SOUTH CITY HOMES V.

REPUBLIC (1990)
Topic: Prescription; computation of time
Presented by: Maria Analyn Ilagan
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Whether or not petitioner South City Homes was able to fulfill the period necessary for prescription – NO

Whether or not petitioner South City Homes could tack his possession to that of its predecessors-in-interest
(sellers Cabrera and Koo Jun Eng) – NO
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NCC 1135
NCC 1138
Possession by mistake of a
Computation of time
greater/lesser area

Friar Lands Act:

no private entity may acquire
exclusive rights to any canal;
this remains under the exclusive
control of the Government
Director of Lands v. IAC:
Hanlon v. Ten Hove:
public land became private as
privity between previous and
a result of prescription duly
present possessors
established by claimant
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Property in dispute:
613-sqm land located between two other lots owned by petitioner South City Homes, Inc (SCHI)
located in Calabuso, Biñan, Laguna

Petitioner: Respondent
South City Homes, Inc. Republic and Court of Appeals
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Lot 2381 (Lot A) Lot 2386 (Lot B)

36,672 sqm 32,011 sqm

Scale: 1 sq cm = 200 sqm

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Lot 2381 (Lot D)

613 sqm

Lot 2381 (Lot A) Lot 2386 (Lot B)

36,672 sqm 32,011 sqm

Scale: 1 sq cm = 200 sqm

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• Lot A and Lot B were purchased on installment basis from the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau of
Lands by Dimaranan and Guico, respectively.

• Dimaranan completed payment for Lot A. Lot A was bought by Cabrera.

• Pena (assignee of Guico) completed payment for Lot B. Lot B was bought by Garcia and subsequently
by Koo Jun Eng.

• SCHI bought both lands from their respective owners.

• The Bureau of Lands conducted a survey and discovered Lot D. SCHI applied for registration.

• Lot D was registered in SCHI’s name by the Trial Court through the Property Registration Law.
o This was reversed by a CA special division, with two members dissenting.
o This case is an appeal by SCHI, arguing that the CA’s reversal was erroneous.
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Petitioner SCHI
As to technical descriptions:
• Lot D was actually part of Lot A and Lot B but it was omitted
because of the inaccuracies in the old surveying system.
As to nature of the lot:
• SCHI insisted that Lot D formed part of the patrimonial
property of the State, being part of the Friar Lands.
As to prescription:
• SCHI already acquired the property by prescription through
uninterrupted possession for more than 40 years in the
concept of owner, by itself and its predecessors-in interest.
• Its possession of the lot dates back to “time immemorial.”
ANALYSIS
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Respondent Republic
• Lot D used to be a canal which could not have been
appropriated by SCHI or its predecessors-in-interest.
• The technical descriptions of Lots A and B did not include the
area covered by Lot D.
• The Republic insisted that Lot D is part of the public domain
and cannot be acquired by a private corporation. The fact
that it was already dried up did not change its nature as a
canal.
• Prescription is not applicable in this case because SCHI was
unable to establish the requisite length of time for
prescription.
• SCHI’s claim of adverse ownership was also not exclusive but
shared by SCHI and its predecessors-in-interest.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of Property law, Respondent Republic has a stronger argument because:

As to technical descriptions:
• The technical descriptions of A and B do not include the strip of land under Lot B.
• SCHI’s assertion that the original survey shows that the two lots adjoin each other is also vulnerable to the argument of the
inaccuracies of the old surveying system. If there is indeed no canal between the two lots, then the area of Lot D should
have been included in either of the two lots. The area of Lot D was not negligible enough to fall under the allowable
margin of error.

As to nature of the lot:

Contrary to the Republic’s claim, the status of a canal is not perpetual; a canal without water is not a canal. The Friar Lands
Act is therefore inapplicable in this case.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of Property law, Respondent Republic has a stronger argument because:
As to prescription: With the Court’s rejection of SCHI’s argument that Lot D was actually part of the two lots, SCHI must fall back on its
claim of acquisitive prescription over Lot D as a separate lot.
• “Time immemorial” pertains to the fact that the starting time of the possession could no longer be recollected.
• SCHI’s possession does not fall into this categorization. The two witnesses it presented had testimonies that were essentially hearsay.
o Witness 1 (Constantino): “[W]e were duly informed that since the beginning even from the time of their predecessors-in-interest,
such strip of land was believed to was believed to be forming part of the two parcels of land and since the beginning they have
been cultivating the same and treating the said strip of land as their own, publicly, notoriously and in the concept of owner.”
o Witness 2 (Casunuran), a farmer: “[M]y predecessor used to tell me that there is a strip in between the two parcels of riceland
which I was working on… According to them, it happened this way that from time immemorial, there was an irrigation canal
constructed on this strip of land…”
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of Property law, Respondent Republic has a stronger argument because:

• SCHI meant to tack its claim of possession of the two lots to the previous owners. However, there was no need for this because SCHI
acquired ownership (and by extension, the right of possession) over the two lots.
o As to Lot D, SCHI could not have acquired it in the same manner as the other two lots because there was no private registered
owner of the lot. Again, Lot D was part of neither two lots.
o Assuming arguendo that the previous owners of the two lots possessed Lot D, their possession cannot be tacked to the
possession of SCHI because again Lot No. 5005 was not included in the two other lots.
• Art. 1138, par. 1 provides that “[t]he present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession
to that of his grantor or predecessor- in interest”
o Tacking of possession is permitted only when there is privity of contract between the previous and present possessors.
o Without such privity, the possession of the present possessor should be counted only from the time its possession actually
started (in SCHI’s case, in 1981). Without such privity, the possession of the present possessor cannot be lengthened by
connecting it with the possession of the previous possessors.
• A deed by itself creates no privity between the previous and present possessors as to land outside the boundaries for which such
deed purports.
• Art. 1135 also provides that a claimant’s possession by mistake of an area greater or less than what is expressed in his title,
prescription shall be counted from the time of his possession.
• With the foregoing, SCHI’s possession shall be counted from 1981 when it purchased the two lots. When SCHI filed for registration of
Lot D in 1983, it was in possession of the land for less than three years. This falls short of the 10-year requirement for acquisitive
prescription in good faith.