b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS,
FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN
and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.
Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.
ABC Law Offices for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the
Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by
way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family
Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco Salinas,
et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is
hereby, reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered
finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as
hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-appellees are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the
death of their son Audie Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of
said Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas;
and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato
Culan- Culan; and
3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00
for attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the
defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag,
Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area
of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and
assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-
01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office
of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of
agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao
del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of
P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax
Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del
Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed
by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the
residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family
home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case
and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment
debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant
is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family
Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the
name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land
and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not
approved by the proper government agency. An opposition
thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the
motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by
defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2,
1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is
alleged that the trial court erred and acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set
aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner' motion for
reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner
contends that only a question of law is involved in this petition.
He asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied
as his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a
family home under the Family Code which took effect on August
4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house
and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in
Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case
pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took
place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not
one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the
Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold
on execution. It is further alleged that the trial court erred in
holding that the said house and lot became a family home only
on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and
that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that
all family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to the effectivity
of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said
Code; and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of
the Family Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2,
Title V have a retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband
and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
house where they and their family reside, and the land on which
it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the
time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such
and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except
as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on
a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the
necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending
credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or
after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
material men and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time
of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner
was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988
being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family
home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family
in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code,
it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also
govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said
Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the
money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which was
the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of
the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court
on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court
correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Griño-
Aquino, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG
and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The issues in this case are not novel: whether or not the
conveyance made by way of the sheriff's sale pursuant to the
writ of execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590
is prohibited under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; and
whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of
property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners'
properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five
(5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at
Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold
at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent
as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to
redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on
February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying
said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on
November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to
declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the
land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their
complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children and
heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on
February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon
their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT No.
P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said
property has been acquired through free patent, such property
is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for
the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Petitioners further alleged that they were in continuous, open
and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9,
1968. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs
Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the
subject property including their family home which was
extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law. As a result of
the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent was
able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the
land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership
of petitioners over said property.
Private respondent refuted petitioners' contentions alleging that
he lawfully acquired the subject properties described as Lot No.
5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs
Sale on February 12, 1996. Said sale has become final as no
redemption was made within one year from the registration of
the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. The validity of the sale in favor
of Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court of Appeals in a
related case (CA No. 499965-R) entitled "Arriola v. Gilig," where
one Rufino Arriola also claimed ownership over the subject
property.
Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally
owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on
September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de Venta.
Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application
for free patent which was final only in 1979.
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since
petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, he has
been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and
therefore, prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968
until possession has been restored to them.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the
complaint.
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
Premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiffs, ordering the dismissal
of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs;
a) Declaring OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No 548906 both
in the name of Pablo Taneo as null and void and directing the
Register of Deeds to cancel the same, without prejudice
however on the part of the defendant to institute legal
proceedings for the transfer of the said title in the name of
defendant Abdon Gilig;
b) Declaring Abdon Gilig as the absolute and legal owner of the
land covered by OCT No. P-12820, and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 851920, and hence entitled to the possession
of the same and as a necessary concomitant, admonishing the
plaintiffs to refrain from disturbing the peaceful possession of the
defendant over the land in question.
c) Likewise declaring the defendant Abdon Gilig as the true and
absolute owner of the house in question formerly declared under
Tax Declaration No. 4142 in the name of Pablo Taneo and
presently declared under Tax Declaration No 851916 in the
name of Abdon Gilig; ordering the plaintiffs or any of their
representatives to vacate and return the possession of the same
to defendant Abdon Gilig;
d) Ordering the plaintiffs, except the nominal parties herein, to
pay to defendant Abdon Gilig the amount of P500.00 a month
as reasonable rental of the house in question to be reckoned
from February 9, 1968 until the possession of the same is
returned to the defendant.
e) To pay to defendant the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
The petition is devoid of merit.
In resolving the issues, the lower court made the following
findings of fact which this Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb:
1. That the land in question originally belonged to Lazaro Ba-a
who sold the same to the late Pablito (sic) Taneo father of the
herein plaintiff on September 18, 1941, by virtue of an Escritura
de Venta identified as Reg. Not. 50; pages 53, Foleo Not. V,
Series of 1941 of the Notarial Register of Ernie Pelaez (Exh. 10);
2. That on July 19, 1951 Abdon Gilig with his wife filed a Civil
Case No. 590 for recovery of property against Pablo Taneo, et
al., wherein Judgment was rendered on June 24, 1964, in favor
of Abdon Gilig and against Pablo Taneo ordering the latter to
pay damages in the amount of P5,000.00 (Exh. 2);
3. That by virtue of said decision, a writ of Execution was issued
on November 22, 1965 against the properties of Pablo Taneo
and on December 1, 1965, a Notice of Levy was executed by
the Clerk of Court Pedro Perez wherein the properties in
question were among the properties levied by the Sheriff (Exh
3);
4. That the said properties were sold at public auction wherein
the defendant Abdon Gilig came out as the highest bidder and
on February 12, 1965, a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was
executed by Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff Pedro Perez (Exh. 1)
ceding the said properties in favor of Abdon Gilig and which
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on
March 2, 1966;
5. That for failure to redeem the said property within the
reglementary period, a Sheriffs final Deed of Conveyance was
executed by same Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on February
1968, (Exhs. 4, 4-A) conveying the property definitely to Abdon
Gilig.
6. That on April 20, 1966, after his third-party claim which he
filed with the Sheriff in Civil Case No. 590 was not given due
course, Rufino Arriola filed Civil Case No. 2667 entitled Arriola
vs. Abdon Gilig, et al., for Recovery of Property and/or
annulment of Sale with Damages;
7. That Judgment was rendered by the Court thru Judge
Bernardo Teves dismissing the case with costs on February 21,
1969;
8. That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision in toto on June 20, 979, declaring
the alleged Deed of Sale executed by Abdon Gilig in favor of the
plaintiff as null and void for being simulated or fictitious and
executed in fraud or (sic) creditors;
9. That on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in
question erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares as a family
home (Exh. F) but was however, notarized only on May 2, 1965
and registered with the Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966.
10. That in the meanwhile, unknown to the defendant, Pablo
Taneo applied for a free patent on the land in question which
was approved on October 13, 1973, (Exh. B) and the Patent and
Title issued on December 10, 1980 (Oct No. P-12820 - Exh. 12);
11. On November 3, 1985, the plaintiff filed the present action. 2
Petitioners contend that under Section 118 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the subject land which they inherited from their
father under free patent cannot be alienated or encumbered in
violation of the law. Citing in particular the cases of Oliveros v.
Porciongcola 3 and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 4 the execution
or auction sale of the litigated land falls within the prohibited
period and is. likewise, a disavowal of the rationale of the law
which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land which the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning
and cultivating it. 5
We are not unmindful of the intent of the law. In fact, in Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 6 the Court elucidated, to wit:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years
after the grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law
impliedly permits alienation of the favor homestead; but in line
with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his
family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance
(Section 117) shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the
homesteader, his widow of heirs within five years. This Section
117 is undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion
of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It
would, therefore, be in keeping with this fundamental idea to
hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only
when the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also
when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly
deducible from the terms of the statute.
The intent of the law is undisputable but under the facts of the
case, the prohibition invoked by the petitioners under Section
118 does not apply to them.
Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 reads:
Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units
or institution, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the
approval of the application and for a term of five years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.
xxx xxx xxx
The prohibition against alienation of lands acquired by
homestead or free patent commences on the date of the
approval of the application for free patent and the five-year
period is counted from the issuance of the patent. The reckoning
point is actually the date of approval of the application. In Amper
v. Presiding Judge, 7 the Court held that:
. . . The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands
acquired by homesteads or free patents commences is "the date
of the approval of the application" and the prohibition embraces
the entire five-year period "from and after the date of issuance
of the patent or, grant." As stated in Beniga v. Bugas, (35 SCRA
111), the provision would make no sense if the prohibition
starting "from the date of the approval of the application" would
have no termination date.
The specific period of five years within which the alienation or
encumbrance of a homestead is restricted starts to be computed
from the date of the issuance of the patent. But the prohibition
of alienation commences from the date the application is
approved which comes earlier. (Emphasis ours.)
Following this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that the
conveyance made by way of the sheriff's sale was not violative
of the law. The judgment obligation of the petitioners against
Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties were levied
and sold at public auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder
on February 12, 1966. On February 9, 1968, the final deed of
conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was
issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property after
the reglementary period. Pablo Taneo`s application for free
parent was approved only on October 19, 1973.
The sequence of the events leads us to the inescapable
conclusion that even before the application for homestead had
been approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the
land. The deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally
transferred the property to Abdon Gilig. As of that date, Pablo
Taneo did not actually have transferred to herein petitioners.
The petitioners are not the owners of the land and cannot claim
to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The
prohibition does not apply since it is clear from the records that
the judgment debt and the execution sale took place prior to the
approval of the application for free patent. We quote with favor
the respondent court's valid observation on the matter:
. . . the application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was
approved only on 19 October 1973 and Free Patent was issued
on 10 December 1980. Under the aforecited provision, the
subject land could not be made liable for the satisfaction of any
debt contracted from the time of the application and during the
5-year period following 10 December 1980, or until 10
December 1985. However, debts contracted prior to the
approval of the application for free patent, that is prior to 18
October 1973, are not covered by the prohibition. This is
because they do not fall within the scope of the prohibited
period. In this case, the judgment debt in favor of defendant-
appellee was rendered on 24 June 1964, the writ of execution
issued on 22 November 1965, notice of levy made on 1
December 1965, the execution sale held on 12 February 1966,
and the certificate of sale registered on 2 March 1966, all before
Pablo Taneo's application for free patent was approved on 19
October 1973. The execution, therefore, was not violative of the
law. 8
Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which
their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution.
In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners invoke the
benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family.
It is said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted
over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated,
which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such
properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs. 9 It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
specials cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may
be constituted judicial and extrajudicially, the former by the filing
of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the
latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper
registry of property declaring the establishment of the family
home. The operative act then which created the family home
extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of
the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil
Code. 10
Under the Family Code, however. registration was no longer
necessary Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied in the family. It reads:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek refuge
to avert execution of the family home arguing that as early as
1964, Pablo Taneo had already constituted the house in
question as their family home. However, the retroactive effect of
the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on the family
home has been clearly laid down by the court as explained in registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as
the case of Manacop v. Court of Appeals 11 to wit: constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the
exception of Article 243 (2).
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family
home, having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is
and is therefore exempt from attachment. even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply
with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the
The contention is not well-taken. house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but
on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family the law that the "family home is the dwelling house where a
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it person and his family resides and the land on which it is
is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said situated," 13 it is understood that the house should be
article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family constructed on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the
residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their
to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt property but to no avail.
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
(Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article
162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V SO ORDERED.
thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code
are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code
(Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was
incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not
exempt from attachment (Annex "O," Plaintiff's Position Paper
and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78)." (pp. 5-6, Decision; pp.
64-65, Rollo) (emphasis ours)

The applicable law, therefore. in the case at bar is still the Civil
Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a
prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances
where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced
sale or attachment.

Art. 243 reads:

The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from

execution, forced sale or attachment, except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the
Registry of Property;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or

after such record of the declaration;

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,

material-men and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building. 12

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo

constituted the house in question, erected on the land of
Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
constituting the family home was registered only on January 24,
1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered
on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was
incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even
 Republic of the Philippines was filed against the petitioners with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
SUPREME COURT
On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a Decision3 acquitting
Manila the petitioners but ordering them to pay Claudio the amount of
₱100,000.00 with legal interest from date of demand until fully
SECOND DIVISION paid.

G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2012 On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff
Felixberto L. Samonte (Sheriff Samonte) levied upon the subject
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE property. On March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on
MESA, Petitioner, public auction; Claudio was the highest bidder and the
corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him.
vs.
Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the subject
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. property to the petitioners and a certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito)
ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and for a monthly rent of ₱5,500.00. However, the petitioners and
REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS, Respondents. Juanito defaulted in the payment of the rent and as of October
3, 1998, their total accountabilities to Claudio amounted to
DECISION
₱170,500.00.

REYES, J.:
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final Deed of Sale 4 over the
subject property was issued to Claudio and on April 4, 1995, the
Nature of the Petition
Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan cancelled TCT No.
T-76.725 (M) and issued TCT No. T-221755 (M)5 in his favor.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by the Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa
Unable to collect the aforementioned rentals due, Claudio and
(Araceli) and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Ernesto), assailing the Court
his wife Ma. Rufina Acero (Rufina) (collectively referred to as
of Appeals’ (CA) Decision1 dated June 6, 2008 and Resolution2
Spouses Acero) filed a complaint for ejectment with the
dated October 23, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391 entitled
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against
"Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa v.
the petitioners and Juanito. In their defense, the petitioners
Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al."
claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the subject
property. The petitioners deny that they are mere lessors; on the
The Antecedent Facts
contrary, they are the lawful owners of the subject property and,
thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
This involves a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street,
Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a Decision, 6 giving due
which was formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the
No. T-76.725 (M) issued by the Register of Deeds of
petitioners and Juanito to vacate the subject property. Finding
Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered under Araceli’s name. The
merit in Spouses Acero’s claims, the MTC dismissed the
petitioners jointly purchased the subject property on April 17,
petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject property.
1984 while they were still merely cohabiting before their
According to the MTC, title to the subject property belongs to
marriage. A house was later constructed on the subject
Claudio as shown by TCT No. T-221755 (M).
property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as their
family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.
The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the
subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from
complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed
Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio) in the amount of ₱100,000.00,
the validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity
which was secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As
of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the
payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against China Banking
legitimacy of Claudio’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
Corporation payable to Claudio.
The petitioners appealed the MTC’s July 22, 1999 Decision to
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored
the RTC. This appeal was, however, dismissed in a Decision
as the account from which it was drawn had already been
dated November 22, 1999 due to the petitioners’ failure to
closed. The petitioners failed to heed Claudio’s subsequent
submit their Memorandum. The petitioners sought
demand for payment.
reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied in
an Order dated January 31, 2000.
Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's
Office of Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of Batas
Consequently, the petitioners filed a petition for review7 with the
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. After
CA assailing the RTC’s November 22, 1999 Decision and
preliminary investigation, an information for violation of B.P. 22
January 31, 2000 Order. In a December 21, 2006 Decision,8 the
CA denied the petitioner’s petition for review. This became final
on July 25, 2007.9
In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999, the petitioners filed
against the respondents a complaint10 to nullify TCT No. T-
221755 (M) and other documents with damages with the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted that the
subject property is a family home, which is exempt from
execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been
validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993
writ of execution.
On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision, 11 which
dismissed the petitioners’ complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the
Family Code, the RTC ruled that even assuming that the subject
property is a family home, the exemption from execution does
not apply. A mortgage was constituted over the subject property
to secure the loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it was
levied upon as payment therefor.
The petitioners sought reconsideration of the RTC’s September
3, 2002 Decision but this was denied in a Resolution12 dated
January 14, 2003.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s disposition in its
Decision13 dated June 6, 2008. The CA ratiocinated that the
exemption of a family home from execution, attachment or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is not automatic
and should accordingly be raised and proved to the Sheriff prior
to the execution, forced sale or attachment. The appellate court
noted that at no time did the petitioners raise the supposed
exemption of the subject property from execution on account of
the same being a family home.
The petitioners then sought reconsideration of the said June 6,
2008 Decision but the same was denied by the CA in its
Resolution14 dated October 23, 2008.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review,
praying for the cancellation of TCT No. T-221755 (M). They
insist that the execution sale that was conducted is a nullity
considering that the subject property is a family home. The
petitioners assert that, contrary to the disposition of the CA, a
prior demonstration that the subject property is a family home is
not required before it can be exempted from execution.
In their Comment,15 Spouses Acero claimed that this petition
ought to be denied on the ground of forum-shopping as the
issues raised had already been determined by the MTC in its
July 22, 1999 Decision on the complaint for ejectment filed by
them, which had already become final and executory following
the petitioner’s failure to appeal the CA’s December 21, 2006
Decision affirming it.
Issues
The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether
the petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping; and (b) whether the
lower courts erred in refusing to cancel Claudio’s Torrens title
TCT No. T-221755 (M) over the subject property.
The Court’s Ruling
First Issue: Forum-Shopping
On the first issue, we find that the petitioners are not guilty of
forum-shopping.
There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision
in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable
opinion in another forum through means other than an appeal or
certiorari. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions
involve the same transactions, essential facts, and
circumstances; and raise identical causes of action, subject
matter, and issues.16
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in the other. The elements of forum-shopping are:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.17
There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the
ejectment case and in the action to cancel TCT No. T-221755
(M). Verily, the primordial issue in the ejectment case is who
among the contending parties has a better right of possession
over the subject property while ownership is the core issue in an
action to cancel a Torrens title.
It is true that the petitioners raised the issue of ownership over
the subject property in the ejectment case. However, the
resolution thereof is only provisional as the same is solely for the
purpose of determining who among the parties therein has a
better right of possession over the subject property.
Accordingly, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a
bar to action between the same parties respecting title to the
land or building. Neither shall it be conclusive as to the facts
therein. This issue is far from being novel and there is no reason
to depart from this Court’s previous pronouncements. In
Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., 18 this Court had
previously clarified that a decision in an ejectment case is not
res judicata in an annulment of title case and vice-versa given
the provisional and inconclusive nature of the determination of
the issue of ownership in the former.
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, namely: (a) identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should
be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata
in the other.
Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment
and ejectment cases. The issue of ownership was likewise being
contended, with same set of evidence being presented in both
cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in the
ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment
case, and vice-versa.
This issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps
of cases iterating the principle that a judgment rendered in an
ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive
as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties
upon a different cause of action involving possession.
It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who
is entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional
determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be
clothed with finality.
Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for
annulment would abate an ejectment suit must be resolved in
the negative.
A pending action involving ownership of the same property does
not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor
suspend the proceedings. This is so because an ejectment case
is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of
a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or
forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of
the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.19 (citations omitted)
Second Issue: Nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M)
Anent the second issue, this Court finds that the CA did not err
in dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT
No. T-221755 (M).
The subject property is a family home.
The petitioners maintain that the subject property is a family
home and, accordingly, the sale thereof on execution was a
nullity. In Ramos v. Pangilinan,20 this Court laid down the rules
relative to exemption of family homes from execution:
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction
must be made as to what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided
under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code.
Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a
verified petition before the courts and the registration of the
court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the
property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is
governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves
the execution of a public instrument which must also be
registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with
either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment
debtor from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no
need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides
therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by
one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the
other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending
upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for
which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155
for which the family home is made answerable must have been
incurred after August 3, 1988.21 (citations omitted)
In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.,22 we
stressed that:
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family
home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are
constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code. 23
(emphasis supplied and citation omitted)
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for
purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as
follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a
family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered
as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime
in January 1987. There was no showing, however, that the same
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property
became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus
correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
The family home’s exemption from execution must be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property
at public auction.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and,
thus, should have been exempt from execution, we nevertheless
rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the petitioners’
complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-221755 (M). We agree
with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from
execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out:
In the light of the facts above summarized, it is evident that
appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a
reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the
law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of
the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold
on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of
sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution – to
put an end to litigation. x x x.24
The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Court’s November
25, 2005 Decision in Honrado v. Court of Appeals,25 where it was
categorically stated that at no other time can the status of a
residential house as a family home can be set up and proved
and its exemption from execution be claimed but before the sale
thereof at public auction:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is
exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v.
Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within
which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-
settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted
to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by
the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or
within a reasonable period thereafter;
"In the absence of express provision it has variously held that
claim (for exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if the
debtor is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time,
or promptly, or before the creditor has taken any step involving
further costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at any time
before sale, or within a reasonable time before the sale, or
before the sale has commenced, but as to the last there is
contrary authority."
In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that
appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a
reasonable time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the
law on exemption, does not mean a time after the expiration of
the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold
on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final bills of
sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution—to
put an end to litigation.1awphil We said before, and We repeat
it now, that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption from execution
of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff.26
(citations omitted)
Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of
Appeals,27 this Court stated that:
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale
under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before
the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient
that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such
property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be
set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x x.28 (emphasis supplied
and citations omitted)
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed
exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at
public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the
same. Failure to do so estop them from later claiming the said
exemption.
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is
the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s
lifetime.29 It is likewise without dispute that the family home, from
the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment.30
The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.31 However, this right can be
waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove
the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy
or a reasonable time thereafter.
In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a
considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject
property is a family home and its exemption from execution and
forced sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the
subject property to be levied upon and the public sale to
proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time the subject property
was sold until a Final Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and,
later, Araceli’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued
under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In
fact, it was only after the respondents filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time
of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.

For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or

omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise
to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or
declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of
the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the
petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed
period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the
status of the subject property as a family home.

The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their present

assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and
artifice that cannot be countenanced without doing the
respondents injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment
award in their favor. Simple justice and fairness and equitable
considerations demand that Claudio’s title to the property be
respected. Equity dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer
the consequences of their unexplained negligence.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions,

the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 6,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed
the complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M)
and other documents, and the October 23, 2008 Resolution
denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138493 June 15, 2000
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner,
vs.
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate
proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows
that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the
child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar
nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are
adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a
proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said
certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Court's consideration is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
reversal of the March 18, 1999 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional
Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046,
the CA ruled as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Costs against the defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA
BABIERA, a.k.a. Teofista Guinto.4
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby rendered, to
wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent Teofista
Guinto as null and void "ab initio";
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to
cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this-decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for private respondent
Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals
in this wise:
Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as
PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of
the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera (herafter referred to as
TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted "that she is
the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6,
1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was
delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said
spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid
of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by
simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then
65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her
signature . . .; that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her
own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to
Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by "hilot"; that the birth
certificate . . . of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally
a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained
false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was
not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother
being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her status,
an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not
sign it; that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate is
void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is
clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to
bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera,
was already 54 years old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in
the year 1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was
already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth certificate
of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner
who inherited the estate of cancelled and declared void and
theretofore she prays that after publication, notice and hearing,
judgment [be] render[ed] declaring . . . the certificate of birth of
respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid and
ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil registrar of
Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH
CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No. 16035.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the
trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition
and the date of hearing thereof in a newspaper, the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
City and TEOFISTA.
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that "the
petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the
legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no
legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171
of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred
by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family
Code." The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, "Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla appeared
and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of private respondent
Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on substituted by Atty. Cabili
as counsel for private respondent."
In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred "that she was always
known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff
is not the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the matter
[is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant]
Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of
Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, . . . Certificate
of Baptism, . . . Student's Report Card . . . all incorporated in her
answer, are eloquent testimonies of her filiation. By way of
special and affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent
contended that the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñoza Babiera;
that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the
instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with
Article 170 of the Family Code.5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial
proved that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena
Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show
that Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed
that she was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last
pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that
the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the
advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical
complications. Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not
signed by the local civil registrar, and the signature therein,
which was purported to be that of Hermogena, was different
from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the
child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a
situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child
of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the
cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab initio
on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or
the mother.
Hence, this appeal.6
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does not have
the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal under
CA GR No. CV-56031 subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV-
56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of limitation
(prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth division utterly
failed to hold, that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth
is superior to the self-serving oral testimony of respondent.7
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of
the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue,
because Article 1718 of the Family Code states that the child's
filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child
is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite
standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 9 The interest of
respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action
for partition which the latter filed against the former. 10 The case
concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her
parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it
applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy
of his wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the
child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish
that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present
action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled thus:
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166,
170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be
sustained. These articles provide:
xxx xxx xxx
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3)
that in case of children conceived insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they
speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any
of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not horn to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
"Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that
she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as
a child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed.
She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the
prescriptive period for such action:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at
the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it
was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside
in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the
child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of
said birth, whichever is earlier.
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the
cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it does not impugn
her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article
170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to
nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was
allegedly void ab initio. 1
Third Issue:
Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially
Hermogena's testimony that petitioner was not her real child,
cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance
of the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth
Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific
facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the
evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding
the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. 14 More important, the Court of Appeals observed that
the mother's signature therein was different from her signatures
in other documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner
show that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one,
there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as
medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to
the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.1awphil
Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was
already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have
given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she
did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated
proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the
deposition of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not
give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her
husband Eugenio's. The deposition reads in part:
q Who are your children?
a Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your legitimate
child with your husband Eugenio Babiera, what can you say
about that?
a She is not our child.
xxx xxx xxx
q Do you recall where she was born?
a In our house because her mother was our house helper.
q Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista Babiera
lived with you in your residence?
a Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t] from time to
time.
q Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever assert[ed] her
as your daughter with your husband?
a No, sir. 15
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth
Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other
than the said document to show that she is really Hermogena's
child; Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed
mother would make a deposition stating that the former was not
the latter's child at all.

All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual

finding of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was
not the child of respondent's parents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed

Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad on official business.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, Petitioners,
vs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad Angeles seeks to set aside the
Decision dated May 29, 20021 of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional
Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat
commenced by the herein respondent Aleli "Corazon" Angeles-
Maglaya.
The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March
25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Caloocan City,
respondent filed a petition2 for letters of administration and her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to
Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged, among other
things, the following:
1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park,
Caloocan, died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of
Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building,
among other valuable properties;
2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Francisco’s
estate;
3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and, together with petitioner,
Belen S. Angeles, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are
the surviving heirs of the decedent; and
4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator.
Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she,
instead of respondent, be made the administratrix of Francisco’s
estate.3 In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged
having married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio
M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was
ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of
Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco represented
in their marriage contract that he was single at that time.
Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as
Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth
certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further
alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not
presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents
or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And
evidently to debunk respondent’s claim of being the only child of
Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco
had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat,
et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse
of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to
the administration of his estate.
In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per
certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December
1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor,
Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva
wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply,
respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption
adverted to owing to her having interposed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by
the RTC at Caloocan.4
Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as
petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation of her evidence
by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on
November 20, 1939 as the legitimate child of Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988. 5
She also testified having been in open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4) other
witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,6
Francisco Yaya,7 Jose O. Carreon8 and Paulita Angeles de la
Cruz.9 Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate
which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary
Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and
Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word "Yes"
appears on the space below the question "Legitimate?
(Legitimo?)"; pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as
bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage
contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government
service records.
After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of
exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" under Section
1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the
dismissal of the petition for letters of administration on the
ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause of
action", it being her stated position that "[P]etitioner [Corzaon],
by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis-à-vis the
decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco
M. Angeles."10
To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition,
followed by petitioner’s reply, to which respondent countered
with a rejoinder.
Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,11 the trial court, on
its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as
legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent] to state a cause of
action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil of Procedure. (Word in bracket added]
Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was
denied by the trial court in its Order of December 17, 1999.12
Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals
where her recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its
assailed Decision dated May 29, 2002,13 reversed and set aside
the trial court’s order of dismissal and directed it to appoint
respondent as administratrix of the estate of Francisco, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is
REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to appoint
petitioner-appellant Aleli "Corazon" Angeles as administratrix
of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the
following main premises:
1. Petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit
premised on the alleged failure of the underlying petition for
letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action,
actually partakes of a demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of
Rule 33;14
2. Petitioner’s motion being a demurer, it follows that she
thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence to rebut
respondent’s testimonial and documentary evidence; and
3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation
with the deceased Francisco.
Hence, petitioner’s instant petition for review on certiorari, on the
submission that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in reversing the
trial court’s order of dismissal;15 (2) in treating her motion to
dismiss as a demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that
respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4) in
decreeing respondent’s appointment as administratrix of
Francisco’s intestate estate.
We resolve to grant the petition.
The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the
question of whether or not respondent is the legitimate child of
decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The
Court of Appeals resolved the issue in the affirmative and, on
the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to appoint
respondent as administratrix of Francisco’s estate.
We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate court’s
conclusion on the legitimate status of respondent, or, to be
precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate
child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate."
In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and
extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of Appeals,16 stated that
since petitioner "opted not to present any contrary evidence",
the presumption on respondent’s legitimacy stands
"unrebutted."17
Following is an excerpt from Tison:
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate
court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized
presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law
more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the
issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:
‘The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .
actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that
civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
‘Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the
Family Code], the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can
no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption,
therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The
obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child
born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity
of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . . may
still be easily available.’
xxxxxxxxx
‘Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife . . . .’(Words in bracket added; Emphasis ours)
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate
court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed
legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the
presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked
collaterally.
A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on
and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue.
He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.18 For, a
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However,
it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus prima facie
established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown,
stand as proved,19 the presumption of legitimacy under Article
164 of the Family Code20 may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents
were legally married and that his/her conception or birth
occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration,
presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. a "surviving spouse" of the decedent. We quote the pertinent
allegation:
In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under
review, did not categorically state from what facts established 4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon]
during the trial was the presumption of respondent’s supposed herself who is 58 years old, and BELEN S. Angeles, the
legitimacy arose. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his
have possibly done so. For, save for respondent’s gratuitous second marriage, who is about 77 years old . . . .YEARS OLD .
assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is . . " (Emphasis and word in bracket added)
absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to respondent’s
mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code
or marriage contract – doubtless the best evidence of appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of a child can be
Francisco’s and Genoveva’s marriage, if one had been established by any of the modes therein defined even without
solemnized21 – was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents.
or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to Said article 172 reads:
declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None
of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At of the following:
best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco’s
daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita Angeles de 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin judgments; or
because his (Tomas’) father and her (Paulita’s) mother, who are
both Francisco’s siblings, told them so.22 And one Jose Carreon 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
would testify seeing respondent in 1948 in Francisco’s house in private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court Genoveva concerned.
before the war.23 In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented
of the execution of the Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
marriage contract; when and where their marriage was
solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a
present, and like significant details.
legitimate child; or
While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
marriage between Francisco and Genoveva, we can even go to
laws.
the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a
witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves
Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of
out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly, therefore, the Court
legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated November 23,
of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal
1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh.
presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should
"E"). In it, her birth was recorded as the legitimate child of
flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova.
Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word
To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no
"married" is written in the certificate to indicate the union of
presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really
Francisco and Genoveva.
nothing for petitioner to rebut.
Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that "[I]t was
Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and
error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled . . . that
Francisco Angeles were married in 1938, respondent never, thru
[respondent’s] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she
the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous
is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva who are
Francisco-Belen Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem,
legally married".
respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it were,
she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion
The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is
– as well as the appellate court’s conclusion - that Francisco was
as simple as it is elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was
legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent
not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is
had declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying,
asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending
quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted marriage with
physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having
petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco
attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered
were already "spouses". Now, then, if, as respondent
a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule
maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva
132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave
Mercado and Francisco were married in 1938, it follows that the
rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child.25 Jurisprudence
marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or
teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating
prior to Genoveva’s death, would necessarily have to be
proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be
bigamous, hence void,24 in which case petitioner could not be,
signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone
if the father refuses.26 Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the
probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:
xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the
birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor
or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is
necessary.27
The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth
Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it were by Francisco and
Genoveva, establishes – and "indubitably" at that - not only
respondent’s filiation to Francisco but even her being a
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity
to the limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded
such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and not just filiation
but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and
Genoveva are legally married. In the apt words of petitioner, the
appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a physician
who merely certified having attended "the birth of a child who
was born alive at 3:50 P.M. ", created " a marriage that of ‘
Francisco and Genoveva’, and filiation (that said child) is the
daughter of ‘Francisco’"’28
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a
child is a matter fixed by law itself.29 It cannot, as the decision
under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the
declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the
mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or
without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably
invest legitimate status to her offspring through the simple
expedient of writing the putative father’s name in the appropriate
space in the birth certificate. A long time past, this Court
cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth certificate
prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:
Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave
the way for any scheming unmarried mother to extort money for
her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater
familias. How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the
birth certificate that the newborn babe is her legitimate offspring
with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for
registration . . . . And any lawyer with sufficient imagination will
realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima
facie evidence – when and if the "father" dies in ignorance of the
fraudulent design xxx30
Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive
comfort from her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from
her student and government records which indicated or
purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father. The
same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed
Francisco giving respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers
or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the
execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of
filiation or recognition.31 And needless to stress, they cannot
support a finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and
Genoveva.
The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding
pictures, the school and service records and the testimony of
respondent’s witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying
open and continuous possession of the status of a child of
Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may
have been the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva.
Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at issue in the
case before us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her
petition for letters of administration on her being a legitimate
child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother,
Genoveva, propositions which we have earlier refuted herein.
If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end
this disposition were it not for another compelling consideration
which petitioner has raised and which we presently take
judicially notice of.
As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the
proceedings at the trial court, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan
granting the petition of spouses Francisco Angeles and
petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A.
Yamat and two others. In that petition, docketed with the
appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned "Aleli
‘Corazon’ Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa
A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco Angeles and Belen S.
Angeles", respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of
Francisco, she should have been notified of the adoption
proceedings.
Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the
aforementioned annulment case to RTC, Caloocan for reception
of evidence. Eventually, in a Decision32 dated December 17,
2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832
on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not, contrary
to her claim, a "legitimate daughter" of Francisco, nor "a child of
a lawful wedlock between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva
Y. Mercado". Wrote the appellate court in that case:
Petitioner [Aleli "Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious
persistence the argument that she is a legitimate child or the
only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y.
Mercado . . . .
In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of
the petitioner, there is nothing in the record to support
petitioner’s claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other
words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at
anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the
claim of petitioner that Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y.
Mercado were married in 1938
While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect
that the records of marriages during the war years . . . were
totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove the existence of the marriage between
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no
witness was presented to confirm the celebration of such
marriage . . . .
Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled
law that photographs are not sufficient evidence of filiation or
acknowledgment.
To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s birth
certificate and even her marriage contract.. . . Reason: These
documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally
inconsequential are petitioner’s school records . . . . all these
lacked the signatures of both Francisco and Genoveva . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or
acknowledged natural child of the late Francisco M. Angeles,
petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption
proceedings, as her consent thereto is not essential or required.
(Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)
of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of
suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds
when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of
respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order
of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140
REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the

appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.47832 was effectively
affirmed by this Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in
G.R. No. 163124, denying Aleli "Corazon" Maglaya’s petition for
Review on Certiorari,33 and Resolution dated October 20,
2004,34 denying with "FINALITY" her motion for reconsideration.
Another Resolution dated January 24, 2005 resolved to "NOTE
WITHOUT ACTION" Maglaya’s second motion for
reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. No.
163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this
case the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, 35 one of two (2)
concepts embraced in the res judicata principle. Following the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is
precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein
respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s
marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a
final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby
become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or
litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their
privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the
latter.36

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in

CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained by this Court in G.R. No.
163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial court’s order of
dismissal in Special Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that
respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child
of Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the
Motion to Dismiss37 interposed by herein petitioner, as
respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to
evidence has become moot and academic. It need not detain us
any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of

administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. 38 When
the law speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are
entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent’s
property;39 one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed,40 or, in short, an heir. In
resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters
of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the
probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132305 December 4, 2001
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner,
vs.
NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision
dated March 4, 1997,1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the judgment dated
October 17, 1990,2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
54, in Civil Case No.87-41515, finding herein petitioner to be the
owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. 1âwphi1.nêt
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as
follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name
alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents
herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property.3 On
April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the
sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the
property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of
Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and
Amanda in the certificate of title to said property.4
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership,
and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala,
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her
the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which
came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs
to them by operation of law, because they are the only legal
heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their
brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 5 was executed
through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to
enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title
(TCT No. 1723346) in petitioner's name alone.7
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The
deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but
respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from
college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he
executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that
Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his "poor and
unschooled sisters who. ..sacrificed for his studies and personal
welfare."8 Respondents also pointed out that it is highly
improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed
consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property
because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible
means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also
stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that
petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987,
or almost eight years after the execution of the sale. 9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not
Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago.
She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C.
Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus
entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that
she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a
child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in
fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded
Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of
his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never
acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such that
respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented
that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain
ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two
ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the
property. The first was decided in her and the other defendants'
favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents
persisted and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the
property as decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she
caused the issuance of a title in her name alone, allegedly after
respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the
property from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay
realty taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her
name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership
and possession each of one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the
property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago and presently covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the name of herein
defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A
Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint,
and the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No.
56226 of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third (1/3)
pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose
T. Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged and adjudicated to
herein defendant as owner and entitled to possession of said
share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages,
attorney's fees and costs. Upon finality of this judgment,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is ordered cancelled and
a new title issued in the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the
defendant as owners in equal shares, and the Register of Deeds
of Manila is so directed to effect the same upon payment of the
proper fees by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no
consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of
petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were
not, petitioner would still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the
property as Jose's daughter. The trial court ruled that the
following evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose:
(1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents
which stated that petitioner is Jose's daughter, and (2) Jose's
income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It
further said that respondents knew of petitioner's existence and
her being the daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier
ejectment cases they filed against petitioner. According to the
court, respondents were not candid with the court in refusing to
recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that she
was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one
is entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda
Santiago the co-owners in equal shares of the one-third (1/3)
pro indiviso share of the late Jose Santiago in the land and
building covered by TCT No. 172334. Accordingly, the Register
of Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said title and issue in its
place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted
that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by
respondents showed that Ida was born of different parents, not
Jose and his wife. It also took into account the statement made
by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are
raised for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant
evidence to prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T.
Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of
the petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that
she had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by
Jose Santiago, making her his sole heir and thus entitled to
inherit his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents had,
before the filing of the instant case, previously "considered" 11
her as the daughter of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly
regarded her as his legitimate daughter. She asserts that her
identification as Jose's daughter in his ITR outweighs the
"strange" answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No.
56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her
filiation collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of
Appeals12 in which we held that "(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can
be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by
the proper parties and within the period limited by law." 13
Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of
this contention.14
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the
daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her
parents as Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas.15 They argue that the
provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the
present case since this is not an action impugning a child's
legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession of property .
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1)
whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in
this action for recovery of title and possession; and (2) whether
or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property
he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or
donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of
the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the
Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in
a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months
if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be
counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles
in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code.
A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is
indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a
particular couple.16
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner
is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose
at all.17 Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title
and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on
prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual
milieu present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case.
What was being challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the
validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of
Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could
not have been validly adopted since Doribel had already been
born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same
time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of
the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to
question the decree of adoption that became final years before.
Besides, such a challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot
be made collaterally but in a direct proceeding.18
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate
status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their
brother's child. The birth certificate presented by respondents
support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)19 plainly states
that... Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and
[Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon
Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and
therefore the supplier of the entries in said Certificate.
Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee
however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists
that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not
her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any
though it would have been the easiest thing to do considering
that according to her baptismal certificate she was born in
Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials and holds that
Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida...
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her
testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that
appellee's parents were Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a
baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the
baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of
the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of
the baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the
sacrament -- nothing more.20 (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's
counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate
indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though she had been using
this name all her life.21
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her
relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her
baptismal certificate.22 However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro
Cabais v. Court of Appeals :
...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified,
but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with
respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of
the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic
Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not
prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person
baptized.23
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive
proof of filiation.24 More so are the entries made in an income
tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and
the amount thereof.25
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy
of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any
reason therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a
certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil
registry, if such were the case. We find petitioner's silence
concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises
doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show
petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the
presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
adverse to her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner
had been using Santiago all her life. However, use of a family
name certainly does not establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago,
has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala.26 The similarity is too
uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied
knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the
birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court,
however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother,
Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting
statements that affect her credibility and could cast along
shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon
Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment,
not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child
of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the
property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through
sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that:
...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic
defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion
that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable from the
following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the
properties in question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the
nature of the contract in the facade of the sale? b) If the deed is
a genuine document, how could it have happened that Jose
Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only 1/3
pro indiviso of the properties covered by his title sold or donated
the whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven's name did Jose
Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his name in
documents requiring his signature (citation omitted) [affix] his
thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the] child of Jose
Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating his
properties to her when she would inherit them anyway upon his
death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a deed
which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier
married to Esperanza Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for [ s
]he was then just 15 years old); and the subject properties were
free from liens and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice
of Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens
were already annotated in the title of said properties). If the deed
was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 after
the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in
possession was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?27
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the
right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner
since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.28 Petitioner could not
have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the
time.29 Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract,30 including one of sale, absent which
there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly
did not pay any centavo for the property,31 which makes the sale
void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act
may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other
act or contract.

Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of

donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:

...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid

donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art.
725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of
the donation should have been made by her father, Leon
Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal
representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one
of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at all - accepted
the "donation" for Ida.32

In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.
1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND
FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May
29, 1992.1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna.
Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave
on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio
and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of
San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor
of private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be they
ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
legally adopted; despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the chance to do
so, that said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who
pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been settled
extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without descendants
whatsoever, and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was
raised and cared by them since childhood is, in fact, not related
to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal
heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She
alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez
and capable of administering his estate. The parties further
exchanged reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's
heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary
evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh.
3); (2) Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns
and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late
Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4)
School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said
spouses reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove,
mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then
thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their
primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late
Vicente, then 77 years of age,2 categorically declared that
petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who
were unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the
petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for
letters and administration and declared petitioner as the
legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles
166 and 170 of the Family Code.
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed
on May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court
states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is
REVERSED and another one entered declaring that appellee
Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter or child by nature
of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and,
therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez.
Her opposition to the petition for the appointment of an
administrator of the intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez
is, consequently, DENIED; said petition and the proceedings
already conducted therein reinstated; and the lower court is
directed to proceed with the hearing of Special proceeding No.
SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred
in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and
misapprehension of facts when it failed to apply the provisions,
more particularly, Arts. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
Code in this case and in adopting and upholding private
respondent's theory that the instant case does not involve an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can question or
impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still
the respondent appellate Court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it gave more weight to the testimonial evidence
of witnesses of private respondents whose credibility and
demeanor have not convinced the trial court of the truth and
sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial
evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the case in a
way not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of the
supreme Court, more particularly, on prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166,
170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be
sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the
wife with sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are
likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of
the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on the
following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been that of the husband except in the
instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at
the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it
was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside
in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the
child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of
said birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of
the child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article
only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having
desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3)
that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they
speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any
of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case
at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now
Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that
she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by
legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that
petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate
court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as
follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that appellee's
evidence is utterly insufficient to establish her biological and
blood kinship with the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on
record is strong and convincing that she is not, but that said
couple being childless and desirous as they were of having a
child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from somewhere
while still a baby, and without he and his wife's legally adopting
her treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as their
own true child, giving her the status as not so, such that she
herself had believed that she was really their daughter and
entitled to inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the
following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel
Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore, never
delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino
Chipongian, admitted that his sister had already been married
for ten years and was already about 36 years old and still she
has not begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even
had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a well-
known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his
mother and wife, who treated his sister for a number of years.
There is likewise the testimony of the elder sister of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then,
being a teacher, helped him (he being the only boy and the
youngest of the children of their widowed mother) through law
school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly respected and
consulted on family matters, that her brother Vicente and his
wife Isabel being childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest
daughter and when she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt
elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel wanted
a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up unruly and
uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought home a baby girl
and told his elder sister Victoria he would register the baby as
his and his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77
years old and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo
City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding judge
of the lower court had to be held at her residence in Parañaque,
MM. Considering, her advanced age and weak physical
condition at the time she testified in this case, Victoria Benitez
Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy and credible, for as one
who may be called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly
be interested in material things anymore and can be expected
not to lie, especially under her oath as a witness. There were
also several disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio
Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who
testified in this case and declared that they used to see Isabel
almost everyday especially as she had drugstore in the ground
floor of her house, but they never saw her to have been
pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born, according to her birth certificate Exh. "3") or at
any time at all, and that it is also true with the rest of their
townmates. Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's
personal beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her
(Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not see
Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that Isabel never
delivered a baby, and that when she saw the baby Marissa in
her crib one day she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's
hair, she was surprised and asked the latter where the baby
came from, and "she told me that the child was brought by Atty.
Benitez and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29,
1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and growing big with
child, as well as her delivering a baby, are matters that cannot
be hidden from the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman
never became pregnant and could not have, therefore, delivered
a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and
caring for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather
late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee
Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is
not the true mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the late Vicente
O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is highly questionable
and suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already
36 years old at the time of the child's supposed birth, was truly
the mother of that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth
certificate, should the child not have been born in a hospital
under the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's
obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since
delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would have been
difficult and quite risky to her health and even life? How come,
then, that as appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa
was supposedly born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife
attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has become
a practice in recent times for people who want to avoid the
expense and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register the
child as their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps Atty.
Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid
the trouble if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa
through court proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife
as the parents of the child in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he
had intended to legally adopt the child when she grew a little
older but did not come around doing so either because he was
too busy or for some other reason. But definitely, the mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of
the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights
of such child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's birth
or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real, biological
daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and his wife Isabel
Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr.
Nilo Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in
the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the sole
heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN because she died
without descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on
a witness stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-
law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said document and
that he signed the same only because the latter told him to do
so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez make
such a statement in said document, unless appellee Marissa
Benitez is not really his and his wife's daughter and descendant
and, therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr.
Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said document
without understanding completely the meaning of the words
"descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This
we cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing
pediatrician who has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn,
Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests of
appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and brother-
in-law, as against those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee Marissa
Benitez is really the daughter and only legal heir of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before
her death, would write a note to her husband and Marissa stating
that:
even without any legal papers, I wish that my husband and my
child or only daughter will inherit what is legally my own property,
in case I die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her
husband —
that any inheritance due him from my property — when he die
— to make our own daughter his sole heir. This do [sic] not mean
what he legally owns or his inherited property. I leave him to
decide for himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really the
daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for Isabel to write
and plead for the foregoing requests to her husband, since
Marissa would be their legal heir by operation of law. Obviously,
Isabel Chipongian had to implore and supplicate her husband to
give appellee although without any legal papers her properties
when she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the
properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since she well
knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and could not be
their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister Victoria
Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother Vicente gave the
date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate
because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and Vicente's)
mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence for the child
Marissa and the mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same
birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was
only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child and that
they gave her the birth date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the
evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not
negated by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner,
the most notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh.
"3") purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate
registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed
by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New
Civil Code, however, "the books making up the Civil Registry
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." As related above, the totality of contrary evidence,
presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the
truth of the content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said
rebutting evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel
Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by Vicente
Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized
document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without
descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente
Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The
repudiation was made twenty-eight years after he signed
petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack
of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Erlinda B. Espejo for petitioners.
C.B. Carbon & Associates for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the
petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against the
private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The
complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986 by Judge
Antonio P. Solano,1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in the
material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel
(private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners)
as his illegitimate children," and that there was no sufficient and
competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case
at bench, another action for recognition and support against the
private respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is
the mother and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO
ANTONIO FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met
sometime in 1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A
Meralco employee and a tennis enthusiast, Carlito used to
spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where Violeta's
father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She
claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6)
months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of
petitioner Claro Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John
Paul on not know that Carlito was married until the birth of her
two children. She averred they were married in civil rites in
October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that
the marriage license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following
documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying
respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal certificate of
petitioner Claro which also states that his father is respondent
Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of
petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro
taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, 3
Dr. Milagros Villanueva,4 Ruby Chua Cu,5 and Fr. Liberato
Fernandez.6 The first three witnesses told the trial court that
Violeta Esguerra had, at different times,7 introduced the private
respondent to them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the
other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who presented
himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter's
baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that
he sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one
of the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was
corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an
officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of
petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent also
presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse
Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and
respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their
affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and
respondent Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private
respondent also declared he only learned he was named in the
birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was
sued for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court
ruled in favor of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds that the
plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are entitled to the relief's
prayed for in the complaint. The defendant (herein private
respondent) is hereby ordered to recognize Claro Antonio
Carlito Fernandez, now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now
aged 41/2 as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he
has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the plaintiffs
support in the amount of P2,000 each a month, payment to be
delivered to Violeta Esguerra, the children's mother and natural
guardian, with arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint
on February 19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint
dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals8 in its impugned
decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied
upon by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the (private
respondent's) paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further
held that the doctrine of res judicata applied because of the
dismissal of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on December
22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court
erred in: (1) not giving full faith and credit to the testimony in of
Violeta Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value to the
testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative
value to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez
taken during the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of
Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value to the birth
certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the
self-serving and incredible testimony of respondent Carlito
Fernandez; and (6) holding that the principle of res judicata is
applicable in the case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional
circumstances. One such situation is when the findings of the
appellate court clash with those of the trial court as in the case
at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary
power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate
court that private respondent is not the father of the petitioners
is substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the
petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to
prove their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely
on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh.
"B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from
proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro.
As explained by the private respondent, he was in the baptism
as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was
corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing
private respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the
evidence required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2",
"B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192
SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness
between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving
him paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the) pictures of
Jewels and Respondent showing allegedly their physical
likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove
paternity and much less would prove violation of complaint's
person and honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro
naming private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary
value. There is no showing that private respondent participated
in its preparation. On this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems,
et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that
although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as
a child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the
baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of
parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical records do
not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115
and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such
canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the
priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act
done by himself or in his presence, like the administration of the
sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations
in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized,
or of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete
evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we
also ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They
are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries
therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the
petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not
also competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again,
the records do no show that private respondent had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates,
the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our
pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil.
1050 (1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the naming of the
father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth
certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but,
also, the statement of any information or circumstances by
which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the
certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by
the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of
said child. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a
birth certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated
is not competent evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the
witnesses for the petitioners and we are satisfied that the
respondent appellate court properly calibrated their weight.
Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father Liberato
Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of
petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
Q Do you recall Father, whether on that occasion when you
called for the father and the mother of the child, that both father
and mother were present?
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized the father and the mother who
were present at that time?
A Yes.
Q Please point to the court?
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question do
you remember having asked him?
A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his works?
render unquestionable his identification of the private
respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of
this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father
Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day
in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has
baptized.

Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the
defendant again. I want to be sure if he is the person who
appeared before you on that occasion?
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on
the credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly
suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove
the paternity of the petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the
respondent appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata
as additional reason in dismissing petitioners action for
recognition and support. It is unnecessary considering our
findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their
cause of action.

However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the
that he has to be shown a picture of the private respondent by
Decision of the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is
Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz: AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown this SO ORDERED.
picture by Violeta Esguerra?

A I cannot recall.

Q At least the month and the year?

A It must be in 1986.

Q What month in 1986.

A It is difficult. . .

Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify
here?

A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was you
want to get a baptismal certificate and then the second time was
I asked you for what is this? And you said it is for the court.

Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your

place, you were already informed that you will testify here before
this Honorable Court?

A Yes.

Q And you were informed by this Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this
man wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?

A Yes, sir.

Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .

A Yes.

(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)

Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend

of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-
accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime
of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a
complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother, Mrs.
Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:
That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and
the first week of April 1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac,
Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have (sic) carnal knowledge with
Sandra Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a woman who is a
mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable
of giving rational and legal consent. 1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged and due trial ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old
Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and
Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who
still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was
limited and most of the time she expressed herself by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of
Misamis Occidental. Four security men were assigned to him,
two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-
appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora,
his son Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-
storey officers' quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial
Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house
was occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the
lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by
the four security men and the other by Alexander Salcedo and
his wife.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of
constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in
Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra
but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and
moody. She felt sick and unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno
Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her mother,
"Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition,
brought her to Regina Hospital. Sandra was able to relieve
herself the following day but still remained moody and irritable.
She refused to take a bath in spite of scoldings from her mother.
She did not want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second
checkup. Dr. Conol, the examining physician, ordered a
urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the
urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs.
Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her daughter was
pregnant and so she brought Sandra to Madonna and Child
Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE
Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-
sound examination. The results were positive. The fetus'
gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-
sound examination at the United Doctors Medical Center
(UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed that
she was indeed pregnant. 5
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was
named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the complaint 6 by
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30)
pictures of different persons were laid on the table and Sandra
was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra
singled out the pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7
Later, Sandra was brought out of the investigation room to a
police line-up of ten people, including Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her assailants.
Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto.8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two
daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask
Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually molested her. 9
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who
sexually molested her. Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad
and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her. Sandra
demonstrated how she was raped. First, her thighs were
touched, then she was hugged and her panty was taken off. A
push and pull movement followed. 10 Celsa testified that she was
present when the victim demonstrated how she was sexually
abused by the two accused, including the way her nipples were
touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts to
emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing
her panty, uttering at the same time "hubad panty."
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped her and said she wished
them dead, as they did something bad to her. 11 She once again
demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held her two
thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying,
"panty" and then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as
if she were sucking. She also touched her private organ and
made a push and pull movement. 12
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major
Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted
on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The
result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center
showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra
Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-
appellant type "O".
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial
contending that it was impossible for them to have committed
the crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno
Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted the other
accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that he "has
a different type of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as his
type of blood is "A", while that of child Jacob Salcedo is
type "O".
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and
pursuant to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, said
accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended
girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and to suffer
the other accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay
the costs of the proceedings.
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared
ACQUITTED from the charge.
SO ORDERED. 13
Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower
court:
1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of
committing the offense charged without detection.
2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant
base on major blood grouping test known as ABO and RHS test,
not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have
committed the crime of rape because most of the time he and
his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on
inspection tours while the victim was always in the company of
her mother. He further contends that it was likewise impossible
for Sandra, if she had really been molested, not to have shouted
out of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult to injury,
accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's brother,
Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have
raped her.
We are not convinced.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during
inspection tours but sometimes they were left behind and would
play pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of
the house. While Sandra was always with her mother, there
were times when she was left alone in the house with the
accused. 14
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:
Q How many security men remain if you can recall when your
husband reported for work?
A Two (2).
Q Who were these security men who remained?
A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and Colaljo?
A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and sometime they
used to go with my husband to the office.
Q Every time when your husband is out what they do while they
were (sic) at the headquarter?
A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were playing at the
porch with my daughter Sandra playing pingpong and sometime
they were listening music.
Q Where did they play usually take place?
A Living room. 15
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you
were at the headquarters you were able to do your choirs, (sic)
doing laundry jobs in the second storey of your house. Do you
know where is your daughter Sandra at that time?
A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.
Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to stay?
A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the living room.
Q Did she has (sic) any playmates? A Witness touching her private part.

A Moreno and Prieto. Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty?

Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with your A Moreno and Ruel.
daughter?
Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?
16
A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards.
A Yes.
The victim more than once positively identified accused-
appellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators of the Q Did you see his sex organ?
crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS,
Sandra singled out accused-appellant and his co-accused from A The witness touching her private parts.
among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons shown to her.
Second, at the police lineup of several persons, likewise Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken (sic) off his
conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again unerringly pointed pants?
accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped
her. Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to A Yes.
accused- appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
The following is the victim's own testimony:
A Yes, witness again touching her private part.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q Both of them?
Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what
A Yes.
Moreno and Ruel did to you?

Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your panty?

RECORD:

A Moreno.
The witness when she stood up held both her thighs (sic) with
her two hand (sic) down to her sexual organ saying a word
Q In your house?
"panty" and she placed her hand on her breast and did
something as if sucking and held her private part (sic) and did a
A Yes.
push and pull movement and she cried.
Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your
Q When you said that there was a push and pull movement of
panty?
the body and when this was being done did you feel pain?
A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.
A Yes pain.
Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the
Q What part of your body is painful?
room?
RECORD:
A In the room.
The witness touching her private parts.
Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now,
can you point to them?
Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?
A Yes.
A Yes.
Q Will you please point to them?
Q Where did you see these blood?
PROS. RAMOS:
RECORD:
May we request the accused to stand up your honor?
The witness touching her private parts.
RECORD:
Q When this push and pull movement was being made, did you
see a man's organ?
Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the
courtroom.
A Yes sir.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q Where did you see this male organ?
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno
Tumimpad)?
A Moreno.
RECORD:
The witness pointing to a certain person who is standing and
when asked what is his name, he readily answered that he is
Moreno Tumimpad.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person standing besides Moreno?
A Joel.
PROS. RAMOS:
If your honor please, she could not pronounced (sic) well the
word Ruel but the way she called this name is Joel which refers
to the same person who is one of the accused in this case. 17
Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that
Sandra demonstrated to her how she was ravished by the two
accused, thus:
Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic)
you as to how she was abused?
A By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.
Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did
Sandra Salcedo was abused as narrated or demonstrated to
you by Sandra Salcedo?
A According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was
hugged and then the panty was taken off and making a push
and pull movement (witness demonstration by holding her
thigh)?
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you
how she was abused. What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if
she had told you any more matter?
A She did not say anything more.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything
else. What happened next?
A Then it was Celsa who asked her.
Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo?
A I was just beside her.
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did
the questioning, did you hear the question being asked by Celsa
to Sandra Salcedo?
A Yes.
Q And what was the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra
Salcedo?
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other things that
these two had done to her?
Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to what was
done to her?
A By way of talking and action.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?
A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as related by
her to Celsa through words and action?
RECORD:
The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic) nipple going
down to her thigh.
Q What else had transpired next?
A No more.
Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of
accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you
observed whose names was usually mentioned first by Sandra
Salcedo?
A She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.
Q And what happened after that?
A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told
us.
Q When did you tell your mother-in- law about what Sandra
Salcedo told you and Celsa?
A That very evening sir. 18
Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues
that his conviction was based on the medical finding that he and
the victim have the same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by
testimonial evidence given by the victim herself and her
relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show
that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same
blood type may have been the father of the child. As held by this
Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:
Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it
can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of
a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a
possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in
others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such
tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive
presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made
in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of
the Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the
finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the
results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not
admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a
possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others with
the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape

having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994
ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S.
ILANO, represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS
SANTOS, respondent.
Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.
Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.
NOCON, J.:
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile,
multiply and fill the earth. Others did not heed the sequence of
this command because they multiply first and then go.
Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate
offspring to sue his father for recognition and support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as
follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was
working as secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was
one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch
together. In less that a year's time, she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her
own as Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was
engaged in the same business and they renewed
acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold
allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than four years.
Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of
marriage, they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962.
They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president
and general manager. He came home to her three or four times
a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-
Charge of the Filipinas Telephone Company branch office. He
also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights and water
bills.1 Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided
also by Melencio with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner
used to give her P700.00 a month for their expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was
fetched by petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay
City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female child at
the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by
petitioner.2 Thereafter, while they were living at Highway 54,
Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born on
December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was
recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia
Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. 3 Leoncia
submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that
she was confined there from December 30, 1963 until January
2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia Ilano.4
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as
husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of
Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and
fifth grading periods10 as her parent. Those signatures were both
identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed them
in their residence in their presence and of Elynia.11 Since
Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one
whom she recognized as her Daddy.12 He treated her as a father
would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and
anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat at
restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.13
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of
Cavite, he gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication:
"To Nene, with best regards, Temiong."14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with
Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she
started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963.
Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the
nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still
unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the
information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in
the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning
for his signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth
certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early
the following morning.
Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her
aunt and sometimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila
Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his instructions to get money as support
and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he cannot
come which she in turn gave to her aunt.15 They stayed at 112
Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally
transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived with them up
to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.
Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any
relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas. He disowned the
handwritten answers and signatures opposite column 16 of the
death certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in
column 13 thereof opposite father's name the typewritten name,
Artemio G. Ilano, appears. He also denied the following: all the
notes alleged to have been received from him by Elynia for
delivery to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merceditas'
Report Card; and being the source of a photo of himself with a
handwritten dedication. He admitted that Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 including the signature is his. He
was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized on
January 7, 1964.16 He does not understand why this case was
filed against him.17
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the
apartment for Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the rentals
and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia lived
together and shared the same bed. They later transferred to San
Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He stopped
visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get
married with another which he eventually did in September,
1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment
fishes ordered by Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know
Leoncia; neither has she been brought to their family home in
Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her father was at their
home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was
advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was hospitalized
on January 7, 1964. She denied that her father was at the Manila
Sanitarium on December 30, 1963; that he fetched a certain
woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because
he was at their home at that time; and that her father lived with
a certain woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time
he was living with them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and
reporting to the office everyday and when he goes to Guagua or
Manila on business, her mother or brother goes with him.
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the
previous testimonies about petitioner's sickness on December
30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It could not be
true that her husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three
(3) times a week with a certain Leoncia de los Santos because
her husband never slept out of their house and that in his
capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of the Filipinas
Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a
year because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the
parties, the trial court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the
father of Merceditas, on the basis of the following:
1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the
period of Merceditas' conception;
2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment
where Leoncia was living, took care of all the bills and shared
the same bed with her;
3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;
4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of
Merceditas; and
5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given
by petitioner to Merceditas.
Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the
complaint.18
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals
did not share the same view as the trial court. A review of the
testimonial and documentary evidenced adduced by private
respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that
petitioner is her father, entitling her to support. The dispositive
portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS
S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child of defendant ARTEMIO G. ILANO with all the right
appurtenant to such status.
Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the
rate of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the
date of the filing of the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to
August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS a
month from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (P1,300.00) PESOS a month
from August 16, 1978 to August 15, 1981; and ONE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00) a month from August
16, 1981 up to the time she reached the age of majority on
December 30, 1984.
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.19
The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution
dated February 26, 1992. 20
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly
committed by respondent court:
1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition
or of a judgment declaring petitioner father of Merceditas with
finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for
recognition; and
3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against
established decisions of this Court.
Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been
dismissed by the trial court, therefore was absolutely no
obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas. It would
have been only from the date of the judgment of the trial court
that support should have commenced, if so granted. Under the
law in force when the complaint was filed, an adulterous child
cannot maintain an action for compulsory recognition. In order
that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it
must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing
under the caption "parent" in the report card, is not sufficient.
Merceditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at
Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor brought around
town by him, treated as his child, introduced to other people as
his child, led people to believe that she was part of his family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of
the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child
of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that
the defendant is his father.
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of
the father to recognize the child as his natural child, for the
purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged to recognize
Merceditas as his spurious child. This provision should be read
in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other
illegitimate) children . . . under the circumstances specified in
articles 283 and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court
found, as it is likewise our finding, that private respondent's
evidence to establish her filiation with and the paternity of
petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by
the highly improbable and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio
and the inherently weak denials of petitioner:
Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and
defendant carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not
satisfied that defendant is the father of the plaintiff because it is
not convinced that her mother and defendant were in
cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took into
account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the
apartment where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who
positively testified that he took care of all the bills and that he
shared the same bed with plaintiffs mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment
at Guagua was rented by the defendant, and that Melencio
Reyes, who was a mere employee and godson of the defendant
with a monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere subaltern of the
latter, and only frequented the place upon instruction of the
defendant to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an
apartment at the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned
by and of which Artemio was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46,
8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-in-Charge in the absence
of Artemio whose residence and main office was in Cavite.
There, for the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4,
1/25/74). The apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of
Melencio. As Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect
(TSN, p. 50, 8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to
call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-
12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the
supplies and services needed in the apartment for which
procurement Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding
receipts of payment for liquidation of cash advances Artemio or
the Guagua Telephone System or Leoncia herself, gives to
Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7,
12 and 14, 1/25/74).
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of
four times a week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73).
Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of P700.00 a month
(TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73).
Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute
between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio
transferred Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-
20, 7/18/73) where they were known as husband and wife (id. p.
41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was
fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11,
Appellant's Brief)
Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several
places heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted
man Friday of Artemio who would deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1"
and "F-3") and money from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference,
among the notes identified by Leoncia as having come from
defendant were the following:
Exh. "F-1"
"Dear Ne,
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng
diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay masakit pa.
Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis
diyan ay si Miling na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati kung may
kailangan ka dian.
Sgn."
"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa
municipio ng Makati. Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.
Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay
pupunta ako.
Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.
Sgn."
Exh. "F-2"
"Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.
Sgn."
Exh. "F-3"
"Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta
ako diyan (11:30 am). Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na,
sigurado yon.
Sgn."
Exh. "F-4"
"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng
mataas ang dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta
sa oficena.
Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin
kong makarating dian sa Jueves.
Sgn."
The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to
Leoncia whose nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio shortens
to "Ne". Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing"
mentioned in Exh. "F-1" refers to Gracia delos Santos, a sister-
in-law of Leoncia who was with Artemio when Leoncia was
removed from the hospital during the birth of Merceditas. (pp.
17-19, Appellant's Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when
pieced together ineluctably gives lie to defendants' diversionary
defense that it was with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the
mother lived with during her period of conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover
of Leoncia being in the apartment and sharing the same
bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires belief.
xxx xxx xxx
Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the
relationship between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a
man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust him to the
hilt and unwittingly required him to submit to Leoncia an
accounting of his expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by
Leoncia, Artemio or Guagua Telephone System which would not
have been the case, if it were true that there was an intimate
relationship between him and plaintiff's mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and
Godfather, Melencio foisted on the court a quo the impression
that he was the lover and paramour of Leoncia but since there
was really no such relationship, he could not state the place in
San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long
they stayed there belying his pretense (sic) of an intimate
relationship with plaintiffs mother.27
Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio,
respondent court then applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as
sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession
of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his
paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient evidence that the
support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated denial
of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative
father is not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the
child which had already been recognized by defendant by
various positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's
father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot
be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible
with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of
which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is
made should be revocable, the revocation of such act will not
revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983
Ed.).
To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not,
however, mean that the concession of status shall continue
forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character
while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously
and without concealment though without publicity (since the
relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of
Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia
vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701) There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child
as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
86302, September 24, 1991.)
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to
the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination by
Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to
their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without
any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since
Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known
and called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74);
the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and
sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all
what a father should do for his child — bringing home goodies,
candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child
enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39,
5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child
of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention
is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was telling Leoncia the
need for a "frog test" to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-
2" and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74)
and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking
Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature
appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of
Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio
would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check
(TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the
check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53,
10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband
and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of
Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the
St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of
Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth grading
period(s) (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas
(sic). Those signatures of Artemio were both identified by
Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-
1" and
"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas
(sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . .
.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of
Cavite, Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following
dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I").
(pp. 19-20, Appellant's Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to
offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of
Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee's daughter.
This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself
in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere
dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically conceived of a
plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a total
stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and
in the process falsified the latter's signatures and handwriting. 28
Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence
is not sufficient proof of continuos possession of status of a
spurious child, respondent court applied next paragraph (4) of
Article 283:
. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too
replete with details that are coherent, logical and natural which
cannot be categorized as mere fabrications of an inventive and
malicious mind of which Leoncia de los Santos was not shown
to possess.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the
genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their
living together as circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of
appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample
support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which
leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not
be infirmed by his belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as
lacking in credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that
defendant is the father since the Certificate of Live Birth was not
signed by appellee and since the monthly report card is not
sufficient to establish recognition, considering the denial of the
defendant of his signature appearing thereon.
While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate
of Live Birth, the evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia
gave birth on December 30, 1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27
p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00
(TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id. p.
26) who made inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The
inquiries were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who
heard the answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a
sheet of paper (id. p. 28). The inquiries were about the name of
the father, mother and child. After the interview the nurse told
them that the information has to be recorded in the formal form
and has to be signed by Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is
no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in
the morning for Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction
to the nurse to give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature as
he was leaving very early the following morning as in fact
Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33).
Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December 30,
1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals,
173 SCRA 656:
The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102 Phil.
1050 [1958] and Berciles v. Government Service Insurance
System (128 SCRA 53 [1984] that if the father did not sign in the
birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
register, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity
does not apply to this case because it was Eustaquio himself
who went to the municipal building and gave all the data about
his daughter's birth. . . .
. . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is
the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child
of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that
status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed affiliation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, . . . Such
evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.29
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision
that practically covers all the other cases in the preceding
paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is
the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the
action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough
under the last paragraph.30 This paragraph permits hearsay and
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with
respect to illegitimate filiation.31
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private
respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to
support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into
account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the
time the person who has a right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203, Family Code of the
Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972.
Plaintiff, having been born on December 30, 1963, was about
nine (9) years old at the time and was already of school age
spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her school
expenses alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00
a month. She attained the age of majority on December 30, 1984
(Article 234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in
arrears for a period of twelve (12) years, four (4) months and
fourteen (14) days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for
the first three (3) years; and considering the declining value of
the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a
graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next three (3)
years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years;
and P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years, four (4)
months and fourteen (14) days until she attained the age of
majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's
fees is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given
facts and circumstances that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.32
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof
that it was arrived at arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted
almost ten years after the decision of the trial court was rendered
does not deserve any consideration because it appears that it is
being raised for the first time in this petition.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its
resolution dated February 26, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994
MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN M.
ALBERTO, and YOLANDA R. ALBERTO, respondents.
Martiniano P. Vivo for petitioner.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
When a putative father manifests openly through words and
deeds his recognition of a child, the courts can do no less than
confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal bard
Shakespeare perspicaciously said: "Let your own discretion be
your tutor; suit the action to the word, the word to the action."
Herein deceased father cannot possibly be charged with
indecisiveness or vacillation for he suited his action to his word
and his word to his action.
In the instant case, we have, therefore, affirmed the decision of
the probate court declaring petitioner as having acquired the
status of a natural child of the deceased Juan M. Alberto and,
as such, entitled to participate in the latter's estate.
On September 18, 1953, a child named Ma. Theresa Alberto
was born out of wedlock to one Aurora Reniva with Juan M.
Alberto as the alleged father. Accordingly, she used "Alberto" as
her surname in all her school records and correspondences.
On September 18, 1967, Juan M. Alberto, felled by a bullet from
an assassin’s gun, died intestate.
His widow, Yolanda R. Alberto, filed a petition for the
administration of his estate on January 10, 1968. After the
publication of notices, she was appointed as the administratrix
of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the
Administratrix' Accounting were approved on August 1, 1970
and on April 29, 1971 respectively, the proceedings were
ordered closed and terminated.
On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa Alberto filed a motion for
leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings
praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a
natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the
deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.
Upon the presentation by the parties of their respective evidence
during the trial, the probate court was convinced that indeed,
Ma. Theresa Alberto had been in continuous possession of the
status of a natural child. Thereupon, it rendered a decision
compelling the decedent’s heirs and estate to recognize her as
a natural daughter and to allow her to participate in the estate
proceedings. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
oppositor and against the estate of the deceased Juan M.
Alberto —
(a) Declaring oppositor Ma. Theresa R. Alberto as having
acquired the status of a natural child of the late Gov. Juan M.
Alberto;
(b) Ordering the administratrix and widow of the deceased and
their children, namely, Mary Joy, Maria Rebecca, Juan, Jr., Juan
III, Maria Yolanda and Juan IV, all surnamed Alberto, to
recognize and acknowledge oppositor as an acknowledged
natural child of the late Gov. Alberto;
(c) Declaring oppositor as one of the heirs of the late Gov. Juan
M. Alberto;
(d) Ordering the administratrix to partition the deceased’s estate
and turn over to oppositor her participation therein equivalent to
one-half (1/2) of the share of each legitimate child; and
(e) Ordering the administratrix to pay oppositor the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the administratrix.
SO ORDERED. 1
The probate court’s findings are quoted hereunder, to wit:
1) In the case at bar, the Court believes, and so holds, that the
oppositor has been in continuous possession of the status of a
child of Juan Alberto by his direct acts as well as the acts of his
family, as follows:
(a) The deceased gave the oppositor sums of money for her
schooling;
(b) The deceased made known to his friends and relatives that
she was his daughter; and
(c) He made known to the personnel of the International School
where oppositor was enrolled that she was his daughter.
2) The following incidents would show the direct acts of the
family of the deceased.
(a) When the deceased’s younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Alberto
Solidum asked that the oppositor be sent to her house in her
Sunday best to meet her father for the first time;
(b) When Fr. Arcilla brought the oppositor to the bedside of the
deceased in the hospital and Fr. Arcilla asked the guard to give
way to her as she was a member of the family;
(c) When the step-mother of the deceased, during the wake,
introduced the oppositor to her youngest sister as an elder
sister.
3) Prescinding from the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence to
prove that the oppositor is the child of the deceased.
1. Oppositor’s mother, Aurora Reniva, testified:
(a) of an indiscretion that led to the conception of and giving birth
to the oppositor;
(b) that Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the meeting between the
oppositor and the deceased at the MOPC; (This particular
testimony was corroborated by Cristeta Andaya, former maid of
Mrs. Solidum, and by the oppositor) and
(c) that Juan Alberto had been sending her money from time to
time.
2) Oppositor also testified that:
(a) She had her first meeting with her father at the MOPC where
he gave her P500.00 personally and two telephone numbers
where he could be contacted and where they talked about her
name, age and other matters.
(b) She had other meetings with her father at the MOPC on
which occasions her father also gave her money.
(c) The deceased visited her two times at the International
School whose rules on visitors were strict and when her father
visited her, the secretary of the principal told her that her father
was waiting for her. This showed that the deceased had
identified himself to the personnel of the school that he was the
father of the oppositor.
(d) He promised to see her in her school during her birthday on
September 18, 1968 but was not able to do so because of his
untimely death.
(e) The deceased promised to bring the oppositor to
Catanduanes but failed likewise because of his death.
(f) When oppositor and her mother went to the PGH on the
occasion of her father’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the hand
and asked the guard to make way for her because she was a
child of Juan Alberto.
(g) After the wake for her deceased father, the deceased’s step-
mother, Saturnina Alberto, introduced her as a sister to Joy
Alberto her half-sister.
(h) Congressman Jose Alberto allowed her associates, upon her
representations, to use the ballroom of the Regent of Manila for
practice purposes. Congressman Alberto was the owner of the
Regent of Manila.
(i) Her uncles and aunts, i.e., brothers and sisters of her father,
regarded her as their niece and introduced her to others as the
eldest daughter of Juan Alberto.
(j) The children of the brothers and sisters of Juan Alberto
recognized her as their cousin.
3) Jose Tablizo testified that:
(a) There was a strong physical resemblance between the
deceased and the oppositor.
(b) The deceased and the oppositor wrote similarly.
(c) It was known among the friends of the deceased, particularly
the Breeze Gang, composed of the witness, Jose Tablizo, the
deceased and 4 others.
(d) Sometime in 1967, the deceased showed him the report card
of the Oppositor and boasted of her high grades.
(e) The friends of the deceased had a party in Virac,
Catanduanes for the oppositor whom they considered as the
deceased’s daughter. (This was corroborated by Silverio
Taberara.)
4) Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Commissioner of
Immigration Edmundo Reyes, as lawyer for the deceased, made
an appointment with him (Atty. Vivo) for a conference, at which
they discussed the latter’s letter to the deceased regarding the
oppositor. In said conference, Com. Reyes said that the
deceased was not denying that he was the father of the
oppositor. And because of his marital status and the fact that he
was a public official, he wanted to avoid public scandal with the
promise to support the oppositor quietly through a cousin, Fr.
Arcilla. 2
The Court of Appeals reversed the above decision of the probate
court on the strength of the following observations:
Assuming the foregoing to be true, we do not believe they satisfy
the degree of proof to establish that oppositor was in continuous
possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased.
In one case, the following facts were proved; that two nurses
took care of the children at the expense of the defendant; that
said defendant kissed the children, called them sons, and
ordered that they be taken care of very well; that he gave the
money for the necessities of the mother and the six children, the
oldest of whom called the father; that he visited the mother,
complained of his big family, and was publicly regarded as the
father of the children. It was held that these were not sufficient
to be a basis for a declaration of paternity. They may show that
the defendant was convinced of his paternity in relation to the
children; but they do not show any intent on his part to place
such children in the possession of status of natural children. The
continued possession of such
status cannot be founded on conjectures and presumption. So,
also, the mere fact that defendant’s mother used to visit the
child, cannot be considered as conduct of his family sufficient to
confer
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child.
(1 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1983 ed., pp. 604-
605, citing, Sentencia, 12 October 1907; Gustilo vs. Gustilo, et
al., 14 SCRA 149; Sentencia, 9 May 1921; Potot vs. Ycong, No.
6651, 22 March 1941, 40 O.G. No. 4, 26 July 1941, p. 748)
We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than
that proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact,
oppositor's Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose
Tablizo after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of
association between the deceased and oppositor such as
normally characterizes the relationship between father and
child. It gives the impression that the deceased studiously
distanced himself from the oppositor and had no intention
whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent
portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMA’s eldest daughter, and I
feel even prouder after I heard from people like you. You were
the ones that knew him most, shared his dreams as a young
man, and witnessed his struggle from Palmera’s slums to
Forbes Park. You saw him rise from cargador to lawyer and,
finally, to governor; I only heard about them through Mama. His
life was a novel, and if I were to help write it, I would be able to
contribute but a few pages, for I knew him only as a Big Man. It
is YOU who had a part in the first adventures of that same novel,
and I envy you. (p. 35, Folder of Exhibits) 3
Hence this petition.
May the estate and heirs of deceased Juan M. Alberto be
ordered to recognize petitioner as the deceased’s natural
daughter on the basis of the evidence presented by petitioner to
establish her claim that she has been in continuous possession
of the status of a natural child?
We rule in the affirmative.
In the probate court, the following have been established:
1) that prior to Juan M. Alberto's marriage to Yolanda Reyes,
herein private respondent, Juan M. Alberto and Aurora Reniva,
mother of herein petitioner, were sweethearts;
2) that as a consequence of an indiscretion, Aurora Reniva
conceived and gave birth to herein petitioner Ma. Theresa
Alberto on September 18, 1953;
3) that petitioner used 'Alberto' as her surname in all her school
records and Juan M. Alberto was known to be her father;
4) that through Fr. Arcilla, a first cousin of Juan M. Alberto,
money was given to Aurora Reniva;
5) that when petitioner was about nine (9) years old, Mrs. Aurita
Solidum, the youngest sister of Juan M. Alberto, arranged the
first meeting between petitioner and Juan M. Alberto at the
MOPC and during said meeting, they talked about petitioner, the
deceased gave petitioner P500.00 and two telephone numbers;
6) that Juan M. Alberto would have visited petitioner on her
birthday in her school, International School, if not for his untimely
death on September 18, 1967;
7) that when petitioner and her mother went to the PGH on the
occasion of Juan M. Alberto’s death, Fr. Arcilla held her by the
hand and asked the guard to make way for her as she was a
daughter of Juan M. Alberto;
8) that after the wake for deceased Juan M. Alberto, his step
mother, Saturnina Alberto introduced petitioner to Joy Alberto as
the latter’s sister;
9) that the siblings of Juan M. Alberto regarded petitioner as their
niece and introduced her to their children as the eldest daughter
of Juan M. Alberto;
10) that the children of Juan M. Alberto’s siblings regarded her
as their cousin;
11) that petitioner was known by Juan M. Alberto’s friends as his
daughter;
12) that Juan M. Alberto showed Jose Tablizo the grades of
petitioner and remarked that those were the grades of his
daughter.
Private respondent, Yolanda Alberto, the sole witness for private
respondents, denied that Juan M. Alberto ever recognized Ma.
Theresa Alberto as his daughter. She presented in evidence
Aurora Reniva’s letters to Juan M. Alberto dated December 23,
1955, September 27, 1954 and March 15, 1960; Aurora
Reniva’s letter to Fr. Arcilla dated December 23, 1955; letter of
Zenaida Reniva to Juan M. Alberto dated September 16, 1953,
to prove that Juan M. Alberto refused to recognize Ma. Theresa
Alberto as his own. 4
However, these letters do not prove that Juan M. Alberto refused
to recognize Ma. Theresa Alberto. All that the letters stated was
that Aurora Reniva was having a difficult time raising a child by
her own self and therefore, she was seeking the assistance of
Juan M. Alberto. Private respondent quoted as Exhibit "3-B" the
portion of Aurora Reniva’s letter dated March 15, 1960 which
says:
. . . I am just wondering why after all those years of patient
waiting, you still do not give a damn to her. 5
The full text of the paragraph, however, reads as follows:
On the 23rd of this month, Maria Theresa P. Alberto will
graduate from the Prep School of Holy Ghost College. I am just
wondering why after all those years of patient waiting, you still
do not give a damn to her. I thought, as I was told before by Fr.
Arcilla, that I just pray and wait because he said pretty soon you
will be sending her money for support. So far, only the 300 pesos
was received by us last October, 1959. For it, I am very grateful
because it helped me a lot in our wants. 6
The letter itself shows that Juan M. Alberto was not completely
indifferent towards Ma. Theresa Alberto. He did provide her
support whenever he could.
The latest letter that was presented in evidence was dated
March 15, 1960. At the time, petitioner and Juan M. Alberto had
not yet met. About two years later, when petitioner was nine
years old, Mrs. Aurita Solidum arranged the first meeting
between petitioner and the deceased. This initial meeting was
followed by many more. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Juan M.
Alberto never took any step to stop petitioner from using his
surname. The testimony of Jose Tablizo established his
recognition of Ma. Theresa Alberto as his daughter. He testified
that Juan M. Alberto showed him two report cards of Ma.
Theresa which showed straight "A's." He said "Boy! Great!" and
Juan M. Alberto said that those were the grades of his daughter.
7 This testimony is now being discredited for being hearsay. This
Court holds that the same falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Sec. 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
as follows:
Sec. 38. Declaration Against Interest. — The declaration made
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest
of the declarant, if the fact asserted at the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest that
a reasonable man in his position would not have made his
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and
against third persons.
As found by the trial court, recognition of petitioner's status as a
natural daughter of Juan M. Alberto was made, not only by the
latter, but by his relatives as well — Fr. Cipriano Arcilla, Jose
Alberto, Aurita Solidum and Saturnina Alberto, among others.
Private respondent only had to present any one of those
relatives to negate petitioner's testimony that she had been
acknowledged by them as the eldest daughter of the deceased.
Her failure to do so baffles this Court. If indeed Ma. Theresa
Alberto were fabricating her testimony, the family of the
deceased would have been more than willing to destroy the
claims of an intruder. Under the circumstances, it is safe for us
to assume that had any of the relatives mentioned by petitioner
been presented as witness for private respondent, their
testimonies would be detrimental to the latter's cause.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner has been in
continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased in accordance with Article 283 of the Civil Code which
provides, inter alia:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child
of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the probate
court, stated as follows:
We find the evidence of oppositor-appellee even weaker than
that proven in the aforequoted citation. As a matter of fact,
oppositor's Exhibit W-1, a letter written by oppositor to Jose
Tablizo after the death of the deceased, betrays a lack of
association between the deceased and oppositor such as
normally characterizes the relationship between father and
child. It gives the impression that the deceased studiously
distanced himself from the oppositor and had not intention
whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his child. The pertinent
portion of the letter reads:
I have always been proud to be JMA’s eldest daughter, and I
feel even prouder after I heard from people like you. You were
the ones that knew him most, shared his dreams as a young
man, and witnessed his struggle from, palmera’s slums to
Forbes Park. You saw him rise from cargador to lawyer and,
finally, to governor; I only heard about them through Mama. His
life was a novel, and if I were to help write it, I would be able to
contribute but a few pages, for I knew him only as a Big Man. It
is YOU who had a part in the first adventures of that same novel,
and I envy you. 8
What a poignant novel this daughter could well author as she
now seeks to establish indubitable parental links with a father
who sired her some forty-one years ago. Why he desisted from
marrying the mother of this girl at a time when no impediment
blocked the way is a matter one can merely conjecture at.
While he did contract marriage subsequently with another
woman, it was only too clear that he had no intentions of closing
definitively that chapter in his life when he begat his first-born.
Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the old
Civil Code, the natural child occupies the highest position, she
being the child of parents who, at the time of her conception,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and
could, therefore, have contracted a valid marriage. Often the
fruit of first love, she is ensconced firmly in her parent's hearts.
No subsequent liaisons, though blessed with legitimate
offspring, can completely obliterate those early memories.
A shared past intimacy between the putative parents and the
clear marks of heredity stamped on the brow of their offspring
are not to be denied. Thus, whether openly or furtively, a father
in the situation of Juan M. Alberto could not have resisted
manifesting signs of concern and care insofar as his firstborn is
concerned. If, at an early age, the child shows much talent and
great promise as petitioner in this case apparently did, it is
understandable, and even to be expected, that the father would
proudly step forward to claim paternity — either through his
direct acts or those of his family, or both, as in instant case.
In the case at bench, evidence is not wanting from which it may
logically be concluded that the deceased Juan M. Alberto took
no pains to conceal his paternity. No less than his younger
sister, his stepmother, his priest-cousin, several relatives and
close friends were categorically informed of the relationship and
they accepted the same as fact.
Understandably, considering the strait-laced mores of the times
and the social and political stature of Juan M. Alberto and his
family, those who were privy to the relationship observed
discreetness. But he himself openly visited his daughter in
school, had meetings with her at the MOPC on which occasions
he gave her money and introduced her proudly to his
gangmates.
Where the daughter admits to envy in a letter to her father’s
friend because the latter played a greater role in her father’s life,
this is but the natural expression of a wistful longing of a child to
reach out to her biological father. Far be it for us to interpret such
sentiment as a betrayal of "a lack of association between the
deceased and oppositor such as normally characterizes the
relationship between father and child." In this instance, the lack
of association cannot be helped for the relationship was far from
normal.
Much less do we take it as giving the impression that the
deceased "studiously distanced himself from the oppositor and
had no intention whatsoever of recognizing oppositor as his
child." On the contrary, during his lifetime, Juan M. Alberto acted
in such a manner as to evince his intent to recognize Ma.
Theresa Alberto, herein oppositor, as his flesh and blood, first,
by allowing her from birth to use his family name; second, by
giving her and her mother sums of money by way of support and
lastly, by openly introducing her to members of his family,
relatives and friends as his daughter. Supplementing such
unmistakable acts of recognition were those of his kin and
gangmates manifesting open acceptance of such relationship.
Taken altogether, the claimed filiation would be hard to disprove.
Since the oppositor seeks a judicial declaration that she be
recognized as a natural child to enable her to participate in the
estate of the deceased, Article 285 of the Civil Code prescribing
the period when such action should be brought governs. It
provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may
be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of
four years from the attainment of his majority.
xxx xxx xxx
The oppositor's case falls clearly under the above exception.
Juan M. Alberto died during the minority of petitioner, that is, on
September 18, 1967 — the day petitioner turned fourteen. As
such, petitioner had four years from the time she reached
twenty-one on September 18, 1974, which was then the age of
majority, within which to bring the aforesaid action. Thus,
petitioner had until September 18, 1978 within which to file the
action for recognition. Petitioner filed her motion for leave to
intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings with the
prayer that she be declared to have acquired the status of a
natural child and as such, entitled to share in the estate of the
deceased, on September 15, 1978. Said motion was, therefore,
seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the four-year
period.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby

GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and that of the probate court AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 111994 December 29, 1994
SOTENIA GONO-JAVIER, TEBURCIO GONO,
ANUNCIACION G. JAVIER, GERMANA G. GULAY, LUCIO
GONO, RAMON GONO, ALFREDO GONO and MANUEL
GONO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESTITUTA CASOCOT,
FERMIN CASOCOT, ALICIA YONSON, ADRIANO
CASOCOT, CARLOS MONTE DE RAMOS, REGINA
DUGLAS and NONITO MARAVE, respondents.
Estanislao G. Ebarle , Jr for petitioners.
Roberto T. Tejano for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Juan Casocot, the alleged natural grandfather of petitioners,
was said to have owned during his lifetime five (5) parcels of
land in Nasipit, Agusan, covered by Tax Declaration ("T.D.") No.
2667, 3227, 1209, 738 and 2666.
On 13 February 1978, petitioners filed a case with the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC") of Butuan City for the recovery of ownership
and possession of the above five (5) parcels which they claimed
were merely held in trust for them by private respondents.
Petitioners averred that they were the children of deceased
Catalino Gono, an acknowledged natural child of Juan Casocot,
who, by intestate succession, should thus be held to be the
owners of the property. Additionally, they asserted that petitioner
Anunciacion Gono-Javier purchased the parcels of land on 20
June 1956 from the Provincial Government of Agusan following
the levy thereof (on 28 May 1956) for tax delinquency.
In their answer, private respondents, all nephews and nieces of
Juan Casocot except for Carlos Monte de Ramos, a
grandnephew, and Nonito Marave, a stranger, to whom a
portion of one of the parcels of land had been sold, contended
that since the complaint had failed to state that Catalino Gono
had been recognized by Juan Casocot either in a record of birth
or in a will, an independent action for voluntary recognition
should have first been instituted to permit any intestate
successional right to legally pass to petitioners. Also alleged in
the answer was that, with the exception of the parcel covered by
T.D. No. 738, the questioned property had been sold by Juan
Casocot to private respondents Restituta and Fermin Casocot
on 19 April 1960 and a portion to private respondent Marave.
Private respondents belied the claim that petitioner Gono-Javier
purchased the property from the Provincial Government of
Agusan. Finally, the defense of prescription was raised on the
ground that private respondents had been in possession of the
disputed property in good faith and for value for more than 17
years before petitioners' action was instituted.
After trial, the Butuan RTC rendered judgment for petitioners
declaring them to be the lawful owners of the property. The
court, in rejecting the claim of ownership made by private
respondents, opined that the deed of sale executed by Juan
Casocot on 19 April 1960, when he was already 80 years old, in
favor of respondents Restituta and Fermin Casocot was
absolutely simulated and void. It ruled that petitioners' father,
Catalino Gono, had been duly recognized by Juan Casocot
since 1954 to be his natural child that thereby entitled petitioners
to inherit the parcels of land in question. The trial court likewise
held that the property had been sold to petitioner Anunciacion
Gono-Javier on 05 and 20 June 1956 after it had been levied by
the Provincial Government for
non-payment of taxes.
The trial court thus nullified Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT")
No. RT-349, issued in the names of Restituta and Fermin
Casocot, with respect to the parcel of land covered by T.D. No.
1209, and all certificates of title issued in the names of
transferees, Felipe Yonson, Alicia Yonson, Adriano Casocot,
Carlos Monte de Ramos, Regina Duglas, Restituta, Fermin
Casocot and Nonito Marave.
On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision, and ordered the dismissal of
the complaint by petitioners for the recovery of title and
possession of the disputed parcels. The appellate court
ratiocinated and concluded:
First. The trial court declared Catalino Gono to be the
acknowledged natural child of Juan Casocot on the basis of a
statement in a deed of donation which he made in favor of
Eugenia Gonzales, widow of Catalino Gono, to the effect that
among the reasons for making the donation was the fact that the
donee "is the surviving spouse of my son had with my common
law wife." (Exh. G).
The deed of donation conveyed to Eugenia Gonzales the parcel
of land covered by TD 738 (Exh. E). It was made on March 29,
1954, about 11 years after the death of Catalino Gono in 1942
or 1943. In the first place, the statement therein describing
Eugenia Gonzales "the surviving spouse of my son had with my
common law wife" is only, if at all, an indirect acknowledgement
of Catalino Gono as the son of Juan Casocot. This falls short of
the requirement that the voluntary recognition of a natural child
must be expressly made either in the record of birth, or in a will,
or in a statement before the court of record or in any authentic
writing. (Civil Code, Art. 278).
In the second place, according to the testimony of plaintiff-
appellee Sotenia Gono herself, Catalino Gono died in 1942 or
1943. (TSN, p. 24, Dec. 10, 1980). On the other hand, his
supposed acknowledgment was made only in 1954. Now, Art.
281 requires that if the child is of age, his recognition must be
with his consent. Obviously, therefore, it was not possible for
Catalino Gono to have given his consent, even if the indirect
reference to him in the deed of donation as the son of Juan
Casocot were considered a sufficient acknowledgment.
For these reasons, it was error for the trial court to declare the
plaintiff-appellees, the children of Catalino Gono, to be the
owners of the four parcels of land covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh.
B), TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD No. 1209 (Exh. D), and TD No.
2666 (Exh. F) by right of inheritance.
Second. Nor may the plaintiff-appellees base their claim of
ownership on the fact that one of them (Anunciacion Gono-
Javier) allegedly repurchased the lands in question after they
had been forfeited to the Province of Agusan for nonpayment of
taxes. The records show that while it is true that Anunciacion
Gono-Javier was issued a certificate of Repurchase of Real
Property after Sale (Exh. N) on June 20, 1956, it is equally true
that on February 3, 1959, she was refunded the amount she had
paid. This is evidenced by a municipal voucher issued on
February 3, 1959 (Exh. P) by which she acknowledged receipt
of P850.00 from Eduardo V. Amber, Treasurer of Nasipit,
Agusan, from the partial payment previously made by Juan
Casocot for taxes covering the period May 29, 1956 to February
2, 1959. Indeed, the Final Bill of Sale (Exh. M) to her, dated
February 3, 1959, which had been prepared, was never
executed as the Provincial Treasurer of Agusan never signed it,
apparently because the day (February 2, 1959), Juan Casocot
had repurchased the properties. That is the reason why on
February 3, 1959 a municipal voucher (Exh. P) for the payment
of P850.00 to Anunciacion G. Javier was made and Anunciacion
G. Javier was actually refunded what she had paid. The trial
court, therefore, erred in holding that, in the alternative, plaintiff-
appellees are owners of the lands in question by virtue of a right
of repurchase from the Provincial Government of Agusan.
Third. The four parcels of land covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh.
B), TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD No. 1209 (Exh. D), and TD No.
2666 (Exh. F) were sold to Restituta and Fermin Casocot by
virtue of a deed of sale made by Juan Casocot on April 19, 1960.
However, the trial court declared the sale to be simulated and
therefore void based on its finding that Juan Casocot was
already in his 80's when he signed the contract in 1960. There
is, however, no proof that he did not know the contents of the
documents or that he did not intend the deed of sale at all. The
trial court unwarrantedly theorized that because the properties
were valuable properties, Juan Casocot could not have intended
to sell them.
Indeed, the fact is that the deed of sale was duly notarized and
the notary public, Atty. Noli G. Cortel, testified that from his
observation, there was nothing either in the mental or physical
condition of Juan Casocot to indicate that he was not in the full
possession of his mental faculties when he executed the deed
of sale in favor of Restituta and Fermin Casocot. Moreover, Atty.
Cortel testified that he interpreted the contents of the document
in the Visayan dialect to Juan Casocot and that afterward Juan
Casocot voluntarily affixed his signature to the document. (TSN,
pp. 9,
11-12, Sept. 6, 1991). Needless to say, a public document,
which is executed with all the solemnities of the law, should not
be set aside on such slender grounds as those cited by the trial
court.
Fourth. The trial court also erred in not ruling that the present
action is barred by the order of Court of First Instance of Agusan
in Civil Case No. 896 (Juan Casocot v. Restituta Casocot and
Fermin Casocot), dismissing a complaint for the nullification of
the deed of sale. (Exh. U) That order, issued on August 10,
1965, became final and it constitutes res judicata in this case,
as no appeal appears to have been taken from it. The trial court
found the dismissal erroneous allegedly because Juan Casocot
had not been notified of the hearing on July 24, 1965 in Civil
Case No. 896. But the trial court did not have the power to
reopen that case. It was improper for it to do so, since the order
of dismissal was final.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and
the complaint in this case is DISMISSED in so far as it seeks the
recovery of the title and possession of four parcels of land
covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh. B), TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD No.
1209 (Exh. D), TD No. 2666 (Exh. F). In other respects, the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.1
In this petition for review, petitioners raise the following
assignment of errors:
1. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial court's
decision holding that Catalino Gono was the acknowledged
natural child of Juan Casocot by his common law wife, and that
the deceased Juan Casocot's declaration in his deed of donation
to Eugenia Gonzales, wife of Catalino Gono, that the deceased
was giving the land in donation to the surviving wife of my son is
sufficient recognition.
2. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial court's
decision holding that when the land in question was sold at
public auction or failure to pay taxes the same was brought by
Anunciacion
Gono-Javier who is one of the petitioners' herein, hence the
questioned land belongs to the petitioners.
3. The appellate court gravely erred in reversing the trial court's
decision holding that the alleged sale between the late Juan
Casocot and the private respondents herein were simulated
hence null and void.
4. The appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the action for
recovery of possession and ownership filed by the herein
petitioners with the trial court is barred by the dismissal of the
complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale filed by the
deceased Juan Casocot himself during his lifetime, which was
dismissed, for his failure to attend the hearing wherein he was
not notified.2
Petitioners' first assignment of error would have been impressed
with merit had the acknowledgment in the deed of donation in
1954 been extended to Catalino prior to his death sometime in
1942 or 1943. Juan Casocot himself died in 1964. Article 278 of
the New Civil Code, the law applicable in 1954,3 provided:
Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
(Emphasis ours.)
The statement made in the deed of donation, a public document,
executed by Juan Casocot in favor of Eugenia Gonzales, widow
of Catalino, i.e., that among the reasons for the donation was
that the donee was "the surviving spouse of my son had with my
common law wife," would have well been explicit enough or, at
the very least, sufficient to make it fall within the purview of the
doctrine of incidental recognition. Unfortunately for petitioners,
however, the recognition came too late. The donation, whereon
the questioned statement appeared, was made on 29 March
1954, or about 11 years after the death of Catalino in 1942 or
1943.
Petitioners take issue, finally, with the Court of Appeals in
holding that petitioners' action to nullify the deed of sale to
private respondents is, in any event, barred by the order of
dismissal thereof by the then Court of First Instance of Agusan
in Civil Case No. 896, entitled "Juan Casocot vs. Restituta
Casocot and Fermin Casocot." Suffice it to say that an
unconditional dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute
under Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court is with prejudice
and has the effect of an adjudication on the merits (Guanzon vs.
Mapa, 7 SCRA 457; Insular Veneer, Inc. vs. Plan, 73 SCRA 1).
All told, we find no valid justification for sustaining the petition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

The provisions of the Civil Code4 on acknowledgment would

readily indicate that voluntary acknowledgment can legally be
effected only during the lifetime of both the acknowledging
parent and the acknowledged illegitimate child. When that
voluntary recognition is so timely made, as above, an action for
its judicial declaration can survive the death of either or both
parties (see Gaspay, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102372,
15 November 1994). The reason for this latter rule is that the
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing
(Art. 278, Civil Code) is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required (see Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356), albeit
not prohibited, to yet have it declared as such. When a party is
so minded as to still bring an action on the basis of such
voluntary acknowledgment, no time frame for initiating it would
obviously be a constraint.

Parenthetically, where, a claim for recognition is predicated on

other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or
an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicate statute of
limitations5 is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment. Thus, the mere possession of status of a
child, contrary to the assertion in passing of petitioners, does not
itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground for the
child to compel, by judicial action, recognition by his assumed
parent.6

Petitioners, in their second and third assignment of errors, would

want us to reverse the Court of Appeals in finding: (a) that while
petitioner Anunciacion Gono-Javier was issued a Certificate of
Repurchase (Exh. "N") on 20 June 1956, she was, however, fully
refunded for the price paid and actual redemption was, in truth,
made by Juan Casocot and (b) that the deed of sale executed
by Juan Casocot, duly notarized, was validly executed. These
factual findings by the appellate court, having been amply
explained and substantiated by it, should not further be
disturbed.
 Republic of the Philippines (3) even if the petition were to be treated as an action to compel
recognition, it would not prosper because it should have been
SUPREME COURT filed during the lifetime of Flaviano Gaspay.5

Manila Private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of

Appeals. In a Decision promulgated September 30, 1991, the
SECOND DIVISION Special Third Division6 of the respondent court reversed the trial
court. It held: (1) the evidence is ample to prove the filiation and
recognition of private respondent as an illegitimate child of the
decedent; (2) the evidence is also sufficient to show that private
G.R. No. 102372 November 15, 1994 respondent consented to her recognition by the decedent; and
(3) actions based on voluntary recognition can be instituted after
FLAVIANO S. GASPAY, JR., AND ERIBERTA S. GASPAY,
the death of the putative father.
petitioners,
Thus, private respondent filed the instant petition for certiorari
vs.
contending:

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND GUADALUPE

I
GASPAY ALFARO, respondents.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISTURBING THE
Anita B. de Loyola for petitioners.
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH REGARDS
TO THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS MARTIN GARIN WHICH
Nilo T. Bacolod for private respondent.
WAS NOT EVEN MADE AN ASSIGNED ERROR IN
APPELLANT'S BRIEF (IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7, RULE
51 OF THE RULES OF COURT).
PUNO, J.:
II
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the Decision of
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25872.
ALLEGED OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF
GUADALUPE OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
The facts reveal that Flaviano Gaspay died without a last will
CAN STILL BE BROUGHT AFTER THE DEATH OF THE
and testament on October 14, 1983 in Tacloban City. He was
ALLEGED PARENT (WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE
then married to Agueda Denoso. They were childless.
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO SECOND
On July 6, 1988, private respondent Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE).
files a petition in the trial court1 alleging, among others, that she
III
is the acknowledged illegitimate daughter of the deceased
Flaviano Gaspay, who died without a will and left certain real
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
and personal properties. She identified her mother as Claudia
GUADALUPE IS ENTITLED TO LETTERS OF
Pason with whom decedent allegedly had an illicit relationship.
ADMINISTRATION.
She prayed for issuance of letters of administration of the
decedent's estate.
We find no merit in the appeal.
Petitioners Flaviano S. Gaspay, Jr., and Eriberta Salvatieva
Anent the first error, it cannot be gainsaid that private
Gaspay opposed the petition with motion to dismiss. Flaviano,
respondent assailed on appeal the correctness of the trial court's
Jr., is an adopted son of the decedent while Eriberta is also not
conclusion of fact that the evidence failed to prove her allegation
a next of kin. They alleged that private respondent is a stranger
that she was recognized as an illegitimate daughter by the
and even assuming her illegitimate status, there is no proof of
decedent. In resolving this factual issue, the respondent court
her recognition or acknowledgment.
did not err in exhaustively examining each and every specie of
evidence relevant thereto and one of them involves the truth of
The motion to dismiss was denied. The trial court2 ruled it was
the testimony of witness Martin Garin. Indeed, this key issue
not based on indubitable grounds. Evidence was then adduced
cannot be resolved authoritatively without considering the
by private respondent. In an Order dated December 6, 1989, the
testimony of Garin, the principal witness of the private
trial court dismissed the petition. It held:
respondent.
(1) the testimonial and documentary evidence3 failed to prove
We now come to the competence and credibility of witness
the purported status of private respondent; (2) they also failed
Garin. The trial court did not give any value to his testimony. The
to show that private respondent, then already of age consented
respondent court did. We sustain the respondent court. Garin
to her recognition as an illegitimate child;4 and
testified that the two (2) letters marked as Exhibits "K" and "L"
were written by decedent. These letters are vital evidence for
the private respondent for they show that the decedent Q Showing to you this document which the same had been
acknowledged her as his daughter. Exhibit "K" written in "waray" marked as EXHIBIT "K" will you take a look at this, do you see
dialect was translated in the trial court as follows: that?

Tomalisties Caibiran Leyte A Yes, sir.

March 10, 1980 Q Whose penmanship is this and the signature?

My dear Child, A Flaviano Gaspay and that is the signature of Flaviano Gaspay.

Lupe, I received your letter and I understood your purpose that Q Why do you say that that is his penmanship and this is his
you are asking for money in the sum of P500.00 pesos because signature?
you are going to use it for the operation of the feet of your child
Marilyn. A I am familiar with his penmanship and signature.

But Lupe, because I am short of money, accept in the meantime Q Why do you know that this is his penmanship and signature.
this P200.00 because this is the only amount I can raise to send
you here at Southern Island Hospital Cebu City, for I pity you A I was an agent of his concession for 18 years second, we were
because you are my child and Marilyn my grandchild. both government officials of Culaba from 1955 to 1959.

Your father, Atty. Nilo T. Bacolod:

(Sgd.) Flaviano Gaspay Q You said that you are an agent of his logging concession for
18 years, from what year up to what year?
On the other hand, Exhibit "L" also written in "waray" was
translated as follows: A From 1932 to 1951.

Tomalisties, Caibiran, Leyte Atty. Bacolod:

August 14, 1983 We request your Honor that the signature of Flaviano Gaspay
as identified by his witness be marked as our EXHIBIT "K-1".
My children Toming and Lupe,
Q We have here a document marked as Exhibit "L" please look
Because I feel my body is about to weaken already, I urge you at it, do you see that?
to verify my lands located in Culaba and in Caibiran so that the
share of Lupe will be assured. A Yes, sir.

Toming, this letter to you is my gift on your birthday today. Q Whose penmanship is that and whose signature is this?

Your father, A That is Flaviano Gaspay's penmanship and signature.

(Sgd.) Flaviano Gaspay We request your Honor that the signature below be marked as
our EXHIBIT "L-1".
The trial court dismissed the testimony of Garin on two (2)
grounds. First, it held that Garin did not even bother to examine Court:
the letters, Exhibits "K" and "L". The records do not sustain this
ruling. We quote the relevant testimony of Garin, viz.: What date is that?

Court: Atty. Bacolod:

Q Are you familiar with the signature of Flaviano Gaspay? August 14, 1983 Exh. "K" and August 10, 1980. May I be allowed
to borrow the Exhibits of the Respondents about the supposed
A Yes, your Honor. letter which were marked in their Annexes from "A" to "I".

Atty. Bacolod (counsel for petitioner): Atty. Gaspay:

Q You are familiar with the signature of Flaviano Gaspay, are May we know the purpose your Honor.
you familiar with his penmanship?
Atty. Bacolod:
A Yes, sir.
For him to identify your Honor.
Court: A That is not written by Flaviano Gaspay.

Lend him your Exhibits. Q Not the one written by whom?

Atty. Bacolod: A That are not letters of Gaspay.

Q Will you take a look at this document, this one marked as Q Who is that Gaspay you are referring to?
Exhibit "1"?
A Flaviano Gaspay.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now let's go back to the joint affidavit, Exhibit "S" in this
Q This Exhibit "2"? affidavit you signed you made mention of names, Flaviano
Gaspay and Claudia Pason, who is this Claudia Pason?
A Yes, sir.
A Mistress of Flaviano Gaspay.
Q This Exhibit "3"?
Q Why did you say that Claudia Pason is the paramour or kerida
A Yes, sir. of Flaviano Gaspay?

Q Another Exhibit "4", take a look at this one? A Because he had a real wife.

A I see it. Q Who is that wife?

Q Take a look at Exhibit "5"? A Agueda Denoso.

A I see that already. Q When was this when Claudia Pason was the kerida of
Flaviano Gaspay?
Q Take a look at Exhibit "6"?
A From 1934, 35, 36 and 37.
A I have seen it.
Q How did you know that this Claudia Pason is the kerida of
Q Exhibit "7"? Flaviano Gaspay?

A Yes I see it. A We are neighbors, our houses are less than four arms length
to the house of Claudia Pason.
Q Exhibit "8"?
Q In what place is that?
A Yes I see it.
A Culaba, Leyte.
Q Exhibit "9"?
Q That place where Claudia Pason was living who was her
A Yes sir I see it.. husband then?

Q Exhibit "10"? A Flaviano Gaspay.

A Yes I see it. Q You mean to convey to this Honorable Court that they were
living as husband and wife?
Q Exhibit "11"?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes sir.
Q As a result of this illicit relationship of the two, what
Q Exhibit "12"? happened?

A Yes I see it. A They bore a child.

Q What can you say about these documents marked as Exhibits Q What do you mean when you said bore one child?
"1" to "12"?
A Claudia Pason gave birth to a child.
A That is not the one?
Q Do you know who this child is?
Q What is that which is not the one?
A Yes, sir.
 Q Who? divergent or different from what Garin saw him write in 1959 and
1961. For it is a fact that there are people whose hand remain
A Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro. steady over the years, and whose eyes even acquire better vision
in their twilight years." We hasten to add that petitioners did not
Q Who is the mother of Guadalupe Gaspay? present any evidence to prove any change in the penmanship of
Gaspay, Sr.
A Claudia Pason.
We are also satisfied that the evidence profusely proved that private
Q Who is the father of Guadalupe Gaspay? respondent consented to her voluntary recognition as an illegitimate
child by the decedent. As well analyzed by the respondent court:
A Flaviano Gaspay.
To begin with, petitioner has been sporting the name Guadalupe
Court: Gaspay since childhood up to the time she got married to Bartolome
Alfaro on May 22, 1953 and even up to the present her
That is not allowed.
acknowledged name is Guadalupe Gaspay Alfaro. (Exhibits J, J-1
and J-2). And then when she filed the subject petition in this case
Atty. Bacolod:
she used the same surname Gaspay after her father and Alfaro after
her lawful spouse since her marriage, thereby accepting the fact
Q Of your own knowledge, if you know whether Guadalupe
and telling the world that she is the recognized daughter of the
Gaspay had come to school?
deceased Flaviano Gaspay. At the time the present petition was
filed on July 26, 1988 petitioner was already over 51 years old,
A Yes, sir.
having been born on December 12, 1936. All these undisputed facts
Q Where at? are sufficient evidence that she consented to her acknowledgment
by the decedent. (Javelona, et al., vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393).
A Culaba. Whether or not judicial approval of such acknowledgment is
required was answered in the negative in Apacible, et al. vs.
Q Do you know who supported her schooling? Castillo, 74 Phil. 589, where the Supreme Court held that such
approval may be supplied by the child's consent given after reaching
A Yes, sir. majority, which obtained in the case at bar.

Q Do you know if this Guadalupe Gaspay is already married? In light of the above, the death of Flaviano Gaspay, Sr., does not
constitute a time bar to private respondent's claim as his
A Yes sir, she is married. acknowledged illegitimate daughter. Settled is the rule that "actions
based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought even after the
Q Do you know who her husband is? father's death."8

A Yes sir, Bartolome Alfaro. In sum, private respondent has proved her entitlement to be
administrator of the estate of Flaviano Gaspay, Sr., her father.
Q Do you know the nickname of Bartolome Alfaro? Section 6 of Rule 78 is in her favor, thus:

A Yes sir. Toming Alfaro.
Q Do you know if this Guadalupe Gaspay has a nickname?
A Yes sir.
Q What is the nickname of Guadalupe Gaspay?
A Lupe.
Atty. Bacolod:
That will be all your Honor. 7
Secondly, the trial court noted that the last time Garin received a
letter from the decedent was in 1961 and the last time he saw him
write was in 1959. It held that Garin had no competence to testify
about the authenticity of Exhibit "L" written in 1980 and Exhibit "M"
written in 1983. In reversing this ruling, the respondent court held
and we agree that the trial court "unfairly assumes that Flaviano
Gaspay's penmanship actually metamorphosed into something
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refused the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If much surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling,
or if the husband or widow, or next kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
For a fact, petitioners neglected to apply for letters of administration
thirty (30) days after the death of Gaspay, Sr. (Dismissed. So
ordered.)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE,
INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO
PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO
BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX
VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO,
ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO,
WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO
SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO,
GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA
PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO,
TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case
No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice
during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom
he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After
Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had
five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo.
Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only
Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix
Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio,
Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido.
Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased,
but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived
by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and
Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but
survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are
already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived
by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido,
Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido,
while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first
and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots
Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio
Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8,
1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on
February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage,
praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of
the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They
alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the
defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that
the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no
successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in
1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31,
1965, annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial
Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots
involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings
that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot
No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that
11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders
judgment as follows: declaring the following as the legitimate
children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia
Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia
Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido,
deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo
Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion
Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great
grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido;
and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the
legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido
and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido,
Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido;
Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria
Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all
lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No.
458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them
should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix
Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia
Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married
to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to
Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to
Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to
Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to
Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to
Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same should
be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of
age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8
belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead
leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to
Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to
Susano Perido, but he is already dead with one son, the same
goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido,
of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow;
1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead
with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of
age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age,
married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to
Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to
Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one child,
the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud
Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote;
1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to
Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4)
declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat,
which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to
Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24
goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal
shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided
by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel
Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his
heirs to be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null
and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the
defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect
to the counterclaim and damages, they being members of the
same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the
trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan
Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were
the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the
exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807,
and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the
Court of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to
reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he
instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of
error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the
appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of
Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that
said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three
were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio
Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of
wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after
their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that
Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were
born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and
corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923
Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the
certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido
married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as
allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner
Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found
that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita
Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding
conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the
circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry
Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the
certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that
he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore,
it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons
living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is
involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof
on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of
Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale
behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend
to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from previous
cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the
appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated
testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The
reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that
Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925,
merely replied that she knew it because "during the celebration
of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from
(their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not
even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in
concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore,
legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of
whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and
808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing
of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be
noted that the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B
to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there
is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio
Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In
other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio
Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages. By
fiat of law said Properties should be divided accordingly among
his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate
court that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio
Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to
establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during
their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The
question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within
the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which
are not reviewable by this Court.
belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by
clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the
same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio
Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that
they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the
conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife,
Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional
5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly
belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first
marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised
here also involves appreciation of the evidence and,
consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is
binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would
require an examination of all the evidence introduced before the
trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of
the circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or
relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal
of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish
the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and
review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose
for which the latter procedure has been established. 2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Muñoz Palma, J., is on leave.

The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the

Court of Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court that
11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the
appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£

With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original

Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be
considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second
wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this
point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the
certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered
owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous
land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the name
of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin,
48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin,
60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger when the
document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is
registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar.
It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA
DE LA PUERTA, respondents.
Isabel de la Puerta for and in her own behalf.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue involved in this case is the filiation of private
respondent Carmelita de la Puerta, who claims successional
lights to the estate of her alleged grandmother.
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a
will leaving her properties to her three surviving children,
namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta.
Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and
was appointed executrix of the will.1
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was
opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was
already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not
fully comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties
listed in the inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively.
2
Meantime, Isabel was appointed special administratrix by the
probate court. 3 Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the
lone oppositor. 4
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of
First Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la
Puerta. After hearing, the petition was granted. 5 However, the
decision was appealed by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During
the pendency of the appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move
for the dismissal of the case 6
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to
intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the
payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta.7 At the hearing on her
motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her claimed
status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion,
declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that
Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was
entitled to the amounts claimed for her support. The court added
that "the evidence presented by the petitioner against it (was)
too weak to discredit the same.8
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the
respondent court,9 which is now in turn being challenged in this
petition before us.
The petitioner's main argument is that Carmelita was not the
natural child of Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to
Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and remained his wife until his
death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita Austrial and
Gloria Jordan.
Invoking the presumption of legitimacy, she argues that
Carmelita was the legitimate child of Juanita Austrial and Gloria
Jordan, who were legally or presumably married. Moreover,
Carmelita could not have been a natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta because he was already married at the time of her birth
in 1962.
To prove her point, Isabel presented Amado Magpantay, who
testified that he was a neighbor of Austrial and Jordan.
According to him, the two were living as husband and wife and
had three children, including a girl named "Puti," presumably
Carmelita. He said though that he was not sure if the couple was
legally married.10
Another witness, Genoveva de la Puerta, Identified herself as
Vicente de la Puerta's wife but said they separated two years
after their marriage in 1938 and were never reconciled. In 1962,
Gloria Jordan started living with Vicente de la Puerta in his
house, which was only five or six houses away from where she
herself was staying. Genoveva said that the relationship
between her husband and Gloria was well known in the
community.11
In finding for Carmelita, the lower court declared that:
. . . By her evidence, it was shown to the satisfaction of the Court
that she was born on December 18, 1962 per her birth certificate
(Exh. A); that her father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother
is Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and
wife until his death on June 14, 1978; that Vicente de la Puerta
was married to, but was separated from, his legal wife Genoveva
de la Puerta; that upon the death of Vicente de la Puerta on June
14, 1978 without leaving a last will and testament, she was the
only child who survived him together with his spouse Genoveva
de la Puerta with whom he did not beget any child; that she was
treated by Vicente de la Puerta as a true child from the time of
her birth until his father died; that the fact that she was treated
as a child of Vicente de la Puerta is shown by the family pictures
showing movant with Vicente de la Puerta (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-
2) and school records wherein he signed the report cards as her
parent (Exh. E and E-1); that during the hearing of her adoption
case in Special Proceeding No. 0041 in Branch V of this Court
at Mauban, Quezon, Vicente de la Puerta categorically stated in
court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria
Jordan (Exhs. B and B-1); that it was Vicente de la Puerta during
his lifetime who spent for her subsistence, support and
education; . . . 12
This is a factual finding that we do not see fit to disturb, absent
any of those circumstances we have laid down in a long line of
decisions that will justify reversal.13 Among these circumstances
are: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.
The petitioner insists on the application of the following
provisions of the Civil Code to support her thesis that Carmelita
is not the natural child of Vicente de la Puerta but the legitimate
child of Juanito Austrial and Gloria Jordan:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately
in such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
These rules are in turn based on the presumption that Juanito
and Gloria were married at the time of Carmelita's birth in 1962,
pursuant to Rule 131, Sec. 5(bb) of the Rules of Court, providing
that:
Sec. 5. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(bb) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
But this last-quoted presumption is merely disputable and may be
refuted with evidence to the contrary. As the Court sees it, such
evidence has been sufficiently established in the case at bar.
The cases 14 cited by the petitioner are not exactly in point because
they involve situations where the couples lived continuously as
husband and wife and so could be reasonably presumed to be
married. In the case before us, there was testimony from Vicente's
own wife that her husband and Gloria lived together as a married
couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was herself
the lawful wife of Juanita Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did
not continuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is
not explained why, if he was really married to her, Juanito did not
object when Gloria left the conjugal home and started openly
consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood at that. That
was unnatural, to say the least. It was different with Genoveva for
she herself swore that she had separated from Vicente two years
after their marriage and had long lost interest in her husband. In
fact, she even renounced in open court any claim to Vicente's
estate.15
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having
been destroyed, it became necessary for the petitioner to submit
additional proof to show that the two were legally married. She did
not.
Turning now to the evidence required to prove the private
respondent's filiation, we reject the petitioner's contention that
Article 278 of the Civil Code is not available to Carmelita. It is error
to contend that as she is not a natural child but a spurious child (if
at all) she cannot prove her status by the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or any authentic writing. On the
contrary, it has long been settled that:
The so-called spurious children or illegitimate children other than
natural children, commonly known as bastards, include adulterous
children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting
with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting
with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and
successional rights (Art. 287, CC). But their filiation must be duly
proven.(Ibid, Art. 887)
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code
allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious
children under the circumstances specified in Articles 283 and 284
of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural
children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule
on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children
may be applied to spurious children. 16
This being so, we need not rule now on the admissibility of the
private respondent's certificate of birth as proof of her filiation. That
status was sufficiently established by the sworn testimony of
Vicente de la Puerta at the hearing of the petition for adoption on
September 6, 1976, where he categorically declared as follows:
Q What relation if any do you have with Carmelita de la Puerta?
A She is my daughter. 17
Finally, we move to the most crucial question, to wit: May Carmelita
de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the estate of
Dominga Revuelta?
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of
the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first
reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother;
and the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
It is settled that —
In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take
place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented
dies before the testator; second, when the person represented is
incapable of succeeding the testator; and third, when the person
represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases,
since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children
or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of
representation. 18
xxx xxx xxx
The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a
deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would
have had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceased
had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact
that at the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was
still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon
his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa
Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In
other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to
succeed to the right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the
right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property. 19
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had
the right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of
representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita
upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death.
It would have been different if Vicente was already dead when
Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from
her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private
respondent was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of
Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga
because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the
barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article
provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
Applying this rule in Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 20 this Court
declared:
. . . even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo,
still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the
estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as
found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock
as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative
father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his
alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most,
petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father,
like the deceased Francisca Reyes.
The reason for this rule was explained in the recent case of Diaz
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 21 thus:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain
in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family
is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment. 22
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred
from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no
natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties
to bind them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino:
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the
latter cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the
parents or ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not
related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation created
by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the
adopted. "By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an
heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred. 23
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente
de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her
father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for
support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate 24 and
cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
Petition Granted. So ordered.
 [A.C. No. 2115. November 27, 1990.]
FELICIDAD BARIÑAN TAN, Complainant, v. ATTY.
GALILEO J. TROCIO, Respondent.
Jose A. Tolentino, Jr., for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT OF LAWYERS; CHARGE
OF IMMORALITY, NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
— The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent
should be disbarred for immoral conduct. This, in turn, hinges
on the question of whether he had, in fact, sexually assault the
Complainant, as a consequence of which the latter begot a child
by him. We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant’s
charge. The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of
April, 1971. Yet, no criminal charge was filed, and it was only
about eight years later, on 5 November 1979, that an
administrative complaint was presented before this Court.
Complainant’s explanation that Respondent’s threat to cause
the deportation of her alien husband should she report to anyone
made her desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had
admitted having lost contact with her husband when he learned
of respondent’s transgression that very same evening (p. 3,
TSN, 16 October 1980, p. 46, Rollo). The fear that she speaks
of, therefore, had become inexistent. Another factor that
engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is the fact that after
the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the
Respondent as if nothing had happened. Thus, by Respondent’s
own account, which was left uncontroverted by the Complainant,
the former assisted her mother and sisters prosecute a robbery
case. Then in March, 1976, she secured respondent’s services
in claiming indemnity from three insurance companies when a
fire burned the school down. Finally, respondent was retained
as a collaborating attorney by complainant’s family in an
inheritance case. These subsequent dealings are far from being
the normal reaction of a woman who has been wronged.
Complainant’s contention that Respondent continued
supporting the child for several years for which reason she
desisted from charging him criminally, has not been
substantiated. Truth to tell, the fact that she kept her peace for
so many years can even be construed as a condonation of his
alleged "immoral conduct." It is likewise strange that an
unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should,
of all names, be called "Jewel."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; PROOF OF
FILIATION; UNUSUAL CLOSENESS AND PHYSICAL
LIKENESS, CONSIDERED INCONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. —
The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness
between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving
him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity, as
Complainant would want us to believe. The same must be said
of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of Jewel and the
Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each
other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and
much less would it prove violation of Complainant’s person and
honor.
3. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATE CHILDREN; PRESUMPTION OF
LEGITIMACY, NOT OVERCOME BY ADEQUATE AND
CONVINCING PROOF IN THE CASE AT BAR. — More
importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of
Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be
in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple
was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption
has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In
fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate the legitimate
child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint, filed on 9 November 1979, complainant
Felicidad Bariñan Tan seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Galileo J. Trocio for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer.
Complainant, owner and directress of Harlyn Vocational School
in Baroy, Lanao del Norte, declares that sometime in April, 1971,
at about 8:30 PM, after classes were dismissed, respondent,
who is the legal counsel of the school, overpowered her inside
the office and, against her will, succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her. As a result, she begot a son on 5 February
1972 whom she named and registered as Jewel Tan. She avers
that respondent used to support Jewel but subsequently lost
interest in doing so thereby neglecting to defray the needed
expenses for Jewel’s well-being. Complainant also alleges that
the respondent threatened her with the deportation of her alien
husband if she complained to the authorities since she was
violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the vocational
school. This threat, aside from the fact that Complainant is a
married woman with eight children and a school directress at the
time of the sexual assault, made her desist from filing a charge
against the Respondent. However, after eight years and
thorough soul-searching, she decided to file this administrative
complaint.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Respondent, in his Answer, admits having acted as a lawyer of
the vocational school. In fact, he contends that he had also
served as the lawyer of the Complainant, her family and her
parents-in-law. Thus, in 1971, he helped prosecute a case for
robbery committed against Complainant’s mother and sisters.
Also, in March of 1976, when a fire of unknown origin gutted the
school, he assisted the complainant in collecting P10,000.00
from FGU Insurance Group, and P40,000.00 from Fortune
Insurance Corporation as indemnities. With regard to the same
case, he also represented complainant in a suit involving a
P130,000.00 claim against the Workmen’s Insurance
Corporation before the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte. Then in 1978, he was retained as a collaborating attorney
by Complainant’s family in an inheritance case. Further, her
father-in-law had always consulted him in matters affecting the
former’s store.
But respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually
assaulted the Complainant. He argues that her motivation in
filing this charge was to get even with him after having been
humiliated when he declined her request to commit a "breach of
trust." He states that in the inheritance case he handled for her
family, Complainant insisted that he report to her mother and
sisters that he had charged a fee of P15,000.00 instead of the
P2,500.00 he actually received so that she could pocket the
difference. He refused and told the Complainant to look for
another lawyer. She tried twice to make peace with him but was
unsuccessful. Rebuffed, she promised to get even with him.
Thus, this complaint.
Another reason why Complainant filed the present case,
respondent claims, is to escape her indebtedness to him
representing his services as legal counsel of the school which
were unpaid since 1974 and the accumulated honoraria from
her fire insurance claims. These obligations were left unpaid
despite demand made when respondent learned that
Complainant had sold a piece of land in Agusan.
On 2 June 1980, the Court, acting upon the Complaint and the
Answer already filed, referred the case to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 19 August 1980, said Office, upon the request of the
Complainant that the investigation be held in Lanao del Norte as
she and her witnesses could not afford to come to Manila,
referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of said province for the
necessary proceedings.
Between September and October of 1980, hearings were
conducted on the case. In a Report and Recommendation,
dated 16 January 1981, the Provincial Fiscal stated that
respondent failed to attend the hearing despite the issuance of
subpoena; that there was prima facie evidence showing that
respondent had committed acts violative of his professional
decorum; and, that he was recommending disciplinary action
against him. The records of the case were then forwarded to the
Office of the Solicitor General.
On 1 September 1982, the Office of the Solicitor General
returned the records to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte
for re-investigation on the ground that the investigation was
conducted in the absence of respondent, who did not appear
despite subpoenas sent to him. Thus, further proceedings were
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal wherein Respondent was
allowed to submit a sworn letter, dated 13 December 1985,
amplifying on the defenses contained in his Answer.
On 13 February 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte
issued a Resolution adopting his previous Report and
Recommendation of 16 January 1981, which found prima facie
evidence to hold Respondent administratively liable. On the
same day, the records of the case were referred back to the
Office the Solicitor General.
On 16 May 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General came up
with its own Report recommending that Respondent be
disbarred for gross immoral conduct. On 17 July 1986, as
directed by the Court, the Solicitor General filed a formal
Complaint for disbarment against Respondent. On 29 May
1990, the case was raffled to this Second Division and was
included in the latter’s agenda on 13 June 1990.
Respondent has filed an Answer, Complainant her Reply, while
Respondent’s Rejoinder, as required by the Court, was received
on 3 October 1990. The required pleadings being complete, this
case is now ripe for resolution.
The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent
should be disbarred for immoral conduct. This, in turn, hinges
on the question of whether he had, in fact, sexually assault the
Complainant, as a consequence of which the latter begot a child
by him.
We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant’s charge.
The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April,
1971. Yet, no criminal charge was filed, and it was only about
eight years later, on 5 November 1979, that an administrative
complaint was presented before this Court. Complainant’s
explanation that Respondent’s threat to cause the deportation
of her alien husband should she report to anyone made her
desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had admitted
having lost contact with her husband when he learned of
respondent’s transgression that very same evening (p. 3, TSN,
16 October 1980, p. 46, Rollo). The fear that she speaks of,
therefore, had become inexistent.
Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is
the fact that after the alleged incident, she continued having
dealings with the Respondent as if nothing had happened. Thus,
by Respondent’s own account, which was left uncontroverted by
the Complainant, the former assisted her mother and sisters
prosecute a robbery case. Then in March, 1976, she secured
respondent’s services in claiming indemnity from three
insurance companies when a fire burned the school down.
Finally, respondent was retained as a collaborating attorney by
complainant’s family in an inheritance case. These subsequent
dealings are far from being the normal reaction of a woman who
has been wronged.
Complainant’s contention that Respondent continued
supporting the child for several years for which reason she
desisted from charging him criminally, has not been
substantiated. Truth to tell, the fact that she kept her peace for
so many years can even be construed as a condonation of his
alleged "immoral conduct." It is likewise strange that an
unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should,
of all names, be called "Jewel."
During the investigation before the Provincial Fiscal, the
complainant, aside from herself, presented two other witnesses,
Eleuteria Garcia and Marilou Pangandaman, both her domestic
help, to testify. Among the three, it was Eleuteria who tried to
establish the manner in which the sexual assault took place.
Thus:
"x x x
"Q You stated in your affidavit marked Annex A that you heard
Felicidad Bariñan Tan shouted (sic) for help on the evening of
last week of April, 1971, can you tell me or do you know why
Mrs. Tan shouted for help?

"A Yes sir. When I responded to the shout for help of Tan I
noticed that Atty. Galileo Trocio, hurriedly left the office leaving
behind Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan.

"Q Did you ask Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan why she was
shouting for help?

"A Before I could ask her the reason why she shouted for help,
she told me and Marilou Pangandaman that she was sexually
abused by Atty. Galileo J. Trocio.

"Q What did you notice of Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan when you
responded to her shout for help?

"A She was crying and trying to fix her dress.." . . (p. 52-53,
Rollo)."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, how near to the crime scene said witness was,

considering that it allegedly happened in school premises, has
not been shown. Her credibility is thus also put in issue.

The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou

Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness
between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving
him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity, as
Complainant would want us to believe. The same must be said
of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of Jewel and the
Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each
other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and
much less would it prove violation of Complainant’s person and
honor.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock

of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should
be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the
couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the
presumption has not been overcome by adequate and
convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth
certificate the legitimate child of the Complainant and her
husband, Tan Le Pok.

WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and is

hereby DISMISSED, for lack of convincing substantiation.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 71994 May 31, 1990
EDNA PADILLA MANGULABNAN as guardian ad litem for
minor ALFIE ANGELO ACERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
AND AMBROCIO TAN CHEW ACERO, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a case of an illegitimate child who was denied support
pendente lite by the appellate court. The child is confused as to
what he is supposed to do. Petitioner pictured a big man eating
a small child which will not fail to repel and horrify all decent
men. She contends that this very image readily forms itself in
the mind when we consider this case.
Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City an
action for actual, compensatory and moral damages and
support for her child Alfie Angelo. Pending the litigation an
application for support pendente lite was filed to which an
opposition was filed by private respondent. On November 2,
1984 the trial court ordered private respondent to pay monthly
support in the amount of P1,500.00 to the minor child, Alfie.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but his motion
was denied on December 5, 1984.
Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed in the Court of Appeals
questioning the said order of the trial court.
In a decision dated March 29, 1984 1 the petition was granted
and the orders of the trial court dated November 2, 1984 were
annulled without pronouncement as to costs. A motion for
reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied on
September 12, 1985.
Hence, the herein appeal by way of certiorari wherein petitioner
raises the following issues:
I
THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENT INSISTED IN IGNORING
THE STATUTORY DISTINCTION BETWEEN A NATURAL
CHILD AND OTHER ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN;
II
THE APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTED
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION;
III
THE APPELLATE COURT IN ONE STROKE PUT TO NAUGHT
THE REMEDY OR RELIEF PROVIDED BY SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE. 2
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the questioned decision of the appellate court, the following
disquisitions were made:
The petitioner's contention is well taken. While the child's
paternity appears to have been established by the affidavits of
the respondent Edna Padilla Mangulabnan as well as by the
affidavits of her two witnesses, this fact alone would not be
sufficient to order the petitioner to pay support to the child. In
addition, it is necessary to prove that the petitioner has
recognized the child. For these are two distinct questions.
(Crisolo v. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 [1954]; Cruz v. Castillo, 28
SCRA 719 [1969]).
As the civil status of the child is the source from which the right
to support is derived, there must be a declaration to that effect
before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be
provisional, it being sufficient that affidavits are considered.
(Crisolo v. Macadaeg, supra; Mangoma v. Macadaeg, 90 Phil.
508 [1951]; Sanchez v. Francisco, 68 Phil. 110 [1939]). But the
question must nevertheless be squarely resolved. It may be that
the birth certificate is prima facie evidence of acknowledgment
of the child, so that until it is finally shown to be spurious it must
be upheld. (Civil Code, Art. 410; Art. No. 3753, sec. 13). On the
other hand, it may be that its probative value is impaired by the
verified opposition of the petitioner. These are, however
questions for the trial court to resolve in passing on the
application for support pendente lite
In the subsequent resolution dated September 12, 1985, the
appellate court also made the following observations:
The contention has no merit. Although Art. 291, in enumerating
those entitled to support, refers in paragraph 3 to 'acknowledged
natural children,' and in paragraph 5 simply to 'illegitimate
children who are not natural' nonetheless there is a need for the
latter class of children (spurious) to be recognized either
voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand
support. The private respondent contends that the cases cited
in the decision (Crisolo v. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 [1954]; Cruz
v. Castillo, 28 SCRA 719 [l969]) refer to the right of natural
children to support. The principle, however, is the same. Thus in
Paulino v. Paulino, 113 Phil. 697 [1961], which involves a claim
to inheritance by a spurious child, it was held:
An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and
successional rights from his putative or presumed parents must
prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by the
voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious)
child. Recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing.' It is compulsory when by court action the child brings
about his recognition.
Article 291 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
ART 291. The following are obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and acknowledged natural children and the
legitimate descendants of the latter;
(4) Parents and natural children by legal fiction and the
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the latter;
(5) Parents and illegitimate children who are not natural.
Brothers and sisters owe their legitimate and natural brothers
and sisters, although they are only of the half blood, the
necessaries of life when by a physical or mental defect, or any
other cause not imputable to the recipients, the latter cannot
secure their subsistence. This assistance includes, in a proper
case, expenses necessary for elementary education and for
professional or vocational training.
From the foregoing provision it is clear that parents and
illegitimate children who are not natural children are also obliged
to support each other as specified in paragraph No. 5
abovecited. It is to be distinguished from the obligation to
support each other as between the parents and acknowledged
natural children and the legitimate or illegitimate children of the
latter; and that between parents and natural children by legal
fiction and the legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the
latter under paragraphs (3) and (4) abovecited.
Under Article 287 of the Civil Code it is provided:
ART. 287. Illegitimate children other than natural in accordance
with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction
are entitled to support and such successional rights as are
granted in this Code.
In this case petitioner established the paternity of the child, Alfie
not only by her own affidavit but also by the affidavits of two (2)
witnesses. In addition thereto petitioner submitted a birth
certificate of the child. The private respondent claims that the
same is spurious as it was sworn before a notary public in Manila
when the child was born in Cavite Maternity Clinic in Las Pinas
Rizal.
There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which
the right to support is derived and before support can be
ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is, by
affidavits. 3
While the appellate court claims that the birth certificate is prima
facie evidence of acknowledgment of the child, and that until it
is finally proved to be spurious it must be upheld, 4 it
nevertheless observed that its probative value is impaired by the
verified opposition of the private respondent.
Petitioner contends, however, that the child is entitled to support
upon proof of filiation to private respondent without need of
acknowledgment.
The appellate court disagrees and holds that even as to
illegitimate children who are not natural children, there is a need
for the latter class of children (spurious children) to be
recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise
they cannot demand support, as in the case of an acknowledged
natural child.
The Court disagrees. The requirement for recognition by the
father or mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by
law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the
Civil Code. Such a child is presumed to be the natural child of
the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract
marriage at the time of conception. 5 Thus, an illegitimate child
like the minor Alfie in this case whose father, the private
respondent herein, is married and had no legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of his conception is not a natural
child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case
recognition is not required before support may be granted. 6
However, under Article 887 of the Civil Code, in all cases of
illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. Such filiation
may be proved by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the
illegitimate (spurious child). Recognition is voluntary when made
in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record
or in any authentic writing. 7 It is compulsory when by court
action the child brings out his recognition. 8
As above related the affidavits of petitioner and the two (2)
witnesses were presented to prove the paternity of the child, and
a birth certificate was also presented to corroborate the same.
The Court agrees with the court a quo that the status of the
minor child had been provisionally established.
Indeed, in response to the resolution of this Court dated
February 14, 1989, if the parties are still interested in
prosecuting this case, petitioner in a manifestation filed on
March 22, 1990, asserted that she is still interested and that in
fact the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. A-39985 has
rendered a decision dated April 9, 1987 granting to petitioner-
appellant minor a monthly support of P5,000.00 to be paid on or
before the fifth day of every month. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the appellate court dated March 29, 1985 and its
resolution dated September 12, 1985 are hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE and the order of the trial court dated November
2, 1984 granting a monthly support pendente lite in favor of the
minor child, Alfie in the amount of P1,500.00 is reinstated and
AFFIRMED with costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48362 February 28, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO RAFANAN, appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ildefonso Jose J. Cruz for appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Fernando Rafanan appeals from a decision of the then Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated 27 February 1978 which
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
On 31 July 1974, a sworn complaint for rape was filed by
Filomena Angala before the Court of First Instance which read
as follows:
The undersigned accuses Fernando Rafanan of the crime of
Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of February, 1974 in Cabanatuan
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have sexual intercourse with the undersigned
against the latter's will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the trial court rendered, on 27 February 1978, a
decision the dispositive part of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Rafanan is hereby
declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
defined and punished by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance; and in the
exercise of the Court's leniency, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessories
of the law, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P5,000.00 as moral damages, to acknowledge and support her
off-spring, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 2
In his Appellant's Brief, the accused claims that the trial court
committed the following errors:
I
The Court a quo gravely erred in not considering properly certain
facts and circumstances that militate against finding the
appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
II
The Court a quo gravely erred in considering and admitting
unreliable evidence to prove that appellant left the premises of
the school thus, allegedly destroying his defense of alibi.
III
The Court a quo gravely erred in finding that appellant is the
father of the cold allegedly born of complainant in the absence
of any valid and proper proof of the circumstances of said birth.
IV
The Court a quo gravely erred in denying to the appellant the
right to present vital witnesses who if presented would have
thrown more light on the search of truth in this case.
V
The Court a quo gravely erred when it convicted the herein
appellant of the crime charged in the light of the facts and
circumstances brought out during the trial of this case.
VI
The Court a quo erred in imposing upon the herein appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to acknowledge and support
the offspring allegedly born of the complainant.
The facts found by the trial court were summarized by the court
itself in the following terms:
Filomena Angala was orphaned of her father in a far-flung and
remote barrio in Mabini, province of Isabela. Being poor with a
brother and seven sisters, but in her earnest desire and ambition
to pursue her studies further, she decided to leave her place of
residence and try her luck in Cabanatuan City Having been
introduced by an elderly woman to the spouses Fernando and
Emma Rafanan, she consented to be a household help for the
latter, her principal chore being to take care of the three children
of the said spouses. It was on January 7, 1974 when Filomena
started to work as a household help for the spouses Rafanan.
The accused Fernando Rafanan was then the principal of the
High School Department at the Philippine Wesleyan College in
Cabanatuan City. His wife Emma was likewise employed as an
accountant therein. In their absence during school days,
Filmena was the only caretaker of the house. While the spouses
Rafanan slept in the second floor of their house with their 2
younger children, Filomena slept in the first floor beside the
stairs with Emalyn, an eight-year old daughter of the Rafanans.
In the evening of February 9, 1974, as it was already time to veins are slightly engorged. Abdomen is flat and tight. There are
retire, and with Mrs. Rafanan and her two children already no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma.
upstairs, Filomena prepared her mat and mosquito net in her
usual place of retirement on the ground floor. Both Filomena and GENITAL
Emalyn then lied [sic] down to sleep.
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full,
As Filomena and Emalyn were both soundly asleep, Filomena convex and coaptated with the pinkish-brown labia minora
was awakened by a man who was already inside the mosquito presenting in between. On separating the same are disclosed a
net and whom she recognized to be the accused Fernando slightly congested-vulvar mucosa and an elastic, fleshy-type
Rafanan. Holding a short firearm and pointing the same at her, hymen with deep, healed lacerations at 5 and 9 and shallow
the accused Fernando Rafanan warned her not to shout or healed lacerations at 6 and 11:00 o'clock positions. External
move. Sensing that the accused was bent on forcing his evil vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance [to] the introduction of
intentions upon her, Filomena slapped the accused, fought back the examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal
and struggled with the latter. The accused in turn gave her fist speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with slightly shallowed
blows in the stomach and bumped her head against the rugosities. Cervix is soft and congested.
cemented floor where she was then lying, rendering her
unconscious. When she regained consciousness, Filomena Vaginal and per-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative
noticed that the accused was already on top of her, the latter's diplococci and for spermatozoa.
penis already penetrating her organ. She felt that Fernando was
already making a downward and upward movement with his Garvindex test is positive.
penis. Filomena wanted to fight back and resist but being of the
weaker sex and stricken with fear because of Fernando's REMARK
threats, Filomena could no longer do so. Filomena suddenly felt 3
Findings are compatible with 2 to 3 months pregnant state.
pain in her organ which made her cry aloud, causing Mrs.
Rafanan who was then upstairs to inquire what the matter was.
The appellant presented a two-fold defense: (1) his first and
Losing no time, Fernando walked toward the stairs half naked
principal defense was alibi; and (2) his second defense, cast in
and without his pants. Alone in her grief and sorrow, Filomena
alternative form, was that assuming for purposes of argument
could only cry and shed tears until daybreak.
only that he had lain with the offended party Filomena Angala,
he had done so with her consent.
Filomena continued to do her usual chores that morning. At
11:00 o'clock [a.m.] of the same day, she told Mrs. Rafanan that
Turning first to the defense of alibi, Fernando Rafanan testified
she was leaving. When asked by Mrs. Rafanan the reason why,
that he was the principal of the High School Department of the
Filomena could only say that the accused had entered her
Philippine Wesleyan College and that he was a licensed holder
mosquito net the previous night. In the light of Filomena's
of a caliber .38 handgun. He claimed that he last saw Filomena
revelation, Mrs. Rafanan begged her not to tell anyone as it
Angala in their house at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 8
would be a great shame for her husband. Leaving the house that
February 1974, upon leaving his house after having there taken
same morning, Filomena went to the house of a relative in
his lunch. The appellant insists that he had not been in their
Mabini Extension, this city She stayed there for two weeks, then
house through the whole night of 9 February 1972 up to 5:00
proceeded to her hometown in Mabini, Isabela. Sometime in the
o'clock in the afternoon of the succeeding day, 10 February
month of April, 1974, Filomena decided to stay with a first
1974, as he had been busy at the school making streamers in
cousin, Artemio Domingo, in Bacoor, Cavite. By this time she
the library of the Philippine Wesleyan College for the then
was already in the family way, having had no menstruation due
forthcoming national seminar on social studies, scheduled from
as early as the middle of March, as Filomena could no longer
11 to 15 February 1974 and sponsored by the Department of
hide her pregnancy, she wrote the president of the Philippine
Education.
Wesleyan College in Cabanatuan City on May 10, 1974,
denouncing the accused who was still the principal of the High
Emma Rafanan, wife of the appellant, corroborated her
School Department and related her harrowing experience with
husband's defense of alibi by declaring that Filomena bad left
the accused. Being a member of the Armed Forces of the
their house for reasons unknown to them at about 5:00 o'clock
Philippines, Artemio Domingo accompanied Filomena to Camp
in the afternoon of 8 February 1974 and that she came back in
Crame on May 14, 1974 where she executed a sworn statement
the evening of the same day but only to pick up her belongings
concerning the incident that happened on February 10, 1974.
and to leave thereafter. Apparently suggesting that nothing
On that same day a PC medico legal officer in the person of 1st
untoward had happened to Filomena, Emma Rafanan further
Lt. Desiderio A. Moraleda examined her, the result of which as
testified that Filomena came back briefly on 27 February 1974
well as his findings are as follows:
to collect the amount of P25.00 representing her half-month's
salary.
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
This Court has many times in the past held that alibi is inherently
Fairly developed, nourished and coherent female subject.
a weak defense, easy of fabrication especially between parents
Breasts are hemispherical with dark brown aroela and nipples
and children, husband and wife, and other relatives and even
from which no secretion could be pressed out. The superficial
among those not related to each other, and that for such defense
to prosper, the accused must prove that it was not possible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of the
commission of that came. 4 Thus, in People v. Detuya, 5 the
Court gave little weight to the testimony of the wife of the
accused on the facts constituting his alibi, stating that:
The first witness is his wife; naturally, human nature being what
it is, she is expected to come to her husband's aid; hence, her
testimony, if at all, carries very little weight. 6
In the present case, accused Rafanan's sole corroborating
witness was his wife, Emma.
To counter the defense of alibi, the prosecution presented
Bonifacio Mangahas and Rolando Wycoco, two of the security
guards of the Philippine Wesleyan College who had been on
guard-duty on 9 to 10 February 1974. The two (2) security
guards testified with the aid of their logbook on which were
recorded the time of arrival and time of departure of the various
people working in the college compound. Bonifacio Mangahas
stated that he had been on guard-duty from 3:00 to 11:00 p.m.
of 9 February 1974 and that the accused had left the college
campus at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 9 February
1974; and that he (Bonifacio) had as a matter of course entered
the departure time of the accused on their logbook. 7 Rolando
Wycoco in turn said that he had been on guard-duty from 11:00
o'clock p.m. of 9 February 1974 until past 7:00 o'clock a.m. on
10 February 1974, and that he had personally noted down the
arrival of Mr. Rafanan at the college compound on 7:00 o'clock
a.m of 10 February 1974. 8 Moreover, the house where the
Rafanans lived was only 600 meters away from the Philippine
Wesleyan College compound. Under these circumstances, we
cannot fault the trial court for refusing to consider the accused's
defense of alibi.
The appellant claims that the trial court denied him the
opportunity to present additional witnesses, viz., Mr. and Mrs.
Naagas, faculty members of the Philippine Wesleyan College.
We find this claim a very strange one indeed considering that it
was defense counsel who filed before the trial court a Motion
Waiving Further Evidence and Resting Case dated 15
September 1977, 9 being apparently content with the denials
and the proferred alibi of the accused as corroborated by his
wife.
We turn to the alternative defense of the accused that if he had
lain with Filomena Angala, it was with her consent. The accused
sought to throw doubt upon testimony of Filomena Angala that
the accused forced himself upon her by pointing a caliber.38
pistol at her mouth and threatening to kill her if she did not give
in to his desires. The accused pointed to the circumstance that
his eight-year old daughter Emalyn was sleeping beside
Filomena in the same mat and under the same mosquito net and
that Emalyn was not awakened during Filomena's alleged
struggle with the accused. The accused also suggested that it
would be highly improbable for a man to seek to force himself
upon a woman in his own house, with his wife sleeping on the
floor above him. 10 In the first place, neither of the circumstances
pointed out by the accused can overcome the explicit and
straightforward testimony of Filomena that the accused had not
only threatened her with his handgun but also punched her in
the stomach and banged her head against the cemented floor
on which their sleeping mat had been laid out, causing her to
lose consciousness for some time. The trial court gave full
credence to Filomena's testimony, while observing, upon the
other hand, that the accused appeared to be unsure of what he
was to say. We must note once again that this Court accords
high deference to the factual conclusions of the trial court since
the judge had the inestimable advantage of watching and
listening to the witnesses as they have gave their testimony and
as they were subjected to cross-examination. 11 Moreover, as
the Court has noted before, rape has been committed in many
different places including places which to many would appear to
be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual embraces. 12 There
appeal's to us nothing inherently improbable in the account
given by Filomena Angala before the trial court of the copulation
she was coerced into by the accused.
Accused also underscored that Filomena Angala had taken
about three (3) months before she told of the outrage allegedly
inflicted upon her by the accused to the police authorities. There
may be situations where the fact that the complainant had failed
to report promptly to the police her being raped, would generate
substantial doubt as to the truthfulness of her accusation. In the
case at bar, however, as the trial court pointed out, the accused
had not only threatened to kill Filomena if she disclosed to
anyone what she had been subjected to, but had also exercised
strong moral influence upon the offended party, by reason of his
position as an important official in a recognized Protestant
Methodist educational institution like the Philippine Wesleyan
College. The trial court said:
The first thrust of the attack set up by the defense is the fact that
it was only three months after the alleged incident when
Filomena became emboldened to disclose her alleged horrifying
experience. It is conceded that Filomena refrained from
disclosing her experience, first, to Mrs. Rafanan, then to Marion
delos Reyes, a relative of Filomena with whom she stayed for
two weeks in Mabini Extension, and finally, to her mother in
Mabini, Isabela where she stayed for a considerable length of
time prior to her departure for Bacoor, Cavite. This is
understandable, for during all these time, Filomena was still
stricken both with fear and with hope that she would not become
pregnant. Fear, because she was but a lowly barrio lass, simple
and innocent, and would easily and naturally succumb to threats
and intimidation employed upon her by the accused in the
evening of February 9, 1974. The central figure in the life of
Filomena inevitably was the accused, being a man of position in
a prestigious institution. While she worked as a lowly housemaid
for the Rafanans, she had hoped to pursue further her studies.
The accused was the barrier against hunger and want, and
could be her only hope to finish her nursing course and be able
to support her family. Because of this, the accused who had
threatened her during that fateful night as well as Mrs. Rafanan
who had requested her not to disclose what happened, must
have had a towering moral influence over Filomena. With this
dominance over Filomena and notwithstanding the fact that his
eight-year old daughter was beside Filomena on the night in
question, it was easy and safe for the accused to rape Filomena
as it was difficult for the latter to frustrate him, nay, for Filomena
to denounce him. All these explain the inexorable fact that
although Filomena fought for her honor when the accused Q: You stated that you became pregnant, why is it that you are
deflowered her, she kept to herself her disgrace until her not pregnant now?
pregnancy gave her away. Thus on cross examination, she
declared: ATTY. BELTRAN:

ATTY. GARCIA
Q: If you did not like to give your parents a problem or you were
afraid that they might hurt you, why did you in fact make the
same in public on May 14, 1974? Is it because you were
pregnant?
We would like to place on record that the witness before she
answers the question, cries on the witness stand.
A: Because I have given birth already, sir.
ATTY. BELTRAN:

A: I made a report already because I could not keep the thing Q: You stated that you have given birth, where is the child now?
that happened to me a secret anymore because I was already
pregnant. And if it only happened that I did not become pregnant A: The child is in Bacoor, sir.
I would not have reported the matter anymore. 13
COURT:
In People v. Silfavan, 14 the Court observed that:
Do you want to exclude the audience?
The delay in prosecuting the rape is not an indication of
fabricated charges. If the complainant did not become pregnant, ATTY. BELTRAN:
she probably would never have revealed that she was raped by
No more, your Honor. 16
her uncle. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy
xxx xxx xxx
and pain rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the
rapists making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. 15
Q: Now, when did you first realize that you are on the family
way?
In the instant case, Filomena had herself stated that had she not
become pregnant or been unable to conceal any further the
A: Because I did not menstruate. sir. I did not menstruate
pregnancy that had ensued from Mr. Rafanan's unwanted
anymore, sir.
attentions, she would not have instituted her criminal complaint
at all.
Q: When was that?

The suggestion of the accused that Filomena had freely

A: May be in the middle portion of March, 1974, sir. From the
consented to his sexual embrace can scarcely be taken
time that happened to me in February I did not menstruate
seriously. Filomena had spoken explicitly and convincingly of
anymore, sir.
the threats and physical violence exercised upon her by the
accused. Moreover, the accused neither alleged nor proved that Q: Where did you first realize that you have symptoms (sic) of
he had had prior sexual intercourse with Filomena or that pregnancy?
Filomena was a girl of loose morals given to sexual promiscuity.
A: Because I did not menstruate anymore, sir.
Accused finally complains that the trial court had held him to be
the father of the child allegedly born of Filomena, Q: My question now is when you went to the PC on May 1974
notwithstanding the "absence of any valid and proper proof of were you then pregnant?
the circumstance of said birth."
A: Yes, sir.
After careful examination of the record of this case, we find no
basis at all for overturning the conclusion of the trial court that Q: When you executed your statement before the CIS on 14 May
the accused had been shown beyond reasonable doubt to have 1974 you realized before that date, that you were in the family
by force and intimidation penetrated Filomena Angala. We also way?
note that Filomena expressly testified to the fact that she had
become pregnant as a result of the outrage inflicted upon her A: Yes, sir.
person and that she gave birth to a child:
xxx xxx xxx 17
Q: Miss Witness, according to you, you were sexually abused
by the accused in the early morning of February 10, 1974, what Q: On the day you wrote this letter, were you aware that you
happened to you after that? were on the family way?

A: I became pregnant, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Since when or how many days prior to May 10 that you are
aware that you were on the family way.
A: I was already three months on the family way at that time, sir.
Q: So you felt on the family way sometime in March?
A: Yes, sir, because I did not menstruate anymore.
Q: In March?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You were telling the court a while ago that one of the reasons
in fact in your testimony, the main reason why you made this in
public, it is because you can not hide your pregnancy anymore?
by the law include the penalty of temporary special
disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special
disqualification. 21
The trial court required the appellant to pay, by way of moral
damages, the sum of P5,000.00 to Filomena. In accordance with
our more recent case law, 22 that amount should now be
increased to P25,000.00 so that Filomena might be somewhat
more fully compensated for the suffering, bitterness and
humiliation to which she had been subjected by reason of
appellant's acts.
WHEREFORE, except for the amount of moral damages
granted to the offended party which is hereby INCREASED to
P25,000.00, the decision of the trial court dated 27 February
1978 is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against appellant.

A: Yes, sir. 18 SO ORDERED.

It is, of course, also true that the record does not show the
identity and personal circumstances of the child born out of the
rape of Filomena. Even so, the Court correctly sentenced the
accused "to acknowledge and support her off-spring"
considering the provisions of Article 345 of the Revised Penal
Code:

Article 345. Civil Liability of Persons Guilty of Crimes against

Chastity. — Persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction shall
also be sentenced:

(1) to indemnify the offended woman;

(2) to acknowledge the off-spring, unless the law should prevent

him from so doing;

(3) in every case to support the off-spring.

xxx xxx xxx

and Article 283 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Article 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to

recognize the child as his natural child:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of

the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the record shows that conception had

occurred at or about the time that rape been inflicted upon
Filomena by the accused, or more particularly, within 120 days
from the commission of the offense. 19 The acknowledgment
required of the accused by the trial court should be understood
to be acknowledgment merely of the filiation of the child; the
accused being a married man could not sire an illegitimate
natural child, 20 a status which in any event is no longer
recognized under the Family Code of the Philippines.

It should also be noted that since the accused was a High

School Principal and as such entrusted with the education and
guidance of youth, the accessory penalties imposed upon him
 Republic of the Philippines legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their
father. Mention is also made of Article 369 of the same Code
SUPREME COURT which provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage
the children conceived before the annulment she principally use
Manila the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect
of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are
EN BANC conceived before such a decree should also be understood as
carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is
G.R. No. L-18407 June 26, 1963 Velarde.

ELAINE A. MOORE, petitioner-appellant, We find tenable this observation of government's counsel.

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Fidel A. Sandoval for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal praying that her child by a former marriage, William
Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read
William Michael Velarde Moore.
After publishing the petition as required by law, trial was held
during which the parties submitted a stipulation of facts.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying the petition
whereupon petitioner interposed the present appeal.
Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear
the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the
first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there
may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the
change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the
community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is
plausible and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual
relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore
family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot
at present overlook or brush aside.1äwphï1.ñët
Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child
concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom
what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. Any
way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and
take such action as our law may permit. For the present we
deem the action taken by petitioner premature.

Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Velarde, also an American citizen, out of whose wedlock a child
by the name of William Michael Velarde was born. This child,
now 14 years old, was born on January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.

The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently

dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by the Superior Court of
the State of California on May 31, 1949. After said decree
became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don
C. Moore on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the
spouses up to the present time. He was supported by Moore
who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were
his true father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's
desire that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his
family name Velarde.

The government opposes the petition and now poses the

following issues: (1) whether under our laws a minor may be
permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband
of his mother; (2) whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such
change of name; and whether petitioner, as mother of the minor,
has the authority or personality to ask for such a change.

Anent the first issue, the government sustains a negative stand

for the reason that our laws do not authorize a legitimate child
to use the surname of a person who is not his father, for, as a
matter of fact, Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that
 Republic of the Philippines The minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are
presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the
SUPREME COURT surname Divinagracia, their father's surname (Art. 364, Civil
Code).
Manila
To allow them, at their mother's behest, to bear only their
SECOND DIVISION mother's surname (which they are entitled to use together with
their father's surname) and to discard altogether their father's
G.R. No. L-55538 March 15, 1982 surname thus removing the prima-facie evidence of their
paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which,
In the Matter of the Change of Names of DIONESIO ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. The
DIVINAGRACIA, JR., and BOMBI ROBERTO mother's desire should not be the sole consideration.
DIVINAGRACIA to DIONESIO NALDOZA and BOMBI
ROBERTO NALDOZA, respectively. ZOSIMA NALDOZA, as The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and
natural guardian and guardian ad litem of said minors, reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of
petitioner-appellant, Court). Where, as in this case, the petitioners are minors, the
courts should take into account whether the change of name
vs. would redound their welfare or would prejudice them.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE FERNANDO Where the petitioner, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother
S. RUIZ of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, and a Japanese, elected Philippine citizenship, and her older
respondents-appellees. brother and sister were using their mother's surname, and the
petitioner felt embarrassed in using her Japanese father's
surname (Oshita) because of the ill-feeling harbored by some
Filipinos against the Japanese, and there was no showing that
AQUINO, J.: her desire to use the maternal surname (Bartolome) was
motivated by any fraudulent purpose or that the change of
surname would prejudice public interest, her petition to change
The issue in this case is whether two minors should be allowed
her surname from Oshita to Bartolome was granted (Oshita vs.
to discontinue using their father's surname and should use only
Republic, L-21180, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 700).
their mother's surname.
Where the petitioner's name in the civil registry is Maria Estrella
Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May
Veronica Primitiva Duterte, Duterte being the surname of her
30, 1970. They begot two children named Dionesio, Jr. and
father Filomeno, who was married to her mother, Estrella Alfon,
Bombi Roberto who were born on October 23, 1970 and July 22,
1973, respectively. but the petitioner since infancy has used the name Estrella S.
Alfon, particularly in the school and voting records, there is
reasonable ground for allowing her to change her surname from
Zosima's husband left her after she confronted him with his
Duterte to Alfon. Such a change would avoid confusion (Alfon
previous marriage with another woman. He never returned to
vs. Republic, G.R. No. 51201, May 29, 1980,97 SCRA 858).
the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Congressman
Maglana in the sum of P50,000.00, one Galagar in the sum of
The instant case is easily distinguishable from the Oshita and
P10,000.00 also Eloy Gallentes and other persons.
AIfon cases where the petitioners were already of age.
The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for
teased them about their father being a swindler. Two criminal
cases for estafa were filed in court against the father. change of name. The reasons adduced for eliminating the
father's surname are not substantial enough to justify the
petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion
Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two minor
as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that
children and their scapegrace father, Zosima, on August 10,
the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal
1978, filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol a petition
surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate
wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be
status as indicated in their birth records (Exh. C and D).
changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname (Special
Proceeding No. 768). After due publication and hearing, the trial
As was said in that In re Epstein 200 N.Y.S. 897, "the child
court dismissed the petition.
should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. "
If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable
The trial court did not consider as sufficient grounds for change
of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his mother's
of surname the circumstances that the children's father was a
surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he
swindler, that he had abandoned them and that his marriage to
should be the one to apply for a change of surname. See Anno.,
Zosima was a second marriage which, however, had not been
53 ALR2d 914.
annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the children's
adoption of their mother's surname would give a false
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is affirmed. No costs.
impression of family relationship.
SO ORDERED.
From that decision, Zosima Naldoza appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440. Appellant's seven assignments of
error may be reduced to the question of whether there is a
justification for the two children to drop their father's surname
and use their mother's surname only.