Organisational and Individual Unlearning in Identification and Evaluation of Technologies

International Journal of Innovation Management
Vol. 20, No. 2 (February 2016) 1650017 (27 pages)

© Imperial College Press
DOI: 10.1142/S1363919616500171
ORGANISATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL UNLEARNING

IN IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF
TECHNOLOGIES
CHRISTIAN W. SCHEINER
by UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO on 07/08/15. For personal use only.
Int. J. Innov. Mgt. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
at zu L€
Universit€ ubeck
ubeck, Germany
Ratzeburger Allee 160, 23562 L€
christian.scheiner@uni-luebeck.de
CHRISTIAN V. BACCARELLA*, NINA FELLER† and KAI-INGO VOIGT‡

School of Business and Economics
at Erlangen-N€
Friedrich-Alexander-Universit€ urnberg
Lange Gasse 20, 90403 Nürnberg, Germany
*christian.baccarella@fau.de
†
nina.feller@fau.de
‡
kai-ingo.voigt@fau.de
JOHN BESSANT
University of Exeter Business School
Exeter EX4 4ST, United Kingdom
J.Bessant@exeter.ac.uk
Published 25 June 2015
The ability of an organisation to recognise and evaluate technologically relevant infor-

mation can be impeded by outdated processes, structures and knowledge. Organisations
need therefore a capacity for “intended memory loss”, which has been labelled as
unlearning. Although a number of scholars have examined unlearning, research is still only
beginning to understand unlearning especially in the area of technology identification and
evaluation. The goal of this study is therefore to examine unlearning on an organisational
and individual level in this context. Unlearning on an organisational level comprises team
composition strategies and directives as well as the implementation of unlearning
mechanisms. On an individual level, unlearning highlights cognitive prototypes which
exert an influence on the perception of technologies and their evaluation. A qualitative
approach has been chosen to examine those aspects, in which technological gatekeepers
serve as sample subjects. Technological gatekeepers take a crucial role in the technology
identification and evaluation as decision makers and due to their influence on organisa-
tional structures and processes. The results of this study suggest that unlearning plays
1650017-1
C. W. Scheiner et al.
currently only a minor role on an organisational and individual level, which is mainly
caused by existing rigidities and in the missing understanding of the necessity to unlearn.
Keywords: Individual unlearning; organisational unlearning; technology identification;

technology evaluation; technological gatekeeper; cognitive prototypes; automotive
industry.
Introduction
Technology-based innovations are predominantly characterised by high failure
rates (Eng and Quaia, 2009). Cierpicki et al. (2000) point out for instance that 7
out of 10 technological products fail within the first 18 to 24 months. Similarly,
Chiesa and Frattini (2011) notice a high failure rate of 40% to 50%. An additional
problem was highlighted by Henderson and Clark (1990) in their studies of
photolithographic equipment. Where technological innovation involved change at
the “component” level, existing knowledge networks and learning heuristics were
successful. But when system-level change took place — what they termed
“architectural” innovation — then the problem of letting go of old networks and
approaches and creating a new framework often put established incumbents at a
disadvantage. Arguably they lacked a capacity for unlearning as well as learning
new approaches (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Tidd and Bessant, 2013). Simi-
larly, “not invented here” is often a consequence of lack of cognitive fit between
existing patterns and a novel but incompatible approach, which would require
letting go of old patterns in order to accommodate the new. Familiar examples
include Kodak’s rejection of instant film and the Carlsson imaging process, or
RCA’s apparent lack of interest in promoting transistor radios during the 1950s
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). Numerous studies analysed and observed over
the last 40 years the difficulties of especially incumbents to cope with new tech-
nologies (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Foster, 1986; Tushman and
Anderson, 1986; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). One reason why particularly com-
panies with a long history of success are failing in this respect is connected to the
paradox of success. Former success factors can turn into reasons for future failure,
when current beliefs, methods, procedures, routines, and structures are in a mis-
match to the current realities of the market with respect to technologies.
In such cases, the identification and evaluation of new technology information
is inhibited or even prevented (Mezias et al., 2001) and inappropriate behaviour is
perpetuated or even reinforced (Akguen et al., 2007). Bettis and Prahalad (1995)
as well as Miller (1990, 1994) argue that change is often impeded by the ro-
bustness of old dominant logics, even if organisations see clear evidence of
changes in their environment. This means that, because of technological
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Organisational and Individual Unlearning in TIE
trajectories and “industry recipes”, there is often a high degree of path dependency
about innovation decision-making and an inbuilt bias toward familiar pathways at
the expense of the road less travelled. The dominant logic can become thus a
general taken-for-granted assumption or can go even so far that it develops into
unchallengeable orthodoxies. Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) describe the problem of
this dominant logic with the case of Polaroid where the dominant logic prevented
the company from finding new responses to the challenge of the emerging digital
imaging. One explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the organisational
memory, which contains the collective knowledge and repetitive behaviour of a
company (Akguen et al., 2007; Tsang and Zhara, 2008). Due to this organisational
memory, organisations and its members avoid conflicts by applying existing
knowledge and behaviour (Rousseau, 2001) or “find it hard to ignore their current
beliefs and methods, because they create explicit justifications for policies and
actions. [. . .] [P]eople in organisations find it very difficult to deal effectively with
information that conflicts with their current beliefs and methods. They do not
know how to accommodate dissonant information and they find it difficult to
change a few elements of their interdependent beliefs and methods” (Starbuck,
1996 p. 727). Berthon et al. (2001) add to the ambivalent nature of organisational
memory, that while contributing to an increase of the overall competitiveness by
allowing to learn from experience and to improve procedures and processes
(Mitchell, 1989), it can simultaneously constrain the spectrum of potential activities,
it can lead to inertia (Berthon et al., 2001), and it can serve ex post as legitimation
for chosen activities (Moorman and Miner, 1997; Levitt and March, 1988).
One solution to this paradox lays in the ability of a company to unlearn.
Unlearning indicates an intentional process (Tsang and Zhara, 2008). This will-
ingly, deliberate, planned, actively driven and structured executed action differ-
entiates unlearning from mere forgetting. Moreover, unlearning may occur on the
organisational as well as on the individual level (Becker, 2005; Hedberg, 1981;
Klein, 1989). Companies that are able to unlearn and reframe their routines will
have a greater likelihood of survival and adaptation (Lyles, 1988; Rampersad,
2004), as obsolete or false elements are discarded and abandoned.
However, research of unlearning is still to a large extent conceptual, theoretical
and normative (e.g., Akguen et al., 2007; Becker, 2005; Sinkula, 2002; Srithika
and Bhattacharyya, 2009; Inkpen and Tsang, 2007; Prince, 2009). Only gradually,
unlearning has been addressed from an empirical perspective (e.g., Akguen et al.,
2006; de Holan and Phillips, 2004; Fernandez and Sune, 2009; Becker, 2010).
Research of unlearning is thus still at the beginning and in numbers also still scarce
(Akguen et al., 2006), which leaves room for further empirical studies especially
in technology identification and evaluation (TIE).
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The aim of this paper is therefore to empirically examine unlearning in the

context of technology identification and evaluation. A two-fold approach has been
chosen to gain insights into unlearning from a holistic perspective. Therefore,
organisational and individual aspects have been included. From an organisational
view, evaluation criteria set by the organisation are examined. Evaluation criteria
stand for the approach of an organisation to guide and govern identification and
evaluation processes in such a way that decisions align to overall goals. Addi-
tionally, directives to the composition of teams are examined to see how organi-
sations perceive unlearning as a necessary and integral part of its firm culture.
Teams, work groups and units have been chosen as research object, as they are
“critically important to organisational effectiveness in the modern economy and
are also important amplifiers and transmitters of the daily activities of their
organisations” (Akguen et al., 2006, p. 74). On an individual level, thinking
patterns are studied. Research in innovation management (Scheiner et al., 2014)
and entrepreneurship (Baron and Ensley, 2006, p. 74) has highlighted the im-
portance of these thinking patterns in perceiving, storing and using relevant in-
formation. Changes in these thinking patterns mirror on an individual level the
ability and the extent of unlearning.
As sample object the automotive industry has been chosen as automobiles are
highly technological advanced and complex products. Automobiles have a mul-
titude of different technologies embedded. Some technologies, such as the internal
combustion ignition engine, have been part of the automobile since the first cars
were introduced into the market, while other technologies focusing for instance on
energy storage or information and communication technologies have enriched the
rudimental technology portfolio over time. These technologies are subjected to a
different technology life-cycle, but have to be implemented nevertheless into the
“system car” due to given market demands and technological progress. As a
consequence, the decision to implement a certain technology has to be taken under
high levels of uncertainty. Companies in the automotive industry do not only have
to cope with the industry-specific technological turbulence, but have to deal with
technological turbulences arising from other industries.
Given the importance of unlearning in technology identification and evaluation
in the automotive industry, this paper will address so far overlooked topics in
unlearning and will expand the existing knowledge on unlearning.
This paper is structured as follows: First, an overview of organisational and
individual unlearning is given and research questions are developed. Following,
the methodology underpinning this paper is described, and the results of the
qualitative survey are presented. Afterwards, a discussion of the findings with
respect to previous scientific work is conducted. The paper concludes with pos-
sibilities to further research.
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Derivation of Research Questions

Organisational unlearning in the technology identification and evaluation
Unlearning on an organisational level can be directed on and can occur in
structure- and/or procedure-related aspects. While the procedure-related elements
address the factor “what” in a technology identification and evaluation context, the
structure-related aspects concerns the management of the factor “who”.
Regarding the procedural-related aspect of unlearning, a number of recom-
mendations have been derived of “what” should be done in organisations to initiate
unlearning and to overcome organisational defensive routines. Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) emphasise for instance the need for actively fostering a critical
and skeptical attitude and communication within the organisation in order to

stimulate unlearning. Klein (1989) focusses on the general circumstances and

suggests creating a climate of change, which accepts mistakes and links unlearning
with positive consequences. Likewise, Basadur and Gelade (2006) emphasise the
importance of familiarity with change processes as a prerequisite of unlearning.
Management has to contribute to unlearning by giving performance-orientated
feedback, by taking complaints and opinions of employees seriously, and by being
also self-critical. Prince (2009) argues for an unlearning process in the organisation
and sees the responsibility for this in the human resource department. At the same
time, training and personal development activities should be an integral part of
such unlearning initiatives (Sorohan and Petrini, 1994; Becker, 2008).
Much of the scientific literature addresses unlearning at a very general level
at the expense of studying specific organisational tasks such as the technology
identification and evaluation. Although previous findings may be applied to
some extent to technology identification and evaluation, especially when people
management is considered, they fail to take into account its characteristics and
specifics. The identification of new technologies is mainly influenced by search
behaviour, which can vary by its scope and by its sources. Regarding the scope
of search behaviour two generic views are distinguished: exploitation and ex-
ploration (March, 1991). While exploitation sees some form of “local search”,
which describes a search behaviour in known sources and on similar technol-
ogies to those already applied and known, exploration describes a more distant
search around novel sources and areas. Empirical evidence demonstrates that
there is a positive relationship between a wider search scope and the ability
to overcome given rigidities (Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Valesco, 2008).
The spectrum of possible technology sources is wide and reaches from e.g.,
patents to customers. A recent study by Scheiner (2014) demonstrates that a
clear hierarchy is given in the importance of different sources of information.
The most important sources are seen in the group of customers and competitors,
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while novel sources such as social media and blogs are found at the bottom of
the list.
Search scope and sources are mainly determined by the dominant logic of a
company as the activities how to search for new technologies arises from this self-
conception. The dominant logic also influences the awareness of people inside the
company to reflect the given procedure. The following research question asks
therefore:
Research question 1: Is unlearning an integral part in the
identification of new technologies?
When organisations develop and grow, their accumulated knowledge and
experiences are used on one hand to construct and steadily improve routines,
which govern processes and decisions of individuals and teams, and on the other
hand they are used to reduce the variation of decisions and routines (Benner and
Tushman, 2003). Simultaneously, former implicit, tacit knowledge and routines
are made explicit and accessible over time, and are embodied in the organisation as
structured processes, because “series of development stages [are] interpolated by a
series of evaluative stages” (Hart et al., 2003, p. 22).
Substantial research about the new product development process has contrib-
uted to a better understanding of how the evaluation process is conducted. For
example, Schmidt et al. (2009) focus on the difference of evaluation stages passed
between incremental and radical new product developments and find that radical
innovations go in average through 4.8 gates, while 3.6 stages are applied for
incremental innovations. The teams concerned with radical innovations are in
addition larger than the teams working on incremental innovations. Schmidt et al.
(2009) explain this result as being due to the higher uncertainty and costs of radical
innovations. The number of criteria applied in this process is at the same time
higher in incremental innovations than in radical ones and technical criteria are
used more frequently in the evaluation of incremental innovations, while financial
aspects are examined more often in radical innovations. As the number of gates,
team size, and number of criteria are not associated with new product performance,
Schmidt et al. (2009) conclude that sophistication and expertise in the initial stages
distinguish a low from a high performance. Hauser and Zettelmeyer (1997) argue
that if the right metric is used, it is possible to encourage the right decisions and
actions. Hart et al. (2003) examine in their study applied criteria in a seven step
new product development process and find that e.g., technical feasibility,
uniqueness, and market potential are applied in earlier product development
stages, while e.g., product performance, quality and budget are used in later stages.
Although the importance of criteria has been shown by existing research,
evaluation criteria pose a challenge to companies for two reasons: First, evaluation
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criteria represent the quintessence of the accumulated organisational memory and

denote to some extent explicit core competences and have been actively promoted
and implemented into existing routines. As routines, they carry the risk of hin-
dering performance in times of high environmental turbulence (Hannan and
Freeman, 1984). Necessary radical transitions from old technologies to new
technologies may be subsequently impeded or hindered (Miller and Friesen,
1980). Second, the difficulty in comparison and evaluation of technologies can be
aggravated by the fact that the capabilities of different technologies cannot always
be measured with the same or similar criteria and the evaluation of new tech-
nologies is therefore often idiosyncratic in nature.
Hence, unlearning of evaluation criteria seems to be a necessary prerequisite of
companies. Only by questioning existing criteria (and possibly abandoning some)

can companies conduct the evaluation properly and take the given circumstances
into account. This is especially the case, when not only one main type of tech-
nology has to be evaluated, but when different types of technologies in different
phases of the technological life-cycle have to be evaluated, as it is the case with the
automotive industry. Research question 2 asks therefore:
Research question 2: Does unlearning occur in the evaluation
criteria set by the organisation?
Concerning structure-related aspects, Akguen et al. (2007) argue that especially
work groups, work units and teams have to be considered in the context of
unlearning to avoid traps and failures and thus place the “who” question at the
center of attention. Akguen et al. (2006) show for instance that after “team beliefs
and project routines have changed, implementing new knowledge or information
positively affects new product success” (p. 73). Thomke and Reinertsen (1998)
find additionally that the abandonment of old routines or approaches leads to
higher agility and flexibility in the execution of business processes. This enables
organisations to react to requirements of customers also in later stages of devel-
opment activities.
A major obstacle lies however in the existence and development of organisa-
tional defensive routines (Becker, 2010; Gieskes and Hyland, 2003). These de-
fensive routines can limit, inhibit, or prevent unlearning (Akguen et al., 2006, 2007;
Grant, 1991). To avoid the development of new defensive routines and the ce-
mentation of existing ones in the first place, manifestations of the organisational
memory have to be addressed. An important organisational tool in this context is
the use of organisational strategies and directives towards the composition of teams.
Previous research has shown that changes in the composition of teams have a
positive influence on unlearning. McGill and Slocum (1993) and Nembhard and
Shafer (2008) highlight the importance of team diversity and heterogeneity
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regarding specialisation, nationality, culture, age, and working experience. Car-

mona and Perez-Casanova (1993) and Srithika and Bhattacharyya (2009) add that
rotation of team members can furthermore stimulate the abandonment of obsolete
knowledge, actions, and behaviour. Yet, such initiatives and activities can only be
successful if strong hierarchal structures are reduced. Otherwise, these hierarchies
counteract unlearning, as individuals tend to stick to well-proven behaviour to
avoid negative consequences (Buchen, 1998).
Despite existing research on the importance of work groups and units in
unlearning, empirical research on organisational activities to embed unlearning in
technology identification and evaluation highlights a largely undiscovered field.
For this reason, the following research questions are proposed:
Research question 3a: Do organisations implement team com-

position strategies and directives to induce and foster unlearning
in the technology identification and evaluation?
Research question 3b: How are strategies and directives towards
team composition determined?
Individual unlearning
Organisational and individual unlearning are intertwined. Sinkula (2002) therefore
argues the need to examine the single individual in the organisation. However,
research on individual unlearning has mainly examined the necessary cause-effect
relationship. As a first step, people have to possess an awareness of the need to
change (Tsang and Zhara, 2008; Akguen et al., 2006; Becker, 2010; Cegarra-
Navarro and Dewhurst, 2006; de Holan and Phillips, 2004; Björkman, 1989;
Buchen, 1998; Moorman and Miner, 1997; Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984). This is
decisive as developed habits and associated behavioural patterns are discarded.
Additionally, sustainable individual changes in behaviour have to be accompanied
by appropriate changes in cognitive structures to avoid a possible negative di-
vergence between individual persuasion and collective behaviour (Cegarra-
Navarro and Moya, 2005). Otherwise, unlearning at the purely behavioural level
could carry the danger of not being sustainable and long-lasting. If external
influences like intensifier (praise) or penalty (criticism) are omitted, a person might
fall back into old, and for the organisation, undesired behaviour patterns (Hull,
1930). Hence, it is important that individuals develop an awareness of the ne-
cessity of unlearning and understand that such unlearning is based on conviction.
Unlearning on an individual level is as a consequence mainly determined and
governed by cognitive processes.
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In cognitive research, individual unlearning is defined as a change of value and

belief structure (Fiske and Taylor, 1984), and has been also characterised by terms
like “mental models” (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kim, 1993), “cognitive maps”
(Huber, 1991; Walsh, 1988), or “schemata” (Barrett et al., 1995). The study of
Mezirow (2000) describes the so called individual frame of reference as a basic,
deeply ingrained in the individual, mental value and belief system, which steers
individual unlearning. More recent studies such as the studies of Mezias et al.
(2001), Cegarra-Navarro and Dewhurst (2006) and Cegarra-Navarro and Moya
(2005) also stress the necessity of changing cognitive models as a condition for
changing behaviour-based routines. An alternative approach is suggested by
Scheiner et al. (2014) who point to the importance of cognitive prototypes and
recommend examining these cognitive prototypes to gain a deeper insight into

technology identification and evaluation. Cognitive prototypes represent the
knowledge of an individual with respect to a specific category as it contains its most
typical features (Reed, 1972; Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Matlin, 2005; Scheiner et al.,
2014). As a consequence, these cognitive prototypes are connected to the ability to
recognize and filter relevant information adequately. The identification of new
technologies is thus highly dependent on the cognitive prototypes of individuals; as
soon as information is presented to a person, he or she tries to classify it at first and
then decides about the resulting consequences based on existing knowledge (Ross
and Makin, 1999). This is especially true for technologies as they are not necessarily
physical objects but rather a combination of specific, observable stimuli in form of
abstract, complex information, which can come from various sources (e.g., suppliers,
customers, universities, etc.) (Scheiner et al., 2014).
Cognitive prototypes are learned over time and are not homogenous amongst
people. Hence, they do not necessarily contain the statistically most frequently
given features of the underlying category. Their depth in the form of stored
features is also influenced by experience and knowledge of individuals
(Wisniewski, 1995). A cognitive prototype could therefore possess either fea-
tures that are outdated or that are not suitable in the light of the overall tech-
nology strategy of a company. In both cases, the existing discrepancy may mean
that the identification and evaluation of technologies will not meet the current
expectations of the company, because employees’ cognitive prototypes do not
fit anymore. Hence, unlearning of cognitive prototypes as such or in parts
(features) can become a necessity. As cognitive prototypes represent however
implicit knowledge in the sense of Brockmann and Anthony (2002) or Nonaka
and Takaeuchi (1995), its unlearning is not easily initiated and accomplished.
Acquiring and forming these cognitive prototypes is the result of a long lasting
process and they are therewith connected with deeply ingrained beliefs and
behavioural patterns, which follow from this process (Knowles and Saxberg,
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1988; Zell, 2003). Individuals with certain expertise are thus often not as open
and positive towards unlearning as individuals with broad knowledge, because
the inhibition threshold to release it increases with growing knowledge (Becker,
2008). Given these difficulties, the following research questions are posed:
Research question 4a: Does unlearning occur on an individual
level in cognitive prototypes?
Research question 4b: Which reasons lead to an unlearning in
cognitive prototypes?
Method
To test the research questions, semi-structured interviews were chosen as a re-
search method. Analogically to the methodical approach of Scheiner et al. (2014),
an interview guideline was developed that comprised general questions towards
the company and the organisational unit, which was responsible for technology
identification and evaluation. In addition, the questionnaire contained specific
questions about the identification and evaluation process of technologies. Further
questions concerning cognitive prototypes were modified from those of Baron and
Ensley (2006) and transferred to the context of TIE. To analyse the aspect of
unlearning, the questionnaire guideline comprised questions about whether orga-
nisations possessed team composition strategies and directives to induce and foster
unlearning in technology identification and evaluation. To explore the individual
level of unlearning the questionnaire examined whether technological key
employees unlearn specific features of existing cognitive patterns and if so, which
reasons led to an unlearning of those characteristics.
To analyse organisational and individual unlearning, technological gatekeepers
were chosen as sample subjects. These gatekeepers are mainly responsible for the
collection and dissemination of external information into a company (Ettlie and
Elsenbach, 2007). Simultaneously, their personal ability to perceive technology
signals adequately determines the identification of new technologies. Outdated
patterns and misleading routines may induce inadequate technology identification
and evaluation (Scheiner et al., 2014).
Hence, a rigid selection process was carefully conducted, to ensure that study
participants fulfilled the criteria of a technological gatekeeper described by Whelan
et al. (2010). They characterise a technological gatekeeper with the help of three
important tasks within the R&D process, namely external information acquisition,
external information translation, and internal information dissemination. As
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mentioned before, gatekeepers control the flow of information and have a sig-
nificant impact on the innovation process and technology development of a
company. Employees in positions such as R&D executives and innovation man-
agers were contacted, as they should serve by function as technological gate-
keepers by seeking and disseminating technologically relevant information (Ettlie
and Elsenbach, 2007). These key personnel have a decisive impact on the iden-
tification of new technologies (Allen et al., 1970), and on the development of new
technological innovations (Reid and de Brentani, 2004). Furthermore, through
their institutionalised power and their direct influence on structures and processes
within an organisation (Allen, 1977), they can actively enhance or impede
unlearning and are therefore appropriate samples.
In total 50 experts were interviewed for this study. 12 experts did, however, not
meet the proposed criteria for expert status of this study and had to be excluded from
the analysis. So the final sample for this study comprises 38 experts. The age of the
participants ranged from 26 to 62 years with a mode of around 46 years. Within their
organisations, they held positions such as Head of Innovation Management, Head of
R&D, Head of Pre-Development, Manager New Technologies, Manager New
Concepts, Technical Development Manager, Head of Product Strategy and Inno-
vation, Head of Research and Development Automotive, etc. All gatekeepers held a
degree from higher education institutions and five experts had gained a PhD degree.
The majority of gatekeepers graduated in a technical area (28 of 38), with me-
chanical engineers comprising the biggest subgroup with a total of 17 members.
Next to mechanical engineering, gatekeepers had studied aerospace engineering,
automotive engineering, production engineering, etc. In addition, five interviewees
held a degree in business administration, three in physics, and one in law.
All experts came from within the German automotive industry and were either
employed in automotive OEMs or automotive suppliers. The automotive industry
is one of the most innovative sectors worldwide (Jaruzelski et al., 2012). Auto-
motive companies heavily depend on the development and commercialisation of
new technological innovations, making it a suitable setting for the present study
(Srinivasan et al., 2009). Although the basic structure of a car has not changed
since its introduction almost 125 years ago, constant technological developments
and progress have made the car a complex system of both, old and new tech-
nologies. One major emerging turbulence stems from alternative drive technolo-
gies, which makes the automotive industry subject to fundamental change more
than ever. Similarly, advances in electronics have altered automobiles radically
over the decades. While in the late 1970s and early 1980s a microprocessor was an
exception in cars, 20 years later models had up to 100 processors embedded
(Turley, 2003). Moreover, the importance of integrated software has risen dras-
tically and is now a major differentiation factor. 300 software developers worked
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for instance several years to program the new instrumental panel in the Mercedes
S-Class 2014 (de Paula, 2013). Companies operating the automotive industry need
subsequently to constantly adapt to these changing market conditions and tech-
nological gatekeepers have to therefore balance new and obsolete technological
know-how.
Replies were examined systematically according to the procedure suggested by
Glaeser and Laudel (2009). The interviews were transcribed first and then im-
portant interview excerpts were collected and assigned to categories. On this basis
the data were further reduced. All interviews were coded independently and the
results were afterwards compared among the coders. Only minor differences
existed, which were discussed and solved.
Results
The first, second and third research questions aim at the organisational level of
unlearning and deal with the core issue of the identification (research question 1)
and the evaluation procedure (research question 2) and to what extent unlearning is
implemented in technology identification and evaluation in the respective orga-
nisation by organisational directives with respect to teams conducting technology
identification and evaluation (research questions 3a and 3b).
Firstly, the identification and evaluation process itself serves as an indicator to
provide evidence of how far unlearning is generally anchored in a company. The
more the process is predetermined, the more routines may be provoked and could
impede unlearning. Therefore, research question 1 examines whether unlearning
mechanisms are implemented in the identification process. To answer this ques-
tion, interviewees were asked about the structure of the identification process and
its rigidity. The responses show that the identification procedure is determined and
structured by organisational directives (e.g., by using techniques such as sys-
tematic technology monitoring or road-mapping) in only 16 cases. Expert 9 states
that “in the field of technology”, it is important “to have an instrument that
supports the recognition of [. . .] trends, [. . .] to [record] the transfers and to
[maintain] them correspondingly”. However, expert 23 mentions that “there [is] no
kind of standard process but one that occurs repeatedly”. Hence, he does not refer
to a standard process, “because such things occur often anyway”. Three inter-
viewees (11, 23, 35) state further that their job description allows them to define
the identification process according to their own ideas. Expert 11 states that he has
“the [. . .] complete freedom here” and is “responsible for bringing up the strategic
[. . .] topics”. According to expert 16, it is “[his] duty as [manager] to manage and
lead those teams towards the right topics”. Overall, the results show that the
1650017-12
identification process is mainly individually structured and governed by the

technological gatekeeper. Therefore, according to the respondents it is important to
“get the right people at the right position” (expert 1) as “one must have an intrinsic
motivation for this topic in order to spend [his or her] time for scouting” (expert 5).
In addition, expert 13 emphasises the key position of TIE in general, as projects
are no longer stopped in the serial development stage: “if the strategic direction is
decided, [. . .] then it is pursued consequently.” He mentions that “it is clearly
constituted in the development stage that only this [strategic direction] is imple-
mented and nothing else. We just follow this path without looking left or right”
(expert 13). These statements point out the existence of rigidities that may hinder
the correction of wrong decisions in a later stage of the development process.
Whether organisations implement unlearning around evaluation criteria is

considered in research question 2. These criteria are set by the organisation in 35
cases; only in two cases are no directives given. To evaluate the extent of
unlearning within the evaluation criteria their affiliation is considered. The first
step to start the process of unlearning is a change in awareness. Unlearning may
occur gradually, so changing importance of criteria constitutes a first step to
unlearning, because the meaning of criteria changes. That means some criteria
become more important while the importance of other evaluation criteria decrea-
ses. Regarding the results, 18 experts state that criteria changed over time. In
eleven cases, the importance of specific criteria has increased over time. Con-
sidering changed criteria, it is apparent that they can be grouped into internal
(organisation-related) and external (market- and technology-related) criteria as
shown in Table 1. According to six statements, changes occur in market-related
criteria. This includes customer benefit (2 mentions), reliability (2 mentions), CO2
emission (1 mention), and weight (1 mention). Regarding the technology-relevant
criteria, specific technology-based attributes are stated in one case. In case of
internal factors, changes of criteria occur with respect to cost awareness
(1 mention) and cost to return analysis (1 mention) as well as risk analysis
Table 1. Changed organisational evaluation criteria with respect to their category.
External factors Internal factors
Market Technology Organisation

Reliability 2 Technology-based attributes 1 Cost awareness 1
CO2 emissions 1 Effort to return analysis 1
Weight 1 Risk analysis 1
Customer value 1 Focus on exclusiveness 1
Market (in general) 1
P
6 1 4
1650017-13
(1 mention) and focus on exclusiveness (1 mention). In two cases, even outdated

criteria are still kept in the evaluation set of the organisation (experts 26, 27).
The triggers leading to such changes of evaluation criteria are mainly caused by
external impulses (7 mentions) and in only two cases caused by internal impulses.
External impulses are induced by legal and political regulations (2 mentions),
customer preferences as trends (1 mention) and expectations (2 mentions) as well
as an increased resource pressure (1 mention) and technical risk (1 mention). For
example, expert 1 mentions that the most radical technological change occurs in
fields of electric, electronic, sensors and telematics systems, especially in con-
sumer electronics. He states that the high dynamism of influencing factors is not
manageable for automobile manufacturers, as they have an average development
cycle from five to seven years. In two cases, cost factors that may be subsumed
under internal factors cause change of evaluation criteria. To answer research

question 2, it can be concluded that change of evaluation criteria rarely occurs, but
exogenous shocks can lead to a changing awareness towards unlearning. In
18 cases criteria changed, which shows a first step towards unlearning. However,
outdated criteria are still kept. Expert 1 emphasizes this by stating that technology
evaluation has to be adapted to changing conditions but in the end it remains likely
rather unchanged. According to expert 16 even “in times of crises [. . .] the same
scheme for evaluation was used”.
To answer the question of whether organisations anchor team composition
strategies and directives to induce and foster unlearning (research question 3a)
and how these strategies and directives are determined (research question 3b),
the usage, the affiliation of team members, and team composition are examined.
In all organisations, identification and evaluation of technologies is conducted in
teams. Whilst research suggests that composition of these teams should be di-
versified as well as varied over time, in our sample the majority of technological
gatekeepers stated that their teams are mostly formed to ensure continuity (23
mentions). This pattern emerges because it is seen as “highly essential to have
continuity in the team instead of a hire-and-fire mentality” (expert 11) and,
“because it makes almost no sense in handing over things from one person to
another” (expert 10). In 14 cases, continuity within the team is explicitly
requested by organisational policies; in six cases, no organisational directives
are given requiring continuity. However, one has to note that “continuity” is
understood differently among the respondents. Depending on the respective
organisation, continuity describes an affiliation with the organisational unit from
two to three years (e.g., expert 3) or up to 20 years (e.g., expert 14).
Discontinuity of teams may prevent emerging routines and therefore is con-
ducive to foster unlearning in general. Nine respondents state that the discontinuity
of their team is caused by an organisational policy such as organisation-wide
1650017-14
rotation (e.g., expert 8, 12). Furthermore, expert 14 reports that they “had to be
more flexible in the last few years because [their] projects demanded [them] to be
so”. An increasing necessity of a “pool of constructors with expertise in different
disciplines who have gained knowledge and experience by working in different
areas and can be assigned various positions” is stated by expert 14. In summary,
organisational directives concerning continuity of teams are given in 23 cases.
In 14 of these cases, teams are formed to ensure continuity. In only nine cases
organisational directives tried to establish change in teams, which is partly realised
in the application of project teams. Consequently, the composition of teams
changes frequently as every new project team members are chosen based on their
technical background. Due to a higher turnover of team members, project-related
teams might foster unlearning in general. However, the teams predominantly

comprised the identical members due to their prior experience and knowledge.
Regarding the composition of teams, factors like interdisciplinary approaches,
internationality, age, technical orientation, and experience of team members were
analysed to answer research question 3b. In our study, organisational directives
concerning team composition are given in 27 cases. In spite of organisational
directives, the composition is mostly the result of an unintended or a rather
“random selection” (expert 11), even if team diversity is evaluated as crucial for
efficient teamwork by the experts (e.g., expert 8, 14, 19). The majority of
respondents state that teams are selected considering their technical diversity
(23 mentions). A different interdisciplinary background of team members is stated
in 20 cases. Furthermore, “a healthy combination of experience and youthful
dynamism” (expert 14), is mentioned by 17 experts, as well as a mixture of the age
of the team members is emphasised (17 mentions). According to expert 10 “the
constellation of [. . .] the experienced staff, [. . .] with [. . .] a massive spectrum on
topics [. . .] and the young ones” has mainly proven to be “very productive”.
Diversity in the cultural background of the team members is stated in only 11
cases. The findings provide evidence that only in a minority of cases teams are
composed heterogeneously and that their composition occurs rather by chance.
Therefore, it becomes apparent that most organisations do not attach importance to
a diversified team structure, and that organisational awareness for team structures
that may foster unlearning is quite small or nonexistent. This finding is supported
by the fact that team members are “almost always the usual suspects” (expert 31)
as they are “the experienced staff ” (expert 31) and “someone who knows some-
thing well, should work on it” (expert 19) in case of project-related teams, which
is reported by six respondents. In conclusion, organisations do not anchor team
composition strategies and directives to induce or foster unlearning in the process
of technology identification and evaluation. Even if organisational directives exist,
they are mostly not fully pursued in practice.
1650017-15
Unlearning in organisations also requires unlearning at an individual level.

Therefore, the fourth research question focuses on the individual level of
unlearning as the important role of the technological gatekeeper, especially for
designing processes and team structures in TIE, was emphasized previously. As
expert 1 suggests, technology identification “depends on the individual and of
course a person is always affected by gained experience and by the individual
evaluation pattern”. To explore whether technological gatekeepers can unlearn
specific features that characterise a representative and promising technology,
interviewees were asked if their individual view of a promising technology has
changed over time. As already described in the context of organisational evalua-
tion, individual unlearning is conducted while stability of the gatekeepers’ pro-
totypical features is considered. Evidence is given that technological gatekeepers

have formed and acquired cognitive patterns which are stable over time. Partici-
pants retained constituting features of these cognitive patterns in 24 cases. Only in
seven cases, changes in cognitive prototypical features could be found. Changed
prototypical features include environmental protection (3 mentions), followed by
uniqueness of technology (2 mentions) as well as application-orientation and re-
liability (1 mention each). Expert 2 illustrates that by stating that “in the field of
commercial vehicles you get into trouble with customers if you develop something
that is not reliable, that will induce massive losses in the market”.
To answer research question 4a, it is apparent from the collected data that
individual unlearning rarely occurs as technological gatekeepers keep their
existing prototypical features. Although expert 24 states the importance “to think
outside of the box, when it is noticed that some processes are not advantageous”,
the results indicate that individual unlearning is in this respect rather limited. If
prototypical features change (7 mentions), this is accompanied often by a simul-
taneous change of organisational evaluation criteria in five cases. In case that
prototypical features do not change (24 mentions), they are kept, even if organi-
sational changes have occured which was stated in two cases.
This is further indicated by data considering impulses that lead to unlearning, as
asked in research question 4b: In seven cases external impulses, that can be traced
back to the market (customer expectations, increased request of services, losses, a
fall in demand), to policy regulations, to the shortage of skilled professionals as
well as to external advisers are named each once to be decisive for the change of
prototypical features. In only two cases internal impulses such as personal expe-
rience and modified organisational policy (cross-functional work) induce a change
in the experts’ prototypical features. This shows that change of technological
gatekeepers’ awareness towards unlearning is only raised by exogenous shocks
from organisational environment.
1650017-16
Discussion and Implications

The results of our study suggest that unlearning plays a minor role in the area of
TIE, due to rigidities on both the organisational as well as the individual level.
Organisational directives concerning the identification process are given in only
16 cases and a formal process of technology identification appeared to be absent in
many of the cases studied. The responsibility for designing such a process usually
rests with the technological gatekeeper. As a consequence, technology identifi-
cation is strongly shaped by the technological gatekeeper who takes the role of an
initiator. Even if organisational directives were in place, in three cases the re-
sponsible expert (11, 23, 35) was explicitly assigned by the organisation to or-
ganise and structure the identification process. Regarding research question 3a, it
can be furthermore stated that organisations focussed solely on aspects of

unlearning in the team composition while neglecting this during the process of
technology identification itself. This might be due to the reason that organisations
rely fully on the respective individuals, who are seen as experts to design the
process.
Organisational directives set the ostensive aspect of the identification procedure
but not its executions (performative aspect). The performative aspect is described
by Tsang and Zahra (2008) as “specific actions performed by specific individuals
in a specific place and time” (p. 1443). So the technological gatekeeper occupies a
position of considerable strategic importance and organisations may run the risk
that this person does not act in line with the interests of the organisation. Hence,
companies need to focus on setting organisational directives and procedures also
in the identification of technologies. The reasons for this is twofold. First, a
stringent process can help companies to prevent unwanted individual influence and
can therefore ensure that technological gatekeepers act in the interest of corporate
strategic goals and are not misled by personal preferences. This could also be
found in four cases where the identification process is explicitly set in organisa-
tions that established change in teams. Second, a standardised process serves as a
necessary prerequisite for control mechanisms. Such control mechanisms enable
the organisation in the first place to evaluate the behaviour of technological
gatekeepers and to interfere if it does not match to the organisational goals.
Technology evaluation criteria on the contrary are almost exclusively specified by
the organisations. Despite the fact that the organisational environment is char-
acterised by rapid and multi-directional technological change, rigidity dominates
the evaluation of technology. In four cases the organisational evaluation scheme
hardly changed and where it did, these changes were mainly with respect to
changed market factors. Only one observed evaluation criterion concerning the
technology itself changed, suggesting that characteristics of technologies may be
1650017-17
highly consistent. Changes in criteria allocated to internal factors mainly con-

cerned cost and risk awareness. Exogenous shocks constituted the most important
external impulse for change, as also described for example by Akguen et al.
(2006), Akguen et al. (2007), Sinkula (2002) and Becker (2008). Shocks lead
subsequently to an altered perception of specific criteria, which serves as a pre-
requisite for unlearning. However, outdated criteria are still retained, limiting the
effect of unlearning. The fact that especially internal evaluation criteria have
hardly changed over time can have its origin in two reasons. First, companies
operate in an environment with a low technological and market turbulence in
which an adjustment of criteria is not necessary. Second, evaluation criteria may
not have changed because of existing path dependencies and technological tra-
jectories. The willingness of individuals is consequently reduced to change given

evaluation criteria, although circumstances and requirements for technologies may
demand it. Hence, companies need to foster an “alertness” for change and need
therefore to constantly reevaluate their technological evaluation criteria in the light
of competitive ramifications.
Regarding the main impulse of changed criteria across the organisations, a
heterogeneous pattern is observed. This could be attributed to the fact that the
experts belong to different groups, namely automotive original equipment manu-
facturers (OEMs) and suppliers. Changes in the evaluation criteria of the auto-
mobile manufacturers occurred mostly due to market-related changes. This may be
a consequence of their stronger dependency and focus on the end-customer market
and its needs. Hence, experts of OEMs may have a more holistic or integrated
view than the experts of the participating suppliers. In the case of the component
suppliers changed evaluation criteria mainly included cost-and risk awareness,
which might be explained by an increasing cost pressure due to a highly com-
petitive environment. Overall, evaluation criteria seem to possess a high durability,
so that outdated criteria are still retained and mostly only an adaptation of existing
criteria is conducted.
At the organisational level, structures concerning team aspects and the identi-
fication process rarely appeared to support or foster unlearning despite evidence
that unlearning can be stimulated by deploying different expertise and talents of
team members (Cegarra-Navarro and Dewhurst, 2006). Additionally, emerging
conflicts and discussions among team members may foster unlearning of old
routines or rules (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Sherwood, 2000). However, the
teams mentioned in our study were formed to ensure continuity, something which
can have an inhibiting effect on unlearning (Carmona and Perez-Casanova, 1993).
Continuity in this case is desired by the company to enhance teams’ experience
and knowledge as the team members are experts on their specific field. In case of
project-related teams, the members are also similar regarding their experience and
1650017-18
expertise. Another factor enabling unlearning is the high turnover of team mem-
bers, which means that strength and amount of organisational memory is reduced
and that there is less commitment to previous practises (Becker et al., 2006). Our
study indicates only a small turnover of team members and consequently little
impulse for unlearning (e.g., Klein, 1989; Tsang and Zhara, 2008).
Team composition was determined to a large extent by organisational direc-
tives. A strongly heterogeneous pattern of composition is apparent across the
organisations with regard to factors like interdisciplinarity, internationality, age,
specialisation, and experience of the team members. Although research suggests that
diversified teams stimulate unlearning (e.g., McGill and Slocum, 1993; Nembhard
and Shafer, 2008), this element was not explicitly valued by the organisations in our
study. The composition of teams was rather arbitrary. Although the teams were
largely formed as a result of organisational directives, they were not designed to
foster unlearning or it was not consistently implemented or actively pursued.
In general, the companies we studied built team structures that opposed
unlearning, which points to a contracting approach to unlearning, which requires a
proactive approach. Organisational routines that can for instance arise from the
continuity or composition of teams have, thus, to be questioned continually, since
rigid and inefficient structures can otherwise prevent flexibility.
Regarding the individual level of the analysed technological gatekeepers, our
findings indicate that specific prototypical features of a representative technology
are mostly kept once they have been formed. This is because of the strong cog-
nitive anchoring of these characteristics that make it difficult for an expert to
actively unlearn these features that are based on previous experience and com-
petences. It is more difficult to unlearn for experts, who have gained great expe-
rience (Becker, 2008) as they have invested considerable time and resources into
building their knowledge and tend to function successfully under routines (Zell,
2003; Knowles and Saxberg, 1988). Obsolete and outdated cognitive prototypes,
however, can obstruct identification of new, more innovative technologies, be-
cause technological gatekeepers may hold tight to old behavioural and cognitive
patterns. There is also hardly any change in such organisational evaluation criteria.
Experts are not confronted therefore with the necessity to adapt or even unlearn
their outdated, individual criteria. Even in the cases where organisational evalu-
ation criteria changed, only a minority of respondents mentioned that their indi-
vidual identification criteria changed as well. Thus, technological gatekeepers
seem not to unlearn actively, even if the organisation tries to do so. However, it
might also be argued, that in case, influential technological gatekeeper do not
change their individual beliefs, it might be obvious that their team is likely to
maintain existing evaluation criteria. It can be summarised that technological
1650017-19
gatekeepers do not appear to want the organisation to unlearn, which is indicated

by the composition of their team and the identification process.
In conclusion, the statements indicate that companies are on the threshold at
which unlearning is initiated. The necessity to unlearn does not seem to exist so
far. However, as the bandwidth of available new technologies keeps widening,
companies are forced to open up and to abandon their rigid, unlearning-impeding
structures. In this context, it is important to keep in mind the risk of internal
resistance against unlearning (e.g., Jansen, 2000; Klein, 1984; Kotter and Schle-
singer, 1979), as well as the risk of outflowing knowledge as a consequence.
In addition to organisational directives that promote active unlearning, a general
consciousness for unlearning needs to be anchored organisationally to strengthen
the readiness of the employees to continually question their existing thought

patterns as well as their behaviour. In our cases, some experts emphasised the
increasing importance of unlearning in the area of TIE. They comment critically
on the fact that only incremental or small improvements are considered and that
only the obvious aspects are recognised, rather than seeing the “bigger picture” or
“thinking outside of the box”. Companies need to implement a wilful “unlearning
culture”, which rewards employees, who are willing to actively let go of obsolete
cognitive ballast.
Possibilities for Future Research

Although this study illustrates a step forwards in understanding unlearning in
technology identification and evaluation, further research is needed.
Possibilities for future research arise from methodological, sample-related, and
topic-related aspects. Regarding the methodology, a qualitative approach has been
chosen to gain insights into individual and organisational unlearning. Hence, the
explanatory power of this study is limited to mere exploratory findings. Future
research could go a step further and examine the aspects of this study with a
quantitative approach. This would offer the possibility to measure the cause-effect
relationship, the degree of unlearning capabilities and routines directly and to
construct thereof a hierarchy among influential factors. Additionally, an emphasis
was laid on an early stage of the technology selection process. Technology
identification and evaluation is however normally an enduring, long lasting pro-
cedure in which several steps and stages have to be taken until a technology is
finally commercialised and embedded into a product. Future research could con-
sequently examine later stages individually or the process as a whole from a
longitudinal perspective. This would allow insights into the necessity and speci-
fications of unlearning in altered conditions.
1650017-20
Regarding the sample of this study, companies from the automotive industry
were chose as sample objects due to their high necessity to innovate. With this
industry focus, the question remains to what extent findings of this study can be
transferred to other industries with a lower or even higher technological and/or
market turbulence. In order to answer this question a cross-industry sample could
help to uncover similarities and differences between the automotive industry and
different industries. Schorr (2008) pointed on the structure of the automotive
industry with its cascading structure having OEMs at the top and different levels of
suppliers underneath. This hierarchical structure offers additional possibilities for
further research. Similar to a cross-industry approach, similarities and differences
between OEMs and suppliers as well as among suppliers on different levels could
exist, which demands from companies to apply different unlearning behaviour and
capabilities. As almost all automotive OEMs from Germany participated in this
study, especially research on suppliers could deepen the understanding. Next to the
industry focus, a specific group of key employees was chosen as sample subject
due to their decisive role in technology identification and evaluation. Previous
research on unlearning (e.g., Becker, 2008; Becker et al., 2006; Akguen et al.,
2006; Cegarra-Navarro and Moya, 2005) has shown however that unlearning
should involve all decision makers. Future research could subsequently shift the
perspective and examine unlearning in technology identification and evaluation
with respect to other decision makers.
Future possibilities for research also result from the focus on cognitive proto-
types on an individual level as well as regarding the team composition, the
identification behaviour, and the evaluation criteria on an organisational level. The
present study extended the scope of research on unlearning in general by including
cognitive prototypes as an element of individual unlearning. The findings of this
study illustrate nevertheless only a first step to understand how unlearning occurs
on this cognitive and perceptual level. Future research should therefore try to
further open up this black box by examining influential factors. These factors
comprise the intrinsic motivation of individuals to unlearn as well as their general
awareness of its general necessity. Additionally, extrinsic motivators such as
trainings and directives could be analysed to test their actual influence on
unlearning. Akguen et al. (2006) emphasised also the role of teams in unlearning.
With respect to cognitive prototypes, future research could try to examine how
cognitive prototypes are developed, influenced, and shared in teams and whether
these processes are reciprocal among team members or if they are following
hierarchical structures. Although the findings of this study clearly demonstrate that
organisational directives do not seem to have a major influence on individuals, this
influence could be given in such teams. On site of the organisational aspects,
future research could examine how the advancement of existing and the
1650017-21
development of novel sources of technological information increase the necessity

to unlearn. Social media are such a novel source of information which bears the
potential to change the search behaviour and scope of companies. Nevertheless, a
recent study by Scheiner (2014) showed for instance that social media are eval-
uated as rather unimportant independently from company size or innovation-
related activities in organisations.
This study showed in addition, that changed criteria have predominantly
an external relation. Further research could thus be conducted to explain
further the influence of external factors such as shocks and regulations. With
respect to unlearning in teams and the team composition, technological gate-
keepers seem to take a defensive position. In order to overcome this attitude, the
underlying reasons have to be understood which illustrates another starting point

for research.
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Organisational and Individual Unlearning in Identification and Evaluation of Technologies

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International Journal of Innovation Management

Vol. 20, No. 2 (February 2016) 1650017 (27 pages)

ORGANISATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL UNLEARNING

CHRISTIAN V. BACCARELLA*, NINA FELLER† and KAI-INGO VOIGT‡

Published 25 June 2015

The ability of an organisation to recognise and evaluate technologically relevant infor-

Keywords: Individual unlearning; organisational unlearning; technology identiﬁcation;

The aim of this paper is therefore to empirically examine unlearning in the

Derivation of Research Questions

and skeptical attitude and communication within the organisation in order to

stimulate unlearning. Klein (1989) focusses on the general circumstances and

criteria represent the quintessence of the accumulated organisational memory and

companies. Only by questioning existing criteria (and possibly abandoning some)

regarding specialisation, nationality, culture, age, and working experience. Car-

Research question 3a: Do organisations implement team com-

In cognitive research, individual unlearning is deﬁned as a change of value and

recommend examining these cognitive prototypes to gain a deeper insight into

identiﬁcation process is mainly individually structured and governed by the

Whether organisations implement unlearning around evaluation criteria is

Table 1. Changed organisational evaluation criteria with respect to their category.

External factors Internal factors

Market Technology Organisation

(1 mention) and focus on exclusiveness (1 mention). In two cases, even outdated

under internal factors cause change of evaluation criteria. To answer research

teams might foster unlearning in general. However, the teams predominantly

Unlearning in organisations also requires unlearning at an individual level.

totypical features is considered. Evidence is given that technological gatekeepers

Discussion and Implications

can be furthermore stated that organisations focussed solely on aspects of

highly consistent. Changes in criteria allocated to internal factors mainly con-

jectories. The willingness of individuals is consequently reduced to change given

gatekeepers do not appear to want the organisation to unlearn, which is indicated

the readiness of the employees to continually question their existing thought

Possibilities for Future Research

development of novel sources of technological information increase the necessity

underlying reasons have to be understood which illustrates another starting point

Abernathy, WJ and JM Utterback (1978). Patterns of industrial innovation. Technology

Becker, K (2010). Facilitating unlearning during implementation of new technology.

Björkman, I (1989). Factors inﬂuencing processes of radical change in organizational

performance data. Biological Cybernetics, 53, 189–194.

Nystrom, PC and WH Starbuck (1984). To avoid organizational crises, unlearn. Orga-

discontinuous innovations: A theoretical model. Journal of Product Innovation

Starbuck, WH (1996). Unlearning ineffective or obsolete technologies. International

Turley, J (2003). Motoring with microprocessors. Available at http://www.embedded.com/

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