Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 11

(8) MANUEL SY Y LIM vs. CA G.R. No.

L-37494 March 30, 1982

Facts:
In or about June 1970 to October 1970, in Valenzuela, Bulacan, accused Manuel Sy y Lim was
charged with the crime of infringement of trademark for selling or offering for sale hand pumps of
inferior quality and labeled JETMATIC DRAGON HAND PUMP and at a lower price, giving the public
general appearance of the JETMATIC Dragon hand pumps of the Sea Commercial Company,
Incorporated as to the outside appearance.

Issues:

WON the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that petitioner is not placed in double
jeopardy by his prosecution under the second information in question.

Held:

No. Acquittal was for the offense specifically charged, without the trial court expressly finding
that for the other offense, which also charged but not expressly so by the statutory designation
of the offense. Evidence exists to justify his being held to answer for such offense, in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, as the trial court in the instant
case very explicitly did. It is this circumstance that, clearly and undisputably would prevent
double jeopardy to attach, for there is neither acquittal nor conviction, not even dismissal of the
case, which might result in double jeopardy arising to ban the proceedings contemplated in the
aforecited provisions of the Rules of Court.

(26) DIRECTOR J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,. JUDGE ROMEO
G. MAGLALANG and BENJAMIN S. ESCAÑO ) [G.R. No. 78162. April 19, 1991.]

FACTS:
Petitioner Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Antonio Carpio charges
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion for having granted bail to Benjamin S. Escaño, an
accused in the ambush-slaying of Mayor Jose C. Payumo, Jr. of Dinalupihan, Bataan and for having
taken petitioner to task for his alleged refusal to release said accused to the custody of the
Dinalupihan police.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of bail of Escano is valid

HELD:
No. The Court ordered the granted bail are hereby void. The order granting bail had been
rendered moot not only by the fact that he had been released from NBI custody, but also because
Escaño jumped bail and did not appear on the date set for his arraignment.

Although the right to bail is principally for the benefit of the accused, in the judicial determination of
the availability of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due process. The court’s
discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it could be uncontrolled and might be capricious or
whimsical.

(27) Alexander and Cecilia Trinidad vs Victor Ang GR No. 192898, Jan. 31, 2011

Facts:
On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg 22 against the
petitioners. On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed with the DOJ a petition for review challenging
this Resolution.

On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed before the MTCC of Masbate City, an
Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg 22 against the petitioners. The MTCC ordered the
petitioners to submit their counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days from receipt of the
said order.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for review filed is a ground for suspension of arraignment.

Ruling:
No. The SC deny the petition for its failure to show any reversible error in the challenged RTC
order.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department
of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not
exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

28. SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE vs. HON. ROLANDO HOW and MA. FE
F. BARREIRO
G.R. No. 140863. August 22, 2000.
THIRD DIVISION, GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information1 for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro
based on the complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. Before the scheduled arraignment of
private respondent could take place, respondent court issued an Order dated June 29, 1999,
resetting the arraignment of private respondent on the ground that private respondent had “filed an
appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Private respondent again filed another “Motion to Defer Arraignment, and on November 15, 1999
respondent court issued an Order further deferring the arraignment of private respondent “until such
time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is resolved.

Issue:
Whether or not the public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the
arraignment of private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary
of Justice.

Ruling:
No. The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after
the information has already been filed in court is well settled. Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors
are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm,
nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.

32. CHIEF PROSECUTOR ZENON L. DE GUIA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO, JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1099 August 1, 1994

Facts:
The incident subject of the present complaint occurred during the trial of Criminal Case No.
2689-90-C 3 in the sala of respondent Judge. At the trial on September 20, 1993, Macario A. Agosila,
representing the Prosecution Office was trying to prove that the accused mortgaged to the
complaining witness a falsified and forged document — Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-164 —
covering a non-existent property. Three (3) of the documents presented and marked by the
prosecution during the pre-trial were the affidavit of complaining witness Fe Ochoa-Baybay (Exhibit
"A"), TCT No. 164 (Exhibit "C"), and TCT No. RT-164 (2766) (Exhibit "E").

ISSUE:
WON Judge Guerrero, Jr. acted arbitrarily in ordering contempt of court against Fiscal Agosila.

Held:
Yes. judges are enjoined to exercise utmost restraint in the use of their contempt powers. They
are expected to avail of the contempt power only as a last resort when all other alternative courses of
action are exhausted in the pursuit of maintaining respect to the court and its processes. Thus, when
a less harsh remedy presents itself to the judge, he should at all times hesitate to use his contempt
power, and instead opt for the less harsh remedy. It is quite clear that respondent Judge had an
alternative to the exercise of the court's contempt power. We agree with the observations of the OCA
in its recommendation, to wit:

33. CORPUZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR. NO. 162214 NOVEMBER 11, 2004
FACTS: Balicena and Andutan, Sr., both public officers, Dept. of Finance. Conspiring and
confederating with each other, together with accused-Corpuz, and other officers of Filsyn Corp.,
recommended and criminally approved the transfer of 61 Tax Credit Certificates totally amounting to
P131,543,043.00 issued to Filsyn Corp. thus changed with violation of Sec. 3(e) of 3019, “tax credit
scam.”
The prosecution was specifically warned by the Court that should it fail to resolve the accused’s
pending motion for reconsideration, it was possible that Criminal Cases would be dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court committed a grave abuse of its discretion in issuing the
Resolution which set aside the order of dismissal issued by J. Nario.

RULING:
No. The Verbal Order of Dismissal by J. Nario is a nullity. Sec. 1, Rule 120 Mandate that a
judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which
it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of
the rights of the accused to a speedy trial.
A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision. Thus, there has been no valid
and effective order of dismissal of the cases.
The petition is denied.

(35) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA,


CEFERINO S. PAREDES,JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET G.R. NO. 115439-41 July 16,
1997

FACTS:
In a resolution dated February 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification
charges against all the herein private respondents. To evade responsibility for Sansaet’s own
participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement his
client,and also one of the herein respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his
discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefore was filed
by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sansaet is eligible for discharge to testify as a as a State Witness.
RULING:
Yes. Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's discharge as state
witness, he can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose
the three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows
consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or
involving common questions of law and fact.

(36) Edward Marcelo Vs CA GR 106695 Aug 4,1994


Facts:

In a complaint-affidavit sworn to on 18 March 1991 and filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, Jose T. Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public
documents committed by forging the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements
(VTA's). Submitted in support of the affidavit-complaint were the findings of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and of the PC/PNP Crime Laboratory that the signature on the VTA's purporting to
be that of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. and the specimen or standard signature of the latter were not written
by one and the same person.

Issue:

Whether a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, which relied on the
reversal by the Review Committee of the Office of the City Prosecutor of the investigating
prosecutor's resolution to file the information, bars the filing of a new information for the same offense
after the Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the review committee.

Ruling:

No. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners' special civil action
for certiorari not necessarily for the reason it relied upon, i.e., "certiorari and prohibition are not the
correct remedies against an order denying a motion to quash," but because the Santiago court did not
act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash. It is settled that if a court, in denying the motion to quash (or a motion to dismiss), acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, certiorari or prohibition lies.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Do
(40) PANFILO O. DOMINGO, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 109376. January 20,
2000
Facts:
26 May 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan
against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then president of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus, Jr.,
former Deputy Presidential Assistant.
In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped from the
complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore outside the criminal
jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary investigation against the other
respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime prescribed

Ruling: No, the crime did not prescribe.

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive period.
Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years." This
was later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982, which increased the
prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen years.

41. HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-
Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then
President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall
Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSRFI).3

Issue:

(a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;

Ruling:

(a.) No. Under Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:


B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.

42. Ramon B. Revilla Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan


DOCTRINE: Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual
opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them from
getting out of control. We have held that discretion is guided by: first, the applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this Court may promulgate; and third, by
those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. The discretion
of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in
instances where such discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
FACTS:
An Information dated 5 June 2014 filed by the Office of the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan
charged Revilla, Cambe and Napoles, among others, with the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended.
In a Resolution dated 19 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against Revilla,
Cambe, and Napoles. On the same day, Revilla voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) and filed a Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his detention at
the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame. On 20 June 2014, Cambe also voluntarily surrendered to
the Sandiganbayan and filed an Urgent Motion to Commit Accused to Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) pending trial of the case.
ISSUES:
WoN the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the applications for bail of Napoles
and Cambe? (Revilla withdrew his petition on this question)

NO. The Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it denied bail to Cambe and Napoles, upon a finding of strong evidence that they committed the crime
of plunder in conspiracy with one another. The SC cited the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, and ruled
that thus, the latter exercised its judicial discretion within the bounds of the Constitution, law, rules,
and jurisprudence after appreciating and evaluating the evidence submitted by the parties. During the
bail hearings, both parties were afforded opportunities to offer their evidence. The prosecution
presented nine witnesses and documentary evidence to prove the strong evidence of guilt of the
accused. The defense likewise introduced evidence in its own rebuttal and cross-examined the
witnesses presented by the prosecution. Only after both parties rested their case that the
Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution, which contains the summary of the prosecution's evidence.
43. Mario FL. Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However,
Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time
for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders
fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

HELD:

It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by


information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

44. G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN


PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL PANGANDAMAN, PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN,
MANGORAMAS PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB P. PANGORANGAN KILATUN
PANGANDAMAN, MARIO PANGANDAMAN, MACABIDAR PANGANDAMAN, PUYAT P.
ROMAMPAT, SANTORANI P. DIMAPENGEN, NASSER P. DIMAPENGEN and DIAMA OPAO
petitioners,

vs.

DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE OF POONABAYABAO,


TAMPARAN AND MASIU, LANAO DEL SUR and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Facts:
The case originated in Lanao. The offended party was ambushed in Lanao, but he survived.
Based on his description, there were around 50 persons who staged the ambush from both sides of
the hill. However, he could not recognize anyone of the 50. But he filed a case against all 50
ambushers, all “JOHN DOES”. So the court issued a warrant of arrest against the 50 John Does.
Issue:
W/N the warrant of arrest is valid? Can a court issue a warrant of arrest against an unknown
accused?

Held:
NO it is not valid. It is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a call of writs long prescribed
as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject. Clearly
violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person
or persons to be seized. The warrant as against unidentified subjects will be considered as null and
void.

45. RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G. R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

FACTS:
On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was
then assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle, he invited the accused to come
inside their sub-station since the place is almost in front of the said sub-station.

ISSUE:
Whether the roadside questioning of a motorist, pursuant to a routine traffic stop can be
considered a formal arrest.

RULING:
There was no valid arrest. When the petitioner was flagged down for committing a traffic violation,
he was not, by the fact itself (ipso facto) and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there
be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:

46. G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005


DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON,
JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.

Facts:

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio
N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners' motion to declare
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for their
failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be
determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo,
based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be determined
only after trial. [1]

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal was filed on time by the petitioners

Ruling:
Yes. We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration).
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within
the fresh appeal period of 15 days

Emilio A. Gonzales vs. Office of the President

Facts:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries)
was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando
Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M.Kalaw, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner
Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct
was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Issue:

Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

Held:

Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi