DAAN V.

SANDIGANBAYAN

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-
24196,1 questions the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.

The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as follows:

Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were charged before this Court for three counts of
malversation of public funds involving the sums of ₱3,293.00, ₱1,869.00, and ₱13,528.00, respectively, which they
purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some
laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective
salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused
were also indicted before this Court for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.

In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea
of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to
substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee with
a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual. On the other hand,
in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but
to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.

Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the accused to
plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual. The prosecution explained:

"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for
a lesser offense of falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
code will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be
the master mind of these criminal acts."

Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said accused
to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of ₱18,860.00 as per official receipt
issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government
has already been restituted x x x.3

The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March 25, 2004, denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea
Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was
presented to justify its approval.5

The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated May 31, 2004.

This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer
on the following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the
payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only ₱18,860.00, which
he already restituted.6

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than
that for the graver charge.7

Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4,
cir. 38-98)

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,8 viz:

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
 (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The
agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis
supplied)

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence
and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-
trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.9

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e.,
that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged
is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.12

In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court,14 viz:

x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick
within which their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83
SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462,
February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale or
the law:

x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act
in allowing the appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide
could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 4
of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have
been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied)

However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion
should neither be arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.16

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer on the ground that petitioner and the
prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
The Sandiganbayan believes that approving the proposal would "only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges
against them and send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to face
would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits they are likely to derive
from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent
value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government."17 1avvphi 1
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent
events and higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea offer should be accepted. The present
case calls for the judicious exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -

Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through
the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather
than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts.18

and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts,19 in order to afford equal justice to
petitioner.

In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the
Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie "Atong" Ang. The
agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to return the
amount of ₱25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration
the timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the requirements of Section 2, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court. The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of "not
guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is
Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is
Plunder.21

The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the
present case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor rationalized:

In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of
₱18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the
damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.

There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is
also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.

With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a
lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
will strengthen our cases against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be
the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely
designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.22

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public Documents through
an untruthful narration of facts to be established, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code has the following elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercial document.24

As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) he
has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are
public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or
property.25 Article 217 also provides that the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or
property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, "shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds
or property to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption is rebutted, then it is
completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.26

Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer, the
lesser offense which petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a public
officer; (b) the offender must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is required by law
or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account
for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.27

Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense includes or is included in the other, to wit:

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former as alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said
to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.28

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the
lesser offenses. Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser
offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his
official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein,
with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain allegations which make out a
case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically, petitioner may
still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render
account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an accounting within the prescribed
period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser
offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.

Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as
foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or custody of local government funds,29 not to mention that
petitioner has already restituted the amount of ₱18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which involves a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a whopping ₱25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case
tremendously pales in comparison.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross inequity will result in a discriminatory dispensation
of justice, the Court will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE.
The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

PANAGUITON V. DOJ

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in
CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent
motion for reconsideration.2

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8
January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner
three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and
Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of
funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili
on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson
appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in
the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had
lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he
himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued
the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim
wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili
and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after
finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño
directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the
questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which
provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year
period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the
complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to
1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the
alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the
order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the
investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same,
stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3)
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that
Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and
punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of
offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court
ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before
the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the
DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification
and certification of non-forum

shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a
mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion
an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion,
stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28

In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on
technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance
with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg.
22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in
accordance with Act No. 3326.

Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition
for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In
addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases.30

The petition is meritorious.

First on the technical issues.

Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with
the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a
number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither
jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31

Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged
are true and correct–the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar,
we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with
the verification requirement.

Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure
to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading
of the petition before the

Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy
of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.

Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in
declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what
is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that
the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals'
pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his
control.38

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special
Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under
special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under
Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position
that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4
December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested
in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People
v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the

institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People
v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a
judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws,
the Court ruled that the

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In
the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court
ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted
by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation
of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves
the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any
kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are
not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24
August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the
assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer
setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties,
especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the
Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution
of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under
B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of
prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21
March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is
also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the
petitioner.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONE V. BERONILLA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 183824 December 8, 2010

MYRNA P. ANTONE, Petitioner,

vs.
LEO R. BERONILLA, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the
issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a) the Resolution1 dated 29 April 2008 dismissing
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assailed the trial court’s Orders 2 dated 20 September 2007 and 6
December 2007 in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution3 dated 18 July 2008 denying
the motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.

The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were rendered incomplete after
herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the court believed would negate the allegation in the
Information that there was a first valid marriage. The evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.

The Antecedents

On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint4 for Bigamy against Leo R.
Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978
had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.

On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information5 before the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled to Branch 115.

Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.6 He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was
declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;7 that the decision
became final and executory on 15 May 200[7];8 and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal
Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007.9 He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy.10

In its comment/opposition to the motion,11 the prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained that the respondent
committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of
petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage
on 16 February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first
marriage null and void on 27 April 2007.12 The prosecution also invoked the rulings of the Supreme Court holding that
a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information, and that facts contrary thereto
are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.13

After a hearing on the motion,14 the court quashed the Information.15 Applying Morigo v. People,16 it ruled:

Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was actually never legally married to Myrna
Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the definition of
Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage
must at least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a similar case, [the Supreme
Court] had the occasion to state:

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." xxx The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. xxx17

The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order18 on the ground, among others,
that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are not on all fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed
out that, in Mercado v. Tan,19 this Court has already settled that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense."20

In its Order of 6 December 2007,21 the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating that Mercado has already
been superseded by Morigo.

In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment22 before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, petitioner
questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-
1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage
of petitioner with respondent null and void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No. B-1290) to file
her "answer to the complaint."23 On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for failure
of herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.24 Respondent, however,
challenged the orders issued by the court before the Court of Appeals.25 The matter is still pending resolution thereat.26

Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March 2008 before the Court of
Appeals,27 herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied
her motion for reconsideration.

In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:

The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following reasons:

1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the allegations in the petition are based
on authentic records.

2. Since the petition assails the trial court’s dismissal of the criminal information for bigamy filed against private
respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted, should be filed in behalf of the People of the
Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor General, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
 3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject criminal case is tantamount
to an acquittal based on the trial court’s finding that the first essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid
marriage contracted by private respondent is wanting. There is no clear showing in the petition that the
dismissal was tainted with arbitrariness which violated petitioner’s right to due process. Notably, petitioner
filed her comment/opposition to private respondent’s motion to quash before the trial court issued its Order
dated September 20, 2007 dismissing the information. Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there can
be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. 28

On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Resolution
for lack of merit. 29

Hence, this petition.30

Our Ruling

We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the pleading and the question of
legal standing to bring the action.

The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated
as unsigned pleading.31

This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that the ends of justice may be
served.32 The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may nevertheless order the
correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading "if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may be served."33 At any rate, a
pleading is required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true
and correct and not based on mere speculations.34

There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the authority to represent the
government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The Administrative Code specifically defined its
powers and functions to read, among others:

Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines,
its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. xxx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.35

As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:

(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General
and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.36

Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,37 we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order.38 Not even the appearance of the conformity of the
public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant
to represent the People of the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court.39

We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the
government were not properly represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.

In Labaro v. Panay,40 this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order or ruling of the trial judge in a
criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us.41 xxx

Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we
opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition,
as we had done before in some cases.42 In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its
own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc.,43 without requiring
the Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this Court determined the merits of the case
involving a novel issue on the nature and scope of jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority to settle
cooperative disputes as well as the battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of the Dolefil Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens the very existence of one of the country’s
major cooperatives."44

And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even absent the imprimatur
of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for
the accused alone."45 To borrow the words of then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal
of a criminal case pending with the trial court was sought:

[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law,
ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx
The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.46

II

We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the respondent’s right against
double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically acquitted when the trial court quashed the
Information.

Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:

(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges;
and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.47

The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has not yet entered his plea
to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information, and (2) the case was dismissed not merely with his
consent but, in fact, at his instance.48
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order sustaining
a motion to quash.49 More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."50 Thus:

It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner was based on Subsection
(a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court – that the facts charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense.
If this is so then the dismissal of said complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, for it is
provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] that
an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion
was based on the grounds specified in Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially reproduced
in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx.51

III

We now determine the merit of the petition ˗ did the trial court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion when it sustained respondent’s motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the
information?

Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in
the information and any evidence contrary thereto can only be presented as a matter of defense during trial.

Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.

We define a motion to quash an Information as ˗

the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.52

This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,"53 for which reason, the court cannot
consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the information.54

As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:55

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged;
otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly sustained. The
fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, a reading of the information will disclose that the essential elements of the
offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a
preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the
circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and
to dismiss the informations on the basis only of the petitioner’s evidence, such as [this].56

As in the recent case of Los Baños v. Pedro,57 where we found no merit in respondent’s allegation that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense because "the Information duly charged a specific offense and provide[d] the
details on how the offense was committed,"58 we see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the
case at bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a lawful marriage
with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo,
which subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity.59

sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code hereunder enumerated:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.60

The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void
from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged
in the Information ˗ that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent
marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to
quash.

Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking into consideration the
established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among others: (1) when the new allegations are
admitted by the prosecution;61 (2) when the Rules so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability
and double jeopardy;62 and (3) when facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties which
destroyed the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash based on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and "it would be pure technicality for the court to close
its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support
possible conviction xxx."63

For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first marriage offer? Would it serve
to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting
the non-observance of the settled rule that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information? We quote:

[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the information do not
charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima
facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the
nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts
and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction,
and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and a
wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of the prosecution.64 (Emphasis supplied.)

We find that there is none.

With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first marriage void ab initio, respondent
heavily relied on the rulings65 in People v. Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void
ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio
marriage is invalid;66 and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be
no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy incomplete.67

Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was promulgated by the late
President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondent’s subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.

The specific provision, which reads:

ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.

was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,68 where this Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly
requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases,69 this Court, concluded,
in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial
in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared
that a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is
guilty of bigamy.70

Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the Order dated 6
December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained that Morigo has already superseded Mercado. In fact, in Morigo,
this Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from one another, and explained:

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. xxx

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.71

The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this Court to give full meaning
to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:72

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage
is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
1avv phil.zw+

nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. xxx.73 (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico,74 this Court
pronounced:

In a catena of cases,75 the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
xxx
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged
in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense
be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary
to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of
evidence.

All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the Information
in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat
disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information;
and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is
obtaining in the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115,
Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V. LACSON

EN BANC

G.R. No. 149453 October 7, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG
and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion; 1 (b) Motion for
Reconsideration;2 (c) Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;3 (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments.4

The Omnibus Motion

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court which granted the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. The respondent thereafter prays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves
or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is in order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing
or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the aforenamed members of the Court were appointed by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case at bar was submitted for the
decision of the Court. He asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC5 specifically provides that it applies only to the
divisions of the Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of this Court which
set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the constitutional issues raised by the respondent in his
motion for reconsideration and its supplement. As such, according to the respondent, the instant case should be
unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to any other member of the Court.

The Court resolves to deny the respondent’s motion for lack of merit.

The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent filed an urgent motion for the recusation of Justices
Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the
February 19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate in the integral portions of the proceedings. Justices Corona
and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves and decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition. 6 On
March 18, 2003, the respondent filed a motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on
account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.

On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondent’s Motion dated March 18, 2003. The
respondent thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in which he
prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and that the case be re-raffled
to another member of the Court who had actually participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002
Resolution. The respondent likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna,
again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after
the case had already been submitted for decision.

On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions of the respondent.7 The Court ruled
that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to the divisions of the Court:

The respondent’s reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted by the respondent, the
said circular is applicable only to motions for reconsideration in cases assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases
assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no longer with
the Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations
thereof. This is the reason why Justice Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of
the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court.8

The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves from participating in the
deliberation of the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration:

Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet members of
the Court during the February 18, 20029 oral arguments before the Court, nonetheless they were not disqualified to
participate in the deliberations on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the
Court or of the instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the resolution
of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already
members of the Court.

It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the February 18, 2002 hearing and oral
arguments of the parties are parts of the records of this case. Said transcripts are available to the parties or to any
member of the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of
the respondent on February 18, 2002 but by reading the said transcripts and the records of this case they are informed
of what transpired during the hearing and oral arguments of the parties.10

It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion had already been passed upon and
resolved by this Court. The respondent did not make any new substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a
reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions.
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. Azcuna only after they
had already concurred in the Court’s Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case law has it that a motion for disqualification
must be denied when filed after a member of the Court has already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the
rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection
of this sort after a decision has been rendered.11

The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments

The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already extensively discussed the issues involved
in the case. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration consists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding the
supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners’ comment on his motion. There is no
longer a need to set the instant case for oral arguments.

The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
– Whether Prospective or Retroactive

The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and thereafter reinstate its
Resolution of May 28, 2002.

He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice in applying penal law,
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and
retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He asserts that
case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of
criminal law. The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the State to
prosecute criminal cases diligently and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused anew. The
respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule
should have retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively. Accordingly,
prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999 within
which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and equal protection of the
law.

The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused. In this case,
the State had been given more than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29, 1999
dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP took effect on December 1,
2000. According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was
designed to derail his bid for the Senate.

In their comment on the respondent’s motions, the petitioners assert that the prospective application of Section 8 is
in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the rules of procedure
which the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the
rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If
such right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule. According to
the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a
retroactive application. They contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the criminal cases
applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that the
"refiling of the cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the filing of the criminal complaint with the
appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of the criminal
complaint or information in court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given
notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so expressly states.
Thus, if the requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period had
not yet even commenced to run.

In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent asserts that the State is proscribed from
refiling a criminal case if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a violation of the right of the accused to due process.
In this case, there was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering that the witnesses in the criminal
cases for the State in March 1999 are the same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to refile the
cases before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary
to the petitioners’ contention, the respondent posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to
the filing of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. The operational act then is the refiling of the Informations
with the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar.

The Court finds the respondent’s contentions to be without merit.

First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution
which reads:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.

The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. It must be
noted that the new rule was approved by the Court not only to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of
the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court
believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent
of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is
shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.12

In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice, may make the rule
prospective where the exigencies of the situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a
rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the dictate is based. Each
constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own
impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the
dictate involved.13

Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute.14 To paraphrase the United States
Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in defining the limits of adherence may make a choice for
itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relating forward.15
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This
constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules
prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the rules
to actions pending before it if in its opinion their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
event, the former procedure shall apply.16

The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective
application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective
effect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and
justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be construed so as not to defeat but to
carry out such end or purpose.17 A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it
in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.18 In Cometa v. Court of
Appeals,19 this Court ruled that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction; hence, a
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent."20 While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there,
we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the "letter
that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmaker’s will."21

In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended,
namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the
express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of the State’s right to due process and a travesty of justice for
the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists, considering that the criminal
cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took effect on
December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences
to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the express consent of the
accused in 1997. The prosecution had the right to revive the case within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under Section 8 took effect, the
prosecution was unable to revive the criminal case before then.

If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would mean that the State would be barred from
reviving the case for failure to comply with the said time-bar, which was yet to be approved by the Court three years
after the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. In contrast, if the same case was dismissed provisionally in
December 2000, the State had the right to revive the same within the time-bar. In fine, to so hold would imply that the
State was presumed to foresee and anticipate that three years after 1997, the Court would approve and amend the
RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court. It must
be stressed that the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not by rules yet
to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved
by the Court. The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.

In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the criminal cases provisionally
dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court explained, thus:

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced
to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing
the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive
provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December
1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or
until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under
the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from
December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the
intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 199922 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period
because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the
time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or
that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States
1a\^/phi 1.net

Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):

We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those
who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights …

The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit
the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of hardship" to the State and adversely affect the administration
of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.23

Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion in Griffin v. People,24 he said, "it is much more conducive to law’s
self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law.
That this is consonant with the spirit of our law and justified by those considerations of reason which should dominate
the law has been luminously expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here and in an opinion which
he wrote for the Court."

Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have
been expected to comply with the notice requirement under the new rule when it yet had to exist:

99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of inadequacy and incompletion. This however is
not strange considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29, 1999, when the criminal cases were
dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have its text to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied
with the mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist?25

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive.26 Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new rule took effect on December
1, 2000. When the petitioners filed the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001,
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule
should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but
from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule 11027 of
the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with
finality.

The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by the petitioners in accordance with
existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the RTC on June
6, 2001, very well within the time-bar therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his right to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the Constitution had been violated.28

The respondent’s plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective application of the new rule simply because
before the Court issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he announced his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic
for the 2004 elections has no factual basis whatsoever.29 The bare and irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where
the issue of the retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was first raised before the Court. The ruling of the
Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today would be the same, regardless of who the party or parties
involved are, whether a senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen.

The respondent’s contention that the prospective application of the new rule would deny him due process and would
violate the equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the new rule
was approved by the Court solely for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the State to due process. The new rule
was approved by the Court to enhance the right of due process of both the State and the accused. The State is entitled
to due process in criminal cases as much as the accused.

Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely defined. It is not a technical conception with a fixed
1a\^/phi 1.net

content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness,
a requisite whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.30 In determining what fundamental fairness
consists of in a particular situation, relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake; private
interests, as well as the interests of the government must be assessed. In this case, in holding that the new rule has
prospective and not retroactive application, the Court took into consideration not only the interests of the respondent
but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be. The interest of the State in the speedy, impartial and
inexpensive disposition of criminal cases was likewise considered.

The Respondent Failed to Comply with the Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure

The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely different from the issue involved in
the present recourse; hence, any admissions he made in the court below are not judicial admissions in this case. He
asserts that the issue involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged
with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedings in the
appellate court are different from those in this Court.

The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the admissions he made in his pleadings
and during the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial admissions may only be used against a party if such
admissions are (a) made in the course of the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made regarding a relevant fact,
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the
ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for the judicial determination of probable cause in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said cases. His motion carried with it, at the
very least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge Agnir, Jr. had
no recourse but to dismiss the criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers that his motion included the general
prayer "for such other reliefs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that the public
prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not even file any motion for the reconsideration of
Judge Agnir, Jr.’s order dismissing the cases.

The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no means to ascertain or verify as true the
contrasting claims of the parties on the factual issues, a function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He
posits that there is a need for the case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to present evidence on whether or
not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this Court,
the respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of notice under Section 8 to be litigated before Judge
Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet in existence at the time he filed his motion for a determination of probable
cause.
The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the offended parties under Section 8 is a formal and not an
essential requisite. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited
to the determination of the civil liability of the accused. According to the respondent, notice to the prosecution provides
sufficient safeguard for the private complainant to recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts;
after all, the prosecution of the offense is under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.

The contentions of the respondent have no merit.

First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same. To recall, in Civil Case No. 01-
100933,31 the respondent32 sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila on his claim that in conducting a preliminary
investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners thereby placed him in double jeopardy
under Section 7, Rule 117 of the RRCP.33 When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed his
petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double jeopardy, praying that:

13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary investigation" was dismissed for the reasons mentioned, there
currently exists no complaint upon which a valid investigation can be had in light of the clear provisions of Rule 110
which requires the existence of a "sworn written statement charging a person with an offense" as basis for the
commencement of a preliminary investigation under Rule 112. 1awphi 1.nét

For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same offenses over which he had been duly arraigned and a plea
validly entered before the Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57) before its remand to the QC
RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on similar charges will put him in jeopardy of being twice punished therefor (Article
III, §21, Constitution).34

The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted anew
for the same offense without violating his right against double jeopardy. However, the respondent filed a second
amended petition wherein he invoked for the first time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:

(e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by respondents against petitioner and the other accused on June 6, 2001
(docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex B)
is dismissible on its face as they involve exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses which had previously been
dismissed by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be
revived two (2) years after such dismissal in accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117.35

Indeed, the CA granted the respondent’s petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP. In this case, the
respondent invoked the same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the oral arguments in this Court, the respondent,
through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the provisions of the Constitution on
double jeopardy:

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for that crime, for the killing of the 11 in
1995?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is my submission, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Let us see your reason for it?

ATTY. FORTUN:36

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:37

Allow me to qualify the effects of double jeopardy occur with permanent dismissal that is my submission.

ATTY. FORTUN:38

No, no, I am not talking of the effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not invoking the doctrine of double
jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they are (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

That is right.

ATTY. FORTUN:

They are two different claims.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.

ATTY. FORTUN:

Very well, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

You are not invoking double jeopardy?

ATTY. FORTUN:

As I mentioned we are saying that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest the effects (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

No, I am not talking of the effects, I am asking about the application, you are not asking the Court to apply the
doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

So, the answer is yes?

ATTY. FORTUN:

No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the rights of double jeopardy upon
the accused who invokes it.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

What you are saying is the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I will ask that later.

ATTY. FORTUN:

They are two different (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting
your case win or lose, sink or sail on the application of 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which is speedy disposition of cases
which implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in this bar.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Are you not resting on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

So, you are resting on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Not exclusive, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

And the Constitution?

ATTY. FORTUN:

The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

To speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

Can a Court, let us see your theory then – your theory rest on two provisions: first, the Rules of Court 8,117
and Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.39

Second. The respondent’s answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga during the hearing
in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that he gave no express conformity to the dismissal of the
cases by Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on double
jeopardy, thus:

JUSTICE SALONGA:

Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the case at bar?

ATTY. FORTUN:

It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered
by the rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned before the Sandiganbayan
prior to the case being remanded to the RTC.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City.

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?

ATTY. FORTUN:

It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination
of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties
of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made one further conclusion that not
only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did
not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:

And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed except [if] it is
with the express conformity of the accused.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

And with notice to the offended party.

ATTY. FORTUN:

That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:

Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?

ATTY. FORTUN:

There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement which would normally
be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal. My very limited
practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of
provisional dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains
the implications of a provisional dismissal.40

The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for equitable relief in his motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases.
The respondent insisted that the only relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that warrants for his
arrest be withheld pending a finding of probable cause. He asserted that the judge did not even require him
to agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases:

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You were present during the proceedings?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE ROSARIO:

You represented the petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who
is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of
Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination of probable cause?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what should the Court
do?

ATTY. FORTUN:

That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy
of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is respectfully
prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
be conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present private
complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest
of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this incident."

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

There is no general prayer for any further relief?

ATTY. FORTUN:

There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Don’t you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for just and
equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a situation where there is no
warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?

ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree
to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not file any motion for reconsideration of the order of
Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be dismissed?

ATTY. FORTUN:
 I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been arraigned,
and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge
Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step in addition to rocking the
boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my client.

JUSTICE GUERRERO:

Continue.41

In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no
uncertain terms that:

Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the
cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and
the others promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for
his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSG’s claim.42

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in
the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course of judicial
proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party
or a party’s attorney during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in pleadings made by a party.43 It may
occur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission.44 A judicial admission
binds the client even if made by his counsel.45 As declared by this Court:

... [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the
trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made ... for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact,
... they bind the client, whether made during, or even after the trial."46

When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the
provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117
was absent.

The respondent’s contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be
used in the present case as they were made in the course of a different proceeding does not hold water. It should be
borne in mind that the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings
in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which
later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such
admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court. As categorically stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment
Company:47

... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by counsel on behalf of a client during a trial, are
binding "for the purpose of the case ... including appeals."
While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no probable cause, absent
the express consent of the accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar
a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so simply because the public prosecutor did not object to a motion of
the accused for a judicial determination of probable cause or file a motion for the reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of the respondent’s motion for a judicial determination of probable cause
will show that it contained no allegation that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the
respondent’s arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only asking the court to determine
whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in
abeyance the issuance of the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no avail, unless the
petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such relief.48 A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it
power to decide questions except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided
beyond them is coram non judice and void.49

Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court to enable the respondent to adduce
post facto evidence that the requisite notices under Section 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court
has thoroughly examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC50 and found no proof that the
requisite notices were even served on all the heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by
this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the mandate under Section
8 because said rule had yet to exist."51

One final matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were assigned, through the
customary raffle of cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases
Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.52 In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the
RTC of Quezon City was directed to try and decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable
dispatch. The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-96, it designated six branches of the RTC
of Quezon City53 as special courts, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the
accused in the said cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime,
the above cases should be consolidated and re-raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch
thereof designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panfilo M. Lacson’s Omnibus Motion and Motion to Set for Oral
Arguments are DENIED. The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH
FINALITY. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to CONSOLIDATE
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.

SO ORDERED.

WILLIAM CO V. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner,
vs.
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,1 Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules)
are the April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975,
which dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the
January 28, 2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set
aside the Orders dated September 4, 20065 and November 16, 20066 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.

The facts are simple and undisputed:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private complainant in Criminal
Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner
William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private
counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while
her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the
Criminal Cases.9 Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October
14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself
from handling the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005.11 The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC
Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City
challenging the revival of the criminal cases.12 It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.13 Co’s
motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005.14 Co then filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15 We dismissed the
petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.16 There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006.17

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the
inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13, 2006.18 Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19 In
spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion.20 When the
court subsequently denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121
acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16,
2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.22 Co then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ONTHE
GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE
CASES;
 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL; and

3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:

a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE

OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;

b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE
ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;

c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ARE REVIVED

IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION TO REVIVE THESE CASES.23

Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He reasons
out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious,
capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of
1998)24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure25 mandating that the entire
trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that
the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion
because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.

Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists
that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s issuance of the order granting the revival must be within
the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2,
2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004
was a leap year.

The petition is unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the controversy in Co’s
previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural
infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that "[i]n any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court
of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our February 13, 2006 Resolution in
G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata between the parties. On this ground alone, this petition
should have been dismissed outright.

Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Co’s arguments are
nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:

First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any evidence
that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was attended with malice or that the same
was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that
"‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept."26 In determining whether the accused's right to
speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.27 The factors to
balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice
as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and
that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.29 "While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong
the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial."30

Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules,
which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the
prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal
of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended
party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion
and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon which was
served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per
records, complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint."33 The importance of a prior notice to the
offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson:34

x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party
or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal
of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private
prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or
the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The
proof of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will
become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably
and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the
prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to
due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the
other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the
prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability
of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.35

Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of the cases became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice to the offended party. When the
Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy
the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in one case:

Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year
after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor
who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be
expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.36

We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the
reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of the order of
provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should
be sent to the latter at his/her given address.37 Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party
has appeared by counsel, service upon the former shall be made upon the latter.38

Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made
prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover,
to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or
unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to
deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected
to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period of time. It is
likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in
not issuing the order of revival on time.

Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive
the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel
who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on
July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order
of provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the
private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.

And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year and that the
one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal
by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.39 Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987,
a yearis composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40 which was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,41 thus:

x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof
provides:

Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific
month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is
the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January
1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February
29, 2008.42

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the one-year period reckoned
from the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003 consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:

1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003

2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003

3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003

4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003

 5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003

6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004

7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004

8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004

9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004

10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004

11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004

12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004

In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory tactic to prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the
"Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein were already resolved with finality by this Court
in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque,
adopted a worthless and vexatious legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It
appears that Atty. Maglaque’s conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well
as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath also upholds in
particular:

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x. 1âw phi 1

This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of litigation is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation,43 We said:

The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the
orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily
a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate.
A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.44

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006
and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the
petitioner.

The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C.
Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V DE GRANO

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 167710 : June 5, 2009]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO

LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the
Resolutions1 dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
88160.

The antecedents are as follows:

On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando),
and Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho
(Domingo), and Leonardo Genil (Leonardo), who were at-large.2 It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality
of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the above named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, motivated by common design and intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL
MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby, thus committing
the crime of MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the Honorable Court shall determine.3

Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-accused
Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that
the prosecution's evidence was not strong.4

Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas at the time when the
crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios moved that the venue be transferred from the RTC,
Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila. Consequently, the case was transferred to the RTC Manila for
re-raffling amongst its Branches. The case was re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-
raffled to Branches 6, 9, and 11 before being finally raffled to Branch 27, RTC, Manila.5

Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court deferred the resolution of respondents'
motion for bail and allowed the prosecution to present evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of the application for bail
ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Teresita and Dr. Leonardo Salvador. After finding that the prosecution's
evidence to prove treachery and evident premeditation was not strong, the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted
respondents' motion for bail. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied.6
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41110, which was denied.
Aggrieved, they sought recourse before this Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court
granted the petition and set aside the decision of the CA together with the Order of the RTC granting bail to the
respondents. The RTC was also ordered to immediately issue a warrant of arrest against the accused. The resolution
was also qualified to be immediately executory.7 As a result, Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando
were not.8

However, upon respondents' motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a Resolution dated September 4, 2001, resolved
to remand the case to the RTC. We noted that, in view of the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court in
connection with the petition, the trial court deferred the rendition of its decision. Consequently, the case was remanded
to the RTC for further proceedings, including the rendition of its decision on the merits.

After the presentation of the parties' respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision9 dated April 25, 2002,
finding several accused guilty of the offense as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused JOVEN DE GRANO,
ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER, qualified by treachery, and there being no modifying circumstance attendant, hereby sentences
them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is hereby sent to the files or archived cases to
be revived as soon as said accused are apprehended.

Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil and Leonides Landicho.

Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.

Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision
dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be entered acquitting them based on the following
grounds, to wit:

1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of all accused solely on the biased, uncorroborated
and baseless testimony of Teresita Duran, the common-law wife of the victim;

2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the evidence adduced by the defense, which was
amply corroborated on material points;

3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence renders the
position of the defense unrebutted;

4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary finding of treachery of the Supreme Court in its
Resolution dated July 12, 1999; andcralawlibrary

5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of conviction despite the fact that the guilt of all the accused
were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.10

In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the reconsideration of the
decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial
ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court.11
Acting on respondents' motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order12 dated April 15, 2004 modifying its
earlier decision by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from
murder to homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court modifies its decision and finds accused DOMINGO
LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of Homicide,
and in default of any modifying circumstance, sentences them to an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as
maximum. Said accused shall be credited with the full period of their preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg.
85.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt.
They are likewise declared free of any civil liability.

To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25, 2002 stands.

SO ORDERED.13

Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration of the Order arguing that:

1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the "Joint Motion for Reconsideration"
dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the taking of Ms. Duran's written statement of
the events she witnessed is understandable considering that Joven de Grano was the mayor of the municipality where
the crime was committed and that another accused, Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.

3. The crime committed is murder.

4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the conspiracy.

On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order14 denying the motion and giving due course to Estanislao's notice
of appeal.

Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor, with the
assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David, filed a Petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the CA arguing that:

(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied bail and deliberately failing to attend
the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice, lost the right to move for reconsideration of their conviction;
andcralawlibrary

(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are utterly erroneous.16

Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the State could not appeal
a judgment of acquittal. However, by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently,
the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.17
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,18 arguing that the verification and certification portion of the petition
was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the
conformity of the Solicitor General.19

On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.20 Petitioner
explained that, for lack of material time, it failed to secure the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it. A day after filing the petition, the private prosecutor sought
the OSG's conformity in a letter21 dated January 12, 2005. The OSG, in turn, informed the private prosecutor that
rather than affixing its belated conformity, it would rather await the initial resolution of the CA.22 Also, so as not to
preempt the action of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the case, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to
secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. Anent the verification and certification of
the petition having been signed by the private prosecutor, petitioner explained that private complainant Teresita was
in fear for her life as a result of the acquittal of former Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was willing to certify the petition
should she be given ample time to travel to Manila.23

However, in a Resolution24 dated January 25, 2005, which was received by the petitioner on the same day it filed its
Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the petition was dismissed outright by the CA on the grounds that it was not filed
by the OSG and that the assailed Orders were only photocopies and not certified true copies. The dispositive portion
of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.

Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.25 In addition to the justifications it raised in its earlier Opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner argued that the petition was not only signed by the private prosecutor, it was also
signed by the prosecutor who represented the petitioner in the criminal proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner
also maintains that the certified true copies of the assailed Orders were accidentally attached to its file copy instead
of the one it submitted. To rectify the mistake, it attached the certified true copies of the assailed Orders.26 This was
opposed by the respondents in their Comment/Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.27 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement28 dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition
filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with the assistance of the private prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his
conformity.

On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution29 denying the motion, thus:

WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing or filing a
Petition for Review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. If there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect, may be undertaken only by
the State through the Solicitor General. It added that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended
party or complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that the petition was not filed in the name of the offended party;
and worse, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed not by the
private offended party, but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the petitioner to secure the
confirmation of the OSG and the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the
OSG in the case.

Hence, the petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FOR NOT HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL NOR IN THE
NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ATTACHED TO THE PETITION WAS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE COUNSEL
AND NOT BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.30

Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none of the respondents appeared at the
promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender after promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a
motion for leave to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the reasons for their absence.
The trial court thus had no authority to take cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents
as stated in Section 6, Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order
dated April 15, 2004 is void. Consequently, no double jeopardy attached to such void Order. The CA, therefore,
committed reversible error when it dismissed the Petition for Certiorarion the ground of double jeopardy.31

Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of the OSG manifesting its intention to
pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact conformed to the filing of the petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had
the CA given the OSG ample time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would not have been dismissed for the
reason that it was filed by the said office.32

With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner invokes a liberal application of the
Rules for private complainant's failure to personally sign it. Petitioner maintains that out of extreme fear arising from
the unexpected acquittal of Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel to Manila. After she was taken out of
the witness protection program, she took refuge in the Visayas and she was there at the time her signature was
required. Since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, and it could not be filed without the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, the private prosecutor was left with no option but so sign it, instead
of allowing the deadline to pass without filing the petition.33

Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the verification and certification of the present
petition, because the real party-in-interest is the OSG itself as the representative of the State.34

On their part, respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorariquestioning the order of acquittal is not allowed and
is contrary to the principle of double jeopardy. Respondents argue that, contrary to the OSG's contention, respondents
Joven and Domingo's absence during the promulgation of the Decision dated April 25, 2002 did not deprive the trial
court of its authority to resolve their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, considering that one of the accused, Estanislao,
was present during the promulgation.35

Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present during the promulgation of the RTC Decision,
Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed their
Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve
the joint motion.36
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as it was not instituted by the OSG on
behalf of the People of the Philippines, and that the verification and certification portion thereof was not signed by
private complainant Teresita.37

Respondents also argue that the Petition for Certiorari before this Court should be dismissed, since the verification
and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor of the OSG, not private complainant.

The petition is meritorious.

Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical objections raised by respondents.

As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, a liberal application
of the Rules should be applied to the present case.

The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made
in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form
of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.38 Truly, verification is only
a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification.

With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the certification requirement is rooted in
the principle that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice
is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.39 However, this Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the
rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.40 Not
being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.

In Donato v. Court of Appeals41 and Wee v. Galvez,42 the Court noted that the petitioners were already in the United
States; thus, the signing of the certification by their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with
the Rules. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,43 the Court upheld substantial justice and ruled that the failure of the parties
to sign the certification may be overlooked, as the parties' case was meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging
and Development Corporation,44 the Court also found, among other reasons, that the extreme difficulty to secure all
the required signatures and the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case constitute compelling reasons
for allowing the petition.

In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals45 and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed out:

The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who
executed the same. To merit the Court's consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of justice.

Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign the certification against forum
shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.46

We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for private complainant's failure to sign
the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it was out of extreme fear that private complainant failed to personally
sign the certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita was already out of the
witness protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas. As such, she could not travel to Manila to personally
sign the petition. Moreover, as maintained by the petitioner, since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was
about to lapse, the private prosecutor was left with no option but to sign the verification and certification, instead of
allowing the period to file the petition to pass without it being filed. A relaxation of the procedural rules, considering
the particular circumstances, is justified. The requirement was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,47 when a strict and literal application of the rules
on non-forum shopping and verification would result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally
construed. An unforgiving application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will not be given premium if it would
impede rather than serve the best interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under
consideration.

We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,48 that the signature of the Solicitor General
on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court is substantial
compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG is the legal representative of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case
where the People or the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.49

Also, respondents' contention that there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in the petition
before the CA does not hold water. In the letter dated January 18, 2004, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to
secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its 1st Indorsement dated March 15,
2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition to the Solicitor General for his conformity. When the
CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the petition, the OSG filed motions50 for
extension of time to file the present petition. Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment51 on respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration.52 Thus, any doubt regarding the endorsement, conformity, and participation of the OSG in the
petitions is dispelled.

Now on the substantive aspect.

A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse before the CA, via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the
respondents of the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-
accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused, except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to
personally appear at the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice thereof.

Petitioner contends that its Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA was the proper
remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the fact that they had
not regained their standing in court.

Petitioner's recourse to the CA was correct.

A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.53 An act of a court or tribunal may be
considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.54

By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.55 In which event, the accused
cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy - the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused
to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or an information
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been
arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express
consent.56

Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority
to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.57

Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where the trial court lacked
jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy. 58 Hence, any
acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it
failed to attach in the first place.

Section 14(2),59 Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial
but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b)
during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a
light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings,
his presence is required and cannot be waived.60

Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time the Decision was
promulgated, provides:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and
any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive
judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the
court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of
appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and
resolved by the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel,
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped
bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation
shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose
the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.61

Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against
the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion
for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within 15 days from notice.62

When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently
thereafter, without surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined
Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause
the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.

The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the
respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was
solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an
accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court;
and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court.63

Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation,
necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.64

However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained the Motion for
Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost
jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTC's ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide
stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.

Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding. We can no longer be tasked to go over
the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again to ascertain if the trial court was correct
in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.65 The sole office of a writ
of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a review of the RTC's evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings
based thereon.66

True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard of the Rules, the finality of respondents'
acquittal and their co-accused's conviction of homicide instead of murder would have been barred by the rule on
double jeopardy.

We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the innocent or from an attempt to uphold
the accused's treasured right to a fair trial, but when these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source
of substantial dismay and warrants this Court's corrective action via a special writ of error.

Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge cannot hide behind such fact
considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not based on the validity of the assailed Order of the RTC, but was
based on technical rules and the rule against double jeopardy.

It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence.
Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused,
not even a judge.67 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence."68 It bears stressing that competence is one of the marks of a good judge. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts.
Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law.69
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25, 2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order
dated April 15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of the crime of Homicide and
acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order
stands.

To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision dated April 25, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court are REINSTATED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P. Soriaso for possible violation/s
of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing the Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-
129988.

SO ORDERED.

Lee Pue Liong v. Chua Pue Chin Lee, G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013 (private prosecutor)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181658 August 7, 2013

LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER,

vs.
CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision2 and the January 31, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion5 for the exclusion of a private prosecutor
in the two criminal cases for perjury pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration6 of the said
order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.

The facts follow:

Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with
the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation
(CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein
respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.

On July 19, 1999, petitioner’s siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took over and barricaded
themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to
enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against
Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are
now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City.7

On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary’s Certificate8 issued by Virginia Lee on even date)
caused the filing of a verified Petition9 for the Issuance of an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 23223810 which covers a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit of Loss 11 stating
that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI, he had in his custody and possession the owner’s duplicate copy
of TCT No. 232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner’s copy of TCT No. 232238 was
inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts
in locating the said title but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the
subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of any obligation with any person, credit or banking
institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments during an ex-parte proceeding. In its
Order12 dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.

Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others, that the September
17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in possession of the said
Owner’s Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI.
Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage the
same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.13

In a Complaint-Affidavit14 dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila, respondent alleged the
following:

1. I am a stockholder, Board Member, and duly elected treasurer of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), which
corporation is duly organized and existing under Philippine laws.

2. As duly elected treasurer of CHI, I was tasked with the custody and safekeeping of all vital financial
documents including bank accounts, securities, and land titles.

3. Among the land titles in my custody was the Owner’s Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
232238 registered in the name of CHI.

4. On June 14, 1999, Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, filed a VERIFIED PETITION for the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copy of the aforementioned certificate claiming under oath that said duplicate copy was in
his custody but was lost.

xxxx

5. Paul Lee likewise executed an affidavit of loss stating the same fact of loss, which affidavit he used and
presented as exhibit "D".

xxxx

6. On August 18, 1999, Paul Lee testified under oath that TCT No. 232238 was inadvertently lost and
misplaced from his files.

xxxx
 7. Paul Lee made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, affidavit and testimony,
as he perfectly knew that I was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.

8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee and even produced in open court the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.

Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila, dated November 12, 1999, x x x.

9. I and Paul Lee are involved in an intra-corporate dispute, which dispute is now pending with the SEC.

10. Paul Lee needed to have a new owner’s duplicate of the aforementioned TCT so that he could mortgage
the property covered thereby with the Planters Development Bank, even without my knowledge and consent
as well as the consent and knowledge of my brother Nixon Lee who is likewise a shareholder, board member
and officer of CHI.

11. If not for the timely discovery of the petition of Paul Lee, with his perjurious misrepresentation, a new
owner’s duplicate could have been issued.

x x x x15 (Italics supplied.)

On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit16 to clarify that she was accusing petitioner of perjury
allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in
his petition filed with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was lost;
(2) by declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by testifying under oath that the said
TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.

The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in the Review Resolution17 dated
December 1, 2000 issued by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla, the recommendation to dismiss the
case was set aside. Thereafter, said City Prosecutor filed the Informations18 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 352270-
71 CR for perjury, punishable under Article 18319 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, against petitioner before
the MeTC of Manila, Branch 28.

At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private prosecutor with the consent
and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. After the prosecution’s presentation of its first witness
in the person of Atty. Ronaldo Viesca, Jr.,20 a lawyer from the Land Registration Authority, petitioner’s counsel moved
in open court that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from participating in the case since
perjury is a public offense. Said motion was vehemently opposed by Atty. Macam.21 In its Order22 dated May 7, 2003,
the MeTC gave both the defense and the prosecution the opportunity to submit their motion and comment respectively
as regards the issue raised by petitioner’s counsel.

Complying with the MeTC’s directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned Omnibus Motion23 asserting that in the crime
of perjury punishable under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private
offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. Petitioner argued that
perjury is a crime against public interest as provided under Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, where the offended party is the State alone. Petitioner posited that there being no allegation of
damage to private interests, a private prosecutor is not needed. On the other hand, the Prosecution filed its
Opposition24 to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion.

The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order25 dated August 15, 2003, as follows:
[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, however,
an offended party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or by attorney, especially in cases of offenses which
cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. The only exception to this rule is when the offended
party waives his right to [file the] civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the
case, in which case he loses his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its
prosecution. And, in any event, whenever an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his
intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94
Phil. 197).

Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in nature and those that can only be
prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. In either case, the law gives to the offended party the right to
intervene, personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of such right only when he waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute one. Such is not the situation in this case. The case at bar involves a public crime and the private
prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.26

The MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.27

Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition28 for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner prayed, among others, for the CA to enjoin the MeTC and
respondent from enforcing the MeTC Orders dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003, and likewise to enjoin
the MeTC and respondent from further allowing the private prosecutor to participate in the proceedings below while
the instant case is pending.

By Decision29 dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the presence of the private
prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the
two perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the perjury
cases as she is the private complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved party.30 Reiterating the MeTC’s invocation of our
ruling in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco31 as cited by former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado in his
Remedial Law Compendium,32 the CA ruled that "the offended party, who has neither reserved, waived, nor instituted
the civil action may intervene, and such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved."33

Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA declared that respondent’s property rights and interests
as the treasurer and a stockholder of CHI were disturbed and/or threatened by the alleged acts of petitioner. Further,
the CA opined that petitioner’s right to a fair trial is not violated because the presence of the private prosecutor in
these cases does not exclude the presence of the public prosecutor who remains to have the prosecuting authority,
subjecting the private prosecutor to his control and supervision.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but the CA denied it under Resolution35 dated January 31, 2008.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND

II
 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT, AN
ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY. 36

Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does not offend any private party but is a
crime which only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly administration of laws. He opines that perjury is a
felony where no civil liability arises on the part of the offender because there are no damages to be compensated and
that there is no private person injured by the crime.

Petitioner argues that the CA’s invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by Justice Regalado in his
book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a civil interest in the criminal case in order to intervene
through a private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner points out that said case involved the crime of grave
threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the crime of grave threats did not
have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of right, may still intervene
because he was one of the offended parties.

Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent respondent in this case despite
the fact that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any damage as she herself did not allege nor claim
in her Complaint-Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any damage that may be satisfied
through restitution,37 reparation for the damage caused38 and indemnification for consequential damages.39 Lastly,
petitioner asserts that respondent is not the proper offended party that may intervene in this case as she was not
authorized by CHI. Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or any private prosecutor for that matter be
excluded from the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam
intervened be set aside and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor alone.40

On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury
cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer
and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan
she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case.41

The petition has no merit.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "[e]very person
criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable."42 Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person
commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the
State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity
or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.43

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section
16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as "the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed." In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,44 this
Court rejected petitioner’s theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy.
We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the
offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and
therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.

In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which
is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial
interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the
evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction
of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the
party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated
party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI’s property and its loss
through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent’s personal credibility and
reputation insofar as her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of
CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by respondent’s timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the
RTC.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court
declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private
crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as
merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings,
that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole
purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such
intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.48

In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent who is also the
corporation’s Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholder’s Meeting)
was instituted by the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondent’s testimony was heard
during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the ground that she failed to allege
and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private
prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private
prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA
which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.

When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private prosecutors to actively
participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:

Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the nature of the offense or where the law
defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene
in the prosecution of the offense.
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate
that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely
(1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured
or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law,
it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally,
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission
of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution,
reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the
civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in
the trial of the criminal action.

Petitioner avers, however, that respondent’s testimony in the inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages
personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner’s alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal
damages were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to
pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without basis.

When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the
court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may
be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve
the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of
civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate
civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising
from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private
prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the MeTC committed no grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-
71 CR.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 31, 2007 and the Resolution
dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.