PALE CASES

1. Immorality
Gubatan vs Amador AC 8962 7/9/18
Fabugais vs Faundo AC 10145 6/11/18

2. Gross Misconduct, Malpractice, Deceit

Santiago vs Santiago AC 3921 6/11/18
Espanto vs Belleza AC 10756 2/21/18
Yap vs Buri AC 11156 3/19/18
In re: CA- GR CV 96282 atty Santamaria AC 11173 6/11/18
Gonzales vs santos AC 10178 6/19/18
Lim vs Rivera AC 12156 6/10/18
Taday vs Apoya AC 11981 7/3/18
HDI vs Cruz AC 111724 7/31/18
Mariano vs Laki AC 11978 9/25/18

A.C. No. 8962, July 09, 2018 - JILDO A. GUBATON, Complainant, v. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR,
Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8962, July 09, 2018

JILDO A. GUBATON, Complainant, v. ATTY. AUGUSTUS SERAFIN D. AMADOR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case arose from an affidavit-complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Jildo A.
Gubaton (complainant) against respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador (respondent) on the ground of
gross immoral conduct and/or immorality.

The Facts

Complainant alleged that respondent, a former Assistant Prosecutor at the City Prosecutor's Office in
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, was having an illicit romantic relationship with his wife, Ma. Bernadette R.
Tenorio-Gubaton (Bernadette), since 2005 up to the present.2
He averred that it was in the early part of 2008, while working in the United States of America (USA), when
he discovered the illicit relationship. Complainant and Bernadette's house helper informed him through a
phone call that a man whom she knows to be "Fiscal Amador" often visits Bernadette. The house helper also
told him that respondent spends nights at their house and stays with Bernadette in their bedroom. When
complainant called Bernadette's dental clinic to verify the information, it was the secretary who took his call.
Upon inquiry, the latter confirmed that respondent and Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit affair.3

Sometime in August 2009, complainant returned to the country. On his first night home, despite his pleas,
Bernadette refused to lie and sleep with him; instead, she demanded that he sleep in another room, to
which he acceded in order to avoid any argument. Since then, Bernadette has refused to sleep with him.
Further, complainant discovered some birth-control pills and condoms in their house, in Bernadette's dental
clinic, and in her handbag. When he confronted her about it, she merely denied ownership thereof. He also
alleged that Bernadette wrote love letters/notes4 to respondent, as in fact, one of these letters had the word
"fiscal"5 on it.6

Complainant likewise alleged that he personally saw respondent and Bernadette together in various places in
Malaybalay City. At one instance, he saw them kissing while inside a vehicle; when he approached to
confront them, respondent ran away.7

The illicit affair of respondent and Bernadette was known to other people as well. Complainant's sister, Nila
Canoy,8 told him about it during phone calls while he was still in the USA,9 as narrated in her
affidavit.10 Likewise, Carlos Delgado (Delgado), Chief of Barangay Public Safety Office in Poblacion,
Malaybalay City, and one Edgar Navarez (Navarez), an employee of the Bureau of lnternal Revenue (BIR)
and a resident of Casisang, Malaybalay City, knew of the affair and executed their respective
affidavits11relative thereto.

In defense,12 respondent denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that he was merely acquainted
with Bernadette and they would only see each other on various occasions and social gatherings. He also
denied the incident where complainant allegedly saw him and Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle.13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After due proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), through Commissioner Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (Commissioner Gomos), issued a Report and
Recommendation14 dated June 27, 2012 recommending the dismissal of the affidavit-complaint for
insufficiency of evidence.

Commissioner Gomos found that the information supplied by complainant and Bernandette's house helper,
Bernadette's clinic secretary, and complainant's sister, Nila, about the alleged illicit affair were purely
hearsay. Likewise, the supposed love letters/notes offered in evidence did not prove that the same were
written by Bernadette to respondent. Similarly, the affidavit executed by Delgado did not positively refer to
respondent, while that of Navarez contained general statements of an affair between respondent and
Bernadette.15 As for the affidavit executed by Nila, the same is clearly biased in view of the latter's
relationship with complainant.16 Finally, with respect to the incident where complainant allegedly saw
respondent and Bernadette kissing inside a vehicle and attempted to confront them, Commissioner Gomos
found the same to be contrary to human experience, reasoning that an offended husband would be expected
to do more than just confront them under the circumstances.17

In a Resolution18 dated June 22, 2013, however, the IBP Board of Governors reversed the June 27, 2012
Report and Recommendation, and instead, suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years. Respondent moved for reconsideration,19 which was denied in a Resolution 20 dated April 20,
2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent
administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with the conclusion of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be held
administratively liable with modification, however, as regards the penalty to be imposed.

It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.21

In this case, substantial evidence exist to prove complainant's claim that respondent had illicit affairs with
Bernadette and hence, should be adjudged guilty of gross immorality.

As per complainant's own account, he actually saw respondent and Bernadette together on various intimate
occasions. In fact, he attempted to confront them at one time when he saw them kissing inside a vehicle,
although respondent was able to evade him.22 The Court is inclined to believe that complainant's
imputations against respondent are credible, considering that he had no ill motive to accuse respondent of
such a serious charge – much more a personal scandal involving his own wife – unless the same were
indeed true.

Complainant's statements were corroborated by the affidavit executed by Navarez, who works in BIR,
Malaybalay City as a messenger and therefore, goes around the city in relation to his work. Navarez
categorically stated that respondent and Bernadette have been carrying on an illicit affair while complainant
was in the USA, and further averred that he had seen them together on different intimate occasions. He
even saw them kissing each other at one instance.23 Notably, it must be highlighted that Navarez is a
neutral and disinterested witness and hence, his declarations deserve ample consideration.

Moreover, complainant's sister, Nila, described to complainant, while the latter was in the USA, how
respondent would often visit Bernadette and spend the night in their residence, while she was still living with
Bernadette and their children thereat. She narrated that Bernadette first introduced respondent to her as a
"cousin" from Davao City. However, the two would often have lunch in the house and thereafter, respondent
would even spend some time with Bernadette inside the latter's bedroom. Nila likewise recounted that
whenever the two of them arrived home in one vehicle, they would kiss each other before alighting
therefrom.24

In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that complainant offered in evidence love letters/notes
supposedly written by Bernadette to respondent to prove the existence of their illicit relationship. The
authenticity of these love letters/notes, although not expressly shown to be written by Bernadette or
received by respondent, were not refuted. Consequently, they lend credibility to complainant's claim.

Finally, it should be clarified that while the information supplied by complainant and Bernadette's house
helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary about the alleged illicit affair constitute hearsay, the same should
not be completely disregarded. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The doctrine on
independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by a third person
may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made. Evidence as to
the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue
or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact. Accordingly, the hearsay rule does not apply,
and hence, the statements are admissible as evidence.25 Verily, complainant personally attests that the
information about the illicit affair between respondent and his wife have been relayed to him by
complainant's house helper and Bernadette's clinic secretary. Clearly, the making of such statements is
circumstantially relevant to this case and therefore, may be considered in evidence against respondent.
Besides, in Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of Umali, Jr. v. Hernandez:26

The relaxation of the hearsay rule in disciplinary administrative proceedings against judges and justices
where bribery proceedings are involved is not a novel thought in this Court; it has been advocated in the
Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion in the administrative case of Justice Ong before this
Court. The Opinion essentially maintained that the Court could make a conclusion that bribery had taken
place when the circumstances – including those derived from hearsay evidence – sufficiently prove its
occurrence. It was emphasized that [t]o satisfy the substantial evidence requirement for
administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and corroborated by
other evidence that are not hearsay.27(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Given that the purported hearsay are supplemented and corroborated by other evidence that are not
hearsay, the Court finds no cogent reason not to apply the same pronouncement to this particular case.

For his part, respondent only proffered a bare denial of the imputed affair. He insists that he was merely
acquainted with Bernadette and that they would only see each other during social gatherings or by pure
accident. The thrust of his denial was that, although they would see each other on occasion, such meetings
were innocent, as in instances when she gave him a short ride from his office to the trial court, the times
when he visited her dental clinic for a procedure and during its anniversary celebration, and when he
"bumped" into her at a department store and she apologized to him for her husband's jealousy.28

Suffice it to say that "[d]enial is an intrinsically weak defense. To merit credibility, it must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability. If unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence [as in this case] it is
negative and self-serving, deserving no greater value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters."29 In any event, the Court observes that the alleged "accidental" and "innocent"
encounters of respondent and Bernadette are much too many for comfort and coincidence. Such encounters
actually buttress the allegations of the witnesses that they carried on an illicit affair.

All told, the Court finds that substantial evidence – which only entail "evidence to support a conclusion, even
if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise" – exist to prove complainant's
accusation of gross immorality against respondent.

Based on jurisprudence, extramarital affairs of lawyers are regarded as offensive to the sanctity of marriage,
the family, and the community. When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their
ethics and morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not
disbarment.30 This is because possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession.31 Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the integrated bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be suspension or disbarment, depending on the
circumstances of the case. In case of suspension, the period would range from one year32 to indefinite
suspension.33 Under the given circumstances, the Court sees fit to impose on respondent a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.34

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Augustus Serafin D. Amador is found guilty of gross immorality.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Respondent's suspension from the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started,
copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in respondent's
personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to
all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018 - OLIVER FABUGAIS, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR.,
Respondent.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018

OLIVER FABUGAIS, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In both their professional and personal lives, lawyers must conduct themselves in such a way that does not
reflect negatively upon the legal profession.

Factual Antecedents

This is a Complaint1 filed by complainant Oliver Fabugais (complainant) against Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr.
(respondent lawyer), for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for having allegedly
engaged in illicit and immoral relations with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B. Fabugais (Annaliza).

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay,2 then 10-year old girl Marie Nicole Fabugais (Marie Nicole), daughter of
complainant, alleged that sometime in October 2006, she, along with her mother, Annaliza. Ate Mimi
(Michelle Lagasca), and a certain Ate Ada (Ada Marie Campos), stayed in a house in Ipil, Zamboanga-
Sibugay, that belonged to respondent lawyer, whom Marie Nicole referred to as "Tito Attorney." Marie Nicole
said that when night-time fell, respondent lawyer slept in the same bed with her and her mother and that
she saw respondent lawyer embracing her mother while they were sleeping.

Marie Nicole further recounted that the next morning, while she was watching television along with her
mother, Ate Mimi and Ate Ada, respondent lawyer who just had a shower, and clad only in a towel
or "tapis," suddenly entered the room; that she (Marie Nicole) along with her Ate Mimi and her Ate Ada,
were told to step outside the room (either by respondent lawyer, or by her mother Annaliza), while her
mother and respondent lawyer remained inside the room.

Because of these developments, complainant filed a case for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Annaliza, with prayer for the custody of their minor children. In said case, respondent lawyer entered his
appearance as collaborating counsel for Annaliza.3

Complainant moreover narrated that, on February 17, 2007, while he was driving his motorcycle along the
San Jose Road in Baliwasan, Zamboanga City, respondent lawyer, who was then riding in tandem in another
motorcycle with his own driver, slowed down next to him (complainant) and yelled at him angrily, "Nah,
cosa man?!" ("So, what now?!"); that he (complainant) also noticed that respondent lawyer kept following
and shouting at him (complainant), and even challenged him to a fistfight, and threatened to kill him.4

Complainant further alleged that respondent lawyer also harassed his sister on February 27, 2007 by
chasing and trailing after her car.5

In his Answer,6 respondent lawyer asserted that the chasing incident actually took place on February 16,
2007, and that it was in fact complainant himself who stared menacingly at him (respondent lawyer) while
he was riding a motorcycle in tandem with his driver. Respondent lawyer sought to reinforce this assertion
through the affidavit of respondent lawyer's driver, Romeo T. Mirasol,7 and two other individuals.8

Respondent lawyer denied that he had had any immoral relations with Annaliza. He claimed that he was
merely assisting Annaliza in her tempestuous court battle with complainant for custody of her children.
Respondent lawyer asserted that when Marie Nicole's maternal grandmother, Ma. Eglinda L. Bantoto, sought
out his help in this case, he told them that they could hide in his (respondent lawyer's) parents' house in
Ipil.9

Respondent lawyer claimed that the cordial relationship he had had with Annaliza could be traced to her
being the stepdaughter of his (respondent lawyer's) late uncle, and also to her having been his former
student at the Western Mindanao State University in Zamboanga City. Respondent lawyer insisted that he
was incapable of committing the misconduct imputed to him for three simple reasons to wit: because he is a
good father to his three children, because he is a respected civic leader, and because he had never been the
subject even of a complaint with the police. He claimed that complainant filed the instant complaint simply
"to harass him from practicing his legitimate profession, and for no other reason."10

Upon recommendation of the IBP-ZAMBASULTA Chapter Board, this case was forwarded to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors (BOG) in April 26, 2007.11 And, in an Order dated August 2,
2007 this case was then consolidated with a similar case filed by the same complainant against the same
respondent.12

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation,13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Investigating
Commissioner) found respondent lawyer guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month.

The Investigating Commissioner noted that on the accusation that respondent lawyer had chased
complainant in his motorcycle on February 17, 2007, this accusation had not been fully substantiated with
convincing evidence. He opined that "there [was] doubt as to whether the incident did occur with the
[respondent lawyer's] presence and participation. [Since] the motorcycles were moving fast and the parties
were wearing helmets[, the] identity of respondent [lawyer] could not be [categorically] established."14

The Investigating Commissioner likewise found no sufficient evidence to establish that respondent lawyer
harassed complainant's sister.

However, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer to have acted inappropriately with
Annaliza which created the appearance of immorality, viz.:

As can be gleaned from the records or the hearing, no categorical sexual activity took place between
respondent and complainant's wife. One would need to inject a bit of imagination to create an image of
something sexual. But as can be read, no sexual activity took place based on the witness' account.

However, it would be erroneous to conclude that respondent's behavior was in total and complete accord
with how a lawyer should behave, particularly in the presence of a minor. Was respondent's behavior toward
a woman, in the presence of her minor daughter of 11 years, proper and in keeping with the dignity of the
legal profession? It is clear that there was impropriety on the part of respondent.

In Tolosa v. Cargo (A.M. No. 2385, March 8, 1989), the Court held that creating the appearance that a
lawyer is flouting with moral standards is sanctionable. Thus, while the charge of
immorality, viz[.], adulterous relationship, was not factually established, certain behavior of the respondent
did not escape notice of the Court.

In this case, while sexual immorality was not established, respondent should be held to account for his
inappropriate behavior which created the image or appearance of immorality especially in the presence of a
minor girl. Respondent's act of lying in bed with another married woman, while he himself is a married man,
in the presence of the woman's daughter could raise suspicions, as in fact it did. x x x.

Respondent should have been considerate of the feelings and perceptions of other people, particularly of
minor children.15

The Investigating Commissioner, thus, recommended respondent lawyer's suspension for one (1) month for
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-BOG

The IBP-BOG in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-30216 adopted and approved the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.

Sometime in 2011, complainant's counsel Atty. Mario Frez (Atty. Frez) filed a Notice, Manifestation, and
Motion for Withdrawal17 from this case, stating that complainant had passed away on June 12, 2011; and
that he was not sure whether complainant's heirs were still willing to pursue the disbarment case against
respondent lawyer since he has had no contact with the complainant since June 1, 2009; and he has had no
information as to the whereabouts of complainant's heirs.

Notwithstanding the Motion for Withdrawal filed by Atty. Frez and considering the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the respondent lawyer in 2013, the IBP-BOG issued on June 21, 2013 a Resolution18 denying
respondent lawyer's motion for reconsideration.

Pursuant to Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this case is before us for final action.

Our Ruling

We find substantial merit in the findings of facts of the IBP. And we reject respondent lawyer's highly
implausible defense that the complainant filed the instant case for no other reason but simply "to harass him
from practicing his legitimate profession."19 There is absolutely nothing in the record to support it.

It bears stressing that this case can proceed in spite of complainant's death and the apparent lack of interest
on the part of complainant's heirs. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in nature; they
are intended and undertaken primarily to look into the conduct or behavior of lawyers, to determine whether
they are still fit to exercise the privileges of the legal profession, and to hold them accountable for any
misconduct or misbehavior which deviates from the mandated norms and standards of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, all of which are needful and necessary to the preservation of the integrity of the
legal profession. Because not chiefly or primarily intended to administer punishment, such proceedings do
not call for the active service of prosecutors.20

We first rule on the accusation relative to the chasing incidents. This Court agrees with the IBP's findings
that the evidence presented by complainant upon this point was insufficient to establish the fact that
respondent lawyer had committed the alleged acts against the complainant and his sister.

We now turn to the accusation in regard to the immoral acts claimed to have been committed by respondent
lawyer with complainant's wife Annaliza. The issue to be resolved here is this: Did respondent lawyer in fact
commit acts that are grossly immoral, or acts that amount to serious moral depravity, that would warrant or
call for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law?

"Immoral conduct" has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.21 This Court has held that
for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral, that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."22

It is not easy to state with accuracy what constitutes "grossly immoral conduct," let alone what constitutes
the moral delinquency and obliquity that renders a lawyer unfit or unworthy to continue as a member of the
bar in good standing.23

In the present case, going by the eyewitness testimony of complainant's daughter Marie Nicole, raw or
explicit sexual immorality between respondent lawyer and complainant's wife was not established as a
matter of fact. Indeed, to borrow the Investigating Commissioner's remark: "[o]ne would need to inject a bit
of imagination to create an image or something sexual."24

That said, it can in no wise or manner be argued that respondent lawyer's behavior was par for the course
for members of the legal profession. Lawyers are mandated to do honor to the bar at all times and to help
maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession under all circumstances.25Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility further provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

"There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of the law."26 As officers of the court, lawyers must in fact and in truth be of good
moral character. They must moreover also be seen or appear to be of good moral character; and
be seen or appear to – live a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.27Members of the bar can ill-afford to exhibit any conduct which tends to lessen in any degree
the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and the integrity of the legal profession.28 The
Courts require adherence to these lofty precepts because any thoughtless or ill-considered actions or
actuations by any member of the Bar can irreversibly undermine public confidence in the law and,
consequently, those who practice it.29

The acts complained of in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral in its rawness or coarseness, but
they were without doubt condemnable. Respondent lawyer who made avowals to being a respectable father
to three children, and also to being a respected leader of his community apparently had no qualms or
scruples about being seen sleeping in his own bed with another man's wife, his arms entwined in tender
embrace with the latter. Respondent lawyer's claim that he was inspired by nothing but the best of
intentions in inviting another married man's wife and her 10-year old daughter to sleep with him in the same
bed so that the three of them could enjoy good night's rest in his airconditioned chamber, reeks with racy,
ribald humor.
And in aggravation or the aforementioned unseemly behavior, respondent lawyer apparently experienced
neither qualms nor scruples at all about exploding into the room occupied by a married man's wife and her
10-year old daughter and their two other women companions clad with nothing else but a "tapis" or a towel.
Of course, respondent lawyer sought to downplay this boorish impropriety by saying in his Motion for
Reconsideration that he was wearing a malong and not tapis at that time. And, of course, this plea will not
avail because his scanty trappings gave him no license to intrude into a small room full of women.
Respondent lawyer could have simply asked everyone in the room to step outside for a little while. Or he
could have donned his clothing elsewhere. But these things seemed to have been totally lost to respondent
lawyer's density. Indeed, respondent lawyer seemed to have forgotten that there are rules other men –
decent men, – live by.

Respondent lawyer's defense that he was a "respectable father with three children" and that he was a
"respected civic leader" to boot, flies in the face of a young girl's perception of his diminished deportment. It
does not escape this Court's attention that the 10-year old Marie Nicole called respondent lawyer "Tito
Attorney." Indeed, by calling respondent lawyer as "Tito Attorney" Marie Nicole effectively proclaimed her
avuncular affection for him, plus her recognition of his being a member of the legal profession. We believe
that Marie Nicole must have been a bit disappointed with what she saw and observed about the manners,
predilections and propensities of her "Tito Attorney." In fact, a close examination of Marie Nicole's testimony
cannot fail to show that in Marie Nicole's young mind, it was clearly not right, appropriate or proper for her
"Tito Attorney" to be sharing the same bed with her and her mother, and for her mother to remain alone in
the same room with her "Tito Attorney," while this "Tito Attorney" was dressing up. In all these happenings,
a modicum of decency should have impelled this "Tito Attorney" to behave more discreetly and more
sensitively, as he could not have been unaware that Marie Nicole was observing him closely and that she
could be forming her impressions of lawyers and the legal profession by the actions and the behavior of this,
her "Tito Attorney."

In deciding, upon the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon respondent lawyer in this case, this Court is
ever mindful that administrative disciplinary proceedings are essentially designed to protect the
administration of justice and that this lofty ideal can be attained by requiring that those who are honored by
the title "Attorney" and counsel or at law are men and women of undoubted competence, unimpeachable
integrity and undiminished professionalism, men and women in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.30 This Court moreover realizes only too well that the power to disbar or suspend members of the
bar ought always to be exercised not in a spirit of spite, hostility or vindictiveness, but on the preservative
and corrective principle, with a view to safeguarding the purity of the legal profession. Hence, that power
can be summoned only in the service of the most compelling duty, which must be performed, in light of
incontrovertible evidence of grave misconduct, which seriously taints the reputation and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the Bar.31 It goes without saying moreover that it should
not be exercised or asserted when a lesser penalty or sanction would accomplish the end desired.32

In the context of the circumstances obtaining in this case, and hewing to jurisprudential precedence, and
considering furthermore that this is respondent lawyer's first offense, this Court believes that a one-month
suspension from the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP, would suffice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent lawyer Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, reckoned from receipt of a copy or this
Decision. He is hereby WARNED to be more careful and more circumspect in all his actions, and to be
mindful of the kind of example be holds up, especially to impressionable young people, lest he brings upon
himself a direr fate the second time around.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. as a member
or the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10756 (Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3218), February 21, 2018 - JUNIELITO R. ESPANTO,
Complainant, v. ATTY. ERWIN V. BELLEZA, Respondent.
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10756 (Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3218), February 21, 2018

JUNIELITO R. ESPANTO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ERWIN V. BELLEZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is the verified Complaint1 of Junielito R. Espanto (Junielito) against Atty. Erwin V. Belleza
(Atty. Belleza) for grave misconduct, malpractice, deliberate falsehood, violation of oath of office
and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility in connection with the demolition of
complainant's 2-storey residential house situated at Barangay Maya, MacArthur, Leyte, without his
knowledge and against his will.

Complainant alleged that he is the owner of a 2-storey concrete residential house situated on a lot
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-43641,2 which was sold by his father to him on
January 12, 2001.3 Junielito alleged that sometime in 2006 while working abroad, he was informed
that Nelia Alibangbang-Miller (Nelia), their neighbor, was claiming that his house was encroaching
on a portion of the adjoining lot she bought. Thereafter, Nelia filed a case for Recovery of
Possession with Damages before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of MacArthur-Mayorga,
MacArthur, Leyte, docketed as Civil Case No. 75 against the Espantos.4 However, Junielito
asserted that he was not included as party to said complaint despite Nelia's allegation that his
house was encroaching on the latter's lot.

In January 2009, after Junielito went back to the Philippines, he averred that Nelia would always
harass him to pay the portion of the land allegedly being encroached upon by his house. He
complained that Nelia threatened him and his family that she would demolish their houses as she
already won in the case she filed against his brother, sister and mother.

On November 22, 2010, through a letter,5 Atty. Belleza notified Junielito that he is given seven (7)
days to vacate the subject property of his client, Nelia. After seven days, Nelia posted a notice on
the door of his house stating "To: Lito, your 7 days is up! Nelia Miller" and padlocked the gate of
Junielito's house.6

On December 1, 2010, Junielito alleged that Atty. Belleza went to his house and threatened him
that they will file a writ of execution to demolish his house if he will not agree to sell and vacate
his house. Junielito lamented that while he initially refused, he eventually gave in as he was
already tired of his situation.

On the same day, because Junielito was initially reluctant, Nelia and Atty. Belleza assured him that
he will be informed of the final details of the sale should there be a buyer of the property. Junielito
alleged that Atty. Belleza drafted an acknowledgment receipt7 where it was indicated therein that
he received the amount of P50,000.00 as a partial payment, and that he will receive the final
percentage of the sale price when the property of Nelia is sold. Thereafter, Atty. Belleza and the
Spouses Miller told him to vacate the house to facilitate its sale and to be able to make the
necessary repairs to which he complied as he believed their sincerity and honesty.

Thus, in the morning of February 14, 2011, Junielito was surprised to receive a text message from
his niece, Elenita Pille, informing him that his house was being demolished with the participation of
Nelia and a certain Irene Tano (Irene), allegedly the buyer of the property.

Junielito lamented that when he got hold of the Deed of Absolute Sale8 executed by Nelia and
Irene, which was prepared and notarized by Atty. Belleza, he then realized that the latter
defrauded him as shown by the fact that he facilitated the sale without his knowledge. Junielito felt
aggrieved as they agreed that Atty. Belleza and Nelia will inform him should there be a buyer of
the property so he can participate in the sale transaction, considering that his house sits on a
portion of Nelia's property. However, not only did Atty. Belleza fail to inform him of the sale of the
property, but they also had his house demolished without his knowledge and consent, and without
permit from the municipal government.

Likewise, Junielito pointed out that in his Counter-Affidavit9 dated April 30, 2011 Atty. Belleza lied
when he stated therein that Civil Case No. 75 has been decided with finality, when in truth and in
fact, said case has yet to be decided with finality as shown by the Certification10 dated May 19,
2011 issued by Melba Lagunzad, Clerk of Court II, 13th MCTC, MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur,
Leyte.

Junielito also alleged that in the Counter-Affidavit11 dated April 30, 2011 of the Spouses Miller,
they lied when they made it appear that the P50,000.00 was given to him out of pity when in fact
it was a partial payment and guarantee that he will be informed of the sale should there be anyone
interested to buy his property.

Junielito expressed his frustration as he believed that Atty. Belleza, a lawyer, was supposed to be
an instrument in the administration of justice. However, given his above-mentioned actuations and
behavior, Atty. Belleza not only failed to observe his duty and obligations as a lawyer but he
likewise showed his unfitness to be retained as member of the bar. He, thus, pray that Atty.
Belleza be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law.

On October 7, 2011, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), ordered Atty. Belleza to submit his Answer on the complaint against him.12

In his Answer13 dated November 10, 2011, Atty. Belleza countered that there was already a
Compromise Agreement between the parties in Civil Case No. 75, which was approved by the
court on December 27, 2006.14 He, likewise, claimed that he merely typed and printed the
acknowledgment receipt and served as witness to the issuance of the same. He further denied that
he had any participation in the demolition of complainant's house.

In its Report and Recommendation15 dated July 19, 2012, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty.
Belleza be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for his deliberate disregard of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-761,16 dated June 21,
2013, resolved to adopt and approve with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD, and instead suspended Atty. Belleza from the practice of law for three (3) months.

We concur with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Well established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. These cases are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.17 Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and
the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.18Corollarily, We will limit the issue on
whether Atty. Belleza committed transgressions that would question his fitness to practice law,
and thus, refrain from discussing issues that are judicial in nature.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best
of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or
omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his
character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the part of the public.19

Given the facts of the case, we find that Atty. Belleza failed to exercise the good faith required of a
lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. Even without touching the issue of the subject
properties' ownership, Atty. Belleza cannot deny that the subject property sold by Nelia to Irene
was still pending litigation due to the alleged encroachment of Junielito's house on the property of
Nelia. It was precisely the reason why they filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
Junielito's relatives. Moreover, when Atty. Belleza sent a notice to vacate Nelia's property to
Junielito on November 22, 2010, the civil case was still pending litigation.

As noted by the IBP-CBD, the acknowledgment receipt of P50,000.00 issued by Nelia as witnessed
and signed by Atty. Belleza is an evidence by itself that he had knowledge of Junielito's interest on
the property even if he disputes the latter's ownership of the subject property. We quote the
acknowledgment receipt for clarification, to wit:

I, LITO ESPANTO acknowledge receipt of the sum of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) pesos, Philippine
Currency from Nelia Miller as partial payment towards sale of "house". I acknowledged I will
receive a final percentage of sale price when house and lot by Nelia Miller is ultimately
sold. Final sales details will be disclosed immediately to me when all property is sold
and final payment will be made at that time. I acknowledge sale price cannot be
"predetermined" due to economic conditions.

x x x20

Upon review of the foregoing acknowledgment receipt, it can be inferred that Junielito
acknowledged that he received P50,000.00 as partial payment and that he will receive the final
percentage of sale price when house and lot by Nelia is sold. It likewise stated therein that
Junielito has the right to be informed of the final sale price and other details related to the sale.
Considering that Junielito was in fact paid albeit partial and was given the right to be informed of
the final sale details, it clearly shows that Nelia and Atty. Belleza recognized Junielito's interest as
an owner although it pertains only to a portion of Nelia's property where his house sits. Why else
would they agree on informing Junielito of such material information if they knew that he has no
right whatsoever with the property being sold.

It should also be pointed out that Atty. Belleza neither denied the existence of the
acknowledgment receipt nor the fact that he signed the same.21 Thus, given the foregoing
circumstances, it can be presumed that Atty. Belleza knew that the sale of the property will
necessarily affect Junielito. Consequently, when they sold the property of Nelia without informing
Junielito despite their agreement to such effect, Atty. Belleza not only breached their agreement
and betrayed Junielito's trust; he also instigated a malicious and unlawful transaction to the
prejudice of Junielito.

Furthermore, even assuming there was already a compromise agreement, it was malicious to sell
Nelia's property without complying with the conditions and agreements set forth therein. Atty.
Belleza knew that one of the issues sought to be resolved in said case was the issue on whether
Junielito's house was encroaching on Nelia's property. However, said issue could not be resolved
without settling the boundaries of the lots, which explains why the compromise agreement
contained provisions for a relocation survey. For clarification, We quote the pertinent portion of the
compromise agreement as thus:

1. Parties agreed to relocate the subject properties designated as Cadastral Lot Nos. 127, and
159;

2. Parties agreed that a commissioner be appointed by the Court to conduct the

relocation survey which be (sic) composed of a qualified and licensed geodetic engineer
from the office of the Land and Surveys Division of the Department Environment and
Natural Resources, Sto. Niño, Extension, Tacloban City;

xxxx

4. Parties likewise agreed that if ever it will be found out by the result of the survey that indeed
defendants encroached a portion of the land of the plaintiff designated as Cadastral Lot No. 159,
parties have the following options:

a. Defendants will buy from the plaintiff the whole area encroached at a reasonable price; or
b. If defendants cannot afford, defendants shall buy only the area encroached which the house of
the defendant is located with reasonable yard at reasonable price and defendant shall vacate the
remaining area and transfer to the unoccupied portion of lot 127 vacated by the heirs of Onofre
Lagarto provided further that plaintiff will be responsible to the heirs of Onofre Lagarto for them to
remove their house; or
c. Plaintiff shall buy the value of the house at a reasonable price;

5. That if ever if (sic) it's found out by the relocation survey that the defendants have not
encroached the land of the plaintiff designated as Cadastral Lot No. 159, then, plaintiff will not
disturb the peaceful possession of the defendants and would voluntarily dismiss the above-entitled
complaint;22

However, when Junielito's house was demolished on February 14, 2011, it appears that no
relocation survey was conducted on the subject properties. In fact, in Order23 dated April 4, 2011,
the court ordered the appearance of the parties in Civil Case No. 75 since while there was already
a compromise agreement entered into by them, the court wanted to verify if a relocation survey
has been conducted on the lots subject of the case as the records were bereft of any showing that
a commissioner's report has been submitted to the court.

Atty. Belleza should know that a compromise agreement once approved by final order of the court
has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of
consent or forgery.24 Hence, when a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory; it
has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. Compromise agreements are
contracts,25 and contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and
absent any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy, they must be complied with in good faith.26 Thus, when Atty. Belleza ignored the
provisions of the compromise agreement and proceeded with the sale of the property even without
the relocation survey, there is no question that he wantonly violated Canon 1 of the CPR.

Moreover, as found during the mandatory conference before the IBP, Atty. Belleza knew that
complainant was not a party in Civil Case No. 75, albeit, his 2-storey concrete residential house
appeared to be encroaching on Nelia's property. Thus, even assuming that there was a valid
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 75, said judgment based on compromise agreement will
not bind complainant. Consequently, even if there was already a writ of execution, the same will
not likewise bind complainant. Moreso, while Atty. Belleza claims that there was a valid
compromise agreement, he, however, failed to show that there was a demolition order issued by
the court. There was likewise no demolition permit issued by the local government.27

It is basic that there could be no demolition of building or structures without a writ of execution
and demolition issued by the court. This Court in a number of decisions held that even if there is
already a writ of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of
demolition issued by the court before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove
improvements over the contested property.28 The pertinent provisions are the following:

Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special order, hearing
and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of
execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has
failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.

The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is necessary, there must
be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the parties for the issuance of a special
order of demolition.29

The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play.
It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate
act. It is an amplification of the provision of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.30 Furthermore, it appeared that when the demolition was made
on February 14, 2011, the case has not yet attained finality as evidenced by a certification issued
by Clerk of Court Melba E. Lagunzad of the 13th MCTC of MacArthur-Mayorga, MacArthur, Leyte on
May 19, 2011.31

In his last ditch effort to exonerate himself, Atty. Belleza denied that he or his client consented or
had knowledge or participated on the demolition and pointed instead on the buyer, Irene, as the
sole perpetrator of the illegal demolition. We are, however, unconvinced since the demolition
would not have happened if Atty. Belleza and his client did not sell the subject property to Irene in
violation of the compromise agreement and while Civil Case No. 75 is still pending litigation. Thus,
Atty. Belleza cannot wash his hands from liability as to the illegal demolition of complainant's
house since in the first place, he facilitated the sale of the subject property.

Clearly, Atty. Belleza's actuations which resulted in the demolition of Junielito's house violates
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer must uphold the
Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes. Infact, contrary to this edict, Atty.
Belleza's acts of demanding Junielito to vacate his house, and the selling of the property while Civil
Case no. 75 was still pending, he violated the basic constitutional right of Junielito not to be
deprived of a right or property without due process of law.

Despite his assertions of good faith, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Belleza's acts of:
(1) issuing the notice to vacate to Junielito while the case was still pending litigation; (2) failing to
inform Junielito of the sale of Nelia's property in contravention to the stipulation in the
acknowledgment receipt; and (3) facilitating, drafting and notarizing of the deed of sale between
Nelia and Irene in violation of the compromise agreement due to the absence of relocation survey.
If the Court allows these irregular practice for the reason that lawyers are constrained to suit their
client's interests, the Court would, in effect, sanction impropriety and wrongdoing.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the
defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to
exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Canon 19 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within
the bounds of the law. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.32

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients
should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity
to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client
must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and must be held within the bounds of
reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.33
 PENALTY

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, the acts of Atty. Belleza in: (1) issuing the notice to vacate to Junielito while the case was
still pending litigation; (2) failing to inform Junielito of the sale of Nelia's property in contravention
to the stipulation in the acknowledgment receipt; and (3) facilitating, drafting and notarizing the
deed of sale between Nelia and Irene in violation of the compromise agreement due to the
absence of relocation survey, clearly constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as
attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Erwin V. Belleza GUILTY of violations of Canons 1 and 19 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Erwin V. Belleza's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be
served on the IBP, and the OCA, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

Atty. Erwin V. Belleza is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision
so that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No.11156 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3680], March 19, 2018

MICHELLE YAP, Complainant, v. ATTY. GRACE C. BURI, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The instant case stemmed from the complaint of Michelle Yap against respondent Atty. Grace C. Buri for
refusing to pay her monetary obligation and for filing a criminal case of Estafa against her based on false
accusations.

The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:

Complainant Michelle Yap was the vendor in a contract of sale of a condominium unit, while Atty. Grace C.
Buri, Yap's close friend and her daughter's godmother, was the vendee. Buri made an offer to purchase the
property but asked for the reduction of the price from P1,500,000.00 to P1,200,000.00. After consulting
with her husband, Yap agreed. Of the total amount of purchase price of P1,200,000.00, P200,000.00
remains unpaid; Buri insisted that she would just pay the balance on installment starting in but without
specifying the amount to be paid on each installment. Because she trusted the respondent, Yap gave Buri
the full and immediate possession of the condominium unit upon completion of the P1,000,000.00 despite
the outstanding balance and even without the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale. However, when Yap finally
asked for the balance in January 2011, Buri said she would pay it on a monthly installment of P5,000.00
until fully paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said she would just cancel the sale. Thereafter, Buri also started
threatening her through text messages, and then later on filed a case for estafa against her.

Buri alleged in the criminal case that when she found out that the sale of the condominium unit was made
without the consent of Yap's husband, Yap cancelled the sale and promised to return the amount of
P1,000,000.00 initially paid. Despite several demands, however, she failed and refused to return the money.
Thus, Buri was constrained to file a case for estafa against Yap. Said case was later dismissed.

Yap then filed an administrative complaint against Buri for the alleged false accusations against her.

When ordered to submit her answer, Buri failed to comply. She did not even appear during the mandatory
conference. Thus, the mandatory conference was terminated and the parties were simply required to submit
their respective position papers. However, only Yap complied with said order.

On July 2, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended Buri's suspension to wit:1

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner recommends to impose the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months upon the respondent, Atty. Grace C.
Buri, and for her to pay the complainant the amount of PhP200,000.00 upon execution by complainant and
spouse of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the condominium unit subject of the sale between the parties.
On January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-062,2 which adopted the
foregoing recommendation but with modification, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A," finding Respondent's violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, Atty. Grace C. Buri is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. The order to pay P200,000.00 is deleted without prejudice to the filing of proper action by
Complainant in Court.
The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no sufficient reason to overturn the findings and recommendation of the IBP that Buri must
be disciplined accordingly.

Here, instead of paying Yap the remaining balance of the purchase price of the condominium unit, Buri
opted to simply threaten her and file a criminal case against her. Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate
Yap and prevent her from collecting the remaining P200,000.00. When given a chance to defend herself,
Buri chose to stay silent and even refused to file an answer, attend the hearing, or to submit her position
paper, despite due notice. Hence, Yap's version of the facts stands and remains uncontroverted.

Buri's unwarranted tenacity simply shows, not only her lack of responsibility, but also her lack of interest in
clearing her name, which, as pronounced in case law, is indicative of an implied admission of the charges
levelled against her.3

Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation despite frequent demands clearly reflects her lack of integrity
and moral soundness; she took advantage of her knowledge of the law and clearly resorted to threats and
intimidation in order to get away with what she wanted, constituting a gross violation of professional ethics
and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.4

Buri indubitably swept aside the Lawyer's Oath that enjoins her to support the Constitution and obey the
laws. She forgot that she must not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit nor give aid nor consent to the same. She also took for granted the express commands of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the CPR.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx
While Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The foregoing canons require of Buri, as a lawyer, an enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity
in all her dealings and emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the
practice of the legal profession, but in her personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with
great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of
the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor.
Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any
conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to
continue to be officers of the court.5

That Buri's act involved a private dealing with Yap is immaterial. Her being a lawyer calls for - whether she
was acting as such or in a non professional capacity - the obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and
candor in her relationship with others. There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined not only for a
malpractice in his profession, but also for any misconduct committed outside of his professional capacity.
Buri's being a lawyer demands that she conduct herself as a person of the highest moral and professional
integrity and probity in her dealings with others.6

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that a
lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important functions
of the State, as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard
of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.7

Time and again, the Court has stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character.
This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer can be
deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the Court after giving him
the opportunity to be heard.8

Verily, Buri has fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing expected of
her. On the contrary, she employed her knowledge and skill of the law in order to avoid fulfillment of her
obligation, thereby unjustly enriching herself and inflicting serious damage on Yap. Her repeated failure to
file her answer and position paper and to appear at the mandatory conference aggravate her misconduct.
These demonstrate high degree of irresponsibility and lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings. Her
attitude severely stains the nobility of the legal profession.9

The Court sustains the modified recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. The Court has held that the
deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
one (1) year-suspension from the practice of law.10 The Court likewise upholds the deletion of the payment
of the P200,000.00 since the same is not intrinsically linked to Buri's professional engagement. Disciplinary
proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent lawyer's administrative and not
his civil liability. Thus, when the claimed liabilities are purely civil in nature, as when the claim involves
money owed by the lawyer to his client in view of a separate and distinct transaction and not by virtue of a
lawyer-client relationship, the same should be threshed out in a separate civil action.11
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Grace C. Buri from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS her that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Grace C. Buri and entered in her file in
the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as
well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10178, June 19, 2018

KIMELDES GONZALES, Complainant, v. ATTY. PRISCO B. SANTOS, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This resolves the petition1 filed by Kimeldes Gonzales (complainant) against Atty. Prisco B. Santos
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for dishonesty and abuse of trust and
confidence of his client.

On November 5, 2001, complainant bought a parcel of land in Tumaga, Zamboanga City. As she was then
living in Quezon City, complainant appointed her sister, Josephine Gonzales (Josephine), to act as her
representative in matters concerning said property. Josephine thereafter engaged the services of respondent
to: (1) register the title in complainant's name; and (2) commence an ejectment suit against the occupants
of the property. Josephine gave respondent a total of P60,000.00—P40,000.00 as fee for the transfer of title
and the remaining P20,000.00 as filing fee for the ejectment case.2 Respondent signed two receipts
acknowledging complainant's payments: (1) on June 12, 2007 for P15,000.00 as partial payment for the
transfer of title; and (2) on June 22, 2007 for P25,000.00 as full payment for the transfer of title, and
P20,000.00 as partial payment, the purpose of which was not indicated.3

Complainant then entrusted the owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) to
respondent for its cancellation. On August 2, 2007, a new title was issued in complainant's name. This,
however, was never surrendered to Josephine, despite her efforts to claim it.4

Later, complainant discovered that her property had been mortgaged to A88 Credit Corporation by one
Norena F. Bagui (Norena), who turned out to be respondent's relative. It appears that Norena used a forged
special power of attorney to effect said mortgage.5

Moreover, complainant learned that respondent never filed an ejectment case against the occupants of her
property despite receipt of the corresponding filing fees.6

Respondent, in his answer,7 denied having any participation in Norena's act. He narrated that after obtaining
the new title to the property, he instructed his niece, Nemalyn Falcasantos, to deliver it to Josephine. He
was surprised to learn that the title had not been delivered to Josephine and worse, that Norena had used it
to mortgage the property. He claimed that when he confronted Norena about it, the latter assured him that
she did so upon complainant's instruction. According to Norena, complainant is her close friend in Manila,
and that she made similar transactions for complainant whenever the latter needed cash.8

Respondent also denied having been engaged to file an ejectment suit against the occupants of
complainant's property. According to respondent, he was shocked to discover an additional P20,000.00 in
his bank account. Nevertheless, he insisted that he never agreed to file an ejectment suit, citing the fact
that some of the occupants are his friends.9

Acting on the complaint, Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Investigating Commissioner

Cachapero) found that respondent was complicit in the constitution of a real estate mortgage over
complainant's property. The mortgage was executed only five days after complainant's title over the parcel
of land had been issued. Hence, respondent's failure to deliver the title to complainant's sister, Josephine,
despite repeated follow-ups, tends to no other conclusion—that respondent participated in the fraudulent
transaction.10

Investigating Commissioner Cachapero also found it suspicious that respondent would readily accept
Norena's alleged narrative of the events. According to the Investigating Commissioner, it is unthinkable that
respondent's nieces, who are from Zamboanga City, would be able to secure complainant's signature within
five days. Commissioner Cachapero added that the fact that complainant had not seen the title—and that
Josephine had been repeatedly demanding for its surrender—is inconsistent with respondent's claim that
complainant authorized the mortgage.11

In any case, even if it were true that respondent's nieces solely authored the fraudulent transaction,
Investigating Commissioner Cachapero finds that it was still respondent's duty to hold his client's property in
trust. He should have been more prudent in ensuring that the title would be safely delivered to Josephine. 12

As regards the second charge, thy Investigating Commissioner rejected respondent's argument that he was
not contracted to file an ejectment case against the occupants of complainant's property. According to
Investigating Commissioner Cachapero, it would seem incredible that respondent would receive P20,000.00
from complainant for no reason at all. Indeed, respondent even acknowledged receipt of the same through a
handwritten receipt.13

Considering these circumstances, Investigating Commissioner Cachapero recommended that respondent be

found guilty as charged and suspended from the practice of law for three years.14

Finding the report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cachapero to be fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No.
XX-2013-39015 dated March 22, 2013, resolved to approve and adopt the same.

We concur with the report and recommendation of the IBP.

Regarding the first charge, we find respondent administratively liable for failing to deliver within reasonable
time the title to complainant or to her sister, Josephine, who acted as her representative. The relationship
between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary; it demands great fidelity and good faith on the part of
the lawyer.16 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) requires lawyers to account for all
money and property collected or received for and from their clients. In addition, Rule 16.03 mandates that a
lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

In the present case, there is no doubt that respondent's services led to the issuance of a new title in
complainant's name. Accordingly, and upon demand by complainant's representative, Josephine, respondent
was expected to timely deliver the title to her. This, respondent failed to do.

Respondent's excuse that he neither knew about nor participated in his nieces' scheme also deserves scant
consideration.

We give merit to the IBP's findings and conclusion. First, the mortgage was executed only five days after
complainant's title had been issued over the parcel of land. At this point, complainant had not even seen the
title. In fact, respondent did not deny that Josephine had repeatedly demanded for its surrender. Second,
upon his alleged discovery of the fraudulent mortgage, respondent readily accepted Norena's claim.
Josephine's repeated follow-ups should have alerted respondent to irregularities attending the mortgage.
Respondent's failure to ensure the timely turnover of the title to complainant and/or her representative led
to, if not facilitated, the constitution of the fraudulent mortgage. Neither does it appear that respondent took
steps to verify his niece's claim. We are thus inclined to agree with the IBP's conclusion that respondent's
nieces are used here as mere scapegoats and that respondent had a hand in the fraudulent mortgage.17

Regarding the second charge, we concur with the IBP and find respondent guilty of abusing his client's trust
and confidence. Canon 17 of the CPR directs a lawyer to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.

In the present case, it is uncontested that respondent received an additional P20,000.00 from complainant.
Respondent, however, denied that it is payment for the filing of an ejectment suit against the occupants of
complainant's property. Nonetheless, he does not proffer any reason to explain why such amount was given
him. As this is a "he said, she said" scenario, we find complainant's version more logical and convincing. We
agree with the IBP that it is incredible for respondent to receive an additional P20,000.00 without a clear
reason for its payment. As complainant stated, respondent received P20,000.00 through his ATM account on
June 20, 2007 for the ejectment case and even acknowledged its receipt on June 22, 2007. 18 We find it
more likely that the amount of P20,000.00 was for a given purpose, that is, to file an ejectment suit.

Respondent violated his client's trust when he received said amount despite knowing that he could not file
the ejectment suit because some of the occupants of complainant's property are his friends. Indeed, he was
not able to file the case but without informing complainant of his reasons.

As for the proper penalty, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to suspend respondent from the practice
of law for three years. In Lopez v. Limos,19 we imposed a similar penalty for violations of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, Cannon 11, Rule 12.04 of Canon 12, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the CPR.20 Moreover, since respondent refused to file the suit requested, we find the return of the amount of
P20,000.00 to complainant in order. We have previously held that when a lawyer receives money from his
client for a particular purpose and the lawyer does not use the money for such purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client.21

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Prisco B. Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
years, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely. In addition, he is ORDERED to return to complainant the amount of P20,000.00 within 90 days
upon finality of this Decision.

Respondent is also DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine the effectivity of his suspension.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant
and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 12156, June 20, 2018

PAULINO LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated March 9, 2015 filed by Paulino Lim (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera (respondent), praying that the latter be meted disciplinary
sanctions for defrauding the former by issuing a worthless check as guarantee for the payment of
respondent's loan.

The Facts
Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in June 2014 in the hallway of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then inquiring about the status of a case. The
two (2) became acquainted after striking a conversation with each other. The following month, or in July
2014, respondent borrowed from complainant the amount of P75,000.00, which the former needed
immediately.2 Complainant did not think twice in lending money to respondent and issuing in his favor BDO
Check No. 03565553 dated July 3, 2014 for P75,000.00, especially since the latter issued a guarantee check
(Union Bank Check No. 00034057804 dated July 19, 2014) to ensure payment of the loan. Subsequently,
respondent made several other loans in the amounts of P150,000.00, P10,000.00, and another P10,000.00,
for which he no longer issued any guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to have been taken by
respondent's sweet talk and promises of payment considering the millions he expects to receive as
contingent fee in one (1) of his cases.5

However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check No. 0003405780, it was dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take or return complainant's calls nor respond to the
latter's text messages. He completely avoided complainant.6 Consequently, complainant's lawyer wrote a
demand letter7 dated October 15, 2014 for the payment of respondent's indebtedness in the aggregate
amount of P245,000.00, but to no avail. Thus, complainant was constrained to file an administrative case
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8

In an Order9 dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed respondent to submit his answer to the complaint within
a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order, failing which the case shall be heard ex
parte.10 However, respondent filed no answer.11 Subsequently, a Notice of Mandatory
Conference/Hearing12 scheduled on November 13, 2015 was sent to respondent on October 20, 2015, during
which the latter did not appear.13

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation14 dated November 14, 2016, the IBP Investigating Commissioner (IC)
found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and be ordered to return to complainant the amount of
P75,000.00 with legal interest reckoned from July 19, 2014.15 The other loans alleged by complainant were
not duly proven. 16

The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Citing the case of Foronda v. Alvarez, Jr.,17 the IBP IC held that
the issuance of a check that was later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates
a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him and hence, constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.18 The penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was based on the case
of Lao v. Medel,19 where the Court meted the same penalty for gross misconduct committed by deliberately
failing to pay just debts and issuing worthless checks.20

In a Resolution21 dated June 14, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the aforesaid report and
recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the
issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records showing the existence of the loan obligation incurred by respondent
as evidenced by complainant's BDO Check No. 0356555 dated July 3, 2014, as well as Union Bank Check
No. 0003405780 dated July 19, 2014 issued by respondent to guarantee the payment of said loan but which
was dishonored upon presentment for the reason "Account Closed," the Court concurs with the findings and
adopts the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, except for the return to complainant of the
amount of P75,000.00 with legal interest.
Time and again, the Court has imposed the penalty of suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct
that a lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his professional or in his private capacity. Good
character is an essential qualification for the admission to and continued practice of law. Thus, any
wrongdoing, whether professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies
disciplinary action,22 as in this case.

It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from complainant for which he issued a post-dated
check that was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his obligation despite repeated demands. It
has been consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of
worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from
the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner
that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility."23 Thus, the IBP IC correctly ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check was a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which explicitly states:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In Enriquez v. De Vera,24 the Court categorically pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing a worthless
check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct penalized by suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which no conviction of the criminal charge is even necessary.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was '"designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated."25 Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of, or was
nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly
violated the law and thereby "exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to
public interest and public order."26

In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to appear at the
scheduled mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138,
Rules of Court.27 Respondent should stand foremost in complying with the directives of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline not only because as a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal orders of duly constituted
authorities, as well as court orders and processes, but also because the case involved the very foundation of
his right to engage in the practice of law. Therefore, his lack of concern or interest in the status or outcome
of his administrative case would show how much less he would regard the interest of his clients.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
legal profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which his license and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the consequence.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.28 In the cases of Lao v. Medel,29Rangwani v. Dino,30 and Enriquez v. De Vera,31 the
Court imposed the penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law for deliberate failure to pay
just debts and for the issuance of worthless checks. In Sanchez v. Torres,32 the Court increased the penalty
to two (2) years in light of the amount of the loan which was P2,200,000.00, and the fact that respondent
therein had repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer and a motion for reconsideration,
which he nonetheless failed to submit, and had likewise failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the
IBP. Considering, therefore, that the amount of the loan proven by complainant herein is P75,000.00, the
Court sustains the recommended penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law. With respect,
however, to the return of the amount of P75,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, the same
cannot be sustained. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.33 In Tria-Samonte v.
Obias,34 the Court held that its "findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on
the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities which have
no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a proper
proceeding of such nature."35 Thus, the return of the P75,000.00 clearly lies beyond the ambit of this
administrative case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's Oath, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11981, July 03, 2018

LEAH B. TADAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a Verified Complaint-Affidavit1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. (respondent) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code)
in authoring a fake decision of a court.

Sometime in 2011, Leah B. Taday (complainant), an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) staying in Norway,
asked her parents in the Philippines, Virgilio and Natividad Taday, to seek legal services for the nullification
of her marriage. Complainant's parents found respondent and contracted his legal services. On April 17,
2011, a Retainer Agreement2 was executed between respondent and complainant's parents indicating that
respondent's acceptance fee was P140,000.00, to be paid on a staggered basis.

According to complainant, respondent was informed that she was staying in Norway and respondent assured
her that this would not be an issue as he can find ways to push for the resolution of the case despite her
absence.

Respondent drafted a Petition for Annulment of Marriage3 (petition) dated April 20, 2011, which he allegedly
sent to complainant for her signature. After notarizing the petition, respondent filed it before the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City (RTC). The case was then raffled to Branch 131, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
22813.

On November 17, 2011, while complainant was on vacation in the Philippines4 and after paying respondent
his legal fees amounting to P14,500.00,5 respondent delivered a Decision6 dated November 16, 2011 which
granted the annulment of complainant's marriage. The said decision was promulgated by a certain Judge
Ma. Eliza Becamon-Angeles of RTC Branch 162. Complainant became suspicious as the said decision came
from a different branch presided by a different judge where the case was originally filed. Complainant's
family became skeptical as the said decision seemed to come too soon and was poorly crafted.

Confused with the turn of events, verifications were made to ascertain the validity of the decision.
Complainant discovered that both Branch 162 and Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon-Angeles do not exist in the RTC.
Frustrated with the incident, complainant, through her parents, sought the withdrawal
of respondent as her counsel from the case.

However, instead of withdrawing as counsel, respondent filed an urgent motion to withdraw the petition. In
its Order7 dated June 25, 2012, the RTC Branch 131 granted the said motion and the case was dropped from
the civil docket of the court.

Complainant and her parents sought the legal services of Atty. Alexander M. Verzosa (Atty. Verzosa) of the
Verzosa Lauengco Jimenez and Abesames Law Offices for their predicament. Atty. Verzosa sent a
Letter8 dated February 26, 2013, to respondent calling his attention regarding the payment of his attorney's
fees and the purported fake decision of RTC Branch 162.

In his Answer,9 respondent denied being informed that complainant was an OFW and claimed that he was
made to believe that she was merely in the Bicol province, hence, he agreed to draft the petition and gave it
to complainant's parents for her signature. The petition was returned to respondent with complainant's
signature so he notarized and filed it before the court.

Respondent denied delivering any decision relative to the annulment case of complainant. He asserted that
the said decision was only a product of her imagination. Respondent likewise denied that he filed an urgent
motion to withdraw the petition in the RTC, Branch 131. He claimed that he merely drafted the said motion
and gave it to complainant's parents but he never signed it.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was submitted for decision.

IBP Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation,10 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) found that
respondent committed several violations of the Code, particularly, Rules 1.01, 1.02 and Canon 1. The
Commission held that respondent notarized the Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping11 of the
petition, even though complainant was not personally present as she was then in Norway.

The Commission also found that respondent authored a fake decision. It opined that the said decision was
fake because it bore the same format and grammatical errors as that of the petition prepared by
respondent. The Commission disregarded the defense of respondent that it was complainant's parents who
made the fake decision. It stressed that any reasonable mind would know that a fake decision would not
benefit complainant. Moreover, complainant's parents continuously paid the legal fees of respondent, which
would show their lack of intent to create the fabricated decision.

The Commission further underscored that when respondent was confronted with the fake decision, he filed
an urgent motion to withdraw the petition before RTC Branch 131. It highlighted that when the new counsel
of complainant questioned respondent regarding these irregularities, he did not respond.

Based on these circumstances, the Commission concluded that the fake decision originated from respondent
and that he violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code. It recommended the penalty of suspension
of two (2) years from the practice of law.

In its Resolution No. XXI-2015-10012 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) modified
the recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to a penalty of disbarment.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the IBP Board in its Resolution No. XXII-
2016-50813 dated September 23, 2016.

Respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration but it was also denied by the Board in its Resolution
No. XXII-2017-95114 dated April 19, 2017.

The Court's Ruling

The Court adopts the findings of the Commission and agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board to
disbar respondent.

All those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings. Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man for money or
malice. These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly
fiduciary nature of their relationship.15
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without
invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attomey.16 In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must
be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.17

In this case, the Court finds that respondent violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code and the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Respondent notarized the petition even though the affiant was not present

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It is imbued with public interest and only those
who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public.18 Notarization converts a private document to a
public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.19

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
signatory to the document personally appeared before the notary public at the time of the notarization, and
personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At the
time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or other mark in the notary public's
notarial register. The purpose of these requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness
of the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatory's free act and deed. If the signatory is
not acting on his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act. A
notary public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is
incomplete.20

In this case, on April 20, 2011, respondent notarized the verification and certification of non forum shopping
in the petition filed before RTC Branch 131 supposedly executed by complainant as the affiant. At that time,
however, complaint was not in the Philippines because she was still in Norway working as an OFW.
Undoubtedly, respondent violated the notarial rules when he notarized a document without the personal
presence of the affiant.

Respondent gave a flimsy excuse that he was not informed that complainant was not in the Philippines when
he notarized the verification and certification on non forum shopping. Assuming arguendo that this is true,
he should have refrained from notarizing such document until complainant personally appear before him. In
addition, respondent should have explained to complainant and her parents that he can only notarize and
file the petition before the court once complainant returns to the Philippines. Lamentably, instead of
informing his client about the rules of notarization, respondent proceeded with the notarization of the
document and gave a false assurance that the case of complainant would still continue even in her absence.

In Gaddi v. Atty. Velasco,21 the Court held that for notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity
and voluntariness of the signatory to the document, for affixing his signature in an incomplete notarial
certificate, and for dishonesty in his pleadings, the lawyer failed to discharge his duties as notary public and
breached Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code.

Similarly, in Ferguson v. Atty. Ramos22 the Court held that when a lawyer affixes his signature and notarial
seal on a deed of sale, he leads the public to believe that the parties personally appeared before him and
attested to the truth and veracity of the contents thereof. The act of notarizing a document without the
presence of the parties is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due
execution of a document that the courts and the public accord to notarized documents.

Here, respondent notarized the verification and certification of non forum shopping even though complainant
did not personally appear before him. Not only did he violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, he also
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code.

Respondent authored a fake decision and delivered it to his client

Aside from improperly notarizing a petition, respondent committed an even graver transgression by drafting
a fake decision and delivering it to his client in guise of a genuine decision.

In this case, respondent delivered a decision dated November 16, 2011, to complainant, which purportedly
granted the petition for annulment of marriage in her favor. This decision is marred by numerous and
serious irregularities that point to respondent as the author thereof.

First, the decision came from a certain Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon Angeles of RTC Branch 162. Yet, a
verification from the RTC revealed that the said judge and the branch were non-existent.

Second, the fake decision is starkly the same as the petition prepared and filed by respondent. A reading of
the fake decision shows that the statement of facts, issues and the rationale therein are strikingly similar, if
not exactly alike, with the petition. Even the grammatical errors in both documents are similar. The fake
decision was so poorly crafted because it merely copied the petition filed by respondent. Moreover, the font
and spacing in the caption of the petition and the fake decision are one and the same. Glaringly, respondent
did not give any credible explanation regarding the similarity of the fake decision and the petition he
drafted.

Third, when respondent was confronted by complainant and her parents about the fake decision, respondent
immediately filed an urgent motion to withdraw the petition before RTC Branch 131. Respondent provided a
poor excuse that he merely prepared the said motion but did not file it. However, it is clear from the order
dated June 25, 2012 of RTC Branch 131 that the motion was filed by respondent and the case was indeed
withdrawn.23

Lastly, when complainant's case was dropped from the civil docket of RTC Branch 131 at the instance of
respondent, complainant and her parents sought the assistance of another lawyer. Atty. Verzosa, through a
letter dated February 26, 2013, confronted respondent regarding the payment of attorney's fees and the
fake decision which respondent gave to complainant. However, respondent neither answered nor denied the
allegation of complainant's new counsel.

In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent argued that the fake decision was drafted by
complainant's parents. The Court finds this completely absurd. On November 17, 2011, complainant's
parents had just paid respondent's staggering acceptance fee as evidenced by a Receipt.24 On the other
hand, the fake decision was dated November 16, 2011. Thus, it is illogical for complainant's parents to draft
a fake decision when they regularly paid for the services of respondent to legally and rightfully represent
their daughter's case. As opined by the Commission, any reasonable mind would know that a fake decision
would not benefit complainant, thus, complainant's parents have nothing to gain from it.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, the Court concludes that respondent indeed authored the fake
decision in order to deceive complainant that he won the legal battle in her favor. Fortunately, complainant
was prudent in protecting her rights and discovered that the decision given to her by respondent was fake.
Surely, respondent's acts resulted to complainant's injuries and has tarnished the noble image of legal
profession.

Proper penalty

The Court finds that complainant has established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence that: (1)
respondent notarized the verification and certification of non forum shopping of the petition without the
personal presence of complainant; (2) respondent is the author of the fake decision to deceive complainant
that her petition for annulment of marriage was granted; and (3) respondent retaliated against complainant
for confronting him with the fake decision by withdrawing the petition in the court, resulting into the
dropping of the case from the civil docket of the court. These acts constitute violations of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.02 of the Code, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
for legal processes.

RULE 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
Respondent also violated Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, which states that:
SECTION 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code. For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to
those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.25

In Krursel v. Atty. Abion,26 the lawyer therein drafted a fake order from this Court in order to deceive her
client. The Court stated that she made a mockery of the judicial system. Her conduct degraded the
administration of justice and weakened the people's faith in the judicial system. She inexorably besmirched
the entire legal profession. The penalty of disbarment was imposed against the lawyer.

Similarly, in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,27 the penalty of disbarment was
imposed against the lawyer who falsified an official receipt from the Court to cover up his misdeeds. The
Court stated that since the lawyer clearly failed the standards of his noble profession, he did not deserve to
continue as a member of the bar.

In this case, respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct, and lessened the
confidence of the public in the legal system. Instead of being an advocate of justice, he became a
perpetrator of injustice. His reprehensible acts do not merit him to remain in the rolls of the legal profession.
Thus, the ultimate penalty of disbarment must be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, the Court adopts the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Govenwrs and finds Atty. Dionisio B. Apoya, Jr. GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 2, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He
is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into Atty. Dionisio B.
Apoya, Jr.'s records. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11724 (Formerly CBD No. 14-4109), July 31, 2018

HDI HOLDINGS PHILIPPINES, INC., Complainant, v. ATTY. EMMANUEL N. CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant HDI Holdings Philippines, Inc. (HDI),
represented by Darmo N. Castillo,1 against respondent Atty. Emmanuel N. Cruz (Atty. Cruz) for violations of
Canons 16.01, 16.02, 16.03, 16.04 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The facts are as follows:

HDI is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office
address at 4th Floor, Francisco Gold I Condominium, 784 Edsa, Quezon City, Philippines.
In its complaint, HDI alleged that on July 10, 2010, they retained the services of Atty. Cruz as its in-house
corporate counsel and corporate secretary. In the beginning, HDI's directors and officers were pleased with
Atty. Cruz's performance, thus, in time, he earned their trust and confidence that he was eventually tasked
to handle the corporation's important and confidential matters. Ultimately, Atty. Cruz became a friend to
most of HDI's directors, officers and staff members.

However, HDI lamented that Atty. Cruz's seeming friendliness was apparently a mere facade in order to gain
the trust of HDI's officers and directors for his financial gain. HDI averred that through Atty. Cruz's
deception and machinations, he managed to misappropriate a total of Forty-One Million Three Hundred
Seventeen Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Seven and Eighteen Centavos (P41,317,167.18), in the following
manner, to wit:

The cash bid and the unpaid personal loans

On September 21, 2011, HDI released Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) in cash to Atty. Cruz to be used
as cash bid for the purchase of a parcel of land located at E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue. Atty. Cruz signed a cash
voucher dated September 21, 2011 evidencing the receipt of the said amount.2

However, after HDI lost in the bid, Atty. Cruz failed to promptly return the money to the company. HDI
made several demands to Atty. Cruz for the return of the money but it was only after four (4) months, or on
January 18, 2012, when Atty. Cruz finally returned the said amount. Because Atty. Cruz eventually returned
the P3 million, HDI gave him the benefit of the doubt and continued to trust him.

A few months later, sometime in April 2012, Atty. Cruz approached HDI's officers and asked for a Four
Million Peso (P4,000,000.00) personal loan allegedly to be used in purchasing his house. Based on his
promises and his position with the company, HDI's officers loaned him the said amount. A Contract of
Loan3 was executed on April 30, 2012 between Atty. Cruz and Chia Tzu Chern, one of HDI's officers, where
the former agreed to pay his loan in the amount of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) by June 15, 2012.

Thereafter, on May 3, 2012, Atty. Cruz informed the management of HDI that there was going to be another
bidding for the E. Rodriguez property. On May 9, 2012, he sent an e-mail4 to Conchita G. Nicolas, the
Corporate Treasurer, asking for Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for the bid deposit. Banking on his
assurances to HDI that the same amount was fully refundable and/or convertible as earnest money for the
sale, HDI again gave Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) to Atty. Cruz, who signed a check voucher5 dated
May 10, 2012 evidencing receipt of the said amount.

Few days later, Atty. Cruz asked for an additional Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for the bid deposit,
claiming that it will be added to their earlier bid deposit of P3,000,000.00, and that the same was likewise
refundable and/or convertible as earnest money for the sale. On May 14, 2012, Atty. Cruz signed the check
voucher6 acknowledging receipt of the additional P3 million as cash bid bond.

On July 18 and 19, 2012, Atty. Cruz sent e-mails7 to HDI's Chairman, Brandon Chia and begged for another
Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) as personal loan. He alleged that his brother has a serious gambling
problem, and that their family had been threatened by several loan sharks because of his brother's debts.
The additional P4,000,000.00 personal loan was supposedly to pay off his brother's debts and keep his
family out of harm. Feeling sorry for Atty. Cruz, Mr. Chia agreed to give him a loan out of his own pocket.

Thereafter, HDI learned that it did not win the rebidding on the E. Rodriguez property. Thus, HDI demanded
for the immediate return of the Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) bid bond. However, despite several and
repeated demands, Atty. Cruz did not heed the same.

Later, in an e-mail8 dated September 27, 2012, Atty. Cruz confessed that he converted the allotted cash bid
bond in the total amount of P6,000,000.00 for his personal use, to wit:
x x x It was at this time sir that my brother told us that he still had some obligations with some other
financiers and that he was getting death threats already. My mom said that she really doesn't know how to
pay for all of it immediately because of the staggering amount (14M including the first 4M). During that time
sir I was supposed to get the bid bond for the second bid for the property beside our newly-acquired Petron
property. We followed the same cash bid procedure sir in our first attempt to acquire the property. However,
instead of remitting back the bond money after the bid just like in our first attempt, out of desperation and
for fear of the life of my family, I unilaterally decided to use that money sir instead of returning it. I
thought of using it first to settle with the financiers and thereafter seek the help of other friends
so I can immediately return the money to which failed to do sir.
Sir, in relaying to you this, I am not justifying or trying to rationalize out what I've done. I just wanted to
relay what really happened. Bottom line sir, I know what I did was wrong sir and I deeply apologize for my
act. I know I have affected a lot of things by my acts. I have not only placed myself at risk but also the
company. My personal concerns got in the way of my work and for that I'm truly sorry.
Believing Atty. Cruz's sincerity in his apology and that he truly acted out of concern for his family, HDI
forgave him and agreed to just convert the misappropriated Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) into another
loan. Thus, another Contract of Loan9 was executed, this time for the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00), representing the second Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) loan made in July, plus the
missing Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00). On September 15, 2012, Atty. Cruz also executed an
acknowledgment, admitting his Ten Million Peso (P10,000,000.00) outstanding debt to Mr. Chia.10

Transaction concerning the property covered by TCT No. 75276

Sometime in the last quarter of 2011, Capital Growth Inc. (CGI), a corporation wholly-owned by HDI
Holdings, Inc., through Atty. Cruz, arranged and facilitated the purchase of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7527611 which was co-owned by Francisco G. Castillo, Francisco
Castillo, and Cristina C. Castillo.

On December 21, 2011, Atty. Cruz sent an e-mail to Mr. Chia, informing him that CGI intended to make
payment of the purchase price of the property and thus requested Mr. Chia, being the Chairman of HDI, for
an amount of Twenty-Six Million Nine Hundred Eighty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P26,987,500.00). The said amount was released by CGI, upon Atty. Cruz's instructions to one Atty. Mauro
Anthony Cabading III (Atty. Cabading), the alleged attorney-in-fact of the Castillo family, who duly
acknowledged receipt of the payment.12

Thereafter, CGI asked Atty. Cruz several times about the transfer of the title of the property to the
company's name but the latter gave no definite answers. Consequently, on July 16, 2013, or more than a
year later, a representative of CGI met with Francisco C. Castillo, the seller. It was then that HDI discovered
that the purchase price of the property was only Twenty-Five Million Two Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand
Four Hundred Pesos (P25,298,400.00) and that they only received the said amount, and not the
P26,987,500.00 as Atty. Cruz's claimed. Further, the Castillo family infon11ed them that they never
authorized Atty. Cabading to be their attorney-in-fact.

After discovering the discrepancy of P1,689,100.00 from the true purchase price of the property, CGI
demanded from Atty. Cruz and Atty. Cabading the return of the difference in the overpriced amount.
However, despite numerous verbal demands made by HDI, Atty. Cruz failed to return the P1,689,100.00.

The fictitious sale of a certain Quezon City property covered by TCT no. N-308973

On May 10, 2012, Atty. Cruz sent an e-mail13 to Mr. Chia, informing him of a 500 square meter property for
sale located in Quezon City, covered by TCT No. N-308973. They were told that the owner of the Quezon
City property died, and the heirs who now owned the same were already entertaining buyers. Atty. Cruz
further stated in his e mail that:
As advised by their lawyer, the family is really intending to sell it already so sir we might need to firm up in
paper with them already as [there] are other interested parties, I would like to ask for your advise regarding
the offer that I will be making tom sir.14
On May 12, 2012, Atty. Cruz sent another e-mail15 to Mr. Chia confirming the meeting with the sellers and
their lawyer and alleged that he offered P42,500.00 per square meter, as advised, which price the heirs
found acceptable. Thereafter, Atty. Cruz advised Mr. Chia that the heirs required an earnest money of
P5,000,000.00 but the full payment of the purchase price of P21,250,000.00 should immediately follow. He
added that it was subject to full reimbursement in the event the heirs defaulted in the contract.

Because Atty. Cruz emphasized the urgency of the sale, HDI immediately started processing the earnest
money of P5,000,000.00 to be given to the heirs. Atty. Cruz then infoni1ed HDI that the check should be
payable again to Atty. Cabading, the alleged family lawyer of the heirs.

On May 15, 2012, HDI gave a Planters Bank Cashier's Check No. 57837616 in the amount of Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to Atty. Cruz as earnest money for the QC property. In return, copies of the contract
to sell and deed of absolute sale signed by a certain Federico Castillo II as the seller were given to HDI.17

On May 23, 2012, HDI released to Atty. Cruz another cashier's check18 in the amount of Sixteen Million Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P16,250,000.00) representing the balance on the full purchase price of the
Q.C. property, payable to Atty. Cabading. The two manager's checks were deposited into the Banco De Oro
Account No. 2138009864 of Cabading.

Thereafter, HDI followed up with Atty. Cruz the transfer of the title of the QC property in its name but
nothing happened. Consequently, HDI directly communicated with one of the heirs, Mr. Jose Castillo. To
HDI's surprise, it turned out that the QC propetiy was never sold to HDI, and the owners of the QC property
was not at all interested in selling the property. Further, HDI found out that the alleged heirs did not have a
family lawyer by the name of Atty. Cabading. The signed copies of the contract to seH and deed of absolute
sale turned out to be mere forgeries as there was also no person in the name of Federico Castillo II, the
supposed named seller in the documents.

Due to this discovery, HDI demanded from Atty. Cruz the return of the total amount of Twenty One Million
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P21,250,000.00), which was released to him for the purchase of the
Q.C. property. To date, Atty. Cruz has ignored HDI's demands, and there has been no attempt on his part to
return the P21,250,000.00 he pocketed.

The unremitted rentals

CGI owned two (2) parcels of land located at E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue covered by TCT Nos. 104620 and
104621 which were being leased to Petron Corporation until March 6, 2018.

Since 2011, HDI, through CGI, has not received rental payments from Petron. Consequently, in the
afternoon of July 2, 2013, the Executive Assistant to the Chairman of HDI, Ms. Wilhelmina Liwanag, called
Petron to inquire and/or follow up on the unpaid rentals from 2011 to 2012 due to HDI as the new owner of
CGI. She was then informed that two (2) checks were already released to Atty. Cruz after he presented a
Secretary's Certificate19 authorizing himself to receive the rental payments.

The next day, Ms. Liwanag, together with the Chairman of HDI and a director of CGI, went to the office of
Petron at SMC Head Office complex to verifY the truth of Petron's officer's claims. They went pres.ented the
following documents:
a. The unauthorized Secretary's Certificate dated January 10, 201320 which pmportedly authorized Atty.
Cruz and a certain Adolph Ilas to collect the rental payments forthe subject property;

b. Acknowledgment receipts for the rental payments signed by Atty. Cruz;21

c. Photocopies of the checks received by Atty. Cruz, i.e., the first check received on January 18, 2013 in the
amount of Two Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Two Pesos and Twenty-Five
Centavos (P2,150,282.25);22 and the second check, in the form of manager's check received on March 12,
2013 in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Fifty-Seven Thousand Seven Hundred EightyFour Pesos and
Ninety-Three Centavos (P2,257,784.93);23 and

d. Two Bureau of Intemal Revenue Forms No. 2307 with Atty. Cruz as the named payee.24
Upon discovery, HDI immediately demanded from Atty. Cruz the rental payments in the total amount of
Four Million Four Hundred Eight Thousand Sixty-Seven Pesos and Eighteen Centavos
(P4,408,067.18)25which he failed to turn over.

Later, HDI finally decided to confront him about his actions. On July 4, 2013, Atty. Cruz went to HDI's office
where he broke down and admitted to everything. After writing his confession,26 Atty. Cruz likewise
tendered his resignation from HDI. On the same occasion, Atty. Cruz's relatives were present and also
expressed their commitment to help pay Atty. Cruz's debts with HDI.27

However, even after several demand letters, Atty. Cruz failed to return the misappropriated money.

Considering the above-cited actuations of Atty. Cruz, it is evident that he violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Rule
1.02, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Rules 16.01, 16.02, 16.03, 16.04 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. HDI alleged that Atty. Cruz failed to live up to the standards expected of a lawyer, thus, he
should be disbarred from the practice of law.

On February 5, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) directed Atty. Cruz to file his Answer on the
complaint against him.28
During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), only the counsel
for HDI appeared. Thus, on October 7, 2014, the IBP-CBD terminated the preliminary mandatory conference
and directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.

On July 6, 2015, in its Report and Recommendation,29 the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Cruz be
disbarred from the practice of law.

In a Resolution No. XXII-2016-44630 dated August 27, 2016, the IBPBoard of Governors resolved to adopt
and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

RULING

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which
the complainant has the burden to discharge. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced
by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief compared to the presented contrary evidence.31

However, in the instant case, Atty. Cruz has chosen to remain silent despite the severity of the allegations
against him. He was given several opportunities to comment on the charges yet no comment came. The
natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is
totally against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations.
Silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth thereof. Consequently,
we are left with no choice but to deduce his implicit admission of the charges levelled against him. Qui tacet
consentive videtur. Silence gives consent.32

Thus, we find that the evidence submitted by HDI, albeit secondary evidence only being mere photocopies,
when put together with Atty. Cruz' written confession33 and his subsequent non-cooperation during the
proceedings before the IBP, would give a convincing conclusion that indeed Atty. Cruz is guilty of the
following reprehensible acts, to wit:
(a) misappropriation of the cash bid in the total amount of P6,000,000.00 which remains unpaid;

(b) contracting unsecured personal loans with HDI in the total amount of P8,000,000.00 which remains
unpaid;

(c) deceiving HDI as to the true selling price of the Q.C. property which resulted in overpayment in the
amount of P1,689,100.00 which remains unpaid;

(d) fabricating a fictitious sale by executing a fictitious contract to sell and deed of sale in order to obtain
money in the amount of P21,250,000.00 from HDI which remains unpaid;

(e) collecting rental payments amounting to P4,408,067.18, without authority, and thereafter, failed to turn
over the same to HDI; and

(f) executing a fake Secretarys Certificate appointing himself as the authorized person to rece.ive the
payments of the lease rentals.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Good moral character is necessary for a lawyer to practice the profession. An attorney is expected not only
to be professionally competent, but to also have moral integrity.34 Deceit and lack of accountability and
integrity reflect on his ability to perform his functions as a lawyer, who is always expected to act and appear
to act lawfully and honestly, and must uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Atty. Cruz
failed in these respects as a lawyer.

In the instant case, considering all the above-cited infractions, it is beyond dispute that Atty. Cruz is guilty
of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct. In several occasions, he manifested a propensity to lie and
deceive his client in order to obtain money. Obviously, his misrepresentations in order to compel HDI to
release money for cash bids, fictitious purchase of a property, the overpriced purchase price of the Q.C.
property and his misrepresentation that he had authority to collect rentals in behalf of HDI and CGI, as well
as his execution of fictitious documents to give semblance of truth to his misrepresentations, constitute
grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These reprehensible conduct of Atty. Cruz without doubt
breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients.

This Court also sees it fit to note that the CPR strongly condemns Atty. Cruz's conduct in handling the funds
of HDI. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others
kept by him.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. When a lawyer collects or
receives money from his client for a pmiicular purpose as in cash for bidclings and purchase of properties, as
in this case, he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the
money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an
accounting or to return the money if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize constitutes a
blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.35

Atty. Cruz's failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the
client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence
in the legal profession and deserves punishment.36

Atty. Cruz's unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he likewise
violated Canon. 16.04 of the CPR, which states that "[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling/or the client."

In his private capacity, Atty. Cruz requested from HDI, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts
as evidenced by contracts of loan and acknowledgement receipts, the authenticity of which was undisputed.
The first time, he borrowed P4,000,000.00 for the purchase of his house; and the second time, he borrowed
another P4,000,000.00 in order to help his brother who allegedly has serious gambling debts. Apparently,
these acts of borrowing money were committed by Atty. Cruz in his private capacity but were assented to by
HDI because of the trust and confidence it has in him as a lawyer. Worse, the loans were unsecured which
left HDI unprotected.

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required
to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings
where the parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are
disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, comis carefully watch these transactions to
assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney's
favor.37 Clearly, in the instant case, Atty. Cruz's acts of contracting unsecured personal loans and receiving
money as loan proceeds from HDI, and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of
integrity and sense of fair dealing.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued
with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to
abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer
from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by
the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In Frias v. Atty.
Lozada,38 the Court categorically declared that a lawyer's act of asking a client for a loan, as what Atty. Cruz
did, is unethical and that the act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of Canon 16.04 of the
CPR.

Corollary, in borrowing money from HDI and thereafter failing to pay the same within the agreed period,
Atty. Cruz failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. We, thus, likewise tind Atty. Cruz
equally liable for violating Canon 7 of the CPR which reads: Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

That being said, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice
and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.39

Finally, Atty. Cruz's indifference to the IBP's directives to tile his comment on the allegations against him
cannot be countenanced. He disregarded the proceedings before the IBP despite receipt of summons and
notices. Atty. Cruz's act of not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating
Commissioner, despite due notice, further aggravated his already disgraceful attitude.40 As an officer of the
Court, Atty. Cruz is expected to know that said directives of the IBP, as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers, is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
promptly and completely.41

Considering the above-cited infractions, it is, thus, beyond dispute that Atty. Cruz demonstrated not just
disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public.
For taking advantage of the trust and confidence of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct and fraudulent acts for personal gain, and disrespecting the IBP due to non-compliance of its
directive to file comment, His acts constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
propensity to defraud his client, and the public in general, render him unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in him as a member of the Bar. Atty. Cruz, indeed, deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.

However, insofar as the return of the misappropriated money, the same should be qualified. As to the
money which Atty. Cruz borrowed as personal loan, the Court cannot order him to return the money the
borrowed from complainant in his private capacity. Complainant may tile a separate civil case against Atty.
Cruz for this purpose.

In Foster v. Atty. Agtang,42 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if
he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the detennination of respondent's administrative
liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against
each other.43

However, insofar as the money received by Atty. Cruz from HDI, in his professional capacity, to wit:
P6,000,000.00, representing the total amount released for bidding;44 P21,250,000.00, representing the total
amount released for the purported purchase of a property which turned out to be fictitious;45P4,408,067.18
representing the unremitted rentals from Petron,46 and P1,689,100.00 representing the overpayment in the
overpriced Q.C. property,47 these amounts should be returned as it was borne out of their professional
relationship.

PENALTY

Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases48 where lawyers abused the trust and confidence reposed in them
by their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court
found them guilty of gross misconduct and disbarred them.

As the infractions in the foregoing cases are similar to those committed by Atty. Cruz, in the instant case,
the Court deems that the same penalty of disbarment be imposed against him. Clearly, as herein discussed
Atty. Cruz committed deliberate violations of the Code as he dishonestly dealt with HDI and misappropriated
the funds intended to a specific purpose for his personal gain. Atty. Cruz, thus, deserves the ultimate
punishment of disbarment.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL CRUZ, guilty of gross
misconduct by violating the Canon of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct, and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Furthermore, Atty. Cruz is ORDERED to RETURN to complainant HDI the amounts of P6,000,000.00,
P21,250,000.00, P4,408,067.18 and P1,689,100.00, with legal interest, if it is still unpaid, within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.