Pil

A PROJECT REPORT ON
APPLICATION OF VIENNA CONVENTION

1969 UNDER RINTENATIONAL LAW
SUBMITTED TO Mr.MD. ATIF KHAN
(FACULTY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW)
SEMESTER-IV
SUBMITTED BY ANUBHA DHIDHI
ROLL NO. 30,
HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I, ANUBHA DHIDHI, feel myself highly elated, as it gives me tremendous pleasure to come out
with work on the topic “APPLICATION OF VIENNA CONVENTION 1969 UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW”.
First and foremost, I take this opportunity to thank MR.MD. ATIF KHAN, Faculty of Law,
Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur for allotting me such topic to work on. He has been very
kind in providing inputs for this work, by way of her suggestions.
I would also like to thank my dear colleagues and friends in the University, who have helped
me with ideas about this work. Last, but not the least I thank the University Administration for
equipping the University with such good library and I.T. facilities, without which, no doubt this work
would not have taken this shape in correct time.
Anubha Dhidhi
Roll no 30
Batch- XII
2
Application of Vienna convention 1969 under International law
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Chapter-I: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………………………04
2. Chapter-II: HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION……………………………………………………………………………..08
3. Chapter-III: OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES……………………………………………………………………………………10
4. Chapter-IV INTEPRETATION OF TREATIES………………………………………………………………………………..22
5. Chapter-V: VAIDITY AND CONTINUANCE OF TREATIES…………………………………………………………….37
6. Chapter-VI: CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………………………………..40
7. REERENCES………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………44
3
Public International Law
CHAPTER-I
INTRODUCTION
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an international agreement governing treaties

between states that was drafted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations and
adopted on May 23, 1969, and that entered into force on January 27, 1980.
A convention governing international treaties was one of the first efforts undertaken by the
International Law Commission, and James Brierly was assigned as special rapporteur in 1949 to
address the subject. After his resignation in 1952, each of his successors began the work anew.
Sir Humphrey Waldock, appointed in 1961, produced six reports from which the commission
was able to create a draft to submit to the UN General Assembly in 1966 with a recommendation
that a conference be convened to conclude a convention based on the draft. The conference held
its first meeting in 1968, and the convention was adopted at its second session the following
year.
It was necessary for 35 member states of the United Nations to ratify the treaty before it could go
into effect. Although it took until 1979 to secure those ratifications, more than half of the UN
members had agreed to the convention by early 2018. Even those members that had not ratified
the document, such as the United States, generally followed the prescriptions of the agreement.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The main objective of the project is to study:
1. The observance o the treaties under Article 26 and Article 27.

2. The interpretation of treaties (general and supplementary means o interpretation)
3. The validity and continuance in force of treaties.
4
LITERATURE REVIEW
Oppenheim's International Law: Volume 1 Peace (International Law, Vol 1)

The essential reference work on international law, edited by two leading authors in the field is
now available from Oxford University Press. This classic Ninth edition takes full account of the
vast increase in the scope and content of international law since the Eighth edition, and in the
range of available source material since the Eighth edition was published.
Malcom N. Shaw’s International law: fifth edition
This fifth edition of Malcom Shaw’s bestselling textbook on international law provides a clear,
authoritative and comprehension introduction to the subject.
S. K. Verma An introduction to public international law second edition
Since the first edition of the book, many developments and changes have been occurred in
intenational law. In this new edition care has been taken to enhance the treatment of topics,
including jurisdictional immunities.
Research methodology
This Project is descriptive and analytical in nature. Secondary and Electronic resources have
been largely used to gather information and data. Books and other reference as guided by
Faculty of public international law have been primarily helpful in giving this project a firm
structure. Websites have also been referred.
Sources of data
Primary and secondary data have been used largely for the collection of datas of this paper.
5
Hypothesis
Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ('VCLT') does not occupy the whole
ground of the law of treaties, it covers the most important areas and is the indispensable starting
point for any description of the law. For good reason, the VCLT has been called the treaty on
treaties.
Research questions
1. What is the ultimate aim of the treaty interpretation process?
2. What is the role of the various means of interpretation for achieving this same aim?
Chaperziation
The entire research work will run into five chapters. The first one on Introduction brings out the
importance of the study, and states its objectives and hypotheses. It also includes methodology
and limitations. Chapter II will contain previous reviews, history of the Problems. A Quick look
on subjective part o application of Vienna convention on law of treaties has been carried out in
chapter III, chapter 1V & chapter V. And lastly in chapter VI Conclusions for Research is
included in followed by Bibliography and References.
Mode of citation
The researcher has followed "the Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, Harvard Law
Review Association" standards in the citations, in this paper.
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
The scope of the Convention is limited. It applies only to treaties concluded between states, so it
does not cover agreements between states and international organizations or between
international organizations themselves, though if any of its rules are independently binding on
6
such organizations, they remain so. It does apply, however, to treaties between states within an
intergovernmental organization. However, agreements between states and international
organizations, or between international organizations themselves, will be governed by the 1986
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations if it ever enters into force. Also, in treaties between states
and international organizations, the terms of the Convention still apply between the state
members. The Convention does not apply to agreements not in written form.
7
CHAPTER-II
HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION
The VCLT was drafted by the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United Nations,
which began work on the convention in 1949. During the twenty years of preparation, several
draft versions of the convention and commentaries were prepared by special rapporteurs of the
ILC. James Brierly, Hersch Lauterpacht, Gerald Fitzmaurice and Humphrey Waldock were the
four special rapporteurs. In 1966, the ILC adopted 75 draft articles which formed the basis for the
final work.1 Over two sessions in 1968 and 1969, the Vienna Conference completed the
Convention, which was adopted on 22 May 1969 and opened for signature the following day. A
convention governing international treaties was one of the first efforts undertaken by the
International Law Commission, and James Brierly was assigned as special rapporteur in 1949 to
address the subject. After his resignation in 1952, each of his successors began the work anew.
Sir Humphrey Waldock, appointed in 1961, produced six reports from which the commission
was able to create a draft to submit to the UN General Assembly in 1966 with a recommendation
that a conference be convened to conclude a convention based on the draft. The conference held
its first meeting in 1968, and the convention was adopted at its second session the following
year.2
The convention applies only to written treaties between states. The first part of the convention
defines the terms and scope of the agreement. The second part lays out the rules for the
conclusion and adoption of treaties, including the consent of parties to be bound by treaties and
the formulation of reservations—that is, declining to be bound by one or more particular
provisions of a treaty while accepting the rest. The third part deals with the application and
interpretation of treaties, and the fourth part discusses means of modifying or amending treaties.
These parts essentially codify existing customary law. The most important part of the
convention, Part V, delineates grounds and rules for invalidating, terminating, or suspending
treaties and includes a provision granting the International Court of Justice jurisdiction in the
1
Brownlie, Ian (1998). Principles of Public International Law (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. pp. 607–08.
ISBN 978-0-19-876299-7.
2
untreaty.un.org, Law of treaties Archived 17 October 2013 at the Wayback Machine., International Law
Commission, last update: 30 June 2005. Consulted on 7 December 2008.
8
event of disputes arising from the application of those rules. The final parts discuss the effects on
treaties of changes of government within a state, alterations in consular relations between states,
and the outbreak of hostilities between states as well as the rules for depositaries, registration,
and ratification.
It was necessary for 35 member states of the United Nations to ratify the treaty before it could go
into effect. Although it took until 1979 to secure those ratifications, more than half of the UN
members had agreed to the convention by early 2018. Even those members that had not ratified
the document, such as the United States, generally followed the prescriptions of the agreement.3
The VCLT is a prime achievement of the International Law Commission (ILC). The law of
treaties was one of the topics selected by the ILC at its first session in 1949 as being suitable for
codification, and it was given priority. This is not surprising. For a long time treaties had been
one of the two major sources of international law. Although the customary international law of
treaties was well developed, there was still some uncertainty, and even disagreement, on some
details. Given the growing importance of treaties, bilateral and multilateral, for international
relations, a coherent reformulation of the law was desirable.4
For the first 10 years the ILC saw its task as being the production of an expository code, setting
out what the ILC considered to be the customary international law on the subject. But in 1961 the
ILC decided that such a code would not be so effective for the purpose of restating the law,
particularly as so many new States had by then emerged,5 and were continuing to emerge.
Codification through a multilateral treaty would give the new States the opportunity to take part
in the formulation of the law, so placing the law of treaties on the widest and most secure
foundation.
3
"Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)".
4
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (1935) 29 AJIL Supplement 653.
5
The text of the ILC draft articles and commentary appears in the Reports of the International Law Commission on
the second part of its seventeenth session and on its eighteenth session. General Assembly Official Records:
Twenty-first Session, Supplement no. 9 (A/6309/Rev.
9
CHAPTER-III
OBSERVANCE AND TREATIES
Pacta Sunt Servanda is a Doctrine borrowed from Roman law and has been adopted as a
principle growing treaties in International Law. According to Anzilloti, the binding force of
International Law is based on the Fundamental principles known as Pacta Sunt Servanda Which
means that the agreement entered into by the States must be followed by them in good faith.
According to this doctrine, the parties to a treaty are bound to observe its terms in good faith.
The theory is one sided for many usages and customary rules of law.6 This theory fails to
explain the binding force of customary rules of International Law7. Much of the code of rights
and duties are not prescribed but are followed by States in their intercourse with each other.
Many eminent jurist classify the maxim Pacta sunt Sevanda as a general principal of law, but
it is any event not to be doubted that the rule has all the characteristics of a Customary rule.
ARTICLE 26: PACTA SUNT SERVANDA
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.
The importance of the pacta sunt servanda principle for the functioning of international relations,
and even more so, for the recognition of international law as “law.”8
6
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-80 (1979).
7
Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J.
INT’LL. nos. 2-3 211, 219-220 (1997).
8
OPPENHEIM ET AL., OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL.1PEACE, introduction & part I (1992).
10
Especially in the traditionally decentralized international system without central judicial

institution, treaty stability seems essential.
It thus comes as no surprise that even institutions/tribunals in particular treaty regimes such as
international human rights or investment law consistently emphasize the importance of treaty
stability. Still, likewise shows that pacta sunt servanda, as codified in Article 26 VCLT, is a meta
rule. The detailed obligations which derive from treaty performance in good faith depend on the
particular treaty and are to be determined by means of treaty interpretation. This is most
important in today’s international law of cooperation with increasingly dense treaty obligations
which reach into formernly exclusively domestic spheres.
Compliance with pacta sunt servanda therefore has always directer consequences at the national
level as well.
The corresponding provision of the Vienna Convention. It calls for no comment other than that it
may be said to constitute a definition of the very essence of treaties, thus recognizing that
international organizations are genuine parties to legal instruments which are genuine treaties,
even if some differences exist between their participation and that of States.
The tension between the static principle of pacta sunt servanda and subsequent changes.
Sometimes, an adjustment between stability and change seems necessary. On this basis it is
shown that the accommodation of change may be required for reasons of justice regarding the
party affected by the change; in view of the legitimacy of a treaty; and in order to prevent a
treaty’s breach.
The (limited range of) mechanisms which allow for an accommodation of subsequent changes
within the treaty; i.e.within the pacta sunt servanda rule. Such accommodation is, for instance,
possible through an evolutive/dynamic interpretation of the treaty: especially institutions
permanently set up in treaty regimes such as the WTO-Dispute Settlement Body and human
rights monitoring institutions (e.g.the European Court of Human Rights) engage in such
interpretation. Other options include a restrictive interpretation of the treaty obligations of the
11
state party which was struck by the change. It is likewise possible to offer the respective state a
wide margin of appreciation in the fulfilment of its treaty obligations. The principle of good faith
is a further tool to ease the tension between stability and change within the treaty regime. Still,
these options are clearly limited. This is perhaps best illustrated with the ICJ’s rejection of the
“approximate application” of a treaty in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case (1997).
The tension between stability and change may only be solved in few instances within the treaty
regime. For this reason, the subsequent
The external limits of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, they deal with those mechanisms which allow
states to derogate from treaty obligations in cases of subsequent changes.
The good faith element of this principle suggests that states should take the necessary steps to
comply with the object and purpose of the treaty. States may not invoke restrictions imposed by
domestic law as good reason for not complying with their treaty obligations provided the
instrument was duly ratified by competent authorities and in accordance with constitutional and
statutory requirements.
Jus cogens, the literal meaning of which is “compelling law,” is the technical term given to those
norms of general international law that are argued as hierarchically superior.9
These are, in fact, a set of rules, which are peremptory in nature and from which no derogation is
allowed under any circumstances. The doctrine of international jus cogens was developed under
a strong influence of natural law concepts, which maintain that states cannot be absolutely free in
establishing their contractual relations. States were obliged to respect certain fundamental
principles deeply rooted in the international community.10
9
REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2d ed. 1994).
10
Gennady M. Danilenko, International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EUR. J. INT’LL. 42, 44 (1991),
available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.
12
The power of a state to make treaties is subdued when it confronts a super-customary norm of jus
cogens.11
In other words, jus cogens are rules, which correspond to the fundamental norm of international
public policy and in which cannot be altered unless a subsequent norm of the same standard is
established. This means that the position of the rules of jus cogens is hierarchically superior
compared to other ordinary rules of international law. In fact, there are rules, which are
preconditions for effective international activity, such as pacta sunt servanda. To abrogate such a
rule is not possible. A treaty providing that pacta sunt servanda is mere reaffirmation. A treaty
denying it is an absurdity. The point is that the very activity of treaty-making assumes the
general rule which complies with the international public policy and is accepted by the
international community at large.12
Rules contrary to the notion of jus cogens could be regarded as void, since those rules oppose
the fundamental norms of international public policy.
As a result, jus cogens rules gained the nature of international constitutional rules for two
reasons. First, they limit the ability of states to create or change rules of international law.
Second, these rules prevent states from violating fundamental rules of international public policy
since the resulting rules or violations of rules would be seriously detrimental to the international
legal system.13Clearly defined contents of the rules of jus cogens are not yet likely to be decided.
Existence of such norms is now universally recognized and well established.
11
DAVID KENNEDY,INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES26-27 (Nomos ed., 1987). Under the
stewardship of its fourth Rapporteur, Weldock, the International Law Commission [hereinafter ILC] undertook in-
depth discussion of jus cogens. As reflected in the relevant ILC Yearbooks, that there was agreement in regards to
the existence of the rules of jus cogensand the peremptory norms were viewed as norms from which states cannot
contract out. See[1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963.
12
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONALLAW79-80 (1979).
13
Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDICJ.
INT’LL. nos. 2-3 211, 219-220 (1997).
13
RECOGNITION OF JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
During the early nineteenth century, recognition of jus cogens was established. Professor
Oppenheim stated that there existed a number of “universally recognized principles” of
international law that rendered any conflicting treaty void, and therefore, the peremptory effect
of such principles was itself a “unanimously recognized customary rule of International Law.”14
For example, he stated that a treaty supporting piracy is void for being contrary to the
“universally recognized principles” of international law.15
Moreover, the concept of jus cogens twice found favor in a judicial context, first, in the decision
of the French-Mexican Claims Commission in the 1928 Pablo Nájera Case, and later by Judge
Schücking of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1934 Oscar Chinn Case[1934]
PCIJ 2 (12 December 1934).16Subsequent to this 1934 case, judges of the International Court of
Justice made similar references to jus cogensin a number of separate and dissenting opinions.17
For example, in a 1993 Bosnian case, Judge Lauterpacht expressed his opinion on the possibility
that the Security Council had violated the genocide prohibition and therewith alleged jus cogens
when imposing an arms embargo on both Serbia and Bosnia. In 1991, Resolution 713 of the
Security Council imposed arms embargo. While this resolution disregarded the state’s inherent
right of self-defense, the Security Council had been unable to take measures necessary to
14
OPPENHEIM ET AL.,OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL.1PEACE, introduction & part I (1992)
15
Id.at 528. During the years of 1963 to 1966, several members pointed out in the ILC commentary that the
emergence of rules having the character of jus cogens was not the product of recent time, rather it has more long-
standing character. They further stated that the concept of jus cogens had originated in regard to such universal
crimes as piracy and the slave-trade as well as such principles as the freedom of high seas and other rules on the law
of the sea. For more information, see LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORYNORMS(JUSCOGENS)
ININTERNATIONALLAW161-62 (1988)
16
Byers, supranote 5, at 213-214 n.8-9.
17
Id.at 214 n.10. For the opinion of the ICJ,see, for example, Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the
Guardianship of Infants (Neth. v. Swed.)1958 I.C.J. 55 (Nov. 28) (separate opinion of Judge Quintana); Right of
Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India) 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12) (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Fernandes);
South West Aftica Case, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (separate opinion of
Judge Tanaka); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G./Den. v. F.R.G./Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20) (separate
opinion of Judge Nervo).
14
maintain peace and security in Bosnia. The consequences led to ethnic cleansing, genocide and
large-scale human sufferings. Therefore, the argument of alleged violation of jus cogenshas some
potential weight.
Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has given the recognition of the
norms of jus cogens in Article 53, where it states:
A treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purpose of the present convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.18
That means a treaty is no longer an international legal document, if, at the time of its conclusion,
it conflicts with the norms of jus cogens, which are peremptory in nature. This article sets up the
four criteria for a norm to be determined as jus cogens, specifically: (1) status as a norm of
general international law; (2) acceptance by the international community of states as a whole; (3)
immunity from derogation; and (4) modifiable only by a new norm having the same status.
On the other hand, Finnish scholar Lauri Hannikainen demonstrated that if a norm of general
international law protects an overriding interest or value of the international community, and if
any derogation would seriously jeopardize that interest or value, then the peremptory character of
the norm may be presumed if the application of the criteria of peremptory norms produces no
noteworthy negative evidence.19
Recognition of the rules of jus cogens was again confirmed in 1986 at the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations. The importance of the rules of jus cogens was confirmed by the trend to apply it
beyond the law of the treaties, in particular, in the law of state responsibility. Specifically, the
International Law Commission (ILC) proposed the notion of international crimes resulting from
18
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/ 27, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.
19
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORYNORMS(JUSCOGENS) ININTERNATIONALLAW20, 207.
15
the breach by a state of an international obligation “essential for the protection of fundamental
interests of the international community,” which is, in fact, closely linked to the doctrine of
international jus cogens.20In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court ofJustice clearly
affirmed jus cogensas an accepted doctrine in international law.21The ICJ relied on the
prohibition on the use of force asbeing “a conspicuous example of a rule of international law
having the character of jus cogens.”22
ARTICLE 27: INTERNAL LAW AND OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES
1. A State party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform the treaty.
2. An international organization party to a treaty may not invoke the rules of the
organization as justification for its failure to perform the treaty.
3. The rules contained in the preceding paragraphs are without prejudice to article 46.
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46. In view of the fundamental importance of the
pacta rule, the conference wished to keep its formulation succinct. Accordingly the proposed
addition was made a separate article in the Convention. As finally adopted, article 27 provides
that, without prejudice to article 46, referred to above, 'A party may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention to the treaties covered by the present draft quickly led to a
proposal containing three paragraphs, dealing respectively with the case of States, the case of
international organizations and the reservation of article 46, which is common to both those
cases.
20
Danilenko, supra note 2, at 43; Byers, supra note 5, at 214; Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19,
available athttp://www.javier-leon diaz.com/humanitarianIssues/State_Resp.pdf.
21
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27).
22
Danilenko, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing Nicar. V. U.S.).
16
It soon appeared, however, that the case of international organizations raised major difficulties
forsome members of the Commission. They considered that the "rules of the organization", as
newly defined in article 2,1 (/), could not be assimilated to the internal law of a State since those
rules themselves constituted rules of international law; treaties concluded by an international
organization to implement those rules, far from being exempt from compliance with them, must
be subject to them so that, at least in one member's opinion, the international organization should
have the right to modify the treaties in question whenever that was necessary for the legitimate
and harmonious exercise of its functions. Various examples were given. For instance, resolutions
of the Security Council concerning the dispatch of peace-keeping forces could result in treaties
being concluded between certain States and the United Nations, but no such treaty could prevent
the Council from amending the resolutions it had adopted. Again, an organization might
undertake by treaty to supply certain assistance to a State, but the treaty could not prevent the
organization from suspending or terminating that assistance if it decided that the State in
question had failed in its obligations concerning, for example, respect for human rights. Another
member of the Commission did not accept the foregoing line of argument, but maintained that
international organizations are no less bound by their treaties than are States and that,
consequently, international organizations are not free to amend their resolutions or to take other
measures which absolve them from their international obligations without engaging their
responsibility under international law.
One point is certain: article 27 of the Vienna Convention pertains more to the regime of
international responsibility than to the law of treaties. It can thus be seen as an incomplete
reference to problems which the Convention did not purport to deal with (art. 73),23even though
23
Article 27 is the result of an amendment (A/CONF.39/ C.1/L.181), which was discussed at the United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties (Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First
Session, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole (United
Nations publication, Sales No. E.68.V.7), pp. 151-158, 28th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, para. 58, and
29th meeting, para. 76). The amendment was adopted, but not before the Expert Consultant had expressed his doubts
about the acceptance of a text which related mainly to international responsibility (ibid., p. 158, 29th meeting,
Committee of the Whole, para. 73). After consideration by the Drafting Committee, the text was approved as a
separate article from article 23 (which became article 26) because it could not be placed on the same footing as the
pacta sum servanda rule(ibid., pp. 427-428, 72nd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, paras.29-48).
17
some of its articles are not unconnected with questions of responsibility (for example, arts. 18,
48,49, 50, 60). Hence it cannot be claimed that article 27 provides an answer to all the questions
arising from the rules of international responsibility, nor can the article be transposed to the case
of international organizations in the expectation of finding such an answer. According to the
principles of international responsibility, a State may invoke a wrongful act of another State in
order to deny it the benefit of performance of a treaty. An international organization may deny a
contracting State the benefit of performance of a treaty if that State has committed a wrongful act
against the organization, no matter whether that wrongful act consists in a breach of the treaty or
of a general rule of international law, or in a breach of the rules of the organization if the State is
also a member of the organization. Here then is a very clear case in which an international
organization may invoke the rules of the organization, or rather a breach of the rules of the
organization, as a ground for its own non-performance of a treaty. However, this involves the
operation of the rules of responsibility, a process which must be fully reserved in accordance
with article 73 of the Vienna Convention.
Another equally certain point is that article 27 contemplates only valid treaties which have been
properly concluded. Where that is not the case, invalidity and not international responsibility is
involved.24The problem thus becomes much more specific. Each organization has certain limits
to the treaties it may conclude concerning the exercise of its functions and powers. If those limits
are overstepped, the question of the validity of the treaties will arise; if they are respected, the
treaties will be valid.25It must therefore be acknowledged that, to an extent to be determined for
each organization, the possibility exists for an organization to bind itself by treaty in regard to
the exercise of its functions and powers. Not to recognize this would simply be to deny the
organization the right to bind itself otherwise than under purely discretionary conditions. It must
be recognized, however, that it may be a delicate matter to determine the margin within which
each organization can commit itself.
24
The reservation in article 27 concerning article 46 of the Vienna Convention, which was inserted in the
circumstances described in the preceding note, is of considerable importance in the case of treaties concluded by an
organization with one of its member States, since the latter may find that breaches of the rules of the organization
are invoked against it.
25
the commentary to article 46
18
For although the organization has some margin of freedom, constitutionally, to bind itself by
treaty in regard to the exercise of its functions, the treaty which the organization concludes must
still make it clear that such is its object and purpose, and this depends essentially on the will of
the parties to the treaty, i.e. on their intention. In this connection, there are two conceivable
hypotheses. The first is that the organization freely and unilaterally takes a decision, by means of
a resolution of one of its organs, which it reserves the right to revoke or alter unilaterally, and the
sole purpose of the treaty which it concludes is to provide for the implementation automatically
follows.26The second hypothesis is that the organization concludes a treaty which, without being
conditional on prior resolutions of the organization and without being subject to the retention or
non-alteration of such resolutions, binds it in an autonomous manner.
In the case of a treaty concluded by the organization, the question whether the first or second of
the hypotheses considered above applies is, subject to article46,27 a question of interpretation of
the treaty and has to be solved in accordance with articles 31 on interpretation of treaties. This
was a decisive factor in second reading; the Commission considered that it was not possible to
refer here to other elements that could be taken as guides in interpreting the treaty; it also
considered that it was unnecessary to add further references—to articles 6 and 31, for example—
to that of article 46.
If these problems are considered from a more general standpoint, the following observations can
also be made. The Vienna Convention accords only a few brief references in paragraph 2 of
26
This hypothesis would also be conceivable in the case of a treaty between States. The following are two examples.
The constitution of a State grants its nationals the right to vote even if they are resident abroad; to implement this
provision, the State concluded a treaty with another State. Or again, a national law grants certain benefits to aliens
who are resident in the country and who satisfy certain conditions; the State concludes treaties which determine the
regime of administrative evidence and certification required from (he country of origin to enable these aliens
actually to secure without difficulty the benefits provided for by the national law. The treaties concluded for this
purpose do not affect any international consolidation of the national law.
27
If the interpretation does not lead to a choice between two constructions that are equally possible as regards the
constitutionality of the commitment, but offers a choice between one construction in favour of an unconstitutional
commitment and another in favour of a legally valid commitment, the latter construction should be preferred, even if
it reduces the scope of the commitment.
19
article 30 to the question of the subordination of one treaty to another or, to put the problem in
still broader terms, to the question of groups of treaties.
A fortiorit has ignored the question of the subordination of a treaty to a unilateral act of an
organization; but the latter question must be set in the wider context of the regime of treaties
concluded by an organization with a member State, which will be taken up later in the
commentary to article 46. The subordination of a treaty to a unilateral act of the organization can
only arise in practice for States whose status as members of an organization renders them
substantially subject to the "rules of the organization".
20
CHAPTER-IV
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
ARTICLE 31. GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. A
special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
ARTICLE 32. SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according
to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b)leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
21
Article 33: Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages. When a treaty has
been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language,
unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall
prevail.
A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated
shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
The terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. When a
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of
articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to
the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted Whenever an issue of treaty interpretation
causes dispute, attention will inevitably focus upon Articles 31–33 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).28 This importance paid to Articles 31–33 in the
practice of international law can be explained partly by the wide recognition of these articles as a
reflection of customary international law.29 It can also partly be explained by the second branch
of the doctrine of inter-temporal law,30 which implies that in the interpretation of a treaty, law-
applying agents have to comply, not with the rules of international law that possibly existed at
the time of the conclusion of the treaty, but, rather, with the rules that exist at the time of
interpretation.31
Taking a closer look at Articles 31–33, we find that generally they do not state the relevant
international law in the form of interpretative directives – they do not give explicit instructions
on how to arrive at a conclusion about the meaning of an interpreted treaty provision. The
drafters of the VCLT have walked a delicate balance between the need to codify and clarify the
law practised by international courts and tribunals and the wish to establish a set of norms that
can be applied to treaties generally. This is why they have chosen a design that places primary
emphasis on means of interpretation. Consequently, Article 31 stresses the importance of
conventional language, adding that terms of a treaty must also be interpreted in their context and
28
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
29
Symptomatically, in the relevant provisions of the VCLT of 1986, Articles 31–33 are repeated word for word.
30
See, e.g., Island of Palmas Arbitration, Award of 4 April 1928, reprinted in UNRIAA, vol. 2, 829, at 845.
31
See, e.g., Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 13 July
2009, ICJ Reports (2009) 213, at 237, para. 47.
22
in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. Article 32 confirms that recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion. This general outline of the Convention may explain why some
commentators continue repeating the pre-Vienna adage that treaty interpretation is a matter of art
and not science.32 As will gradually transpire in this article, the characterization of treaty
interpretation as art is a good indicator of the fundamentally different views still existing among
international lawyers on treaty interpretation matters and the proper or correct way to read
Articles 31–33. This characterization suggests that although treaty interpretation is now governed
by international law, no understanding of a treaty provision can ever be rationally
explained.33Certainly, this suggestion can be interpreted differently. It can be interpreted as a
remark about the discovery of a meaning of a treaty.34 As such, it may be correct although rather
trivial. Considering the inherently individualized nature of any process of discovery, and the
countless number of factors that potentially may have an influence upon it, we cannot seriously
expect to find a regular pattern systematically employed in each instance of discovery by a law-
applying agent of an assumed meaning of a treaty. Consequently, reasons suggest that the
characterization of treaty interpretation as art and not science should be read instead as a remark
about the justification of an assumed meaning of a treaty. Interpreted in this way, I personally
have great difficulties accepting it. As far as my experience of international law and legal
practice is concerned, if rationality means that observers should be able to reconstruct an
assumed meaning of a treaty as a conclusion inferred from sound premises according to the
32
See, e.g., A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), at 184; Klabbers, ‘On Rationalism in Politics:
Interpretation of Treaties and the World Trade Organization’, 74 Nordic Journal of International Law (2005) 405;
D. Hollis, Art and Auto-Interpretation of Treaties, available at opiniojuris.org
33
Although admittedly neither art nor science is a concept that can be easily defined, what philosophers generally
find when comparing the two concepts is that they relate differently to reason. The concept of art stresses the
individualistic perspective; art is reason applied only within limits set by either the artist or the viewer herself.
Science, on the other hand, is thought of as a body of knowledge that can be tested and rationally explained. It is
reason applied within limits defined externally. ‘If an artist says, “This work expresses something deep in my heart”,
everyone nods approvingly. If a scientist says, “I don’t have any evidence to show you, but deep in my heart I
know”, people start rolling their eyes and quickly leave the room.’ I would like to thank Geologist Professor Bruce
Railsback for this example. See Pages for Students: What Science Is, available at www.gly.uga.edu/railsback.
34
On the distinction between discovery and justification of legal propositions, see, e.g., R.A. Wasserstrom, The
Judicial Decision (1961), at 25–31; J. Wróblewski, The Judicial Application of Law (1992), at 14–16. On the
importance of this distinction for the understanding of Arts 31–32 of the VCLT, see further U. Linderfalk, ‘AJIL
Symposium: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History? A Response to Julian Davis Mortenson, Part 2’,
available at opiniojuris.org
23
accepted rules of inference,35 then assumed meanings of treaties can indeed be explained in
rational terms, and, what is more, they can be explained based on the structural framework of
Articles 31–33 of the VCLT. Consequently, whether treaty interpretation is an art or a science
cannot be determined in the abstract, based on the mere nature of the VCLT or the particular
activity in question. It is a question of fact inextricably tied to the approach taken by each and
every law-applying agent in particular cases. I will spend the remainder of this article arguing
this proposition exactly.
THE STRUCTURE OF ARTICLES 31–33
A necessary first step in my line of argument is to clarify the structural framework of Articles
31–33 of the VCLT. Two questions need to be answered:
 1. What is the ultimate aim of the treaty interpretation process?

 2. What is the role of the various means of interpretation for achieving this same aim?
Beginning with the first question, naturally, the ultimate aim of the treaty interpretation process,
as described in the VCLT, is to establish the legally correct meaning of the interpreted treaty. By
the legally correct meaning of a treaty, international lawyers generally understand the
communicative intention of the treaty parties – that is to say, the meaning that the parties
intended the treaty to express.36 This is the explanation to why, according to Article 31,
paragraph 4, of the VCLT, an ordinary meaning shall be given to the terms of a treaty only in so
far as it cannot be established that the treaty parties intended differently – that the terms should
be given instead a special meaning. This is also the explanation to why, in establishing any such
35
See, e.g., Wróblewski, ‘Legal Syllogism and Rationality of Judicial Decision’, 5 Rechtstheorie (1974) 33, at 38–39.
Wróblewski distinguishes between the internal and the external rationality of a legal decision, whereas obviously
not only the soundness of the inference can be tested but also the soundness of the premises.
36
See, e.g., I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th edn, 1990), at 627; P.-M. Dupuy, Droit
international public (1992), at 220; McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention’, 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005) 279, at 287; R. Jennings and A. Watts
(eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1 (9th edn, 1992), at 1267; Ress, ‘The Interpretation of the Charter’, in
B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, (1994) 25, at 30; I. Sinclair, The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, 1984), at 115; Yasseen, ‘L’interprétation des traités d’après la
Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités’, 151(3) Recueil des Cours (1976) 1, at 16.
24
special meaning,37 law-applying agents shall take into account ‘any agreement relating to the
treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty’;38‘any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty’;39
‘any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions’;40 ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’;41 ‘any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’;42 the state or states of affairs
that the parties to the treaty assumedly intended to attain by the application of the treaty; 43 as
well as the state or states of affairs that assumedly caused the parties to conclude it.44
The communicative intention of the treaty parties can only be assumed. Thus, the interpretation
of a treaty is no different than the understanding of any verbal utterance produced by a person or
group of persons, whether orally or in writing. As emphasized by modern linguistics
(pragmatics), an utterance can be understood only on the assumption that whoever produced it
acted rationally. That is to say, in expressing her communicative intention, the utterer acted in
conformity with some particular standard or standards of communication. To facilitate reference,
henceforth, I will refer to any such assumption made by an agent in the interpretation of an
utterance as a communicative assumption.45
37
Note that a special meaning can depart from the ordinary meaning of a treaty in different ways. Still building on
conventional language, it can serve to clarify or disambiguate the ordinary meaning. Rarely is the special meaning a
neologism in the true sense of this word.
38
VCLT, supra note 1, Art. 31, para. 2(a) (emphasis added).
39
Ibid., Art. 31, para. 2(b) (emphasis added).
40
Ibid., Art. 31, para. 3(a) (emphasis added).
41
Ibid., Art. 31, para. 3(b) (emphasis added).
42
Ibid., Art. 31, para. 3(c) (emphasis added).
43
According to ibid., Art. 31, para. 1, the ordinary meaning of a treaty shall be considered in the light of ‘its object
and purpose’.
44
According to ibid., Art. 32, recourse may be had to the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty.
45
This terminology builds on the pragmatic literature. See, e.g., D. Sperber and D. Wilson, Relevance,
Communication and Cognition (1986); D. Blakemore, Understanding Utterances: Introduction to Pragmatics
(1992). For a more comprehensive treatment of the concept of communicative assumptions in the context of treaty
interpretation, see U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (2007)
25
Naturally, different kinds of communicative assumptions may be relevant for the interpretation
of utterances depending on such things as, for instance, the functional or social reason causing
them. In the specific context of treaty interpretation, as can be seen from the practice of
international courts and tribunals, law-applying agents operate on assumptions such as the
following examples: that treaty parties have expressed their intention arranging so that the treaty
conforms to the lexicon, grammar and pragmatic rules of the language used for every
authenticated version of it;46 that treaty parties have expressed their intention arranging so that a
consistent meaning can be conferred on all words and lexicalized phrases used in the interpreted
treaty;47 that treaty parties have expressed their intention arranging so that no norm expressed in
the treaty logically contradicts any other;48 that treaty parties have expressed their intention
arranging so that no part of the treaty comes out as redundant;49 that treaty parties have expressed
their intentions arranging so that the application of the treaty results in the realization of its
object and purpose;50 that treaty parties have expressed their intention arranging so that the treaty
does not derogate from any other international legal norm applicable in the relationship between
them;24 that treaty parties have expressed their intention arranging so that when the treaty
expressly limits the scope of a generically defined class of referents it excludes all other referents
belonging to this class;51 that treaty parties have expressed their intention favouring the
sovereign freedom of states;52 that treaty parties have expressed their intention arranging so that
the treaty corresponds to whatever can be inferred from the subsequent practice developed in its
application, rather than whatever can be inferred from its preparatory work;53 that treaty parties
46
See, e.g., Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment, 13 December 1999, ICJ
Reports (1999) 1045, at 1062, para. 25.
47
See, e.g., Navigational and Related Rights, supra note 4, at 239, para. 54.
48
See, e.g., Case of Soering v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 July 1989, at 33, para. 101; at 34, para. 103,
available at hudoc.echr.coe.int
49
See, e.g., Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011, paras. 133–
134, available at www.icj-cij.org
50
See, e.g., Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 19, at 1072–1073, para. 43.
51
See, e.g., Award in the Arbitation Regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway between the Kingdom of
Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Decision of 24 May 2005, reprinted in UNRIAA, vol. 27, 35, at 72–
73, para. 79.
52
See, e.g., Navigational and Related Rights, supra note 4, at 241, para. 61. The relevant rule of interpretation is
often referred to using the Latin maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius.
53
Ibid., at 236–237, para. 48.
26
have expressed their intention arranging so that the treaty comes out as altogether logically
consistent, rather than corresponding to whatever can be inferred from its preparatory work.54
Turning now to the second question, the role of the various means of interpretation specified in
the VCLT is obviously to permit assumptions such as those just stated. These assumptions are of
two kinds. The first kind of assumption describes a relationship between the interpreted treaty
and a particular means of interpretation. For example, in assuming that treaty parties have
expressed their intention arranging so that the treaty conforms to the relevant lexicon, grammar
and rules of pragmatics, law-applying agents make an assumption about the relationship between
the interpreted treaty and conventional language. In assuming that treaty parties have expressed
their intention so that no part of the treaty comes out as redundant, the law-applying agents make
an assumption about the relationship between the interpreted treaty and the context. I will refer to
assumptions of this kind as first-order communicative assumptions.55
A second kind of assumption describes a relationship between two first-order communicative

assumptions. For example, law-applying agents may assume that the treaty parties have
expressed their intention arranging so that the treaty corresponds to whatever can be inferred
from the subsequent practice developed in its application, rather than to whatever can be inferred
from its preparatory work. Similarly, they may assume that treaty parties have expressed their
intention arranging so that the treaty comes out as altogether logically consistent, rather than
corresponding to whatever can be inferred from its preparatory work. I will refer to assumptions
of this kind as second-order communicative assumptions.56
As it appears, Articles 31–33 of the VCLT presuppose the existence of a series of first- and
second-order communicative assumptions. If we can establish these assumptions, the information
already provided in Articles 31–33 will allow a description of the substance of these articles in
the form of interpretative directives or – as some would have it – proper rules of
54
See, e.g., Soering, supra note 21, at 33–34,
55
Compare Linderfalk, supra note 18.
56
Ibid.
27
interpretation.57Such rules of interpretation would then read something along the line of the
following examples:
 Rule 1: If a treaty uses elements of conventional language (such as, for instance, words,
grammatical structures, or pragmatic features), the treaty shall be understood in
accordance with the rules of that language.
 Rule 2: If one of the two possible ordinary meanings of a treaty provision makes a part of
the treaty redundant, whereas the other ordinary meaning does not, then the latter
meaning shall be adopted.
 Rule 3: If one of the two possible ordinary meanings of a treaty provision helps attain the
object and purpose of the treaty, whereas the other ordinary meaning does not, then the
former meaning shall be adopted.
 Rule 4: If one of the two possible ordinary meanings of a treaty provision helps to favour
the sovereign freedom of states, whereas the other ordinary meaning does not, then the
former meaning shall be adopted.
 Rule 5: Rule 2 shall be applied prior to Rule 4, insofar as this does not leave the meaning
of the treaty ambiguous or obscure or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result.
This list of examples helps emphasize the inconclusive nature of the law laid down in Articles
31–33 of the VCLT. If Articles 31–33 help law-applying agents resolve many issues of treaty
interpretation, they obviously do not help them resolve all such issues. First, international law
cannot always determine the extension of a means of interpretation relative to the particular issue
confronted.58 For example, whereas, according to international law, law-applying agents shall
understand a treaty in conformity with conventional language, international law does not tell
those agents whether, in the interpretation of a particular treaty, conventional language shall be
understood to mean the language applied at the time of its conclusion or the language applied at
the time of interpretation. Second, international law cannot always determine the existence of the
necessary relationship between the means of interpretation drawn upon and the interpreted treaty
57
Compare R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 36–38.
58
‘Extension’ is a term of art. Consequently, by the extension of a means of interpretation, such as conventional
language, I will understand the total number of referents coming with the scope of application of this concept.
28
provision. For example, whereas, according to international law, if the ordinary meaning of a
treaty is ambiguous, law-applying agents shall adopt the meaning that best helps attain the object
and purpose of the treaty, international law cannot help those agents determine the instrumental
relationship between the ordinary meanings of a treaty and its object and purpose. Third,
international law cannot always determine the priority of two or more rules of interpretation. For
example, whereas, according to international law, if a conflict occurs between Rules 2 and 4, the
former shall normally have precedence, international law cannot help law-applying agents
resolve a conflict between Rules 2 and 3.
Despite the existence of Articles 31–33 of the VCLT, to some extent, issues of interpretation still
have to be resolved at the discretion of the law-applying agents themselves. The crucial question
is whether this makes treaty interpretation an art and not science. As I will argue in the following
section, the answer to this question inevitably depends on the approach taken by each and every
law-applying agent in disposing of the discretion given to her. To establish this proposition, in
sections 3–5 of the article, I will provide a series of examples taken from the practice of
international courts and tribunals. As the examples go to show, when international judiciaries
decide issues of interpretation that cannot be resolved on the basis of international law
simpliciter – whether they concern the extension of a means of interpretation (section 3), the
relationships between a means and an interpreted treaty (section 4), or the priority of the rules of
interpretation (section 5) – typically, judiciaries still take great pains to explain their decisions in
rational terms, using forms of reasoning firmly anchored in the structural framework of Articles
31–33 of the VCLT.
EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENT RULES OF INTERPRETATION
A second-order communicative assumption is an assumption made by a law-applying agent

about the relationship between two first-order communicative assumptions. To some extent,
Articles 31–33 determine the relationship between those first-order assumptions that draw upon
the primary means of interpretation listed in Article 31 and those that draw upon the
supplementary means of interpretation (Article 32).59 Consequently, according to Article 32, if
59
Compare Linderfalk, ‘Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention Real or Not?
Interpreting the Rules of Interpretation’, 65 Netherlands International Law Review (2007) 133.
29
the application of Article 31 leaves the meaning of an interpreted treaty ambiguous or obscure, or
leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, then whatever assumptions can be
made based on Article 32 shall have priority over those based on Article 31. Inversely, if the
application of Article 31 does not leave the meaning of an interpreted treaty ambiguous or
obscure, and it does not lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, then whatever
assumptions can be made based on Article 31 shall have priority over those based on Article 31.
Articles 31–33, on the other hand, do not help determine when the application of Article 31 leads
to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Similarly, they do not help determine the
relationship between the different communicative assumptions that can often be made based on
Article 31 and the context and the object and purpose of a treaty. Neither do Articles 31–33 help
determine the relationship between two or more communicative assumptions based on the
supplementary means of interpretation. In other words, once again, international law leaves to
law-applying agents a certain scope of discretion. The following examples will give an idea of
how this discretion is typically used.
In Bosnia Genocide (Merits),60 the ICJ had to determine whether states parties to the Genocide
Convention, by virtue of the Convention, were under an obligation not to commit genocide
themselves.61 As the Court readily admitted, such an obligation was not expressly imposed by
the actual terms of the Convention. Still, as it concluded, ‘taking into account the established
purpose of the Convention, the effect of Article I is to prohibit States from themselves
committing genocide’.62 Article I of the Genocide Convention, it may be recalled, imposes upon
parties to the Convention the obligation to prevent and to punish all acts of genocide. To explain
its conclusion, the Court invoked among other things the following line of argument:
The expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts of genocide … requires the
State Parties, inter alia, to employ the means at their disposal … to prevent persons or groups not
60
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Bosnia Genocide), Merits, Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports
(2007) 23.
61
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, 78 UNTS 277.
62
Bosnia Genocide, supra note 80, at 113, para. 166.
30
directly under their authority from committing an act of genocide or any of the other acts
mentioned in Article III.63
As recognized by the Court itself, this interpretation goes beyond the ordinary meaning of
Article I. Thus, to support it, a mere reference to the purpose of Article I is not sufficient. It has
to be established also that the ordinary meaning of Article I amounts to a ‘manifestly absurd or
unreasonable’ result, in the sense of Article 32 of the VCLT. Stated in terms of the particular
issue of interpretation, it has to be shown that, actually, very strong reasons support the following
second-order communicative assumption: ‘Parties to the Genocide Convention expressed their
intentions arranging so that Article I contributes to the realization of its object and purpose,
rather than conforms to the lexicon, grammar, and pragmatic rules of the English language.’
International law fails to provide these reasons, and this would seem to be why the ICJ resorts to
the following explanation:
It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their
power, commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were
not forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have
such firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law.
In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission
of genocide.64
Arguably, this explanation, however terse, is exceptionally convincing.
In Soering v. the United Kingdom,65 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had to
engage with the suggestion made by Amnesty International that the death penalty should then (in
1989) be considered an inhuman and degrading punishment in the sense of Article 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
As the Court noted:
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Soering, supra note 21.
31
‘The Convention is a living instrument … which must be interpreted in the light of present-day
conditions’; and [as a consequence of this], in assessing whether a given treatment or punishment
is to be regarded as inhuman or degrading for the purposes of Article 3 (art. 3), the Court cannot
but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of
the member States of the Council of Europe in this field’. De facto the death penalty no longer
exists in time of peace in the Contracting States to the Convention. In the few Contracting States
which retain the death penalty in law for some peacetime offences, death sentences, if ever
imposed, are nowadays not carried out. This ‘virtual consensus in Western European legal
systems that the death penalty is, under current circumstances, no longer consistent with regional
standards of justice’, to use the words of Amnesty International, is reflected in Protocol No. 6
(P6) to the Convention, which provides for the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace.66
Prima facie, as the Court seemed fully willing to admit, this development could in fact be seen to
support the wide interpretation of Article 3 that Amnesty International had suggested. However,
it was quick to add:
The Convention is to be read as a whole and Article 3 (art. 3) should therefore be construed in
harmony with the provisions of Article 2 (art. 2) (see, mutatis mutandis, the Klass and Others
judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 31, § 68). On this basis Article 3 (art. 3)
evidently cannot have been intended by the drafters of the Convention to include a general
prohibition of the death penalty since that would nullify the clear wording of Article 2 § 1 (art. 2-
1).67
If we are to analyse this reasoning, the ECtHR was obviously facing a conflict between two
different first-order communicative assumptions. On the one hand, there is the assumption that
the parties to the ECHR expressed their intention arranging so that the meaning of Article 3
continuously corresponds to whatever can be inferred from the subsequent practice developed in
the application of this provision – in this case, the national penal policy of the European states.
On the other hand, there is the assumption that the parties to the Convention expressed their
66
Ibid., at 33–34, para. 102.
67
Ibid., at 34, para. 103.
32
intention arranging so that Article 3 comes out as being logically consistent with Article 2.
Resolving this conflict, the Court obviously decided that the latter assumption should be
preferred over the former. This decision builds on a second-order communicative assumption. It
builds on the assumption that the parties to the ECHR expressed their intention arranging so that
the treaty comes out as altogether logically consistent, rather than corresponding to whatever can
be inferred from its preparatory work.
This assumption requires support that can only be found beyond international law simpliciter.
There are two distinct ways to provide this support. The ECtHR can choose to try to either
reinforce the strength of the preferred first-order communicative assumption or undermine the
strength of the conflicting assumption. As shown by the following passage, the Court obviously
opted for the latter alternative:
Protocol No. 6 (P6), as a subsequent written agreement, shows that the intention of the
Contracting Parties as recently as 1983 was to adopt the normal method of amendment of the text
in order to introduce a new obligation to abolish capital punishment in time of peace and, what is
more, to do so by an optional instrument allowing each State to choose the moment when to
undertake such an engagement. In these conditions, notwithstanding the special character of the
Convention, Article 3 (art. 3) cannot be interpreted as generally prohibiting the death penalty.68
Protocol no. 6 adds to the subsequent practice already considered – the national penal policy. It
shows the overall practice to be less consistent than Amnesty International would otherwise have
it.
In the Case of James and Others,69 the ECtHR found itself faced with a very similar situation.
The applicants in this case argued that the respondent (the United Kingdom), by a compulsory
68
ibid. Interestingly, in the Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber of the European Court for Human Rights
considered the relevance of the abolitionist trend among the Council of Europe member states for the interpretation
of Article 3 of the ECHR. Although the Court eventually found that it was not necessary for it to reach ‘a firm
conclusion’ on this point, noting the adoption of Protocol no. 13 to the ECHR, it added a passage indicating that the
reasoning applied in Soering might still be valid: ‘For the time being, the fact that there is still a large number of
States who have yet to sign or ratify Protocol No. 13 may prevent the Court from finding that it is the established
practice of the Contracting States to regard the implementation of the death penalty as inhuman and degrading
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, since no derogation may be made from that provision, even in
times of war.’ Case of Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, at para. 165, available at hudoc.echr.coe.int
69
Case of James and Others, Judgment of 21 February 1986, available at hudoc.echr.coe.int
33
transfer of their property and by depriving them of their entitlement to proper compensation, had
acted in violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR. The relevant part of this Article
reads as follows: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.’
One of the issues of interpretation brought before the Court was whether, as the applicant argued,
the reference in the second sentence of Article 1 to ‘the general principles of international law’
implied that the international law requirement of prompt, adequate and effective compensation
for the expropriation of property of foreigners applied also to nationals. The applicants
contended that it did. According to them, to treat the general principles of international law as
inapplic able to a taking by a state of the property of its own nationals would be tantamount to
permitting differentiation on the ground of nationality. This, they said, would be incompatible
with the expression: ‘no one’, which opened the second sentence of Article 1, and with Article 1
of the Convention, which by virtue of Article 5 of Protocol no. 1 obliged the respondent to
secure to everyone within its jurisdiction all rights laid down in this Protocol.70 The Court did not
find this interpretation convincing. In its opinion, ‘the general principles of international law’
were not applicable to a taking by the state of the property of its own nationals, for the following
reason:
Article 1 (P1-1) expressly provides that deprivation of property must be effected ‘in the public
interest’: since such a requirement has always been included amongst the general principles of
international law, this express provision would itself have been superfluous if Article 1 (P1-1)
had had the effect of rendering those principles applicable to nationals as well as to non-
nationals.71
Just as in Soering, the situation presents a conflict between two first-order communicative
assumptions. On the one hand, there is the assumption implied by the argument of the applicants
70
Ibid., at 39, para. 63
71
34
that the parties expressed their intention arranging so that Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 comes out
as logically consistent with Article 5 of this same Protocol and with Article 1 of the Convention.
On the other hand, there is the assumption implied by the reasoning of the Court that the parties
expressed their intention arranging so that no part of Protocol no. 1 comes out as redundant. The
interpretation of the Court implies a preference of the latter assumption over the former. It
implies the following second-order communicative assumption: the parties to Protocol no. 1
expressed their intention arranging so that Protocol no. 1 comes out as altogether logically
consistent, rather than avoiding within this Protocol all redundant expressions. Once again, as in
Soering, the ECtHR, in trying to support this assumption, resorted to the strategy of undermining
the strength of the first-order communicative assumption that it had chosen not to prefer:
As to Article 1 (art. 1) of the Convention, it is true that under most provisions of the Convention
and its Protocols nationals and non-nationals enjoy the same protection but this does not exclude
exceptions as far as this may be indicated in a particular text (see, for example, Articles 4 para. 3
(b), 5 para. 1 (f) and 16 of the Convention, Articles 3 and 4 of Protocol No. 4) (art. 4-3-b, art. 5-
1-f, art. 16, P4-3, P4-4).72
TREATIES AND THIRD STATES OR THIRD ORGANIZATIONS
The articles which make up section 4 of the Vienna Convention have been transposed to treaties
that are the subject of the present draft articles without causing any substantive problems, save
for one point concerning article 36. A general regime has thus been established which
corresponds to articles 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 whereby the situation of international organizations
is assimilated, with the exception of article 36, to that of States.
Article 36 Bis deals with a special situation, which calls for special rules, namely, that of treaties
to which organizations are parties and which are designed to create rights and obligations for the
member States of those organizations
Article 34. General rule regarding third States and third organizations A treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State or a third organization without the consent of that
State or that organization. The principle which the Vienna Convention lays down is only the
72
35
expression of one of the fundamental consequences of consensuality. It has been adapted without
difficulty to treaties to which one or more international organizations are parties; in second
reading, the Commission combined in a single paragraph the two paragraphs of the draft adopted
in first reading, Thus emphasizing the parallel with the Vienna Convention.
36
CHAPTER-V
INVALIDITY, TERMINATION, AND SUSPENSION OF TREATIES
ARTICLE 42 VALIDITY AND CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF TREATIES
1. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be impeached
only through the application of the present Convention.
2. The termination of a treaty, its denunciation orthe withdrawal of a party, may take place only
as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention. The
same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.
ARTICLE 43 OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW

INDEPENDENTLY OF A TREATY
The invalidity, termination or denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the
suspension of its operation, as a result of the application of the present Convention or of the
provisions of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation
embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law independently of the
treaty.
ARTICLE 44 SEPARABILITY OF TREATY PROVISIONS
1. A right of a party, provided for in a treaty or arising under article 56, to denounce, withdraw
from or suspend the operation of the treaty may be exercised only with respect to the whole
treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.
2. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a

treaty recognized in the present Convention may be invoked only with respect to the whole treaty
except as provided in the following paragraphs or in article 60.
37
3. If the ground relates solely to particular clauses, it may be invoked only with respect to those
clauses where:
a. The said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty with regard to their application;
b. It appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that acceptance of those clauses was not
an essential basis of the consent of the other party or parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole;
and
c. Continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be unjust.
4. In cases falling under articles 49 and 50 the State entitled to invoke the fraud or corruption
may do so with respect either to the whole treaty or, subject to paragraph 3, to the particular
clauses alone.
5. In cases falling under articles 51, 52 and 53, no separation of the provisions of the treaty is
permitted.
ARTICLE 45 LOSS OF A RIGHT TO INVOKE A GROUND FOR INVALIDATING,

TERMINATING, WITHDRAWING FROM OR SUSPENDING THE OPERATION OF A
TREATY.
A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or
suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if, after
becoming aware of the facts:
a. It shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or continues in
operation, as the case may be; or
b. It must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty
or in its maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be.
38
INVALIDITY OF TREATIES
ARTICLE 46 PROVISIONS OF INTERNAL LAW REGARDING COMPETENCE TO

CONCLUDE TREATIES
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in
violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as
invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law
of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the
matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.
Many of the provisions contained in the VCLT deal with invalidity, termination, and suspension
of treaties. If one approaches international law in geological terms looking for its different
layers,73 these provisions evidence layers from times in which international law was considered
the law of contracts for states. Rules on error in Article 48 VCLT or fraud in Article 49 VCLT
are typically known from the domestic law of contracts or civil codes. Domestic rules on the
promulgation of acts of parliament differ substantially: acts of parliament have to be established
in a specific procedure; furthermore, in some jurisdictions their conformity with a constitution is
required. And usually they do not lose their force if circumstances change.
In the times when international law was seen as private law between princes or states, the major
theoretical problem was the ontological question, i.e., how to explain why sovereign states could
bind themselves through their sovereign will.74 The practical side of this problem was the degree
to which states were bound by treaties and under what circumstances they could free themselves
of obligations previously undertaken. Under the contractual model, civil law analogies provided
73
Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’, 64 ZaörV/HJIL
(Heidelberg J Int’l L) (2004) 547.
74
See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (1927).
39
for various grounds to terminate or avoid international treaties. If it is true that international law
has been changing its structure in the course of time and has become more like public law, 75this
would suggest that the contractual analogies ought to be rethought. What do the commentaries
tell us about the grounds for invalidity and the direction in which the law of treaties has been
heading?76
The tension between the stability of treaty relations and the freedom of states to denunciate or
withdraw from a treaty is evident when it comes to the question of implied rights of termination.
As Villiger (at 706) puts it, Article 56 VCLT achieved ‘a sound balance between the general rule
and the exceptions, between stability and orderly change’. Article 56 VCLT presumes that a
treaty which provides neither for termination nor for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to
termination or withdrawal unless an implied right can be derived from the intention of the parties
or the nature of the treaty. As Thomas Giegerich (Dörr and Schmalenbach) (at 980–985) and
Theodore Christakis (Corten and Klein) (at 1253) show, there are still treaties which remain
silent on the question of termination and withdrawal. Christakis (Corten and Klein) attacks the
rule with the aim of achieving greater freedom for states to withdraw or denunciate from treaties.
He argues for reframing the presumption in favour of an implied right of denunciation (at 1258–
1261). On a normative level, this account is based on a voluntaristic view of international law (at
1259–1260). On a practical level, it sees advantages in attracting more parties to treaties without
risking violations of the law, since the general right of denunciation allows the parties to escape
from their obligations. In essence, Charistakis is reinforcing the old contractual and voluntaristic
conception of international law. Another provision originating in the domestic law of contracts is
Article 62 VCLT, which is the provision on clausula rebus sic stantibus. This ground for
termination has been contested, but was nevertheless included in the Vienna Convention. All
commentaries agree that the requirements for the application of Article 62 VCLT are very
restrictive. Malcolm Shaw and Caroline Fournet (Corten and Klein) show that the customary
status of the provision is unclear (at 1416–1418). The compromise achieved in Vienna was
drafted in such a complex manner that Villiger developed a questionnaire with the aim of
restructuring the different parts of the provision into logical order (at 779). This questionnaire
75
See the research outline by von Bogdandy, Dann, and Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public
International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities’, 9 German LJ (2008) 1375.
76
For a very interesting recent account on related questions, especially with regard to Arts 52 and 53 see Dajani,
‘Contractualism in the Law of Treaties’, 34 Michigan J Int’l L (2012)1.
40
provides the reader with a new structure that helps him to check whether Article 62 VCLT
applies. This is a good example of how commentaries rearrange the law in a way to make it
better comprehensible. Giegerich (Dörr and Schmalenbach) attributes only minor practical
relevance to the provision, but mentions one important function of Article 62 VCLT that it shares
with other rights to termination and withdrawal: it can be used as a threat to bring about a
renegotiation of the treaty (at 1070). Thus, the mere possibility of exit may stabilize treaty
relations. Yet, the high threshold established by Article 62 VCLT will render the possibility for
exit very small. The fact that Article 62 VCLT has rarely been applied, may also be interpreted
as a success of the VCLT. As the states ratified the VCLT, they accepted that treaty relations are
to remain mostly stable. It remains to be seen whether a public law concept of international law
will make grounds for termination superfluous and redundant. In order to examine whether the
grounds for termination and withdrawal have become outdated, one would have to look at the
bigger picture of which the grounds for termination and withdrawal are only one part. In terms of
institutional economy, one can – following Albert Hirschman – conceptualize the continued
attractiveness of participation in institutions in the terms of exit and voice. 77 Termination and
withdrawal would then constitute exit options. And a restriction of these rights would make it
necessary to increase participation rights. More abstract considerations are, however, rarely
found in commentaries. Commentaries regularly produce what Harold Koh would consider to be
‘useful legal scholarship’: helping practitioners and policy makers to make decisions when faced
with a legal problem.
77
See A. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice and Loyality (1970); for an application of the theory to the EU see Weiler, ‘The
Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale LJ (1991) 2403, at 2410 ff; for an application to transnational questions
including the law of treaties in international law see Benvenisti, ‘Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalisation’, 98
Michigan L Rev (1999) 167.
41
CHAPTER-VI
CONCLUSION
International treaties and conventions contain rules about what entities could sign, ratify or
accede to them. Some treaties are restricted to states that are members of the UN or parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. In rare cases there is an explicit list of the entities
that the treaty is restricted to. More commonly the aim of the founding signatories is that the
treaty is not restricted to particular states only and so a wording like "this treaty is open for
signature to States willing to accept its provisions" is used (the so-called "All States formula")78.
When a treaty is open to "States", for the depositary authority79 it is difficult or impossible to
determine which entities are States. If the treaty is restricted to Members of the United Nations
or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, there is no ambiguity. However, a
difficulty has occurred as to possible participation in treaties when entities which appeared
otherwise to be States could not be admitted to the United Nations, nor become Parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice owing to the opposition, for political reasons, of a
permanent member of the Security Council or have not applied for ICJ or UN membership. Since
that difficulty did not arise as concerns membership in the specialized agencies, where there is no
"veto" procedure, a number of those States became members of specialized agencies, and as such
were in essence recognized as States by the international community. Accordingly, and in order
to allow for as wide a participation as possible, a number of conventions then provided that they
were also open for participation to States members of specialized agencies. The type of entry-
78
All States are defined as all UN member states and states about which there are individual statements of inclusion
by the UN Secretary-General or other UN organ. Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs Supplement No. 8;
page 10, UN THE WORLD TODAY (PDF); the United Nations Secretary-General has stated that when the "any
State" or "all States" formula is adopted, he would be able to implement it only if the General Assembly provided
him with the complete list of the States coming within the formula, other than those falling within the "Vienna
formula"UN Office of Legal Affairs
79
The UN Secretary-General or some other competent authority defined in the treaty in question, e.g. Switzerland
for the Geneva Conventions – see special cases
42
into-force clause used in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was later called the
"Vienna formula" and its wording was used by various treaties, conventions and organizations.80
Some treaties that use it include provisions that in addition to these States any other State invited
by a specified authority or organization (commonly the United Nations General Assembly or an
institution created by the treaty in question) can also participate, thus making the scope of
potential signatories even broader.
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations
or of any of the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General
Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the Convention, as follows: until 30
November 1969, at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria, and
subsequently, until 30 April 1970, at United Nations Headquarters, New York.
80
UN Legal Affairs the so-called "Vienna formula".
43
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Press
 Chinkin, C. (1993). Third Parties in International Law (Clarendon Press)
 Fon, V. and Parisi, F. (2003). The Hidden Bias of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. George Mason University, Law and Economics Working Paper Series 03-08.
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 F Capotorti ‘Il diritto dei trattati secondo la Convenzione di Vienna’, in Società Italinana
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 Kelsen, H. (1966). Principles of International Law (Robert W. Tucker, ed.)
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 RD Kearney and RE Dalton ‘The Treaty on Treaties’ (1970) 64 AJIL 495–561.
 S Rosenne, The Law of Treaties. A Guide to the Legislative History of the Vienna
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U.K.: Manchester University Press.
 Stark, J.G. (1989). Introduction to International Law (10Th ed.)
44
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A PROJECT REPORT ON

APPLICATION OF VIENNA CONVENTION

(FACULTY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW)

SUBMITTED BY ANUBHA DHIDHI

ROLL NO. 30,

HIDAYATULLAH NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an international agreement governing treaties

1. The observance o the treaties under Article 26 and Article 27.

Oppenheim's International Law: Volume 1 Peace (International Law, Vol 1)

Malcom N. Shaw’s International law: fifth edition

S. K. Verma An introduction to public international law second edition

1. What is the ultimate aim of the treaty interpretation process?

SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION

HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION

OBSERVANCE AND TREATIES

ARTICLE 26: PACTA SUNT SERVANDA

Especially in the traditionally decentralized international system without central judicial

RECOGNITION OF JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

ARTICLE 27: INTERNAL LAW AND OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES

ARTICLE 31. GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION

ARTICLE 32. SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION

THE STRUCTURE OF ARTICLES 31–33

 1. What is the ultimate aim of the treaty interpretation process?

A second kind of assumption describes a relationship between two first-order communicative

EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENT RULES OF INTERPRETATION

A second-order communicative assumption is an assumption made by a law-applying agent

Arguably, this explanation, however terse, is exceptionally convincing.

TREATIES AND THIRD STATES OR THIRD ORGANIZATIONS

ARTICLE 42 VALIDITY AND CONTINUANCE IN FORCE OF TREATIES

ARTICLE 43 OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW

ARTICLE 44 SEPARABILITY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

2. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a

c. Continued performance of the remainder of the treaty would not be unjust.

ARTICLE 45 LOSS OF A RIGHT TO INVOKE A GROUND FOR INVALIDATING,

ARTICLE 46 PROVISIONS OF INTERNAL LAW REGARDING COMPETENCE TO

 Beemelmans, H. (1997). Law of treaties in International Law: Remarks on Recent Theory

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