TABANIAG V.

PEOPLE

PEOPLE V NELMIDA, SEPTEMBER 11, 2012

DOCTRINE:
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one
performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of
the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of
Article 48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional
phrase “a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.” This is not an original
reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, the Court already recognized the “deeply rooted x x x
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes.” As we observed in People v. Tabaco, clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the
[Revised Penal Code], [this Court] further stated in [Hon.] Pineda that “to apply the first half of Article
48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the
law.”
RTC: Double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder
CA Affirmed RTC
SC: (no complex crime) 2 counts of murder and 7 counts of attempted murder
Aggravating circumstances alleged: Treachery, abuse of superior strength.
Mitigating circumstances: none

Facts:
On June 5, 2001. The appelants herein, Wenceslao Nelmida and Ricardo Ajok, together with 10
other accused, allegedly ambushed the victims, they were 9 in total and 2 of them, namely P03 De la
Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, immediately died due to the ambush. The act was perpetrated through the
use of high-powered firearms with conspiracy. The crime was allegedly committed by the accused in
relation to the past Mayoralty Elections in the locality.

On August 29, 2001 appellant Wenceslao was arrested in Misamis Occidental. Samuel Cutad While
Ricardo was arrested on December 20, 2001 in Sapad, Lanao Del Norte. The other 9 accused
remain at large.

One of the accused, Samuel Cutad, was allowed by the court to become state witness and was then
acquitted of such crime.

The survivors, together with the Samuel Cutad testified the following narration of events:

Samuel’s testimony:
That on June 5, 2001 around 3pm, the party of Samuel(accused party), positioned themselves on
both sides of a road in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and waited for the pickup of the
vicitms to pass by. That upon passing of the victims’ vehicle, with the use of high powered firearms,
the accused party fired upon them inflicting numerous injuries and causing the death of the
aforementioned individuals.

That after committing the act, the accused went back to Samuel’s house just ten meters away from
the scene of the crime and then got their stuff from the said house and went about their own ways.
Survivors’ testimony:
The company of Mayor Tawantawan were heading to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when suddenly
they were fired upon by the accused from both sides of the road. The driver and Mayor
Tawantawan, who was seated at the passender’s seat, were unharmed, but those riding at the back
were all injured. All of them were rushed to the hospital but PO3 Dela Cruz and Sgt. Dacoco wered
dead before they arrived at the hospital. The other five victims required hospitalization for the
treatment of their injuries.

Some of the survivors seated at the back of the pickup also testified that they saw Wenceslao
shooting directly at them while in a squatting position by the side of the road.

On the other hand, Ricardo and Wenceslao interposed the defense of alibi. Both the RTC and CA did
not appreciate their defense. Both courts ruled that the defense of alibi, absent the presentation of
other evidence proving the same, is not entitled to any weight in the eyes of the law. That they were
also not sufficiently able to prove their physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime when the
same occurred.

Thus, the RTC sentenced the accused with reclusion perpetua, applying Art. 48. The CA affirmed the
same.

Appellants then appealed their case to the Court. The Court ruled that they were guilty beyond
reasonable ground of the crime but modified the sentence imposed declaring that the application of
Art. 48 on Complex crimes was erroneous.

Issue:
WON Art. 48 is applicable in the case at bar.

SC Ruling:
No. The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which
explicitly states that:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and
in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of
the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case
do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims were
not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. To note,
appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts died while five (5) of them were
wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies.
Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than
one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, each act by each gunman
pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and
distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not
apply for it speaks only of a "single act."

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code despite the
fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to
the death and/or injuries to their victims.

In People v. Lawas, the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas,
simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was there
held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the
accused to fire at each and every victim separately and distinctly from each other.
If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense.
However, "single criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the
identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to perpetuate
the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. Since it
was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to
find all the accused guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them
responsible for 50 deaths.

Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this Court held in People v.
Remollino, the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule.
The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy, among others.
Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the
concerted actions of the appellants and their co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused
brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up
service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their
co-accused, thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited
for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle
passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets thereon
resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused
ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt to get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed
appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-accused fled.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the appellants and their
co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were synchronized in their approach to riddle
with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a
single criminal impulse ─ to kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused
persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active
cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create
joint criminal responsibility.
With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had assumed
joint criminal responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among them
actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective
responsibility replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of
determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.

Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos, People v. Abella, People v. Garcia and People v. Pincalin,
this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even though several acts were
performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to Lawas, that Article
48 is applicable even in cases where several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. In Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that: nonetheless,
this Court further held that "in other cases where several killings on the same occasion were
perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings
would be treated as separate offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some
decided cases."

De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the general rule stated in
Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar circumstance of the cases.

It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, this Court, once again, applied Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were not the same as in Lawas, De los
Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court departed from the general rule.

In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley of shots at the
jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando),
survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime. Accused were convicted for the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. We
there held that the case comes within the purview of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing
Lawas and Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts were performed by the
accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed Rolando; and that there
was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately
and distinctly from each other. On the premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal
impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi’s group as a whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense.

The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.

The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several
killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be
applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the
killings did not involve prisoners or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such,
Abella would not apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since
conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused.
Each accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing
the number of persons actually killed by each of them.
Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.
Abuse of superior strength was absorbed by treachery. Treachery was taken as the qualifying
circumstance of the crime to elevate the crime to murder. Evident Premeditation was not duly
proven.
The prosecution was also not able to prove that absent the fact of medical assistance, the other
victims would have naturally died, thus frustrated murder also cannot be upheld.
With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.
PEOPLE V. DILLATAN SR.
SUMMARY: Accused-appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide, for taking P70,000 and
shooting at the victims, leading to injuries on the Spouses Acob and the death of their son. The SC
affirmed their conviction.
DOCTRINE: Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or
with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as
used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the
central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after
the robbery.
---
Common human experience tells us that when extraordinary circumstances take place, it is natural
for persons to remember many of the important details. This Court has held that the most natural
reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime is committed. Most often the face of the assailant and
body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness'
memory. Thus, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to
remember the faces of the assailants, this Court sees no reason how both parents, who witnessed
the violence inflicted, not only upon themselves, but especially upon their son, who eventually died
by reason thereof, could have done any less.
---
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a joint
purpose, concert of action and community of interest. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that
there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the
time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in its
execution.
Moreover, it is settled that when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing,
unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
---
“Homicide," in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense
and forms part of the essential element of robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force
upon anything. Stated differently, all the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
FACTS: Private complainants, the spouses Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob), were owners of
a market stall at the public market of Sta. Rosa, Aurora, Isabela. Around 6 o'clock in the evening of
February 7, 2010, the Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their stall and
proceeded home by riding together on their motorcycle. Homer was the driver, Violeta sat at the
middle, while Henry sat behind her. They were approaching the entrance to their barangay around
6:30 p.m. when they noticed two persons, whom they later identified as herein accused-appellants,
near a motorcycle. When they passed, accused-appellants rode the motorcycle and tailed them.
Accused- appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced them to
stop and immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt
bag which contained P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter, Dillatan uttered, "barilin mo na." Garcia then fired
at the victims hitting, first, the left hand of Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and
pierced Homer's chest causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry, on the
other hand, was able to get off the motorcycle and tried to escape but Garcia also fired at him
thereby hitting his right knee. Accused-appellants, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several
people then came to the aid of the private complainants and brought them to the hospital where
Homer later expired by reason of his gunshot wound. Violeta and Henry were treated for their
wounds. Accused-appellants were apprehended by police authorities later at night where they were
subsequently identified by Violeta at the police station as the ones who grabbed her belt bag and
shot them. A criminal complaint was subsequently filed against accused-appellants.
 Accused-appellants were charged of robbery with homicide. RTC convicted them of the
crime charged. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
 WoN the prosecution established the identity of the assailants

o YES. It must be stressed that Henry and Violeta were seated together atop their
motorcycle when Dillatan grabbed her bag and Garcia fired at them. In fact,
Violeta was embracing her son, Homer, when a single bullet struck them. Both
accused-appellants, at that time, were both less than a meter away from the
victims. Hence, despite the swiftness of the assault upon them, Henry and
Violeta could not have mistaken the identity of accused- appellants as the
persons responsible for the attack.

o Moreover, Violeta's testimony disproves the poor illumination claim of accused-

appellants when she testified that "it was still bright" at the time of the
commission of the crime. It is settled that when the conditions of visibility are
favorable, as in this case, the eyewitness identification of accused-appellants as
the malefactors and the specific acts constituting the crime should be accepted.
Add the fact that Violeta and Henry had an unhindered view of the faces of
accused-appellants during the whole time that the crime was being committed.
Thus, accused-appellants' attack on the positive identification by Violeta and
Henry must, therefore, fail.

 WoN accused-appellants acted in conspiracy with one another

o YES. In the present case, the coordinated acts and movements of accused-
appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime point to no other
conclusion than that they have acted in conspiracy with each other.

NOTES: In the present case where, aside from the killing of Homer, the Spouses Acob, on the
occasion of the same robbery, also sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime
committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries sustained by the Spouses Acob are
subsumed under the generic term "homicide" and, thus, become part and parcel of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Nonetheless, it is also settled that in robbery with homicide, the victims who sustained injuries,
but were not killed, shall also be indemnified. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries
sustained by these victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity
and damages.
In the instant case, while it was alleged in the Information that Henry, who was shot on his right
knee, and Violeta, who's left hand was hit by the same bullet that killed Homer, could have died
from their injuries were it not for the timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, the
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove such allegation. Thus, their injuries are
not considered fatal and, as such, the Spouses Acob are each entitled only to be indemnified
amounts which are equivalent to those awarded in an attempted stage.
PEOPLE V. LIM
SUMMARY: The SC acquitted Romy Lim of violation of R.A. 9165 for non-compliance with the
chain of custody rule.
DOCTRINE: It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the
physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s
such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area;
(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for
and in his/her behalf;
(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to
be apprehended;
(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and
an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of
being charged with arbitrary detention; or
(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on
tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of
the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven.
---
Judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are
typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto,
Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements
of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn
statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of
coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX
of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall be presented.
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been
practiced in most cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts'
already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following
should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must
state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers
must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in
order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn
statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before
the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in
order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
 4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may
exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest)
or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 112, Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional
Office X of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a confidential
informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7,
Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col.
Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan,
and IO1 Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting officer/back-up/evidence
custodian, and the poseur-buyer, respectively. The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust
money (with its serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the Coordination Form for the
nearest police station, and other related documents.
Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about 15 minutes before
10:00 p.m. and arrived in the target area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and the CI
alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and
the other team members disembarked a few meters after and positioned themselves in the area
to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped in front of a house. The CI
knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. " Gorres came out and invited them to enter.
Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television. When the CI introduced IO1
Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres
stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who
then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn,
IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan,
which was the pre-arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members, immediately
rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were standing near the door.
They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that they
were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest for
selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their heads and to squat on the
floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body
search on both.
When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his
pocket. IO1 Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and a
transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it contained a
plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was seized.
IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of
white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that
she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite
exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media and barangay
officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.
The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1
Orellan in possession of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and
prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and for the
drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the case. Likewise,
IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and
Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the
evidence seized were taken.
The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug
specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the
sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic
Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas personally received the letter- requests and the two
pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI
Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory
tests on them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of
shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With
respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of
shabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were
reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on
the cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence
custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office during
the inquest.
Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).
Lim, together with Gorres, was also indicted for illegal sale of shabu. RTC handed a guilty
verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient
evidence linking him as a conspirator. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
 WoN the chain of custody rule was complied with

o NO. We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the
confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the
safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by
law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such
as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a
counter-assault. The present case is not one of those.

o Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the
plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned
over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1
Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately
conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu. To
ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by
Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body
search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both
bearing his initial/signature.

o Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives

of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of
the seized items. In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
 o In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay
officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining,
making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. IO2 Orcales similarly declared
that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the
evening and there were no available media representative and barangay officials
despite their effort to contact them. He admitted that there are times when they
do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might leak the
confidential information. We are of the view that these justifications are
unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the
law.

o The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence
of a representative from the Department the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, stated
in his Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the
media, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried
to contact a DOJ representative.

o The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details
of an earnest effort to coordinate with and secure presence of the required
witnesses. They also failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in
waiting for the representatives in Lim's house, considering that the team is
composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two accused were the only
persons in the house.

NOTES: Lim ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt