Plea and Motion To Quash Case Digests

Dennis B.
Flores September 4, 2019

Criminal Procedure – B Fiscal Aldrich Uayan
Case Digests: PLEA & MOTION TO QUASH
Plea Cases:
Case#1
Title: Estrella Taglay vs Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray and Loverie Palacay, GR No. 164258
Ponente: PERALTA, J.
Date Published: August 22, 2012
Summary:
A. Petitioner/Appellee: Estrella Taglay
B. Respondent/Appellant: Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray and Loverie Palacay
C. Resolution of the Lower Court:
[xxx] petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
there is no doubt that the offended party is a minor and, thus, the case falls within the
original jurisdiction of Family Courts pursuant to (R.A.) No. 8369; even granting that there
was defect or irregularity in the procedure because petitioner was not arraigned before the
RTC, such defect was fully cured when petitioner's counsel entered into trial without
objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned.
Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's counsel has cross-examined the witnesses
for the prosecution. Consequently, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369.
D. Issues raised by Petitioner: 1) Lack of jurisdiction (petitioner contends that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case because Circular No. 11-99, which authorizes the
transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts to the RTCs, is applicable only
to cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on March 1, 1999.
Petitioner argues that all Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts after the effectivity
of the said Circular can no longer be transferred to the RTC; instead they should be
dismissed. Considering that the Information in the instant case was filed with the MCTC
on November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that the MCTC should have dismissed the case
instead of ordering its transfer to the RTC); 2) Re-arraignment (petitioner insists that she
should have been arraigned anew before the RTC and that her arraignment before the
MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein were void)
E. Issue raised by Respondent, if applicable: Irregularity of arraignment cured by trial (
RTC also held that even granting that there was defect or irregularity in the procedure
because petitioner was not arraigned before the RTC, such defect was fully cured when
petitioner's counsel entered into trial without objecting that his client had not yet been
arraigned. Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's counsel has cross-examined the
witnesses for the prosecution.)
F. Resolution of the Supreme Court:
1) [xxx]"pending the constitution and organization of the Family Courts and the designation
of branches of the Regional Trial Courts as Family Courts in accordance with Section 17
of R.A. 8369; implication then is that all cases filed with first-level courts after the effectivity
of the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the MCTC
is already bereft of any authority to transfer the case to the RTC as the same no longer
falls under the coverage of Circular No. 11-99. What the MCTC should have done was to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction; the Information filed with the MCTC cannot be
used as a basis for the valid indictment of petitioner before the RTC acting as a Family
Court, because there was no allegation therein of private complainant's minority; as there
is an infirmity in the Information constituting a jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured.
There is no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the basis
of a valid conviction;
2) [xxx] court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that
she should have been arraigned by the RTC; the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void; thus, the need for
petitioner's arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the RTC; [xxx] true
that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC without
objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned; [xxx] held that the active participation
of the counsels of the accused, had the effect of curing the defect in the belated
arraignment [xxx]
On the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus, there
is nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact that
her client, herein petitioner, was not arraigned.
G. Relevance to the topic: Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.[28] The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to
him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him.[29] As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot
be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.[30] Otherwise, absence of arraignment
results in the nullity of the trial court.
Case #2
Title: People of the Philippine vs Rodolfo Oling Madraga. GR No. 129299
Ponente: Buena, J.
Date Published: November 15, 2000
Summary:
A. Petitioner/Appellee: People of the Philippines
B. Respondent/Appellant: Rodolfo Oling Madraga
C. Resolution of Lower Court: [xxx] this Court finds the accused [xxx] beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the said crime of Rape against his own daughter, who is only more
than 16 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. And hereby sentences said
accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH.
D. Issue raised by Petitioner: Denial of due process (Accused was arrested without warrant
and his right to preliminary investigation was not observed); Plea is null and void (the trial
court violated Sec 3, Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on conducting
“Searching Inquiry”)
E. Issue raised by respondent, if applicable:
Contentions have no merit.
1) [xxx] estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest if he fails to move
for the quashing of the information before the trial court, or if he voluntarily submits himself to
the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea, and by participating in the trial; Larranaga vs.
Court of Appeals provided that "the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the
court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the (complaint) or, otherwise,
render it defective."
2) [xxx] failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the accused's plea of guilty to the capital offense, as mandated; FLAG would have been
correct were it not for the circumstance that accused-appellant did not, in fact, plead guilty to
a capital offense in the first place; In other words, since the appellant did not plead guilty to a
capital offense, he cannot properly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 116
Failure to allege the fact of filiation and minority in the information for rape is fatal and
consequently bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable with death. In the case
at bar, such relationship is not stated in the "cause of the accusation," or in the narration of
the act or omission constituting the offense, but only in the preamble or opening statement of
the complaint.
Accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty, but it appears from the records of the
proceedings before the court a quo that the same was a conditional plea, because appellant's
counsel argued that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and drunkenness should be
appreciated in favor of the appellant.
G. Relevance to current topic: A conditional plea of guilty, or one entered subject to the
provision that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty
and would, therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.
Case #3
Title: People of Philippines vs Patrick de Luna, GR. No. 77969
Ponente: Gancayco, J.
Date Published: June 22, 1989
Summary:
B. Respondent/Appellant: Patrick de Luna
[xxx] finding accused Patrick de Luna Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty plus his
manifestation to this court that he did not intentionally want it to happen that way, the court
hereby sentences accused Patrick de Luna to Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and
to indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of P30,000.00.
D. Issues raised by Petitioner:
E. Issues raised by Respondent, if applicable: Valid plea of guilty ([xxx] the court a quo
erred in sentencing the accused for murder which was not pleaded or admitted by the
accused, because of his qualification to his plea, that he did not commit the crime
intentionally; denied the allegations of treachery and evident premeditation in the
information which are necessary to sustain a charge and subsequent conviction for
Murder, plea was that of guilt of the lesser offense of Homicide, not Murder); Proper waiver
of presentation of evidence ([xxx] the court a quo erred in not requiring the prosecution to
present evidence in order to determine the proper penalty for the crime involved)
1) While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information including
the aggravating and qualifying circumstances, the repeated and emphatic qualification
stated by the defendant-appellant as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the
attention of the trial court that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its
consequences. Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning and effect of
the technical language used in the information qualifying the acts constituting the offense.
In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of
such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus
leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. the appellant's
qualified plea of guilty is not a valid plea of guilty. Thus, this Court has ruled that: "An
accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt,
provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him. In such cases, the information
should first be amended or modified with the consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant,
or the accused must be considered as having entered a plea of not guilty." This procedure
would run contrary to the explicit provisions of Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states: "SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.’
- The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by
the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary."
(Emphasis supplied.)
(2) The procedure to be followed in a situation like this where the accused, with assistance
of counsel, voluntarily pleads guilty to a capital offense is explicitly laid down in Sec. 3,
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure; when an accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf; [xxx] even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full
knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the court must still require the introduction
of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the
defendant.
G. Relevance to the topic:
Section 2, Rule 116 - The consent of the fiscal and the offended party is necessary. "SEC.
2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.’ - The accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary."
Sec. 3, Rule 116- , three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a
capital offense has been entered by the accused:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.” This rule is, therefore, mandatory.
Case #4
Title: People of the Philippines vs. Jaime Santos, alias “La Perla,” alias “Velasco,” alias “Santos,”
et al., GR No. L-11813
Ponente: Felix, J.
Date Published: September 17, 1958
Summary:
B. Respondent/Appellant: Jaime Santos
C. Resolution of Lower Court: [xxx] this Court finds the accused Jaime Santos, alias
Velasco, La Perla, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rebellion, with
multiple murder, arson, and robbery
D. Issues raised by petitioner:
E. Issues raised by respondent, if applicable:
(1) In not sentencing the appellant to suffer imprisonment of 1 year, 1 month and 10 days
of prision correctional;
(2) In imposing upon the appellant the penalty of life imprisonment;
(3) Appellant Santos does not controvert the findings of fact of the trial court so the case
is limited to the single issue of whether or not there exists a complex crime of rebellion
with murders, robberies, etc., defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Santos admitted in his confession that he participated in the raids; on the ground of the
multiplicity of offenses charged therein in violation of Section 2-(e) of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. cannot be considered as independent common crimes; the latter are either
absorbed by the crime of rebellion if committed in pursuance of the aims, purposes and
objectives of the rebels and in furtherance of their intention to overthrow the duly
constituted government by force; holding that the lower Court erred in finding appellant
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, arson and robbery and that appellant
should be only found guilty of simple rebellion
G. Relevance to the current topic:
CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; CRIME CANNOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER
COMMON CRIMES. — There is no question that appellant committed the crime of
rebellion, but as this Court already held in the cases of People v. Amado V. Hernandez
Et. Al., 99 Phil., 515 and the later case of People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90 (by a voting
of 7 against 4) this crime cannot be complexed with other common crimes, because the
latter are either absorbed by the crime of rebellion if committed in pursuance of the aims,
purposes and objectives of the rebels and in furtherance of their intention to overthrow the
duly constituted government by force, or are independent common crimes which had no
connection with the rebellion and must be separately prosecuted in the proper court within
the territorial jurisdiction of which the same had been committed.
Case #5
Title: People of the Philippines vs Halil Gambao Y Ismail, et al., GR No. 172707
Ponente: Perez, J.
Date Published: October 1, 2013
Summary:
B. Respondent/Appellant: Halil Gambao Y Esmail, Eddie Karim Y Uso, Edwin Dukilman Y
Suboh, Tony Abao Y Sula, Raul Udal Y Kagui, Theng Dilangalen Y Nanding, Jaman
Macalinbol Y Katol, Monette Ronas Y Ampil, Noar Evad Y Mulok, Thian Perpenian Y
Rafon aka Larina Perpenian & Johnson Does
C. Resolution by the lower court:
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting [accused-appellants] of
Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. [xxx]
“[xxx] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon
each of them the supreme penalty of death [xxx]”
D. Issues raised by petitioner:
E. Issues raised by respondent/appellant, if applicable: Insufficiency of evidence
(because they would have this Court believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to
positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age); Improvident Plea
(because duties of the trial court when accused pleads to a capital offense were not
complied with)
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made, this Court
will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment. [xxx]
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the
cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If
the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.
The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal
significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission of the crime by the accused.
G. Relevance to the current topic: This case provides the general rule on improvident pleas
of guilt and the exemption.
Case #6
Title: People of the Philippines vs Pascasio Villasco, et. al.
Ponente: Padilla, J.
Date Published: July 24, 1951
Summary:
B. Respondent/Appellant: Pascasio Villasco
C. Resolution of the Lower Court: [xxx] the Court sentenced him to suffer five (5) years
imprisonment and to pay one-fourth of the costs.
D. Issue raised by Petitioner:
E. Issue raised by Respondent, if applicable: [xxx] both counsel and the Solicitor General
recommend that the sentence be reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio,
on the ground that it does not appear in the information under what circumstances the firearms
and the hand grenade were seized from the appellant. It is not alleged that the appellant used
or was carrying them when they were seized from him.
It has been seen that mere possession or custody of any of the articles specified in that Act,
within the time designated in the proclamation, was not illegal unless the possessor made use
of them or carried them on his person.
Section 1, Republic Act No. 482, approved on 10 June 1950, provides:
Any person who holds or possesses any firearm and/or ammunition without permit or license
may, without incurring any criminal liability, surrender the same within a period of one year
from the date this Act shall take effect: Provided, however, That this section shall not be
interpreted to mean as in any way exempting from such liability any person, without the
requisite permit or license, found, within the aforementioned period of time, making use of
said firearm and ammunition or carrying them on his person except for the purpose of
surrendering them as herein required: Provided, further, That this section shall not in any way
affect any case pending in court, on the date of the passage of this Act, for violation of existing
laws on firearms and ammunition.
[xxx] the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if it was not the
sole ingredient, of the offense, the very acts which were punished subject to certain conditions.
It has been seen that mere possession or custody of any of the articles specified in that Act,
within the time designated in the proclamation, was not illegal unless the possessor made use
of them or carried them on his person. What the accused could have been obliged to allege
and prove, if he had been prosecuted for using or carrying on his person a firearm, was that
he defended himself with the arm or was on his way to give it up, as the case might be.
G. Relevance to the topic
The plea of guilty entered by the appellant admits the facts set out in the information and, if
those do not constitute a crime or a violation of law, such plea does not have the effect of
admitting the commission of a crime or the violation of a law, for there is none charged in the
information, or of supplying what has been omitted or what has not been pleaded therein, to
the extent of curing a defective information or one that does not allege facts sufficient to
constitute a public offense or a violation of law.
Case #7
Title: People of the Philippines vs Salvador Abad Santos, Ricardo Nepomuceno, and Jose P.
Veluz, all Associate Judges Constituting the Second Arcache
Ponente: De Joya, J.
Date Published: June 17, 1946
Summary:
B. Respondent/Appellant: Salvador Abad Santos
C. Resolution of the Lower Court: Joseph Arcache has been accused of the crime of treason
before the People's Court; different kinds of properties alleged to have been sold by him to
the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the City of Manila, during the enemy occupation, added the
phrase "and other similar equipments;” allegation objected to was too broad and too indefinite
to enable the accused to properly defend himself, the respondent judges granted the petition,
and, at the request of the prosecution, postponed the trial of the case
D. Issue raised by petitioner: Instead of submitting a bill of particulars, the special prosecutor
filed a motion for reconsideration of said order court, on the ground that it was contrary to law
that the court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with abuse thereof; on the ground
that the alleged defect in the information could be cured by amendment, which might be
properly ordered, in the interest of justice, so that the accused might is clearly informed of the
charges against him, and thus avoid any possible surprise, without necessity in the part of the
accused to plead anew to the amended information.
E. Issue raised by respondent, if applicable: Joseph Arcache verbally petitioned the
respondent judges that the prosecution should make more specific said phrase "and other
similar equipments"; be stricken from he infromation therefrom, unless the prosecution should
furnish a bill of particulars specifying what those other similar equipments were.
Thus, evident that, in the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of
specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as
they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve
to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus enable them to
prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might have; to avoid all possible
surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases
should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or information; and if any such
phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of
the trial, the court should order either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary
specification, which is but an amendment in mere matters of form.
It is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised of the true charges
against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to
their rights and interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in
criminal complaints or informations; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on
motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order either
its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an
amendment in mere matters of form.
Case #8
Title: BrigGen (RET) Jose Ramsical, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Summary:
A. Petitioner/Appellee: BrigGen (RET) Jose Ramsical Jr.
B. Respondent/Appellant: Sandiganbayan
C. Resolution of Lower Court: Petitioner; President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land; Flaviano
executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds
of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 instead of the actual purchase price
of P10,500.00 per square meter. Ombudsman: (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of
public funds or property through falsification of public documents.
Motion for Reconsideration—the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed
participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale,
and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the
price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner
could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated
the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors
concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner's continued prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner's second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The
Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should
be ventilated in the trial of the case.
D. Issue raised by Petitioner: Grave abuse of discretion as to the Sandiganbayan, which
denied petitioner's motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him.
(1) argues that petitioner's motion for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and
pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule
II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or
resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof
with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been
filed in court; the filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing
of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in
the resolution subject of the motion; filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither
can it bar the arraignment of the accused; Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,
which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. - Unless a shorter period is provided by
special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused
(2) Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment - Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, (The grounds for
suspension of arraignment)
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner's defenses are evidentiary in nature and
are best threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioner's claim that the
Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause against him
is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB- Military, recommending the dropping of the
cases against petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel
of prosecutors; As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors
finding probable cause against petitioner prevails. Ombudsman who has the full discretion
to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once
the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
G. Relevance to current topic:
Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, (The grounds for suspension of arraignment ) -
which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall
be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department
of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing
of the petition with the reviewing office.
Case #9
Title: John Joseph Lumanlaw Y Bulinao vs Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., GR. No. 164953
Ponente: Panganiban, CJ.
Date Published: February 13, 2006
Summary:
A. Petitioner/Appellee: John Joseph Lumanlaw Y Bulinao
B. Respondent/Appellant: Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.
C. Resolution of Lower Court:
Petitioner was apprehended [xxx] Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26,
2002, for illegal possession of a dangerous drug (SHABU).
Delayed arraignment which has already passed one year, nine months, and four days.
D. Issues raised by petitioner: On the whole, the issues may be reduced to the following:
1) whether there was a violation of the right to speedy trial, warranting a quashal of the
information against petitioner; 2) whether mandamus is the proper remedy
E. Issues raised by respondent, if applicable: Respondent avers counters that there were
no capricious and oppressive delays that would justify a dismissal of the information.
F. Resolution of Supreme Court:
1) Unreasonable Delays: In fact, by fixing a period of only thirty days from filing of the
information to the conduct of an arraignment, RA 8493 recognizes this fundamental
right should and can be done with minimal delay; [xxx] it would have been more
prudent for respondent judge to have appointed a counsel de oficio for purposes of
arraignment only; it is also a duty of the judge to minimize delays, based on Rule 3.05
of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct: “A judge shall dispose of the court’s
business promptly and decide cases within the required period.”
2) Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus: a) In view of our finding of unwarranted delays
in the conduct of arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand—
through a writ of mandamus—expeditious action from all officials tasked with the
administration of justice; b) It is the policy of this Court not to deny a writ of mandamus
on purely technical matters, if a party would be deprived of substantive rights.
Procedural rules should not be strictly enforced when their enforcement would result
in a miscarriage of justice. [xxx]
Let it be known that this Court will not shirk from the responsibility—nay, the duty—to
set aside all obstacles to the fortification of every citizen’s constitutionally enshrined
rights. We will not condone or give imprimatur to the sluggish pace of the proceedings
below. The Court has the duty to safeguard liberty; hence it will always uphold the
basic constitutional rights of our people, especially the weak and the marginalized
G. Relevance to current topic: Vexatious, oppressive, unjustified and capricious delays in
the arraignment violates the constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy case
disposition, particularly when the accused is detained.
A writ of mandamus is the proper remedy for extraordinary cases, i.e. unreasonable and
unwarranted delays in arraignment which then deprives a person of his right to a speedy
disposition of case.
Motion to Quash Cases:
Case #1
Title: People of the Philippines vs Edgardo V. Odtuhan
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Summary:
B. Respondent/Appellant: Edgardo V. Odtuhan
[xxx] respondent was indicted in an Information[9] for Bigamy committed as follows: That
on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being
then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with Eleanor A. Alagon, which second/subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.
The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s
motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do
not charge an offense.
D. Issue raised by petitioner:
E. Issue raised by respondent, if applicable: Defective information (the Information
alleges the complete elements of Bigamy); Non-extinguishment of Criminal liability from
first marriage
The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution
at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document
presented by respondent. [xxx] if we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately
filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to
allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
G. Relevance to current topic:
Antone vs Beronilla provides “a motion to quash information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information.”
To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is
evident on its fact. If the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court
the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained,
the court may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
Matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Case #2
Title: Suy Sui vs People of the Philippines
Ponente: Paras, CJ.
Date Published: February 17, 1953
Summary:
A. Petitioner/Appellee: Suy Sui
B. Respondent/Appellant: People of the Philippines
C. Resolution of Lower Court:
[xxx] Sell and offer for sale to the public, one bag of refined suger, 10 lbs. at P2, which
price is in excess of P0.20 than that authorized by law as the maximum ceiling price of
said commodity, to wit P1.80.
Court Found The Petitioner Guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of P5,000, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to be barred from engaging in the
wholesale and retail business in the Philippines for a period of five years, with a
recommendation to the President for the immediate deportation of the petitioner
D. Issue raised by petitioner:
[xxx] the petitioner contends that the classification of refined sugar into two groups
contained in Executive Order No. 331 is ambiguous an ambiguity which should be
resolved in favor of the petitioner;petitioner claims that, for the same refined sugar, two
ceiling prices for one kilo are fixed, namely, P0.40 and P0.45, with the result that, if P0.45
is adopted as a criterion, 10 pounds of sugar would cost approximately P2.02, or P0.02
less than the amount for which the petitioner sold the 10-pound bag of refined sugar to
Faustino Caraan.
argued by respondent that the petitioner failed to raise the point not only in the Court of
First Instance by a motion to quash but also in the Court of Appeals as a consequence of
which he must be deemed to have waived the objection.
Under section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to move to quash amounts to a
waiver of all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the
complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of
the same.
Point now raised by the petitioner is in effect that the information does not charge an
offense.
[xxx] appealed decision is reversed, and the petitioner is hereby acquitted [xxx]
Section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to move to quash amounts to a waiver
of all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except when the complaint or
information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same.

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Dennis B.

Flores September 4, 2019

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