PENALTIES | EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C. Lagran 2. Reclusion perpetua,
Topic: Simultaneous Service of Penalty 3. Reclusion temporal,
Doctrine: The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served 4. Prision mayor,
simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. 5. Prision correccional,
ISSUE: Should Lagran be released on the ground that he has already 6. Arresto mayor,
simultaneously served his sentences? 7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
FACTS: On April 18, 1994, petitioner Pete Lagran was convicted by the RTC 9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
of Quezon City of 3 counts of violation of BP Blg. 22. He was sentenced to 10 Temporal absolute disqualification
suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for each count and to pay a fine of 11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right
P125,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in insolvency. He appealed to the CA to follow a profession or calling, and
but it dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief. The decision became final 12. Public censure.
and executory and entry of judgment was made. By virtue of an Order issued
by Judge De Guzman of the RTC of QC, petitioner was committed to the Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum
Quezon City Jail. Later, he was transferred to the New Bilibid Prison where he duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length
has been serving his sentence until present. Petitioner filed the instant petition of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
for habeas corpus, praying for his immediate release as he allegedly No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total
completed the service of his sentence. Citing Art. 70 of the RPC, he argued of those imposed equals the same maximum period.
that if the penalties or sentences imposed on the accused are identical, Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
and such penalties or sentences emanated from one court and one In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties shall
complaint, the accused shall serve them simultaneously. He stated he has be computed at thirty years. (As amended).
been incarcerated for 2 years and 4 days, thus, his detention is now without
legal basis. Art. 70 of the RPC allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only
if the nature of the penalties so permit. The penalties that can be
RULING: NO. Petitioner's argument deserves scant consideration. simultaneously served are:
Art. 70 of the RPC provides: Successive service of sentence. — When the (1) perpetual absolute disqualification,
culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously (2) perpetual special disqualification,
if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall (3) temporary absolute disqualification,
be observed: (4) temporary special disqualification,
In imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be (5) suspension,
followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be (6) destierro,
possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty first imposed, (7) public censure,
or should they have been served out. (8) fine and bond to keep the peace,
For purposes of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the (9) civil interdiction, and
respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the (10) confiscation and payment of costs.
following scale:
1. Death,
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These penalties, except destierro, can be served simultaneously with

imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be
served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. Where
the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms
should be served successively.

In the case at bar, petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment
for every count of the offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not
allow petitioner to serve all the prison terms simultaneously. Applying the rule
on successive service of sentence, we find that petitioner has not yet
completed the service of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence
only on February 24, 1999. His prayer, therefore, for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus has no basis.

Disportive: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

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Lllamado v CA
Topic: Not a Penal Statute
Doctrine: Courts have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the
spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated
by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the CA erred on denying Llamado’s petition for
probation on the grounds of PD No. 968, as amended? NO
2. (more on the topic at hand) Whether or not PD No. 968, as amended
can be applied to Llamado’s conviction? NO
Facts:
Ricardo Llamado and Jacinto Pascual, Treasurer and President of
Pan Asia Pacific Corp., respectively, wherein Llamado was prosecuted for
violating BP22 by the RTC of Manila. Llamado allegedly co-signed a postdated
check payable to Leon Gaw in the amount of P185k wherein the said check
was dishonored due to lack of sufficient funds.
Llamado was solely convicted because Pascual fled the country and
jurisdiction to try him has not yet been obtained.
RTC Ruling:
Llamado was sentenced to prision correccional and fine of P200k with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and required to reimburse the
amount of P185k plus cost of the suit.
CA Ruling:
On July 9, Llamado’s counsel received from the CA a notice of file his
Appellant’s Brief within 30 days. They managed to secure several extensions
of time within which to file his brief, the last extension expired on Nov. 18.
However, his counsel sought advice from another counselor, on Nov. 30 with
assistance of his new counsel, filed to the RTC a Petition for Probation
invoking PD No. 968 (Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds
Thereof And For Other Purposes) as amended. It was not accepted by the
lower court, since the said case was already forwarded to the CA.
Llamado then filed to the CA, a Manifestation and Petition for
Probation dated on Nov. 16 enclosing a copy of the Petition for Probation
that he had submitted to the trial court. Llamado asked the CA to grant his
Petition for Probation or to remand the petition back to the trial court. At the
same time, Llamado, prayed that the running for the period for the filling of his
Appellant’s Brief be held in abeyance until after the CA shall have enacted in
his Petition for Probation.
In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March 1988 and filed with the
Court of Appeals, petitioner formally withdrew his appeal conditioned,
however, not on the approval of his Petition for Probation.
Nevertheless, CA denied the Petition for Probation. Llamado moved
for MR which was also denied.
SC Ruling: NO. Llamado cannot apply for a petition for probation
because the judgment has become final and that the Probation Law is
not a penal statute to be given liberal construction.
1. In P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, Section 4 - the
trial court could grant an application for probation “at any time”, “after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,” and after “an appeal
has been taken from the sentence of conviction.” Hence, the filing of the
application for probation was deemed to constitute automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.
After it was amended by PD 1257, it reveals that it had established a
prolonged but definite period during which an application for
probation may be granted by the trial court. That period was: 'After the
trial court shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before
he begins to serve his sentence.’ Clearly, the cut-off time-
commencement of service of sentence-takes place not only after an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction, but even after
judgement has been rendered by the appellate court and after
judgment has become final.
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In the present case Section 4 as amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in
effect, hence, petitioner Llamado's application for probation would have
had to be granted. His application for probation was filed well before the
cut-off time established by Section 4 as amended.
Note: Period of perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the RTC is
15 days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from.
Appeal is taken or perfected by simply filling a notice of appeal with the RTC
which rendered the judgment appealed from.
2. Llamado invokes the dissenting opinion of Justice Bellosillo that to
recourse to the cardinal rule in statutory construction that penal laws
should be liberally construed in favor of the accused and to avoid a too
literal and strict application of the proviso in PD No. 1990 which defeat the
manifest purpose or policy for which the probation law was enacted.
1. Llamado states that Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, is vested
in the trial court solely and CA has no jurisdiction to entertain the same
and should have remanded to the trial court. The SC deemed that the trial
court lost its jurisdiction over the case when petitioner perfected his
appeal. The CA was not in a position to remand the case except for
execution of judgment. Also, Llamado is not at liberty to casually attack
that jurisdiction when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the
argument is mooted by the conclusion that Llamado has right to apply for
probation but was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR No.
04678 is hereby AFFIRMED

This court cannot accept the argument of Llamado because on the proviso
“no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction”
did not really mean the 15 day rule.

On the petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal statutes,

we note at the outset that the Probation Law is not a penal statute.
However, we understand Llamado’s argument is to be really that any
statutory language that appears to favor the accused in a criminal case
should be given a "liberal interpretation." Courts have no authority to
invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the spirit of the law" where the
words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation.

The spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are to be
derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some
external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending
the words of the legislature.
Additional arguments for recit:
People v Montecalvo
Topic: Execution and service of penalties; Suspension in case of
Insanity or Minority; R.A. 9344, Sec. 38, 64 & 40
Doctrine: To give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 9344,
the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend
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even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he/she
committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance
with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she is given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community.
Issue: Whether there is merit in the appellant’s assertion of his minority during
the commission of the crime? YES
Facts:
1. Appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno was charged with raping AAA in
an Information on April 30 2003, the accusatory portion of which reads:
2. That at around 7 in the evening of Dec 9 2002, accused Rey
Monticalvo actuated by lust and with lewd design, with force and
intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with [AAA], 12 years old and is suffering from
mental disorder or is demented or has mental disability, without the
consent and against the will of said victim.
3. Upon arraignment, appellant Monticalvo pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
4. At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the defense failed to
make any stipulation of facts.
5. The pretrial conference was then terminated and trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
6. Prosecution presented witnesses;
a. AAA, the victim
b. BBB, mother of AAA
c. Analiza Pait, neighbor and friend of AAA
d. Dr. Nochete, Medical officer
e. Dr. Belicina, Medical specialist
7. Their testimonies established the facts that AAA is a mental retardate
and was 12 years and 11 months old at the time of the rape incident.
She and appellant Monticalvo, who was then 17 years old, are
neighbors.
8. In the afternoon of 9 December 2002, AAA and her friend, Analiza,
were in front of the sari-sari store of AAA’s mother, BBB, while
appellant Monticalvo was inside the fence of their house adjacent to
the said sari-sari store.
9. appellant Monticalvo invited AAA to go with him to the kiln at the back
of their house. AAA acceded and went ahead.
10. Upon seeing appellant Monticalvo and AAA going to the kiln, Analiza
followed them until she reached a papaya tree located three and a half
meters away from the place.
11. Analiza hid under the papaya tree and from there she saw appellant
Monticalvo undress AAA by removing the latter’s shorts and panty.
12. Appellant Monticalvo, however, glanced and saw Analiza. Frightened,
Analiza ran away and went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without
telling BBB what she saw.
13. Monticalvo proceeded. After undressing AAA, appellant made her lie
down, placed himself on top of AAA and made push and pull
movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped, allowed AAA to sit down
for a while and then sent her home.
14. When AAA got home, her mom asked her where she came from and
she said that she was at the back of their house as appellant
Monticalvo brought her there and had sexual intercourse with her.
15. The next day, BBB brought AAA to the police station and the hospital
where she was examined and found that there were completely
healed hymenal lacerations
16. Dr. Nochete explained that AAA could have sustained those complete
healed hymenal lacerations more than a month prior to the date of the
examination.
17. He also clarified that even though AAA has no fresh hymenal
laceration it does not necessarily mean that no sexual intercourse was
committed on her on Dec 9 2002.
18. Possibly because the vaginal canal has become loose. They did not
also find any trace of sperm, its presence being dependent on whether
the appellant did ejaculate or not.
RTC Ruling: Found appellant Rey Monticalvo y Magno guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of a demented person committed against
AAA, thereby imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
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CA RULING: Rendered the assailed Decision on 3 December 2009 affirming
in toto the trial court’s Decision dated 18 October 2005
SC Ruling: Yes, At the time of the commission of the crime charged on 9
December 2002, appellant was only 17 years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled
to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years
of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is
one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80
of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
(2) Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the law shall be imposed, but always
in the proper period.
Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable
penalty upon appellant is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to
reclusion perpetua — the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant can be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within
the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal), that is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and maximum of which shall
be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (there being no
other modifying circumstances attendant to the crime), that is 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. With that, the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be imposed upon
the appellant.
On May 20 2006, Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," took effect. Section 68 thereof
specifically provides for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence.―Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under
this Act or other applicable law.
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case even though
the crime was committed four (4) years prior to its enactment and effectivity.
Parenthetically, with more reason should Republic Act No. 9344 apply to this
case as the 2005 conviction by the lower courts was still under review when
the law took effect in 2006.
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has
reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who
is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense
is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need
of application: Provided, however, that suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the
law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21,
thus:
SEC 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
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before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict with the law mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as
has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the maximum, is imposed upon the appellant; and (3) the amount of exemplary
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this damages awarded by the lower courts is increased from P25,000.00 to
Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages both in the
a certain speci7ed period or until the child reaches the maximum age of amount of P50,000.00 are maintained. This case, however, shall be
twenty-one (21) years. REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344. SO ORDERED.
Suspension of the sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the
law reaches the maximum age of 21 years old. The age of the child in conflict
with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she
was still of tender age.
At present, appellant is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of
the trial court was promulgated prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344.
Therefore, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of the said law is already moot
and academic

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No.
9344, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as
he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall
be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order that he/she is given the
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is
that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00457 dated 3 December 2009 is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: (1) appellant is found guilty of rape under subparagraph
(b) of Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not under
subparagraph (d) thereof; (2) in view of the privileged mitigating circumstance
appreciated in favor of appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced
to reclusion temporal and being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies and the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision
Monsanto v Factoran
Topic: Extinction of criminal liability: total extinction - effect of pardon
Doctrine: The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime
and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
The Court stated that a pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has
been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.
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Issue: Whether or not the executive pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualifications as prescribed by the Revised Penal Code? NO.
Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then
assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to imprisonment of four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum,
to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a
fine of P3,500 she was also ordered to indemnify the government in the sum
of the defrauded amount in total of P4,892.50.
The SC affirmed the decision in a prior case. Pending her motion for,
she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before
conviction). By reason of said pardon, she wrote the Calbayog City treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of
Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended
the absolute pardon.
She wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her
has wiped out the crime which implies:
1. That her service in the government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date
of her preventive suspension;
2. that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension;
and
3. that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50.
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy
Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate
her former position and that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former
public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and
entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
SC Ruling: No. The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the Executive
Secretary.
They defined pardon as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. . . . A pardon is a deed, to the validity of
which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.”
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never Committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes.
The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon
implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.
The Court stated that a pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has
been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain
why Monsanto, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for
lost earnings and benefits.
The Court does not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots
out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated
as if he were innocent. This is because pardon cannot mask the acts
constituting the crime.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring
back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be
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constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of
the privilege.
Therefore, the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office
forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa
thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to
that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this
particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, she may apply for
reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction.
And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds

Additional Notes:
Conviction of pardon
Petitioner’s basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to
her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while
her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. But it was stated that it is
not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon,
she is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction
by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality. People v Patriarca
Civil indemnity Topic: Amnesty, its effects; Amnesty v. Pardon
Petitioner also sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity Doctrine: Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability offense itself; it overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not though he had committed no offense.
served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil
liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of Jose
Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger Patriarca?
of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
Facts: Nonito Malto (witness) testified that on June 30, 1987, Jose Patriarca
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Jr. with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in his house,
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs. So which he granted. They had with them a person who was hogtied. The accused
ordered. asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished and Malto complied.

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Around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a
gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering
the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard
two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions to carry away
the dead man. Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo
Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military, on
March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo (member of the Civilian Home Defense
Force (CHDF) in their locality) were recovered in the property of a Rubuang
Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
When Elisa Alevaro was informed that her son was abducted by the New
People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military
and looked for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the
NPA passed, that they saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for
drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA. After
three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a
relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca,
Jr.
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who
admitted that Patriarca is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon,
but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal cases filed against
him.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending
Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed
Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of
Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National
Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National
Amnesty Board.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter to the National Amnesty
Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for
reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken
by the NAC. In his reply, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things,
that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.
RTC Ruling: A decision was rendered convicting the accused.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca,
Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory provided
by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of
the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for
failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted."
SC Ruling: Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation
No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March
25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor
and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political
beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not
limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion
or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal
association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority
or agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means
of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without
leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War;
Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal
ends."
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to
the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished
by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.
Amnesty v. Pardon
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is:
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Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
it is granted to one after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36,
Revised Penal Code).

Amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is

a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. It is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Romualdez v Marcelo
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon Jose N. Patriarca, Topic: Extinction of criminal liability; Total extinction; R.A. 3019 and
Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the prescription
appeal. Doctrine: Same as ruling

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of

the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case
No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664,
which are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon,12 are ordered DISMISSED. The release of Jose N. Patriarca who
is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise ORDERED
unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance
with this decision.
Issue: WON the criminal offenses charged against Romualdez have already
prescribed. YES
Facts:
1. Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez is being charged with violations of
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets
and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period
1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department
of Foreign Affairs.
2. Romualdez claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused
its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him
for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
3. Romualdez asserts that the Ombudsman (Marcelo) cannot revive the
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004.
4. He also claims that the case should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
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5. Ombudsman Marcelo, however, contends that:
a. the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 does not mean that Romualdez was thereafter exempt
from criminal prosecution;
b. that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should
it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary
investigation;
c. that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the
filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989
interrupted the prescriptive period;
d. that the absence of Romualdez from the Philippines from
1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based
on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
e. The PCGG avers that the Omdudsman need not wait for a
new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of
Romualdez
f. And since both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 (the Act To
Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin To Run) are silent as to whether
prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent
from the Philippines, the RPC should be applied. (RPC
provides that prescription is interrupted when accused is
outside of the Philippines)
Ruling:
Section 11 of RA 3019 (amended by BP 195) provides a prescriptive period of
15 years but before it was amended by BP 195 on March 16,1982, the
prescriptive period was 10 years. The amendment cannot be given retroactive
effect because it is not favorable to the accused.
Hence, offenses allegedly committed by Romualdez from 1962 up to March
15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses
allegedly committed by Romualdez during the period from March 16, 1982 until
1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when the period begins to run and when it is interrupted, reference is
made to Section 2 of Act No. 3326:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The Court ruled that the prescriptive period began to run from the discovery
thereof on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez against Romualdez with the PCGG.
The Court however disagrees to the Marcelo’s contention that the prescriptive
period was interrupted when petitioner was outside the Philippines because
Article 91 of the RPC should be applied suppletorily.
(Art 91 – prescription is interrupted when accused in outside the Philippines)
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence
of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period.
The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act
No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike the
explicit mandate of Article 91.
Hence, petitioner’s absence from the Philippines did not interrupt the
prescriptive period.
The only matter left is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in
1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period.
The court held that an invalid information is no information at all and cannot
be the basis for criminal proceedings. Hence, no proceedings exist that could
have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
In addition, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the
same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.
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Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending
before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857-04-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered
DISMISSED.

People v Abungan

Topic: Extinction of criminal liability; Total extinction; Death of accused

pending appeal

Crime: Murder
Penalty: Criminal liability extinguished by death of Abungan

Doctrine:
RPC 89(1). How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment

Issue: WON the death of the appellant (1) pending appeal and (2) prior to the
finality of conviction extinguishes his criminal and civil liabilities arising from a
delict or crime. - YES

Facts: Pedro Abungan, Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. were
charged with murder. The accused were armed with long firearms and shot
Dirilo, inflicting upon him wounds on different parts of his body thereby causing
the latter’s death. Only Abungan was arrested since the others remained at
large. After conviction by RTC, Abungan filed a Notice of Appeal and was
committed to the New Bilibid Prison. A year later, he filed the Appellant’s Brief.
In response, the OSG submitted the Appellee’s Brief. The case was then
submitted for resolution when Abungan filed his manifestation stating that he
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would not file a reply brief anymore. 2 months later, however, Abungan had
died during the pendency of his appeal.
RTC Ruling: Abungan was convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
SC Ruling: Yes. RPC 89(1) states the criminal liability is totally extinguished
by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
People v Bayotos provides that the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability and civil liability arising from the
crime or delict. However, if the civil liability is predicated on a source of
obligation (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, quasi-delicts) other than delict, the
claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused. The
offended party may pursue an action for recovery by filing a separate civil
action enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation. The offended party also need
not fear a forfeiture of his right to file the said civil action by prescription.
In this case, the death of Abungan extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover,
because he died (1) during the pendency of the appeal, and (2) before the
finality of conviction against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict
(civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. However, the victims may still
file a separate civil action against his estate if the civil liability is based on
sources of obligation other than delict as provided by NCC 1157. The death of
Abungan would result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.
Dispositive: The criminal case against Abungan is dismissed and the
appealed decision is set aside.
Del Castillo v Torrecampo
Topic: Extinction of criminal liability; escape and prescription of penalties
Doctrine: Prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date the
felon evades the service of his sentence.
Escape in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC
means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Art. 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. - The period of
prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign
country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit
another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
Issue: Did the penalty imposed on petitioner del Castillo already prescribe,
thus extinguishing his criminal liability?
Facts:
1. Petitioner Del Castillo was charged with violation of Sec. 178 of the
1978 ELection Code before the RTC of Camarines Sur.
2. According to the Information filed, petitioner Del Castillo conducted
himself in a disorderly manner on Barangay Election Day.
3. Del Castillo was striking an electric bulb and two (2) kerosene
petromax lamps lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is
located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center.
4. The voting room was then plunged into complete darkness, thereby
interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election
Tellers.
RTC Ruling: Declared petitioner Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 178(nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election
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 PENALTIES | EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Code, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum.
CA Ruling: Affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and said decision
became final and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled
on October 14, 1987.
Additional facts:
1. During the execution of judgment, petitioner Del Castillo failed to
appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest
and the confiscation of his bond.
2. However, petitioner Del Castillo was never apprehended and
remained at large.
3. Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner Del Castillo filed
before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest
on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.
4. The motion to quash, as well as his motion for reconsideration thereof
were denied.
5. On November 20, 1998, the CA rendered its now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
6. Petitioner del Castillo asserts that the CA gravely erred in holding that
the penalty imposed upon him has not prescribed, and that Art. 93 of
the RPC provides that the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence.
SC Ruling: NO, the penalty imposed on petitioner del Castillo did not
prescribe.
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978
Election Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This
being the case, We have to apply the provision of the Revised Penal Code
which allows the application of said code in suppletory character when it
provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provision of
this code. This code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such
judgment would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did
not appear for such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October
24, 1996.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence.
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up,
or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no
extradition treaty or committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time
form the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the
convict.
From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not
prescribed because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy
the second element, to wit That the convict evaded the service of the sentence
by escaping during the service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, the
petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to
run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to
Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed
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only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during
the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and
for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live
a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution
of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The
Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioners guilt
was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong
he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence
and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly
interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in
confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Dator v Carpio-Morales
Topic: Re-election of Public Officer & Condonation Principle
Condonation/Aguinaldo Doctrine: it basically means that administrative
offenses of an elected official are considered forgiven when he gets voted into
office again, or “offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where
the Constitution provides that the penalty in the proceeding for removal shall
not extend beyond removal from office, and disqualification from holding office
for a term for which the officer was elected or appointed.”
Issue: Whether the condonation principle is not applicable to Dator. NO.
Facts: The case stemmed from a complaint filed on May 2, 2016 by
complainant Moises B. Villasenor (Villasenor) against the incumbent Mayor of
Lucban, Quezon, petitioner Celso Olivier T. Dator (Dator), and Maria Lyncelle
D. Macandile (Macandile), also of Lucban, Quezon for grave misconduct,
grave abuse of authority and nepotism.
In his immediately preceding term, Dator (Mayor of Lucban, Quezon) hired his
sister Macandile as Chief Administrative Officer and designated her as
Municipal Administrator. There was no appointment paper that was submitted
to the Sangguniang Bayan for the required confirmation pursuant to Sec.
443(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC).
It was also alleged that Macandile lacked the qualifications of a Municipal
Administrator and her Job Order stated that "the above-named hereby attests
that he/she is not related within the third degree (fourth degree in case of
LGUs) of consanguinity or affinity to the 1) hiring authority and/or 2)
representatives of the hiring agency", when in truth and in fact, she is the sister
of Dator.
In the Joint Counter-Affidavit of Dator and Macandile, they denied the charges
and stated that Macandile was merely granted an authority to perform the
duties and functions of an administrator in the exigency and best interest of
public service. Macandile's credentials showed her competence as she
worked as a Head Nurse in Ginebra San Miguel, Inc. from 1994 to 2005. They
stated that the position of Municipal Administrator did not exist in the
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municipality's plantilla of personnel, hence, there was no appointment paper
submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for confirmation.
They also countered that the position of Municipal Administrator is primarily
confidential, non-career and coterminous with the appointing authority and that
the Job Order was executed for payroll purposes only. They pointed out that
complainant was a former mayor of Lucban, Quezon and the said practice was
done even during the complainant's administration. They submitted copies of
the Job Order forms issued during the administration of the complainant,
where a Dr. Palermo C. Salvacion (Dr. Salvacion) was designated as Chief
Administrative Officer from 2007 to 2010.
OMB Ruling: OMB ruled in dismissing the charges against Macandile, but
finding Dator administratively liable for Simple Misconduct. The OMB found
that Dator's act of hiring his sister without observing the regular process of
appointment, and merely issuing a Job Order was irregular. It noted that since
the position of Municipal Administrator was not in the plantilla, Dator should
have requested the Sangguniang Bayan to create the said position through an
ordinance.
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Dator. A Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise filed that Villasenor granted authority through
similar job orders to a Dr. Salvacion as Chief Administrative Officer to perform
the functions and duties appurtenant to an Administrator from 2007 to 2010. It
was further pointed out that the administrative case was extinguished by the
re-election of Dator in 2016 under the Aguinaldo (or condonation) Doctrine
which was only abandoned in 2015 by the Supreme Court in the Ombudsman
Carpio Morales vs. CA, et al, case.
CA: the CA denied the petition outright in this wise:
The Petition for Injunction, with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, is DISMISSED on the
following grounds:
1. an original action for injunction (under Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (Allgemeine Bau-
Chemie Phils. Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank, 482 SCRA 247)
2. the correct mode to impugn the Decision of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases is to appeal to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 (Gupilan-Aguilar vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 717 SCRA 503)
Ruling: No, the condonation principle is not applicable to Dator
Contrary to the position of Dator, the condonation principle is not applicable to
him.
The case of the Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mayor Julius Cesar Vergara
made a succinct discussion on the said principle and its prospective
application. Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC
precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is
meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local
position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post.
In November 10, 2015, this Court, in Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA and
Jejomar Binay, Jr., extensively discussed the doctrine of condonation and
ruled that such doctrine has no legal authority in this jurisdiction. This Court's
abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application
for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines. Considering that the present case (Conchita Carpio Morales v. CA
and Jejomar Binay, Jr) was instituted prior to the above cited ruling of this
Court. the doctrine of condonation may still be applied.
Unlike in the said case, however, the case against Dator was instituted on May
2, 2016, or AFTER the ruling of this Court in the seminal case of Conchita
Carpio Morales vs. CA and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr. Clearly then, the
condonation principle is no longer applicable to him.
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Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

Resolution dated February 23, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 154524 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman's
Decision dated March 20, 2017 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as it finds
petitioner Celso Olivier T. Dator GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, with
modification that the petitioner is meted with the penalty of ONE MONTH and
ONE DAY SUSPENSION. Petitioner Dator shall be entitled to his salary and
such other emoluments, which he would otherwise have been entitled to,
beyond the meted penalty of one month and one day suspension.

The Petition for Review assailing the Ombudsman's Decision dated March 20,
2017 and Order dated February 27, 2018 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground
of forum shopping.

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