URBANO v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182750

FACTS:
Sometime in 28 September 1993, Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD), having just arrived from a drinking
session in a restaurant with some of their co-workers. While in the compound, the two
exchanged a heated argument, with Tomelden hurling insulting remarks at petitioner.
Eventually, the verbal argument escalated into a physical fight, wherein the
petitioner delivered a lucky punch, as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on
Tomelden’s face, thus causing him to topple down. The latter would’ve hit his head on
the pavement were it not for their companions who caught him. Nevertheless, the blow
cause Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious.
Subsequently, Tomelden was brought into the office of the general manager
where he spent the night. The following day, he came home to his wife and informed
her of the incident, further complaining of his pains. The wife then brought Tomelden to
the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano treated him for his lacerated
finger, contusions, and hematoma in the right cerebrum.
A few days later, he went back to the hospital due to severe pain, drowsiness,
and vomiting. Due to the severity of the condition, he was brought to a different hospital
where he was diagnosed as suffering from brain injury.
However, due to financial constraints, Tomelden had to be discharged. As he
was heading home with his wife, he once again felt extreme pain. The couple then
detoured to the initial hospital that they went to but to no avail as Tomelden was no
longer responding to any stimulant. On the same day, Tomelden died at nine o’clock in
the evening.
As for the petitioner’s part, he denied having any intention to kill Tomelden. The
petitioner claims that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was
the cause of the latter’s death.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for the crime of homicide; and
(2) Whether or not the court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
sufficient provocation on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong in favor of the petitioner

HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that petitioner herein is guilty for the crime of homicide. The
prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioner’s lucky punch hitting Tomelden
right smack on the face. And even if Tomelden’s head did not hit the ground as his co-
workers averted that actuality, that punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him
unconscious right after the September 28, 1993 fight. From then on, Tomelden was in
and out of the hospital complaining of headache, among other pains, until his demise on
October 10, 1993, or 12 days after the blow that made Tomelden unconscious.
The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano, buttressed
by that of Rosario who related about her husbands post September 28, 1993 severe
head pain, clearly establish beyond cavil the cause of Tomeldens death and who was
liable for it.
As for the second issue, the Court finds merit in the contention of the petitioner.
When the law speaks of provocation, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct
of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not enough
that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. In the instant case, Tomeldens
insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before the fist fight
constituted sufficient provocation; petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a
fist fight.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent
to kill may be presumed from the fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor
may still be considered when attendant facts and circumstances so warrant, as in the
instant case. Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very much smaller than
Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the
scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked,
petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWADs general
manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be expected from, and would be
unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPO1 ERNESTO ULEP

G.R. No. 132547

FACTS:
Sometime in the morning of 22 December 1995, one Buenaventura Wapili,
who was having a troublesome, disoriented morning, and seeming to have gone
berserk, was found naked, running around aimlessly, and appeared to have gone
insane.
In the incident that followed thereafter, accussed-appellant SPO1 Ernesto
Ulep, together with police officers Espadera and Pilo, arrived at the scene, armed with
M-16 rifles, and saw the naked Wapili moving towards them.
During the said, the police claimed that Wapili was armed with a bolo and a
rattan stool; on the other hand, the relatives and neighbors of the victim aver that Wapili
was merely holding a rattan stool, and nothing more. Thereafter, SPO1 Ulep fired a
warning shot in the sky and ordered deceased herein to drop his weapons or he will fire
at him.
Not having put down his weapon and being merely two to three meters away
from the party of SPO1 Ulep, the latter shot the victim with his M-16 rifle, thus hitting
him in various parts of the body and causing Wapili to drop on the ground. Still, SPO1
came closer and fired another bullet into the head of Wapili, literally blowing the latter’s
brains out.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery should be appreciated
in the case as to qualify the offense from murder to homicide

HELD:
Yes, the qualifying circumstance of treachery should be appreciated in the
present case. Treachery is appreciated in cases wherein the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employs means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended part might make.
In the instant case, the accused fired a warning shot in the air and specifically
ordered the victim to lower his weapon. This shows that the appellant did not seek the
killing of Wapili on purpose. The appellant’s decision to kill was made in an instant and
the victim’s helpless position was merely incidental to his having been previously shot.
Therefore, the Court finds SPO1 Ulep guilty of homicide instead of murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PASCUAL

G.R. No. 172326

FACTS:
Sometime in 25 December 2000 around Mandaluyong City, accused-
appellant herein, with lewd designs and the use of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, lie and have carnal knowledge of one Lorelyn
Pacubas Y. Tamayo, against the latter’s will and consent.
During the said incident, Pascual, by reason of the rape with intent to kill
and taking advantage of superior strength, covered the face of said victim with a pillow,
thus suffocating her until her instantaneous death. Aside from which, Pascual likewise
stole an amount of more or less Php 10,000, belonging to said victim.
In the arraignment that ensued, Pascual pleaded not guilty, thus promting
trial where the latter later on presented witnesses that will support his claim and alibi. A
post-mortem examination of Tamayo’s body reported finding cause of death as
asphyxia, and uncovered seminal stains in the crime scene. However, one of the
defense witness, Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, testified on the results of the DNA analysis and
concluded that no DNA sample from the suspect was present on the aforesaid
specimens. Moreover, she added that she cannot determine whether a woman was
raped or not based solely on DNA testing.
In the judgment rendered by the trial court, Pascual was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented against Pascual was
sufficient enough for his conviction; and
(2) Whether or not the result of the DNA examination entitles Pascual to an acquittal
HELD:
Yes, the Courts answered in the affirmative as to the first issue raised. In
the special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must
be established beyond reasonable doubt. Considering that no one witnessed the crime
charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in
light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient evidence is presented by the prosecution to proved
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
As for the second issue, the Court rules in the negative. According to the
chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the specimen subject of this case was
inconclusive. In light of the flawed procedure, the Court holds that the result of the DNA
examination does not entitle Pascual to an acquittal. The evidence in its entirety
inevitably leads to the conclusion that Pascual is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged herein.

MUPAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172834

FACTS:
Sometime in 18 February 1993, in the Bangar City, La Union, Philippines,
the accused herein Jun Mupas and Gil Mupas conspired, confederated, and mutually
helped one another and with intent to kill, in unlawfully and willfully feloniously attacking,
mauling with fists and stones, and stabbed with a knife one Rogelio Murao Y. Sibayan.
In the course of said event, the victim was hit and sustained injuries on his
face and head, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not, by reason of causes
independent of the will of said accused, which is the timely medical assistance rendered
to the victim which saved the latter’s life.
In the arraignment that ensued, said accused pleaded not guilty, hence trial
ensued where they presented witnesses to support their claims. In the decision
rendered by the trial court, the accused herein were convicted for the crime of
Frustrated Homicide, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish Gil’s identity as one of the
perpetrators of the crime and that his defense of denial was duly supported by
clear and convincing evidence; and
(2) Whether or not, assuming the accused is proven guilty, the court erred in finding
the accused guilty of Frustrated Homicide instead of physical injuries

HELD:
 The Court ruled in the affirmative in the first issue. Rogelio’s allegations of
Banjo’s participation in the incident and that Jun carried with him a bolo are
uncorroborated and bereft of proof. Absent proof of Gil alias banjo’s involvement in the
incident, his acquittal is in order.
As for the second issue, the Court likewise rules in the affirmative. For the
crime of homicide to be proven, one important element in the said is the intent to kill. In
the present case, assuming that Gil did indeed had participation, there is no evidence
present that would point to the fact that he or Jun had intended to kill the victim herein.
Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of
commission. Such must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every
possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. Therefore, the court finds
merit in the defense of denial of the accused herein.
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to
sustain the claim that petitioners had any intention to kill Rogelio. When such intent is
lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical
injuries only and in this case, less serious physical injuries.
Thus, in absent of competent proof, Jun should be held liable only for the
crime of less serious physical injuries. As for Gil, he must be absolved from any liability
for failure of the prosecution to prove that he conspired with Jun in the accused crime.

SERRANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175023

FACTS:
Sometime in 8 March 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines, accused herein, with
intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the
person of one Anthony Galang Y. Lagunsad.
The said incident occurred after a brawl ensued between two rival groups which
consisted of 15-18 members. The victim was stabbed by accused herein in the left side
of his stomach and was beaten until he was blue. Galang later on fell into a nearby
creek, where he ended up in a fallen position, during which the victim herein claimed
that he was able to see a portion of his intestines visible from the stabbed wound.
After being helped and receiving timely medical attention, the latter stayed in the
hospital for one week and subsequently a month of house rest to recover from the
injuries he had sustained.
In the trial that followed, the RTC ruled that the crime committed was frustrated
homicide, to which the CA reversed by concluding that the crime committed was
actually only in the attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound
inflicted would have undoubtedly lead to the death of Galang.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed by the accused herein is that of the
attempted homicide instead of its frustrated stage
HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that the accused herein is guilty for the crime of attempted
homicide and not for frustrated homicide. The crucial point to consider is the nature of
the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the
wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without timely medical
intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without
medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this
situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the
petitioner. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. T/SGT. ANGUS, JR.

G.R. No. 178778

FACTS:
Accused-appellant herein T/SGT Porferio R. Angus, Jr. was a member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Army, assigned at the Lanisi
Patrol base, lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. He is legally married to one Betty Angus,
the victim herein.
The facts of the case show that on 10 January 2002, at the Lanisi Patrol Base,
Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental, at about ten o’clock in the morning, more or less,
accused Angus, Jr. with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault, choked, and strangled the neck of his legitimate wife Betty
Angus, thereby resulting to the latter’s instantaneous death. Despite lack of actual
witnesses to the incident, it was stated that a day before the said incident, the accused
was heard arguing with his wife about a woman. The following day, as fate would have
it, Betty was found dead by one of the companions of Angus, Jr. after having breakfast
with the same, thus leading to the conclusion that accused herein killed his wife.
During arraignment, Angus, Jr. pleaded not guilty and thus trial ensued where the
RTC rendered a decision finding the latter guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide. On appeal, the case was brought to the CA were the court ruled in the
affirmative, thus reiterating the decision of the RTC in finding Angus, Jr. guilty of the
said charges.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt due to the lack of evidence/witness

HELD:
The Court found merit in the appellant’s contentions. The Constitution mandates
that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
In the crime of parricide, the elements of the latter are as follows: (1) a person is
killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse.
The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp in the evening
of January 9, 2002. Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant arguing over the latters illicit
relationship with another woman. The following day, appellant went out of his bunker to
have breakfast with his companions, and later on returned to the bunker to invite his wife
to join him. He then returned to his companions where he told them that his wife cannot
join them as she was still asleep. Two hours later, appellant returned to his bunker
followed by one of his companions who saw the dead body of the victim.
The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an
unbroken chain which leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is
guilty of killing his wife. Thus, in the absence of any other evidence reasonably linking
appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to convict him.