General Principles Case No.

2
LEO T. MAULA v. XIMEX DELIVERY EXPRESS, INC.
G.R. No. 207838, January 25, 2017
Second Division
Peralta, J.:

FACTS:
PetitionerMaulawas hired by respondentXimex Inc. as Operation Staff for seven
years. His employment was uneventful until on 2009, Ximex’ HR Department required the
employees to sign a form sub-titled "Personal Data for New Hires"changingthe designated
salary/wage to daily instead of monthly, which Maula questioned. The parties entered into an
amicable settlement before the NCMB. Thereafter, a problem was brought up in the company
about a misrouted cargo. Said incident was blamed on Maulaas he has the duty of, among others,
documentation, checker, dispatcher or airfreight coordinator. The imputation is quite absurd
because it was the client who actually wrote the name and destination, whereas, it was not the
petitioner but his co-employee who checked the cargo.
The following day, March 26, 2009, he received a memorandum charging him
with "negligence in performing his duties." On April 2, 2009, he received another memorandum
of '"reassignment" wherein he was directed to report immediately in another department of the
company. But on the same day, he was instructed by the HR manager to proceed to his former
office for him to train his replacement, to which he complied. However, upon some time of
teaching inside the warehouse, his replacement then went home. Then, the supervisor insisted
Maula to continue with his former work, but due to the "reassignment paper" he had some
reservations. Sensing he might again be framed up and maliciously accused of such as what
happened on the misrouted cargo, he thus refused and went home.
An attempt to serve another memorandum was made on him obligating him to
explain why he did not perform his former work (in Paranaque) and not report to his
reassignment (in Taguig). It validated his apprehension of a set-up. At this point, petitioner lost
his composure. Exasperated, he refused to receive the memorandum and thus retorted
"Segurona abnormal naangutakmo" as it dawned on him that they were out looking for every
means possible to pin him down.Nonetheless, he reported to his reassignment in FTI Taguig on
April3, 2009. There he was served with the memorandum suspending him from work for thirty
30days effective April 4, 2009 for alleged "Serious misconduct and willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work."
With this, Maula filed a case with the NCMB but the respondents never appeared.
Thereafter, he was refused entry in the office and a dismissal letter was handed to him. He re-
file his complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Efforts were exerted by the LA but
there came no amicable settlement. The LA ruled that Maula is illegally dismissed on the
ground that the alleged mishandling turned out to be baseless, the reassignment was without
clear explanation and the charge for disobedience was not eventually acted upon and does not
constitute serious misconduct. The NLRC affirmed in toto the LA's decision. The CA reversed
the decision of NLRC on the ground that Maula’s behavior constitutes grave misconduct and
that accusatory and inflammatory language used by an employee to the employer or superior
can be a ground for dismissal or termination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maula is illegally dismissed.

RULING:Yes.Maula is illegally dismissed.

Dismissal from employment have two facets: first, the legality of the act of
dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process; and, second, the legality of the manner of
dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process. The burden of proof rests upon the
employer to show that the disciplinary action was made for lawful cause or that the termination
of employment was valid. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of
evidence required is substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Thus, unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
conclusions of the employer do not provide legal justification for dismissing the employee.
When in doubt, the case should be resolved in favor of labor pursuant to the social justice policy
of our labor laws and the 1987 Constitution.
While an employer is given a wide latitude of discretion in managing its own
affairs, such as in the imposition of disciplinary measures, the exercise of disciplining and
imposing appropriate penalties on erring employees must be practiced in good faith and for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
rights of employees under special laws or under valid agreements. The reason being that -
security of tenure of workers is not only statutorily protected, it is also a constitutionally
guaranteed right having the status of a vested right. Thus, any deprivation of this right must be
attended by due process of law.
Respondents manifestly failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged act constitutes
serious misconduct. For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it
must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and, (c) it must
show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. The admittedly
insulting and unbecoming language uttered by petitioner to the HR Manager should be viewed
with reasonable leniency in light of the fact that it was committed under an emotionally charged
state. Furthermore, respondent cannot invoke the principle of totality of infractions considering
that petitioner’s alleged previous acts of misconduct were not established in accordance with the
requirements of procedural due process.
Petitioner's termination from employment is inappropriate considering that he had
been with respondent company for a considerable length of time, seven years, and he had no
previous derogatory record. It is settled that notwithstanding the existence of a just cause,
dismissal should not be imposed. Petitioner’s preventive suspension of 30 days was also
inappropriate.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The November 20, 2012
Decision and June 21, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 121176,
which set aside the December 15, 2010 Resolution and July 20, 2011 Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission that affirmed the February 18, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter
finding the illegal dismissal of petitioner, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Labor
Arbiter is DIRECTED to recompute the proper amount of backwages and separation pay due to
petitioner in accordance with this decision.
 PERFECTO M. PASCUA v. BANK WISE, INC. and PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 191460
January 31, 2008

BANKWISE INC., v. PERFECTO M. PASCUA and PHILIPPINES VETERANS BANK

G.R. No. 191464
January 31, 2008

FACTS:

Perfecto M. Pascua was employed by Philippine Veterans Bank as Executive Vice

President for Marketing. In a Memorandum of Agreement, Philippine Veterans Bank obliged
itself to purchase the entire outstanding capital stock of Bankwise. Thereafter, the Philippine
Veterans Bank elected a new set of members of board of directors and appointed a new set of
officers. Pascua was reassigned to a Special Accounts Unit without specification as to his duties
and responsibilities.

Pascua was then instructed to tender his resignation as part of the merger agreement of
the Bank with the guarantee that Pascua would receive all his money claims during the transition.
He pleaded through a letter that he may be allowed to stay until the end of the year. Seeing as
Pascua had yet to submit his resignation, the director of Bankwise told Pascua that it was
imperative that he submit his resignation and assured his continued service with Philippine
Veterans Bank. Thereafter, Pascua tendered his resignation.

Despite repeated demands for his money claims, Philippine Veterans and Bankwise failed
to release Pascua’s remuneration. Pascua then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of salary, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave,
13th month pay, separation pay, retirement benefits, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees against the banks.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case on the ground that Pascua had voluntarily resigned.
NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and held that Pascua is constructively dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pascua is constructively dismissed?

HELD:

No. Perfecto Pascua held a highly technical position in the company and he would have
supervised several employees in his long years in service and might have even processed their
resignation letters. He would have been completely aware of the implications of signing a
categorically worded resignation letter. If he did not intend to resign, he would not have
submitted a resignation letter. He would have continued writing letters to Bankwise signifying
his continued refusal to resign.

Pascua's resignation letter was unconditional. It contained no reservations that it was

premised on his subsequent claim for severance pay and other benefits. His resignation was also
accepted by his employers. In this instance, Pascua is not considered to have been constructively
dismissed.

The employer has the burden of proving, in illegal dismissal cases, that the employee was
dismissed for a just or authorized cause. Even if the employer claims that the employee resigned,
the employer still has the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary.

It is constructive dismissal when resignation "was made under compulsion or under

circumstances approximating compulsion, such as when an employee's act of handing in his or
her resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him or her no alternative but to resign."

The Court also discussed that "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in
a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency
of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment." In order
to prove that resignation is voluntary, "the acts of the employee before and after the alleged
resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or
her employment."

However, Pascua admitted that he filed a categorical letter of resignation.

 (G.R. No. 209468, December 13, 2017)

UNITED DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTERv. CESARIO BERNADAS, REPRESENTED

BY LEONILA BERNADAS

FACTS:

Cesario is a rank and file employee of United Doctors Medical Center, as a

housekeeper but eventually promoted to be a utility man. United Doctors Medical
Center and its rank and file employees had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
under which rank and file employees were entitled to optional retirement
benefits.Under the optional retirement policy, an employee who has rendered at least 20
years of service is entitled to optionally retire. The optional retirement pay is equal to a
retiree's salary for 11 days per year of service.

On October 20, 2009, Cesario died from a "freak accident" while working in a
doctor's residence. He was 53 years old.

LeonilaBernadas (Leonila), representing her deceased husband, Cesario, filed a

Complaint for payment of retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees with the
National Labor Relations Commission. Leonila and her son also claimed and were able
to receive insurance proceeds of P180,000.00 under the CBA.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed Leonila's Complaint, ruling that Cesario should
have applied for optional retirement benefits during his lifetime, the benefits being
optional. Since he did not apply for it, his beneficiaries were not entitled to claim his
optional retirement benefits.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the L.A.’s Decision holding that the optional
retirement plan was never presented in this case, casting a doubt on whether or not the
plan required an application for optional retirement benefits before an employee could
become entitled to them, inclined with the principle laid by the Constitution full
protection to labor.

M.R. was denied. On petition for certiorari to C.A., the latter sustained the
NLRC’s decision. Also, the M.R. was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that respondent Cesario's beneficiaries do not have legal

capacity to apply for Cesario's optional retirement benefits since respondent himself
never applied for it in his lifetime. It asserts that even assuming respondent Cesario was
already qualified to apply for optional retirement three (3) years prior to his death, he
never did. Thus, there would have been no basis for respondent Cesario's beneficiaries
to be entitled to his optional retirement benefits.
 On the other hand, Leonila counters that had her husband died "under normal
circumstances," he would have applied for optional retirement benefits. That Cesario
was unable to apply before his death "is a procedural technicality" that should be set
aside so that "full protection to labor"is afforded and "the ends of social and
compassionate justice" are met.

ISSUE: Whether or not LeonilaBernadas as her husband's representative, may

claim his optional retirement benefits in consonance with whether or not
CesarioBernadas is entitled to receive his optional retirement benefits despite his
untimely death.

HELD: YES.

The CBA between the parties provides:

ARTICLE XI
RETIREMENT AND SEVERANCE PAY

SECTION 1. RETIREMENT AND SEVERANCE PAY. The CENTER shall grant each
employee retirement and severance pay in accordance with law. It shall also continue
its present policy on optional retirement.

The terms and conditions of a CBA "constitute the law between the
parties." However, this CBA does not provide for the terms and conditions of the
"present policy on optional retirement." Leonila merely alleged before the Labor Arbiter
that petitioner "grants an employee a retirement or separation equivalent to eleven (11)
days per year of service after serving for at least twenty (20) years," which was not
disputed by petitioner. Therefore, doubt arises as to what petitioner's optional
retirement package actually entails.

It is settled that doubts must be resolved in favor of labor. Moreover, "retirement laws
should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the
retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes."

Rolando de Roca vs Eduardo C. Dabuyan, et al.

 G.R. No. 215281 March 05, 2018

FACTS:
Dabuyan, et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against “RAF Mansion Hotel Oki
Management and New Management and Victoriano Erawan”. Later, they amended the complaint
and included petitioner de Roca as co-respondent. Summons were served on de Roca but it was
returned. Another summons was issued and personally served to the petitioner. Despite service of
summons, petitioner did not attend the subsequent hearings prompting the labor to direct
Dabuyan, et al. to submit their position paper.
Upon filing their position paper, de Roca filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, on the same day. He alleged that, while he is the owner of RAF Mansion
Hotel Building, the same was being leased by Victoriano Ewayan, the owner of Oceanics Travel
and Tour Agency.
De Roca claims that Ewayan was the employer of Dabuyan, et al. Consequently, he
asserted that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and Dabuyan, et al. and
the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction.
The LA rendered a decision directing de Roca to pay backwages and other monetary
awards to Dabuyan, et al.
De Roca then filed a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of jurisdiction
before the NLRC. However, it was dismissed because it was filed beyond the allowable period.
De Roca filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but the latter
dismissed the petition. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but also denied. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a lessor of a hotel business can be held liable for the labor obligation of
the lessee who also use the name of the hotel in his operations.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court granted de Roca’s petition.
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the lights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law.
Contract of employment between Dabuyan, et al. on the one hand, and Oceanic and
Ewayan on the other, is effective only between them; it does not extend to Roca, who is not a
party thereto. His only role is a lessor of the premises which Oceanic leased to operate the hotel;
he cannot be deemed as Dabuyan et al.’s employer –not even under the pretext that he took over
as the “new management” of the hotel operated by Oceanic. There simply is no truth to such
claim. Thus, to allow Dabuyan, et al. to recover their monetary claims from Roca would
necessarily result in their unjust enrichment.

BRAZIL ET.AL V. STI EDUCATION SER GROUP INC. ET. AL

 G.R. NO. 233314, NOVEMBER 21, 2019
Facts:
Petitioner Luningning Z. Brazil was first employed by STI College-Legazpi on June 3,
1997 as a part-time faculty member. Petitioner Salvacion L. Garcera and petitioner Rita S. De
Mesa were next hired in June 2000 and June 2001, respectively, also as part-time faculty
members by STI-Legazpi. The services of the petitioners continued until June 2011, for which
they filed a Complaint for illegal constructive dismissal and non-payment of salaries/wages,
separation pay and 131h month pay, with claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees before the National Labor Relations Commission.
Brazil claimed that she was hired as a "full-load faculty member" of STI-Legazpi in June
2002, when she started receiving a fixed monthly salary. On February 1, 2004, she was
regularized as evidenced by STI-Legazpi's Personnel Action Form. Likewise, Garcera claimed
that in a written evaluation of her teaching performance, acknowledged by her on October 12,
2004, STI-Legazpi categorized her employment status as regular. Moreover, in an electronic mail
correspondence dated April 24, 2008 with Joseluis Geronimo of the STI Headquarters, the latter
confirmed the status of Brazil and Garcera as regular employees. De Mesa claimed that she was
employed as a "full-load faculty member" in 2003, as indicated in her faculty employment
contract. She further advanced that as of June 2009, she was already considered a regular
employee as she started to receive a fixed monthly salary for twelve months. Petitioners alleged
that they were required to submit letters of intent and to sign contracts with STI for each
semester. However, upon their alleged regularization, STI no longer required them to do so. In
addition, they enjoyed the same benefits granted to regular employees such as full payment of
salary and statutory benefits during summer, semestral and Christmas breaks.
Thereafter, Lagatic, the school administrator, handed to the petitioners separate job offers
for the first semester of academic year 2011-2012. The job offers for Brazil and De Mesa were
for part-time faculty members, whereas the job offer for Garcera was for a probationary faculty
member. Petitioners refused to sign the said job offers because although the same stipulated a
higher monthly salary, their security of tenure as regular employees would be taken away from
them. Upon inquiry, petitioners were informed by Lagatic that their 201 files did not contain
their appointment papers, and that they failed to conform with the standards set out in the 2008
MORPHE .
Petitioners alleged that despite their repeated requests for the amendment of their
respective job offers on the basis of their belief that they are regular employees, Lagatic still
handed to them the same job offers. As they still refused to sign the said contracts, they were
replaced with six newly-hired faculty members on the following day. They also did not receive
any teaching load at the start of the school year, although they still received their respective
salaries for the period of June 1 to 15, 2011. Petitioners averred that the addendum regarding the
additional two years to comply with the CHED requirement was absent in the job offers handed
to them. The memorandum also came late as classes have already started on June 13, 2011. Since
they were placed in a floating status and no longer received their salary for the period of June 16
to 30, 2011, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed complaints for illegal constructive
dismissal with monetary claims.
The LA declared petitioners as regular employees. Thus, respondents were found guilty of
illegal dismissal and were ordered to pay the petitioners their respective separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement as well as other monetary claims. The LA ratiocinated that although the 2008
MORPHE applies in the determination of whether a faculty is a regular employee or not, it does
not apply in a case where regular employment status has already been achieved or had already
been granted to faculty members. TheNLRC, affirmed the LA's finding of illegal dismissal
except for De Mesa. The CA ruled that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petitioners' complaints for illegal dismissal with money claims. Petitioners were
merely separated from service as a result of their stubborn refusal to sign their respective job
offers which were made in accordance with the 2008 MORPHE.
Issue: Whether or not there was reversible error on the part of the CA?
Held:
The SC finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in ruling that the NLRC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petitioners' complaints for illegal
dismissal with money claims. The Court do not intend to disturb the factual antecedents of this
case as found by the courts a quo. As aptly observed by the CA, "the parties do not contest that,
either expressly or impliedly, STI granted petitioners the status of a regular faculty member.” As
such, an examination of the evidence pertaining to how the petitioners were granted a regular
status by the STI is unnecessary.
Petitioners also do not question the applicability of the 1992 MO RPS and/or the 2008
MORPHE to them and their failure to qualify thereunder for lack of a master's degree. They
merely insist that despite the application of the 2008 MORPHE, an employer educational
institution that has granted or treated its employees as regular or permanent employees can be
held liable for illegal constructive dismissal, and consequently liable to pay separation pay, back
wages, etc. Subsequent compliance with the MORPHE is not an available defense for employers
in such cases.
Courts may resort to application of equity only when there is insufficiency or absence of
law. The principle of equity cannot prevail over the positive mandate of the law, such as the 2008
MORPHE in this case. Application of equity "would be tantamount to overruling or supplanting
the express provisions of the law."
 Francisco vs NLRC
FACTS:
In 1995, petitioners was hired by Kasei Corporation during its incorporation stage. She was
designated as accountant, Corporate Secretary and Liaison Officer. In 1996, she was designated
as acting manager. For five years, she performed the duties of acting manager with monthly
salary of P27, 500. In 2001, petitioner was replaced by a certain Liza R. Fuentes as Manager. She
was required to sign a resolution for her replacement but she was assured that she would still be
connected with Kasei Corp. However, Kasei Corporation reduced her salary, she was not paid
her mid-year bonus allegedly because the company was not earning well. Later, she was
informed that she is no longer connected with the company. Thus, she filed an action for
constructive dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was illegally dismissed, NLRC affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, CA reversed the NLRC decision. CA
denied petitioner’s MR, hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:
Whether there was an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent

RULING:
Yes. Petition Granted. In certain cases, the control test is not sufficient to give a complete picture
of the relationship between the parties, owing to the complexity of such a relationship where
several positions have been held by the worker. The better approach would therefore be to adopt
a two-tiered test involving:
(1) the putative employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and
(2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship.

The proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is dependent on the alleged
employer for his continued employment in that line of business. In the United States, the
touchstone of economic reality in analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of
the Federal Labor Standards Act is dependency. By analogy, the benchmark of economic reality
in analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of the Labor Code ought to be the
economic dependence of the worker on his employer.

By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei
Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the
corporation’s Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in various
capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate
Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax
services to the company and performing functions necessary and desirable for the proper
operation of the corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an
indefinite period of engagement.

Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of
respondent corporation because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal,
receiving check vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and
allowances, as well as deductions and Social Security contributions from August 1, 1999 to
December 18, 2000. When petitioner was designated General Manager, respondent corporation
made a report to the SSS signed by Irene Ballesteros. Petitioner’s membership in the SSS as
manifested by a copy of the SSS specimen signature card which was signed by the President of
Kasei Corporation and the inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry system of the SSS evinces
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent
corporation.

It is therefore apparent that petitioner is economically dependent on respondent corporation for

her continued employment in the latter’s line of business.

Furthermore, the affidavit of Seiji Kamura dated December 5, 2001 has clearly established that
petitioner never acted as Corporate Secretary and that her designation as such was only for
convenience. The actual nature of petitioner’s job was as Kamura’s direct assistant with the duty
of acting as Liaison Officer in representing the company to secure construction permits, license
to operate and other requirements imposed by government agencies. Petitioner was never
entrusted with corporate documents of the company, nor required to attend the meeting of the
corporation. She was never privy to the preparation of any document for the corporation,
although once in a while she was required to sign prepared documentation for the company.

Based on the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion that petitioner is an employee of
respondent Kasei Corporation. She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation,
and is economically dependent upon respondent for her continued employment in that line of
business. Her main job function involved accounting and tax services rendered to respondent
corporation on a regular basis over an indefinite period of engagement. Respondent corporation
hired and engaged petitioner for compensation, with the power to dismiss her for cause. More
importantly, respondent corporation had the power to control petitioner with the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

The corporation constructively dismissed petitioner when it reduced her salary by P2,500 a
month from January to September 2001. This amounts to an illegal termination of employment,
where the petitioner is entitled to full backwages. Since the position of petitioner as accountant is
one of trust and confidence, and under the principle of strained relations, petitioner is further
entitled to separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement.
 Sonza vs. ABS-CBN (G.R. No. 138051)

Facts:

Respondent ABS-CBN signed an Agreement with the Mel and Jay Management and
Development Corporation (MJMDC). The latter agreed to provide SONZA’s services exclusively
to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. However, SONZA wrote a letter to ABS-CBN
irrevocably resigning from the position they have contracted to in the agreement. Later, SONZA
filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the Department of Labor and Employment asking for
his salaries, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, signing bonus, travel
allowance and amounts due under the Employees Stock Option Plan. ABS-CBN argued and filed
a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no employer-employee relationship existed between the
parties.

Labor Arbiter:Sonza is not an employee of ABS-CBN. It must be noted that complainant

was engaged by respondent by reason of his peculiar skills and talent as a TV host and a radio
broadcaster. Unlike an ordinary employee, he was free to perform the services he undertook to
render in accordance with his own style.

NLRC: Affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

CA: Upon elevation of the case to the CA, it was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court
of Appeals has given weight and credence to the ruling of the NLRC that there is no employer-
employee relationship between SONZA and ABS-CBN.

Issue:

WON Sonza is an employee of ABS-CBN.

Ruling:

No, Sonza is not an employee of ABS-CBN, but an independent contractor.

The ruling of the Supreme Court can be best explained using the four—fold test.

A. Selection and Engagement of Employee

ABS-CBN engaged SONZA’s services to co-host its television and radio programs
because of SONZA’s peculiar skills, talent and celebrity status. Independent contractors often
present themselves to possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary
employees. The specific selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and
celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not
conclusive, of an independent contractual relationship. If SONZA did not possess such unique
skills, talent and celebrity status, ABS-CBN would not have entered into the Agreement with
SONZA but would have hired him through its personnel department just like any other
employee.
 B. Payment of Wages

SONZA’s talent fees, amounting to ₱317,000 monthly in the second and third year, are so
huge and out of the ordinary that they indicate more an independent contractual relationship
rather than an employer-employee relationship. ABS-CBN agreed to pay SONZA such huge
talent fees precisely because of SONZA’s unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed
by ordinary employees. Obviously, SONZA acting alone possessed enough bargaining power to
demand and receive such huge talent fees for his services. The power to bargain talent fees way
above the salary scales of ordinary employees is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of
an independent contractual relationship.

C. Power of Dismissal

For violation of any provision of the Agreement, either party may terminate their
relationship. SONZA failed to show that ABS-CBN could terminate his services on grounds
other than breach of contract, such as retrenchment to prevent losses as provided under labor
laws. During the life of the Agreement, ABS-CBN agreed to pay SONZA’s talent fees as long as
"AGENT and Jay Sonza shall faithfully and completely perform each condition of this
Agreement." Even if it suffered severe business losses, ABS-CBN could not retrench SONZA
because ABS-CBN remained obligated to pay SONZA’s talent fees during the life of the
Agreement. This circumstance indicates an independent contractual relationship between
SONZA and ABS-CBN.

D. Power of Control

Applying the control test to the present case, we find that SONZA is not an employee but
an independent contractor. The control test is the most important test our courts apply in
distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. This test is based on the extent of
control the hirer exercises over a worker. The greater the supervision and control the hirer
exercises, the more likely the worker is deemed an employee. The converse holds true as well –
the less control the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an independent
contractor.

ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to SONZA. To perform his work, SONZA only
needed his skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television, and
sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBN’s control. SONZA did not have to render eight hours
of work per day. The Agreement required SONZA to attend only rehearsals and tapings of the
shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN could not dictate the
contents of SONZA’s script. However, the Agreement prohibited SONZA from criticizing in his
shows ABS-CBN or its interests. The clear implication is that SONZA had a free hand on what to
say or discuss in his shows provided he did not attack ABS-CBN or its interests.

We find that ABS-CBN was not involved in the actual performance that produced the
finished product of SONZA’s work. ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform his job.
ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to modify the program format and airtime schedule for
more effective programming. ABS-CBN’s sole concern was the quality of the shows and their
standing in the ratings. Clearly, ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods
of performance of SONZA’s work. No doubt, ABS-CBN supplied the equipment, crew and
airtime needed to broadcast the "Mel & Jay" programs. However, the equipment, crew and
airtime are not the "tools and instrumentalities" SONZA needed to perform his job. What
SONZA principally needed were his talent or skills and the costumes necessary for his
appearance. Even though ABS-CBN provided SONZA with the place of work and the necessary
equipment, SONZA was still an independent contractor since ABS-CBN did not supervise and
control his work. ABS-CBN’s sole concern was for SONZA to display his talent during the airing
of the programs.
 THELMA DUMPIT-MURILLO, petitioner,　vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ASSOCIATED BROADCASTING COMPANY, JOSE JAVIER
AND EDWARD TAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 164652 June 8, 2007

FACTS:
Associated Broadcasting Company (ABC) hired Thelma Dumpit-Murillo under a talent
contract as a newscaster and co-anchor for Balitang-Balita, an early evening news program. The
contract was for a period of three months. After four years of repeated renewals, petitioner’s
talent contract expired. Two weeks after the expiration of the last contract, petitioner sent a letter
to Mr. Jose Javier, Vice President for News and Public Affairs of ABC, informing the latter that
she was still interested in renewing her contract subject to a salary increase. Thereafter,
petitioner stopped reporting for work. She sent a demand letter to ABC, demanding
reinstatement, payment of unpaid wages and full backwages, payment of 13 th month pay,
vacation/sick/service incentive leaves and other monetary benefits due to a regular employee.
ABC replied that a check covering petitioner’s talent fees had been processed and prepared, but
that the other claims of petitioner had no basis in fact or in law. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint for illegal constructive dismissal. NLRC reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Murillo is an employee of Associated Broadcasting Company.

RULING:
Thelma Dumpit-Murillo was a regular employee under contemplation of law. The
practice of having fixed-term contracts in the industry does not automatically make all talent
contracts valid and compliant with labor law. The assertion that a talent contract exists does not
necessarily prevent a regular employment status. Further, the Sonzacase is not applicable. In
Sonza, the television station did not exercise control over the means and methods of the
performance of Sonza’s work.In the case at bar, ABC had control over the performance of
petitioner’s work. Noteworthy too, is the comparatively low P28,000 monthly pay of petitioner
vis the P300,000 a month salary of Sonza, that all the more bolsters the conclusion that petitioner
was not in the same situation as Sonza. The duties of petitioner as enumerated in her employment
contract indicate that ABC had control over the work of petitioner. Aside from control, ABC also
dictated the work assignments and payment of petitioner’s wages. ABC also had power to
dismiss her. All these being present, clearly, there existed an employment relationship between
petitioner and ABC.

Concerning regular employment, the requisites for regularity of employment have been
met in the instant case. Petitioner’s work was necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer which includes, as a pre-condition for its enfranchisement, its participation
in the government’s news and public information dissemination. In addition, her work was
continuous for a period of four years. This repeated engagement under contract of hire is
indicative of the necessity and desirability of the petitioner’s work in private respondent ABC’s
business. As a regular employee, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure and can be dismissed only
for just cause and after due compliance with procedural due process. Since private respondents did not
observe due process in constructively dismissing the petitioner, there was an illegal dismissal.

FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. VS.ARLENE S. ESPIRITU G.R. NO. 204944-45

DECEMBER 3, 2014

FACTS:

In 2005, Arlene S. Espiritu was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. as a news
correspondent/producer tasked to report Philippine news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau field
office. The employment contract was initially for one year, but was successively renewed on a
yearly basis with salary adjustments upon every renewal.

In January 2009, Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer. She informed Fuji about her condition,
and the Chief of News Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki Aoki, informed the former that the company had
a problem with renewing her contract considering her condition. Arlene insisted she was still fit
to work as certified by her attending physician.

After a series of verbal and written communications, Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal
contract. In consideration thereof, Arlene acknowledged the receipt of the total amount of her
salary from March-May 2009, year-end bonus, mid-year bonus and separation pay. However,
Arlene affixed her signature on the nonrenewal contract with the initials "U.P." for "under
protest."

On May 6, 2009, Arlene filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NCR Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC, alleging that she was forced to sign the non-renewal contract after Fuji came to
know of her illness. She also alleged that Fuji withheld her salaries and other benefits when she
refused to sign, and that she was left with no other recourse but to sign the non-renewal contract
to get her salaries.

On September 10, 2009, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and held that Arlene was not a
regular employee but an independent contractor.

On March 5, 2010, The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ruled that Arlene was a
regular employee since she continuously rendered services that were necessary and desirable to
Fuji’s business.

The Court of Appeals affirmed that NLRC ruling with modification that Fuji immediately
reinstate Arlene to her position without loss of seniority rights and that she be paid her
backwages and other emoluments withheld from her. The Court of Appeals agreed with the
NLRC that Arlene was a regular employee, engaged to perform work that was necessary or
desirable in the business of Fuji, and the successive renewals of her fixed-term contract resulted
in regular employment. The case of Sonza does not apply in the case because Arlene was not
contracted on account of a special talent or skill. Arlene was illegally dismissed because Fuji
failed to comply with the requirements of substantive and procedural due process. Arlene, in fact,
signed the non-renewal contract under protest as she was left without a choice.
Fuji filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, alleging
that Arlene was hired as an independent contractor; that Fuji had no control over her work; that
the employment contracts were renewed upon Arlene’s insistence; that there was no illegal
dismissal because she freely agreed not to renew her fixed-term contract as evidenced by her
email correspondences.

Arlene filed a manifestation stating that the SC could not take jurisdiction over the case since
Fuji failed to authorize Corazon Acerden, the assigned attorney-in-fact for Fuji, to sign the
verification.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not Arlene was an independent contractor?

2.Whether or not Arlene was a regular employee?
3.Whether or not Arlene was illegally dismissed?
4.Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly awarded reinstatement, damages and
attorney’s fees?
HELD:

1. Arlene was not an independent contractor.

Fuji alleged that Arlene was an independent contractor citing the Sonza case. She was
hired because of her skills. Her salary was higher than the normal rate. She had the power
to bargain with her employer. Her contract was for a fixed term. It also stated that Arlene
was not forced to sign the non-renewal agreement, considering that she sent an email
with another version of her non-renewal agreement.

Arlene argued (1) that she was a regular employee because Fuji had control and
supervision over her work; (2) that she based her work on instructions from Fuji; (3) that
the successive renewal of her contracts for four years indicated that her work was
necessary and desirable; (4) that the payment of separation pay indicated that she was a
regular employee; (5) that the Sonza case is not applicable because she was a plain
reporter for Fuji; (6) that her illness was not a ground for her dismissal; (7) that she
signed the non-renewal agreement because she was not in a position to reject the same.

The level of protection to labor should vary from case to caese. When a prospective
employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands
upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the
ordinary worker.

The level of protection to labor must be determined on the basis of the nature of the work,
qualifications of the employee, and other relevant circumstances such as but not limited
to educational attainment and other special qualifications.
 Fuji’s argument that Arlene was an independent contractor under a fixed-term contract is
contradictory. Employees under fixed-term contracts cannot be independent contractors
because in fixed-term contracts, an employer-employee relationship exists. The test in
this kind of contract is not the necessity and desirability of the employee’s activities, “but
the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of the
employment relationship.” For regular employees, the necessity and desirability of their
work in the usual course of the employer’s business are the determining factors. On the
other hand, independent contractors do not have employer-employee relationships with
their principals.

To determine the status of employment, the existence of employer-employee relationship

must first be settled with the use of the four-fold test, especially the qualifications for the
power to control.

The distinction is in this guise:

Rules that merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of a mutually desired
result without dictating the means or methods to be employed creates no employer-
employee relationship; whereas those that control or fix the methodology and bind or
restrict the party hired to the use of such means creates the relationship.

In appliacation, Arlene was hired by Fuji as a news producer, but there was no evidence
that she was hired for her unique skills that would distinguish her from ordinary
employees. Her monthly salary appeared to be a substantial sum. Fuji had the power to
dismiss Arlene, as provided for in her employment contract. The contract also indicated
that Fuji had control over her work as she was rquired to report for 8 hours from Monday
to Friday. Fuji gave her instructions on what to report and even her mode of
transportation in carrying out her functions was controlled.

Therefore, Arlene could not be an independent contractor.

2. Arlene was a regular employee with a fixed-term contract.

In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the

applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by
the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The standard,
supplied by the law itself, is whether the work undertaken is necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, a fact that can be assessed by looking into the
nature of the services rendered and its relation to the general scheme under which the
business or trade is pursued in the usual course. It is distinguished from a specific
undertaking that is divorced from the normal activities required in carrying on the
particular business or trade.

However, there may be a situation where an employee’s work is necessary but is not
always desirable in the usual course of business of the employer. In this situation, there is
no regular employment.
 Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office is a small unit213 and has a few employees. Arlene had to do
all activities related to news gathering.

A news producer “plans and supervises newscast [and] works with reporters in the field
planning and gathering information, including monitoring and getting news stories,
rporting interviewing subjects in front of a video camera, submission of news and current
events reports pertaining to the Philippines, and traveling to the regional office in
Thailand.” She also had to report for work in Fuji’s office in Manila from Mondays to
Fridays, eight per day. She had no equipment and had to use the facilities of Fuji to
accomplish her tasks.

The successive renewals of her contract indicated the necessity and desirability of her
work in the usual course of Fuji’s business. Because of this, Arlene had become a regular
employee with the right to security of tenure.

Arlene’s contract indicating a fixed term did not automatically mean that she could never
be a regular employee. For as long as it was the employee who requested, or bargained,
that the contract have a “definite date of termination,” or that the fixed-term contract be
freely entered into by the employer and the employee, then the validity of the fixed-term
contract will be upheld.

3. Arlene was illegally dismissed.

As a regular employee, Arlene was entitled to security of tenure under Article 279 of the
Labor Code and could be dismissed only for just or authorized causaes and after
observance of due process.

The expiration of the contract does not negate the finding of illegal dismissal. The
manner by which Fuji informed Arlene of non-renewal through email a month after she
informed Fuji of her illness is tantamount to constructive dismissal. Further, Arlene was
asked to sign a letter of resignation prepared by Fuji. The existence of a fixed-term
contract should not mean that there can be no illegal dismissal. Due process must still be
observed.

Moreoever, disease as a ground for termination under Article 284 of the Labor Code and
Book VI, Rule 1, Section 8 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code require
two requirements to be complied with: (1) the employee’s disease cannot be cured within
six months and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health
as well as to the health of his co-employees; and (2) certification issued by a competent
public health authority that even with proper medical treatment, the disease cannot be
cured within six months. The burden of proving compliance with these requisites is on
the employer. Non-compliance leads to illegal dismissal. blesvirtualLawlibrary

Arlene was not accorded due process. After informing her employer of her lung cancer,
she was not given the chance to present medical certificates. Fuji immediately concluded
that Arlene could no longer perform her duties because of chemotherapy. Neither did it
 suggest for her to take a leave. It did not present any certificate from a competent public
health authority.

Therefore, Arlene was illegally dismissed.

4. The Court of Appeals correctly awarded reinstatement, damages and attorney’s

fees.

The Court of Appeals awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. It also
ordered reinstatement, as the grounds when separation pay was awarded in lieu of
reinstatement were not proven.

The Labor Code provides in Article 279 that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to
reinstatement, backwages including allowances, and all other benefits.

Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed only (1) when the employer has ceased
operations; (2) when the employee’s position is no longer available; (3) strained relations;
and (4) a substantial period has lapsed from date of filing to date of finality.

The doctrine of strained relations should be strictly applied to avoid deprivation of the
right to reinstatement. In the case at bar, no evidence was presented by Fuji to prove that
reinstatement was no longer feasible. Fuji did not allege that it ceased operations or that
Arlene’s position was no longer feasible. Nothing showed that the reinstatement would
cause an atmosphere of antagonism in the workplace.

Moral damages are awarded “when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or
constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals,
good customs or public policy.” On the other hand, exemplary damages may be awarded
when the dismissal was effected “in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

After Arlene had informed Fuji of her cancer, she was informed that there would be
problems in renewing her contract on account of her condition. This information caused
Arlene mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. The manner of her
dismissal was effected in an oppressive approach with her salary and other benefits being
withheld until May 5, 2009, when she had no other choice but to sign the non-renewal
contract.

With regard to the award of attorney’s fees, Article 111 of the Labor Code states that “[i]n
cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s
fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.” In actions for recovery
of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect
his rights and interest, the award of attorney’s fees is legally and morally justifiablen.”
Due to her illegal dismissal, Arlene was forced to litigate.

Therefore, the awards for reinstatement, damages and attorney’s fees were proper.
 G.R. No. 165881 April 19, 2006

OSCAR VILLAMARIA, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JERRY V. BUSTAMANTE, Respondents

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Oscar Villamaria, Jr. was the owner of Villamaria Motors. One of those drivers was
respondent Bustamante. Bustamante remitted P450.00 a day to Villamaria as boundary and kept
the residue of his daily earnings as compensation for driving the vehicle. Villamaria verbally
agreed to sell the jeepney to Bustamante under the "boundary-hulog scheme," where Bustamante
would remit to Villarama P550.00 a day for a period of four years; Bustamante would then
become the owner of the vehicle and continue to drive the same under Villamaria’s franchise.
The parties agreed that if Bustamante failed to pay the boundary-hulog for three days, Villamaria
Motors would hold on to the vehicle until Bustamante paid his arrears, including a penalty of
P50.00 a day; in case Bustamante failed to remit the daily boundary-hulog for a period of one
week, the Kasunduan would cease to have legal effect and Bustamante would have to return the
vehicle to VillamariaMotors.Under the Kasunduan, Bustamante was prohibited from driving the
vehicle without prior authority from Villamaria Motors. Thus, Bustamante was authorized to
operate the vehicle to transport passengers only and not for other purposes. Bustamante
continued driving the jeepney under the supervision and control of Villamaria. As agreed upon,
he made daily remittances of P550.00 in payment of the purchase price of the vehicle.
Bustamante failed to pay for the annual registration fees of the vehicle, but Villamaria allowed
him to continue driving the jeepney.Villamaria took back the jeepney driven by Bustamante and
barred the latter from driving the vehicle.Bustamante filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal
against Villamaria and his wife Teresita.

LA: the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Villamaria and ordered the
complaint dismissed on ground that the contract of Boundary-Hulog, as well as the PAALALA,
to prove their claim that complainant violated the terms of their contract and afterwards
abandoned the vehicle assigned to him.

NLRC: The NLRC rendered judgment dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC ruled
that under the Kasunduan, the juridical relationship between Bustamante and Villamaria was that
of vendor and vendee, hence, the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

CA: the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC decision. the appellate court ruled that the Labor
Arbiter had jurisdiction over Bustamante’s complaint. The CA ratiocinated that Villamaria’s
exercise of control over Bustamante’s conduct in operating the jeepney is inconsistent with the
former’s claim that he was not engaged in the transportation business.

Issue:
WON employer-employee relationship exists between the parties
Ruling:
Yes. The SC ruled that Article 217 of the Labor Code, an employer-employee relationship is an
indispensable jurisdictional requisite. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the NLRC under
Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee
relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or
their collective bargaining agreement. Not every dispute between an employer and employee
involves matters that only the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Actions between employers and employees where the
employer-employee relationship is merely incidental is within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the regular courts. When the principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a
collective bargaining agreement, the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC even though a claim for damages might be asserted as an incident to such
claim.

Under the boundary-hulog scheme incorporated in the Kasunduan, a dual juridical relationship
was created between petitioner and respondent: that of employer-employee and vendor-vendee.
The Kasunduan did not extinguish the employer-employee relationship of the parties extant
before the execution of said deed.The boundary system is a scheme by an owner/operator
engaged in transporting passengers as a common carrier to primarily govern the compensation of
the driver, that is, the latter’s daily earnings are remitted to the owner/operator less the excess of
the boundary which represents the driver’s compensation. Under this system, the owner/operator
exercises control and supervision over the driver. It is unlike in lease of chattels where the lessor
loses complete control over the chattel leased but the lessee is still ultimately responsible for the
consequences of its use. The management of the business is still in the hands of the
owner/operator, who, being the holder of the certificate of public convenience, must see to it that
the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising and regulatory authority, and the rules
promulgated with regard to the business operations. The fact that the driver does not receive
fixed wages but only the excess of the "boundary" given to the owner/operator is not sufficient to
change the relationship between them. Indubitably, the driver performs activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the owner/operator.

The exercise of control by private respondent over petitioner’s conduct in operating the jeepney
he was driving is inconsistent with private respondent’s claim that he is, or was, not engaged in
the transportation business; that, even if petitioner was allowed to let some other person drive the
unit, it was not shown that he did so; that the existence of an employment relation is not
dependent on how the worker is paid but on the presence or absence of control over the means
and method of the work; that the amount earned in excess of the "boundary hulog" is equivalent
to wages; and that the fact that the power of dismissal was not mentioned in the Kasunduan did
not mean that private respondent never exercised such power, or could not exercise such power.

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

G.R. No. 192084 September 14, 2011

JOSE MEL BERNARTE, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (PBA), JOSE EMMANUEL M. EALA, and
PERRY MARTINEZ,Respondents.

FACTS

Complainant Bernarte, along with fellow PBA referee Renato Guevarra, alleged that they were
illegally dismissed by PBA when their respective retainer contracts as referees were not renewed
after two successive contracts in 2003. As a result, they filed a complaint of illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Complainant alleged that their repeated rehiring by PBA made them
employees of the latter. In addition, complainant alleged that PBA exercised control over the
performance of his work as evidenced by the stipulations on his contract which therefore
rendered him an employee of PBA. Among the stipulations raised by the petitioner where his
being subjected to rating as referee, being required to attend all basketball games by the PBA, to
comply with all the requirements of the PBA governing the conduct of the referees in and out of
the court, to keep himself in good physical, mental and emotional condition during the term of
the contract, and being prohibited to officiate other basketball games outside the PBA and to
conduct himself according to the highest standards of honesty or morality, among others.
Labor Arbiter declared petitioner was an employee of PBA who was illegally dismissed and
ordered the latter to reinstate him with backwages and damages. NLRC affirmed the decision of
the LA. On appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC declaring that petitioner
was not an employee of PBA but an independent contractor. It ruled that PBA did not exercise
control over the means and methods in the performance of the complainant’s work. Hence the
instant appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed as an employee of the respondent PBA?
RULING
No. The petition is bereft of merit.
To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, case law has consistently
applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the...
employee on the means and methods by which the work is accomplished. The so-called "control
test" is the most important indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship. The allegation by the complainant of the control imposed on him by the respondent
was not sustained by the Court ruling that those are mere guidelines towards the achievement of
the mutually desired result without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it
quoting from Sonza V. ABS-CBN and Insular Life V. NLRC.
The Court held that the referees exercise their own independent judgement, based on the rules of
the game, as to when and how a call or decision is to be made which decision PBA cannot
overrule. The referees are the only, absolute, and final authority on the playing court and
respondent cannot control the referee when he blows the whistle because such authority
exclusively belongs to the referee.
The Court ruled petitioner is an Independent Contractor as indicated by the circumstances of his
contract particularly the number of hours required from him in the performance of his work and
the non-deduction from his fees of the statutory deductions such as the SSS, Philhealth and
PagIBIG contributions which are regularly deducted from employees. As an independent
contractor, the repeated rehiring of the petitioner does not prove that he is an employee but a
mere renewal of the contract between him and the PBA which the latter may or may not renew
upon expiration either for unsatisfactory performance or violation of its terms and conditions.
The Court also cited applicable foreign case law declaring that a referee is an independent
contractor, whose special skills and independent judgment are required specifically for such
position and cannot possibly be controlled by the hiring party (Yonan V. US Soccer Federation,
Inc.).
Wherefore, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 220978, July 05, 2016

CENTURY PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner, v. EDWIN J. BABIANO AND EMMA B.

CONCEPCION, Respondents.

Facts:
Respondent Babiano has been hired by the petitioner as Director of Sales and eventually,
he was promoted as Vice President of Sales. On the other hand, respondent Concepcion became a
sales agent of the petitioner. As provided in both of their contracts, the respondents shall forfeit
their commission on each sale in cases where a disclosure of information has been committed.
Moreover, the respondents are also prohibited to engage in the same line of service in favour of
the competitor of the petitioner. Notably, the contract states that no employer-employee
relationship shall arise from such contract. In 2009, Babiano tendered a resignation letter
containing therein that he already accepted a position in the competitor company of the
petitioner. The petitioner forfeited the benefits of Babiano as to the commission due to him. On
the same year, Concepcion also rendered her resignation letter as Project Director, effective
immediately. In 2011, the respondents filed a complaint for non-payment of commission and
benefits. The petitioner argued that the respondents are mere agents of the petitioner and no
employer-employee relationship exists among them. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the
petitioner declaring that the claims of the respondents lack merits and such case should have
been filed through an ordinary civil action because no employer-employee relationship exists. On
appeal before the NLRC, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter have been reversed and set aside,
declaring the respondents as employees of the petitioner and awarding them their money claims.
The NLRC explained that the act of the petitioner on repeated re-hiring of Concepcion clearly
shows that she is indeed an employee of the petitioner. The petitioner moved for reconsideration,
however NLRC denied the same. The CA upheld the ruling of the NLRC but increased the
monetary amount of the claim. Hence, this present petition before the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are employees of the petitioner.

Ruling:
Yes. They are to be considered as employees of the petitioner.

The Supreme Court stressed in their rulings that the control over the manner and
execution of the duties of an engaged person for services is the determining factor of an
employer-employee relationship. Clearly, the petitioner has control over the performance of the
respondents without using their discretion in completing the task. Anent thereto, the money
claims of the respondents has been filed correctly due to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. Therefore, the respondents are declared employees.
 BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER), Petitioner,
vs.
FLY ACE CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO, Respondents.

FACTS

On May 23, 2008, the petitioner Danilo (Bitoy) Javier filed a complaint against the respondents
(Fly Ace Corporation / Flordelyn Castillo) for underpayment of salaries and other labor standard
benefits. Javier worked for the respondent’s company since September 2007 as an all around
worker around the respondent’s warehouse and a pahinantefor the company’s deliveries.

The petitioner claims that he worked for the respondent from 7:00 AM to 5:00 PM, Monday to
Saturday during his time of employment but was never issued a company ID nor any payslips
like the other employees, and on May 6, 2008, the petitioner was barred from entering the
company’s premises and despite repeated pleading to allow him to resume work he was not
allowed too.

To support his allegations, the petitioner presented an affidavit of one Bengie Valenzuela who
alleged that petitioner was a stevedore or pahinanteof Fly Ace from September 2007 to January
2008. The said affidavit was subscribed before the Labor Arbiter.

Fly Ace on the other hand claims that the petitioner was contracted by its employee Mr. Ong as a
pahinanteon a pakyaw (or per work) basis at an agreed rate of 300 per trip (later increased to 325
on January 2008). Mr. Ong had contracted the petitioner only roughly 5 to 6 times per month
whenever their contracted hauler (Milmar Hauling Services) was not available.
Fly Ace also submitted their contract with Milmar, and copies of acknowledgement receipts
evidencing the payment for the petitioner’s services with the words “daily manpower
(pakyaw/piece rate pay) with the petitioner’s signature / initials to try and prove that petitioner
was not one of their employees.

LABOR ARBITER
 LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, saying that the petitioner failed to present
proof of his regular employment with the company:
o Complainant has no employee ID showing his employment with the Respondent
nor any document showing that he received the benefits accorded to regular
employees of the Respondents. His contention that Respondent failed to give him
said ID and payslips implies that indeed he was not a regular employee of Fly
Ace considering that complainant was a helper and that Respondent company has
contracted a regular trucking for the delivery of its products.

o Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business but in the importation
and sales of groceries. Since there is a regular hauler to deliver its products, we
give credence to Respondents’ claim that complainant was contracted on
"pakiao" basis.
 o As to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll presented by the
Respondents showing salaries of workers on "pakiao" basis has evidentiary
weight because although the signature of the complainant appearing thereon are
not uniform, they appeared to be his true signature.
NLRC
 On appeal at the NLRC, Javier was favored. It ruled that the LA skirted the argument of
Javier and immediately concluded that he was not a regular employee simply because he
failed to present proof. It was of the view that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not
preclude the existence of employer-employee relationship.
CA
 On March 18, 2010, the CA annulled the NLRC findings that Javier was indeed a former
employee of Fly Ace and reinstated the dismissal of Javier’s complaint as ordered by the
LA.
 In an illegal dismissal case the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its
dismissal was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper,
an employer-employee relationship must first be established. It is incumbent upon private
respondent to prove the employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence.

 It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove, by substantial evidence, that he is an

employee of petitioners, but he failed to discharge his burden. The non-issuance of a
company-issued identification card to private respondent supports petitioners’ contention
that private respondent was not its employee.
 Case was elevated to the SC on appeal.

ISSUES
1. WON the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was not a regular employee of FLY
ACE

RULING:
 NO, Javier is not a regular employee.
 The Court affirms the assailed CA decision.

It must be noted that the issue of Javier’s alleged illegal dismissal is anchored on the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between him and Fly Ace.
Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for the grant of relief.

While Javier remains firm in his position that as an employed stevedore of Fly Ace, he was made
to work in the company premises during weekdays arranging and cleaning grocery items for
delivery to clients, no other proof was submitted to fortify his claim. The lone affidavit
executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful in strengthening Javier’s cause. The
Court cannot ignore the inescapable conclusion that his mere presence at the workplace falls
short in proving employment therein. The supporting affidavit could have, to an extent, bolstered
Javier’s claim of being tasked to clean grocery items when there were no scheduled delivery
trips, but no information was offered in this subject simply because the witness had no personal
knowledge of Javier’s employment.
The Court is of the considerable view that on Javier lies the burden to pass the well-settled tests
to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control the employee’s conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion is
whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the
result of the work but also as to the means and methods by which the result is to be
accomplished.

In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case.
Further, Fly Ace does not dispute having contracted Javier and paid him on a "per trip" rate as a
stevedore, albeit on a pakyaw basis.

The Court cannot fail to note that Fly Ace presented documentary proof that Javier was indeed
paid on a pakyaw basis per the acknowledgment receipts admitted as competent evidence by the
LA. Unfortunately for Javier, his mere denial of the signatures affixed therein cannot
automatically sway us to ignore the documents because "forgery cannot be presumed and must
be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.
G.R. No. 186621 March 12, 2014
SOUTH EAST INTERNATIONAL RATTAN, INC. and/or ESTANISLAO AGBAY,
Petitioners,
vs.
JESUS J. COMING, Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent filed an illegal dismissal complaint against the petitioner. He has been
engaged by the petitioner as an operator of a sizing machine used for the operations of the
company. Allegedly, the petitioner told Jesus that his services shall be terminated due to the
financial crisis of the company, however his services may be re-hired in case the company shall
need him again. After a year of waiting, the petitioner did not call the respondent, thus, he filed a
complaint against the petitioner. On their part, the petitioner stressed that the respondent is not
their employee, using the SSS employee list as their basis. Respondent then filed affidavits of the
pioneer employees of the petitioner stating that the respondent is one of them as pioneers. The
Labor Arbiter ruled favouring Jesus. Before the NLRC, the ruling had a reversal declaring that
no employer-employee relationship exist. Another reversal took place before the CA. hence, this
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Jesus is an employee of the petitioner.
Ruling:
Yes. He is an employee of the petitioner.
Considering that the nature of work engaged by the respondent in favour of the petitioner,
a sizing machine operator is necessary and desirable to the purpose of the petitioner as a compny.
Moreover, as to the "control test", the following facts indubitably reveal that respondents wielded
control over the work performance of petitioner, to wit: (1) they required him to work within the
company premises; (2) they obliged petitioner to report every day of the week and tasked him to
usually perform the same job; (3) they enforced the observance of definite hours of work from 8
o’clock in the morning to 5 o’clock in the afternoon; (4) the mode of payment of petitioner’s
salary was under their discretion, at first paying him on pakiao basis and thereafter, on daily
basis; (5) they implemented company rules and regulations; (6) [Estanislao] Agbay directly paid
petitioner’s salaries and controlled all aspects of his employment and (7) petitioner rendered
work necessary and desirable in the business of the respondent company.

Employer-Employee Relationship
 MARSMAN and COMPANY, INC. vs. RODIL C. STA. RITA
GR No. 194765, April 23, 2018

Facts:

Marsman, a domestic corporation, was formerly engaged in the business of

distribution and sale of pharmaceutical and consumer products for different manufacturers
within the country. It temporarily hired Sta. Rita on November 16, 1993 as a warehouse
helper. Then it confirmed Sta. Rita's status as a regular employee on September 18, 1994
and adjusted his monthly wage to P3,796.00. Later, Sta. Rita joined Marsman Employees
Union (MEU), the recognized sole and exclusive bargaining representative of Marsman's
employees.

On July 1995, Marsman purchased Metro Drug Distribution, Inc., (now Consumer
Products Distribution Services, Inc. (CPDSI), a company that was also engaged in the
distribution and sale of pharmaceutical and consumer products. The similarity in Marsman's
and Metro Drug's business led to the integration of their employees which was formalized in
a Memorandum of Agreement.

CPDSI contracted its logistic services to EAC Distributors (EAC). CPDSI and EAC
agreed that CPDSI would provide warehousemen to EAC's tobacco business which operated
in EAC-Libis Warehouse. A letter issued by Marsman confirmed Sta. Rita's appointment as
one of the warehousemen for EAC-Libis Warehouse, effective October 13, 1997, which also
stated that the assignment was a "transfer that is part of our cross-training program."

Parenthetically, EAC's use of the EAC-Libis Warehouse was dependent upon the lease
contract between EAC and Valiant Distribution (Valiant), owner of the EAC-Libis Warehouse.
Hence, EAC's operations were affected when Valiant decided to terminate their contract of
lease on January 31, 2000. In response to the cessation of the contract of lease, EAC
transferred their stocks into their own warehouse and decided to operate the business by
themselves, thereby ending their logistic service agreement with CPDSI.

This sequence of events left CPDSI with no other option but to terminate the
employment of those assigned to EAC-Libis Warehouse, including Sta. Rita. A letter issued
by CPDSI's Vice-President and General Manager, notified Sta. Rita that his services would
be terminated on February 28, 2000 due to redundancy. CPDSI also reported the matter of
redundancy to the Department of Labor and Employment.

Sta. Rita filed a complaint in the NLRC against Marsman for illegal dismissal with
damages in the form of moral, exemplary, and actual damages and attorney's fees.
Marsman filed a Motion to Dismiss on the premise that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction
over the complaint for illegal dismissal because Marsman is not Sta. Rita's employer.
Marsman averred that the Memorandum of Agreement effectively transferred Sta. Rita's
employment from Marsman and Company, Inc. to CPDSI.

The Labor Arbiter found Marsman guilty of illegal dismissal. However, it was reversed
by the NLRC. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC and held that Marsman is Sta. Rita’s
employer.

Issue:
Whether or not an employer – employee relationship exist between Marsman and Sta. Rita
at the time of the latter’s dismissal.
Ruling:
No. employer – employee relationship does not exist at the time of the dismissal.
Settled is the tenet that allegations in the complaint must be duly proven by competent
evidence and the burden of proof is on the party making the allegation. In an illegal
dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an
employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an
employer-employee relationship must first be established. In this instance, it was incumbent
upon Sta. Rita as the complainant to prove the employer-employee relationship by
substantial evidence. Unfortunately, Sta. Rita failed to discharge the burden to prove his
allegations.

The integration and transfer was a necessary consequence of the business transition
or corporate reorganization that Marsman and CPDSI had undertaken, which had the
characteristics of a corporate spin-off. To recall, a proviso in the Memorandum of Agreement
limited Marsman's function into that of a holding company and transformed CPDSI as its
main operating company. In business parlance, a corporate spin-off occurs when a
department, division or portions of the corporate business enterprise is sold-off or assigned
to a new corporation that will arise by the process which may constitute it into a subsidiary
of the original corporation. The spin-off and the attendant transfer of employees are
legitimate business interests of Marsman. The transfer of employees through the
Memorandum of Agreement was proper and did not violate any existing law or
jurisprudence. It is a management prerogative. The Court has upheld the
transfer/absorption of employees from one company to another, as successor employer, as
long as the transferor was not in bad faith and the employees absorbed by a successor-
employer enjoy the continuity of their employment status and their rights and privileges
with their former employer.

Sta. Rita also failed to satisfy the four-fold test which determines the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. Hence, the petition of Marsman is granted. Having
established that an employer-employee relationship did not exist between Marsman and
Sta. Rita at the time of his dismissal, Sta. Rita's original complaint must be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction on the part of the Labor Arbiter to take cognizance of the case.
Maricalum Mining Corporation vs Ely G .Florentinoet. Al.
G.R. No. 221813 July 23, 2018

Facts: In 1992, respondent G Holdings Inc. bought 90% of petitioner Maricalum Mining
Corporation’s shares and thereafter immediately took possession of its Sipalay Mining Complex
and took full control of its management and operations. In 1999, the Sipalay General Hospital,
Inc. was duly incorporated. Afterwards, some of Maricalum Mining's employees retired and
formed several manpower cooperatives each of which executed identical sets of Memorandum of
Agreement with Maricalum Mining wherein they undertook, among others, to provide the latter
with a steady supply of workers, machinery and equipment for a monthly fee. In 2001,
Maricalum Mining decided to stop its mining operations to avert continuing losses. Its properties
were foreclosed and sold to G Holdings as the highest bidder.
In 2010, some of Maricalum Mining's workers and Sipalay General Hospital's employees
jointly filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter (LA) against G Holdings, and the cooperatives
for illegal dismissal, underpayment and nonpayment of salaries and benefits, and damages.
Complainants posited that: the Sipalay Hospital is "among the assets" of Maricalum
Mining acquired by G Holdings; and their payroll were prepared by G Holdings' accounting
department. Correspondingly, G Holdings maintained that: it was Maricalum Mining who
entered into an agreement with the manpower cooperatives for the employment of complainants'
services.
The LA ruled in favor of complainants and held that G Holdings connived with
Marcalum Mining in orchestrating the formation of manpower cooperatives to circumvent
complainants' labor standards rights. On appeal, the NLRC imposed the liability of paying the
monetary awards imposed by the LA against Maricalum Mining, instead of G Holdings, on the
ground that it was Maricalum Mining who entered into service contracts with each of the
manpower cooperatives. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between G Holdings and the
employees of Sipalay Hospital.

Ruling: NO.
In this case, the Supreme Court applied the four-fold test: a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; b) the payment of wages; c) the power of dismissal; and d) the
power to control the employee's conduct, or the so-called "control test."
Complainant failed to show that their services were selected and engaged by either
Maricalum Mining or G Holdings. However, the cash vouchers and notices of termination are
reasonable enough to draw an inference that G Holdings and Maricalum Mining may have had a
hand in the complainants' payment of salaries and dismissal.
Further, in order to determine the presence or absence of an employment relationship
between G Holdings and the employees of Sipalay Hospital by using the control test, the Court
examined Sipalay Hospital's Articles of Incorporation imparting its 'primary purpose, to wit:
“ To own, manage, lease or operate hospitals or clinics offering and providing medical services
and facilities to the general public, provided that purely professional, medical or surgical
services shall be performed by duly qualified physicians or surgeons who may or may not be
connected with the corporation and who shall be freely and individually contracted by
patients.”
It is immediately apparent that Sipalay Hospital, even if its facilities are located inside the
Sipalay Mining Complex, does not limit its medical services only to the employees and officers
of Maricalum Mining and/or G Holdings. Moreover, G Holdings is a holding company primarily
engaged in investing substantially in the stocks of another company-not in directing and
managing the latter's daily business operations. Because of this corporate attribute, the Court can
reasonably draw an inference that G Holdings does not have a considerable ability to control
means and methods of work of Sipalay Hospital employees. Markedly, the records are simply
bereft of any evidence that G Holdings had, in fact, used its ownership to control the daily
operations of Sipalay Hospital as well as the working methods of the latter's employees.
Lu vs. Enopia et al., GR No. 197899, March 6, 2017

FACTS: TirsoEnopia and 34 others were hired from January 20, 1994 to March 20, 1996 as
crew members of the fishing mother boat F/BMG-28 owned by Joaquin Lu who is the sole
proprietor of Mommy Gina Tuna Resources (MGTR) based in General Santos City. Parties had
an income-sharing arrangement wherein 55% goes to Lu, 45% to the crew members, with an
additional 4% as "backing incentive.” They also equally share the expenses for the maintenance
and repair of the mother boat, and for the purchase of nets, ropes and payaos. Sometime in
August 1997, Lu proposed the signing of a Joint Venture Fishing Agreement between them, but
complainants refused to sign the same as they opposed the one-year term provided in the
agreement. According to complainants during their dialogue on August 18, 1997, Lu terminated
their services right there and then because of their refusal to sign the agreement. On the other
hand, Lu alleged that the master fisherman (piado) Ruben Salili informed him that Enopia et al.
still refused to sign the agreement and have decided to return the vessel F/B MG-28. On August
25, 1997, complainants filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims and damages.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and found that no employer-employee relationship
exists but a joint venture. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the NLRC and found that there was an employer-employee
relationship since there was the element of control.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship?

HELD: Yes, there is an employer-employee relationship. It was shown as evidence that the
employer stated in their Social Security System (SSS) online inquiry system printouts was
MGTR, which is the company of Lu.The coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship. The 4% backing incentive fee which was
divided among the fishermen engaged in the fishing operations approved by Lu was paid to them
after deducting the latter's respective vale or cash advance. If indeed a joint venture was agreed
upon between petitioner and respondents, why would these fishermen obtain vale or cash
advance from petitioner and not from the piado who allegedly hired and had control over them. |
Communications between the respondents and the petitioner were made through radio operators
and checkers. Such allows constantly monitoring or checking the progress of respondents' fishing
operations throughout the duration thereof, which showed their control and supervision over
respondents' activities. It was established that petitioner exercised control over respondents. It
should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control,
and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer actually supervises
the performance of duties by the employee. It is enough that the former has a right to wield the
power. Finally, the power of dismissal over the fishermen were shown when Lu dismissed them
after they refused to sign the joint fishing venture agreement.
 Romero vs. People of the PH
G.R. No. 171644. November 23, 2011
J. Peralta
Facts:
Private respondent Romulo Padlanwas a former classmate of petitioner in
college. Sometime in September 2000 Romulo went to petitioner's stall to inquire about securing
a job in Israel. Convinced by petitioner's words of encouragement and inspired by the potential
salary, Romulo asked petitioner the amount of money required in order for him to be able to go
to Israel. Petitioner informed him that as soon as he could give her US$3,600.00, his papers
would be immediately processed. When he was able to raise the amount, Romulo went back to
petitioner and handed her the money, after a briefing with one Mokra, conducted at a later time,
Romulo was able to left for Israel; was able to work and receive US$800.00 salary per month.
Two and a half months after, he was caught by Israel's immigration police and was detained. He
was subsequently deported because he did not possess a working visa. On his return, Romulo
demanded from petitioner the return of his money, but the latter refused and failed to do so.

On the other hand, private respondent Arturo Siapno is petitioner's nephew. Sometime in
August 2000, he went to petitioner's stall. He was convinced by the petitioner that if he could
give her US$3,600.00 for the processing of his papers, he could leave the country after 2weeks.
Arturo contacted a relative in the U.S. to ask the latter to cover the expenses for the former's
overseas job placement. The relative sent the US$3,000.00 to Teresita D. Visperas, petitioner's
sister in Israel. He left for Israel in September 2000; was able to work and receive US$800.00
salary per month. 3months after, he was also caught by the immigration officials, incarcerated for
ten days and was eventually deported. After arriving in the country, Arturo immediately sought
the petitioner. Petitioner promised him that she would send him back to Israel, which did not
happen.

After learning that Padlan suffered the same fate, Siapno checked with the DOLE
Dagupan whether petitioner, Visperas and Mokra had any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment. Finding that petitioner and the others were not authorized
to recruit for overseas employment, Arturo and Romulo filed a complaint against petitioner,
Teresita and Jonney before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Consequently, a complaint was filed against petitioner and Mokra for the crime of Illegal
Recruitment. Trial on the merits ensued and the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment as defined in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of Presidential
Decree No. 442. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo. Hence, this
petition.

Issues:
 1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the accused based merely on a
certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office without said certification being
properly identified and testified by the POEA.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of the accused in interpreting the
gesture of good faith of the petitioner as referral in the guise of illegal recruitment.

Ruling:
1. No. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely:

(1) the offender has no valid license or authority

required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and

(2) he undertakes either any activity within the

meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined
under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.

Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person,

corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. Clearly, the creation of the POEA
did not divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over recruitment and placement of
activities. The governing rule is still Article 35 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring a
certification from the agency primarily involved, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) is flawed. Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the certification
from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office stating that petitioner has not been issued any license
by the POEA nor is a holder of an authority to engage in recruitment and placement activities.

2. No. Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines, "recruitment and placement" as:

"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,

transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
 fee, employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

The testimonies of the private respondents clearly establish the fact that petitioner's
conduct falls within the term recruitment as defined by law. As testified by Romulo Padlan,
petitioner convinced him and Arturo Siapno to give her US$3,600.00 for the processing of their
papers.

It is apparent that petitioner was able to convince the private respondents to apply for
work in Israel after parting with their money in exchange for the services she would render. The
said act of the petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the meaning of recruitment and placement
as defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.

Premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied.

D:Consequently, the Decision dated July 18, 2005 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment as defined
in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2018, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed should be
imprisonment of four (4) years, as minimum, to seven (7) years, as maximum, and a fine of
₱100,000.00 plus cost and for petitioner to return the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to
Romulo Padlan and the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to Arturo Siapno.

NOTE:
In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for
money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided
the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.

The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment is
not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that
accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment. Such case is made, not by the issuance or
the signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without
the necessary license or authority.

In People v. Pabalan, the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the amounts
delivered to the accused did not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such payments.
Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts
required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees
in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MA. HARLETA
VELASCO Y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA DIALA, AND
BERNA M. PAULINO, ACCUSED;
MARICAR B. INOVERO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
[ G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014 ]
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

The several accused were charged for violation of Section 6 of RA No. 8042 (illegal
recruitment) and estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. In such case, only Inovero was arrested and prosecuted, while the other accused
having remained at large.

The prosecution presented five (5) private complainants as witnesses to prove the crime
of Illegal Recruitment. Four of them testified that on different occasions on year 2003, they went
to Harvel International Talent Management and Promotion (“HARVEL”) upon learning that
recruitment for caregivers to Japan was on-going there. They met Inovero, Velasco, and Diala;
Inovero was conducting a briefing on the applicants, while, Diala, the alleged talent manager,
directed the applicants to submit certain documents, and to pay placement and processing fees.
The last complainant to testify alleged that she applied for the position of janitress at HARVEL
sometime in December 2002 and just like the rest of the complainants, she was required to
submit certain documents and to pay processing fee. Diala and Inovero promised the applicants
that they will be deployed in three (3) months or in June 2003 however, the promised
deployment never materialized. Later, they found out that neither HARVEL nor Inovero was
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as per records at the POEA Licensing
Branch.

In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations claiming that she is the niece of accused
Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied working there. Explaining her presence in
HARVEL, she alleged that she worked for her uncle, Velasco’s husband, as an office assistant,
hence, for at least two or three times a week, she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for
her uncle. She also testified that her alleged errands mainly consisted of serving food and
refreshments during orientations at HARVEL. Inovero likewise denied receiving any money
from the complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor.

The RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of estafa but convicting
her for the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale as defined and penalized by
Section 6 and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995).

On appeal, the decision of the RTC is affirmed.

ISSUE

WON CA erred in affirming Inovero’s conviction by the RTC.

RULING:

NO, the appeal lacks merit.

The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the
accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b)
of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the
accused had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and
(3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest
terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.

Despite Inovero’s protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following
circumstances contrarily convince the Honorable Court that she was into illegal recruitment.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was the
one who conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others, on how much
their salary would be as caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when they finally will be
deployed.
Second, when Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo as one of the
owners of HARVEL, Inovero did not bother to correct said representation. Inovero’s silence is
clearly an implied acquiescence to said representation.
Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela,
represented herself as the one expediting the release of applicants’ working visa for Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEA’s Versoza – Inovero had no
license nor authority to recruit for overseas employment.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the RTC correctly found that Inovero committed
illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the impression that she can
send them abroad for employment purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or
authority to do so.

It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on the findings
of fact by the trial court which are conclusive and binding once affirmed by the CA on
intermediate review. The Court leaves its confined precinct of dealing only with legal issues in
order to deal with factual ones only when the appellant persuasively demonstrates a clear error in
the appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the appellate courts. In this case, all that
Inovero’s appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the
complainants, while the complainants credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during
the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Their positive assertions were far trust
worthier than her mere denial.

Hence, the Court upholds the CA’s affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
 WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26, 2010,
subject to the MODIFICATION that appellant Maricar B. Inovero is ordered to pay by way of
actual damages to each of the complainants the amounts paid by them for placement, training
and processing fees, respectively as follows:

(a) NovezaBaful – P28,500.00;

(b) DaniloBrizuela – P38,600.00;
(c) Rosanna Aguirre – P38,600.00;
(d) AnnalizaAmoyo – P39,000.00; and
(e) Teresa Marbella – P20,250.00.
plus interest on such amounts at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid. Inovero shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
1. STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP
MANAGEMENT, vs. SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR.G.R. No. 177498 January 18, 2012
PEREZ, J.:

Doctrine:

Even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the
perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach
of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.

FACTS:

On 6 March 1995, SulpecioMadequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the Adjudication

Office of the POEA against the petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for
failure to deploy under a second contract. In his complaint-affidavit, respondent alleged that:

1. Respondent was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on behalf of its principal Chung-
Gai Ship Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel "Stolt
Aspiration" for a period of nine (9) for $1,212.00 per month commencing on 6 November 1991;

2. He then joined the vessel MV "Stolt Aspiration", but only after three (3) months, he was
ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no reason
or explanation;3. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioner’s office
where he was transferred employment with another vessel named MV "Stolt Pride" under the
same terms and conditions of the First Contract;4. POEA approved the Second Contract,
however, respondent was not deployed by petitioners despite the commencement of the contract.
POEA subsequently certified the Second Employment Contract without the knowledge that
petitioners failed to deploy the respondent.5. Because of petitioners alleged non-compliance with
the Second Contract, respondent Medequilla demanded for the return of his passport and other
employment documents from the petitioners. He claimed that he was made to involuntarily sign
a document in order to recover his employment papers. Medequilla prayed for payment of
damages as well as attorney’s fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners’ bad
faith in not complying with the Second Contract. The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of
the DOLE upon the effectivity of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

LA RULING:

The LA declared the respondents guilty of constructively dismissing the complainant by not
honoring the employment contract. Accordingly, respondents are hereby ordered jointly and
solidarily to pay complainant $12,537.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. The LA
found the first contract entered into by and between the complainant and the respondents to have
been novated by the execution of the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held
liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the second
contract. However, he ruled that there was no substantial evidence to grant the prayer for moral
and exemplary damages.

NLRC RULING: Affirmed with modification the Decision of the LA.

NLRC deleted the award of overtime pay in the total amount of US $3,636.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have the obligation to deploy the respondent by virtue of the
perfected contract, and thus will be held liable for damages in case of non-deployment.

SC RULING:Yes. The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the
seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. The Court agreed
with petitioners on such point. However, even without actual deployment, the perfected contract
gives rise to obligations on the part of petitioners. Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of
what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Thus, even if by the standard contract employment commences only "upon actual departure of
the seafarer", this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment
without any valid reason.The Court further made a distinction between the perfection of the
employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The
perfection of the contract occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the
cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the
employer-employee relationship would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed
from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship,
contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights
and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.

Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9)
months’ worth of salary as provided in the contract. This is but proper because of the non-
deployment of respondent without just cause.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,
INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.
GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant

Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a
POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief
Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
$700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per
month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was

constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that he would
be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano

Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer
and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving
only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against

respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his
money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the
computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199,
$413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as
moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him

US$8,770, representing his salaray for three (3) months of the
unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus
$45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages
as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded
Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3) months salary at
$1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's
fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which
was made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he

questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary
rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein
petitioner Serrano.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article
XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject
clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on
the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will
receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
provides: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws
newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot
affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws
already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and
deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under
Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be
enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in

1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract
between petitioner and respondents in 1998.Hence, it cannot be
argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause,
impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when
the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were
deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No.
8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject
clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring
respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety,
and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not
only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for
all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate
measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members
of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment,
full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing

constitutional provisions translate to economic security and
parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by
workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should
be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden
imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of
Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of
classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the
classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based
on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the
law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it
applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the
deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged
classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to
serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that
the challenged classification serves an important state interest
and that the classification is at least substantially related to
serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a
legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification
is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral,

for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals
that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an
invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-
à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than
one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-
term employment who were illegally discharged were treated
alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they
were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No.
8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their employment contract have since been differently treated in
that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no
such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a
suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim
of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject
clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens
it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector
protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the
classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether
it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive
means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the

scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as
the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical
standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of
public concern.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found
no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly
serve.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of
proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would
justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under
the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the
subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by
mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such
callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can
never be a justification for any form of government action that
alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden
on another sector, especially when the favored sector is
composed of private businesses such as placement agencies,
while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose
protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that
private business interest can be elevated to the level of a
compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen
the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign
principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the
constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4,
2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring
foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to
migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary
measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive
suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003,
contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against
erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less
restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing
the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to
equal protection.
The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.R. No. 172933 October 6, 2008
JESUS E. VERGARA, petitioner, vs. HAMMONIA MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and
ATLANTIC MARINE LTD., respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus Vergara was hired by respondent Hammonia Maritime Services for its
foreign principal, respondent Atlantic Marine. He was hired for a contract of nine months and a
basic monthly salary of USD 642.00 as a pumpman. Vergara is a member of AMOSUP, a union
which has a CBA with Atlantic Marine, represented by Hammonia. While on work, he felt he
was losing his vision and according to the medical log in the vessel, it was glaucoma. Upon
landing on Texas, he consulted a physician who advised him to see an ophthalmologist upon his
return to the Philippines. He was sent home where the company-designated physician confirmed
the diagnosis of the Texas-based doctor. Upon undergoing two treatments, he was declared fit to
resume his seafaring duties.

Claiming he was still experiencing gradual visual loss, he sought the opinion of another
doctor not designated by his company, who pronounced that although he was fit to word, he is
suffering from a permanent partial disability (Grade X). Then, he claimed payment of disability
and sickness benefits pursuant to the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the existing
CBA in the company. Hammonia denied the claim, prompting Vergara to file a complaint before
the NLRC. The LA favored the petitioner Vergara but was reversed on appeal before the NLRC.
Vergara then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA but was dismissed, even
on reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the claims of Vergara for sickness and disability benefits have merit.

RULING:

NO. Petition denied.

The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is
totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to
work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either
partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract
and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such
declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the
employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already
exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is
justified by his medical condition.

Thus, upon petitioner's return to the country for medical treatment, both he and the
respondent company acted correctly in accordance with the terms of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract and the CBA; he reported to the company-designated doctor for treatment
and the latter properly referred him to an ophthalmologist at the Chinese General Hospital. No
dispute existed on the medical treatment the petitioner received, to the point that the petitioner
executed a "certificate of fitness for work" based on the assessment/certification by the company-
designated physician.

Problems only arose when despite the certification, the petitioner sought second and third
opinions from his own doctors, one of whom opined that he could no longer resume work as a
pumpman while the other recognized a Grade X (20.15%) partial permanent disability. Based on
these opinions, the petitioner demanded that he be paid disability and sickness benefits; when the
company refused, the demand metamorphosed into an actual case before the NLRC Arbitration
Branch.

As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so

declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the
expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either
fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the present case, while the initial
120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-designated
doctor duly made a declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner was
fit to work. Viewed from this perspective, both the NLRC and CA were legally correct when they
refused to recognize any disability because the petitioner had already been declared fit to resume
his duties. In the absence of any disability after his temporary total disability was addressed, any
further discussion of permanent partial and total disability, their existence, distinctions and
consequences, becomes a surplusage that serves no useful purpose.
 DOEHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY INC. vs. HENRY C. HARO
G.R. No. 206522. April 18, 2016.
DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of its foreign principal, Dohle
Ltd., hired respondent as oiler aboard the vessel MV CMA CGM Providencia
for a period of nine months with basic monthly salary of US$547.00 and
other benefits. Before deployment, respondent underwent pre-employment
medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty.

Respondent stated that on June 1, 2008, he boarded the vessel and assumed
his duties as oiler; however, in November 2008, he experienced heartache
and loss of energy after hammering and lifting a 120-kilogram machine;
thereafter, he was confined at a hospital in Rotterdam where he was
informed of having a hole in his heart that needed medical attention.

After his repatriation on December 6, 2008, respondent reported to Doehle-

Philman which in turn referred him to Clinico-Med. Respondent claimed that
he was confined for two days in UST Hospital and that a heart operation was
recommended to him. He nevertheless admitted that he has not yet
undergone any surgery. On April 24, 2009, respondent’s personal doctor, Dr.
Luminardo M. Ramos (Dr. Ramos), declared him not fit to work.

Consequently, on June 19, 2009, respondent filed a Complaint for disability

benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees against petitioners. Respondent claimed
that since he was declared fit to work before his deployment, this
proved that he sustained his illness while in the performance of his
duties aboard the vessel; that he was unable to work for more than
120 days; and that he lost his earning capacity to engage in a work
he was skilled to do. Thus, he insisted he is entitled to permanent
and total disability benefits.

For their part, petitioners alleged that respondent boarded the vessel on June
2, 2008; that on or about November 21, 2008, respondent was confined at a
hospital in Rotterdam; and that upon repatriation, he was referred to Dr.
LeticiaAbesamis (Dr. Abesamis), the company-designated doctor, for
treatment.17 Petitioners denied that respondent has a hole in his heart.
Instead, they pointed out that on December 27, 2008, Dr. Abesamis
diagnosed him of “aortic regurgitation, moderate” but declared that
his condition is not work-related.Petitioners further argued that since
respondent’s illness is not an occupational disease, then he must prove that
his work caused his illness; because of his failure to do so, then he is not
entitled to disability benefits.

The LA dismissed the case for lack of merit. The LA noted that Dr. Abesamis
declared that respondent’s illness is not work-related; therefore, it is
incumbent upon respondent to prove otherwise. The NLRC dismissed the
appeal. It found no sufficient evidence that respondent’s illness is work-
connected. The CA granted the Petition and concomitantly reversed and set
aside the September 28, 2010 and November 30, 2010 NLRC Resolutions.

ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in setting aside the NLRC Resolutions denying respondent’s
claim for permanent and total disability benefits?

RULING:
The Court finds merit in the Petition.

The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino

Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, particularly Section 20(B) thereof,
provides that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the
seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract. To emphasize, to be compensable, the injury orillness 1)
must be work-related and 2) must have arisen during the term of the
employment contract.

In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, the Court held that those diseases not
listed as occupational diseases may be compensated if it is shown that they
have been caused or aggravated by the seafarer’s working
conditions. The Court stressed that while the POEA-SEC provides for a
disputable presumption of work-relatedness as regards those not listed as
occupational diseases, this presumption does not necessarily result in an
automatic grant of disability compensation. The claimant still has the burden
to present substantial evidence or “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the illness.

In this case, considering that respondent did not suffer from any
occupational disease listed under Section 32(A) of the POEA-SEC,
then to be entitled to disability benefits, the respondent has the
burden to prove that his illness is work-related. Unfortunately, he
failed to discharge such burden. Records reveal that respondent was
diagnosed of aortic regurgitation, a heart “condition whereby the aortic valve
permits blood ejected from the left ventricle to leak back into the left
ventricle.” Although this condition manifested while respondent was aboard
the vessel, such circumstance is not sufficient to entitle him to disability
benefits as it is of equalimportance to also show that respondent’s illness is
work-related.

In Ayungo v. BeamkoShipmanagement Corporation, the Court held that for a

disability to be compensable, the seafarer must prove a reasonable
link between his work and his illness in order for a rational mind to
determine that such work contributed to, or at least aggravated, his
illness. It is not enough that the seafarer’s injury or illness rendered
him disabled; it is equally necessary that he establishes a causal
connection between his injury or illness, and the work for which he
is engaged. Here, respondent argues that he was unable to work as a
seaman for more than 120 days, and that he contracted his illness while
under the employ of petitioners. However, he did not at all describe his work
as an oiler, and neither did he specify the connection of his work and his
illness.

Moreover, the company-designated doctor determined that

respondent’s condition is not work-related. Section 20(B)(3) of the
POEA-SEC provides that the company-designated doctor is tasked to
determine the fitness orthe degree of disability of a medically repatriated
seafarer. In addition, the company-designated doctor was shown to have
closely examined and treated respondent from his repatriation up to four
months thereafter. Thus, the LA and the NLRC’s reliance on the declaration of
the company-designated doctor that respondent’s condition is not work-
related is justified.

Lastly, the Court holds that the fact that respondent passed the PEME is of
no moment in determining whether he acquired his illness during his
employment. The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It is not intended to be a
thorough examination of a person’s medical condition, and is not conclusive
evidence that one is free from any ailment before deployment.54 Hence, it
does not follow that because respondent was declared fit to work prior to his
deployment, then he necessarily sustained his illness while aboard the
vessel.

Given all these, the Court finds that the CA erred in setting aside the NLRC
Resolutions, which affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint. The Petition is
granted.
 G.R. No. 205703, March 07, 2016

INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL & MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. (IPAMS), SNC

LAVALIN ENGINEERS & CONTRACTORS, INC. AND ANGELITO C.
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. JOSE G. DE VERA AND ALBERTO B.
ARRIOLA, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is

a local placement agency duly organized and existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers & Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the
principal of IPAMS, a Canadian company with business interests in several
countries.
Alberto Arriola was then hired by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning
agency, IPAMS. He signed the contract of employment in the Philippines and
started working in Madagascar.
After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination of
employment due to diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the
unavailability of alternative assignments.
Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave
pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA). He claimed that SNC-Lavalin still owed
him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-month unexpired portion of his
contract, amounting to, more or less, One Million Sixty-Two Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty-Six Pesos (P1,062,936.00). He asserted that SNC-Lavalin
never offered any valid reason for his early termination and that he was not
given sufficient notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted that the
petitioners must prove the applicability of Canadian law before the same
could be applied to his employment contract.
The petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal against them. They
claimed that SNC-Lavalin was greatly affected by the global financial crises
during the latter part of 2008. The economy of Madagascar, where SNC-
Lavalin had business sites, also slowed down. As proof of its looming
financial standing.
The petitioners continued that the pre-termination of Arriola's contract was
valid for being consistent with the provisions of both the Expatriate Policy
and laws of Canada. The said foreign law did not require any ground for
early termination of employment, and the only requirement was the written
notice of termination.
The LA dismissed Arriola's complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC reversed
the LA decision and ruled that Arriola was illegally dismissed by the
petitioners. The CA affirmed that Arriola was illegally dismissed by the
petitioners. It opined that Philippine’s labor law shall be applied. However, it
decreased the award of backpay to Arriola because the NLRC made a wrong
calculation.
Issue:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ARRIOLA WAS VALIDLY
DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.

Held: Yes, Philippine law shall be applied.

The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment
contracts. This rule is rooted in the constitutional provision of Section 3,
Article XIII that the State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local
or overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his employment abroad, it does not
strip him of his rights to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a
living wage under our Constitution.
As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the
employment contract. A synthesis of the existing laws and jurisprudence
reveals that this exception is subject to the following requisites:

1. That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract

that a specific foreign law shall govern;
 2. That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts
pursuant to the Philippine rules on evidence;
3. That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy of the Philippines; and
4. That the overseas employment contract must be processed through
the POEA.

Here, the petitioners were able to observe the second requisite, or that the
foreign law must be proven before the court pursuant to the Philippine rules
on evidence. The petitioners were able to present the ESA, duly
authenticated by the Canadian authorities and certified by the Philippine
Embassy, before the LA and The fourth requisite was also followed because
Arriola's employment contract was processed through the POEA. The
petitioners miserably failed to adhere to the two other requisites.

FIRST DIVISION
January 18, 2017
G.R. No. 184256
MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC., and MAERSK CO. IOM LTD.,
Petitioners, vs.
JOSELITO R. RAMOS, Respondent. SERENO, CJ.:
FACTS:

Petitioner Maersk ltd., through its local manning agent petitioner

Maersk Inc., employed private respondent as able-seaman of M/V NKOSSA II
for a period of four (4) months. Within the contract period and while on board
the vessel, private respondent’s left eye was hit by a screw. He was
repatriated to Manila and was referred to Dr. Salvador Salceda, the company-
designated physician, for [a] check-up.

Private respondent was examined by Dr. Anthony Martin S. Dolor at the

Medical Center Manila and was diagnosed with "corneal scar and cystic
macula, left, post-traumatic." He underwent a "repair of corneal perforation
and removal of foreign body to anterior chamber, left eye." He was
discharged with prescribed home medications and had regular check-ups. He
was referred to another ophthalmologist who opined that "no more
improvement can be attained on the left eye but patient can return back to
duty with the left eye disabled by 30%." He was then examined by Dr. Angel
C. Aliwalas, Jr. at the OspitalngMuntinlupa (ONM), Alabang, Muntinlupa City,
and was diagnosed with "corneal scar with post-traumatic cataract
formation, left eye." He underwent [an] eye examination and glaucoma test
at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), Manila.

Since private respondent's demand for disability benefit[s] was

rejected by petitioners, he then filed with the NLRC a complaint for total
permanent disability, illness allowance, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, in his medical report, Dr.Dolor stated that although private

respondent's left eye cannot be improved by medical treatment, he can
return to duty and is still fit to work. His normal right eye can compensate for
the discrepancy with the use of correctional glasses. Private respondent
visited again the ophthalmologist at the Medical Center Manila who
recommended "cataract surgery with intra-ocular lens implantation," after
evaluation of the retina shall have been done." In his letter addressed to
Jerome de los Angeles, General Manager of petitioner Maersk Inc., Dr.Dolor
answered that the evaluation of the physician from ONM could not have
progressed in such a short period of time, which is approximately one month
after he issued the medical report, and a review of the medical reports from
PGH and the tonometry findings on the left and right eye showed that they
were within normal range, hence, could not be labeled as glaucoma. Private
respondent decided to be examined by physician of his choice, Dr.Roseny
Mae Catipon-Singson of Casa Medica, Inc. (formerly MEDISERV Southmall,
Inc.), Alabang, Muntinlupa City and was diagnosed to have ''traumatic
cataract with corneal scaring, updrawn pupil of the anterior segment of
maculapathy OS. His best corrected vision is 20/400 with difficulty."
Dr.Catipon-Singson opined that private respondent "cannot be employed for
any work requiring good vision unless condition improves."

The labor arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision 7 dismissing the Complaint. It

held that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-
approved contract and Collective Bargaining Agreement expressly provided
for a situation in which the seafarer's appointed doctor disagrees with the
company-designated physician. In this case, both parties may agree to the
appointment of a third doctor, whose assessment would then be final on both
parties.9 According to the LA, both failed to avail themselves of this remedy.

In the meantime, respondent underwent cataract extraction on both

eyes. 13 He was fitted with correctional glasses and evaluated. Dr.Dolor found
that the former's "right eye is 20/20, the left eye is 20/70, and when both
eyes are being used, his best corrected vision is 20/20." On the basis of that
report, respondent was pronounced fit to work. 14
 At the NLRC, the latter granted respondent's appeal and setting aside
the LA's decision, that, as regards the need to appoint a third doctor, the
NLRC found it unnecessary considering that "there is really no disagreement
between respondents' company-designated physician and Complainant's
physicians as to the percentage [30%] of visual impairment of his left eye." 18
Thus, respondent was awarded disability compensation benefit in the
amount of USD6,270 for Grade 12 impediment, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.On appeal with the CA, it affirmed all the
findings of the NLRC on both procedural and substantive issues, but deleted
the award of moral and exemplary damages, because there was no
"sufficient factual legal basis for the awards. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON respondent is partially disabled and therefore entitled to disability

compensation.

RULING:

YES.
Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain that it has occasioned,
but to the loss or impairment of earning capacity. There is disability when
there is a diminution of earning power because of actual absence from work.
This absence must be due to the injury or illness arising from, and in the
course of, employment. Thus, the basis of compensation is reduction of
earning power.

Permanent partial disability occurs when an employee loses the use of

any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue
with his former work. In this case, while petitioners’ own company-
designated physician, Dr.Dolor, certified that respondent was still fit to work,
the former admitted in the same breath that respondent’s left eye could no
longer be improved by medical treatment. As early as 13 April 2002, Dr.Dolor
had in fact diagnosed respondent’s left eye as permanently disabled, to wit:
Present ophthalmologic examination showed corneal scar and a cystic
macula at the left eye. Vision on the right eye is 20/20 and JI while the left
showed only 20/60 and J6. Our ophthalmologist opined that no more
improvement can be attained on the left eye but patient can return back to
duty with left eye disabled by 30%. Petitioners’ argument that the injury was
curable because respondent underwent cataract extraction in on both eyes
in 2003, and Dr.Dolor issued a medical evaluation finding that respondent’s
best corrected vision for both eyes was 20/20 (with correctional glasses), are
thus inconsequential. The curability of the injury “does not preclude an
award for disability because, in labor laws, disability need not render the
seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is enough that it
incapacitates him to perform his customary work.”
 Moreover, under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract, which was
designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels? In resolving
disputes regarding disability benefits, its provisions must be “construed and
applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in the seamen’s favor, because only
then can the provisions be given full effect.” Besides, the schedule of
disabilities under Section 32 is in no way exclusive. Section 20.B.4 of the
same POEA-Standard Employment Contract clearly provides that “[t]hose
illnesses notlisted in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as
work related.” This provision only means that the disability schedule also
contemplates injuries not explicitly listed under it.

It is clear from the latter provision that for a seafarer to be entitled under
said CBA to 100% compensation for less than 50% disability, it must be the
company doctor who should certify that the seafarer is permanently unfit for
further sea service in any capacity.

In the case at bar, Complainant had corneal scar, a cystic macula and
30% loss of vision on his left eye. Thus, applying Section 30 56 of the standard
contract, We hold that Complainant's impediment grade is Grade 12. Under
Section 30-A 57 of the standard contract, a seafarer who suffered an
impediment grade of Grade 12 is entitled to 10.45% of the maximum rate.
Significantly, the company physician did not certify Complainant as
permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity. The company
physician certified that'' xxx patient can return back to duty with the left eye
disabled by 301Y.1" (Page 39, Records). Complainant, therefore, is not
entitled to 100% disability compensation benefit, but merely 10.451Yo of
US$60,000.00, which is computed as follows: US$60,000.00 x 10.45% =
US$6,270.00. Respondents, therefore, are liable to Complainant for
US$6,270.00 as compensation benefit for his permanent partial disability, to
be paid in Philippine Currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The

assailed Decision60 and Resolution61 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94964 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 REYNALDO Y. SUNIT v. OSM MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
G.R. No. 223035
February 27, 2017

Facts:
Respondent OSM Maritime Services, Inc. (OSM), hired petitioner Reynaldo Sunit (Sunit) to
work onboard vessel Skandi Texel as Able Body Seaman for three months with a monthly salary
of $689. Deemed incorporated in the employment contract is the 2010 Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and the NIS AMOSUP CBA.
During his employment, petitioner fell from the vessel's tank and suffered a broken right femur.
He was immediately brought to a hospital for treatment and was eventually repatriated due to
medical reason. Upon arrival in Manila on October 6, 2012, he immediately underwent a post-
employment medical examination and treatment wherein the company-designated physician
diagnosed him to be suffering from a "Fractured, Right Femur; S/P Intramedullary Nailing, Right
Femur." After 92 days of treatment, the company-designated doctor issued a Medical Report
giving petitioner an interim disability Grade of 10.
Dissatisfied with the medical report, petitioner sought the opinion of another doctor, Dr.
VenancioGarduce, who recommended a disability Grade of 3. After further medical treatment,
petitioner was assessed with a final disability grade of 10 by the company physician of
respondent OSM, Dr. William Chuasuan, Jr.
Respondents offered disability benefit of $30,225 in accordance with the disability Grade 10 that
the company-designated doctor issued. Petitioner refused and filed a claim for a disability benefit
of $150,000.00.
During the pendency of the case with the Labor Arbiter, the parties agreed to consult Dr. Lyndon
L. Bathan for a third opinion. Dr. Bathan issued a Medical Certificate recommending a Grade 9
disability and stated therein that petitioner is "not yet fit to work."
The LA awarded disability benefit in the amount of $13,060. The NLRC modified the LA's
findings and awarded permanent and total disability benefit in the amount of $150,000. The
NLRC reasoned that petitioner is considered as totally and permanently disabled since Dr.
Bathan, the third doctor, issued the Grade 9 recommendation after the lapse of the 240-day
period required for the determination of a seafarer's fitness to work or degree of disability under
the POEA-SEC.
In reversing the NLRC, the CA held that the 240-day period for assessing the degree of disability
only applies to the company-designated doctor, and not to the third doctor. It is only upon the
company-designated doctor's failure to render a final assessment of petitioner's condition within
240 days from repatriation that he will be considered permanently and totally disabled and,
hence, entitled to maximum disability benefit. In petitioner's case, the company-designated
doctor was able to make a determination of his disability within the 240-day period; hence, he is
not considered as totally and permanently disabled despite the opinion of the third doctor having
been rendered after the lapse of 240 days from repatriation.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
Ruling:
YES. Petitioner's disability is permanent and total despite the Grade 9 partial disability
that Dr. Bathan issued since his incapacity to work lasted for more than 240 days from his
repatriation. While the Court ruled that Dr. Bathan is not bound to render his assessment within
the 120/240 day period, and that the said period is inconsequential and has no application on the
third doctor, petitioner's disability and incapacity to resume working clearly continued for more
than 240 days. Applying Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code, petitioner's disability should be
considered permanent and total.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
Note:
Below are the procedural requisites under the rules and established jurisprudence where the
parties can opt to resort to the opinion of a third doctor:
First, when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his
fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician.
Second, if the seafarer disagrees with the findings of the company doctor, then he has the right to
engage the services of a doctor of his choice. If the second doctor appointed by the seafarer
disagrees with the findings of the company doctor, and the company likewise disagrees with the
findings of the second doctor, then a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer
and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on both of them.
It must be emphasized that the language of the POEA-SEC is clear in that both the seafarer and
the employer must mutually agree to seek the opinion of a third doctor. In the event of
disagreement on the services of the third doctor, the seafarer has the right to institute a complaint
with the LA or NLRC.
Third, despite the binding effect of the third doctor's assessment, a dissatisfied party may
institute a complaint with the LA to contest the same on the ground of evident partiality,
corruption of the third doctor, fraud, other undue means, lack of basis to support the assessment,
or being contrary to law or settled jurisprudence.

CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Noel Orbeta

GR No. 211111 25 September 2017
 Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Noel Orbeta was hired by CF Sharp Crew on behalf of its principal,
Gulf Energy Maritime (GEM) as a Seaman on the vessel M/T Gulf Coral.
While on duty, he slipped and fell on his bank and landed on the vessel’s
metal floor. Upon docking in the United Arab Emirates, Orbeta was referred
for medical examination after complaining of pain in his lower right
abdomen, difficulty urinating, and slight irritation in the urinal area. After
examination by a physician, he was diagnosed with acute lumbago and
recommended for immediate repatriation.
On 10 February 2010, upon arrival in the Philippines, he immediately
reported for post-employment examination. He was found to be suffering
from minimal compression fracture of his first lumbar vertebra and
underwent physical therapy for the same. He underwent MRI scanning, was
made to wear a lumbar corset, and was given neuron enhancers and pain
relievers. The MRI results came out and he was accordingly temporarily
diagnosed with lumbosacral muscular spasm with mild spondylosis on his
second and third lumbar vertebrae, and it was concluded the he suffered no
compression fracture. He was then given a provisional Grade 10 partial
disability rating and was scheduled to undergo a bone scan on 16 July 2010.
However, he failed to appear and instead consulted with an independent
orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Escutin, who recommended for him to undergo a
Bone Scan and EMG-NCV, and found him to be permanently disabled and
unfit for sea duty.
Instead of following the recommendation for bone scan, he filed a
case before the labor arbiter for payment of permanent and total disability
benefits, medical expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees. The LA ruled in
favor of Orbeto, awarding him disability benefits in the amount of $44,550
and 10% attorney’s fees, stating that the rating of the company physician
was premature as Orbeto was yet to undergo a bone scan. Dr. Escutin’s
findings were likewise disregarded due to being merely based on
presumption.
Upon appeal to the NLRC, the commission merely reiterated the LA’s
ruling, but increased the award to $89,100 as Orbeto was ruled to deserve a
Grade 1 disability rating, having failed to obtain employment for more than
120 days from repatriation, but the award of attorney’s fees was deleted.
The Court of Appeals reiterated the NLRC’s ruling; thus, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not permanent disability has been established.
RULING:
No. The company-designated physician and Dr. Escutin are one in
recommending that respondent undergo at least a bone scan to determine
his current condition while undergoingtreatment, thus indicating that
respondent’s condition needed further attention. In this regard, petitioners
are correct in arguing that respondent abandoned treatment, as under the
law and the POEA contract of the parties, the company physician is given up
to 240 days to treat him. On the other hand, the fact that Dr. Escutin
required the conduct of further tests on respondent is an admission that his
diagnosis of permanent total disability is incomplete and inconclusive, and
thus unreliable. It can only corroborate the company-designated physician’s
finding that further tests and treatment are required. In New Filipino
Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. Despabeladeras, this Court held that a seafarer is
guilty of medical abandonment for his failure to complete his treatment
before the lapse of the 240-day period, which prevents the company
physician from declaring him fit to work or assessing his disability.
Nevertheless, respondent might have treated the company-designated
physician’s 16 June 2010 temporary diagnosis as the final assessment of his
condition, which prompted him to secure the opinion of Dr. Escutin and
thereafter file the case prematurely. For this he cannot be completely
blamed; indeed, he might have proceeded under the impression that he was
being shortchanged. Given his position in the employment relation, his
distrust for the petitioners is not completely unwarranted.
Consequently, respondent is entitled only to compensation equivalent
to or commensurate with his injury. As such, the Labor Arbiter’s findings to
be correct and in point, even with respect to his ruling on respondent’s
entitlement to attorney’s fees. As far as Orbeta is concerned, his work-
related condition was serious enough to require further medical care, yet it
could have been resolved if he had undergone the procedure prescribed by
the company-designated physician and his own appointed doctor. For his
omissions, he is only entitled to disability benefits consistent with his injury
suffered.

medical records.
OFW Employment
ELIZABETH M. GAGUI v. SIMEON DEJERO AND TEODORO R. PERMEJO

FACTS:
Simeon Dejero and TeodoroPermejo filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal
against PRO Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes. After due proceedings, Labor
Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a Decision, ordering respondents Pro Agency Manila, Inc., and
Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to jointly and severally pay complainants. Pursuant to this Decision,
Labor Arbiter Ramos issued a Writ of Execution, was returned unsatisfied, an Alias Writ of
Execution was issued, but was likewise disregarded. Respondents filed a Motion to Implead
Respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc.’s Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtors
including Petitioner Gagui as the Vice-President/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agency, Manila,
Inc.
After due hearing, Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan granted respondents’
motion. A 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was issued which resulted in the garnishment of
petitioner’s bank deposit in the amount of P85,430.48.13 However, since the judgment remained
unsatisfied, respondents sought the issuance of a third alias writ of execution. Accordingly, the
3rd Alias Writ of Execution was issued resulting in the levying of two parcels of lot owned by
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution alleging that apart from
not being made aware that she was impleaded as one of the parties to the case, the dispositive
portion of the Decision did not hold her liable in any form whatsoever. Labor Arbiter Lita V.
Aglibut denied petitioner’s motions on the following grounds: (1) records disclosed that despite
having been given sufficient notices to be able to register an opposition, petitioner refused to do
so, effectively waiving her right to be heard; and (2) under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
(R.A. 8042) or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, corporate officers may
be held jointly and severally liable with the placement agency for the judgment award.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, which the latter denied for lack of merit. The CA
affirmed Decision of NLRC stating that there is “no need for petitioner to be impleaded x xx
because by express provision of the law, she is made solidarily liable with PRO Agency Manila,
Inc., for any and all money claims filed by private respondents.” The general rule is that
corporate officers, directors and stockholders are not liable, except when they are made liable for
their corporate act by a specific provision of law, such as R.A. 8042.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with PRO Agency
Manila, Inc. in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042, despite not having been impleaded in
the Complaint and named in the Decision
RULING:
Section 10, R.A 8042 provides “The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.
This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a
condition precedent for its approval.”
In the case of Sto. Tomas V Salac, the Court passed the constitutionality of this provision
and maintained “But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the
liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and
solidarilyliable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the
affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities. “
Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable, there must be a separate
finding that she was remiss in directing the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal dismissal
of respondents. Examination of the records would reveal that there was no finding of neglect on
the part of the petitioner in directing the affairs of the agency. In fact, respondents made no
mention of any instance when petitioner allegedly failed to manage the agency in accordance
with law, thereby contributing to their illegal dismissal.
G.R. No. 152642
November 13, 2012

HON. PATRICIA A. STO.TOMAS, ROSALINDA BALDOZ and LUCITA

LAZO, Petitioners,
vs.
REY SALAC, WILLIE D. ESPIRITU, MARIO MONTENEGRO, DODGIE BELONIO,
LOLIT SALINEL and BUDDY BONNEVIE, Respondents.

Facts:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,and G.R. 184298-99(Constitutionality of Section 10, last
sentence of 2nd paragraph)
Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma filed a claim for death and insurance
benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. and
White Falcon Services, Inc. for the death of their daughter JasminCuaresma while working as
staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas had
already received insurance benefits arising from their daughter’s death from the Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to the findings of the
Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found Becmen and White
Falcon jointly and severally liable for Jasmin’s death and ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas the
amount of US$113,000.00 as actual damages. The NLRC relied on the Cabanatuan City Health
Office’s autopsy finding that Jasmin died of criminal violence and rape.The CA held Becmen and
White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmin’s death not work-related or work-connected
since her rape and death did not occur while she was on duty at the hospital or doing acts
incidental to her employment. The Court deleted the award of actual damages but ruled that
Becmen’s corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with their company for its failure
to investigate the true nature of her death.
The corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely, EufrocinaGumabay, Elvira
Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio and Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.) filed a motion for leave to
Intervene.They questioned the constitutionality of the last sentence of the second paragraph of
Section 10, R.A. 8042 which holds the corporate directors, officers and partners jointly and
solidarily liable with their company for money claims filed by OFWs against their employers and
the recruitment firms.
Issue: Whether or not the 2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate
directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily
liable for money claims and damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of
corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with
their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that
company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities. In the case of Becmen
and White Falcon,while there is evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating
the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no mention of any evidence in the case against them that
intervenorsGumabay, et al., Becmen’s corporate officers and directors, were personally involved
in their company’s particular actions or omissions in Jasmin’s case.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, x xx
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court HOLDS the
last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and
constitutional. The Court, however, RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its
Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenorsEufrocinaGumabay, Elvira
Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with respondent
Becmen Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicia and Mila Cuaresma for lack
of a finding in those cases that such intervenors had a part in the act or omission imputed to their
corporation.
Teekay Shipping Philippines v. Roberto Ramoga, Jr.

GR No. 209582 19 January 2018

Tijam, Jr., J.

FACTS:

On 18 February 2010, Ramoga entered into a contract of overseas employment with

Teekay Shipping Ltd. represented by its local manning agency, Teekay Shipping Philippines Inc.,
to work on board the vessel M/T "SEBAROK SPIRIT.”

After the mandatory pre-employment medical examination (PEME), Ramoga was

declared fit for sea duty. He joined the vessel on April 9, 2010. Barely six (6) months after, he
slipped and twisted his left ankle while climbing the stairs on board the said vessel. He
underwent an x-ray examination at the Bangkok Hospital in Pattaya City, Chonburi, Thailand.
He was diagnosed to be suffering from a non-displaced fracture base of 2nd and mild displaced
fracture base of 3rd metatarsal bone. A surgery was recommended for open reduction and
internal fixation of the injured ankle to prevent its further displacement. He was later repatriated
and referred for further treatment. The company doctor later issued a certification stating that he
was fit to return

Unsatisfied with the assessment, Ramoga sought the help of his own doctor, Dr. Rogelio
P. Catapang who is an orthopedic and traumatology flight surgeon at Sta. Teresita General
Hospital. The said doctor issued a medical report declaring that [respondent] still continues to
have pain and discomfort on his left foot and ankle even after his continuous physiotherapy. He
likewise cannot ambulate for long distances, unable to tolerate prolonged walking and squat
especially if the weight is borne on the left foot. Since the time of his injury, he is unable to work
at his previous occupation. Thus, he was declared to be permanently unfit in any capacity to
resume his sea duties. He then lodged a complaint for permanent tital disability benefits, sickness
allowance, medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean-going Vessels.
 The LA ruled in favor of Ramoga. Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the same with the
modification that the sickness allowance was deleted. Before the CA, the NLRC decision was
affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramoga is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

RULING:

No. Article 198(c)(1) of the Labor Code states that disability which lasts for more than
120 days is deemed total and permanent. While Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation provides that:

Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement – (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first
day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than
120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical
attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which
case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare
the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total
disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or
mental functions as determined by the System.

The mere lapse of 120 days from the seafarer's repatriation without the company-
designated physician's declaration of the fitness to work of the seafarer does not entitle the latter
to his permanent total disability benefits.

Here, the records reveal that respondent was medically repatriated on 4 October 2010. It
is undisputed that the company-designated physician issued a declaration as to respondent's
fitness to work on 8 April 2011 or 186 days from his repatriation. Thus, to determine whether
respondent is entitled to his permanent total disability benefits it is necessary to examine whether
the company-designated physician has a sufficient justification to extend the period.

There is a sufficient justification for extending the period. In a Report dated 11 January
2011, the company-designated physician advised respondent to continue his rehabilitation and
medications and to come back on 1 February 2011 for his repeat x-ray of the left foot and for re-
evaluation. The company-designated physician has determined that respondent's condition
needed further medical treatment and evaluation. Thus, it was premature for the respondent to
file a case for permanent total disability benefits on 4 March 2011 because at that time,
respondent is not yet entitled to such benefits. The company-designated physician has until 1
June 2011 or the 240th day from his repatriation to make a declaration as to respondent's fitness
to work.

Neither is the declaration of respondent's own doctor that respondent is unfit to return to
sea duties conclusive as to respondent's condition. It is well-settled that the assessment of the
company-designated physician prevails over that of the seafarer's own doctor. The assessment of
the company-designated physician is more credible for having been arrived at after months of
medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done in
one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records.

G.R. No. 170139. August 5, 2014.*

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs. JOY C. CABILES,
respondent.

LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is a recruitment and placement agency

sending workers to Taiwan while respondent Joy Cabiles was one of those hired and has signed a
one-year employment contract as a quality control personnel, with a monthly salary of NTS
15,360.00. Upon her deployment, Cabiles was made to work a cutter. Petitioner claimed that a
certain Mr. Hwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and
that she should “immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport” and she was
asked to “prepare for repatriation”. Cabiles claimed that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned NTS 9,000.15. Moreover, Wacoal deducted NTS3,000.00 to cover her
plane ticket to Manila.

Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against Sameer and
Wacoal, with claims for unpaid salary, overpayment of placement fees, and damages. The
petitioner Sameer was substituted by Pacific Manpower and moved to dismiss the case alleging
the absence of employer-employee relationship between them and denied liability. The LA
dismissed the case but upon appeal before the NLRC, such was reversed as Sameer failed to
prove that there were just causes for termination. Three (3) months’ worth of salary,
reimbursement for placement fees, and attorney’s fees were awarded.

Aggrieved, Sameer filed a petition for certiorari against the NLRC before the CA but the
latter affirmed the decision of the NLRC, with respect to the issues on dismissal, unpaid wages,
and benefits. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

WON the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the NLRC as to terms, conditions, and
benefits.

RULING:
 NO. Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for
the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees
and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states that
overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause „shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that „repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency
which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. The exception is when „termination of
employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, which as we have established, is not the
case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION
FUND.--The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the
primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs
attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its
principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a
deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local
agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the
worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the
repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.