South City Homes v.

Republic
Topic: Prescription; computation of time

SOUTH CITY HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

ISSUE
 Whether or not petitioner South City Homes was able to fulfill the period necessary for prescription; whether or not
petitioner South City Homes could tack his possession to that of its predecessors-in-interest (sellers Cabrera and Koo
Jun Eng) – NO

RULES
 Art. 1138 – computation of time
 Art. 1135 – possession by mistake of a greater/lesser area
 Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120): no private entity may acquire exclusive rights to any canal; this remains under the
exclusive control of the Government.
 Hanlon v. Ten Hove: privity between previous and present possessors
 Director of Lands v. IAC: reversed Manila Electric Co. v. Castro-Bartolome; public land became private as a result of
prescription duly established by claimant

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The property in dispute is a 613-sqm land located between two other lots owned by petitioner South City Homes, Inc.
(SCHI). The two lots were acquired by SCHI in 1981; the original owners of the lots acquired their respective lots in 1910
from the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau of Lands. In 1983, the Bureau of Lands discovered the disputed lot and SCHI
subsequently applied for the registration of the land; this was granted in 1984 by the trial court. The lower court’s
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

 The property in dispute is a 613-sqm land located between two other lots owned by petitioner South City Homes,
Inc (SCHI).
o Lot 2381: 36,672 sqm
o Lot 2386-A: 32,011 sqm
o Both lots are registered in the name of SCHI
 1910: Both Lots 2381 and 2386-A were purchased on installment basis from the Friar Lands Division of the Bureau
of Lands by Dimaranan and Guico, respectively.
o 1918: Dimaranan completed payment for the lot. Lot was bought by Cabrera.
o 1919: Pena (assignee of Guico) completed payment for the lot. Lot was bought by Garcia and subsequently
by Koo Jun Eng.
 1981: SCHI bought Lot 2386-A.
 1981: SCHI bought Lot 2381.
 1983: Bureau of Lands conducted a survey; it identified the disputed property as Lot No. 5005.
 1984: Lot No. 5005 was registered in SCHI’s name by the Trial Court through the Property Registration Law.
o This was reversed by a CA special division, with two members dissenting.
 This case is an appeal by SCHI, arguing that the CA’s reversal was erroneous.

ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner SCHI Respondent Republic
As to technical descriptions:
 Lot No. 5005 was actually part of Lots 2381 and  Lot No. 5005 used to be a canal which could not
2386-A but it was omitted because of the have been appropriated by SCHI or its
inaccuracies in the old surveying system. predecessors-in-interest.
 The technical descriptions of Lots 2381 and 2386-
A did not include the area covered by Lot No.
5005.
As to nature of the lot:
 The Republic insisted that it is part of the public
domain and cannot be acquired by a private
  SCHI insisted that Lot No. 5006 formed part of
the patrimonial property of the State, being part
of the Friar Lands.
As to prescription:
 SCHI already acquired the property by
prescription through uninterrupted possession for
more than 40 years in the concept of owner, by
itself and its predecessors-in interest.
 Its possession of the lot dates back to “time
immemorial.”
corporation. The fact that it was already dried up
did not change its nature as a canal.
 Prescription is not applicable in this case because
SCHI was unable to establish the requisite length
of time for prescription.
 SCHI’s claim of adverse ownership was also not
exclusive but shared by SCHI and its
predecessors-in-interest.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of Property law, the Republic has better rights over the disputed property.

As to technical descriptions:
 The technical descriptions of Lots 2381 and 2386-A do not include the strip of land under Lot 5005.
 SCHI’s assertion that the original survey shows that the two lots adjoin each other is also vulnerable to the
argument of the inaccuracies of the old surveying system. If there is indeed no canal between the two lots, then
the area of Lot 5005 should have been included in either of the two lots. The area of Lot 5005 was not negligible
enough to fall under the allowable margin of error.

As to nature of the lot:

 Contrary to the Republic’s claim, the status of a canal is not perpetual; a canal without water is not a canal. The
Friar Lands Act is therefore inapplicable in this case.

As to prescription: With the Court’s rejection of SCHI’s argument that Lot 5005 was actually part of the two lots, SCHI
must fall back on its claim of acquisitive prescription over Lot 5005 as a separate lot.
 “Time immemorial” pertain to the fact that the starting time of the possession could no longer be recollected.
 SCHI’s possession does not fall into this categorization. The two witnesses it presented had testimonies that
were essentially hearsay.
o Witness 1 (Constantino): “[W]e were duly informed that since the beginning even from the time of their
predecessors-in-interest, such strip of land was believed to was believed to be forming part of the two
parcels of land and since the beginning they have been cultivating the same and treating the said strip of
land as their own, publicly, notoriously and in the concept of owner.”
o Witness 2 (Casunuran), a farmer: “[M]y predecessor used to tell me that there is a strip in between the
two parcels of riceland which I was working on… According to them, it happened this way that from time
immemorial, there was an irrigation canal constructed on this strip of land…”
 SCHI meant to tack its claim of possession of the two lots to the previous owners. However, there was no need
for this because SCHI acquired ownership (and by extension, the right of possession) over the two lots.
o As to Lot No. 5005, SCHI could not have acquired it in the same manner as the other two lots because
there was no private registered owner of the lot. Again, Lot No. 5005 was part of neither two lots.
o Assuming arguendo that the previous owners of the two lots possessed Lot No. 5005, their possession
cannot be tacked to the possession of SCHI because again Lot No. 5005 was not included in the two
other lots.
 Art. 1138, par. 1 provides that “[t]he present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by
tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor- in interest”
o Tacking of possession is permitted only when there is privity of contract between the previous and
present possessors.
o Without such privity, the possession of the present possessor should be counted only from the time its
possession actually started (in SCHI’s case, in 1981). Without such privity, the possession of the present
possessor cannot be lengthened by connecting it with the possession of the previous possessors.
 A deed by itself creates no privity between the previous and present possessors as to land outside the
boundaries for which such deed purports.
 Art. 1135 also provides that a claimant’s possession by mistake of an area greater or less than what is expressed
in his title, prescription shall be counted from the time of his possession.
 With the foregoing, SCHI’s possession shall be counted from 1981 when it purchased the two lots. When SCHI
filed for registration of Lot No. 5005 in 1983, it was in possession of the land for less than three years. This falls
short of the 10 year requirement for acquisitive prescription in good faith.