Criminal Law

five days before the 3rd

Prof. Ramel C. Muria, LL.M

St. Thomas More Association of Lawyers for
Transformation (SALT), Inc.
Generality
diplomatic immunity

Persons exempt from the operation of Philippine

Criminal Law by virtue of the principles of public
international law include (a) Sovereigns and other
chiefs of State; (b) Ambassadors, ministers
plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges
d’affairs.
Remember: The exemption of sovereigns and other
chiefs of State are absolute; they are immune from
local jurisdiction even if their entry into the state is
incognito.
Functional diplomatic immunities for members of
international organization is limited exception to the
principle of generality of criminal law (Liang v. People, 335
SCRA 125, 154).
❖recognition by the recipient state and agreement
between the international organization and the
recipient state;
❖limitation implied from the functions that they are
performing
Principle of Territoriality

Maritime criminal jurisdiction principles:

French rule: emphasizes nationality as such, “crimes

committed on board a foreign merchant vessel should
not be prosecuted in the court of the country within
the territorial jurisdiction of which they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace
and security of the territory or the safety of the state is
endangered.”
Principle of Territoriality

1. Recall the extraterritorial application of the

Revised Penal Code under article 2.
2. Qualified universal jurisdiction of Philippine
courts for crimes punished under the Human
Security Act (Section 58 of Republic Act
9372).
3. Republic Act No. 9851 has similar provision
on qualified universal jurisdiction of courts.
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9851 provides
that the State shall exercise jurisdiction over
persons, whether military or civilian,
suspected or accused of a crime defined and
penalized in this Act, regardless of where the
crime is committed,
Principle of Territoriality

4. Recall the principles of maritime criminal

jurisdiction.
5. Recall the Crimes Committed by Public
Officers under Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code.
Principle of Territoriality

English rule: stresses the principle of

territoriality as such, “crimes are triable in the
courts of the country within whose territory they
were committed, unless they merely affect things
within the vessel, or they refer to the internal
management thereof.”
Principle of Territoriality

Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over crimes

committed on board a foreign merchant vessel in
the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) (see Magallona v.
Ermita, 655 SCRA 476).

Exception: when the crime committed violated

Philippine laws related to the sovereign rights of
the Philippines over the natural living and non-
living resources in the EEZ, e.g. Philippine
Fisheries Code.
Principle of Territoriality

Philippine courts have jurisdiction over crimes

committed on board a foreign merchant vessel in
the KIG and the Scharborough Shaol since the
Philippines consider them as its “regime of islands”
(see Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476).
Principle of Territoriality

Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over crimes

committed on board a foreign merchant vessel in
the continguous zone (24 nautical miles from the
baselines)

Exceptions:
❖ crimes committed in areas pertaining to the
Philippines territorial sea (12 nautical miles from
the baselines)
❖ crimes pertaining to violations of customs, fiscal,
sanitary, and immigration laws
Transitory Criminal Jurisdiction

Marital infidelity committed abroad which

causing mental and emotional anguish to
offended wife who was in the Philippines is
triable by Philippine courts (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No.
212448, January 11, 2018).

Remember: Not all marital infidelity

committed abroad may cause mental or
emotional anguish on the offended spouse.
Transitory Criminal Jurisdiction

Violation of BP 22 is a transitory crime. A

criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
may be filed and tried either at the place
where the check was issued, drawn, delivered,
or deposited (Morillo v. People, G.R. No. 198270,
December 5, 2015; Brodeth v. People, G.R. No. 197849,
November 29, 2017).
Transitory Criminal Jurisdiction

Estafa through post-dating a check is a

continuing or transitory crime. In estafa
through post-dating a check, it is not the non-
payment of a debt which is made punishable,
but the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check. Thus, the crime may be
prosecuted at the place where any of the
essential ingredients of the crime took place
(Cabral v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 23317, January 23, 2019).
Prospectivity

A penal law cannot make an act punishable in a

manner in which it was not punishable when
committed. New statute which establishes
conditions more lenient or favourable to the
accused, can be given retroactive effect. This
exception does not apply if the accused is a
habitual criminal and whenever the law
specifically states its non-application (see Art. 22,
RPC).
Prospectivity

An ex post facto law has been defined as one —

a. which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent
when done criminal, and punishes such
action; or
b. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed; or
c. which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed; or
Prospectivity

d. which alters the legal rules of evidence and

receives less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission
of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.
Prospectivity

The Supreme Court added two (2) more to the

list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate
civil rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful; or (f) that which
deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty (Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 135080,
November 28, 2007).
Civil liability arising from crimes

Damages arising from crimes: (a) civil

indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim
without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime; (b) actual or
compensatory damages to the extent proved, or
temperate damages when some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot be
provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and
(d) exemplary damages when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances (People v. Parba, G.R. No. 214506, October
19, 2015, 773 SCRA 83, 93).
Civil liability arising from crimes

Civil liability ex delicto may not be

recovered:
(a) When the court acquitted the accused with a
declaration that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist (Abellana v.
People, 655 SCRA 683)

(b) When the accused died prior to the finality of

the judgment of conviction
Civil liability arising from crimes

Civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a

worthless check are deemed instituted in a case
for violation of B.P. 22; the death of the accused
will not automatically extinguish the civil
action. (Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 5,
2015, 772 SCRA 1).
Civil liability arising from crimes

No civil liability may be awarded if there is no

act or omission punished by la which could
serve sas the source of civil liability ex delicto
(Dy v. People, G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016).
Civil liability arising from crimes

When an accused escaped from detention

pending appeal, both his criminal and civil
liability will become final and executory. The
decision convicting an employee in a criminal
case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the former’s
civil liability, but also with regard to its amount
(Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703,
April 14, 2004).
Civil liability arising from crimes

Aggravating circumstances may be considered

for purposes of determining the amount of
exemplary damages even if not alleged in the
information (People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June
22, 2015. 759 SCRA 666).
Felonies

General elements of crimes. Every crime has

two elements: the act or omission (actus reus)
and the mental element which is commonly
referred to as criminal intent (mens rea). For
one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo,
there must be a confluence of both an evil act
and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea (Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842,
November 29, 2006, 476 SCRA 461, 479).
Felonies

Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are

distinct and separate crimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime (Jason
Ivler y Aguilar v. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, et.
al, GR 172716, November 17, 2010).
Felonies

What is penalized under Article 365 of the

Revised Penal Code “is the mental attitude or
condition behind the acts of dangerous
recklessness and lack of care or foresight
although such mental attitude might have
produced several effects or consequences,”
(Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014).
Mistake of fact

Mistake of fact which would relieve an accused

of criminal liability has the following elements:
(a) The act done would have been lawful had
the facts been as the accused believed them to
be; (b) The intention of the accused was not
unlawful; and (c) There was no fault or
negligence. A mistake of fact contradicts the
presumption of criminal intent for acts which
would otherwise be considered as unlawful.
Mistake of fact

Remember: An act may be justified under the

mistake of fact doctrine only if the accused had no
time or opportunity to make further inquiry
and that the circumstances pressed him to act
immediately.

See U.S. v. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910, 15 Phil.
489; People v. Pambaya Bambayabao, G.R. No. L-29481, October
31, 1928, 52 Phil. 309; U.S. v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-10678,
August 17, 1915, 31 Phil. 308 and People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
L-41674, March 30, 1937; U.S. v. Apego, 23 Phil. 391).
Motive

As a general rule, proof of motive for the

commission of the offense charged does not
show guilt; and the absence of proof of such
motive does not establish the innocence of
accused for the crime charged such as murder.
To emphasize, "motive is irrelevant when the
accused has been positively identified by an
eyewitness. Intent is not synonymous with
motive. Motive alone is not a proof and is hardly
ever an essential element of a crime." (People v.
Manzano, G.R. No. 217974, March 5, 2018)
Mala in se vis-à-vis mala prohibita crimes

1. Good faith is not defense in crimes mala

prohibita (see Arsenia Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 617).

2. Lascivious conduct punished under Section

5 (b) of R.A. 7610 is malum prohibitum (see
Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007,
533 SCRA 643).
Mala in se vis-à-vis mala prohibita crimes

3. The anti-hazing law is malum prohibitum

(Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, 761
SCRA 375).

4. Hitting a child without intention to debase

his “intrinsic worth and dignity” as a
human being is not child abuse (see Bongalon
v. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013; Jabalde
v. People, G.R. No.195224, June 15, 2016).

5. Whipping a child in public place is child

abuse (Torres v. People, G.R. No. 206627, January
18, 2017).
Mala in se vis-à-vis mala prohibita crimes

6. Physical abuse of a child under Section

10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a special
law, is inherently wrong, rendering material
the existence of a criminal intent on the
part of the offender (Mabunot v. People, G.R. No.
204659, September 19, 2016).
Mala in se vis-à-vis mala prohibita crimes

7. The non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG

Fund premiums is malum prohibitum.
What the relevant laws punish is the
failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or
justifiable cause in remitting or paying the
required contributions or accounts (Matalam
v. People, G.R. Nos. 221849-50, April 4, 2016).

8. The crime of Illegal Use of Public Funds

under Article 220 is malum prohibitum (see
Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, 761
SCRA 375).
Criminal liability

Principles of criminal liability

First, for an accused to be criminally liable for

the unintended consequences of a criminal
act, the following requisites must be present
(1) that an intentional felony has been
committed, and (2) that the wrong done be the
direct, natural and logical consequences of the
felony committed by the offender (U.S. v. Brobst,
14 Phil. 310, 319; People v. Noel Sales, G.R. No. 177218,
October 3, 2011, 658 SCRA 367, 377; People v. Aniceto
Martin, G.R. No. L-3002, May 23, 1931; People v. Adriano,
G.R. No.205228, July 15, 2015, 763 SCRA 70).
Criminal liability

Second, the rule is that if a man creates in

another person's mind an immediate sense of
danger, which causes such person to try to
escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures
himself, the man who creates such a state of
mind is responsible for the resulting injuries
(People v. William Page, G.R. No. 3707, June 7, 1977, 77 SCRA
348, 355; People vs. Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, G.R. No. L-
27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17; People v. Calixto
Valdez, G.R. No. L-16486, March 22, 1921, 41 Phil. 49).
Criminal liability

Remember: To hold the accused criminally liable

for the resulting injury, what must be created in
the mind of the victim should be an immediate
sense of danger. If the victim suffered heart
attack, or any injury because the accused
committed acts which resulted to the victim’s
feeling of shock or frustration or hate, the
accused will not be criminally liable for the
resulting injury under this principle.
Criminal liability

Third, for an accused to be held responsible to

the resulting injury, the felony must be the
proximate cause of the resulting injury.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186; People v.
Gerardo Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947, 78 Phil. 458;
Filomeno Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
72964, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 1; People v. Orlito
Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011).
Criminal liability

Severe tetanus infection as efficient

intervening cause. If the severe tetanus
infection ensued more than 14 days from the
time the accused assaulted the victim, it should
be treated as an efficient intervening cause
that broke the relationship between the acts
committed by the accused and the resulting
death of the victim, unless the injuries
inflicted by the accused is serious or mortal
in nature (People v. Orlito Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412,
September 7, 2011; Filomeno Urbano v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988, 157
SCRA 1).
Criminal liability

The felony committed is not the proximate

cause of the resulting injury when
(a) there is an active force that intervened
between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a
distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from
the felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the
intentional act of the victim.
Criminal liability

The intended felony of the offender may not

come about because of (a) mistake in the
identity of the victim (error in personae); (b)
mistake in the blow, that is, when the
offender intending to do an injury to one
person actually inflicts it on another
(aberratio ictus); or (c) when the act exceeds
the intent, that is, the injurious result is
greater than that intended (praeter
intentionem).
Criminal liability

Aberratio ictus resulting in child abuse. If

the accused has wilful intention of committing
a felonious act on another person but the
injury falls on the victim who is a minor child,
as when he swang his arms to throw burning
oil on his adversary but the burning oil hit a
baby instead, he would be criminally liable for
child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI, of
Republic Act 7610 (see Patulot v. People, G.R.
No. 235071, January 7, 2019; not within the
coverage but the principle is a mere
reiteration).
Aberratio ictus

Four armed men alighted from a Toyota Corolla

and started shooting at the driver of a CRV.
Unfortunately, a bystander was injured during
the shooting. Both the driver and the bystander
died due to the shooting. The accused is guilty
of the death of the victim under Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine
of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal
liability for the acts committed in violation of
law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom. (People v.
Adriano, G.R. No.205228, July 15, 2015, 763 SCRA 70,
83).
Impossible crimes

Legal impossibility would apply to those

circumstances where (1) the motive, desire
and expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law; (2) there is intention to
perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and
(4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead
falls in this category (Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 103119, October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 57; Gemma
Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 209, 592
SCRA 426).
Impossible crimes

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous

circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation
of the intended crime. One example is the man
who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and
finds the pocket empty (Intod v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 103119, October 21, 1992, 215 SCRA 52, 58).
Note: No impossible crime without proof that the
victim was already dead when the accused
stabbed him (People v. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14,
2018).
Conspiracy

Conspiracy must be proven as convincingly as

the criminal act itself - like any element of the
offense charged, conspiracy must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Amar,
G.R. No. 194235, June 8, 2016; People v. Pepino and Gomez,
G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016).
Conspiracy

Implied conspiracy. Direct proof that the two

accused conspired is not essential as it may be
inferred from their conduct before, during, and
after their commission of the crime that they
acted with a common purpose and design. (People
v. Renato Lagat y Gawan, G.R. No. 187044, September 14,
2011)
Conspiracy

Wheel conspiracy. The wheel conspiracy occurs

when there is a single person or group (the hub)
dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with
another spoke (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538; Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 220598-220593, July19,
2016).
Conspiracy
Conspiracy

❖ In the event that the spoke shares a common

purpose to succeed, there is a single
conspiracy.
❖ In the instances when each spoke is
unconcerned with the success of the other
spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.
Conspiracy

Chain conspiracy. Chain conspiracy exists when

there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This
involves individuals linked together in a vertical
chain to achieve a criminal objective (see Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377
SCRA 538; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 220598-220593, July19, 2016).
Conspiracy
Mere presence in the commission of the
crime as basis of joint criminal liability

1. Section 4, paragraph 6 of R.A. No. 8049

provides that the presence of any person
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation as principal, unless he
prevented the commission of the punishable
acts (Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015,
761 SCRA 375, 427-431).
2. Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code provides
in part that any member of a band who is
present at the commission of a robbery by the
band, shall be punished as principal of any of
the assaults committed by the band, unless it
be shown that he attempted to prevent the
same.
Mere presence in the commission of the
crime as basis of joint criminal liability

3. In robbery with homicide, all those who take

part as principals in the robbery would be
liable as principles in the single and
indivisible crime of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually took part in
the killing, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavoured to prevent the same (People v.
Lagabala, G.R. No. 221427, July 30, 2018; mere
reiteration of an old principle).

Note: Mere presence should be interpreted to mean as

physical presence and knowledge of the commission of the
crime not contemplated by the previous conspiracy.
Nuances on the joint criminal
responsibility resulting from conspiracy

1. Private individuals may also be held liable

for violations of RA 3019. The law punishes
not only public officers who commit prohibited
acts enumerated under Sec. 3, but also those
who induce or cause the public official to
commit those offenses. This is supported by
Sec. 9, which includes private persons as
liable for violations under Secs. 3, 4, 5, and 6
(Santillano v. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 3,
2010).
Nuances on the joint criminal
responsibility resulting from conspiracy

2. Private individuals who conspired with

accountable public officer may also be
liable for malversation of public funds
under Art. 217. It must be stressed that a
public officer who is not in charge of public
funds or property by virtue of her official
position, or even a private individual, may be
liable for malversation or illegal use of public
funds or property if such public officer or
private individual conspires with an
accountable public officer to commit
malversation or illegal use of public funds or
property (Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224,
July 29, 2015).
Nuances on the joint criminal
responsibility resulting from conspiracy

3. Persons who cooperated as principals in the

killing of a person whom they knew to be
the lawful spouse of their co-accused is not
guilty of parricide. It is a established doctrine
that a stranger who participates in the
perpetration of parricide is not guilty of
parricide but only of murder or homicide
according to the factors present in the
offense (People v. Malgana, et al., G.R. No. L-20652,
October 25, 1923).
Nuances on the joint criminal
responsibility resulting from conspiracy

4. Criminal liability arising from conspiracy in

the commission of offenses punished under
special laws may be based on the suppletory
application of the principle of conspiracy.
(Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, January 25, 2013; Go-
Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008;
Ladonga v. People, G.R. No. 101066, February 17, 2005)
Mere signature in a document as an
indicator of conspiracy

An inference of conspiracy between the accused

and those who took direct part in the crime of
malversation of public funds cannot be drawn
from the mere signature of the said accused in a
document related to the crime (People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197953, August 5, 2015, 765 SCRA
321; Maamo and Silor v. People, G.R. No. 201917, December
1, 2016).
Self-defense

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:

1.Actual or material unlawful aggression
means an attack with physical force or with a
weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the intent of the aggressor to
cause the injury.
Self-defense

2. Imminent unlawful aggression means

an attack that is impending or at the
point of happening; it must not consist
in a mere threatening attitude, nor must
it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like
aiming a revolver at another with intent
to shoot or opening a knife and making a
motion as if to attack (People v. Nogas, G.R.
No 172606, November 23, 2011; People v. Gamez,
G.R. No. 202847, October 23, 2013, 708 SCRA 625).
Self-defense

❖ A mere threatening or intimidating

attitude does not constitute unlawful
aggression (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340,
July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 204, 215).

❖ A mere push or a shove, not followed by

other acts, has been held insufficient to
constitute unlawful aggression. (see People v.
Teodoro Sabio, G.R. No. L-23734, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 901, 902).
Self-defense

❖ Accused’s observation that one of the

men was pulling an object from his waist
is not a convincing proof of unlawful
aggression (People v. Bingky Campos and Danny
“Boy” Acabo, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011, 653
SCRA 99, 114-116).
Self-defense

When unlawful aggression ceases, the

defender no longer has any justification to
kill or wound the original aggressor (Flores v.
People, G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA
127, 145-146; People v. Dioscoro Alconga and Adolfo
Bracamonte, G.R. No. L-162, April 30, 1947, 78 Phil.
366).
Retaliation

Retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In

retaliation, the aggression that the victim started
already ceased when the accused attacked him, but
in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing
when the accused injured the aggressor. As such,
there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim to justify his fatal stabbing by the accused
(People v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, June 28, 2015, 760 SCRA
413, 426-427).
Defense property

The defense of property is not of such

importance as the right to life, and defense of
property can only be invoked as a justifying
circumstance when it is coupled with an
attack on the person of one entrusted with
said property (People v. Apolinar, 38 O.G. 2870; see
also People v. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-334660-67. April 20,
1983).
Defense property

No unlawful aggression in concerted fight.

The acceptance of personal encounter or fight
excludes the application of paragraph 1 of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code for the
reason that the fight, once accepted, the first
aggression is an incident of the fight and
without judicial effects modifying the
imputability resulting from the accepted act
(U.S. v. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713; People v. Macaspac, 60 Phil.
633; People v. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105).
Minority

Children above fifteen (15) but below eighteen

(18) and who acted with discernment shall be
referred to appropriate diversion program (see
sec. 22, RA 9344).
a. Where the imposable penalty for the crime
committed is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the diversion program shall
be conducted by the law enforcement officer
or punong barangay with the assistance of
the local social welfare or development
office.
Minority

b. In victimless crimes where the imposable

penalty is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the diversion shall be
conducted by the local social welfare or
development officer.
c. Where the imposable penalty for the crime
exceeds six (6) years imprisonment,
diversion may be resorted to only by the
court (sec. 23, RA 9344).
Discernment

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor

to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case. An
accused minor who covered the mouth of a
rape victim with a handkerchief and conspired
with co-accused in raping her is found to be
acting with discernment (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No.
199270, October 21, 2015, 773 SCRA 518, 537).
Suspended sentence

Suspended sentence is applicable even if the

accused who committed the crime in his
minority had reached the age of beyond 21 years
old. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still
of tender age. Accused may be confined in
an agricultural camp or any other training
facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344 (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No.
199270, October 21, 2015, 773 SCRA 518; People v. People
v. Sisracon, G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018).
First time minor offender under RA 9165

Probation or Community Service for a

First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of
Imprisonment. – Upon promulgation of the
sentence, the court may, in its discretion,
place the accused under probation, even if the
sentence provided under Republic Act 9165 is
higher than that provided under existing law
on probation, or impose community service in
lieu of imprisonment (section 70, RA 9165).
Insanity

Tests to determine insanity. To determine

whether an accused was legally insane during
the commission of the crime, two
distinguishable tests are used: (a) the test of
cognition – whether there was a “complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the
criminal act” and (b) the test of volition –
whether there was a “total deprivation of
freedom of the will.” (People v. Anacito Opuran, G.R.
Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 654)
Special context for violence against women

While it is required that the offender has or had a

sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. It is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long
as there is sufficient evidence showing the past
or present existence of such relationship
between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed (Dabalos v. RTC, Br.
59, Angeles City (Pampanga), G.R. No. 193960, January 7,
2013).
Instigation vis-à-vis entrapment

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime

that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the "decoy
solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity
in the act were present and apparently
assisting its commission (People v. Bartolome, G.R.
No. 191726, February 6, 2013).
Restitution

Restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, as

provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in
relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article of
the Revised Penal Code, but should be treated
a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of
the accused when the two circumstances are
present in a case (Legrama v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
178626, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 270, 282).
Dwelling

Dwelling is the place of abode where the

offended party resides and which satisfies the
requirements of domestic life. To be
aggravating, the crime must be committed
not only in a dwelling but in the dwelling of
the offended party, provided that the latter
has not given provocation.
Evident premeditation

Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in a

case where, although the accused had planned
the perpetration of the killing, the victim was
different from the person whom the accused
had originally intended (People v Guillen, 85 Phil.
307).
Evident premeditation

However, evident premeditation may be

appreciated if the conspirators were
determined to kill not only the intended
victim but anyone who may help him
interpose a violent resistance (People v. Ubina,
97 Phil. 515). Premeditation may be appreciated
although the victim, who was to be the object of
the preconceived vengeance, was not
determined by the criminal, as long as the
actual victim belonged to the class
designated by the accused (U.S. v. Zalsos and
Ragmac, 40 Phil. 96).
Treachery

Treachery cannot be presumed, except in the

following cases:
1. Attacks on a minor (People v. Umawid, G.R. No.
207990, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 582, 609; People v.
Malolot, 548 SCRA 676, GR 174063, March 14, 2008).
Treachery

2. When the victim was tied elbow to elbow

with his body sustaining many wounds
and his head cut off, treachery is
considered (US v. Santos, 1 Phil. 222, 224-22) or if
a person is first seized and bound, with a
view to rendering him incapable of defense,
and he is then slained either by the person
who reduced him to his helpless state or by
another," alevosia is present (see People v.
Mongado, G.R. No. L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
642)
Alternative circumstances

❖As a general rule, relationship is mitigating in

crime against property, and is even exempting
in theft, estafa and malicious mischief. It is
aggravating in crime against chastity.
Alternative circumstances

❖Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into

consideration as a mitigating circumstance
when the offender committed a felony in a
state of intoxication, if the same is not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit
the said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance (People v. Crisostomo,
G.R. No. L-32243, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 47, 55).
Alternative circumstances

❖Lack of instruction is generally mitigating,

except in crimes against property and
chastity. Should the accused abuse his
educational attainment to commit a felony,
the circumstances should be considered as
aggravating.
Principals

Principals by direct participation. Principals

by direct participation do not only participate
in the criminal resolution but proceed to
personally take part in the perpetration of the
crime. The expression those who take a direct
part in the commission of the deed means
those who, participating in the criminal
resolution, proceed together to perpetrate the
crime and personally take part in the same
end (People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38).
Principals

Principal by inducement. The conviction of a

person as a principal by inducement requires
(1) that the inducement be made with the
intention of procuring the commission of the
crime; and (2) that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission by the
material executor (Ambagan, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos.
204481-82, October 14, 2015, 772 SCRA 489, 514-515).
Principals

Principal by indispensable cooperation. To be

a principal by indispensable cooperation, it is
essential that there must be participation in the
criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in
criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another
act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
Accomplices

In order that a person may be considered an

accomplice, namely,
(1) that there by community of design; that is
knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by
previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid
in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way;
Accomplices

(3) that there be a relation between the acts

done by the principal and those attributed
to the person charged as accomplice (People
v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706
SCRA 508, 529).
Accessory

1. profiting by the effects of the crime;

2. concealing the body, effects or instruments
of the crime; and
3. assisting in the escape of the principal
provided he acts with abuse of public
functions, or if the principal is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to
take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime (art. 19).
Accessory

Two types of accessories by harboring or

concealing an offender:
1. Public officer who abuses his official position
in harboring, concealing or assisting the
principal to escape
2. Private person who harbors, conceals, or
assists the principal of the crime of treason,
parricide, murder or attempt to take the life of
the Chief executive to escape
Accessory

Corpus delicti. To prove the corpus delicti, it

is sufficient for the prosecution to be able to
show that (1) a certain fact has been proven —
say, a person has died or a building has been
burned; and (2) a particular person is
criminally responsible for the act (People v. SP01
Catalino Gonzales, G.R. No. 192233, February 17, 2016).
Exemption from criminal liability

Exemption from criminal liability. The

penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be
imposed upon those who are such with respect to
their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, illegitimate, and adopted brothers and
sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees, with the single exception of accessories
falling within paragraph 1 of Article 19 (Art. 20,
RPC).
Accessory vis-à-vis Obstruction of Justice

Article 19, paragraph 2 defines "accessories" as

those who, with knowledge of the commission of
the crime and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission by concealing or
destroying the body of the crime, its effects or
instruments, in order to prevent its discovery
(Padernal v. People, G.R. No. 18111, August 17, 2015, 766
SCRA 614, 627-628)
Complex crimes vis-à-vis composite
crimes

❖In a composite crime, the composition of the

offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or
compound crime, the combination of the
offenses is not specified but generalized, that
is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense
being the necessary means to commit the
other;
Complex crimes vis-à-vis composite
crimes

❖In a composite crime, the penalty for the

specified combination of crimes is specific, but
in a complex or compound crime the penalty is
that corresponding to the most serious
offense, to be imposed in the maximum period;
Complex crimes vis-à-vis composite
crimes

❖A light felony that accompanies the commission

of a complex or compound crime may be made
the subject of a separate information, but a
light felony that accompanies a composite
crime is absorbed (People v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244,
June 22, 2015, 759 SCRA 666, 682).
Kidnapping with rape

No matter how many rapes had been

committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is
only one kidnapping with rape. This is because
these composite acts are regarded as a single
indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single
penalty (People v. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No.
186417, July 27, 2011).
Forcible abduction with rape

If the taking was by forcible abduction and the

woman was raped several times, the crimes
committed is one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible
abduction was only necessary for the first rape;
and each of the other counts of rape constitutes
distinct and separate count of rape (People v. Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011; People v.
Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002).
Robbery with Homicide

The intent to commit robbery must precede the

taking of human life. The homicide may take
place before, during or after the robbery (People v.
Orosco, G.R. No. 209227, March 25, 2015, 754 SCRA 214,
226-227; People v. Salazar, 277 SCRA 67; People v. De Leon,
591 SCRA 178; People v. De Jesus, 429 SCRA 384).
Robbery with rape

Robbery with rape. The special complex

crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code contemplates a situation where the
original intent of the accused was to take,
with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed
on the occasion thereof or as an
accompanying crime (People vs. Evangelio, 656
SCRA 579).
Rape with homicide

In the special complex crime of rape with

homicide, the following elements must
concur: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal
knowledge of a woman was achieved by
means of force, threat or intimidation; and
(3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or
intimidation, the accused killed a woman
(People v. Villarino, 614 SCRA 372, GR 185012, March
5, 2010).
Rape with homicide

In rape with homicide, it is immaterial that

the person killed is someone other than the
woman victim of rape (People vs. Laog, 658 SCRA
654).
Kidnapping with homicide

Where the person kidnapped is killed in the

course of the detention, regardless of whether
the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall
be punished as a special complex crime under
the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
RA No. 7659 (People v. Elizalde, G.R. No. 210434,
December 5, 2016).
Continued crimes

A continued (continues or continuing crime) is a

single crime consisting of a series of acts but all
arising from one criminal resolution.
Three-fold rule

The maximum of the convict’s sentence shall

no be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him. No other
penalty to which he may be liable shall be
inflicted after the sum total of those imposed
equals the same maximum period. Such
maximum period shall in no case exceed
forty (Art. 70).
Simultaneous service of sentence

When the culprit has to serve two or more

penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if
the nature of the penalties permit. Otherwise,
the order of their respective severity shall be
followed (Art. 70).
Prescription of crimes

Computation of period of prescription of crimes.

The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to
run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him. The term of prescription shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC).
Prescription of crimes

Blameless ignorance doctrine. Under the

rulings in the Behest Loans Cases, the discovery
rule, which is also known as the blameless
ignorance doctrine, stipulates that: x x x the
statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of
the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the
courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or
has no reasonable means of knowing the
existence of a cause of action (Del Rosario v. People,
G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018).
Indeterminate Sentence Law

How to determine the maximum and minimum sentences.

(1) Crimes punished under the RPC. The maximum term shall be taken in
the penalty that can be properly imposed under the RPC considering
the attending circumstances. The minimum penalty shall be taken
within any period of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed by law.
(2) Offenses punished under special laws. The maximum term shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the said law.
Illustrations:

Supposed the crime committed is homicide, where the proper

penalty is reclusion temporal.

Fixing the indeterminate sentence, will require the fixing of the

minimum sentence which must be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree, prision mayor. The indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision Mayor in any of its period to Reclusion Temporal in its

proper period.

Remember the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are

considered only in the maximum sentence.
Supposed the crime is only frustrated homicide

Lower the penalty for homicide by one degree first considering the
rule in determining the penalty for frustrated crimes. Thus, the
proper penalty will be prision mayor.

Then fix the indeterminate sentence, following the procedure in the

first illustration.

The indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision Correccional in any of its period to Prision Mayor in its

proper period.
Supposed the crime is a complex crime of homicide with direct
assault

Considering Art. 48 provides that the penalty for complex crime

must be the penalty for the graver offense to be imposed in the
maximum, the proper penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.

The indeterminate sentence must take into consideration also the

prescription of Article 48 to fix the penalty in its maximum period,
thus the indeterminate sentence shall be:

Prision mayor maximum period in any of its period to

Reclusion Temporal maximum in its proper period.
Probation

Amendment under Republic Act 10707

• No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the

defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction:

• When a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty

is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the
imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed
to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such
decision becomes final.
Probation

• The application for probation based on the modified decision shall

be filed in the trial court where the judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial
court where such case has since been re-raffled.

• In a case involving several defendants where some have taken

further appeal, the other defendants may apply for probation by
submitting a written application and attaching thereto a certified
true copy of the judgment of conviction.

• This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of

probation should he seek a review of the modified decision which
already imposes a probationable penalty (sec. 1).