requisites for conspiracy to
defraud: 1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective against US 2) one or more overt acts of
the illegal purpose 3) an intent to commit the offense. These requisites are all present in this case.
In Count 2,6,7 Cueto violated the omnibus clause section 1503 “Whoever…corruptly or by threats
or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes or
endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of law, shall be imprisoned…”
The court refuse to accept the notion that lawyers were just doing their job. His role as a defense
attorney did not insulate him of his corruptly-motivated actions.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 4
A.C. No. 6711
Title:
Date: July 3, 2007
HADJULA vs. MADIANDA
Ponente: GARCIA, J.
Petitioner: MA. LUISA HADJULA Respondent: ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA
Facts:
Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the BFP
(Bureau of Fire Protection). Complainant claimed that she approached respondent for some legal
advice and in the course of their conversation, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies
of marriage certificate, baptismal certificate etc. However, respondent refused to have her as
client and instead directed her to a lawyer friend.
Complainant filed criminal and disciplinary actions against respondent – in relation to the alleged
demand for a cellular phone by the respondent to grant complainant’s as the latter was part of
BFP promotion board.
COUNTER COMPLAINT was filed by the respondent based on the information she received from
complainant when the latter tried to seek legal services from her. (Anti-graft and corruption;
Immoral conduct)
Issue/s:
Whether the act of respondent in using the information she acquired from complainant when the
latter tried to seek legal advice from her was a violation of the rule on confidentiality.
Ruling:
Yes. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a
veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the
lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the
relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that one is, at
the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence. Of little
moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will
it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize
the relationship.
What at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing
charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were
readily available.

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CASE # 5
422 A2D510 No. 4D14–1363
Title:
BRENNAN vs. BRENNAN
Ponente:
Petitioner: Marianne K. BRENNAN Respondent: Daniel Joseph BRENNAN
Facts:
This appeal places in issue the propriety of a contempt Order against a Defendant's counsel in a
custody case. The Order resulted from counsel's refusal to disclose to the Court and to the Plaintiff
the whereabouts of the Defendant and the children who are the subjects of the custody
proceedings. The record shows that on June 1, 1979, Plaintiff-Appellee Linda Brennan filed a
Complaint against her husband, David Brennan, for custody of the two minor children of the
parties, David Matthew Brennan, then 11 years of age, and Kelly Lynn Brennan, then 4 years of
age. The Complaint alleges that the children resided in Allegheny County until May 27, 1979,
when the father took the children and removed them from the jurisdiction, purportedly to reside
in the State of Florida. Service of the Complaint in the case was made by Plaintiff by mailing a
copy of the Complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested, as well as by ordinary mail, to
the Defendant's last known residence. The copy mailed by certified mail was returned unclaimed,
but the copy sent by ordinary mail was not returned. On June 22, 1979, the Plaintiff filed a
Petition to expedite the hearing date, which therefore had been set for October 11, 1979. She
attached an affidavit to her Petition averring that the Defendant had advised her by telephone
that he had received a copy of the Complaint. The lower court, on June 22, 1979, issued an Order
setting conciliation for July 2, 1979, directing both parties to appear, and directing the Defendant-
Appellant to produce the children at the hearing. Subsequently, the Plaintiff, on July 5, 1979,
filed an affidavit which, in pertinent part, declared that on June 21, 1979, she had advised the
Defendant of the July 2, 1979 conciliation which had been ordered. Thus, the Appellee asserted by
affidavit that she advised her husband of the conciliation date before her Petition for expedited
hearing was even filed and the court set that date for the conciliation. Further, one Ethel
Matthews, apparently the Plaintiff's mother, entered a second affidavit on record declaring that
she had notified the Defendant of the conciliation on June 20, 1979, two full days before the
Plaintiff's Petition was filed, and the conciliation date was fixed by the lower court. The Defendant
failed to appear or produce the children at the scheduled conciliation on July 2, 1979, and on that
date the Court awarded temporary custody of the children to the Plaintiff. No further events
concerning the case appear of record until October 11, 1979, when Attorney Theodore Breault, a
member of the Allegheny County Bar, entered his appearance on behalf of the Defendant. At that
time, Attorney Breault presented a Motion for Continuance on *366 behalf of the Defendant. In
this Motion it was alleged that the Defendant only found out about the hearing by chance a few
days earlier, had not been provided notice under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, and
also alleged that there was a lack of in personam jurisdiction over Defendant. At the October 11,
1979 hearing, the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant had received a copy of the original
Complaint in the case which had been sent by ordinary mail, and further, that Defendant had
acknowledged in several telephone conversations that he had received notice of the October 11,
1979 hearing date. During the hearing, Attorney Breault was asked by the Court to reveal the
home address and telephone number of the father as well as the name and address of the school
the children were attending. Mr. Breault refused to provide such information, asserting that his
client had specifically requested that he not do so. Mr. Breault grounded his refusal on the
attorney-client privilege. Breault did, however, provide a business address and telephone number

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

for his client. Following the hearing, the lower court issued an order requiring Attorney Breault to
disclose by October 15, 1979, the father's business address and telephone number, his home
address and telephone number, and the name and address of the childrens' school. A hearing was
set for October 15, 1979. At the hearing on October 15, 1979, Attorney Breault continued his
refusal to reveal the home address and telephone number of the Defendant or the identity or
location of the school then attended by the children. He did, however, provide the same business
address and telephone number which he had previously furnished. Following the hearing, the
Plaintiff petitioned the Court to enter a Rule to Show Cause why Attorney Breault should not be
held in contempt for his failure to comply with the Court's Order of October 11, 1979 for
disclosure. The lower court made the rule returnable on October 19, 1979, at which time a hearing
was scheduled. On October 19 Attorney Breault appeared at the hearing and again respectfully
refused to divulge the information demanded by the Court, again relying primarily upon the
attorney-client privilege. Attorney Breault, then represented by his own counsel, waived any
additional hearings that may have been procedurally required prior to the adjudication of
contempt. The lower court then entered an Order finding Attorney Breault in civil contempt of
court, and imposed the sanction of a $100 per day fine, for the benefit of the Plaintiff, said fine to
be increased by $100 per day each succeeding week until the information concerning the
Defendant and the children was revealed. The lower court denied Attorney Breault's request for a
supersedeas but on October 23, 1979, upon an appeal by Attorney Breault, this Court granted a
supersedeas and simultaneously advanced the argument on this appeal in order to expedite
review.
Issue/s:
Whether as a general principle, the attorney-client privilege may prevent a court from compelling
an attorney to disclose his client's address, when that client has specifically requested counsel to
maintain confidentiality as to that information
Ruling:
The attorney-client privilege, protecting the confidentiality of information passed by a client to his
attorney, is well-established in our law. It has been recognized in our statutes and rules of
conduct, as well as being a fundamental concept in our body of common law. The Act of July 9,
1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, eff. June 27, 1978, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5928, provides the statutory basis
for the privilege. It states:
In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential

communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same,
unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.
This statute is substantially a reenactment of the Act of May 8, 1887, P.L. 158, No. 89, § 5(d), 28
P.S. § 321, which provided:
Nor shall counsel be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to

him by his client or the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this
privilege be waived upon the trial by the client.
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is of particular significance in the recognition

of the attorney-client privilege, insofar as it may be applicable in this case. Canon 4 states: "A
Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." The Ethical Considerations
which follow each Canon of the Code serve as practical guides in the understanding of the Canons.
It provides:

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Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of
the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has
employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his
lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his
client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for
his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his
independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant
and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the
confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to
proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.
Thus, in any analysis of the attorney-client privilege, we must recognize that our Code of
Professional Responsibility provides strong support for the concept of a legally protected
confidentiality for client-attorney discourse.
The privilege exists only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that the
interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the
court may require that the communication be disclosed. It has been repeatedly held that when the
advice of counsel is sought in the assistance of the commission of a continuation of criminal or
fraudulent activity, the privilege of the protection is lost. In defense of the privilege, we must be
mindful of the concept that the party seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing a prima
facie case that the attorney was used to promote an intended or continuing fraudulent or criminal
activity.
The Order of the lower court adjudging Attorney Breault in contempt must be reversed, and the
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Upon remand, the lower court will, inter
alia have to address the merits of the purported Motion for Continuance filed by the Defendant.
While captioned as a Motion for Continuance, we note that the document includes factual
averments verified by an affidavit filed by Attorney Breault, and also contains a challenge to the
court's in personam jurisdiction. It appears anomalous that the Defendant contests in personam
jurisdiction yet refuses to permit his counsel to disclose his correct current address. In further
proceedings, after issues concerning jurisdiction are resolved, the Plaintiff may desire to present
evidence to attempt to establish that a crime or fraud is being advanced by the exercise of the
privilege by the defense as to Attorney Breault's knowledge of Defendant's address. Further,
Plaintiff may attempt to demonstrate that the interests of justice have clearly been frustrated by
the exercise of the attorney-client privilege in this case, in order to overcome the rule favoring
non-disclosure. Moreover, the lower court may deem it appropriate to appoint separate counsel for
the children in this case. Of course, any resolution of such matters would not be appropriate by
this Court in the context of the instant appeal. We merely hold that the contempt finding and
resultant Order, involving defense counsel's refusal to disclose his client's address, were in error.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 6
733 F. Supp. 95
Title:
US vs. DEL CARPIO-COTRINA
Ponente:
Petitioner: UNITED STATES of America Respondent: Fausto DEL CARPIO-COTRINA
Facts:
Fausto Del Carpio – Cotrina was indicted by the grand jury on charges of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The US Magistrate
released Del Carpio on two concurrent corporate surety bond and in addition, another personal
surety appearance bond that he and his wide posted.
His lawyer, Joel De Fabio, attempted to contact him on several occasions to inform him of
developments in the case, but it was unsuccessful. During the first week of August 1989, Del
Carpio’s wife telephoned De Fabio and told him that Del Carpio had left the residence with a
suitcase and that she did not know where he had gone. De Fabio did not advise the court of these
events. Instead, three days before trial, at the calendar call, De Fabio moved for a continuance of
the trial date, representing that he had a special trial setting in another matter in Tampa. The
court initially denied the motion but reset it to September 5, 1989 due to the Government’s
scheduling conflicts.
On September 1, at a second calendar call, another counsel appearing for De Fabio, informed the
court that De Fabio had been unable to reach Del Carpio and did not expect him to appear for
trial. The court issued an order to show cause. At the trial, De Fabio argued that he was never
certain that his client would fail to appear and therefore, under the attorney-client privilege, and
ethical rules governing attorneys, he had no duty to notify the court of his client’s disappearance.
Issue/s:
Whether or not defense counsel Joel De Fabio has breached his ethical obligations by failing to
disclose to the court that the defendant Del Carpio had jumped bond and would not appear to
stand trial on criminal charges.
Ruling:
Yes. The court has been unable to find any reported decisions addressing whether attorney has a
duty to advise the court that the client has jumped bond and does not intend to appear for trial.
However, the relevant ethical principles have been interpreted in the analogous context of client
perjury. Perjury is similar to bail jumping in terms of critical considerations because both crimes
may interfere with the administration of justice. In addition, for both crimes, the lawyers may
learn of the client’s intent before the crime has been committed. At that point, as an officer of the
court, the lawyer muts inform the court of the client’s criminal or fraudulent intent. This is
especially true if the counsel’s silence will help the client commit the crime or fraud. Thus, the
duty to disclose future crimes and the duty of candor toward tribunal apply equally to both
situations.
However, it is admittedly difficult for a lawyer to know when the criminal intent will actually be
carried out, for the client may have a change of mind. All of these courts have generally equated a
firm actual basis and proof beyond reasonable doubt with the actual knowledge standard. The

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actual knowledge standard is necessary to prevent unnecessary disclosure of client confidences
and to protect the fiduciary nature of the attorney client relationship. Applying this standard to
the record, the court must determine whether De Fabio knew that Del Carpio had fled the
jurisdiction and would not appear for trial, in violation of his bond conditions. De Fabio had been
unable to contact Del Carpio since the arly stages of proceedings and could not reach him even
three days before trial. Moreover, Del Carpio’s wife had called De Fabio to advise him that Del
Carpio left the house with a suitcase for parts unknown. It would not be speculation to conclude
that Del Carpio had fled the jurisdiction.
On the contrary, these facts, taken together, provided counsel with a firm factual basis for
believing that his client did not intent to appear for trial. This factual finding requires the court to
consider a difference between the perjury and bail-jumping scenarios. In the perjury context, a
lawyer who knows his client intends to commit perjury need not advise the court until his failure
to inform the court could only assist Del Carpio in succeeding in his efforts to elude law
enforcement officers. In effect, De Fabio’s attempt to secure a continuance, no matter how
legitimate his motive, could only buy more time for the defendant to flee the jurisdiction. The
court concludes that De Fabio was required to inform the court that his client would not appear
for trial before moving for a continuance trial date. Disclosure was necessary to “avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client” or “to prevent a client from committing a crime”. The duty
of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client
zealously within the bounds of law.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Conflict of Interest (Canon 21, 21.04. Canon 15, 15.01 to 15.08)
CASE # 1
A.C. No. 5303
Title:
Date: June 15, 2006
JALANDONI vs. VILLAROSA
Ponente: CORONA, J.
Petitioner: HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in
behalf of PENTA RESORTS
Respondent: ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA
CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of
LUMOT A. JALANDONI
Facts:
Respondents was the lawyer of Lumot A. Jalandoni a Chairman or President of Penta Resorts
Corporation (PRC). That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married
to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married
to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC)
where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality, Penta Resorts
Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only property of the
corporation is as above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the effort of the
spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land.
The respondent represented Mrs. Jalandoni in a civil case. Utmost trust and confidence was
reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal
circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The latter was provided with all the
necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters affecting
the corporation (PRC) particularly involving problems which affect Hotel Alhambra. Said counsel
was privy to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel.
The respondent handled the entire case and sometime presented Mrs. Jalandoni as a witness,
eventually respondent filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Mrs. Jalandoni without any
approval or knowledge form the said client, which resulted to irreparable injury to Mrs. Jalandoni
because it suffered unexpected defeat.
Thereafter, spouse’s jalbuena was sued by PRC for estafa, and the respondent represented the
spouse’s jalbuena before the city Prosecutor of Bacolod. In his contention the respondent said
there is a retainership agreement between them and Dennis Jalbuena and that he cannot refuse
to the said client.
A case was filed against the respondent, due to conflict of interest to his clients and for not
releasing the significant documents which belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni or PRC and which was
allegedly used for the benefit or advantage of Spouses Jalbuena in the case filed against them by
PRC.
Issue/s:

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(1) Whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by
respondent;
(2)Whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in Civil Case
Ruling:
(1) YES. Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have
been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the
opposing parties are present clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the
second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his
former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy.
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally
unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even
if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the
cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the
confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both
for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the
same general matter. The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is
it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all
parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which
subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.
Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members was
improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required. A lawyer who acts as
such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.
(2) NO. Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of
the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name
of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without
the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy
of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for
hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent made

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was
supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only
presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in
his place.
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as
additional counsel. Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily
mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s speculations on the
professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of
this case.
Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel would be granted
by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28, 1999, the
first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have actually granted his motion for
withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:
That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza professional engagement on her behalf
despite respondents withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his
unprofessional conduct, especially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed.
Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the
possibility of a conflict of interest.
Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly collected
P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to Lumot A.
Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni
were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a client’s documents,
money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional
capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.

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CASE # 2
A.C. No. 5804
Title:
Date: July 1, 2003
HORNILLA vs. SALUNAT
Petitioner: BENEDICTO HORNILLA and
Respondents: ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT
ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 3
A.C. No. 6160
Title:
PEREZ vs. DE LA TORRE
Petitioner: NESTOR PEREZ Respondent: ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

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CASE # 4
A.C. No. 6836
Title:
GONZALES vs. CABUCANA
Petitioner: LETICIA GONZALES Respondent: ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 5
A.C. No. 7360
Title:
Date: July 24,2012
CATALAN vs. SILVOSA
Ponente:
Petitioner: ATTY. POLICARIO I.
Respondent: ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA
CATALAN, JR.
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
CASE # 6
A.C. No. 9058
Title:
SEARES, JR. vs. GONZALES-ALZATE
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
Petitioner: ROBERT VICTOR G. SEARES, Respondent: ATTY. SANIATA LIWLIWA V.
JR. GONZALES-ALZATE
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 7
A.C. No. 4354
Title:
ARTEZUELA vs. MADERAZO
Ponente: PUNO, J.
Petitioner: LOLITA ARTEZUELA Respondent: ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
CASE # 8
A.C. No. 5128
Title:
PORMENTO, SR. vs. PONTEVERDA
Petitioner: ELESIO C. PORMENTO, SR. Respondent: ATTY. ALIAS A. PONTEVEDRA
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Limitations/Restrictions of Government Lawyers in the

Practice of Law (Canon 6, 6.01 to 6.03; Rule 15.06; Rule 3.03;
Sec 35, Rule 138, Rules of Court; RA 6713 sec 7 (b) (2); Rule X
Sec 1 (c))
CASE # 1
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC
Title:
OLAZO vs. TINGA
Ponente: BRION, J.
Respondent: JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA
Petitioner: JOVITO S. OLAZO
(Ret.)
Facts:
Complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig, previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was
segregated and declared open for disposition. A Committee on Awards whose duty was to study,
evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for
disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent
was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and
Pateros.
Charge:
Violation of Rule 6.02
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
The complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales
application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that
the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainants father, Miguel P.
Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants sales application and claim the subject land for
himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept,
on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land.
The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject
land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondents
deceased wife. As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants
sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales
application were subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to
Manuel Olazo, the complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded
Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

result of the respondents promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with
Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land
transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in
this regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his
knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No.
119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the
proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by
the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and
Memorandum No. 119. The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2)
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period,
when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee
on Awards.
Issue/s:
Whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct first, while
the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and
second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client
before the office he was previously connected with.
Ruling:
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought
before the Committee on Awards. These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any
way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat,
since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent
was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain
personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainants sales application
over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is
the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003, categorically
stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting
party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge,
Olazos disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondents alleged participation, and
we find it to be in the respondents favor. Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo,
that the complainant presented to support his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure
and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional
Director-NCR; the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996; and the Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated July 17, 1996), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that
the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To
our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show
how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the
complainants sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what
Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than
what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel
Olazo.
Second Issue:
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with
the sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee
on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged
in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only
in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described
private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. In any event, even granting that
respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or
that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant
to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.
Penalty: Dismissed

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CASE # 2
A.C. No. 6788
Title:
RAMOS vs. IMBANG
Ponente:
Petitioner: DIANA RAMOS Respondent: ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
Facts:
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang
in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Jovellanos. She gave respondent P8,500 as
attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses.
Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside.
He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her
P350.
After six consecutive postponements, she was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any
case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the
very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the
Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and was assigned as
counsel for the complainant's daughter.
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses. Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent,
he declined.Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who
was a private practitioner. Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she
was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon. Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's
refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses.
Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the
P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.
A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of
her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for
safekeeping. Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15,
1992.
On April 1994 Respondent resigned from the PAO. A few months later, the complainant again
asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private
practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as
he lost contact with the complainant.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

IBP’s resolution:
It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting
private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries. The CBD concluded that
respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01, Rule 16.01. and Rule 18.01.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and
ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was
substantiated by the receipt.
Issue/s:
W/N Atty. Imbang violated the Lawyer’s Oath as well as several provisions in the CPR
Ruling:
YES. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their
actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also
public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official
function.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote
themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest
at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 3
G.R. Nos. 151809-12
Title:
PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Ponente: TINGA, J.
Petitioner: PRESIDENTIAL
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
Division), et al.
(PCGG)
Facts:
Petitioner is filed a motion to disqualify respondent Estelito Mendoza. Petitioner claims that
respondent “actively intervened” in the liquidation of GENBANK which was later Lucio Tan et
al.
In 1976 GENBAnk encountered financial difficulties and was later declared insolvent by the
Central Bank. The latter ordered the liquidation of the bank's assets. As then solicitor general,
respondent Mendoza filed a petition with the Court of First Instance praying the assistance
and supervision of the court in GENBANK's liquidation as mandated by Sec 29 of RA 265.
After the 1986 Revolution, PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for “reversion,
reconveyance, restitution accounting and damages” against respondent Tan et al. In connection
therewith, PCGG several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above
named persons taking advanteage of their close relationship and influence over former President
Marcos. In all these cases respondent Tan et al were represented by their counsel
former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza who has then resumed his private practice
of law.
The PCGG claims that respondent Mendoza's acts were in violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
“engagement or employment in connection in which he had actively intervened while in said
service”.
The Sandiganbayan denied PCGG's motion to disqualify claiming that the latter failed to prove
the existence of inconsistency between respondent Mendoza's former function as Solicitor General
and his present employment as counsel for the Lucio Tan group. The Sandiganbayan noted that
Mendoza did not take position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his
term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that Mendoza's appearance as counsel was beyond the
one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of RA 6713.
Issue/s:
Whether former Solicitor General Mendoza vioalted Rule 6.03
Ruling:
No. Rule 6.03 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility provides “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.”

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

According to the American Bar Association Formal Opinion 342, matter is defined as “any
discrete isolatable acts as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular

situation and specific party and not merely an act of drafting enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles
of law.
In the case at bar, respondent merely advised how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and
even filing the petition with the CFI of Manila. The respondent merely followed the provisions of
Sec 29 RA 265:
xxx“The Central Bank shall, by yhe Solicitor General file a petition with the Court of First
Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court
in the liquidation of such institution” xxx
The Court held that the advice given by respondent on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is
not the “matter” contemplated in Rule 6.03.
In fine, the intervention must be substantial and significant.

134

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
CASE # 4
856 F. Supp. 370 (1992)
Title:
US vs. WHITE BROTHERS
Ponente:
Respondent: Russell White BROTHERS, Jr., G.
Petitioner: UNITED STATES of America
Thomas Nebel, and Thomas White Brothers
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 5
A.C. No. 4018
Title:
Date: March 8, 2005
ALI vs. BUBONG
Ponente:
Petitioner: OMAR P. ALI Respondent: ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG
Facts:
Issue/s:
Ruling:

136

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 6
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459
Title:
MADERADA vs. MEDIODEA
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
Respondent: Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA,
Petitioner: IMELDA Y. MADERADA 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo
Facts:
On Sep. 7, 2001, a criminal case of Forcible Entry with prayer for a preliminary injunction,
temporary restraining order, and damages was filed by herein complainant Maderada, which was
presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol, who however, due to Maderada‘s occupation as clerk of
court, inhibited herself. Herein respondent Judge Mediodea replaced her.
During the case, the opposing party questioned the appearance of Maderada as the counsel of
herself and her co-plaintiff in the civil case. Respondent Judge refutes Maderada‘s assertion that
she appeared as counsel on her own behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer.
Furthermore, Mediodea alleges that Maderada did not secure authority from this Court to appear
as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she appeared in court. The
OCA recommended that Mediodea should be fined for failing to observe the reglementary periods
in deciding cases, and added that Maderada is also at fault for not seeking approval of the court to
appear as counsel.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Maderada should be reprimanded.
Ruling:
Yes. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in
propria persona or to self-representation. A party has a right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by law, sec. 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, what is prohibited is,
appearing as the counsel for her co-plaintiff. It no longer follows the raison d’etre of protecting
one’s own rights.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to
government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they are
not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, THEY SHOULD DO SO
ONLY WITH PRIOR APPROVAL OF THIS COURT. The OCA added that “[e]ngaging in any
private business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to
moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office.” The same reasoning was accepted by the
Court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby

found GUILTY of gross inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding
cases, and is FINED in the amount of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y.
Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without
court authority and is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

SO ORDERED.
TOPIC AT HAND (The same is not mentioned in the case.)

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
XXX
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
XXX
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions.

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(Canon 16
Rules 16.01, 16.02, 16.03, 16.04
Rule 138, Secs. 24, 25, 37)
CASE # 2
Doctrine: A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the
mere fact that the client owes him attorney’s fees.(Canon 16, Rule 16.03)
A.C. No. 7057
Title:
Date: July 25, 2006
ALMENDAREZ, JR. vs. ATTY. LANGIT
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Petitioner: DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR. Respondent: ATTY. MINERVO T. LANGIT
Facts:
David L. Almendarez, Jr. filed complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Minervo T. Langit for acts unbecoming a lawyer. Complainant, as
attorney-in-fact of his mother Pura Lioanag Vda. de Almendarez, was the plaintiff in an ejectment
case before the Municipal Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 2 to which Atty. Langit was the
counsel. Two of the respondents in the ejectment case paid rentals amounting P255, 000.00 was
withdrawn by Atty. Langit as confirmed by the officer-in-charge Clerk of Court. Respondent did
not inform complainant of these transactions. Atty. Langit appropriated the amount to himself
because the complainants owe him his attorneys fees. Complainant, through his new counsel Atty.
Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent a final demand letter for the accounting and return of the
P255, 000.00. Respondent failed to reply. Thus, this administrative case was filed. During trial,
Atty. Langit refused to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the
complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent
did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a
position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for
authority.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty Langit is guilty of gross misconduct
Ruling:
YES. Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money
representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning
such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for
complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. The Code of
Professional Responsibility (“Code”) states:
CANON 16—A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01—A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.03—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court’s approval of the
motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could
have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services, provided he
gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s
money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney’s fees. In this case,
respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to
retain the money.
Respondent’s failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter’s demands gives rise
to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. More
specifically, it renders respondent liable not only for violating the Code but also for contempt, as
stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client’s funds; contempt.—When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this
section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Thus, Atty. Minervo T. Langit was suspended from practice of law for two (2) years for violating
Canons 1, 11, 16 and 17 of Code of Professional Responsibility. And ordered for Restitution of the
money appropriated.

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)
(CPR Rule 15.03; Canon 21)

CASE # 3
A.C. No. 9094
Title:
SANTOS FOUNDATION vs. ATTY. Date: August 15, 2012
FUNK
Ponente: ABAD, J.
Petitioner: SANTOS VENTURA
HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., Respondent: ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK
represented by GABRIEL H. ABAD
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against a lawyer who sued a former client in representation of a new
one.
Complainant Hocorma Foundation filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Richard Funk. Alleging that respondent used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief
executive officer and trustee of the foundation from 1983-1985. He also served as its couonsel in
several criminal and civil cases.
Complainant alleged taht respondent filed an action for quieting of title and damages against
Hocorma on behalf of Mabalacat institute using information he acquired while with the
foundation.
In his answer, Atty. Funk contended that he was hired by Mabalacat Institue by Don Teodoro
Santos in 1982 to serve as director and legal counsel. He emphasized that, in all these, the
attorney-client relationship was always between Santos and him. He was more of Santos’ personal
lawyer than the lawyer of Hocorma Foundation.
Santos left for America to get medical treatment. The former and Atty. Funk agreed that the
latter would be paid for his legal services out of the porperties that Santos donated or sold to the
Hocorma Foundation. Atty Funk also claimed that he was authorized to advise Hocorma and
follow up with it Santos’ sale or donation of a 5-hectare land in Pampanga to Mabalacat Institute.
Atty. Funk was to collect all expenses for the property transfer from Hocorma Foundation out of
funds that Santos provided. It was Santos’ intention since 1950 to give tha land to Mabalacat
Institute free of rent and expenses.
According to Atty. Funk, Santos suggested to the complainant his inclusion in that board, a
suggestion that the foundation followed. After Santos died, respondent was elected President of
Mabalacat Institute.
The foundation later refused to pay Atty. Funk’s fees, thus he severed his ties with Hocorma. Four
years later, he filed a suit against Hocorma. The trial court, CA and SC decided in favor of the
respondent.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

After hearing, the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have violated Canon
15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR with the aggrvating circumstance of a pattern of misconduct consisting
of four couort appearances against his former client, the Hocorma Foundation. The CBD
recommended Atty. Funk’s suspension from the practice of law for one year. Respondent moved
for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client in violation of the
CPR when he filed several actions against such client on behalf of a new one.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Funk violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR
provieds that a lawyer cannot respresent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was
formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after teminating his relationship with
the foundation, he filed a complaint against it on behalf of another client without the foundation’s
consent.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the higly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties.
Evidence shows that Hocorma Foundation availed itself of the legal services of Atty. Funk in
connection with, among others, the transfer of one of the properties subject of the several suits
that the lawyer subsequently filed against the foundation. Indeed, Atty. Funk collected attorney’s
fees from the foundation for such services. Thus, he had an obligation not to ouse any knowledge
he acquired during that relationship, including the fact that the property under litigation existed
at all, when he sued the foundation.

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Terminating and Establishing Attorney-Client Relationship

(Rule 138, Sec. 21; Canon 22 Rule 22.01)
CASE # 3
A.C. No. 6155
Title:
FRANCISCO vs. PORTUGAL
Ponente: TINGA, J.
Petitioners: MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO,
Respondent: ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P.
JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M.
PORTUGAL
JOAQUIN
Facts:
The complaint against Atty. Portugal was filed for violation of the Lawyers’ Oath, gross
misconduct and gross negligence. It was filed in relation to Atty. Portugal’s representation in the
case of SPO1 Ernest Francisco, SPO1 Donato Tan and PO3 Rolando Joaquin.
SPO1 Francisco, SPO1 Tan and PO3 Joaquin were involved in a shooting incident which resulted
in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, a case filed against
them for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted
homicide.
They engaged the services of Atty. Portugal. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Sandiganbayan but it was denied. He also filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion
for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration. Pending resolution, he
also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam).
Thereafter, complainants never heard from Atty. Portugal again despite the frequent telephone
calls they made to his office. When Atty. Portugal did not return their phone inquiries,
complainants went to his last known address and found out that he had moved out without any
forwarding address.
After more than a year, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad
cautelam petition as they had neither news from Atty. Portugal about the case nor knowledge of
his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Decision
denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees. They also learned that the said
Resolution was final and warrants of arrest had already been issued against them because Atty.
Portugal, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period
for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.
As a defense, Atty. Portugal states that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only
met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused.
He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present
at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He also claims that there was no formal

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

engagement undertaken by the parties, but only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of
the Lawyer’s Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. He asserts that because of all the
efforts he put into the case, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these
were done without proper and adequate remuneration. As to the ad cautelam petition, he
maintains that it was filed on time. He says that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3
April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review, seeking an additional 30 days. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the
petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.
He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3
Joaquin, who served as the contact person between Atty. Portugal and complainants, attaching
the Notice to Withdraw which Atty. Portugal instructed the accused to sign and file with the
Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the
registry receipt. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would
be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as Atty. Portugal.
The Court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. IBP
found Atty. Portugal guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and a penalty of
6-months suspension.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Atty. Portugal committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling the
complainants’ case, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petition’s dismissal with finality.
Ruling:
YES. In criminal cases, lawyers have a higher duty to be strict in defending the accused for it is
not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to
their life and liberty. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical
conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is
of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and
good faith that is required by reason of necessity and public interest. It is also the strict sense of
fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society.
The Court also found out that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though
respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for
Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that
a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and it rests on the sound discretion of
the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary
period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long
before Atty. Portugal filed his motion for extension.
As to Atty. Portugal’s conduct in dealing with the complainants, he definitely fell short of the high
standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. The
Court notes that though Atty. Portugal represented to the accused that he had changed his office
address, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known
to complainants. Presumably, his office would have received the Court’s dismissal of the petition.
The prudent step to take was to at least inform the client of the said Decision. Had Atty. Portugal
truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably
well-versed in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself

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instead of the accused. He should have informed this Court through a manifestation that he had
already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of
Withdrawal. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the
relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only
from the client’s written consent or from a good cause. Once he agrees to take up the cause of the
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion
the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. He owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his
client. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. After agreeing to take up the
cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any
fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which
duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may
be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. Hence, even if Atty.
Portugal felt under-compensated, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in
handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of
remuneration.
Rule 14.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate
clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that
actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he
might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when
even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for 3 months.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

CASE # 4
A.C. No. 5303
Title:
Date: June 15, 2006
JALANDONI vs. VILLAROSA
Ponente: CORONA, J.
Petitioner: HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., in
behalf of PENTA RESORTS
Respondent: ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA
CORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of
LUMOT A. JALANDONI
Facts:
Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation named as Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she
owned almost 97% of the PRC’s shares. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely, Dennis Jalbuena
and Humberto Lim.
Sometime on September 19, 1997, Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued in a civil case
where she was represented by Atty. Villarosa, who entered his appearance on October 2, 1997. It
was Atty. Villarosa who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of the civil case. However, on
April 27, 1999, Atty. Villarosa, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed
a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, a day before its scheduled hearing, which resulted to
irreparable damage and injury to Jalandoni, et. al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client
suddenly suffered unexpected defeat.
According to Villarosa, the withdrawal as counsel for Jalandoni was to fulfill an alleged
retainership agreement with the spouses Jalbuena in an Estafa case filed by the PRC, through
Christina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin. In respondent’s comment, he stated that it was
he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that
he withdrew from the case with the knowledge of Mrs. Jalandoni and with leave of court.
Issue/s:
Whether Atty. Villarosa violated Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling:
YES. It has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other
than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
Canon 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate
in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of
the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name
of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without
the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy
of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for
hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper." Respondent
made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which
withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs.
Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in

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LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

court, supposedly in his place.
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as
additional counsel. Mrs. Jalandoni’s conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily
mean conformity to respondent’s desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s speculations on the
professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of
this case.

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Judicial Clemency and Reinstatement
CASE # 4
Title: A.M. NO. 07-7-17-SC
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C.
DIAZ, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT Date: September 19, 2007
OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 37,
APPEALING FOR JUDICIAL Ponente:
CLEMENCY
Facts:
Judge Diaz, presiding judge of Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
informed the Court that he is an applicant for judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court
branches. He was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council and was told to seek judicial
clemency due to the fact that he was once fined P20,000 "for not hearing a motion for demolition."
He claims that this lapse happened only once as a result of an "oversight." He then requested for
judicial clemency. In a subsequent letter, he expressed deep remorse for the lapse for which he
was held administratively liable in Alvarez v. Diaz and promised to avoid the commission of the
same or similar acts.
In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and his action on the
motion for demolition made him liable for grave abuse of authority.3 He was fined P20,000.
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides: SEC. 5.
Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any
judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
xxx
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case,
where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been
granted judicial clemency.
Issue/s:
W/N Judge Diaz should be granted judicial clemency.
Ruling:
Yes. Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the
preservation of public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing
that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.
In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all
personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges’ associations and prominent members of the

148

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years
ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He humbly
accepted the verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the promulgation of
Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12
years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the institution. Thus,
the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.

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CASE DIGESTS IN PROBLEM AREAS IN

LEGAL ETHICS (PALE)

Requirements “before admission to the bar” or for continuous

A.C. No. 7269

Petitioner: Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana Respondent: Atty. Yolando F. Busmente

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CASE # 2: PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional

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CASE # 3 (DIGEST FROM INTERNET)

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Whether Mr. Abad has been admitted to the Philippine Bar.

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CASE # 5: REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES

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Title: B.M. No. 2540

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Whether Balajadia is liable for indirect contempt

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Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:

Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.

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WON grounds invoked constitutes gross immorality

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‘Upright character’ * * * is something more than an absence of bad character. * * * It means

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Whether or not the defense of Malinao is proper

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Title: B.M. No. 1678

Yes, Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.

Because of the exception;

-updating and payment in full of annual membership dues in the IBP

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Considering petitioners explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very

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G.R. Nos. L-10236-48

Whether or not the acts of the defendants constitute contempt of court

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G.R. No. 154207

The MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

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within 30 days from its filing.

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CASE # 24: Canon 9, Rule 9.01

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Solicitation of Legal Services (Canons 2, 3