(160) People vs.

Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)

FACTS: From various reports of the presence of armed persons roaming around the
barangays of Caibiran, SPO3 Jose Nio and his team conducted patrol where they met
the group of the accused. Upon seeing the government agents, accused’s companions
fled. Nio told the accused not to run away and introduced himself as “PC,” after which
he seized the dried coconut leaves which the accused was carrying and found wrapped
in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked
accused who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected
with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission
to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of firearm. The accused contended that the firearm
found in his possession was given by his companion when it was wrapped in coconut
leaves and claimed that he was not aware of the firearm concealed on the coconut
leaves. Trial court found the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid seizing of the property on the part of SPO3 Nio.

RULING: The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know
that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri
bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify
an arrest without a warrant."

This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought
about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk"
situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could
be made. In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away,
the former identified himself as a government agent. The peace officers did not know
that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of
firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming around in
the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the
group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object
wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure
may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and
frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents.
Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a
search warrant first. Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court
when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.

(161) ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution

On April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Station were conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of
the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger
Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving the official car of the Police
Station of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that
drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle.
They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to
resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male
person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu
to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected
crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking
in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.
Version of the Defense
On April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini
street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three
policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his
lone passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The policemen bodily searched
the accused and the tricycle driver. However, nothing was found on the persons of the
accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they
brought the accused to the police headquarters.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the
latter to follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the
presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned over the
pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However,
nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. The accused was led to a cell. The
policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the pockets of his
pants.
At about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought
outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen
to call his parents in order to settle the case. The accused did not call his parents and
he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the
office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was
found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say anything.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the
Kalookan City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched
the accused who was made to take off his pants at the police headquarters but no
marijuana was found on the body of the accused.
The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on
the strength of the arresting officers testimony. On appeal, Respondent Court found no
proof that the decision of the trial court was based on speculations, surmises or
conjectures.

Issue:
WON The evidence seized is admissible.

Ruling:
The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of
Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of
a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s). In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the
interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a
person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual
arrest. In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US
Supreme Court held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against him. It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the
Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout
of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who
were high. The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
investigate if he was actually high on drugs.
Furthermore, the court agrees with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to
raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more
particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the
person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had
an actual intention to relinquish the right. In the present case, however, petitioner is
deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial
court.

(162) Malacat vs. Court of Appeals

283 SCRA 159

FACTS: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats
reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan
Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila,
was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three
to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes moving very
fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed
both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of
men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up
with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as
allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw
Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu
found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist line." Yu's
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .
38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police
Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave
it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered
from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of
Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by
counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and
explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers
mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched,
but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.
In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial
court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a "stop and
frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while
the police officer seeks to obtain more information"; and that the seizure of the grenade
from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty
of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua,
as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he
was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of
“stop and frisk.”

HELD: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly
issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under
the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit"
arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1)
customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and
frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest
must not be confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto
or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being hiding a grenade, could not
have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat's
rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

(163) Florida vs. J.L., 98-1993, March 28, 2000

FACTS:
After an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black
male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun,
officers went to the bus stop and saw three black males, one of whom, respondent J. L.,
was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any
of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm or observe any unusual
movements. One of the officers frisked J. L. and seized a gun from his pocket. J. L.,
who was then almost 16, was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm
without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. The trial court
granted his motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search. The
intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that
decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment.

ISSUE:
Whether police officers may possess reasonable suspicion for a stop and frisk
when they receive an anonymous tip that a person of a particular description, at a
particular location, is illegally carrying a concealed firearm, and the officers promptly
verify the observable details provided by the tip.

HELD:
No. An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more,
sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. An officer, for the
protection of himself and others, may conduct a carefully limited search for weapons in
the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual conduct where, inter alia, the officer
reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, 30 . Here, the officers' suspicion that J. L. was carrying a weapon arose not
from their own observations but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an
unknown caller. The tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable
suspicion to make a Terry stop: It provided no predictive information and therefore left
the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. See Alabama v.
White , 496 U. S. 325, 327 . The contentions of Florida and the United States as amicus
that the tip was reliable because it accurately described J. L.'s visible attributes
misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. The reasonable
suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just
in its tendency to identify a determinate person. This Court also declines to adopt the
argument that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a "firearm
exception," under which a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if
the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. The facts of this case do
not require the Court to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger
alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great-- e.g., a report of a person carrying a
bomb--as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability.
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the decision of the Third District Court of
Appeal. Pet. App. A1-A28. The court held that an anonymous tip concerning presently
occurring criminal activity cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion when police can
verify only the innocent details of the tip. Instead, the court held that an anonymous
tip could serve as the basis for reasonable suspicion in three narrowly-defined
circumstances: (1) when the tip relates suspicious behavior which the police
verify as suspicious upon arrival; (2) when the tip contains predictions of future
events that the police subsequently verify; and (3) when the tip is coupled with
independent police work that uncovers additional suspicious circumstances. Id.
at A5-A6. Applying that analysis, the court held that, because the tip in this case
concerned presently occurring criminal activity and police verified only the innocent
details of the tip, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk respondent. Id.
at A7-A9.

(164) PAPA VS. MAGO

22 SCRA 857
1968
Facts: Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, when the truck transporting the
goods was intercepted by the BOC, questioned the validity of the search conducted by
them since it was made without any search warrant and whether the BOC has
jurisdiction over the forfeited goods.

Issue: Was the search conducted by the BOC valid?

Held: Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and
Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to
enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft
and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the
need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the search of a dwelling house, the
Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view,
therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for customs officers not only to board and search
vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search and examine
any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom they should suspect there was
merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced into the United States
in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in charge of the vehicle or beast
or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which
they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to
seize and secure the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture.

(165) People vs. CFI of Rizal

101 SCRA 86 (1980)

FACTS:
Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed that a shipment
of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila on a blue Dodge car. Their
agents then stationed in themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate. On that same day, a
light blue Dodge car driven by Sgt. Hope approached. Hope tried to get away but was
later blocked by the agents. Later on, the boxes were opened by representatives of BIR
in the presence of the respondents. It revealed watches and bracelets of assorted
brands, supposedly untaxed. Bureau of Customs issued Warrant of Seizure and
Detention. It was admitted that before the respondents were arrested, there was not
warrant of arrest and seizure.
Accordingly, the seized items were owned by del Rosario and Hope was only
contracted to transport them. Hope testified that he never knew the contents of the
boxes and that they were untaxed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the merchandize in a moving vehicle by authorized
agents without warrant of seizure are inadmissible in evidence.

RULING:
No. As enunciated in the leading case of Papa v. Mago: "except in the case of
the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs
law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws. Thus, we refute the constitutional charge of respondents that the
warrantless seizure violated Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution. earches and
seizures without warrant are valid if made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile
or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.
It is quite true the agents received one such information several days or a week
before the encounter; but the fact that its agents failed to obtain a warrant in spite of the
time allowance is not a sign that they have been remiss in their duty. The records hardly
reveal anything certain and confirmatory of the report during the said period except the
general knowledge that some highly dutiable goods would be transported from Angeles
City to Manila in a blue Dodge automobile. Lacking this essential determination, the
agents could not have possibly secured a valid warrant even if they had foreseen its
compelling necessity. For one thing, the information could have been just another false
alarm. rovidentially, however, things turned out differently on that day wherein the
agents acted not on the basis of a mere hearsay but on a confirmed information worthy
of belief and probable cause enough for them to adopt measures to freeze the fleeting
event.
The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the
privileged area where search and seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a
warrant.

(166) TOMAS SALVADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005

FACTS: On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations
Squadron conducted routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to
check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain
PAL personnel.
They were ordered to keep close watch on an Airbus 300 parked inside the
Domestic Airport terminal. At around 11:30 that same evening, three (3) persons had
boarded the Airbus 300. At 12:15, 3 persons had disembarked with their abdominal
areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow truck with its lights off.
 The PAF surveillance team followed the aircraft tow truck. At the Lima Gate of the
Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the tow truck. Sgt. Teves then got off,
identified himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight. They were later
identified as Tomas Salvador, petitioner, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and Napoleon
Clamor, the driver of the tow truck.
An officer approached Aurelio Mandin. He noticed that Mandin’s uniform was
partly open, showing a girdle. A package wrapped in brown packaging tape fell.
Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items, the rest of the team
surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered without a fight. The
team searched their bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles beneath their
uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5)
packets, while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team confiscated the
packets and brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.
In the morning, an examiner of the Bureau of Customs, arrived at the
PAFSECOM Office. She opened one of the packets and on seeing that it contained
dutiable goods, she proceeded to weigh the thirteen (13) packets seized from the
accused.
The accused were charged with violating Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs
Code.
All the accused denied committing the offense charged, claiming they were
framed-up by the military. However, only Salvador opted to elevate his case to this
Court. He contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the PAF
operatives is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.

RULING: The court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that under the
factual circumstances of the case at bar, there was sufficient probable cause for the
PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his companions. They boarded
the parked Air Bus 300 PAL plane at the time when there were no other PAL personnel
working therein. They stayed inside the plane for sometime and surprisingly, came out
with bulging waists. They then stopped and looked around and made apparent signals.
All these acts were sufficient to engender a reasonable suspicion that petitioner and his
colleagues were up to something illegal. Moreover, the search and seizure was
conducted in connection with the enforcement of customs law when the petitioner and
his co-accused were riding a motor vehicle. In addition, the search was conducted at
the vicinity of Lima Gate of the Manila Domestic Airport which, like every gate in the
airport perimeter, has a checkpoint. Finally, the petitioner and his companions agreed to
the search after one of them was caught with a suspicious-looking packet. Under these
circumstances, the search and seizure is legal and the seized items are admissible in
evidence.
The Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only
such as are unreasonable. Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where
searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These
recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view;
(3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations;
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. 10
 Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission
of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug
trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other
words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the
nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and
seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs
law.
Moreover, we recall that at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused
were on board a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. As stated earlier, the search of a
moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the requirement
for a search warrant. Such exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may
readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other
immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor vehicle since they can quickly be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. Verily, we
rule that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in holding that the articles
involved in the instant controversy were validly seized by the authorities even without a
search warrant, hence, admissible in evidence against petitioner and his co-accused.

(167) WHREN ET AL. v. UNITED STATES (Search and Seizure of a vehicle without
a probable cause)

FACTS: Plainclothes policemen patrolling a "high drug area" in an unmarked vehicle

observed a truck driven by petitioner Brown waiting at a stop sign at an intersection for
an unusually long time; the truck then turned suddenly, without signaling, and sped off at
an "unreasonable" speed. The officers stopped the vehicle, assertedly to warn the driver
about traffic violations, and upon approaching the truck observed plastic bags of crack
cocaine in petitioner Whren's hands. Petitioners were arrested.

Defense of the Accused: Prior to trial on federal drug charges, they moved for
suppression of the evidence, arguing that the stop had not been justified by either a
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe petitioners were engaged in illegal
drug-dealing activity, and that the officers' traffic-violation ground for approaching the
truck was pretextual. The motion to suppress was denied, petitioners were convicted,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUES: Whether the stoppage of a vehicle and search/ seizing drugs were valid
without probable cause?

HELD: The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he
has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist
absent some additional law enforcement objective.
(a) Detention of a motorist is reasonable where probable cause exists to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred. Petitioners claim that, because the police may be tempted
to use commonly occurring traffic violations as means of investigating violations of other
laws, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be whether a reasonable officer
would have stopped the car for the purpose of enforcing the traffic violation at issue.

(b) Although framed as an empirical question-whether the officer's conduct deviated

materially from standard police practices-petitioners' proposed test is plainly designed to
combat the perceived danger of pretextual stops. It is thus inconsistent with this Court's
cases, which make clear that the Fourth Amendment's concern with "reasonableness"
allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent.

(c) Also rejected is petitioners' argument that the balancing of interests inherent in
Fourth Amendment inquiries does not support enforcement of minor traffic laws by
plainclothes police in unmarked vehicles, since that practice only minimally advances
the government's interest in traffic safety while subjecting motorists to inconvenience,
confusion, and anxiety. Where probable cause exists, this Court has found it necessary
to engage in balancing only in cases involving searches or seizures conducted in a
manner unusually harmful to the individual. The making of a traffic stop out of uniform
does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice

(168) People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)

Doctrine: Where the military operatives had reasonable grounds to believe that a
crime was being committed, and had no opportunity to apply for and secure a
search warrant from the courts, the same constituted an exception to the
prohibition against warrantless searches.

Facts:

Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged
coup d’état in December 1989 against the Government.

Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team,
conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC on early morning of
December 1, 1989, which surveillance actually started November 30, 1989 at around
10:00 PM. Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the
said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as
communication command post.

Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo when a group of 5 men disengaged themselves and walked towards
their surveillance car. Maj. Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area.
However, as they passed the area, then 5 men drew their guns and fired at them, which
resulted to the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for
they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire.

Thereafter, on the morning of December 5, 1989, a search team raided the Eurocar
Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4
dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov.

Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia in the office of a certain
Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping though door.

No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, there
was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped
up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the
Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.

Issue:

Whether there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

Held:

YES, there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

It is admitted that the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant at that time. It
was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on
the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming
from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so,
thereby compelling the former to break into the office.

The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory
or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is
primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably
or even colorably explained.

In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding
areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein
were deserted.
Under circumstances, SC considered that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.
Furthermore, in the prevailing situation, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply
for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested
that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.

(169) VALMONTE vs. GEN. DE VILLA

[G.R. No. 83988. May 24, 1990.]
Facts:
In the Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition for
prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their
dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Petitioners have filed the instant motion
and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. Before submission of the
incident for resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his comment, to
which petitioners filed a reply. The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the
movants as a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether installment and operation of checkpoints is unconstitutional and

constitutes warrantless search.

Ruling:
No. No one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the
present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social
and economic policies or performance. But, at least, one must concede to it the basic
right to defend itself from its enemies and to pursue its program of government intended
for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal
right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best
achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
What the Court declared is that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under
exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the
balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may
be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is that when the
situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no
reason to remain.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorist’s right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a
rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants
are required to answer a brief question or two. 1 For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
As held by the U.S. Supreme Court:
"Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring public.
First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal. Motorists using
these highways are not taken by surprise as they know, or may obtain knowledge
of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere. Second
checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less discretionary
enforcement activity. The regularized manner in which established checkpoints
are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the
stops are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location
of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of
limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely
to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a
class, and since field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint,
there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals them there was in
the case of roving-patrol stops. Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of
discretion in locating or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-
stop judicial review.”
As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after
a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of
the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Again, as held by the U.S.
Supreme Court —
"Automobiles, because of their mobility, may be searched without a
warrant upon facts not justifying a warrantless search of a residence or office.
The cases so holding have, however, always insisted that the officers conducting
the search have ‘reasonable or probable cause to believe that they will find the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin
their warrantless search. .”
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite
similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the
commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter. In People v. Kagui Malasuqui, it was
held —
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for
the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the
most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."

(170) Aniag vs Comelec

237 SCRA 86, 1994

FACTS: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2323, “Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.
COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification
of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing
special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr.
Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for
the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner
then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner’s house and
return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano
approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano
was apprehended and detained.
Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of
information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,
and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an
elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327.
He argues that “gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons” and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional.
The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered
moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.

ISSUE: Whether the search and seizure in the check point is valid.

RULING: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an

appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution
for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case
at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano’s waist nor placed within his reach, as they
were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given
these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as
well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying
circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search
could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the
facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of
the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to
due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was
himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is
declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence
in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and
therefore, set aside.
 (171) PEOPLE v USANA and LOPEZ

323 SCRA 754; January 28, 2000

FACTS

On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the
Makati Police were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and
the South Luzon Expressway. They were checking the cars going to Pasay City,
stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the
others. At about past midnight they stopped a Kia Pride car. One of the policemen saw a
long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later
identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Escaño, to open the
door. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of the
police, parked, the other passengers were search for more weapons. Their search
yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escaño. The three passengers
were thereafter brought to the police station by PO3 Nonato. Since SPO4de los Santos
was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily
agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it,
which they asked Escaño to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which,
upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation, was found positive for hashish.
An information for violation of RA 6425 thereafter was filed against them. The trial court
found the three accused guilty of the said crime. Accused-appellants assail the manner
by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that the checkpoint
manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced. They also
complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Also,
they question the validity of the search.

ISSUES

1. WON the check point was illegal

2. WON the search was valid

3. WON the accused are guilty of violation of RA 6425

HELD

1. NO. Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of
public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. This
Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the
exigencies of public order and are conducted in away least intrusive to motorists are
allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorists’ right to "free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a
rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants
are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routinechecks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when
conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpoint herein conducted
was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be
hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of
pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those
who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be
able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not constitute a
ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search
and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed
suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the
passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights
inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting its
passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the
situation demands. We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused
have invoked. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend
to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred
from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated.

2. YES. Escano consented to the search and consented warrantless search is one of
the exceptions from the warrant requirement. Jurisprudence recognizes six generally
accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2)
search of movingvehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customssearches; (5)
consented warrantless search; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. Even though there was
ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the
vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escaño was
consented to by him.

3. NO. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk
of the car and there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of
hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.
Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez
for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. No fact was adduced to link Usana and
Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the
latter’s car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to
the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was
no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the
car or that they saw the same before it was seized.

Accused were acquitted.

(172) PEOPLE v. VINECARIO, et al. 420 SCRA 280 (2004)

Facts: On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a
checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise
known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely
appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped
past of the police officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police
officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was
only a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant
opened the bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then
brought to the police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were
investigated by police officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they
were made to sign some documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional
Trial Court rendered them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited
drugs under Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged
1,700 grams of marijuana violated there constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure.

HELD: Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as
pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection,
vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which
justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a
law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
the Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused
was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. In light then of Vinecario et al.‘s
speeding away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down
by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the
contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario,
when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was
a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen
from proceeding with their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a
reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the
law or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.

(173) Camara vs. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)

Facts: Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code for
refusing, after three efforts by city housing inspectors to secure his consent, to allow a
warrantless inspection of the ground-floor quarters which he leased and residential use
of which allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming the
inspection ordinance unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections,
appellant while awaiting trial, sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of prohibition,
which the court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, and similar cases, the District
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.

Issue: WON, the warrantless inspection is unconstitutional since it violated the Fourth
Amendment?

Held: Yes, His conviction by the CA was based on Frank v. Maryland case where
warrantless building inspections are allowed.

However, the Court overruled their decision on that case asserting that the
Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a
warrantless code enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The basic purpose
of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable against the States through the
Fourteenth, through its prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials. With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented
warrantless search of private property is "unreasonable."

To allow warrantless inspection of a building, there must be a probable cause or

an emergency circumstances that would justify the inspection. In the case at bar, it is
clear that this is a nonemergency situation since the inspectors had the luxury to visit
the building and tried to secure the appellant’s consent three times. Thus, in the
nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the inspectors obtain a
search warrant.

(174) UMIL V. RAMOS

FACTS: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-
CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit
being treated for a gunshot wound at a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the
wounded person who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually
petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidationsquad responsible for the
killing of two CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile
patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.

RULING: YES. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that
he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crime.

Petitions are DISMISSED.

(175) PEOPLE VS SUCRO

GR No. 93239 March 18, 1991

FACTS: Roy Fulgencio was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander
of the INP) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information
gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.

Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later
to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return
to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while
appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to
a group of persons. Pat. Fulgencio called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later
Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police
officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to
intercept Macabante and appellant.
Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to
be a tea bag of marijuana.
When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro. The
police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4
teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante
ISSUES: Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and
consequently.

Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful.
The rule states:
A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw
Sucro conduct his nefarious activity and the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by
the police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily
admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro
had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an
illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the
team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity. Police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted
surveillance activities of the accused.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under
Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. There is
nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in
evidence.

(176) PEOPLE v. LUISITO GO [ GR No. 116001, Mar 14, 2001]

FACTS: On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, SPO1 Mauro
Piamonte and SPO3 Candido Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit
of the Calamba Police, went to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to
follow up an intelligence report that shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there.
Police civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw
accused-appellant Luisito Go, also known as "King Louie", enter the Flamingo Disco
House with two women. Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in accused-
appellant's waist. Together, the three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was
located about a hundred meters away from the outpost.

When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that
they were conducting an "Operation Bakal," whereby they search for illegally possessed
firearms. The owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. They went
up to the second floor of the disco. The waiter turned on the lights, and the police
officers saw accused-appellant and his lady companions seated at a table. They
identified themselves and asked accused-appellant to stand up. When the latter did so,
the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of
the gun, but accused-appellant was unable to produce any. Instead, accused-appellant
brought out the driver's license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte
confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88, Serial Number
006784, with a magazine containing ten (10) rounds of live ammunition. Accused-
appellant was invited to the police precinct for questioning.

On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car,
which was parked outside. The police officers accompanied accused-appellant to his
car, a Honda Civic with license plate number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3
Liquido noticed a Philippine National Police identification card hanging from the
rearview mirror. He asked accused-appellant if he was a member of the PNP, and he
said no. The police officers asked accused-appellant for his driver's license and the
registration papers of the vehicle, but he was unable to produce them. When accused-
appellant opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found that the same
belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters
and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked accused-appellant why he
had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that
they talk the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that
they should talk at the police headquarters. Accused-appellant took out an attaché case
from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant
opened the first bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane.
The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash.

The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police station. When they
arrived at the precinct, they turned over the attaché case together with the two black
clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags containing
granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attaché case was
opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an
improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.

Consequently, two Informations were filed against accused-appellant before the

Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34. The first information charged
accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A. 6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act), and
the other information charged accused-appellant with violation of P.D. 1866 for the
illegal and unlawful possession of firearm and ammunition.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest and subsequent seizure were legal or invalid.

RULING OF THE COURT: The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be

arrested without any warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-
and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where
an arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of
a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed,
and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.

In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellant's waist when he
stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was
necessary. Accused-appellant could not show any license for the firearm, whether at
the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a
situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.

As a consequence of appellant's valid warrantless arrest, he may be

lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in
Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The
subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance,
which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal
possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an
illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause,
which states that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against warrantless
arrest cannot be used for any purposes in any proceeding. Hence, not being fruits of the
poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the
firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against
appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented
search is admissible in evidence.

(177) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GABRIEL GERENTE

 G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993

FACTS: The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and
his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood
and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. The police frisked appellant and
found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil.
The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. On May 2, 1990, two separate
information were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him
for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of Gerente was lawful and the seizure of marijuana
valid incident to his warrantless arrest

RULING: Since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace
and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully
arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain
a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as
an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides:

SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is
about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

(178) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO SINOC

[G.R. Nos. 113511-12. July 11, 1997]

FACTS: On September 20, 1991, at about 6 oclock in the morning, Isidoro Viacrusis,
manager of Taganito Mining Corporation, was motoring from the company compound to
Surigao City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero driven by Tarcisio
Guijapon. As Viacrusis and Guijapon were approaching the public cemetery of Claver,
they were stopped by several armed men. The latter, identifying themselves as
members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), boarded the Pajero and ordered Guijapon to
proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed men ordered
Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands bound behind their back, to a
coconut grove some six meters from the road, and after making them lie face down on
the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived. The driver,
Guijapon, died on the spot.

At about 7 a.m. the following day, a secret informant (known as a "civilian asset") named
Boyet reported to the police Station at Moncayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen
("carnapped") Pajero was parked behind the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at
the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion, Moncayo. On instructions of the Station
Commander, a police team went to the place. They saw the Pajero and, their initial
inquiries having yielded the information that the man who had brought it there would
return that morning, posted themselves in such a manner as to keep it in view. Some 3
hours later, at about 10:30 a.m., they saw a man approach the Pajero who, on seeing
them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that the man, identified as
Danilo Sinoc of Surigao del Norte, had the key of the Pajero, and was acting under
instructions of certain companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at
Tagum, Davao del Norte.

Riding on the recovered Pajero, the police officers brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only
to discover that his companions were no longer there. They later turned over Sinoc to
the 459th Mobile Force, together with the Pajero. Sinoc, Vicente Salon @ "Dodong,"
Benjamin Espinosa @ "Benji," Jaime Jornales @ "James," Victorino Delegencia @ Jun-
Gren," and one Roger Doe @ "Ram" (at large) were charged. Only Sinoc and Vicente
Salon were arraigned. The other accused being then at large. Assisted by their
respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and were
thereafter jointly tried.

The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, found Sinoc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in two cases jointly tried: one, of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 2 and 48 3 of the
Revised Penal Code) — in Criminal Case 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of
kidnapping with frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6 4 and 48 of the same
Code) — in Criminal Case 3565. In each case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
imposed on him. Salon, on the other hand was acquitted inasmuch as conspiracy was
not proven. Sinoc appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the police officer had personal knowledge of the crime Sinoc
committed to allow them to arrest the latter without a warrant of arrest.

RULING: Yes.
The law provides that an arrest without warrant may be licitly effected by a peace officer,
inter alia. "When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." There is
no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an offense had just
been committed; i.e., that some 12 hours earlier, a Pajero belonging to a private
company had been stolen and its driver and passenger were shot, the former having
died and the latter being on the verge of death. Nor is there any doubt that an informer
had reported that the stolen Pajero was at the Bliss Housing Project at Moncayo. It was
precisely to recover the Pajero that a team composed of SPO1 Michael Aringo went to
that place and, on taking custody of it, forthwith dispatched a radio message to "Higher
Headquarters" advising of that fact.

There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions reached the
place where the Pajero was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa, owner of the
apartment behind which the vehicle was parked, that the man who had brought the
Pajero would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus described did in fact show up
at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified by Overa as "the one who rode on
that car Pajero. Just as there is no question that when the police officers accosted him,
Sinoc had the key to the stolen Pajero and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly
to take possession of it. Sinoc's link to the stolen vehicle was thus palpable. The
foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to arrest Sinoc. His
arrest without warrant was justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers' clear
duty to apprehend him; their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.

(179) People vs. Baula

Facts: After the gruesome killing of Patronicia Caburao, the investigating police went to
the residence of the accused-appellant, Baula et al. In the process of questioning the
appellants, the police saw bloodstained bolo, short pants, polo shirts and was
subsequently confiscated without search warrant and directed to the NBI for forensic
exams. The exam resulted that the bloods found in the confiscated articles bears the
same blood type “O” as that of the victim. Thus, the accused were arrested, charged
and was convicted in the crime of murder by the RTC Lingayen and sentenced to suffer
RP. Hence this appeal for review on the decision of the lower court in the ground that
the articles sought (bloodstained bolo, shirt and short pants) cannot be admitted as
evidence against the accused since it was seized without a valid search and seizure
warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search conducted was valid under a consented
search
Held: NO. The articles are unlawfully searched and seized. A search incidental to a
valid arrest is one of the statutory exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no
search and seizure shall be effected without a valid warrant. In this instance, the arrest
should be lawful before search and seizure by the arresting officer would be conducted.
A warrantless arrest may be effected by the arresting officer when in his presence the
person arrested is have committed, committing or attempting to commit the crime. It
cannot be reversed; otherwise, it would unlawful and unconstitutional and the seized
article would be inadmissible evidence. In the case at bar, Accused-appellants were not
being arrested at the time that the subject articles were allegedly taken from them but
were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the
death of Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect
a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus likewise barred from effecting a
warrantless search and seizure.
An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the
strength of the evidence yielded by that search. The Court finds it less than
credible the stance of the prosecution that the polo shirt and short pants have
been voluntarily given. An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure
cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally
protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot
ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors. Thus, the
bloodstained polo, bolo and shorts are inadmissible as evidence.

(180) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CUBCUBIN

[G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001]

FACTS: Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police station, received a telephone
call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in
San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team,composed of SPO1 Malinao,
Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the call
and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on
the road. A tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him them accused-
appellant and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in
San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half
away from the crime scene. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told Rosal and
Malinao, Jr. that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun Dulce” and
led the policemen where accused-appellant lived. Upon arriving the police asked
permission if they could enter the house. After entering they found a bloodied shirt and
two spent .38 caliber shells. Accused appellant was then asked to return to the cafe for
identification. He was positively identified by the waitress to be the person with whom
the victim drank with. The police then went back to his house and there found a .
38paltik pistol. An information for murder was then filed against accused-appellant. The
trial court found him guilty and sentenced him with the capital punishment.

ISSUES:(1)Whether or not the arrest of the accused appellant was valid.

(2) Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.
RULING: (1) NO. There was no probable cause. The two did not have "personal
knowledge of facts" indicating that Cubcubin had committed the crime.
Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly inferred was based
entirely on what they had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP
station in San Antonio, Cavite City at about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and
reported that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an
alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the Sting
Cafe; by Danet Garcellano,waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said that the man last
seen with the victim was lean,mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a
white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants;by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata
who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-
appellant, alias "Jun Dulce" and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and
accompanied them to accused-appellant's house. Thus, PO3 Rosal andSPO1 Malinao,
Jr. merely relied on information given to them by others.(2)
(2)NO. As in this case,a mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a
search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. Nor can the warrantless
search in this case be justified under the "plain view" doctrine. The "plain view" doctrine
is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.What the
"plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification —whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused— and permits the warrantless seizure.Finally, the
prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. Even
assuming the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an
incident thereto. A valid arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either in the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control. The rationale for such search and seizure is to prevent the person arrested
either from destroying evidence or from using the weapon against his captor. It is clear
that the warrantless search in this case cannot be justified on this ground. For neither
the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accused-appellant's immediate control. In
fact, according to the prosecution, the police found the gun only after going back to the
house of accused-appellant.

(181) PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZA

G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992

Facts: S/Sgt. Molinawe and other officers received from a confidential informer that
there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. Molinawe
gave the money to Taduran who acted as the buyer. He was told to look for a certain
Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for
100 grams of marijuana, Don halted and later on Don gave Taduran "a certain object
wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and received payment
therefore.
Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding
his said purchase of marijuana. Subsequently, Major Zeidem ordered a team to
conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same
date, appellant, Lonceras and Segovia was arrested. The constables were not,
however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused.
Thereafter, agents of the NARCOM conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza, father of appellant. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was
not authorized by any search warrant. The RTC found Rodrigueza guilty of violating
the Dangerous Drug Act.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence confiscated during the raid conducted in the
house of Jovencio Rodrigueza is admissible in evidence.

Ruling: NO. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace

officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at
bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be
caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person
acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents
failed to meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution,
after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC
Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking
him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the
supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the natural
course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation.
It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been subjected
to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of
the law.
(In the case at bar, the police officer, acting as poseur-buyer in a “buy-
bust operation”, inst5ead of arresting the suspect and taking him into custody after
the sale, returned to police headquarters and filed his report. It was only in the
evening of the same day that the police officer, without a warrant, arrested the
suspect at the latter’s house where dried marijuana leaves were found and confiscated.
It was held that the arrest and the seizure were unlawful.)

(182) GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

206 SCRA 586 (1992)

FACTS: Rolito Go entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling
in the opposite or "wrong" direction. Go and Eldon Maguan's cars nearly bumped each
other. Go alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner
then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was
able to take down petitioner's car plate number. Verification at the Land Transportation
Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The security guard of the
bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the
same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably
the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner. On 8 July 1991, Go
presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police
forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police
promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against petitioner with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio
("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail
himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any
such waiver. On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and
before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his
gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an
information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional
Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor
certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did
not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with
the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.
Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. On 12 July 1991,
petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in order to expedite action on
the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent
Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and
ordered his release. Petitioner was in fact released that same day. On 17 July 1991,
however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, embodying the following: (1)
the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours
from receipt of the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted
leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled;
(3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation
dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July
1991. On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that
the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been
previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for
suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of
his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge. On 23 July 1991,
petitioner surrendered to the police.

ISSUE: Is the warrantless arrest of Rolito Go lawful?

RULING: We do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides as follows: Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact
just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was
the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's
name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge."
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is
also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San
Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the
disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in
all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan
or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was
applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was
substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right
should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had
not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released
forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

(183) People vs. Calimlim, G.R. No. 123980, August 30, 2001

Facts: Manuel Calimlim was found guilty of four (4) counts of rape by RTC of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan. Private complainant, LANIE S. LIMIN a minor 14 years old living with the
family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer (Ferrers) for the past three
years. The night of April 2, 1995, she was alone in houses of the The Ferrers. The
Ferrers were in the other house. Nearing midnight she was awakened by Calimlim who
entered her room. Appellant immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and
said "Accompany me because I killed my wife." Calimlim dragged her to the pig pen.
Afterwards, she was again forcibly taken back to her room, then to her cousin's room
and to the kitchen. In each of these places, appellant forcibly had sex with her while he
poked a knife against her neck. She was able to recognize Calimlim because while they
were in the kitchen she was able to remove the cloth covering his face. After the fourth
intercourse, appellant threatened that he would kill her if she reported the incidents.
Despite the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer who then reported to Dr. Nancy
Quinto. On cross-examination, complainant stated that she did not struggle nor shout
nor resist because she was afraid that appellant might kill her. Appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charges denying the charges and having an alibi, maintaining that he was in
his house and that he went to sleep at 10:00 P.M. That he had sex with his wife in the
early morning of April 3, 1995. He averred that he was just being used as a scapegoat
by the Ferrers who hated him since he did not vote for Ferrer who was a candidate
during the last elections. He also surmised that the Ferrers could have been irked when
appellant allowed the construction of a waiting shed in front of his house. He asserted
that as a hollow blocks maker, a physically draining job, he was often tired and weak
and had little strength to engage in sex for more than once a month. Trial court rendered
its joint decision finding appellant guilty of all charges. Appellant was sentenced to death
for each count of rape.

Issue: Calimlim claimed that the RTC overlooked his constitutional rights, such as the
requirement of giving a chance to accused to file counter-affidavits and that of his
witnesses; his being immediately arrested without warrant of arrest; and when he was
arrested he was not accorded the right to counsel when brought to the Police. In sum,
the issue was the denial of appellant's constitutional rights.

Held: The right of the accused was not violated because he waived his right to question
any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of
his liberty. He waived his right when he entered a plea of not guilty to each of the
informations charging him of rape. Thus, he had effectively waived his right to question
any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of
his liberty. This is clear from a reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
Given the circumstances of his case now, the exceptions do not apply here and we are
constrained to rule that appellant is estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his
arrest.
Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. The defense's
claim of warrantless arrest which is illegal cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of the appellant, nor can the state be deprived
of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability.
However his punishment was modified because the qualifying circumstance, concerning
"use of deadly weapon," was not alleged in the four informations against the appellant.
Even if proved during trial, still that circumstance could not be used to aggravate
appellant's crime, not having been included in the informations. To do so would violate
appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
 (184) People v Enrile
G.R. No. 74189; 26 May 1993

FACTS: A buy-bust team was dispatched to entrap appellant Rogelio Abugatal, a plan
made on the strength of a tip given by a police informer. After witnessing the exchange,
two policemen approached appellant and placed him under arrest, at the same time
confiscating the wrapped object he gave the poseur-buyer. Upon prodding, appellant
Abugatal led the police to the house of his co-accused Enrile where he identified the
latter as the source of the marijuana. Appellant Enrile was frisked and the marked
money was found inside his front pocket.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant Enrile’s warrantless arrest and search was justified.

RULING: NO. The policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal
knowledge that he was the source of the marijuana. The discovery of the marked
money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. (Not
flagrante delicto) The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that
fact alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.
The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that
a man's house is his castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may
violate. There were measures available under the law to enable the authorities to
search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was found in possession of prohibited
articles. The police did not employ these measures.
What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the
slightest heed to the injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the
tactics of the police state, where the minions of the government place little value on
human rights and individual liberties and are obsessed only with the maintenance of
peace and punishment of crime.
These are laudible objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be
pursued at the cost of dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the
individual from overzealous law-enforcers who mistakenly believe that suspected
criminals have forfeited the safeguards afforded them by the Constitution.

(185) People v. Pasudag

G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001
(Lack of Urgency)

Facts: On September 26, 1995, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, SPO2 Pepito Calip of
the PNP Sison, Pangasinan, went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-jueteng operations.
He urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school. About five (5) meters
away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There were marijuana plants in
between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as to who
owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned
it.SPO2 Calip went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police Romeo C.
Astrero. The latter dispatched team (composed of SPO2 Calip, SPO3 Fajarito, SPO3
Alcantara and PO3 Rasca) to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 in that same
afternoon, the team arrived at Brgy; Artacho and went straight to the house of accused
Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for accused Pasudag and asked him to bring the team
to his backyard garden which was about five (5) meters away.Upon seeing the
marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took pictures of accused
Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants.They uprooted seven (7)
marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the
police station.The trial court held that the accused Alberto Pasudag y Bokang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal cultivation of marijuana. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure were valid

Ruling: As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law
enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any
individual The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained
in violation of this provision is inadmissible.

In tile case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court
a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house.He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the
backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot
and confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient
reason to believe that they would be uprooteds on that same day.

In People vs. Valdez the Court ruled that search and seizure conducted without the
requisite judicial warrant is illegal and void ab initio. The prosecution's evidence clearly
established that the police conducted a search of accused's backyard garden without a
warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant; they failed to secure one.
There was no showing of urgency or necessity for the warrantless search, or the
immediate seizure of the marijuana plants.

"Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce."

"The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in

suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes
and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights."
We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed
without warrants." "The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of high handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions."

With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.

(186) People vs. Aminnudin [GR L-74860, 6 July 1988]

Facts: Idel Aminnudin y Ahni was arrested on 25 June 1984, shortly after disembarking
from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 p.m., in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended
to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently,
the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a “thorough investigation.” The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against Aminnudin, who was eventually
convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Issue: Whether there was ample opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest against
Aminnudin, for alleged possession and transport of illegal drugs.
Held: It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo
by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one
saying it was two days before the arrest (this was the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr.), another two weeks and a third “weeks before
June 25.” There was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, Aminnudin was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime
about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to
dispense with the obtention of the warrant. The present case presented no urgency.
From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least
two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause,
indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority
that “search warrant was not necessary.”

(187) PEOPLE VS. PLANA

 G.R No. 128285
FACTS: On September 23, 1994, Felix Lagud saw the three men holding a girl while
another man was on top of her. The girl was being raped and she was later stabbed.
Frightened that the assailants would see him, Lagud ran away.
On September 26, 1994, Lagud heard that a girl was found dead in Barangay Cobe.
It was the same place where, three days earlier, he saw the four men gang up on the
girl. He wanted to go to the place but he was told that the foul smell coming from the
decomposed body already permeated the place. He later learned that the deceased
was Helen Perote.
In his affidavit, as well as in his testimony in court, Lagud identified accused-
appellants Plana, Perayra and Saldevea as the three men who were holding the girl
while their fourth companion was raping her. At the time of the incident, he did not yet
recognize the fourth man who was on top of the girl. However, when he saw accused-
appellants at the municipal hall where they were brought when they were arrested on
September 26, 1994, he identified the fourth man to be accused-appellant Banday.
The RSAF questioned them if they saw a girl named Helen Perote. They answered
no. Accused-appellants were then instructed by the police to go to the police
detachments, but they didn’t comply. So the policemen looked for them and when they
were already at the detachment, the authorities began interrogating them. Later in the
afternoon, the four accused-appellants were brought to the municipal hall in Dumarao,
Capiz. They were placed under detention there. Accused-apellants denounce as
violative of their constitutional rights their detention without, at the time, a judicial order
or an information filed in court.

At their arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. On November 23,

1996, after due trial, a judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether the detention without a judicial order or an information filed in court
violated their constitutional rights

HELD: With respect to the issue raised by accused-appellants, i.e., they were detained
without judicial order and prior to the filing of the information, suffice it to say, that they
already waived their right to question the irregularity, if any, in their arrest. Accused-
appellants respectively entered a plea of not guilty at their arraignment. By so pleading,
they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in their
arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons.

(Note: Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made BEFORE HE
ENTERS HIS PLEA, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. The accused must
move for the quashing of the information against him before arraignment. Otherwise, he
is estopped from questioning the validity of the arrest.)

Validity of Conviction
(188) PEOPLE V CONDE G.R. No. 113269, April 10,2001
FACTS: Conde et al. Were found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. Oscar Conde and his 3 companions approached, robbed and carried away
unestimated cash and merchandise of 2 Indian Nationals. While Conde poked a gun at
them, the three others stabbed the Indian Nationals. The incident was witnessed by
Apollo Romero who was about 25 to 35 meters away from where the crime was
committed while sitting by the window and drinking his coffee. After the stabbing, the 4
men fled. PO3 Sevillano was assigned to investigate and arrested the 3 accused. When
Conde’s wife, Felicidad visited him in the Police Station, the weapons used in the
commission of the crime was discovered inside her bag after a routine inspection.
PO3 Sevillano admitted that he did not have a warrant of arrest during the apprehension
of the accused, nor a search warrant when they inspected Felicidad’s bag, nor when
they found the stolen items in the house of a certain Jimmy. The following issues are
now raised by the appellants.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the identification made by Apollo Romero deserves credence.
(2) Whether the conviction is valid even if their arrest was conducted in violation for their
right against warrantless arrest.
(3) Whether or not the alleged stolen items can be presented in evidence.
HELD: (1) YES. The fact that Romero never saw Atis does not detract from the
credibility and reliability of Romero’s testimony. Furthermore, The delay of Romero in
reporting the incident, if sufficiently explained, does not impair his credibility and his
testimony. Likewise credibility is not affected by the initial reluctance of witnesses to
volunteer information. Romero categorically identified 2 of the perpetrators. Atis and
Conde.
(2) YES. Although the arrest was a clear violation of their constitutional right because
because it cannot be said that the arresting officer had probable cause based on
personal knowledge, PO3 Sevillano merely acted on the information from Romero and
he has 5 days lapsed to conduct surveillance to apply and secure for arrest warrant.
unfortunately, Conde et al. did not assert their constitutional right prior to their
arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the information against him
before his arraignment. When Conde et al. entered their pleas on arraignment without
invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might have accompanied their
arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the
judicial process. Any objection, defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should have
been made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for the appellants to raise
the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information upon
arraignment constitute clear waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgement rendered upon a sufficient complaint a trial free from error, The
warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings including
those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state
be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their
culpability.
(3) NO, the evidence was illegally obtained “fruit of the poisonous tree” hence it is
inadmissible as evidence. In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
robbery must be proven conclusively as the killing itself. Wherefore, the ruling is
MODIFIED. They are guilty of 2 counts of HOMICIDE.
(189) People vs. Lugod
GR 136253, 21 February 2001

FACTS: A case of rape with homicide was filed against the accused,
Clemente John Lugod, for allegedly raping the eight year old victim, Nairube J.
Ramos and dumping her dead body in the grassy coconut plantation area.
On September 15, 1997 at around 7:00 pm, Helen Ramos, the victim’s
mother, was asleep in her house together with her husband and their children,
Nimrod, Naeres and Nairube. At around 12.30 am, they noticed that Nairube was
gone. The backdoor of their house was left open where a pair of slippers that
did not belong to the family was found.In the morning, the police began their
search for Nairube wherein a panty belonging to the victim was found, as well as a
black collared shirt belonging to the accused, Lugod). Witnesses testified that both
slippers and the shirt were worn by Lugod).Lugod was then brought to the
police station where he was t e m p o r a r i l y i n c a r c e r a t e d ) . A l t h o u g h h e
a d m i t t e d t o S P O 2 G a l l a r d o t h a t h e r a p e d a n d k i l l e d Nairube, Lugod
refused to make a statement regarding the same.
On September 19, 1997, the Vice mayor visited the accused in his cell. In the
course of h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h L u g o d , L u g o d a l l e g e d l y c o n f e s s e d t o
t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f t h e o ff e n s e . L u g o d w a s c h a r g e d f o r r a p e w i t h
h o m i c i d e . A f t e r t r i a l , L u g o d w a s f o u n d g u i l t y a n d w a s sentenced to
death.

ISSUE: Whether Lugod’s alleged confession can be used against him?

RULING: No. Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he
would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to indicate that he intended
to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the
waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently,
Lugod's act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the
assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed Lugod's
rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be
disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same
vein, Lugod's act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in
violation of the Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the-
uncounselled confession and is considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we
were to assume that Lugod was not yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his
constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station, Lugod's acts
subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily
made considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession
was elicited by SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the
truth. Furthermore, when Lugod allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2
Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly 100 of the towns people of Cavinti
escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic towards
Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended
and taken to the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the
location of the body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a
spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, Lugod's claim that
he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious doubt as to
the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he
visited Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated
Lugod's assertion that he was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod
cannot be used against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the
prosecution is the fact that several persons testified having seen Lugod the night before
the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers and
black T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as
the testimony of Romualdo Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in
the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and
without slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature. The combination
of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical
conclusion that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances,
taken with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's
whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and
nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.

(189.1) Miranda vs Arizona

Doctrine: Miranda Rights - “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can
and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I
have just read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?”

Under the Fourth Amendment, any statements that a defendant in custody makes
during an interrogation are admissible as evidence at a criminal trial only if law
enforcement told the defendant of the right to remain silent and the right to speak
with an attorney before the interrogation started, and the rights were either
exercised or waived in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner.

Facts: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where
he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police
officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral
and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of
kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were
not violated in obtaining the confession.

Issue: W/N statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody are
admissible as evidence.

Ruling: The Supreme Court, ruled that the prosecution could not introduce Miranda's
confession as evidence in a criminal trial because the police had failed to first inform
Miranda of his right to an attorney and against self-incrimination. The police duty to give
these warnings is compelled by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which gives a
criminal suspect the right to refuse "to be a witness against himself," and Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees criminal defendants the right to an attorney.

(190) People vs Del Rosario

Facts: Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias
Boy Santos and John Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot
and killed her. While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Virgilio Boy Santos
and John Doe alias Dodong remained at large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a
police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.
During his trial, del Rosario contended that there was violation of his right to
remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights.
The cross-examination revealed that Upon finding the name of the owner of the
tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where
the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and
was invited for interview.The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered
to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused
informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers
may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.
Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where
a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief
encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a
magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at
the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The investigator
took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996 and was only subscribed on May
22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal.
His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his
detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge
Talavera. A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy.
Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already
gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to
escape.
Issue: W/N del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation.

Held: Yes. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay
captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised
nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name
of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless
slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario
had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in
the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the
same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a

general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation
that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it
encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

(191) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMON BOLANOS

FACTS: This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 14, under Criminal Case No. 1831-M-90, for "Murder", wherein the accused-
appellant, Ramon Bolanos was convicted, as follows:

Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao testified that they proceeded to the
scene of the crime of the Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival they saw
the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of blood with stab
wounds.

The corroborating testimony of Patrolmen Francisco Dayao, further indicated that when
they apprehended the accused-appellant, they found the firearm of the deceased on the
chair where the accused was allegedly seated; that they boarded Ramon Bolanos and
Claudio Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the
vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that he
killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive."

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant’s alleged confession was an admissible

evidence?
HELD: NO. the Constitutional rights of the accused-appellant have been violated, the
appellant is ACQUITTED.

During the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of the
appellant was given without the assistance of counsel as it was made while on board
the police vehicle on their way to the police station.

A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by the Solicitor General's Office,
dated April 2, 1992, with the position that the lower court erred in admitting in
evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while on board the police
patrol jeep. Said office even postulated that: "(A)ssuming that it was given, it was
done in violation of appellant's Constitutional right to be informed, to remain
silent and to have a counsel of his choice, while already under police custody."

Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the
way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section
12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices and their families.

Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by
which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged
confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the
conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review.

(192) Rhode Island vs. Innis

[446 US 291, 12 May 1980]

Facts: On the night of 12 January 1975, John Mulvaney, a Providence, Rhode Island
taxicab driver, disappeared after being dispatched to pick up a customer. His body was
discovered 4 days later buried in a shallow grave in Coventry, Rhode Island. He had
died from a shotgun blast aimed at the back of his head. On 17 January 1975, shortly
after midnight, the Providence police received a telephone call from Gerald Aubin, also
a taxicab driver, who reported that he had just been robbed by a man wielding a sawed-
off shotgun. Aubin further reported that he had dropped off his assailant near Rhode
Island College in a section of Providence known as Mount Pleasant. While at the
Providence police station waiting to give a statement, Aubin noticed a picture of his
assailant on a bulletin board. Aubin so informed one of the police officers present. The
officer prepared a photo array, and again Aubin identified a picture of the same person.
That person was Innis. Shortly thereafter, the Providence police began a search of the
Mount Pleasant area. At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the same date, Patrolman Lovell,
while cruising the streets of Mount Pleasant in a patrol car, spotted Innis standing in the
street facing him. When Patrolman Lovell stopped his car, Innis walked towards it.
Patrolman Lovell then arrested Innis, who was unarmed, and advised him of his so-
called Miranda rights. While the two men waited in the patrol car for other police officers
to arrive, Patrolman Lovell did not converse with Innis other than to respond to the
latter's request for a cigarette. Within minutes, Sergeant Sears arrived at the scene of
the arrest, and he also gave Innis the Miranda warnings. Immediately thereafter,
Captain Leyden and other police officers arrived. Captain Leyden advised Innis of his
Miranda rights. Innis stated that he understood those rights and wanted to speak with a
lawyer. Captain Leyden then directed that Innis be placed in a "caged wagon," a 4-door
police car with a wire screen mesh between the front and rear seats, and be driven to
the central police station. 3 officers, Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna,
were assigned to accompany Innis to the central station. They placed Innis in the
vehicle and shut the doors. Captain Leyden then instructed the officers not to question
Innis or intimidate or coerce him in any way. The three officers then entered the vehicle,
and it departed. While en route to the central station, Patrolman Gleckman initiated a
conversation with Patrolman McKenna concerning the missing shotgun. Innis then
interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around so he
could show them where the gun was located. At this point, Patrolman McKenna radioed
back to Captain Leyden that they were returning to the scene of the arrest, and that
Innis would inform them of the location of the gun. At the time Innis indicated that the
officers should turn back, they had traveled no more than a mile, a trip encompassing
only a few minutes. The police vehicle then returned to the scene of the arrest where a
search for the shotgun was in progress. There, Captain Leyden again advised Innis of
his Miranda rights. Innis replied that he understood those rights but that he "wanted to
get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the school." Innis then led
the police to a nearby field, where he pointed out the shotgun under some rocks by the
side of the road. On 20 March 1975, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Innis
with the kidnaping, robbery, and murder of John Mulvaney. Before trial, Innis moved to
suppress the shotgun and the statements he had made to the police regarding it. After
an evidentiary hearing at which Innis elected not to testify, the trial judge found that Innis
had been "repeatedly and completely advised of his Miranda rights." He further found
that it was "entirely understandable that [the officers in the police vehicle] would voice
their concern [for the safety of the handicapped children] to each other." The judge then
concluded that Innis's decision to inform the police of the location of the shotgun was "a
waiver, clearly, and on the basis of the evidence that I have heard, and [sic] intelligent
waiver, of his [Miranda] right to remain silent." Thus, without passing on whether the
police officers had in fact "interrogated" Innis, the trial court sustained the admissibility
of the shotgun and testimony related to its discovery. That evidence was later
introduced at Innis's trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. On
appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, set aside Innis's conviction.
Contrary to the holding of the trial court, the appellate court concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of waiver. Having concluded that both the shotgun
and testimony relating to its discovery were obtained in violation of the Miranda
standards and therefore should not have been admitted into evidence, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that Innis was entitled to a new trial.

Issue: Whether Innis was "interrogated" by the police officers in violation of the former's
undisputed right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer.

Held: The special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a
suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected
to interrogation. "Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. The Miranda
safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the
suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of
protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the
underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely
to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But,
since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their
words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on
the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Herein, Innis was not "interrogated" within the meaning of
Miranda. It is undisputed that the first prong of the definition of "interrogation" was not
satisfied, for the conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no
express questioning of Innis. Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, nothing
more than a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from Innis was
invited. Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded that Innis was subjected to the
"functional equivalent" of questioning. It cannot be said, in short, that Patrolmen
Gleckman and McKenna should have known that their conversation was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from Innis. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that the officers were aware that Innis was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal
to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children. Nor is there anything
in the record to suggest that the police knew that Innis was unusually disoriented or
upset at the time of his arrest. The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, thus, in equating
"subtle compulsion" with interrogation. That the officers' comments struck a responsive
chord is readily apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did
say, that Innis was subjected to "subtle compulsion," but that is not the end of the
inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the
product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. This was not established in the
present case.

Guidelines for Arresting/ lnvestigating Officers.

(193) People v. Mahinay

G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999

In People v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999, the Supreme Court
laid down the guidelines and duties of arresting, detaining, inviting or investigating
officers or his companions, as follows:
a) The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warning,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood
by said person.
b) . He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as evidence against him.
c) He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have
the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own
choice. '
d) He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by
any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the Court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting in his behalf.
e) That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed
that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the
presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made.
f) The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means, e.g., by telephone, radio,
letter or messenger, with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member
of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him
or by anyone of his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer
with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It
shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished.
g) He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided
it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, and ensure that he understood
the same.
h) In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be
informed that is must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel,
 otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insists on his
waiver and chooses to speak.
i) The person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at
any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with a
warning that once he makes such indication the police may not interrogate him if
the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has
already begun.
j) The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to
remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from
invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements.
k) He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

FACTS: Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his
tasks was to take care of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to the
latter’s residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence
of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her
mother. The following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and
disappeared.
The victim’s body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was
found in the septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed
that the victim was raped and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s mother
to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as
that of the appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank
were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively
identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession
wherein he narrated how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court
convicted him of the crime of Rape and was sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

ISSUES:
Whether the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance
with his rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and
Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt

RULING: The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.

The Court ruled that the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken within the
ambit of the law as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted,
warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and
custodial rights.
 As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt. However,
the Court ruled otherwise.
The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of
direct proof does not absolve the appellant because conviction may be had with the
concurrence of the following requisites as stated in the Rules of Court:
There is more than one circumstance;
The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
And also, in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240
SCRA 335, that facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even
direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial court’s decision in giving credence to several
circumstantial evidence, which is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond
the shadow of reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that
provided the rights of suspects under custodial investigation in detail.
A person under custodial investigation should be informed:
1. In a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other
warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to
and understood by said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes
may be used as evidence against him;
3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence
of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any
person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the
person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in
the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the
most expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or messenger – with his
lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family,
or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from
his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall
be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
 7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;
8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the presence of
counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he
insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process
that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet
commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel
or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
(194) People vs. Judge Ayson [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215, JUL 1989]
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio
City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline,
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees’ Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000.
The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He
proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa
was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution
contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that
the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer.
Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration
filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as
evidence the admission and statement of accused.
Ruling of the Court:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination
(only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different
crime charged- not present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is
not to “be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an “option of refusal
to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry.” the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to
refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must
claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by
the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.

(195) Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Judge Sumilang

FACTS: Respondents Judge Sumilang, Malla, Lagmay and Mercado, court employees
of the MTC of Pila, Laguna. On-the-spot audit examination was conducted by the OCA.
During the examination, several anomalous transactions were discovered. One involved
a managers check deposited in the name of Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil
Case No. 858, wherein Entero Villarica, on August 7, 1992 during the tenure of Malla
entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to said respondent instead of handling it over to
the Clerk of Court. Malla executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and Mercado
borrowed P55,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she used
P100,000.00 for her personal needs. Judge Sumilang, Malla, Lagmay and Mercado
were charged in a report by OCA for misappropriating funds. The SC issued a resolution
treating the memorandum as an administrative complaint.

Issue: Whether Malla’s constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit
before the OCA, where she admitted her misdeed.

Ruling: No, The constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
may be invoked only during “custodial investigation”. Such investigation is defined as an
“investigation conducted by police authorities who will include investigation conducted
by the Municipal Police (now PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies. Thus,
the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. During the investigation, Malla
repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i,e. that she used a substantial
amount for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and coercion
she claims was employed against her.

(196) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE TING LAN UY, JR.,JAIME B.
OCHOA, et al

Facts: In July 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public
accountable officer, being the Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR),
Ernesto Gamus and Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of the Loan
Management and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst,
respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul Nicolas, alias
George Aonuevo, alias Mara Aonuevo, a private individual being a foreign exchange
trader, said public officers taking advantage of their official positions, falsified or caused
to be falsified the NPCs application for managers checks with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS
and TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25), intended for the purchase of US
dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), by inserting the account
number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, when in truth and in fact as the accused
well knew that the Payment Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities
did not indicate the account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning, and with the use of the
said falsified commercial documents, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and
receiving the total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY
FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.75), from the National Power Corporation, which they
thereafter malversed, embezzled, misappropriated and converted to their own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National Power Corporation.

Sandiganbayan acquitted Jose Ting Lan Uy from Malversation thru falsification of

Commercial Document but found Jaime Ochoa guilty.

In his defense, Jaime Ochoa (appellant) asserts that there was no evidence that he
committed any of the acts alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the
Application for cashiers check; that he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that
he received the proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. He
claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the
transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the
NPC personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the
Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not be used against
him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional
rights when he executed the affidavit.

Issue: WON the appellant should be acquitted since the affidavit was taken without the
benefit of a counsel in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: The appellant is found guilty of Malversation through Falsification of commercial

document.

Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of a counsel.

The investigation under the above-quoted provision refers to a custodial

investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and the
investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions
or admissions from the suspect. Custodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to
operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been
taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory question
which tend to elicit incriminating statements.

Therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision invoked by

accused-appellant are not available before government investigators enter the picture. It
was even held in one case that admissions made during the course of an administrative
investigation by Philippine Airlines does not come within the purview of Section 12. The
protective mantle of the constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or
confessions made to a private individual, or to a verbal admission made to a radio
announcer who was not part of the investigation, or even to a mayor approached as a
personal confidante and not in his official capacity.
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in
an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having committed the crime, nor
to a person undergoing an audit examination because an audit examiner is not a law
enforcement officer.
 Thus, the flaw in Ochoa’s argument becomes immediately apparent, considering
that his statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPCs audit team
and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a general inquiry
into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no specific suspect.
The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at the
time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his predicament.
The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from coercion. The interview
where the sworn statement is based was conducted by NPC personnel for the NPCs
administrative investigation. Any investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding
separate, distinct and independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or
lumped together with the latter.

(197) GAMBOA VS CRUZ

FACTS: Petitioner alleges that:

On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for
vagrancy, without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter,
petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and
then detained therein together with several others.

The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including
petitioner, complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a
companion." After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell
but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by
the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her.

On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.

On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On

2 April 1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.

On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense,

manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence.
On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to counsel and to due process was violated
during the line up.
HELD: As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least,
in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled,
at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General states:

When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he

had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a
part of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it
was held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused
may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United
States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course
of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a
criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not
have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation
between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the
police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He
was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far
from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be
used against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being
investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant
while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to
counsel had not accrued.

Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to
extend to those under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may
be better than any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no
real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the
moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions
or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or
innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any
way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly
represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose
not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had
rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard.

(198) UNITED STATES VS WADE

388 US 218 (1967)
Facts
 Billy Joe Wade (defendant) was arrested under suspicion of involvement in a
bank robbery. The court appointed counsel for Wade. An FBI agent subsequently
arranged a lineup to have two bank employees identify the man they remembered from
the robbery. The agent did not notify Wade’s attorney prior to conducting the lineup. At
the lineup, both employees identified Wade as the bank robber. At trial, the employees
identified Wade when asked if they saw the robber present in the courtroom. On cross-
examination, the employees confirmed that they had previously picked Wade out of the
lineup and testified that prior to the lineup, they had seen Wade in the hallway with the
FBI agent before the other lineup participants were brought in. Wade moved for a
judgment of acquittal or to strike the courtroom identifications, claiming that because the
lineup was conducted without notice to and in the absence of Wade's appointed
counsel, the lineup violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Wade was
convicted. The appellate court held that the lineup did not violate the Wade’s Fifth
Amendment rights but did violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that, though there was no Fifth Amendment deprivation, the
absence of counsel at the lineup denied respondent his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and required the grant of a new trial at which the in-court identifications of
those who had made lineup identifications would be excluded. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue:
WON a lineup conducted without notifying a suspect's counsel require exclusion of an
in-court identification of a suspect by a witness be excluded from trial?

Held:

In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan vacated the lower judgment and
remanded to determine whether the employees based their trial identifications solely on
the lineup. The Supreme Court affirmed that the lineup did not violate Wade’s privilege
against self-incrimination. To decide the Sixth Amendment issue, courts must decide
whether counsel’s presence at a pre-trial confrontation of the accused will preserve the
accused’s right to a fair trial. In this case, Wade was entitled to counsel at the lineup.
The Court held that the identifications should not be excluded if they were based on
observations other than the lineup.

Neither the lineup itself nor anything required therein violated respondent's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, since merely exhibiting his person for
observation by witnesses and using his voice as an identifying physical characteristic
involved no compulsion of the accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature against
himself which is prohibited by that Amendment. Pp. 388 U. S. 221-223.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial
but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the
results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might derogate
from his right to a fair trial. Pp. 388 U. S. 223-227.
The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as analyzing fingerprints and
blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled to the
aid of counsel. Pp. 388 U. S. 227-239.
Page 388 U. S. 219
There is a great possibility of unfairness to the accused at that point, (1) because of the
manner in which confrontations for identification are frequently conducted, (2) because
of dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and suggestibility' inherent in the context
of the confrontations, and (3) because of the likelihood that the accused will often be
precluded from reconstructing what occurred, and thereby obtaining a full hearing on
the identification issue at trial. Pp. 388 U. S. 229-235.
This case illustrates the potential for improper influence on witnesses through the lineup
procedure, since the bank employees were allowed to see respondent in the custody of
FBI agents before the lineup began. Pp. 388 U. S. 233-234.
(c) The presence of counsel at the lineup will significantly promote fairness at the
confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification. Pp. 388 U. S. 236-
238.

In-court identification by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited before trial in the
absence of counsel must be excluded unless it can be established that such evidence
had an independent origin or that error in its admission was harmless. Since it is not
clear that the Court of Appeals applied the prescribed rule of exclusion, and since the
nature of the in-court identifications here was not an issue in the trial and cannot be
determined on the record, the case must be remanded to the District Court for
resolution of these issues. Pp. 388 U. S. 239-243.

Justice Hugo L. Black dissented in part and concurred in part, expressing that the lineup
violated Wade's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Black would affirm the
conviction, though, because the prosecution did not use evidence of the lineup at trial.
Justice Byron R. White dissented in part and concurred in part, stating that Wade was
not entitled to counsel at the lineup. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart
joined in the opinion. Justice Abe Fortas concurred in part and dissented in part, stating
that the lineup violated Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination. Chief Justice Earl
Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the opinion.

(199) People vs. Escordial

Facts:
The said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of gain and by
means of violence and intimidation on the person, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00, belonging
to said offended party and the occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the
complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will, and inside her room wherein
she was temporarily residing as a boarder.
Issue: Whether or not failure to timely object immediately when witnesses are
presented by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding the subject matter
were asked of the is deemed a waiver of the right provided by Section 12 Article III of
the Constitution?

Ruling: Yes, the right is deemed as waived. While it cannot be denied that accused-
appellant was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his
custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory
or exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that
he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In
fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to physical
torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was charged. In other
words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-appellant which should
have been excluded as evidence against him.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. 42 However, the cases
at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention
by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible
perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-
court identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up,
the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a
police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered
for that purpose.43 During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been
recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which
necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of
these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality."44 We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the
custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. 45
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these witnesses
were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding this matter
were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-
appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object to the admissibility of these
testimonies.47
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not render the
in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of the
poisonous tree."48 This in-court identification was what formed the basis of the trial
court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from the illegal
arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence thereof, 49 it is admissible as evidence
against him. However, whether or not such prosecution evidence satisfies the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
The test is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect
other than the line-up identification.55 As held in United States v. Wade:56
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is that quoted in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 488, 9 L ed 2d 441, 455, 83 S Ct 407,
"'[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Maguire, Evidence of Guilt
221 (1959)." See also Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293, 309, 17 L ed 2d 374, 386, 87
S Ct 408. Application of this test in the present context requires consideration of various
factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the
existence of any pre-line-up description and the defendant's actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the
defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and
the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant
to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning
the conduct of the lineup.
We now consider whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses meet the test as
laid down in that case.

(200) People vs. Piedad, et al.,

G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002

FACTS:
Piedad with others assaulted Daguinod by hitting him with an empty bottle on the
head, ganging him and mauling him, hitting him with a big stone on the head and
stabbing him with a bladed weapon on the right back portion of his body, causing
immediate death.
All accused pleaded not guilty and stated their alibi.
SPO4 Acharon and SPO2 Lagajino and others responded to the phone call from
East Avenue Medical enter regarding the incident. They then repaired to the crime
scene where the accused were apprehended. The others were surrendered to the
police station by their parents and the barangay chairman.
During the trial PO3 Torrente identified a blood-stained concrete clab he found on
the crime scene, allegedly one used to hit the victim’s head. The former admitted that it
was not submitted to forensics for examination to confirm whether the stain was indeed
human blood.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Piedad’s identification by prosecution was flawed and that he
should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into a confrontation
with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by the police.

RULING:
The absence of police lineup is more theoretical than real. Even before the
incident, the witnesses knew the accused. When the accused were presented before
the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones
responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused
simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses
were certain they recognized the perpetrators of the crime.
 Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect can be
identified as the culprit of a crime. [11] What is important is that the prosecution witnesses
positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors
Luz, one of the witnesses and the wife of the victim, was right beside her
husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz could not have
mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the attack. She was only a foot away
from Niel before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Lito, the other witness, was also able
to recognize the accused with accuracy.
The alleged inconsistencies by the prosecution witnesses do not impair the
credence given to their testimonies and do not change the fact that accused-appellants
were positively identified as the attackers of the deceased. It is perfectly natural for
different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as
there may be some details which one witness may notice while the other may not
observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of
narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were
prefabricated and rehearsed

(201) CLEMENTE MAGTOTO vs. JUDGE MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 March 3, 1975)
also Simeon vs. Villaluz [GR L-37424] and People vs. Isnani [GR L-38929]

FACTS: (No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case.)
Judge Manguera of the CFI Branch II of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02)
and Judge Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declared
admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases.
District Judge Isnani of CFI Branch II of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on
the other hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case,
although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel
before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.

RULING: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, reads:

“No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence,
and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a
confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense who has not been informed of his right (to remain silent and) to counsel.”
 The Court held that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and
should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a
confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New
Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in
evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of
the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not
been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so
informed before that date.
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to
be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any
confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and
should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated.
Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in GRs L-37201-02,
37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in
accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them
inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent
and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because, no such right existed at
the time.
The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In
every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his
attorney or counsel," impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to
be informed of such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a
detained person was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a
request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel at
any time.
The historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel and to be
informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in
evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect.
To give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a
great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the
acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended
parties in many criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of
the New Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force although without
assistance of counsel. The Constitutional Convention could not have intended such a a
disastrous consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of justice
suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is
acquitted.
Furthermore, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, Retroactive effect of penal
laws, is not applicable to the present cases because the "penal laws" mentioned in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to substantive penal laws, while the
constitutional provision in question is basically a procedural rule of evidence involving
the incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be included in
the term "penal laws;" and because constitutional provisions as a rule should be given
a prospective effect.
Even as We rule that the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel
and to be informed of such right under pain of any confession given by him in violation
thereof declared inadmissible in evidence, to be prospective, and that confessions
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution are admissible in evidence
against the accused, his fundamental right to prove that his confession was involuntary
still stands. (The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be admissible, must be freely
and voluntarily made). Our present ruling does not in any way diminish any of his rights
before the effectivity of the New Constitution.

(202) People vs. Caguioa, (Voluntary, knowing & intelligent waiver)

Accused is illiterate

FACTS: Accused Paquito Yupo was arrested and tried for murder. He pleaded not guilty
the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of Meycauayan Police department
as witness and before whom a written statement of the accused and his alleged waiver
of his rights to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was
taken. After the witness had identified the statement of the accused and the waiver &
the prosecution started asking him on the part of the incriminating answers in the
statement of the accused.he defense counsel objected based on the ground of such
statements being inadmissible in evidence & as the statement was taken by the police
without any counsel assisting the accused in the investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver presented was admissible as evidence.

HELD: Supreme Court held that the presented waiver was not admissible as evidence.
The right to counsel may be waived as long as such waiver is made intelligently and
voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequence. However & it was not shown that
the waiver was given voluntarily and freely. An even more disturbing factor is that the
accused a 19, year old native of Samar & was interrogated extensively in Tagalog
instead of the language he was most comfortable which was Waray. Maybe to impress
the Court & the opening statements by the police in the waiver were in Tagalog followed
by a monosyllabic answer ‘’OPO. However & there was no signature 'y the accused.
There were only illegible letters & perhaps indicating that they were his initials. This only
shows that the accused was not literate enough to fully understand the legal implication
and effects of the waiver. The only answer was OPO implying that the accused is no
knowledgeable or literate enough to understand his charges nor his rights
The prosecution may not use statements& whether exculpatory or inculpatory &
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
Prior to any questioning & the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent& that any statement he does not made may be used as evidence against him&
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney& either retained or appointed.

The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes toconsult with an attorney before speaking,
there can be no questioning. Likewise & if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated & the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements
on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.

(203) People v. Tampus

G.R. No. L-44690, March 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE,

accused whose death sentence is under review.

FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a
prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of
nature and to fetch water.

The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution,
followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him.
Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet,
Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard:
"Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted
on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his
on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the
comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the
chest and neck

Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus
and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they
assaulted Saminado.

The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found
Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado.

In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the
following issues:

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section
20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent
after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio
called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary

HELD: 1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and
Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they
surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that
they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary
confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of
the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to
have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial
confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.

Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings
in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to
be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation.

It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt,
confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial
confession.
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right
to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim
it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right
3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place
where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in
the national penitentiary.

Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case
is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground
for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial
court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be
offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of
the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and
the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly barred from admission under
the Bill of Rights.

I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional right to
counsel and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary" extrajudicial
confession during his custodial interrogation by the prison investigator, who at such late
stage (in propounding question No. 6, not at the beginning of the interrogation)
purportedly took time out to admonish and inform the accused of his rights to counsel
and to silence. The fundamental rights of such unfortunate disadvantaged persons as
the accused should all the more be clearly protected and observed. At the very least,
such alleged waiver must be witnessed by a responsible official of the penitentiary, if not
by the municipal judge of the locality.

Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also well taken. After the prosecutor
had presented the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and when counsel
de oficio then called upon the accused to testify, it became the trial court's duty (contrary
to the majority's ruling) to apprise and admonish him of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and against self-incrimination, i.e. the right not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself.

Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any confession or incriminatory
statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence."

(204) People vs Sayaboc

DOCTRINE
: The right to be informed requires “the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.” It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any
waiver he might make of these rights.
:The Right to Counsel- If the advice given (by the counsel) is so cursory as to be
useless, voluntariness is impaired. The desired role of counsel in the process of
custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory
advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing
questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.

Facts:
On December 2, 1994, accused was charged with the crime of murder. On March
8, 1995, witnesses identified Sayaboc at the PNP Headquarters as the gunman who
shot victim to death. On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao, chief investigator,
was called to take the statement of Sayaboc. Before taking the statement of Sayaboc,
he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted
to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao
asked the police officers to get a lawyer wherein they brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of
the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while.
After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, “okay,” he continued the investigation,
during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However, Cagungao would
stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort
room. That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect. He
therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum
of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso.
The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal
Melvin Tiongson. Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the
defense of alibi. He also flatly denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed
of his rights.

Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc is admissible in evidence.

Ruling: NO.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be
voluntary.[22] The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is
able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights
during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the
extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to
allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the
unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations.
Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the
confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment,[23] the
failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders
the confession valueless and inadmissible.
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession
contains the passing of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be
informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara,[26] the Court
explained:
The stereotyped advice appearing in practically all extrajudicial
confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form or
model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt Opo
as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its
tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression
of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing
of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle.[27] It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of
any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like
Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva
Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days
previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a
competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty.
Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of
Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent
throughout the duration of the custodial investigation.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel
should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect
understands the import and consequences of answering the questions propounded. In
People v. Deniega,[29] we said:
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is
rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed
to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If
the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.

(205) People vs Francisco Galit, G.R. No. L-51770, March 20, 1985

FACTS: Francisco was arrested for the alleged killing Natividad Fernando the occasion
of a robbery. He had been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days,
to no avail. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. The investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his
innocence. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he
signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as
directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.

ISSUE: Whether extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and
intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit of counsel is admissible.

RULING: Accused is acquitted. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of
the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state
witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not
assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights. The alleged
confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence
because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.

(206) People v. Bandula

G.R. No. 89223 May 27, 1994

Facts: Six armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay,
Negros Oriental. At gunpoint, the two masked men held Salva who was manning his
post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back. They then went
up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the
plantation, hog- tied him, and divested him of his personal property. From there, the six
armed men proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of the Polo
Coconut Plantation. After forcing their way into the house, the masked men and
Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables.
Thereafter, the hooded men shot Atty. Garay.

Issue: Whether the extrajudicial confessions Bandula and co-accused Dionanao

executed are inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under
duress and intimidation, and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney
who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel
of their choice.
Ruling: It can be gleaned that when Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated
immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. And, counsel who
supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney. On
top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly,
these are blatant violations of the Constitution.

The Constitution requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a

special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna
assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective
extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering
that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality
in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of
peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a
fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.

The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being
interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start
of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(207) People v. Quidato Jr.

GR no. 117401 297 scra 1

FACTS: Bernardo Quidato Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide in RTC Davao for
killing his father BQ Sr. tohether with Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita. During the trial,
the prosecution presented as its witness Leo Quidato, the Bernardo Jr.’s brother; Gina
Quidato, Bernardo Jr.’s wife; and patrolman Lucerio Mara. The prosecution also offered
in evidence the affidavits containing the extrajudicial confessions of Eddie and Reynaldo
Malita. Instead of placing the Malita brothers on the witness stand, the prosecution
opted to present Atty. Jonathan Jocom to attest that the Malita brothers were
accompanied by counsels when they executed their extrajudicial confessions.
Prosecution also presented MTC Judge George Omelio who attested to the due and
voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers. According to the
prosecution, BQ Sr. owns a 16 hectare coconut land. He had 2 sons BQ Jr and Leo
Quidato. He is also a widower.

On Sept. 16, 1988, BQ Jr. accompanied his father to sell 41 sacks of copra in Davao.
They hired the Malita brothers. After selling the copras, BQ Sr. paid the Malita brothers
and they parted ways. According to the testimony of Gina, she allegedly heard BQ Jr
and the Malita brothers planning to get money from BQ Sr and she went to sleep at
around 10 PM so she did not know what transpired nest. The accused BQ Jr. raised the
issue of marital disqualification rule when his wife gave the testimony against him.

According to the Malita brothers, they went to the house of BQ Sr., BQ Jr. knocked on
the door and when the old man opened the door, the son pushed his father and hacked
him with his bolo. They looked for money in the aparador but found none so they left.

The body of BQ Sr. was found by his grandson when he called his grandfather for
breakfast. Leo Quidato the confronted his brother and the 3 accused was arrested.
During the custodial investigation, the Malita brothers made an extrajudicial confession
of what transpired even without the presence of a counsel. Their testimonies were
reduced to writing, and they signed the testimonies in front of Atty. Jonathan Jocom the
next morning after having been apprised of their constitutional rights.

ISSUE: WON the evidence presented by the prosecution are admissible and sufficient
to convict the accused.

HELD: No. BQ Jr. must be acquitted for inadmissibility of evidence. His guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution relied heavily on the affidaevits
executed by the Malita brothers. However, the brothers were not presented on the
witness stand to testify on their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two
gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the
affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm their averments in their affidavits,
the affidavits must be excluded from judicial proceedings, being inadmissible hearsay.
The voluntary admissions of an accused made extra judicially are not admissible in
evidence against his co accused when the latter had not been given the opportunity to
hear him testify and cross examine him. SolGen invoked Sec.30, Rule 130: this rule is
inapplicable because the confession was made after the conspiracy. The manner by
which the affidavits were obtained by the police renders the same inadmissible
evidence if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled
extrajudicial confession without valid waiver of the right to counsel that is in writing and
in the presence of the counsel- is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the
Malita brothers gave their statements in the absence of counsel although they signed
the same in the presence of the counsel the next day.
In People v. De Jesus: admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the
benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of
counsel are flawed under the constitution.

As to the testimony of Gina, being the wife of the accused she is disqualified from
testifying against her husband. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly-
marital disqualification.

(208) People vs. Januario, 267 SCRA 608 , G.R. No. 98252 February 07, 1997

Facts: Defendants were charged in violation of RA 6539 otherwise known as the Anti-
Carnapping Law. During their custodial investigation led by NBI, defendants stated what
ascribed during the carnapping incident including their confession of guilt in the
presence of their apparent counsel, Atty. Saunar, who was then an applicant for a
position in the NBI.

Issue: WON, defendant’s right to competent and independent counsel was violated?

Held: Yes, Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of appellants is not a
guarantee that appellants' respective confessions had been taken in accordance with
Article 111, Section 12(1) of the Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than
"competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice." Elucidating on this
particular constitutional requirement, this Court has taught: It is noteworthy that the
modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic laws previous to
the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to
stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely
stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of
normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on
the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.

Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
were one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent
and independent, i.e., that he Is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. We find that Saunar was
not the choice of appellant Januario as his custodial investigation counsel.

Moreover, he could not have been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by our
Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be
said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the
NBI a few months after.

Thus, the defendants were acquitted.

(209) PEOPLE V. LABTAN

FACTS: Accused-Appellant Henry Feliciano, together with accused Orlando Labtan and Jonelto
Labtan, were convicted of highway robbery and robbery with homicide. Feliciano was
convicted on the basis of a sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial. The prosecution’s
case was mainly anchored on the three-page sworn statement executed by Feliciano, originally in
Visayan dialect, before the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. According to the prosecution, prior to
the propounding of questions to the accused-appellant, he was informed of his constitutional rights
and he even signed the confession in the presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez, Attorney de Officio
provided to the accused.

When the defense presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano testified for his behalf. His
defense consisted of an alibi and a repudiation of his sworn statement. He testified that he was
brought to the police station, was mauled for two hours and was forced to sign a document. He was
also brought to the office of Atty. Chavez and saw the latter sign the documents. He did not
know what was happening. Atty. Chavez did not even talk to him before signing the document.
Then he was brought back to jail. He appealed to the higher court alleging that the court
a quo erred un admitting in evidence the tainted extra-judicial confession he executed in
the absence of an effective and vigilant counsel.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the sworn-statement executed by accused Feliciano in the

absence of a competent counsel of his choice, is admissible in evidence.
Did Atty. Chavez provide the accused the kind of counseling required by the
Constitution?
RULING: The appeal is meritorious.

Under Article III, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of persons under
custodial investigation are provided.

In People vs Gamboa 13, the Court stated that:

“The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e, when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must
be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
The moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.”

We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO3
Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993; regarding
his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact
that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel.

(210) PEOPLE v. SAMUS

FACTS: The trial court found Samus guilty of murder of one Dedicacion and John Ardee
Balisi.

Samus’ version of facts: That he was at the house of his friend, when a group of CIS
operatives arrived and arrested him inside the same house. It was not true that he
jumped from the roof of the house. The CIS people did not have any warrant for his
arrest. His kumpadre was not present at that time. He was brought to a camp where he
was tortured until he lost his consciousness. On the same night, he was brought to a
hospital, was given medicine, then brought back to the cell where he was handcuffed at
the door of the cell. The CIS got hold of the medical certificate. He was forced by the
CIS to admit the killing of the victims and the sale of jewelry of the victim by means of
torture and threat.
He also testified that he was forced to execute a document admitting the killing. He was
forced to sign said document. He did not know one Atty. Juliano and did not talk to him.

ISSUE: Whether his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel as violated.

RULING: There are cogent reasons to disregard its findings with respect to the day of
arrest of Samus. It is hard to believe the testimony of the police officers in which Samus
jumped from the roof of a house to look as if he was escaping were true, jumping from a
roof is not a crime that would justify the warrantless arrest of Samus. Yet, they arrested
him. None of the circumstances under a valid warrantless arrest was present when
Samus was arrested.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

Samus claims that his alleged confession to the media while in police custody cannot be
admitted in evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings, and the turnover
receipt relative thereto should be excluded for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
After being illegally arrested, appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission
elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation are normally
inadmissible in evidence.

In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that appellant was subjected to a
preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to skirt this
issue by stating that it was only the media that had questioned appellant, and that they
were merely present during the interview. Also, an examination of the testimonies of the
three law enforcers show the folly of their crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible
evidence.

In the absence of testimony from any of the media persons who allegedly interviewed
appellant, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and led him to
his confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated appellant and
elicited from him uncounselled admissions.

Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible,

under the present circumstances we cannot rule it out because of Samus’ failure
to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence
under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given
under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel.
However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the
result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility.

Upon examination of the records, we find that during the entire examination in court of
Prosecution Witness Pontaos (one of the arresting officers), Samus did not question or
object to the admissibility of the formers testimony. Worse, the latter’s counsel even
freely cross-examined the witness without any reservations. Having made no objection
before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question for the first time on appeal.
The evidence having been admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject it.

If only appellant had made a timely objection to the admissibility of the said testimony,
the prosecution could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to
support its case. To disregard unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late
stage when it can no longer present additional evidence as substitute for that which is
now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.

(211) PEOPLE VS. TOMAQUIN [JULY 23, 2004]

FACTS: Tomaquin together with Rico and others were having drinking spree. Tomaquin
left the group saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group
transferred to Lorega proper. A few minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting
for help as the latter heard Jaquelyn in the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn bloodied.
Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later found a tres
cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to be appellant’s. Brgy
tanod’s Julius Yosores and Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City,searched for
appellant because of the information given by Rico Magdasalthat the shoes and tres
cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to appellant. Together with Rico, they
went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and
found him sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods
told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the
house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. There, appellant was asked about
the shirt he was wearing and he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. It
was Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled
clothes.

Appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Homicide Section. After
being apprised of his constitutional rights, appellant toldSPO2 Monilar that he was
willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him.
SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him that he will be available in the
afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he conferred with
appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told
him that appellant was ready to give his statement. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession
was taken in Cebuano dialect. On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had
a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal and three other persons. His version of the incident
is that it was Rico who committed the crime and not him. Appellant claims that Rico and
Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the presence of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato
Parawan when he was brought to the latter’s house. He was made to admit committing
the crime because Rico has a family while he is single. Appellant also repudiated his
extrajudicial confession, saying thatAtty. Parawan merely asked him to sign a blank
sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him with his
expenses. RTC convicted him of Murder.

ISSUE: Is a lawyer at the same time barangay captain competent and independent?

RULING OF THE COURT: No, in this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a
barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct
conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was
accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered
as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial
confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and
competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without any
intervening conflict of interest.
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant
counsel. An “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires
that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time
the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until
the signing of the extrajudicial confession. The Court cannot imagine how Atty.
Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellant’s rights as an accused during the
investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the
crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.

(212) People of the Philippines Vs Amado Bagnate

G.R. No. 133685-86 May 20, 2004
FACTS: Amado Bagnate was found guilty of murder for killing his grandmother and rape
with homicide for killing and raping his niece. He was turned over for custodial
investigation and he was informed in the Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be
assisted by counsel, that whatever he says may be used against or in his favor, and that
he cannot be tortured or molested. He was offered services of Atty. Paterno
Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. The investigation was then conducted in the
Bicol dialect, with SPO2 Ambion asking the questions. It was translated thereafter into
English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the purpose of putting it into writing. After
typing the first page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and explained the
contents thereof to appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon.
Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and assailed its
admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his constitutional rights,
particularly his right to a competent and independent counsel of his own choice; and
that he was not fully apprised of the consequences of his confession.
ISSUE: WON failure of counsel to advise his client of the penalty to be imposed on the
crimes he was accused of committing will render:
the counsel incompetent and not independent
the confession of accused inadmissible in evidence
RULING: To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be express
and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and competent
counsel. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra-
judicial confession, and the assistance given must be independent and competent, that
is, providing full protection to the constitutional rights of the accused.
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the
crimes he was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellant’s extrajudicial
confession. Section 12 (1) to (3), Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado , or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 22 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by
an accused without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having
been given competent and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he
cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not provided with one; or the waiver of his
rights was not in writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he was tortured,
forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other means that vitiated his free will.
There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to inform an accused of the
possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption arise that
the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to apprise
the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is
death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused
to admit his guilt in the commission of a crime.
To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an
accused during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be:
"….willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished
from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of
the individual’s constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418) this Court
stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."
As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during the entire
procedure – from the time appellant signified his intention to give his extrajudicial
confession up to the time he signed the same. Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that
appellant was not aware of the consequences of his admissions as Judge Base
explained it to appellant when he appeared before the latter to swear to the veracity of
his confession.