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EDITORIALTEAM
Editor
Dav jd Saw david_saw@adprconsult.com.my
Associate Editor
R. S. Sassheen,
K.
Farouk Kamal
Copy Editor
Arish, William Tan
CONTENTS
Assistant Editors Volume 15 November/December 2008
R.G.G. Paran
5enior Writer
Adam lsmail
Russia Correspondent
Elena Laskina
IN FOCUS
Librarian
Noor Afzan Md. Affan
Contributors
Prof. Dr. Bilveer 5inqh, Prof. DI Philip Davies,
Prof. Dr. K. S. Nathan. Dr. Ahmad Faruqui
REGIONAT FOCUS 4
Defence Developments in lndonesia
DIRECTORS
Chairman
Dato'Hj.Ahmad Hasmuni Hj.Hussein AIR SYSTEMS 17
Managing Director
l,4dm. V. Ranee Sachi ranee,sachi@adprconsult.com.my The Chinese Air Force Growth Path
Executive Publisher
Vittorio Rorsi Prudente vittorio_prudente@odprconsult.com.my
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IN FOCUS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
DEFENCE DEVELOPMENTS
IN INDONESIA bYDAVIDSAW
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still remains and needs to be done to attempts to retain their colony had
A H# : f T: : :::?i: l""ff ."Jt transform th is country. failed and finally accepted lndonesian
needs to start by looking at the past, After the surrender of Japan in Au- independence.
for it is the past that has shaped the gust 1945, lndonesian nationalists de- With the prestige of success in an
present in political, economic and de- clared independence from colonial anti-colonial struggle against a west-
fence terms. lndonesia is still a state rule by the Netherlands on lTth August ern power, Sukarno became a major
in transition; it is still coming to terms 1945 and Sukarno became the first political figure in the emerging post-
with a democratic political system and president of independent lndonesia. colonial world. He was also a leading
still trying to overcome years of eco- The return of the Dutch to lndonesia light in the formation of the Non-
nomic mismanagement and corrup- led to an anti-colonial struggle and it Aligned Movement (NAM). Sukarno
tion. Much progress has been made was only on 27th December 1949 that gradually moved closer to the Soviet
by lndonesia in recent years, but much the Dutch finally understood that their bloc, probably prompted by the grow-
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
ing political importance of the lndo- Southeast Asia. ln addition armoured kom' standing for nationalism, religion
nesian Communist Party (PKl), and this vehicles and air defence equipment and communism. The contradictions
led to the supply of military equipment came from the Soviet bloc. between these three political currents
by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, The Tentara Nasional lndonesia (TNl) would inevitably lead to conflict.
Poland and China from 1957 onwards. had become a major military power in On top of this lndonesia created its
This Soviet bloc assistance totally regional terms, but lndonesia had in- own problems as Sukarno decided on
transformed the lndonesian military. creasing security concerns. For exam- a policy of 'Konfrontasi' with Malay-
Naval equipment supplied bythe Soviet ple, the US Central lntelligence Agency that also drew in British Common-
sia
Union included a Sverdlov class heavy (ClA) was supporting separatist groups wealth forces. ln consequence, by the
cruiser, Skory class destroyers, Riga in lndonesia with weapons, equipment mid-l960s, lndonesia was at the centre
class frigates and 12 Project 613 Whis- and even air support. ln 1958 there of an absolutely unstable security en-
key class submarines. Aircraft included was an attempted coup in Sumatra vironment.
Tupolev Tu-16 bombers, MiG-l9 and and Sulawesi. The reality of the situa- Then events suddenly spun out of
MiG-21 fighters. By the mid-1960s the tion in the lndonesia of that period was control. On 30th September 1965 the
lndonesian Air Force, Tentara Nasional that Sukarno was attempting to tread PKI attempted a coup, which was ruth-
lndonesia - Angkatan Udara (TNl-AU) a path between three distinct political lessly suppressed by the TNI under the
was the largest and best equipped in currents, which were known as'Nasa- leadership of General Suharto. Gradu-
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ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
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Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
pected events, such as natural disas- role of the TNI over the years has done limited.
ters. lf circumstances had been dif- little or nothing to aid it in discharging lf we take 1988 as our base year, in
ferent SBY would have been expected its core security mission or giving it the financial terms using constant 2005
to win a second term, now things are appropriate tools to do so. US dollars as a comparator lndonesian
much more unpredictable. Arguably, military expenditure was $1,885 mil-
lndonesia could do with a bit of po- lio n eq u iva le nt to 2o/o of G D P. ln 1996,
litical stability, especially in the cur- Defence Funding military expenditure was 52,840 mil-
rent diffi cult economic circumstances, Environment lion, which was equivalent to L6o/o of
in the end though it will come down GDP. The next year spending was re-
to the will of the estimared 174 million ln real terms, the TNI and its major duced to 52,653 million or 1.5o/o of GDP,
voters in lndonesia. constituent elements, the TNI-Ang- falling to 52,079 million or 1.10/o of GDP
Governing lndonesia is no easy task. katan Darat. (TNl-AD), the army, the in 1998. ln the ten years from i988,
This archipelagic nation of 12508 is- TNI-Angkatan Laut (TNl-AL), the navy, military expenditure as a percentage
lands has a population in excess of and the TNI-Angkatan Udara (TNl-AU), of GDP either remained static or de-
237.5 million people and a multiplicity air force, have never had the financial clined.
of ethnic groups of which the Javanese resources required. lt is commonly Entering the democratic era, military
al 40.60/o are the most numerous. All assumed that under the New Order expenditure hardly grew in a measur-
regime that the TNI benefited from
of this also presents the TNI with a dif- able fashion for many years. ln 1999
ficult task in trying to defend the coun-
major funding - that is not the case. ln military expenditure amounted to
try against both internal and external fact in the last decade of rule by Suhar-
threats. Added to which, the political to military expenditure was essentially (...Continued on page 8)
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ASIANDEFENCE&DIPLOMACY No\
(...Continued from page 7) The improving lndonesian economY procurement area. This comes on top
gave the TNI an increase in funding in of the fact that military expenditure as
S1,710 million or of the GDP. For
0.9o/o both 2006 and 2007 in comParative a percentage of GDP is now running
the next three years it remained at the and percentage of GDP terms. Yet in at under 1o/o. ln this environment any
equivalent of 1o/o of GDP, rising to 1.3% reality the level of military expendi- overhaul of TNI equipment resources
in 2003. Here the value of using con- ture in lndonesia is not enough to as part of a sustained modernisation
stant 2005 U5 dollars as a comparison support the modernisation needs of a programme is virtually impossible.
tool is useful, in 2003 lndonesian mili- military with over 300,000 personnel
tary expenditure amounted to 53,319 and an inventory of essentially aged
million far more than any equivalent equipment. Modernisation Sttess
year in the last ten years ofthe Suharto With concerns growing about the
regime. The following year saw mili- future direction of the lndonesian A look at the armoured vehicle re-
tary expenditure as a slice of GDP ris- economy, the government has chosen sources of the TNI-AD presents a ma-
ing lo 1.4o/o and expenditure of 53,653 to reduce its expenditure. One of the jor argument for the pressing need for
million. However, 2005 spending was casualties of this is military expendi- modernisation. There are large num-
down to 53,517 million equivalent to ture, with a I00lo cut being made in TNI-
AD budget allocations primarily in the (...Continued on page 10)
1.2o/o of GDP.
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(...Continued from page 8) US or European-supplied equipment ment amongst other systems. At the
is a major bonus. However. much of time it was believed that this package
bers of AMX-I3 tanks acquired in the the legacy equipment in lndonesia is would be financed by a loan from Rus-
early 1960s, some reworked in lndo- beyond economic salvation and ought sia, but this appears to have been dif-
nesia and some modernised with the to be scrapped. ficult to resolve.
Singaporean SM1 package. In terms ln the past few years though there The TNI is now trying to arrange
of tracked personnel carriers there are has been some progress on acquiring the delivery of three of the six Sukhoi
large numbers of AMX-VCl vehicles, new equipment, from amongst oth- combat aircraft that were ordered
the last of these was delivere d in 1962. ers the Republic of Korea (ROK) and in 2007, but this is proving problem-
Turning to wheeled armoured vehicles Poland. The ROK has supplied training atic. A loan has been agreed with the
there are over 100 BTR-4Os acquired aircraft, two LPDs and assisted PT PAL French investment bank Natixis to cov-
in the early 1960s, many of these have in Surabaya with the construction of er the 5360 million purchase price of
been subject to a basic modernisation, two more LPDs (the first was launched these three aircraft, the only problem
and there are some 55 British Saracen in August). Poland supplied air defence was that parliamentary approval was
vehicles, again acquired in the early equipment and aircraft, with lndonesia needed for this release of this funding
1960s, with a limited number modern- able to finance the purchase through a and it was proving hard to get.
ised. loan from Poland. The most significant The problem in funding the Sukhoi
The TNI-AD has been ingenious in defence supply relationship is with purchase illustrates the difficulties that
keeping its aged armoured vehicles Russia; in 2003 lndonesia acquired four lndonesia faces in trying to modernise
viable, but the fact that it has had to Sukhoi combat aircraft for around 5i 95 its military. To purchase foreign equip-
do this is symptomatic of the prob- million, of which 526 million was paid ment it needs to obtain loan packages
lems that it faces. Years of under in- in cash and the rest in bartered prod- at reasonable terms, something that is
vestment, plus the imposition of arms ucts. not that easy to obtain. with the cur-
embargos have left the three services This first Sukhoi contract opened rent financial crisis finding any accept-
with tremendous problems. Much of the way to an expansion of defence able loan package is going to be ex-
the legacy equipment in lndonesia is links between lndonesia and Russia. tremely difficult, further adding to the
desperately short of spares a problem Last year the two countries seemed to modernisation problems of the TNl.
for the TNI-AU in particular. Progress agree a major defence package with Once again it looks as if circumstances
is being made on that front, the fact a value in excess of $1 billion to cover will conspire to limit the ability of the
that spares can now be obtained for more Sukhoi aircraft and naval equip- TNI to acquire new equipment. r
It's offi cial !
We are the official and only show daily news
published at lndo Defence & lndo Aerospace 2008.
INDO
INBODEFENCE Af,ROTPACE
208
THE 3FO lNDONESIA'S OFFICIALTBI-SERVICE OEFENCE EVENT
2c.8
THE 1ST INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL AVIATION,
AIRCRAFT AND Y EVENT
Points to ponder:
o The exhibition is fully supported by the lndonesian Government & the
lndonesian Armed Forces
r lndonesia is investing significant funds into the acquisition of new defence
systems for theArmed Forces, with air, land and naval systems required
o Existing legacy equipment is to be subject to upgrade and modernization
Programmes
o lndonesia is looking to develop the capabilities of the indigenous defence
industry through technology transfer programmes and joint ventures
o The growing lndonesian economy is generating increasing demand for air
transport with local airlines modernizing and expanding their fleets
o New major airport and infrastructure development programmes across
lndonesia to cope with increasing air transport demand
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
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Nov/De. 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
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ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
ers and this comes through the ability to cover less than six weeks of imports. they perceive that Pakistan is contrib-
to direct government expenditure to The picture of doom and gloom is un- uting in assisting US policy objectives
appropriate areas. ln consequence less ending. in Afghanistan, future aid will come
government expenditure equals less What Pakistan needs, in addition with strings attached. Even worse is
ability to buy support and that equals to the massive infusion of money to the fact that Washington currently
unpopularity. resolve the balance of payments cri- sees Pakistan in a rather negative light,
The IMF will also demand the Paki- sis, is foreign investment to keep its add to this a new administration taking
stan significantly reduce the amount economy growing. With terrorist in- office in January in the US and its all a
of money that it spends on defence. cidents in Pakistan continuing to rise, recipe for uncertainty for the Pakistani
Bearing in mind the propensity of the a less than decisive government and leadership. One thing is for certain, in
Pakistani military to intervene in poli- a dreadful macro-economic climate, the future Pakistan will not receive the
tics, aggravating them by reducing it is hardly surprising that Pakistan is easy ride that it got from the Bush ad-
their budget is hardly likely to be a wise most definitely not a favoured invest- ministration for so many years.
move. All things considered it is not ment destination at present. Yet it is
difficult to see why the government not that long ago that Pakistan could
would wish to avoid the medicine of attract substantial foreign investment, Security Scenario
the lMF. However, unless they can find from 2003 onwards the economy grew
another solution, the IMF is the only rapidly. Last year though as political There was a time when security plan-
game in town. uncertainties grew the economy suf- ning in Pakistan was pretty straightfor-
The scope of the crisis in Pakistan is fered and nothing has happened since ward, the fundamental threat was the
immense. lnflation is running at almost to slow the downward trend. overwhelming conventional superior-
30%, the Pakistan rupee has been shed- One of the big contributors to ity of lndia and the requirement was to
ding value against the dollar and this is growth in Pakistan was US economic find a means to counter this superior-
a major problem as Pakistan needs dol- assistance, this flowed in after Pakistan ity. The belief in Pakistani military cir-
lars to pay for food and fuel imports. decided that it would become an ally cles was that although they could never
Last year on 22nd October 60.7 rupees in the 'War on Terror'. From the end match the lndian military in terms of
was equivalent to a US dollar, this year of2001 onwards this US assistance numbers, they could offset this numeri-
the rate is 81.4 rupees for a US dollar. amounted to s10 billion. Future US cal disadvantage through what they
There is only enough foreign currency economic assistance depends on how thought was the superior quality of
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their soldiers and their martial spirit. ln Afghanistan in the wake of the terror- Beyond this though, the critical point
reality this was a fallacy, yet it impact- ist attacks of 11th September 2001, it was that the decislon taken by General
ed on Pakistani defence planning for marked a dramatic reversal of Paki- Musharraf in 2001 to support the US
years. stani policy regarding the Taliban and broke Pakistan out of international iso-
Another immense obstacle for Paki- Afghanistan. Yet, from the perspective lation. When US economic assistance
stan to surmount was finding a counter of the Paklstani military it was the cor- came into play, this acted as the cata-
to lndia's possession of nuclear weap- rect choice to make. By March 2004, lyst for Pakistani economic growth and
ons. This was achieved at great cost and Pakistan had been granted Major Non- encouraged more foreign investment
the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and its as- NATO Ally (MNNA) status by the US gov- that further stimulated the economy.
sociated delivery systems act as a coun- ernment. This opened the way to the Had Pakistan continued to pursue more
ter to lndian capabilities in this area. full resumption of the defence supply sensible economic policies in recent
Howevet the nuclear programme also relationship and significant financial as- years, current circumstances might be
led to the estrangement of Pakistan sistance as well. very different. Sadly, this was not to be.
from the U5, its main defence equip- ln equipment terms, the ability to Pakistan has paid a price for turning
ment supplier, for more than a decade. acquire F-16C/D aircraft, upgrade the its back on Afghanistan and the Taliban
This resulted in a dramatic dilution existing F-16A/8 fleet and acquire more in 2001 and perhaps this was not antici-
in the combat power of the Pakistan F-16A/8 aircraft was a significant bonus pated. One of the things that Pakistan
Armed Forces as existing equipment for the Pakistan Air Force. The other two has always lacked was strategic depth
could not be sustained. Furthermore, services also benefited from US equip- in a geographical sense, there was tre-
alternative sources of supply could not ment, for example the Pakistan Army mendous logic in allowing lnter Serv-
replace the US in terms of both capabil- received attack and utility helicopters, ices lntelligence (lSl) to sponsor and
ity and cost. with the Pakistan Navy receiving new support the Taliban, as once the Taliban
When General Musharraf decided P-3C Orion MPA aircraft. All of this was had come to power in Afghanistan they
to support US military operations in extremely welcome. provided Pakistan with that strategic
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
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depth. port from Pervez Musharraf was to the problem go away, esPeciallY if
The lSl was supporting the Taliban move into the background and leave economic conditions do not improve,
on the one side and on the other were the civilian politicians to attempt to they will only postPone events.
supporting jihadist groups in Kashmir solve the mess that Pakistan was in. For Pakistan it is vital that the po-
in furtherance of Pakistani objectives in US pressure to allow the 'democratic litical elites understand the danger of
that area. The danger for Pakistan was process' to proceed doubtless played the current situation in the country.
that its support of these jihadist groups a part in this decision by the military. Unfortunately, over the years the po-
might have unintended consequences. The only problem is that General Ash- litical elites have proven more inclined
This is what has come to pass, with the faq Kayani, the ArmY Chief of Staff' to self-interest rather than looking to
rise of the 'Pakistani Taliban', an insur- must now be wondering how much support the national interest. There is
gency along the Pakistan-Afghanistan worse the security situation could get no reason to believe that this will have
border and terrorism in the main cities and what options he has to deal with changed, as the current Zardari gov'
of Pakistan. The jihadist groups have it. ernment and the main political oppo-
gone from being a tool that could be The last thing that the Pakistani sition led by Nawaz Sharif are implac-
manipulated to suit the purposes of the military wants to be doing is fight- able opponents.
lSl and Pakistan, to being a direct threat ing a counter-insurgency campaign The only certaintY in Pakistan is
to the security of the Pakistani state. within Pakistan. They are a military that things are likely to 9et much
This is a classic example of the law of that is structured to deal with conven- worse before they get any better, un-
unintended consequences. tional rather than asymmetric threats, less all concerned are truly lucky. The
hence the costlY nature of recent sad thing is that Pakistan has never
military operations in the tribal areas been that lucky with its politicians.
along the Afghan border. By inclina- All of which means that the Pakistan
The Next Step tion President Zardari is a dealmaker Armed Forces, as the eventual guaran-
The leadership of the Pakistan and will seek to negotiate his way out tor of the state, must potentially be
Armed Forces currentlY find them- of dealing with the insurgency, this prepared to intervene in the political
might actually suit the military at this process, even though that is the last
selves in an incredibly difficult situ-
ation. Their aim in withdrawing sup- point. Yet making deals will not make thing they wish to do at the moment.r
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
he Chinese People's Liberation end of 1949 Soviet advisors made great be the final defeat of the Nationalist
Army Air Force (PLAAF) was efforts to train pilots and other person- forces on Taiwan, now it had to deal
formally established on lith Novem- nel for the fledgling PLAAF. Not that with a new security situation and by
ber 1949, yet its history can be traced PLAAF was aware of yet, but a critical the end of July 1950, PLA units started
back to the numerous air units that the test was on the horizon that would see moving towards the Sino-North Kore-
Chinese Communist Party had formed them thrown into combat far earlier an border area.
during the Civil War period with vary- than anybody had anticipated. The Chinese attitude to the Korean
ing degrees of success. The prime rea- On 25th June 1950, Kim ll Sung un- conflict grew more focussed after the
son behind the establishment of the leashed the North Korean People's US/UN amphibious landing in lnchon
PLAAF in 1949 was the future availabil- Army (NKPA) in an effort to destroy the and the move across the 38th Parallel
ity of extensive military assistance from Republic of Korea (ROK) and unify the into North Korean territory by the end
the Soviet Union in the form of equip- Korean peninsula by force. Although of September 1950. ln October 1950,
ment, training and support. the Chinese leadership had been in- Beijing was convinced that it had to
It was Soviet methods that would formed about the invasion, what it did intervene to protect its borders and
fundamentally shape the PLAAF and not expect in the aftermath was Amer- save North Korea. This saw PLA forces
also support the establishment of a ican intervention. China was marshal- organized into the Chinese People's
Chinese aerospace industry. From the Iing its forces for what it hoped would Volunteers (CPV) under the command
NAVAL SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
of Peng Dehuai. Peng was an experi- pushed back. The middle of 1951 saw flown in Korea would go on to become
enced field commander and realised the Korean War move to a stalemate the PLAAF leadership in the 1980s
immediately that if the CPV were com- along the 38th Parallel, with armistice and 1990s. lt was this leadership that
mitted against the US/UN forces in negotiations commencing at Kaesong. would transform the PLAAF and lay
Korea it would need effective air sup- Stalemate on the ground did not the groundwork to make it the force it
port. The only problem was that Mao mean that military operations ceased, is today.
itl
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
al Revolution and other mass political ing and was in no position to PaY for
A New Beginning complete systems. The requirement
campaigns unleashed by Mao needed
lf it was politics that resulted in the to be repaired. Deng instituted the was to acquire technology that could
Sino-Soviet split and damaging con- 'Four Modernisations' policy under be applied to improve the quality of
sequences for PLAAF and the Chinese which China would focus on improving existing Chinese systems and create
aerospace industry, it was politics that the areas of agriculture, industry, sci- the basis upon which new generation
offered new opportunities at the end ence and technology and the military. systems could be built.
ofthe 1970s.The death ofMao Zedong A pragmatic leadership was now set on This era saw China start working
and the re-emergence of Deng Xiaop- unleashing the extraordinary econom- with US, European and lsraeli compa-
ing as a national leader saw major ic potential of China. nies, which opened up a host of major
changes in China. As Deng solidified As far as PLAAF and the Chinese aer- possibilities to the Chinese aerospace
his power, he was able to sideline the ospace industry were concerned there industry. ln 1986 Grumman started
political radicals, and then proceeded was an immense need to access new working with Shenyang on the Peace
to break the international isolation of technology, it had become increasingly Pearl programme, under which the
China. This had two purposes, firstly a obvious howfarthey had fallen behind. troubled J-8 would be upgraded with
need to counter the Soviet Union and With foreign countries and companies western avionics and other modifi-
its satellite states who were seen as a drawn to the huge untapped Poten- cations. Nanchang started working
major threat and secondly to modern- tial of the Chinese market, technology with ltalian industry on an upgraded
ise the Chinese economy. started to flood into China. However, in version of the Q-5, British companies
The immense damage of the Cultur- terms of defence China was not look- supplied radar and other technology,
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AIR SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
while French and lsraeli companies with an embargo being imposed and opment and also a major opportunity.
were working across a whole spectrum programmes such as Peace Pearl being China opened discussions on the ac-
of defence programmes. The hunger cancelled. Yet China was not isolated quisition of military equipment in 1990
for western technology was immense. in wake of Tiananmen, it was too big a and in March '199'l was able to evalu-
Chinese aerospace companies then market to be ignored. China still had ate the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi Su-27
started producing components for access to technology, much of it dual- in China. By this time the Soviet Union
foreign companies, for example aero- use which could be applied to defence was no more and China was working
engine parts were produced for GE. programmes, and in a broad economic with Russiawho was desperate for
This was tremendously helpful as it sense China was much stronger than money and for products, this allowed
provided access to modern materi- it had been ten years earlier. Despite China to negotiate contracts where
als technology and foreign currency. the embargo, defence cooperation did it could pay by bartering goods and
Equally as important in this period was continue with foreign countries, with other commodities. ln 1991 a contract
the fact that Chinese students were important benefits to China. There was signed for 20 Su-27SK and six Su-
going to foreign universities and re- were also other developments on the 27UBK aircraft, which were delivered
search institutions; this was to have horizon that would work in China's fa- from KNAAPO in 1995.
both short and long-term benefits for VOU T. The arrival of the Sukhoi Su-27 was
Chinese industry. As the 1980s contin- a revolution for PLAAF, for the first
ued, China's economic modernisation time in four decades they actually had
picked up speed and as the economy a world-class combat aircraft. A sec-
A Different Time
grew, so did industry and science and ond batch of aircraft was purchased
technology in China. By 1989, the China's main ideo- from KNAAPO in 1995 and delivered in
The Tiananmen Square incident of logical adversary and prime security of 16 Su-27SK and six
1996, consisting
1 989 put an end to overt defence coop- threat, the Soviet Union, was starting the scene
Su-27UBK aircraft. This set
eration between the west and China, to fall apart. This was a welcome devel- for the most ambitious Sino-Russian
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
programme of this era, the license tween 48 and 57 aircraft were built to merous contracts for Sukhoi-related
production of the Su-27SK in China. the end of 2004. lnstead of200 aircraft, spares and sub-systems, as well as for
The contract was agreed in 1995, with China decided to stop Su-27SKL-11 li- air weapons such as the R-73 Within
,l05.
a contract valued at 52.5 billion being cense production at Visual Range (WVR) AAM, the R-27 and
signed in 1996. China continued to purchase com- R-77 Beyond Visual Range (BVR) AAM,
The license production agreement plete aircraft from Russia, a require- KAB guided bombs and Kh-29, Kh-31
would allow Shenyang to build up to ment for a strike aircraft saw China and Kh-59 air-to-surface weapons. Rus-
200 Su-275K aircraft, which would be acquire 38 Sukhoi Su-30MKK aircraft sia had supplied export versions of the
known as the J-11 in China. lnitially in 1996 in a contract valued at $2 bil- R-27 in the semi-active radar homing (R-
Russia would supply complete parts lion. KNAAPO delivered these aircraft 27R) and infrared homing (R-27T) ver-
kits for assembly, gradually local con- between 2000 and 2001. This was fol- sions. China then went to the Ukraine
tent would rise although the main el- lowed by a second contract for 38 and acquired the active radar homing
ements such as avionics, engines and more Su-3OMKK in 2001 and these air- variant of the missile (R-27AE), they also
weapons would still be imported. The craft were delivered between 2002 and acquired the R-27RE and R-27TE which
first locally assembled J-l1 flew in De- 2003. ln 1999 an order was placed for were extended range versions of the
cember 1998, with local production 28 Su-27UBK aircraft, which were built standard R-27R and R-27T. ln 2000
commencing in 2000 with 48 J-11 air- by lrkut, and delivered in 2002. China acquired 124 R-27RE, R-27TE and
craft built by 2002. Then a total of be- On top of this China signed nu- R-73 from the Ukraine, between 200,l
AIR SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
and 2006 they acquired a further 1,153 uses composite materials and there a local version of the Rafael Python 3,
R-27 missiles from the Ukraine. have been other changes that reduce and then with the new PL-12 BVR AAM.
China was extremely conscious of weight by as much as 700 kg according The PL-12 uses sub-systems from both
becoming over-dependent on Russia; it to some sources, these changes also Russia and the Ukraine and offers ca-
was therefore consistently developing extend airframe life and reduce RCS. ln pabilities equivalent to the R-77. More
its own independent aircraft, avion- terms of avionics the aircraft features recently, in mid-2002 it was disclosed
ics, engine and weapons capabilities. a complete package from China and that China was working on a new indig-
However, the Sukhoi fleet would need is fitted with the Type 1474 (KLJ-4) ra- enous WVR AAM. Earlier this year some
to be supported and the Su-27 offered dar, a bigger version of the radar in the images of the weapon became availa-
incredible potential for further devel- indigenous J-10 fighter, new cockpit ble and the PL-ASR designator was not-
opment. This saw Shenyang start work featuring multi-function displays and ed, although it is now called the PL-l0.
on an indigenous variant of the Su- a wide-angle HUD, navigation system, It appears that the system was actually
27SK that was to be known as the J-l18, Feibao flight control system and other tested in late 2007 although there is no
activity on this programme had started equipment. firm evidence of when it could be de-
before 2002 with the aim of creating a A critical development was the abil- ployed, with 2010 being suggested.
true multirole combat aircraft. ity to provide an indigenous engine The J-l 1B is in production and is en-
More recently, the scope of the J-1 1B for the J-l1B, this was achieved when tering service with PLAAF units in sig-
programme has become clear as during the WS-10A Tai Hang was successfully nificant numbers. Work has reportedly
2007 more prototypes were seen and integrated and achieved the majority also commenced on a two-seat version
by the end of that year were conduct- of its performance goals. The aircraft of the aircraft which some call the J-
ing weapons trials. The J-'l1B looks like also uses the complete array of Chi- aircraft would make sense as
11BS. This
the Su-27SK, but there are significant nese air weapons; early examples were PLAAF has found that it requires large
differences. Structurally the aircraft seen with the PL-8 wvR AAM, in reality numbers of Su-27UBK aircraft for OCU
@
AIR SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
applications. ln addition the Su-27UBK single-engine fighter for PLAAF that place on 23rd March 1998, with the
has been used as a mission controller would eventually result in the J-10. first J-10A production aircraft, with
where a senior pilot acts as the flight At this time the links that had been the AL-31, taking place on 28th June
leader for a Su-27SK formation. Equally opened with the US, Europe and lsrael 2002.
a two-seat version could fulfil a role gave PLAAF and the 611 lnstitute the After testing at the Central Flight
similar to that of the Su-3OMKK in serv- opportunity to explore a host of new Test Establishment (CFTE), the J-10A
ice with PLAAF. possibilities in working on Project was granted state certification at the
10. This is where the linkage comes end of 2003 allowing full-scale pro-
between the J-l 0 and the lsraeli Lavi duction to commence. First deliver-
Chinese Developments fighter programme. The lsraeli pro- ies of the J-l0A were made in 2004
gramme provided much inspiration to 44th Air Division PLAAF in Yunnan.
The most significant development and access to advanced avionics, The next stage in the programme saw
for PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace equally others contributed to the J-1 0 the development of the two-seat J-
industry is the successful entry into programme as well, from US comput- 10S for the OCU role, the prototype
service of the Chengdu J-10 fighter. ers and machine tools to design as- first flew on 23rd December 2003 and
Back in the 1970s, the 611 lnstitute de- sistance from European companies. state certification for production was
veloped a new design for the J-9 fight- lnto the .l990s as PLAAF require- received in 2005.
er project that was based on a PLAAF ments evolved there were changes to Today well in excess of 100 J-10A/S
requirement for a Mach 2.4 high alti- the Project 10 design, which appar- aircraft are in service with the 44th,
tude fighter. This design had a canard, ently saw two separate design tracks 2nd and 3rd PLAAF Air Divisions.
delta wing configuration and the de- - one with indigenous systems (J-10) There have been some changes to the
sign was completed around 1975 be- and the other incorporating Russian aircraft, with more recent examples
fore the programme was cancelled systems (J-10A). The incorporation being fitted with a refuelling probe.
in 1980. Then, in the mid-l980s work of the Russian Lyulka-Saturn AL-31FN ln addition the design has reportedly
started at the 611 lnstitute on Project was a major step forward in the pro- been further developed. The J-10S
10 - a high-performance single-seat gramme. First flight of the J-l0 took provided the basis for the develop-
AIR SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 200B
&.::*
ment of the J-108; this is a two-seat Shenyang was working on a future seen, even so a programme of this
aircraft for more demanding strike fighter under the J-13 designation, sophistication shows the confidence
and presumably air defence suppres- while the 611 lnstitute in Chengdu of PLAAF and the Chinese aerospace
sion missions. The J-108 is said to had the J-14 as their future fighter industry that they can design and de-
have made its first flight this year and concept. All we can really surmise at velop a truly advanced future combat
should soon go to CFTE to enter the present is that the future aircraft will a i rc raft.
state certification process as a prel- have two-engines, be highly stealthy This article has sadlY onlY
ude to entering full Production. and be equivalent to the Russian PAK- scratched the far as PLAAF
surface as
The arrival of the J-10A/S shows the FA aircraft (see: AD&D SePtember/ programmes are concerned - it truly
increasing capabilities of the Chinese October 2008), as well as a counter to is a complex and fascinating area to
aerospace industry, very few nations the US F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike study. For space reasons we have ne-
are able to develop what aPPears to Fighter (JSF). glected to mention developments of
be a world-class fighter aircraft. Yet Presumably work on the future the J-8 fighter and H-6 bomber, as
this appears to only be the start, with fighter got underwaY in the mid- well as the JH-7A attack aircraft. There
a future combat aircraft programme 1990s, although as we do not know are also major developments in train-
already in the development stage' ln exactly who is going to build it at ing aircraft and AEW&C Platforms.
1997 lhe US Navy revealed that China this point, is difficult to determine a The fundamental message is that
was working on a future fighter pro- real programme timescale. lncreas- the PLAAF of today is an increasingly
gramme known as JXX and theY es- ingly there has been speculation that capable and well-equiPPed force.
timated that the aircraft would be in Shenyang will be responsible for the with the future holding the promise
service by 2015. new aircraft, with Chengdu assisting of even more significant capability
It appears that the 601 lnstitute in in various ways. This remains to be growth. r
ta4
NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
'I
r.id.ig
I n a orevious issue of Asian Defence describing some of the most important amphibious operations. Outside of
I a oiptorucy (AD&D) we looked at ship classes, as well as looking at key this, the prime mission of PLAN was
the submarine capabilities of the Chi- future developments. coastal patrol.
nese People's Liberation Army Navy PLAN was established in 1950 and The first transformation of PLAN
(See: AD&D July/August 2008: 'Red Star it was equipped with whatever re- came in the '1950s with the arrival of
Rising - China's Expanding Submarine mained of the former Nationalist Navy extensive military assistance from the
Capabilities') and the immense growth and anything else that could be found. Soviet Union. This went beyond the
in qualitative terms of the People's Lib- At this time PLAN was just an adjunct supply of equipmenU there was assist-
eration Army Navy (PLAN) submarine to the dominant ground forces of the ance in the establishment of a ship-
fleet. With this article we will be look- People's Liberation Army (PLA) and it building industry and the granting of
ing at PLAN surface combatants and could provide a limited capability for license production rights for Soviet
NAVAL SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
naval equipment in China. ln essence in by the end of the Maoist period and the Chinese economic miracle was
the Chinese naval sector was primarily the arrival of a more pragmatic leader- starting to pick up pace and the coun-
a product of Soviet assistance. When ship, China started to open up to the try was in a far stronger position than it
relations between the Soviet Union world. There was also an understand- had been at the start ofthat decade. ln
and China ruptured and Soviet techni- ing that the PLA desperately needed the context of security, China was see-
cians left China in 1960, the fate of na- to modernise and that foreign technol- ing the Soviet bloc disintegrate which
val programmes in China was thrown ogy would be necessary to achieve this removed its most dangerous strategic
in to chaos. goal. ln this period China perceived competitor.
With the break in relations with the the Soviet Union to be a major threat
Soviet bloc, China found itself inter- to its security and forged links with the
nationally isolated and in the context US and European nations to acquire
The Russian Option
of naval systems was left with a lot defence technology to meet its needs.
of 1940s and 1950s era technology This led to both the military and the de- The collapse of the Soviet Union and
with very little ability to develop in- fence industry being confronted with the emergence of the successor states,
digenous successor technology. Even the reality of how far China had fallen such as Russia, provided China with
worse, any progress that China might behind the rest of the world in defence the opportunity to acquire defence
have made in the 1960s was halted by equipment and technology. The result systems and technology in a virtualiy
the ideologically driven catastrophe of this was a process of transformation unrestricted manner at extremely af-
that was the Cultural Revolution. As a in the PLA and in the Chinese defence fordable prices. Arguably it is this link-
consequence of this, PLAN found itself industry. age with Russia that has been one of
having to make do with whatever the The Tiananmen Square incident in the most important factors in the de-
Chinese industrial base could come 1989 brought a halt to open defence velopment of the PLA and the Chinese
up with. The end result was that PLAN links with the west, even though cer- defence industry, as we know it today.
was condemned to working with infe- tain European countries would con- For PLAN the opportunity to pur
rior technology and therefore had to tinue to supply China with defence chase equipment and technology from
develop strategic concepts that took equipment and defence-related sys- Russia and the Ukraine offered them
these facts into account. tems in spite of the embargo that had the ability to radically transform their
With the political changes ushered been imposed on China. By this time capabilities. ln 1994 PLAN purchased
''* %**
W
NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
t rx 1- 1$1
)uly 20O4. The sister ship, Wuhan (169) tion that at least two of these could sile system, with six revolver-type VLS
was launched in January 2003 and be built, although other reports talk of each containing eight 5V55RM missiles.
commissioned into the SSF at the end four. What will be interesting to see is The system uses the 3R41 Volna radar,
of 2004. The Type 0528 design then the evolution of the Type 052D com- which has a range of 100 km and can
provided the basis for the Type 052C pared to the Type 052C. engage six targets simultaneously,
Luyang-ll air defence destroyer design Up at the Dalian Shipyard another with each target being addressed with
that was to be built at Jiangnan. destroyer class was being built, in the two missiles. Other radars include the
The first Type 052C, Lanzhou (170), mid-l990s work started on the Type Fregat-MAE-5 3D air search radar and
was launched in April 2003 and com- 0518 Luhai and in October 1997 the the Mineral-ME surveillance and tar-
missioned in July 2004, the second first unit Shenzhen (167) was launched geting radar. There are also are eight
unit, Haikou (171) was launched in Oc- and then commissioned late in 1998. YJ-83 ASCM, 100 mm gun, two Type
tober 2003 and commissioned in 2005, The Type 0518 class did not progress 730 CIWS and two triple tube 324 mm
both are in service with the SSF. These beyond a single unit, but its hull form torpedo launchers.
impressive units are equipped with the and steam turbine propulsion plant The Type 051C performs a similar
HQ-9 vertical launch air defence sys- provided the basis for the Type 05lC mission to the Type 052C, but has a to-
tem with 48 missiles, they have eight Luzhou air defence destroyer class. tally different equipment fit with the
YJ-62 ASCM, a 100 mm gun, two Type The first Type 051C, Shenyang (115), primary systems all being of Russian
730 CIWS systems, two triple tube 324 was Iaunched in December 2004 origin. lt is suggested that Dalian will
mm torpedo launchers, four iS-barrel and commissioned wlth the North be starting work on a follow up to the
ASW rocket launchers and can embark Sea Fleet (NSF) in October 2006. The Type 05iC design, initially designated
aKa-28 or Harbin Z-9C helicopter. second unit, Shijiazhuang (116) was Type 051D, and that two units will be
There are now reports that a follow launched in 2005 and commissioned built. The hull form and propulsion will
on class to the Type 052C is to be built, with the NSF at Qingdao in March 2007. be a development of the Type 051C,
known as the Type 052D, but no real The main weapons system of the Type the interesting thing to watch for in the
details are available. There is specula- 051C is the Russian Rif air defence mis- envisaged Type 05i D is its weapon and
tr
NAVAI- SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec20OB ASIANDEFENCE&DIPLOMACY
sensor fit, how much indigenous versus graded, while of the five in the SSF two .Jianghu-ll, while Thailand acquired
how much foreign equiPment. have been upgraded, none of the four four Type 053HT Jianghu-lll class. Nu-
ln total PLAN have 26 destroYers in Luda in the ESF have been uPgraded. merous different versions were built
service, the most significant classes It would be fair to assume that non- and 43 remain in PLAN service.
of which we have described above. Of modernised Luda class units will con- The NSF has one TYPe 053 Jianghu
the others, the two TYPe 052 Luhu are tinue to be withdrawn in the coming and fourType 053H1 Jianghu-llclass in
worth noting, these were the first truly years and presumably be replaced by service, the ESF has eight Jianghu, two
modern indigenous destroyers to en- the expected new TYPe 051 D and TYPe Jianghu-ll, three Type 053H2 Jianghu-
ter service with PLAN. Commissioned 052D classes. lll, four Type 053H2G Jiangwei and six
in 1994 and 1996 with the NSF, they Type 053H3 Jiangwei-ll. Finally the
were given refits and modernised in S5F has two Jianghu, three Jianghu-
200312004. Significantly, the most nu- ll, six Type 053H1G Jianghu-V and four
Fnr ga€e Fx'*g *"e aax rc*s
merous destroyer class in PLAN service Jiangwei-ll. Early model Jianghu class
is the older Type 051 Luda class. The PLAN frigate force currentlY units are being decommissioned and
Originally there were 17 Luda class numbers some 49 units, but the ma- this process will doubtless continue,
built, with units commissioned be- jority are older Jianghu/-Jiangwei class other units of the class have been put
tween 1970 and 1993, with four distinct units. These were launched from 1971 through modernisation programmes
variants being built. One Luda was lost through to the early 1990s and were to extend their service lives.
in an explosion, while three have been also successful in the export market. The key frigate class in PLAN is
decommissioned. Of the four Luda in Bangladesh acquired a single TYPe the Type 054/054A Jiangkai/Jiang-
service with the NSF, two have been up- 053H1 Jianghu-ll, Egypt acquired two kai-ll, construction of the first unit,
rsi
i"d l
iLo;-*-*
tr
NAVAI SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
Ma'anshan (525), started at Hudong- Huangshan (570), with Hudong-Zhon- The Type O54/054A Jiangkai class
Zhonghua Shipyard in
Shanghai in ghua building Chaohu (568) that was is obviously inspired by the French La
2002 and was launched in September commissioned in July this year. A new Fayette class frigate particularly with
2003, being commissioned into the Type 0544 is currently under construc- the emphasis on RCS reduction, but
ESF in Februa ry 2005. The second Type tion at the Huangpu Shipyard. it represents an impressive develop-
054 unit, Wenzhou (526), was built by The Type 054 has a Chinese sensor ment in Chinese naval construction
the Huangpu Shipyard in Guangzhou fit
and is equipped with eight YJ-83 and extremely effective addition to
and was commissioned in the ESF in ASCM, the HQ-7 air defence missile PLAN capabilities. The unit under con-
January 2008. system, 100 mm gun, two AK-630 struction at Huangpu is rumoured to
The Type 054 was then replaced in CIWS systems and an embarked Ka-28 feature some changes to the standard
production by the more impressive or Z-9C helicopter. The Type 0544 has Type 0544 design, but it is too early to
Type 054A Jiangkai-ll class. Xuzhou a larger displacement and its sensor say whether this will actually repre-
(530) was launched at Huangpu in fit is of mixed Russian and Chinese sent a distinct new variant to this frig-
September 2006, being commissioned origin, including the Russian Fregat- ate design.
and joining the ESF in January 2008. MAE-5 air search radar. They have the
Hudong-Zhonghua then built their HQ-16 air defence system with a VLS
first Type 054A in the form of Zhoush- containing 32 missiles, two Type 730 Carrier Ambitions
an (529), which was launched in May CIWS and a 76 mm gun, while retain-
2007 and is believed to be attached ing the YJ-83 ASCM and the helicopter PLAN has been interested in acquir-
to the SSF. Huangpu then delivered capability. ing an aircraft carrier capability for
NAVAI SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 200B ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
many years, realising that the posses- independent Ukraine would find itself long journey to China. ln 2002 Varyag
sion of such a capability would make having an incomplete aircraft carrier reached China and was Placed at the
it a true'blue water' navY. lt was how- that they could not finish, by this time Dalian Shipyard.
ever quick to understand that it could the name of the ship was Varyag. Var- Varyag stayed at
Dalian, then in
not just rush into an aircraft carrier yag languished in the Ukraine until it 2005 it was suddenly emerging from a
programme, it had to obtain the theo- was decided to sell the carrier, either dry dock having been freshly repaint-
retical knowledge to build complex for scrapping or for any non-military ed. lt was now apparentlY obvious
systems of this type, develop the nec- purpose. ln 1998 a Macau-based com- that China was serious about obtain-
essary personnel resources to be able pany acquired VarYag for what theY ing an aircraft carrier capability. How-
to operate a carrier and have the fleet described as conversion into a 'float- ever, the magnitude of the task facing
structure necessary to sustain a carrier ing casino' that would be located off Dalian in turning Varyag into a usable
capability. Another important factor Macau. capability was immense. Bear in mind
was that PLAN had to have the budget The Ukraine accepted this offer, that Varyag is a hulk; the Ukrainians
to acquire, operate and maintain an but decided to strip any materiel that stripped anything from the ship that
aircraft carrier or carriers, and this is a might have any military application, might have a military application, so
vastly expensive proPosition. essentially leaving Varyag as a hulk. Dalian will have a major task on their
Developing a knowledge base on The Macau-based comPanY now had hands to return it to a usable condi-
carriers was not an easy process and to move Varyag to Asia after taking tion. Gorshkov, the aircraft carrier be-
so PLAN took every opportunity to ob- possession in 1999, but this would ing refurbished in Russia for lndia, was
tain information on the subject. When not be easy especially when the Turk- in an immensely better condition than
the Royal Australian Navy decided to ish government declined to let it pass Varyag ever reached.
retire and scrap the carrier HMAS Mel- through the Bosphorous and transit At this point it is worth discussing
bourne, a Chinese company made the to the Mediterranean fearing an acci- aircraft carrier developments in the
most satisfactory bid to break up the dent. This situation was only resolved Soviet Union to see where Gorshkov
ship. After being taken to China in in 2001 when the Chinese government and Varyag fit into the picture. Gor-
1995, Melbourne was extensively in- stepped in and reassured the Turks shkov is a Project 1143 class carrier;
vestigated by PLAN and by Chinese in- who then allowed VarYag to transit four of these were built in the shape
dustry, before being finally scrapped. through Turkish waters to begin its of Kiev, Minsk, Novorossiysk and Baku
Other aspects of aircraft carrier design
were investigated when Chinese'com-
mercial' interests acquired the former
Soviet carriers Minsk in 1998 and Kiev
in 2000 and brought them to China.
Where the future destiny of Chinese
aircraft carrier ambitions lies is with a
former Soviet aircraft carrier that is cu r-
rentiy at the Dalian Shipyard in China.
Back in December 1985 the Nikolayev
South Shipyard in what is todaY the
Ukraine started work on what was to
be the second Project 1143.5 aircraft
for the Soviet Navy. The first Project
1143.5 aircraft carrier was the Admiral
Kuznetsov, which is currently in serv-
ice with the Russian NavY.
Nikolayev launched their aircraft
carrier for the Soviet Navy on 4th De-
cember 1988and itwasto begiventhe
name Riga in Soviet service. Building
work was still continuing when the So-
viet Union collapsed and so the newly
E
NAVAL SYSTTMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
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(later renamed Gorshkov in October ice, but had a major machinery acci- asthe prime component.
'1993 The sale of the Gorshkov to lndia
1990). All of these units were built at dent in 1992, suffered a fire in
the Nikolayev South Shipyard. With and then a boiler explosion and fire was finally signed in January 2004.
a 45,500-ton full load displacement, in February 1994. lt was then placed The plan was that the carrier would
Gorshkov was laid down at Nikolayev in repair, going to sea in May 1995 be modified and completed to lndian
in December'1978 and launched on 1st and then being laid up. At this point Navy specifications in August 2008.
April 1982, being completed on 11th lndia entered the picture and discus- At that point the carrier would be
December 1987 and then assigned to sions commenced on a possible sale transferred to the lndian Navy, would
the Soviet Northern Fleet. All of these of the carrier to the lndian Navy. By then return to lndia in preparation for
Project 1143 carriers met interesting 1999 il was announced that an agree- entry into service in 2009. Consider-
fates after the collapse of the Soviet ment in principle had been reached ing that Gorshkov had been laid up
Union; Novorossiysk was scrapped, on the sale of the Gorshkov, covering since mid-1995, the fact that Russia
while Minsk and Kiev were sold to Chi- its refurbishment, modernisation and believed that it could complete the
nese commercial interests (Minsk is upgrade to a STOBAR (Short Take Off conversion in a little over four years
used as the centrepiece of the 'Minsk But Arrested Landing) configuration. seemed somewhat ambitious. This
World'theme park in Shenzhen). What followed were negotiations on proved to be the case; it became ap-
The fate of the Gorshkov was to be how to achieve these goals and at parent that the magnitude of the task
different to that of its sister ships. Gor- what cost, along with the acquisition had been seriously underestimated in
shkov remained in Russian Navy serv- of an air group with the RAC MiG-29K terms of time and cost. The timeline
F4
NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
for the programme now aPPears to be the case. ln recent years Chinese ship- Future Ptospects
that the carrier, which will INS Vikra- yards have become a major comPeti-
maditya in lndian service, will finish tor to Japanese and Korean shipyards
trials in mid-2012 and be handed over in the most sophisticated segments Once it has been fullY refurbished
to the lndian Navy at the end of that of the merchant shipbuilding indus- the role of the Varyag will be to act
year, becoming operational in lndian try including chemical and oil tank- as a training carrier, so that PLAN can
waters in 2013. ers. China has also developed major refine its naval aviation doctrine and
Bearing in mind the fact that Gor- skills in the repair and conversion of develop the necessary skills to put that
shkov was in far better condition than large tonnage merchant ships. All of doctrine into practice. ln parallel with
the Varyag, gives you an idea of how this will be a major contribution to the this, work has already started on inves-
complex it will be for China to make successful refurbishment of Varyag. tigating the appropriate design, tech-
Varyag a viable carrier. Although Another positive is the fact that nology and systems requirements for
the fact that China has extensively China has strong relationships with an indigenous Chinese aircraft carrier
studied two of the sister ships of the the Ukrainian naval industry, for ex- design. There has already been much
Gorshkov both Kiev and Minsk are in ample Ukrainian DA80/DN80 gas tur- theoretical work carried out, however,
China, might prove extremely useful bines are widely used as powerplants the possession of Varyag and its use
in gaining an understanding of the in Chinese destroyer designs. This as a training carrier will allow PLAN to
challenges faced by the Russian ship- should give China access to a much apply real world information gained in
yard in the Gorshkov conversion and of the data necessary for a successful an operational environment to future
of what went wrong. refurbishment of Varyag. Equally as carrier design. China's ability to build
There was a time when attemPting important is the defence relationship an aircraft carrier-sized unit is not in
to bring the Varyag back to a usable with Russia, which will be critical in doubt, its commercial shipyards have
condition would have been beyond the provision of systems and equip- proven that they can successfully build
the capabilities of the Chinese ship- ment to complete the transformation and deliver highly sophisticated large
building industry, that is no longer of Varyag into an operable carrier. tonnage ships to commercial custom-
.b-
*l*f,:-,+..-
NAVAT SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLoMACY Nov/Dec 2008
ers around the world. This aircraft is a logical choice, it is the R-73 and R-27 air-to-air missiles. Signifi-
PLAN has already started on devel- aircraft used by the Russian Navy on cantly in 2004 China acquired what was
oping the personnel resources neces- their carrier Kuznetsov and PLAN is described as a Sukhoi Su-27 from the
sary to operate its future carrier fleet. perfectly familiar with the aircraft as it is Ukraine. However, this was not an or-
A number of pilot-qualified PLAN naval from the Sukhoi Su-271-30 family, land- dinary Su-27,iLwas actually a develop-
aviation officers have gone through based PLAN aviation units currently ment aircraft for the 5u-33 programme.
commanders'courses that have led to operate the Sukhoi Su-30MK2. PLA Air Bearing in mind Chinese knowledge
them commanding surface warships Force units in China also operate the of the Su-27/-30 family and the fact that
such as destroyers. More recently the Su-27SK/UBK and the Su-30MKK, while they are building their own Su-27 in the
Chinese media reported that a class of Shenyang manufactures the Sukhoi Su- form of the J-1lB, it is not difficult to
50 students have been enrolled at the 27SK under license as the J-l1. Hence imagine that this Ukrainian acquisition
Dalian Naval Academy to be prepared there is plenty of Sukhoi operational would potentially allow China to start
for naval aviation officertraining to pro- and support experience in China. work on a carrier variant of the J-1 1B.
vide the pilots for the combat aircraft ln the beginning PLAN is only look- After this the acquisition of only two
to be used by the future PLAN aircraft ing to acquire two Su-33 aircraft for tri- 5u-33 aircraft makes sense, these air-
carriers. lt should be noted that in Rus- als purposes, a requirement which has craft would give China a true pattern to
sian Navy service that a Project 1143.5 complicated negotiations with Russia. work against in building a naval version
aircraft carrier has a crew of 1,960, plus After all there is still suspicion over Chi- of the J-l 1 B.
the air group with 626 people and a nese activities in the Su-27/J-11 license Equally interesting is the fact that in
flag staff of 40 people. ' production programme at Shenyang. 2007 China acquired a Ukrainian Sukhoi
This leads us to the aircraft that PLAN The Russian suspicion of what China's Su-25YTG aircraft. The point of this is
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will select for its new carrier capability, aims are in only looking to acquire two that the Su-25YTG is essentially the
for a number of years PLAN has been in Su-33 aircraft for 'trials and evalua- Su-25UTG trainer used on the Russian
discussions with Rosoboronexport over tion' purposes would appear to be ex- aircraft carrier. China does not operate
the acquisition of up to 50 Sukhoi Su-33 tremely sensible and goes beyond the the Su-25; the only reason for acquiring
aircraft manufactured by the Komso- annoyance at the J-11B programme. ln this aircraft is to obtain the technical
molsk-na-Amure Aircraft Production 2000 China started acquiring weapons details necessary to help in the devel-
Association (KNAAPO), a subsidiary of and equipment from Ukrainian stocks opment of a training aircraft to support
the Unified Aircraft Corporation (OAK). and by 2006 this had included 1,277 Chinese carrier operations.
NAVAL SYSTEMS
Nov/Dec 2008 ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY
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There is no doubt that Russia is right craft carrier force will mark its trans- is to look what the Soviet Navy was in-
to be cautious in dealing with China on formation into the first rank of world tending to do ,with a successor to the
the Su-33 issue. However, building a navies and offer a host of new strategic Project 1143.5 design of the Varyag.
carrier-based combat aircraft is not an and operational possibilities. As pre- Back in 1973 work started on the design
easy process and one can only presume viously mentioned, an aircraft carrier of Project 1153 Orel class aircraft car-
that the potential purchase of 50 Su-33 along with its air group is an incredibly rier, this programme was terminated in
aircraft is a fallback position if China is expensive investment. That is why it is 1983. Then in 1984 work started on the
unable to meet its needs with an in- worth being cautious in speculating on Project 1143.7 Ulyanovsk aircraft car-
digenous naval aircraft solution. So it the number of carriers that PLAN would rier design, with the first unit being laid
would appear that Russian suspicion of be looking to acquire. There have been down at Nicolayev South Shipyard in
Chinese motives is justified thus far. suggestions that up to six carriers could November 1988. The Programme was
ln the Russian Navy the air grouP of be acquired or more realistic sugges- cancelled in November 1991 when the
the carrier Admiral Kuznetsov has 12 tions that there will be three carriers carrier was 45o/o complete; it was then
Sukhoi Su-33 aircraft, five Sukhoi Su- acquired, allowing PLAN to have three scrapped in February 1992. The con-
25UTG/UBG aircraft and up to 20 Kam- carrier battle groups (the carrier, escort struction materials for a second carrier
ov Ka-27 helicopters. The role of the units and support units). With three had been assembled at Nicolayev and
Sukhoi Su-25 is to provide a two-seater carriers PLAN will be able to have two these were also scrapped.
trainer and light attack aircraft capabil- carriers available, with the third going Unlike Varyag, the Ulyanovsk was
ity. The Russian Navy has a single regi- to or from a maintenance state. a conventional aircraft carrier with
ment of 24 Su-33 aircraft, supported by With Varyag set to act as a training catapult assisted take off and arrested
a number of 5u-27UBK training aircraft carriet it is worth speculating on the landing (CATOBAR), whereas Varyag is
for operational conversation purposes. shape that the future PLAN aircraft car- a STOBAR carrier. The Ulyanovsk has
For PLAN the possession of an air- rier might take. One possible solution a nuclear propulsion plant and has a
NAVAL SYSTEMS
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLoMACY Nov/Dec 2008
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(...Continued from page 38) tons and can also embark up to four While an LPD does not have the glam-
Chinese-designed Landing Craft Air our of the future aircraft carrier pro-
Spratly lslands in 1988. Cushion (LCAC). The LCAC can carry a gramme, it is proof that PLAN has not
As with other areas of the PLAN in- main battle tank, other armoured vehi- forgotten the importance of amphibi-
ventory there have been significant cles, logistic vehicles, troops and sup- ous warfare to modern navies.
improvements in the design and capa- plies. lt is believed that the Type 07i This article on the major surface
bilities of the LST fleet in recent years. has the capacity to carry between 15 combatant programmes in PLAN illus-
However, in comparison with other and 20 armoured vehicles, and in ex- trates that it is becoming a very power-
major navies the amphibious warfare cess of 500 troops. lt is helicopter ca- ful military instrument for the Chinese
capabilities of PLAN are somewhat lim- pable with two deck spots for the Z-8 leadership. ln a little over a decade
ited. This has started to change with (Super Frelon) helicopter. The Type 071 PLAN has transformed itself from op-
the introduction of the first LPD into is equipped with a 76 mm AK-176 gun erating a few capable units and a large
PLAN service in the form of the Type and four AK-630 CIWS systems. number of historical curiosities into a
071 class. The Type 071 LPD provides PLAN force with increasingly modern and
Kulunshan (998), the first Type 07'l with a modern power projection capa- sophisticated units. This process is set
LPD was launched at the Hudong- bility that up to this point it has lacked. to continue, with the aircraft carrier
Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai in De- It is to be expected that at least one programme being conclusive proof of
cember 2006 and was commissioned other Type 071 LPD will be built, after the level of ambitions of PLAN. More
into the PLAN South Sea Fleet 0n 30th which a modified version of the design and more, PLAN is becoming a force to
November 2007. This LPD has a full will be developed or PLAN will move on be reckoned with in the Asian security
load displacement in excess of 12000 to a larger and more capable LPD class. environment. r
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REGIONAL UPDATE
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
I n early October Taiwan was finally a special budget of 519 billion to pay Taiwan.
lwett on course to sign a major se- for it all. The problem was that every This puts Taiwan in a very difficult
ries of contracts with the US govern- time the government tried to get the situation as they realise that they have
ment to procure a number of different budget through the Legislative Yuan, to modernise their military capabilities,
defence systems. That being said, what Taiwan's parliament, the Kuomintang but are limited in what they can ask for.
Taiwan actually got and what it really (KMT) who at that time was the main Taiwan has actually allocated funding
wanted are two different things. All of opposition party blocked it. for the acquisition of some 66 Lock-
which is quite ironic when you consider Eventually these tactics by the KMT heed Martin F-16C/D Block 52 aircraft
the fact that the Bush administration is forced the special budget programmes and had made a request to the US to
the most favourably disposed adminis- to be sidelined. Then all of a sudden, negotiate an acquisition programme.
tration to Taiwan in many yearsl with Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT becom- The US response was to sit on the re-
Right from the start the Bush admin- ing Taiwan's President, there is inter- quest and it is unlikely that it can be
istration was ready to support the sale est in acquiring a host of new defence considered u ntil after Ja n uary 2009 a nd
of a major package of defence equip- systems from the US. By this time, the the installation of a new administration
ment to Taiwan, including eight con- attitude of the Bush administration to in Washington. What will happen next
ventional submarines (SSK), 12 P-3C Ori- Taiwan is less than friendly and those on the F-16C/D front remains an open
on MPA aircraft and six Patriot PAC-3 air in the US State Department who are al- question.
defence systems. This equipment was ways anxious to avoid offending China What Taiwan will actually receive
on offer to Taiwan from April 2001 and are in the ascendant and perfectly pre-
the Taiwan government had allocated pared to block weapon requests from (...Continued on paqe 44)
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REGIONAL UPDATE
(...Continued from page 42) ll missiles and 173 Stinger Block 1 air- lish this is a logistic support and spares
to-air-missiles. Assuming all options contract for ROCAF aircraft including
was disclosed by the US Defense Se- involved in the DSCA notification are the F-l6A/8 Block 20, the AIDC Ching
curity Cooperation Agency in a notifi- taken up, the total value ofthe contract Guo F-CK-lA/B lndigenous Defense
cation to Congress. The four Northrop would be 52.532 billion. Fighter (lDF), the Lockheed Martin C-
Grumman E-2T AEW&C aircraft current- The air defence capabilities of Tai- 130H Hercules and the Northrop Grum-
ly in service with the Republic of China wan are to be improved through the man F-5E/F.The value of this contract is
Air Force (ROCAF) are to be upgraded acquisition of 330 Patriot PAC-3 missiles, estimated at 5334 million.
to the Hawkeye 2000 configuration in a four AN/MPQ-65 radars and associated The Republic of China Navy (ROCN)
contract with a potential value of $250 command, control and communica- will be obtaining a total of 32 UGM-84
million. tions equipment. The DSCA estimates Sub-Launched Harpoon Block ll mis-
The Republic of China Army (ROCA) that the total cost of this contract will siles for its Sea Dragon class subma-
will finally be able to meet its require- be $3.1 billion. Over seven years after it rines (SSK). ln addition the contract will
ment for a new attack helicopter to was first offered to Taiwan, the Patriot include training missiles, spares, test
supplement its existing AH-lW attack PAC-3 is finally on the verge of being equipment and support services. This
helicopter fleet. ln total 30 Boeing acquiredl contract has a total value of $200 mil-
AH-64D Block lll Apache Longbow at- ROCAF will also be the recipient of lion.
tack helicopters are involved, as well what the DSCA describes as a 'Blanket
as 1,000 AGM-1141 Longbow,Hellfire Order Requisition Case'. ln plain Eng- (...Continued on page 46)
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REGIONAT UPDATE
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
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INDUSTRY INSIGHT
ASIAN DEFENCE & DIPLOMACY Nov/Dec 2008
The Alenia Aeronautica C-27J Spar ment could expand to a total over 207 by Lithuania with three aircraft. Other
tan tactical transport aircraft continues aircraft over the next ten years, which customers in Europe include Bulgaria
to build major momentum in the in- would bring the contract value to the with five aircraft and Romania. More
ternational marketplace. This is hardly region of 56 billion. recently it was confirmed that Morocco
surprising when you consider the fact The C-27J in the JCA configuration had ordered four aircraft in a €130 mil-
that orders for the aircraft now amount first flew in June of this year at Caselle lion contract.
to 121 from eight air forces around the in ltaly and in August flew to the US to The C-27J could also be on the verge
world. The most significant victory for the L3 Communications facility at Waco, of finding a new application in the US.
this ltalian aircraft is its selection for the Texas, for the installation and integra- Reports in the US media suggest that
Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) programme tion of customer specified equipment. US Air Force Special Operations Com-
for the US Air Force and the US Army. On 'l5th October the first C-27J was of- mand (AFSOC) is looking to use the C-
For the JCA programme, Alenia Aer- ficially handed over to the US military. 27J as the basis for a gunship aircraft
onautica works with L-3 Communica- The second aircraft will be handed over to meet its AC-XX requirement. Exist-
tions lntegrated Systems who act as the in November. ing AC-130 gunships are suffering from
prime contractor, supported by Alenia This US contract and the potential over use, what AFSOC intends to do is
North America. ln June 2007 a 52.04 for follow-on US purchases puts the to develop an affordable gunship alter-
billion contract was signed with the C-27J in a very strong position in the native to complement its current fleet.
US military, covering the acquisition of tactical transport aircraft category. An- Here the C-27J comes into the picture,
78 C-27J aircraft. The JCA requirement other point to note is that the aircraft with the aim being to integrate it with
as outlined for the US actually covers has already been successful in the Euro- existing weapon and sensor packages
a total of 145 aircraft, of which 75 are pean NATO countries. Greece was the to create a new gunship in the form of
for the US Army and 70 for the US Air first customer acquiring 12 aircraft, fol- the AC-27J Stinger ll. Up to 16 of these
Force. Eventually the US C-2il require- lowed by ltaly with 12 aircraft and then aircraft could be required.
INBODEFENCE
208
THE 3RD INDONESIA'S OFFICIAL TRI-SERVICE DEFENCE EVENT
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