DE LOS REYES VS.

MUNICIPALITY OF KALIBO

FACTS:

Jose Peralta owns a land in Kalibo, which through accretion, land was added to the said lot. When he died, the lot together with
the supposed area of accretion was transferred to his son, Juanito Peralta. While the area of accretion was apportioned and registered
for tax declaration purposes under the names of siblings Juanito, Javier, Josephine, and Julius. On the other hand, the Municipality of
Kalibo, through its then Mayor Diego Luces and the member of its Sangguniang Bayan, sought to convert more or less four (4) hectares
of said area of accretion into a garbage dumpsite. Juanito, opposed said project in a letter. Despite his opposition, the Municipality of
Kalibo continued the project under the justification that the contested property is actually part of the public domain. The Peraltas filed a
complaint for quieting of title over the subject properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain?

RULING:

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property
which is the subject matter of the action. While legal title denotes registered ownership, equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the
absences of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed. Likewise, the plaintiff must show that
the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that purportedly casts a cloud on their title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Art. 457 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, under which the Peraltas claim ownership over the disputed parcels of land, provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be:
(a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks
of rivers.

Here, Ignacio characterized the land in question as swampy and its increase in size as the effect of the change of the shoreline of the
Visayan Sea, and not through the gradual deposits of soil coming from the river or the sea. Also, Baltazar Gerardo, the Officer-in-Charge
of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the Bureau of Lands, found upon inspection in 1987 that the subject area
was predominantly composed of sand rather than soil. One of the plaintiffs, Javier, also testified that in 1974 or 1976, the Visayan Sea
was around one (1) kilometer from the land in question, and in 2003, the distance already became around three (3) kilometers, giving the
impression that the increment was actually the result of additional area of sand deposits left by the sea when it had receded, and not by
gradual deposits of soil or sediment caused by the action of water. In addition, the DENR has remained firm and consistent in classifying
the area as land of the public domain for being part of either the Visayan Sea of the Sooc Riverbed and is reached by tide water. Further,
the Sheriff’s Report shows that when he conducted an ocular inspection of the area, part of it was reached by the tide. At around 11:30am,
he was able to measure the deepest portion of the high tide at around nineteen (19) inches, and its wideness at five (5) meters near the
concrete wall.

Indeed by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, administrative agencies, like the
DENR, are in a better position to pass judgment on the same, and their findings of fact are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
by the courts. Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant. Hence, the questionable character of the land, which could most probably be part of the public
domain, indeed bars Jose from validly transferring the increment to any of his successors.

Indubitably, the plaintiffs are merely successors who derived their alleged right of ownership from tax declarations. But neither can they
validly rely on said tax declarations and the supposed actual, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property by
their predecessors-in-interest. Any person who claims ownership by virtue of tax declarations must also prove that he has been in actual
possession of the property. Thus, proof that the property involved had been declared for taxation purposes for a certain period of time,
does not constitute proof of possession, nor is it proof of ownership, in the absence of the claimant’s actual possession of said property.
In the case at bar, the Peraltas failed to adequately prove their possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest.

HEIRS OF NARVASA, SR. VS. IMBORNAL

FACTS:

Basilia owned a parcel of land (Sabangan property) which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina
(Imbornal sisters). Catalina's husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m.
riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan

Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion. The
First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. OCT No. P-318 was issued in the
name of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion.
The Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.[19] On
November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion. Claiming rights over
the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition,
and/or damages against respondents

They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the
Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent application over the
Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the Motherland which
now included both accretions in trust for the Imbornal sisters

Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to
the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said... accretions in
their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners

Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance, claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they
respected respondents' rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their (Francisco, et al.'s) shares thereon...
but also to the subsequent accretions. Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance of said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment
of their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the... amount of P100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00,
including attorney's fees and other costs... the RTC rendered a Decision

(a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their... pecuniary equivalent

The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and
the Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland

It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.'s allegation... that the Sabangan property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother,
Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending homestead patent application.

In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in trust for them... once his homestead patent application had
been approved.As Ciriaco was only able to a... cquire the Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the proceeds realized
from the sale of the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al.

With respect to the accretions that formed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the
owner of the said accretions. Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the Motherland by virtue of the
implied... trust created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said
accretions despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.

With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a homestead patent, which later became the basis for the
issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his name; as such, said certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through an action for...
reconveyance filed by his wife's (Catalina's) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al. being the children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are
the sisters of Catalina).

On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the
First Accretion, and all the respondents with respect to the Second Accretion need not be the owners of the Motherland in order to
acquire... them by acquisitive prescription.

In this case, the CA found... that respondents have acquired title to the subject accretions by prescription,[33] considering that they have
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was
formed),... which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent Victoriano covering the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the
following grounds: (a) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as an affirmative defense in the Amended Answer,
and

(b) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.

RULING:

At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.

To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland,... alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for their
predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired
the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and... deceit.

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.[38]Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee... of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years,
reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the... property,[39] if the plaintiff is
not in possession.However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible

When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.[38]Article
1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee... of an implied
trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years,
reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the... property,[39] if the plaintiff is
not in possession.However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible.

An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the
date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual... need to reconvey
the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.

Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the respective titles covering the
disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in... possession of
the said properties.

Hence, with respect to the Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for
reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5,1943; with respect to the First Accretion... covered by OCT No. P-318
issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed until August 15,
1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481issued on November 10,... 1978in the name of the
respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.

A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint[42]covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed
only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek... the reconveyance
of two (2) of theseproperties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the
Second Accretion having been seasonably filed.

Thus, considering that respondents raised prescription as a defense in their

Amended Answer,[43] the Amended Complaint with respect to the Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have been dismissed
based on the said ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the Second Accretion surviving. As will be, however,... discussed
below, the entirety of the Amended Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on its substantive merits
since the existence of the implied trust asserted in this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint is completely...
dismissible.

The main thrust of Francisco, et al.'s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one
hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds from...
the sale of the Sabangan property an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters were used for the then-pending homestead
application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, co-owners of the Motherland...
together with Ciriaco's heirs.

The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show
the existence of the trust and its elements.[45] While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence... must be trustworthy
and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy
evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.[46]

In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either
mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of an... implied
trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.

As the CA had aptly pointed out,[47]a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions[48] set
forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and... improvement of the
homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for
the grant of his homestead patent application.

As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired... and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an
implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing that the Imbornal sisters
entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion... thereof, or asserted any right over the same at any point during their lifetime

Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December
15, 1933, Ciriaco's title to the Motherland had become indefeasible. It... bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led
to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco's name are presumptively regular and
proper,[49] which presumption has not been overcome by the... evidence presented by Francisco, et al.

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners, are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First
Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second
Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show
that they acquired these properties through prescription as it was not established that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore,...
whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners'
claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be... reconveyed
in their favor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. SANTOS III

FACTS:

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on
March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which
had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the
Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the
latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not
covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was
an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos
and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio,
City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-
000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B

With this, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit.

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced that on the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned
by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, and stated that it could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in
this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River
which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which
was obtained by the latter from his mother

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the
fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription (section 14(1) of PD 1529)

RULING:

NO! (By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner
of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs
to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.)

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application by a
preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition
to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they
established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil
through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up
river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously
part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name
in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable
conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River,
resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not
the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The
drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish
at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems
to be highly improbable that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been
deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time
intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in
existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied
Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque
River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque
River that had dried up and become an orchard.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

Xxxx

The Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject
parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan
Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC –
Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and
that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their
predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents
had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision
mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to
justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the
taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of
surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession,
and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the
riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is
simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’
predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a
positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the
Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares
that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should
belong to some other person.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES
the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively
belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.

GALANG VS. REYES

FACTS:

Facts:

On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes... filed a case for the annulment of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-928 against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang... with the Regional Trial Court,... Antipolo

Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and
(2) an adjoining property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185252, with an... area of 1,201 sq.m.;... that the properties
were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa;
that the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a... certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources... that they discovered the existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997
when their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed them that the subject property had been fraudulently titled in the names of
the Galangs; that in

1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his...
house on it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to continue the application because of financial constraints on his part

The Galangs in their Answer[7] denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered that OCT No. P-928 was
issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR,... that they and... their predecessor-in-interest had
been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that the property described under TCT No.
185252 belonged to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that the property was... transferred in the
names of the Reyeses through falsified document;[8] that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course
and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the... dried creek which adjoined and co-
existed with their property; that Enteroso... was able to occupy a portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations, and
stealth in 1981;

In its Decision,[9] dated July 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being an erroneous remedy.

In the case before the trial court, the Reyeses presented no evidence of fraud despite their allegations that the Galangs were not... in
possession of the property and that it was part of a dried creek. There being no evidence, these contentions remained allegations and
could not defeat the title of the Galangs

The fraud must be actual... not me... the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, because the
proceedings which are being assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings, which by law, are presumed to have been fair...
and regular.

CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-928 and the reconveyance of the land to the
Reyeses. The free patent covering the subject land, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are null and void.[12]

The Galangs moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN NOT RESOLVING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, HAS THE SOLE
AUTHORITY TO FILE [CASES FOR] ANNULMENT OF TITLE INVOLVING

PUBLIC LAND.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE [A] CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS EVEN WITHOUT
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMED[IES].

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
IN DEVIATING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND INTERPRETING ARTICLE 420 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BY SUBSTITUTING ITS
OWN OPINION BASED ON ASSUMPTION OF FACTS.

RULING:

Regarding the first issue, the Galangs state that the property was formerly a public land, titled in their names by virtue of Free Patent No.
045802-96-2847 issued by the DENR. Thus, they posit that the Reyeses do not have the personality and authority to institute any action...
for annulment of title because such authority is vested in the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General.

In this regard, the Galangs are mistaken. The action filed by the Reyeses seeks the transfer to their names of the title registered in the
names of the Galangs. In their Complaint, they alleged that: first, they are the owners of the land, being the owners of the properties...
through which the Marigman creek passed when it changed its course; and second, the Galangs illegally dispossessed them by having
the same property registered in their names. It was not an action for reversion which requires that the State be the one to initiate the
action in... order for it to prosper.

In this case... the complaint instituted by the Reyeses before the RTC was for the annulment of the title issued to the Galangs, and not
for reversion

Thus, the real party in interest here is not the State but the Reyeses who claim a right of ownership over the property in... question even
before the issuance of a title in favor of the Galangs.

Although the Reyeses have the right to file an action for reconveyance, they have failed to prove their case.

Court agrees with the RTC that the Reyeses failed to adduce... substantial evidence to establish their allegation that the Galangs had
fraudulently registered the subject property in their names.

Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven
that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the... claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must
prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek,
and (3) the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by... natural occurrence.

Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment and the new course.

performance

The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of titl~, should never be
presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evi~ence, with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a
question of... fact which must be proved.

MAYOR OF PARANAQUE VS. EBIO

FACTS:

Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent
Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.

Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son,
Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing
an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid taxes for the land.

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio
secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro
transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance
from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The
proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended.

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning office
proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.

On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty
(30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and
expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

RULING:

NO! It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of
Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from
the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain
as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided
for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has
been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them
by prescription as against the State.

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation
of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.

REGENT VS, TANJUATCO

FACTS:

Petitioner New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and
Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna. NRSI alleged that
in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land
by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the Bureau of Lands. On
January 2, 1995, Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares of stock in the corporation. Then, pending
approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000. On March 12, 1996,
the Director of Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title
were then issued in the name of Tanjuatco.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, Tanjuatco advanced the affirmative defense that the complaint stated no cause of action against him.
According to Tanjuatco, it was Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He averred further that the complaint did not
charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI. RTC dismissed the complaint of petitioner on demurrer to
evidence and held that Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NRSI was able to substantiate its claim of entitlement to ownership of the lands in Tanjuatco’s name

RULING:

NO! NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of accretion. It submitted in evidence, titles to four parcels
of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of Tanjuatco.

But it must be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
following requisites:

(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show
by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer
any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing requisites.

Further, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, which under Article 502 (1) of the
Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion. The Certification issued by Forester III Emiliano S. Leviste confirms that said lands
were verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable, certified and declared as such on September 28, 1981. Clearly, the Republic is
the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.

Next, petitioner sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name of Tanjuatco. NRSI presented before the trial court a
copy of the Voting Trust Agreement which the spouses Cuevas executed in favor of Pauline Co. However, nothing in said agreement
indicates that NRSI empowered Cuevas to apply for the registration of the subject lots on its behalf. Neither did petitioner adduce
evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and Chairman. Even assuming that Cuevas was the president of NRSI, his powers are
confined only to those vested upon him by the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws. In truth, petitioner could have easily presented
its by-laws or a corporate resolution to show Cuevas’s authority to buy the lands on its behalf. But it did not.

Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of contract, reconveyance and damages against respondents. An action
for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. In an action for
reconveyance, the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, specifically
the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one
with a better right.

To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person
claiming ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name
of the defendant was procured through fraud or other illegal means; (3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value; and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and incontrovertible but within four years from the
discovery of the fraud, or not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust. Petitioner failed to show the presence of these requisites.

NAZARENO VS. CA

FACTS:

The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative remedies before having recourse to the
courts.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result
of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.

Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one
Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals.
As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4.
A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 20.

The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory. Private
respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the
same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filed another case for certiorari
with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which
was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of
the subject lots they occupied..

Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571
with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the
applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.

In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis
conducted an investigation and rendered a report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D
(equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file
appropriate public land applications.

Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment
of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if
qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective portions.

Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary of the Department of Natural
Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then
ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced thereon.
He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.

Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia
Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and
recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent
Hilario and order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as
amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by
the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey
plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
resources. 1

Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an
appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had
been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as
Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and
executed..

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assign the following errors:

I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION
ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS, MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE
DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS
MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.

The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not the subject land is public land. Petitioners claim
that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.

In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires
the concurrence of these requisites : (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or
streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.

For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-mentioned requisites must be present.
However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas
Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and
other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in
the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules
on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.

In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject
land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA
(G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the
subject of Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which was conducted as a consequence of
Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio
Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his
ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River. The
investigation report also states that, except for the swampy portion which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied
by a part of a big concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials, including those of private
respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in the early part of 1978. 6

Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of Lands. 7 This Court has
often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. 8 Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
the same are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. 9

It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial. In Republic v. CA, 10 this Court ruled that
the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the
Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco
v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said
land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such,
part of the public domain.

In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its
sawmill
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late
Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan
River bounding his land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.

Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed
petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.

However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to
appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of
respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director
of Lands". 14 It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the
Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.

In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for
reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of
the Secretary of the Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 15 this Court held that the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands
with respect to questions involving public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3,
4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 16

As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the
Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A.
No. 141) which states, thus:

Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this
Act through the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control.

Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any
other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall
be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent
Abelardo G. Palad, the Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the conclusive finding that the
subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he
issued the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.

Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate the subject land practically changed respondent
Hilario's decision is baseless. It is incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the subject land to private
respondents Salasalans and Rabayas as they had not yet been issued patents or titles over the subject land. The execution order merely
directed the segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which was actually being occupied by private respondents before
they were ejected from it. Based on the finding that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the
subject land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and in the exercise of his administrative discretion,
directed petitioners to vacate the subject land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the occupants
thereof.

While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied by them, they nevertheless filed their protest or
opposition to petitioners' Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an application as they were in fact
directed to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's execution order merely implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that
petitioners' own application still has to be given due course. 17

As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition and
management of the lands of the public domain. 18 He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the circumstances as long
as they are based on the findings of fact.

In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, 19 this Court held that where, in the disposition of public lands, the Director of Lands bases his
decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one
of judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari. Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 MENESES VS. CA

FACTS:

On March 1, 1977, Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses 2 Free Patent and 2 OCT
covering lots located in Los Baños, Laguna.

Pablito acquired said property from Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed in 1975 in consideration of
Bautista’s “love and affection” for and “some monetary obligations” in favor of Meneses. After the execution of said document, Meneses
took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding
realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the land from his aunt. He had been occupying the land since 1956.

On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of their land as far back as 1919 when their matriarch was issued an OCT
covering a lot, with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on 1973 under a TCT in
the names of her heirs, all surnamed Quisumbing.

The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area which had gradually accrued to their property
by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. The CFI of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings’ title thereto.

In 1979, the Quisumbings filed a case before the CFI of Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Darum and Almendral for
nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baños,
using his brother Pablito as a “tool and dummy,” illegally occupied their “private accretion land” and confederating with District Land
Officer Darum and Land Inspector Almendral, obtained free patents and OCTs to the land.

In 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the
Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. (The lots occupied
by Meneses, as found by the court, are to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by the Quisumbings. )

Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the to the CA, which affirmed in toto the lower court’s decision.The defendants-
appellants filed two MRs of the CA decision but it was denied, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lands in question were accretion lands and not lands of the public domain; and

Whether or not conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses.

RULING:

YES! While the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to
the same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.

The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains “falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources.” Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to “flux and reflux of tides” it cannot be considered a foreshore
land. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director
of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a
registerable title.

Additionally, the provision of the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84
of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law
does not require the same.

2. As found by the CA, petitioners conspired in the approval and grant of the free patents heirs Quisumbing. Such fraud was confirmed
by this Court in Meneses v. People, which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the
issuance of the same free patents and titles. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as
charged. The judgment of conviction was affirmed.

NOTES:

1. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of these requisites:

(1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
2. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court. While it is the appellate court’s duty to review the same, a
reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The CA can only modify or change the amount awarded as
damages when they are palpably or scandalously and reasonably excessive.

3. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

POOLE-BLUNDEN VS. UBP

FACTS:

Poole-Blunden (petitioner) came across an advertisement for public auction of certain properties placed by Union Bank in the Manila
Bulletin sometime in March 2001. One of these properties was Unit 2-C of T-Tower Condominium located at Makati City. The
condominium unit was acquired by UnionBank through forclosure proceedings.

A week prior to the auction, petitioner visited the unit for inspection. He found that the unit had an irregular shape, but didn’t doubt the
unit’s area as advertised, the ceiling in a bad condition, and the unit needed substantial repairs to be habitable. On the day of the auction,
he also inspected the Master Title of the project owner to the condominium. Petitioner won the bid and he entered to a Contract to Sell
with UnionBank. He started occupying the unit in June 2001 and by July 2003, he was able to fully pay for the unit, paying a total amount
of P 3,257,142.49.00.

Petitioner decided to construct two additional bedrooms in the unit. He noticed apparent problems in its dimensions. He took a rough
measurement and found that the floor area was just 70 sqm, not 95 sqm as advertised. He got in touch with an officer of UnionBank to
raise the matter, but no action was taken. He then wrote to Unionbank to inform them of the discrepancy and asked for the rescission of
the Contract to Sell, along with the refund of the amounts he had paid. UnionBank replied that upon inquiring with HLURB, the
Homeowners’s Association of T-Tower, and its appraisers, the unit was confirmed to be 95 sqm inclusive of the terrace and the comon
areas surrounding it. The petitioner was not satisfied because according to the Master Title, “boundary of each unit are the interior
surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors thereof." He hired an independent geodetic engineer, to survey the
unit and measure its actual floor. It was found out that the actual area was only 74.4 sqm and gave a copy of the certification to Unionbank.
UnionBank explained that the total area of the unit is based on the ratio allocation maintenance cost submitted by the developer to
HLURB is 98 square meters (60 square meters as unit area and 38 square meters as share on open space). On the other hand, the
actual area thereof based on the measurements made by its surveyor is 74.18 square meters which was much higher than the unit area
of 60 square meters that was approved by HLURB. The petitioner was dissatisfied with the said explanation.

Petitioner filed for the recission of the Contract to Sell with Damages with the RTC of Makati and said court dismissed the complaint. The
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating that the sale was made on a "as-is-where-is" basis as indicated in their contract. Thus, the
petitioner supposedly waived any errors in the bounds or description of the unit. With the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, he filed
for a petition to the Supreme Court stating that: there is a vitiation of his consent as to the object of the sale and he charges UnionBank
with fraud since it failed to disclose to him that the advertised 95 square meters was inclusive of common areas. Thus, the Contract to
Sell may be voided and that UnionBank is liable for breach of warranty despite the "as-is-where-is" clause in the Contract to Sell.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Union Bank committed such a degree of fraud as would entitle Joseph Harry Walter Poole-Blunden to the voiding of the
Contract to Sell the condominium unit identified as Unit 2C, T-Tower Condominium, Makati City.

RULING:

YES! Bank's insistence on how common spaces should be included in reckoning the Unit's total area runs afoul of how Republic Act No.
4726, otherwise known as the Condominium. Section 3(b) of the Condominium Act defines a condominium unit, as follows:

"Unit" means a part of the condominium project intended for any type of independent use or ownership, including one or more rooms or
spaces located in one or more floors (or part or parts of floors) in a building or buildings and such accessories as may be appended
thereto.

Section 6(a) of the Condominium Act specifies the reckoning of a condominium unit's bounds. It also specifies that areas of common use
"are not part of the unit":

The boundary of the unit granted are the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows and doors thereof. The following
are not part of the unit bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations and other common structural elements of the building; lobbies,
stairways, hallways, and other areas of common use.

Thus, the unit sold to petitioner was deficient in relation to its advertised area. This advertisement having been made by respondent, it is
equally settled there was a falsity in the declarations made by respondent prior to, and with the intention of enticing buyers to the sale.

Petitioner's contention on how crucial the dimensions and area of the Unit are to his decision to proceed with the purchase is well-taken.
The significance of space and dimensions to any buyer of real property is plain to see. This is particularly significant to buyers of
condominium units in urban areas, and even more so in central business districts, where the scarcity of space drives vertical construction
and propels property values.

The defense of "as-is-where-is" terms of the purchase is untenable. First, a stipulation absolving a seller of liability for hidden defects can
only be invoked by a seller who has no knowledge of hidden defects. Respondent here knew that the Unit's area, as reckoned in
accordance with the Condominium Act, was not 95 square meters. Second, an as-is-where-is stipulation can only pertain to the readily
perceptible physical state of the object of a sale. It cannot encompass matters that require specialized scrutiny, as well as features and
traits that are immediately appreciable only by someone with technical competence.

Thus, the Court ordered that the Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent be annulled, and petitioner be refunded all the
amounts he paid to respondent in respect of the purchase of the Unit plus damages.

GEÑORGA VS. HEIRS OF MELITON

FACTS:

Julian and other respondents all surnamed Meliton are the registered owners of identified as Lot No. 1095-C located in Concepcion
Pequeña, Naga City. During his lifetime, Julian sold a portion of the subject land to Geñorga who took possession and introduced
improvements on the portions respectively sold to them. However, Julian failed to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT which led
the petitioner to file a Petition for the surrender for the said copy.

The petitioner obtained a favorable decision from RTC of Naga City ordering the administratrix of the estate of Julian to surrender
possession thereof enter the deed of sale and to issue the corresponding certificates of title after compliance with the requirements of the
law. It further held that should the holder fail or refuse to comply with the court’s directive: (a) TCT No. 8027 shall be declared null and
void; and (b) the RD-Naga shall issue a new certificate of title in lieu thereof, enter the deeds of sale, and issue certificates of title in favor
of the buyers.

The administratix failed to comply. In an Order dated October 2, 2008, the RTC declared TCT No. 8027 null and void, resulting in the
issuance of a new one, bearing annotations of the buyers’ adverse claims. The new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 (subject
owner’s duplicate title) was given to petitioner in 2009.

On April 22, 2013, respondents filed a Complaint against petitioner alleging that they are entitled to the possession thereof as registered
owners, and suffered damages as a consequence of its unlawful withholding, compelling them to secure the services of counsel to protect
their interests.

In her Answer, petitioner averred that she and the other buyers are in the process of completing all the requirements for the registration
of the sales in their favor, and have paid the estate taxes thereon. They had likewise caused the survey of the land but the first geodetic
engineer they hired to conduct the same failed to deliver his services, prompting them to file a complaint against him, and to hire another
geodetic engineer. Considering that their possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title was by virtue of a court decision, and for the
legitimate purpose of registering the sales in their favor and the issuance of titles in their names, they should be allowed to retain
possession until the completion of the requirements therefor. The said title was eventually submitted to the RD-Naga on September 13,
2013.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has the obligation to surrender and delivery of possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title to
respondents

RULING:

YES! Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject land was an undivided co-owned property when Julian sold different portions
thereof to various persons. However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the subject land
were eventually sold, and the buyers took possession and introduced improvements thereon, declared the same in their names, and paid
the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection from respondents who never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently,
the Court finds that there is, in this case, a partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to the
segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in their names upon compliance with the requirements
of law.

Records show that the subject owner’s duplicate title had already been surrendered to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013, and some
of the buyers had secured Certificates Authorizing Registration and paid the corresponding fees for the registration of the sales in their
favor. Nonetheless, while the rights of the buyers over the portions respectively sold to them had already been recognized by the RTC of
Naga City in its July 17, 1998 Decision in Civil Case No. RTC ’96-3526 which had attained finality on September 10, 2006, there is no
showing that the other affected buyers have similarly complied with the necessary registration requirements.

Notably, from the time petitioner received possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title in 2009, a considerable amount of time had
passed until she submitted the same to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013. But even up to the time she filed the instant petition before
the Court on May 6, 2016, she failed to show any sufficient justification for the continued failure of the concerned buyers to comply with
the requirements for the registration of their respective deeds of sale and the issuance of certificates of title in their names to warrant a
preferential right to the possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title as against respondents who undisputedly own the bigger portion
of the subject land. Consequently, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the RTC Decision directing petitioner
or the RD-Naga to deliver or surrender the subject owner’s duplicate title to respondents.

Moreover, it bears to stress that the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds is only ministerial in nature.
Thus, the RD-Naga cannot be expected to retain possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title longer than what is reasonable to
perform its duty. In the absence of a verified and approved subdivision plan and technical description duly submitted for registration on
TCT No. 8027, it must return the same to the presenter, in this case, petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to establish a better right to the
possession of the said owner’s duplicate title as against respondents.

As a final point, it must, however, be clarified that the above-pronounced delivery or surrender is without prejudice to the rights of the
concerned buyers who would be able to subsequently complete the necessary registration requirements and thereupon, duly request the
surrender of the subject owner’s duplicate title anew to the RD-Naga.

BAUTISTA VS. BAUTISTA

DOCTRINE:

There is an implied trust when a property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the
purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.

FACTS:

The Bautista siblings - Margarito, Manuel L. Bautista, Carmelita Bautista Sahagun (Carmelita), Aniano L. Bautista (Aniano ), Florencia
Bautista de Villa (Florencia), and Ester Bautista Cabrera (Ester) - established a lending business through a common fund from the
proceeds of the sale of a parcel of coconut land they inherited from their mother Consorcia Lantin Bautista.4 Margarito, Florencia, and
Ester managed the business with Reginald Sahagun, Carmelita's son, as credit investigator. Senen Cabrera, Ester's husband, prepared
the documents for mortgage and reported the status of the lending business to the Bautista siblings.6 Through the said lending business,
the siblings acquired several real properties in San Pablo City.

On March 2, 1998, Amelia V. Mendoza (Amelia) obtained a loan in the amount of P690,000.00 from Florencia, and secured the same
with a real estate mortgage over a 25,518-square-meter parcel of land she owned situated at Barangay Sta. Monica, San Pablo City,
denominated as Lot 2, Plan Psu-45117 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 2371 (Sta. Monica property).8 They later
extended the mmigage through a Kasulatan ng Pagdaragdag ng Sanla, for an additional loan of Pl 15,000.00 on April 6, 1998.

On May 13, 1998, Amelia and Florencia renewed the mortgage for Pl ,085,000.00 and cancelled the previous loan of P690,000.00 through
a "Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage." Subsequently, on April 12, 1999, Amelia and Florencia executed another Kasulatan ng
Pagdaragdag ng Sanla in the amount of P57,500.00. Florencia, thereafter, received the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T- 23 71,
which she, in turn, entrusted to Carmelita when she went overseas.

On November 28, 2002, Amelia allegedly sold the subject property to Margarito through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan for P500,000.00
and, likewise, cancelled the Pl ,085,000.00 loan through another "Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage." On the same date, Florencia
filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Second Owner's Duplicate of TCT No. T-2371 before the RTC of San Pablo City, Branch 29. She
alleged that she was the mortgagee of the subject property, and that she could not locate, despite diligent search, the owner's duplicate
title in her possession, which she misplaced sometime in September 2002. Florencia also executed a SpecialPower of Attorney in favor
of Margarito to represent her in the proceedings.

Petitioners tried to oppose the issuance, 18 but on January 30, 2003, the RTC granted the petition and TCT No. T-59882 was later issued
in the name of Margarito. On January 12, 2004, petitioners registered an Adverse Claim over the Sta. Monica property, which was
annotated on TCT No. T- 59882.

Failing to settle their differences, petitioners subsequently instituted a Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. SP-6064(04) before the RTC of San Pablo City, Branch
32, over several properties against herein respondent Margarito, the Spouses Marconi de Villa and Florencia Bautista, and the Spouses
Senen Cabrera and Ester Bautisa

On April 23, 2004, the parties filed a "Partial Settlement" manifesting that they have entered into an amicable settlement over the other
properties involved in the complaint. In a Decision dated April 28, 2004, the RTC approved the compromise agreement.

Since no settlement was reached as regards the Sta. Monica property, petitioners presented copies of their bank transactions with Far
East Bank to support their claim of co-ownership over the same. They also presented an undated, unnotarized, and without the name of
the vendee Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan (blank Kasulatan ), which Amelia purportedly executed and signed disposing the subject
property in favor of the Bautista siblings. Petitioner Carmelita also alleged that the duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2371 in the name of
Amelia was in her possession and was never lost.

For his part, Margarito asseverated that he exclusively owns the property in controversy since he used his personal funds in purchasing
the land. Margarito presented TCT No. T-59882 covering the Sta. Monica property, and the Tax Declaration and Receipts thereof.
On February 16, 2009, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared, among other things, that the Sta. Monica property was
commonly owned by the siblings. The RTC also ordered that the property bpartitioned among all of them and that an accounting of its
income be held.

On March 3, 2009, Margarito filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the RTC denied it in an Order32 dated April 2, 2009.

Aggrieved, Margarito elevated the case before the CA. In a Decision dated March 6, 2012, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC. CA ruled that the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-59882 under the name of defendant-
appellant Margarito L. Bautista is declared exclusively owned by defendant-appellant Margarito L. Bautista. CA concluded that petitioners
failed to establish that they are co-owners of the Sta. Monica property. It held that the TCT under Margarito's name was an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property and has more probative weight than the blank Kasulatan adduced by the petitioners.
Consequently, petitioners' action for partition and accounting cannot be acted upon because they failed to prove that they are co-owners
of the Sta. Monica property.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the property was conveyed to the respondent.

2. Whether or not an implied trust was established in this case.

RULING:

1. NO! the property was not conveyed to the respondent. From the foregoing, petitioners established the manner in which they acquired
several properties through their business and have them registered under their names. Even the compromise agreement they entered
into, which was approved by the RTC, reflected their claim and admission that they co-owned the properties although titled to only one
of their siblings. It was, thus, logical for the RTC to conclude that it was through this practice that they also acquired the Sta. Monica
property.

Moreover, several other circumstances buttressed petitioners' claim, among which is that they have proven that their lending business
has the financial capacity to acquire the Sta. Monica property; that Florencia, who was co-manager of the business, entered into several
mortgage transactions with Amelia; and that the blank Kasulatan was in their possession. They even opposed the issuance of a second
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2371 since the original TCT was in their safekeeping and was not actually lost.

Based on the List of Exhibits, aside from his bare allegations and testimony, Margarito neither identified nor presented the deed of sale
during trial nor formally offered the same as his evidence. It is elementary that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence. It appears that Margarito's evidence of exclusive ownership are the certificate of title, the tax declarations
pertaining thereto, his bank deposits, and other mortgage contracts involving different mortgagors. Despite all these, Margarito failed to
prove that Amelia conveyed the Sta. Monica property exclusively in his name. It is also quite intriguing why he did not even bother to
present the testimony of Amelia or of Florencia, who could have enlightened the court about their transactions. In addition, We find it
incredible that a property, which secured a loan roughly over a million pesos, would be sold for considerably less than that amount or for
only P550,000.00.

2. YES! the property was conveyed to the respondent Margarito, like in the case at bar, although a certificate of title is the best proof of
ownership of a piece of land, the mere issuance of the same in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate
of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on.

There is an implied trust when a property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the
purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.54 This is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements
of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such
consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trustthe registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a
title.

A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between families, does not lose that character
simply because of what appears in a legal document. 56 From the foregoing, this Court finds that an implied resulting trust existed among
the parties. The pieces of evidence presented demonstrate their intention to acquire the Sta. Monica property in the course of their
business, just like the other properties that were also the subjects of the partition case and the compromise agreement they entered into.
Although the Sta. Monica property was titled under the name of Margarito, the surrounding circumstances as to its acquisition speak of
the intent that the equitable or beneficial ownership of the property should belong to the Bautista siblings.

TABASONDRA VS. CONSTANTINO

FACTS:

The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two marriages. The respondents Tarcila Tabasondra-
Constantino and the late Sebastian Tabasondra were the children of Cornelio by his first wife, Severina; the petitioners, namely: Arsenio
Tabasondra, Fernando Tabasondra, Cornelio Tabasondra, Jr., Mirasol Tabasondra-Mariano, Fausta Tabasondra-Tapacio, Myrasol
Tabasondra-Romero, Marlene Tabasondra-Maniquil, and Guillermo Tabasondra, were children of Cornelio by his second wife, Sotera.
Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were also the registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land
located at Dalayap, Tarlac City, identified as Lot No. 2536, containing an area of seventy-seven thousand one hundred and forty-seven
(77,147) sq. m.; Lot No. 3155, with an area of thirteen thousand six hundred fifty-nine (13,659) sq. m.; and, Lot No. 3159, with an area of
nine thousand five hundred forty-six (9,546) sq. m., covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 106012.

Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on August 19, 1990 and August 4, 1998, respectively.
They all died intestate and without partitioning the property covered by TCT No. 106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the
Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.

On August 22, 2002, the Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the Defendants-Appellant claiming that the parcels of land
are owned in common by them and the Defendants-Appellants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence,
they asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons.

In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the same should be made only with
respect to Cornelio' s share. They contended that they already own the shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of
the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in their favor on August 18, 1982.

The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintifft, ordering [the] partition of the three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT No. 16012
among the compulsory and legal heirs of Cornelio, Valentina[,] and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra.

On November 30, 2010, the CA promulgated the decision affirming the RTC with modification in that the partition and the accounting is
ordered to be made only with respect to a thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting with respect to only 33,450.66 square meters of the property registered
under TCT No. 10612.

RULING:

YES! There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana was 100,352 square
meters; and that each of the co-owners had the right to one-third of such total area. It was established that Valentina and Valeriana
executed the Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they specifically disposed of their shares in the property registered under TCT No. 10612
in favor of Sebastian Tabasondra and Tarcila Tabasondra.

The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana to thereby alienate .. their pro indiviso shares to Sebastian and Tarcila even without
the knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the alienation covered the disposition of only their respective interests in
the common property. According to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the petitioners as the
successors-in-interest of Cornelio could not validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their shares in favor of the
respondents.

The SC affirmed the CA's ruling that there is no denying that the RTC erred in granting the complaint and ordering a partition without
qualifying that such should not include the shares previously pertaining to Valeria and Valentina. Simply put, since the aggregate area of
the subject property is one hundred thousand three hundred fifty-two (100,352) sq.m., it follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana
each has a share equivalent to thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq. m. portion thereof. Accordingly, when
Valentina and Valeriana sold their shares, the Defendants-Appellants became co-owners with Cornelio. Perforce, upon Cornelia's death,
the only area that his heirs, that is, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, are entitled to and which may be made subject
of partition is only a thirty three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro indiviso shares in the three lots, Sebastian
and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property with Cornelio (later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-
in-interest of Cornelio). In effect, Sebastian and Tarcila were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-third
pro indiviso share in the three lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of Cornelio, namely, Sebastian, Tarcila and
the petitioners.

Although the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not segregate the 100,352-square meter property into
determinate portions among the several co-owners.

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and segregating, by metes and bounds,
the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect the physical partition of the property in the following
proportions: Tarcila, one-,, third; the heirs of Sebastian, one-third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of
Sebastian (collectively), one-third. That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA uncharacteristically did not require it.
Upon remand, therefore, the R TC should comply with the express terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the R TC will be to appoint not more than three competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to command such commissioners to set off to each party in interest
the part and proportion of the property as directed in this decision.

DOMINGO VS. MOLINA

FACTS:

On June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided
portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land which was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354.

Anastacio has been borrowing money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina all throughout his life. Ten years after the
death of Flora in 1978, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. It was registered under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2729677 and the entire one-half undivided portion of the land was transferred to them.

One of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against the spouses
Molina when he learned of the transfer on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims that it is only to serve as collateral for the money that his father
has borrowed. He alleges that Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s consent, as she
was already dead at the time of the sale.

The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for his debts and told them that they
already own half of the land. They have been in possession of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and
have religiously paid the property’s real estate taxes. The adopted son of the spouses Molina, Cornelio Molina, substituted them when
they died during the pendency of the case.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that his father did not sell the property
to the spouses Molina considering that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property to answer for conjugal liabilities. Furthermore, it
denied Melecio’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling and so he proceeded with his appeal to the CA.

The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant evidence that there was fraud in the
conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. It gave credence to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale. It also held that
Flora’s death is immaterial because Anastacio only sold his rights over the lot to the spouses Molina, excluding Flora’s interest. Finally,
the CA held that Melecio’s action has prescribed because he failed to file the action within one year after entry of the decree of registration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal; and
2. Whether or not fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina.

RULING:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora’s
consent. However, this argument is unmeritorious.

Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code’s effectivity which was on August 3, 1988 and so their property relation is
a conjugal partnership. It dissolved when Flora died in 1968, pursuant to now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.

The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership among the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition. This will
also include Anastacio with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title to any
specific portion of the conjugal properties without having done an actual partition first, either by agreement or by judicial decree. On the
other hand, Anastacio owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest. As a
consequence, he had the right to freely sell and dispose his undivided interest in the subject property.

The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. Anastactio’s sale to the spouses
Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for his rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively
transferred. The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong
to the co-heirs after liquidation and partition. Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for PARTITION
under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina. The
notarized deed of conveyance annotated on the OCT executed between Anastacio and the spouses Molina negated Melecio’s argument
that no document was executed for the sale of the disputed property. Furthermore, the petitioner’s belief that his father, Anastacio, could
not have sold the property without his knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's registered
title over the subject property.

VICTORIA VS. PIDLAOAN

FACTS:
The petitioners Rosario Victoria and Elma lived together since 1978 until Rosario left for Saudi Arabia. In 1984, Elma bought a parcel of
land in Lucena City and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title. When Rosario came home, she caused the construction of a house on
the lot but she left again after the house was built. Elma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot. When the properties were about to be
foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from her sister-in-law, Eufemia Pidlaoan, to redeem the property.

On her part, Eufemia called her daughter abroad, Normita, to lend money to Elma. Normita agreed to provide the funds. Elma allegedly
sought to sell the land. When she failed to find a buyer, she offered to sell it to Eufemia or her daughter. On March 21, 1993, Elma
executed a deed of sale entitled "Panananto ng Pagkatanggap ng Kahustuhang Bayad" transferring the ownership of the lot to Normita.
The document was signed by Elma, Normita, and two witnesses but it was not notarized.

When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized, the notary public advised them to donate the lot instead to avoid
capital gains tax. On the next day, Elma executed a deed of donation in Normita's favor and had it notarized. TCT No. T-50282 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-70990 was issued in Normita's name. Since then, Normita had been paying the real property taxes over the lot
but Elma continued to occupy the house.

Rosario found out about the donation and petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract, cancellation of TCT, and damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction against respondents.

The petitioners argue that the deed of donation was simulated and that the parties entered into an equitable mortgage. On the other hand,
the respondents deny the claim of equitable mortgage and argue that they validly acquired the property via sale. The RTC ruled that there
was donation but only as to half of the property. The CA agreed with the respondents that the deed of donation was not simulated, relying
on the presumption of regularity of public documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rosario is a co-owner.

RULING:

NO! Elma transferred ownership of the entire lot to Normita.

One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system has a right to rely on what appears on the face of the certificate of title
and need not inquire further as to the property's ownership. A buyer is charged with notice only of the claims annotated on the title.25
The Torrens system was adopted to best guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.26

In the present case, the records of the case show that Elma alone purchased the lot in 1984 from its previous owners. Accordingly, TCT
No. T-50282 was issued solely in her name. Thus, Normita bought the lot relying on the face of the TCT that Elma and no other person
owned it.

We acknowledge that registration under the Torrens system does not create or vest title. A certificate of title merely serves as an evidence
of ownership in the property. Therefore, the issuance of a certificate of title does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in
the certificate may be co-owners of the real property, or that the registered owner is only holding the property in trust for another person.28

In the present case, however, the petitioners failed to present proof of Rosario's contributions in purchasing the lot from its previous
owners. The execution of the transfer documents solely in Elma's name alone militate against their claim of co-ownership. Thus, we find
no merit in the petitioners' claim of co-ownership over the lot.

At this point, we address the petitioners' claim that Rosario co-owned the lot with Elma because the value of the house constructed by
Rosario on it is higher than the lot's value. We find this argument to be erroneous.

We hold that mere construction of a house on another's land does not create a co-ownership. Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that
co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Verily, a house and a lot are separately
identifiable properties and can pertain to different owners, as in this case: the house belongs to Rosario and the lot to Elma.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on another's land in good faith, the land owner may either: (a) appropriate
the works as his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. The law does not force the parties into
a co-ownership.29 A builder is in good faith if he builds on a land believing himself to be its owner and is unaware of the defect in his title
or mode of acquisition.30

As applied in the present case, Rosario's construction of a house on the lot did not create a co-ownership, regardless of the value of the
house. Rosario, however, is not without recourse in retrieving the house or its value. The remedies available to her are set forth in Article
448 of the Civil Code.

HEIRS OF YAMBAO VS. HEIRS OF YAMBAO

FACTS:
A parcel of land located in Barangay Bangan, Botolan, Zambales, which was originally possessed by Macaria de Ocampo. Macaria’s
nephew, Hermogenes Yambao, acted as an administrator of the property and paid realty taxes therefor. After Hermogenes died, it was
claimed that all of his heirs were free to pick and harvest from the fruit-bearing trees on the subject property. Eleanor one of the daughter
of the Heirs, even constructed a house. However, sometime in 2005, the communal and mutual use of the property ceased when the
heirs of Feleciano, herein petitioners, prohibited them from entering the property and even ejected Eleanor from the subject property.
Hence, a complaint filed with the RTC for partition, declaration of nullity of title/documents and damages against the heirs of Feliciano.

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by the heirs of Hermogenes. RTC opined that the heirs of that the heirs of
Hermogenes failed to show that the subject property is owned by Macaria stating that tax declarations and receipts in Macaria’s name
are not conclusive evidence of ownership. The RTC further held that even if Macaria owned the subject property, the heirs of Hermogenes
failed to show that he has the right to succeed over the estate of Macaria.

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The CA pointed out that:

Feliciano’s application for free patent, he acknowledged that the source of his claims of possession over the subject property was
Hermogene’s possession of the real property in peaceful, open, continuous, and adverse manner and more importantly, in the concept
of an owner, since 1994. Feliciano’s claim of sole possession in his application for free patent did not therefore extinguish the fact of co-
ownership as claimed by the children of Hermogenes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is indeed co-owned by the heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs if Feleciano.

RULING:

The petition is denied. A co-ownership is a form of trust with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual possession was
adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of
the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common
property.

Presricption may nevertheless run against a co-owner if there is adverse, open continuous and exclusive possession of the co-owned
property by the other co-owner/s. In order to that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse the following requisites must concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other
co-owners; (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

APIQUE VS. FAHNENSTICH

FACTS:

Dominador and Evangeline are siblings

Evangeline left for Germany to work sometime in 1979.

Evangeline executed General and Special Powers of Attorney... constituting Dominador as her attorney-in-fact to purchase real property
for her, and to manage or supervise her business affairs in the Philippines.

she opened a joint savings account... with Dominador at Philippine Commercial International Bank... which later became Equitable PCI
Bank (EPCIB)

Dominador withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account and, thereafter, deposited the money to his own savings
account with the same bank

Evangeline learned of... such withdrawal

Evangeline demanded the return of the amount withdrawn from the joint account, but to no avail. Hence, she filed a complaint

Evangeline claimed to be the sole owner of the money deposited in the subject account, and that Dominador has no authority to withdraw
the same.

Dominador asserted,... , that he was authorized to withdraw funds from the subject account to answer for the expenses of Evangeline's
projects,

Issues:
whether or not Evangeline is entitled to the return of the amount of P980,000.00 Dominador withdrew from their joint savings account
with EPCIB

Ruling:

A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities.

Under such setup, the depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account,... and their share in... the deposits shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.

The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.

The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the account, each of the named account holder has an
undivided right to the entire balance,... and any of them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the... need or
consent of the other,... during their lifetime.

Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right against each other may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the
purpose for which the account was opened and... how it will be operated.

In this case,... It is... admitted... that: (a) the account was opened for a specific purpose, i.e., to facilitate... the transfer of needed funds
for Evangeline's business projects;... and (b) Dominador may withdraw funds therefrom "if"... there is a need to meet Evangeline's financial
obligations arising from said... projects.

Hence, while Dominador is a co-owner of the subject account as far as the bank is concerned — and may, thus, validly deposit and/or
withdraw funds without the consent of his co-depositor, Evangeline — as between him and

Evangeline, his authority to withdraw, as well as the amount to be withdrawn, is circumscribed by the purpose for which the subject
account was opened.

Dominador's right to obtain funds... was, thus, conditioned on the necessity of funds for Evangeline's projects.

Admittedly, at the time he withdrew the amount of P980,000.00 from the subject account, there was no project... being undertaken for
Evangeline.

DIVINAGRACIA VS. PARILLA

FACTS:

Conrado Nobleza, Sr. owned a 313-sq m parcel of land located at Cor. Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City. During his lifetime, he
contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.;
and (b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Celedonio, Ceruleo,[7] and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely, Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo.[8]
Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord.
Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.[9]

According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.'s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his
siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the subject land to Santiago
for a consideration of P447,695.66, as embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale[10] dated
November 22, 1989 (subject document),[11] which was, however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares,
namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children).[12] On December 22, 1989,
the same parties executed a Supplemental Contract[13] whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the aforesaid
consideration, only P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay the remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the
partition of the subject land.[14] However, Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject document registered
because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude's refusal to surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude's
failure to partition the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint[15] dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for
receivership.[16]

For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor compel
them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because, inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b)
the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the
same.[17]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[18] dated November 29, 2002, the RTC ordered, among others, the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the
one hand, and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e., Felcon, et al.) on the other hand and, consequently, the
cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owner's duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo,
Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr.[19] The RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of
the subject land and, as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the RTC held that Santiago did not validly
acquire Mateo, Sr.'s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to
Mateo, Sr.'s share thereon.[20]

On reconsideration[21] of Ceruleo and herein respondents Celedonio, Maude, Celestial, Coronacion, and Cecilia (respondents), the RTC
issued an Order[22] dated April 4, 2003 further ordering Santiago to comply with the provisions of the Supplemental Contract dated
December 22, 1989 by paying the amount of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land.

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed[23] to the CA. Records are bereft of any showing that the other heirs made similar appeals thereto.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[24] dated March 26, 2009, the CA set aside the RTC Rulings and, consequently, dismissed Santiago's complaint for judicial
partition.[25] It held that Felcon's siblings, as well as Maude's children, are indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject
land and, thus, their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago's complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal.[26]

Aggrieved, the heirs of Santiago[27] moved for reconsideration[28] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[29] dated April 6, 2011,
hence, this petition instituted by herein petitioner, Ma. Elena R. Divinagracia, as administratrix of Santiago's estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that Felcon's siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude's children are indispensable parties to
Santiago's complaint for judicial partition; and (b) dismissed Santiago's complaint for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.

RULING:

The petition is partly meritorious.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with
the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution
of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.[30] Thus, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.[31]

With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be
joined as defendants, viz.:

SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.

Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie
without the joinder of the said parties.

In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso
share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr.,
Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules
on representation under the Civil Code,[33] their respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.:
Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.[34]

The aforementioned heirs whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant have vested rights over the subject
land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago's
complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.'s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-
representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.'s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when
pursuant to Article 972[35] of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel. Verily, Santiago's omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.

Santiago's contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs and, thus, they should no longer be regarded
as indispensable parties deserves no merit. As correctly noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order
to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of
ownership, which is the first stage in an action for partition.[36] Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is
definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject
document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived
from that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who
have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado, Sr., in Santiago's complaint.

In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition renders all subsequent
actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.[38] Therefore,
the CA correctly set aside the November 29, 2002 Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.

However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago's failure to implead all the indispensable parties
in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.,[39] the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of
indispensable parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit:

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply
with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

CABRERA VS. YSAAC

FACTS:

Henry Ysaac is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land. He leased out a portion of the property to several lessees, including Juan
Cabrera. In need of money, henry offered to sell the 95 sq. m lot but demurred because the lot was too small for his needs since there
was no parking space for his vehicle.

To deal with Juan’s need, Henry expanded his offer to include 2 adjoining lots which was then leased to 2 families but warned that the
sale could only agree if the 2 families would agree.

The deal was almost closed with the agreed price but Juan stated that he could only pay the full price after his retirement. Henry agreed
but demanded for an initial payment which Juan paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid sale between the petitioner and respondent.

RULING:

NO! It was null ab initio. Specific rules attach when the seller co-owns the object of the contract. Sale of a portion of the property is
considered an alteration of the thing owned in common. Under the Civil Code, such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the
other co-owners. However, the rules also allow a co-owner to alienate his or her part in the co-ownership. These two rules are reconciled
through jurisprudence.

If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-owners.
He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned property. if he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has
a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes
and bounds."

The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or abstract quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the
definite portion of the land refers to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.

To illustrate, if a ten-hectare property is owned equally by ten co-owners, the undivided interest of a co-owner is one hectare. The definite
portion of that interest is usually determined during judicial or extrajudicial partition. After partition, a definite portion of the property held
in common is allocated to a specific co-owner. The co-ownership is dissolved and, in effect, each of the former co-owners is free to
exercise autonomously the rights attached to his or her ownership over the definite portion of the land.

It is crucial that the co-owners agree to which portion of the land goes to whom.

Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to
partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should
redound to his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.

The object of the sales contract between petitioner and respondent was a definite portion of a co-owned parcel of land. At the time of the
alleged sale between petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still held in common. The rules allow respondent to sell his
undivided interest in the co-ownership. However, this was not the object of the sale between him and petitioner. The object of the sale
was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner, respondent has "no
right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the thing is
represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication."[86]
There was no showing that respondent was authorized by his co-owners to sell the portion of land occupied by Juan Cabrera, the Espiritu
family, or the Borbe family. Without the consent of his co-owners, respondent could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property.

A co-owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite portion of the property. However, such contract is still subject to the suspensive
condition of the partition of the property, and that the other co-owners agree that the part subject of the contract to sell vests in favor of
the co-owner's buyer. Hence, the co-owners' consent is an important factor for the sale to ripen.

BAGAYAS VS. BAGAYAS

FACTS:

On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint5 for annulment of sale and partition before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-42,
claiming that Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas (respondents) intended to exclude her from
inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive parents, Maximino Bagayas (Maximino) and Eligia Clemente (Eligia), by falsifying a deed
of absolute sale (deed of absolute sale) purportedly executed by the deceased spouses (Maximino and Eligia) transferring two parcels of
land (subject lands) registered in their names to their biological children, respondent Rogelio and Orlando Bagayas6 (Orlando).7 Said
deed, which was supposedly executed on October 7, 1974,8 bore the signature of Eligia who could not have affixed her signature thereon
as she had long been dead since August 21, 1971.9 By virtue of the same instrument, however, the Bagayas brothers were able to secure
in their favor TCT Nos. 37565710 and 37565811 over the subject lands.

As a matter of course, trial ensued on the merits of the case. Petitioner presented herself and five other witnesses to prove the allegations
in her complaint. Respondents likewise testified in their defense denying any knowledge of the alleged adoption of petitioner by Maximino
and Eligia, and pointing out that petitioner had not even lived with the family.12 Furthermore, Rogelio claimed13 that after their parents
had died, he and Orlando executed a document denominated as Deed of Extrajudicial Succession14 (deed of extrajudicial succession)
over the subject lands to effect the transfer of titles thereof to their names. Before the deed of extrajudicial succession could be registered,
however, a deed of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to them was discovered from the old files of Maximino, which they used
by “reason of convenience” to acquire title to the said lands.15cralaw virtualaw library

In a Decision16 dated March 24, 2008 dismissing the case a quo, the RTC summarized the threshold issues for resolution, to
wit:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
[1] Whether or not [petitioner] is an adopted child of the late spouses Maximino Bagayas and Eligia Clemente;

[2] Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 7, 1974 is valid;

[3] Whether or not plaintiff can ask for partition of the subject properties assuming that she is an adopted child of the late spouses
Maximino Bagayas and Eligia Clemente and assuming further that the subject deed of sale is invalid; and

[4] Is the prevailing party entitled to damages?17

With respect to the first issue, the RTC declared petitioner to be an adopted child of Maximino and Eligia on the strength of the order of
adoption, which it considered as more reliable than the oral testimonies of respondents denying the fact of adoption.18 On the issue of
the validity of the questioned deed of absolute sale, the RTC ruled that Eligia's signature thereon was a mere surplusage, as the subject
lands belonged exclusively to Maximino who could alienate the same without the consent of his wife.19cralaw virtualaw library

The RTC further held that, even though petitioner is an adopted child, she could not ask for partition of the subject lands as she was not
able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale. Moreover, the action for annulment of sale was improper
as it constituted a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando.20cralaw virtualaw library

Insisting that the subject lands were conjugal properties of Maximino and Eligia, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration21 from the
aforesaid Decision, which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution22 dated June 17, 2008 holding that while it may have committed a
mistake in declaring the subject lands as exclusive properties of Maximino (since the defendants therein already admitted during the pre-
trial conference that the subject lands are the conjugal properties of Maximino and Eligia), the action was nevertheless dismissible on the
ground that it was a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando.23 Citing the case of Tapuroc v. Loquellano Vda. de Mende,24 it
observed that the action for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale is not the direct proceeding required by law to attack a Torrens
certificate of title.25cralaw virtualaw library

No appeal was taken from the RTC’s Decision dated March 24, 2008 or the Resolution dated June 17, 2008, thereby allowing the same
to lapse into finality.

Subsequently, however, petitioner filed, on August 1, 2008, twin petitions26 before the same RTC, docketed as LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-
35, for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 to include her name and those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as
registered owners to the extent of one-third of the lands covered therein.27 The petitions were anchored on Section 108 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1529,28 otherwise known as the “Property Registration Decree,” which provides as follows:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same be [sic] Register of Deeds, except by
order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner [sic] of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper
cases, the [sic] Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon
the ground that x x x new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; x x x; or upon any other reasonable
ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of
a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant of any other relief upon such terms and conditions,
requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the
court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair
the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written
consent. x x x.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
To substantiate her “interest” in the subject lands, petitioner capitalized on the finding of the RTC in its Decision dated March 24, 2008
that she is the adopted child of Maximino and Eligia, and that the signature of the latter in the deed of absolute sale transferring the
subject lands to Rogelio and Orlando was falsified.29cralaw virtualaw library

The petitions were dismissed30 by the RTC, however, on the ground of res judicata. The RTC ruled that the causes of action in the two
cases filed by petitioner are similar in that the ultimate objective would be her inclusion as co-owner of the subject lands and, eventually,
the partition thereof.31 Since judgment had already been rendered on the matter, and petitioner had allowed the same to attain finality,
the principle of res judicata barred further litigation thereon.32cralaw virtualaw library

Dissatisfied, petitioner argued in her motion for reconsideration33 that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 (for annulment of sale and
partition) on the ground that it was a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando did not amount to a judgment on the merits, thus,
precluding the applicability of res judicata.34 The motion was resolved against petitioner, and the dismissal of LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-
35 (for amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658) was upheld by the RTC in an Order35 dated March 16, 2009. Hence, the instant
petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the dismissal of the earlier complaint on the ground that it is in the nature of a collateral
attack on the certificates of title constitutes a bar to a subsequent petition under Section 108 of PD 1529.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that Civil Case No. 04-42 was a complaint for annulment of sale and partition. In a complaint for partition,
the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion
of the properties involved.36 The determination, therefore, as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action
for partition. As held in the case of Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:37
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and
a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition
is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In
the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and
the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case – i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is
decreed – the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.38 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In dismissing Civil Case No. 04-42, the RTC declared that petitioner could not ask for the partition of the subject lands, even though she
is an adopted child, because “she was not able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale”39 purportedly
executed by Maximino and Eligia. This conclusion came about as a consequence of the RTC’s finding that, since the subject lands
belonged exclusively to Maximino, there was no need to secure the consent of his wife who was long dead before the sale took place.
For this reason, the forgery of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed was held to be inconsequential. However, on reconsideration,
the RTC declared that it committed a mistake in holding the subject lands as exclusive properties of Maximino “since there was already
an admission [by] the defendants during the pre-trial conference that the subject properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses
Maximino Bagayas and Eligia Clemente.”40 Nonetheless, the RTC sustained its dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42 on the ground that it
constituted a collateral attack upon the title of Rogelio and Orlando.

In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr.41 (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate
of title and not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the
Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented
by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused
with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack since
she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando’s title to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate of title over the same.

Be that as it may, considering that petitioner failed to appeal from the dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-42, the judgment therein is final and
may no longer be reviewed.

The crucial issue, therefore, to be resolved is the propriety of the dismissal of LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 on the ground of res judicata.
It must be pointed out that LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 praying that judgment be rendered directing the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac to
include petitioner's name, those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to the extent of one-third of the lands covered
by TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658, were predicated on the theory43 that Section 108 of PD 1529 is a mode of directly attacking the
certificates of title issued to the Bagayas brothers. On the contrary, however, the Court observes that the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657
and 375658 under Section 108 of PD 1529 is actually not the direct attack on said certificates of title contemplated under Section 4844
of the same law. Jurisprudence instructs that an action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a certificate of title when its objective
is to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the certificate of title was decreed.45 Corollary thereto, it is a
well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the certificate of title was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for such purpose. As explicated in Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc.:

It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether [the certificate of] title was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance
of the decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate cannot
be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding. The certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.

Contrary to the foregoing characterization, Section 108 of PD 1529 explicitly states that said provision “shall not be construed to give the
court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration.” In fact, based on settled jurisprudence, Section 108 of PD 1529 is limited
only to seven instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (c)
when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d)
when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as
married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation,
which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when
there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.48 Hence, the same cannot be said to constitute an attack on a
certificate of title as defined by case law. That said, the Court proceeds to resolve the issue as to whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s
twin petitions for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 was proper.

Petitioner claims that the determination of the RTC in Civil Case No. 04-42 that she is an adopted child and that the signature of her
adoptive mother Eligia in the deed of absolute sale transferring the subject land to Rogelio and Orlando was forged amounts to a new
interest that should be reflected on the certificates of title of said land, or provides a reasonable ground for the amendment thereof.

The Court disagrees for two reasons:

First. While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption, as well as the forgery of Eligia's signature on the
questioned deed, no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed. Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the
legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may
institute an action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land. More importantly, the Court has consistently
ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.49cralaw virtualaw
library

Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 because the present controversy involves
not the amendment of the certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and Orlando but the partition of the estate of Maximino and Eligia
who are both deceased. As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela,50 the prevailing rule is that proceedings under Sec tion 108
of PD 1529 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not
controversial issues.51 Relief under said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. This is now the controlling precedent, and the Court should no
longer digress from such ruling.52 Therefore, petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided under Section 108 of PD 1529.

NOTARTE VS. NOTARTE

FACTS:

Petitioners Leonardo, Guillermo, Regalado, all surnamed Notarte, and the heirs of Felipe Notarte were co-owners of a 263,233-square
meter land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48098.

On October 15, 1984, respondent Godofredo Notarte (Godofredo) bought a portion of the said land from Patrocenia Nebril-Gamboa
(Patrocenia), cousin of Felipe Notarte. Thereafter, Godofredo filed a complaint before the MTC to correct and remove the overlapping of
boundaries of the lots originally covered by OCT No. 48098. He averred that the said parcel of land is no longer undivided as it had been
physically segregated into the designated shares of the registered owners.

Leonardo, et al. countered that the land was never validly partitioned since there was neither extrajudicial nor judicial partition executed.
They claimed that their respective areas of possession were just orally assigned to each one of them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an oral partition of co-owned property is valid.

RULING:

YES! Under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a
partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction. Partition may thus be inferred from
circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption.

The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. In another case, we have held that after exercising acts of ownership over their
respective portions of the contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying the existence of an oral partition.

On this point, this Court has ruled that: "On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition
is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce
such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder."

PADILLA VS. MAGDUA

FACTS:

Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his name without the consent and knowledge of
his co-heirs. Juanita, the mother of the heirs had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Affidavit) in favor
of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land.

The land was subsequently sold by Ricardo's daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua.

RTC: The case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the
right of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of
all other heirs, then prescription can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land under
the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by Ricardo's daughters in favor
of Dominador.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the present action is already barred by prescription.

APPLICABLE LAW/S:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term
may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership. (400a)

• Section 1, Rule 9 of the rules of Court. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case.

RULING:

NO! It has not prescribed. Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. In the present case,
all three requisites have been met.

After Juanita's death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mother's land. The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about
the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself.
Accordingly, Ricardo's interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after repudiating their claim of entitlement
to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be
clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership,
before the prescriptive period begins to run.

However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardo's
repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages
with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year
acquisitive prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over the land. Thus, Dominador cannot
invoke acquisitive prescription.

In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription,
insufficiently established Dominador's rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to
determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the land.