Tanada vs Tuvera GR no. L-63915
Judge Angeles; Remington; and Firestone
(Apr 24, 1985)
Facts:
Petitioners seek to compel the publication of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamation, executive orders, letters of
implementation, and administrative orders through a writ of mandamus.
Held:
General rule is that writ of mandamus can be invoked by a private person
only when he has a private of particular interest to be subserved, or a right to be
protected, which right is independent of that which he holds with the public.
EXCEPTION is when the question is one of public right and the mandamus is
intended to procure enforcement of a public duty, in which case, the people are
considered as the real parties in interest.
Publication is necessary to inform the people of the existence of laws
under which they are to be bound. Failure to do so takes away the basis for
application of “ignorantia legis non excusat”.
It is the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern.
Presidential issuances that apply to the general public and provide for
fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation must be published. Those that
apply only to particular persons or a class thereof need not be published.
People of the Philippines vs. Que Po Lay GR no. L-6791
March 29, 1954
Facts:
Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange amounting to about 7000 USD.
He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank within one day following their
receipt, which was a violation of the requirement of Circular no. 20. The circular
was issued in 1949 but was not published until November 1951, which was 3
months after Que Po Lay’s conviction of its violation.
Held:
Circular no. 2 was not binding at the time Que Po Lay failed to sell the
foreign exchange he possessed in pursuant thereof.
Even though Central Bank circular no. 2 is not a statute, it has the force
and effect of law, it binding the public to its provisions and it providing penalties for
their violation.
Phil. Int’l Trading Corp. Vs.
GR no. 108461 (Oct 21, 1996)
Facts:
PITC is a branch of the DTI with the function of regulating imports and
exports. It required in AO no. SOCPEC 89-08-01 that RP application for import of
goods from PROC should be balanced by an export of Philippine products of equal
value. When Remington and Firestone failed to adhere to the export of Philippine
products requirement, their applications to import from PROC were subsequently
denied by PTIC. However, when a new trade agreement was entered into between
RP and PROC encouraging liberalization of trade, the DTI was directed to cease the
implementation of SOCPEC. Thereafter, PTIC did away with the trade balancing
requirement and allowed respondents to import anew from PROC.
The lower courts held that PTIC’s authority to process and approve
applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations has
already been repealed by EO 133 (Feb 27, 1987).
The constitutionality of SOCPEC is also assailed.
Held:
EO 133 did not repeal PTIC’s authority to issue rules and regulations.
There is no indication of the removal of PTIC’s regulatory functions. While it does
not grant regulatory power, EO 133 is also silent as to the abolition or limitation of
such powers. The general repealing clause in EO 133 does not hold in the case at
bar, there being no repeal absent irreconcilable inconsistency [relating to PTIC’s
regulatory powers].
In sum, PTIC derives its authority from the DTI (which was granted quasi-
legislative powers), of which it is an implementing arm.
The AO, however, while issued in valid exercise of authority, is invalid for
violation of the publishing requirement under Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The original
AO being issued on Aug 30, 1989, and its amendments filed in the UP Law Center,
and published in the National Administrative Register only on March 30, 1992, the
respondents are not bound by the said AO, their application to import having been
filed before march 30, 1992.
Quoting Tanada vs Tuvera: “...Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation.”
Roy vs. CA GR no. 80718
(Jan 29, 1988)
Facts:
Petitioners’ firewall collapsed and destroyed the neighbouring tailoring shop
owned by respondents, resulting in physical injuries and death. The RTC found
petitioners guilty of negligence and awarded damages accordingly, which decision
was echoed by the CA. On the last day to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the
basis of a 1985 jurisprudence that the 15-day period to file an appeal or a motion
for reconsideration cannot be extended. On August 30, 1986, the SC resolution
clarifying the matter was enforced.
Held:
Petitioners’ motion was filed on September 9, 1987. It is no longer covered by the
grace period running from June 30-August 30, 1986.
SC decisions do not have to be published in the Official Gazette for them to be
binding and effective. It is Counsel’s duty to keep informed on the recent
developments in the judiciary.
Cawad vs. Abad et al GR no. 207145
July 28, 2015
Facts:
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna
Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into law in order to promote the social
and economic well-being of health workers, their living and working conditions and
terms of employment, to develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped
to deliver health projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper
qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government service.
public health workers (PHWs) were granted the following allowances and
benefits,... Section 20. Additional Compensation.
Section 21. Hazard Allowance
Section 22. Subsistence Allowance
Section 23. Longevity Pay.
Pursuant to Section 35[5] of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health promulgated
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in July 1992. Thereafter, in November
1999, the DOH, in collaboration with various government agencies and health
workers' organizations, promulgated a Revised IRR consolidating all additional and
clarificatory rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating back from the
effectivity of the Magna Carta.
On July 28, 2008, the Fourteenth Congress issued Joint Resolution No. 4, entitled
Joint Resolution Authorizing the President of the Philippines to Modify the
Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and the Base
Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and for
other Purposes, approved by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 17,
2009, which provided for certain amendments in the Magna Carta and its IRR.On
September 3, 2012, respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed
issuances, DBM-CSC Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on
the grant of Step Increments due to meritorious performance and Step Increment
due to length of service.
hortly thereafter, on November 29, 2012, respondents DBM and DOH then
circulated the other assailed issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012
In a letter[9] dated January 23, 2013 addressed to respondents Secretary of Budget
and Management and Secretary of Health, petitioners expressed their opposition
to the Joint Circular cited above on the ground that the same diminishes the
benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.
Issues:
WHETHER RESPONDENTS' ISSUANCE OF DBM-DOH JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 1, S. 2012
IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for its failure to comply with Section 35[23]
of RA No. 7305
Wong Woo Yiu vs Vivo et al
L-21076 March 31, 1965
Doctrine:
Laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Facts:
1. The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner
to be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country
as a non-quota immigrant, which was later on affirmed by the Board of
Commissioners.
2. However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed
BSI No. 3 and ordered petitioner to be excluded from the country.
3. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of
merit. She then filed the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction (considered as certiorari) before the Manila CFI.
4. After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a
written stipulation of facts, the court a quo declared valid the original
 decision and restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the
country. Respondents interposed the present appeal.
5. It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she
came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband
Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on January
15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village
leader; that the new set of Board of Commissioners found that
petitioner’s claim was without basis, it appearing that in the entry
proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he
first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not
possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in
an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to
China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he
admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939,
and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise
claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four years old so
that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.
Issue:
W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her marriage and can
thus be admitted as non-quota immigrant in the country?
Held:
No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and
her alleged husband in the investigations conducted by the immigration
authorities. Also, the only basis in support of petitioner’s claim that she is Blas’ wife
is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-
wife relationship.
Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family rights or
to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated
in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court
inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the
gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum
(Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of
petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not
one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as
reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil
Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid under the law
of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no
validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to
the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule
that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed
that it is the same as our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is clear that
petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Decision appealed from reversed.
Norma del Socorro v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilselm
GR no. 193707 Dec 10, 2014
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders[1] dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court... of Cebu City (RTC-
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994,
they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.[3]
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son was
only eighteen (18) months old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home
to the Philippines.[6]
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to
their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.
To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.[11]
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.[12]
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with
the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.[16] Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.
Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order
Subsequently,... respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21]
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25] denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration
Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with
petitioner's contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.[37]
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support...
petitioner's son altogether.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his
favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if
the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.[44] Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be
the same with Philippine law, which... enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is
not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,...
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a... foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle
imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Principles:
the doctrine of processual presumption
Mun. Gov’t of Coron vs. Carino
GR no. L-65894 (Sept 24, 1987)
Facts:
Then Pres Marcos directed the mayor of Coron to clear a certain space
the government then needed. The clearing of that space would require the
demolishment of respondents’ structures. The case was brought to court. After a
series of postponements, a date for the final hearing was set, during which
respondents and their counsel failed to appear. Upon petitioner’s motion that
respondents’ failure to appear be construed as a waiver of their right to cross-
examine petitioners’ witnesses and to present evidence, the case was submitted
for decision.
Respondents appealed but failed to submit the required printed copies of
their record on appeal. Respondents also failed to act on the appellate court’s
directive to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed.
The resolution dismissing respondents’ appeal became final and
executory on September 27, 1982, and a writ of execution issued on February 1,
1983.
BP 129 (Sec. 39): “No record on appeal shall be required to take an
appeal...”
Interim of Rules of Court promulgated on Jan 11, 1983 (Secs. 18): “...the
filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with...”
(Sec. 19b): “...In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule
109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed,
the period of appeal shall be 30 days, a record of appeal being required.”
In a supplemental motion dated April 12, 1983, respondents maintained
that since, under the present law, printed records on appeal are no longer
required, the rule on technicalities should be relaxed and their right to appeal
upheld.
On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued a resolution seeking to revive
the case.
Held:
The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised
only in the manner provided for by law.
Quoting Alday vs. Camilon, “Statues regulating the procedure of the court
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural rules are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.”
Benzonan vs. CA GR no. 97973 (Jan 27, 1992)
DBP vs CA and Pe GR no. 97998 (Jan 27, 1992)
Facts:
Pe obtained a parcel of land through Free Patent issued on Oct 29, 1969.
He mortgaged the land to secure a commercial loan, the proceeds of which he used
to build improvements upon the land. Upon failure to pay back his loan, DBP
foreclosed the mortgage on June 28, 1977 and was the highest bidder. The
certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds on Jan 24, 1978. Pe
leased the lot and its improvements from DBP but failed to redeem it within the
one year period. DBP then sold the lot to spouses Benzonan on Sept 24, 1979.
On July 12, 1983, Pe offered to repurchase the land from DBP. Upon
denial, he filed a complaint for repurchase under Sec 119 of CA 141. RTC and CA
upon appeal both affirmed that the land should be reconveyed to Pe.
Spouses Benzonan raised the issue of when to count the five-year period
for repurchase – from date of foreclosure sale or from expiration of one year
period to redeem foreclosed property?
Section 119 of CA 141 provides: “Every conveyance of land acquired
under the free patent or homestead provision, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years
from the date of conveyance.”
In the Mongan and Tupas cases prevailing at the time the lot was
mortgaged, acquired in a foreclosure sale, and sold subsequently to the Benzonan
spouses, it was held that the five-year period should be counted from the date of
the foreclosure sale.
Reversing this decision was the Bellisiano case (1988) which held that the
five-year period should be counted from the day after the expiration of the one-
year period of repurchase allowed in an extrajudicial foreclosure.
Held:
Monge and Tupas cases hold in the instant case for “when a doctrine of
this Court is overruled and a different view adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.”
People vs. Pimentel
GR no. 100210 (Apr 1, 1998)
Facts:
In 1983, Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700. A
warrant of arrest was issued but not served because he could not be found.
On June 5, 1990, Tujan was arrested on basis of the 1983 warrant. During
the arrest, he was discovered to have in his possession firearms and ammunition
and was subsequently charged with Illegal possession of Firearms and Ammunition
in Furtherance of Subversion under PD 1866.
Tujan filed motion invoking his right to a preliminary investigation, but
during the hearing, his counsel withdrew the same, stating his intention to file a
motion to quash on ground of double jeopardy. The same motion was granted
insofar as subversion is concerned without prejudice to the prosecution for Illegal
Possession of firearms.
Held:
At the time of Tujan’s arrest, the prevailing laws were PD 1866, which
punished the illegal possession of firearms and makes the violation, when done “in
furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with, the crime of rebellion,
insurrection, or subversion”, a qualifying circumstance to increase penalty to
death; and RA 1700, which penalizes “any person who ‘knowingly, wilfully, and by
overt act affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association
or organization”.
No double jeopardy was found because Tujan was arrested for two
different offenses springing from two different laws.
The effectivity of RA 7636 on September 22, 1992 totally repealed RA
1700 while the present petition was pending in the SC; and on June 6, 1997, RA
8294 amended PD 1866 to the effect that violation thereof becomes bailable and
the death penalty was replaced by 4 years 2 months 1 day to 6 years imprisonment
and a fine of 15,000.
Amending laws were held to have a retroactive effect because (1) they
are favourable to the accused (2) who is not a habitual offender. The charge of
subversion, now decriminalized, should be dismissed, and the penalty under RA
8294 applied to the illegal possession charge.

Aguillon vs. Director of Lands
17 Phil 507
GR no. L-5448 Dec 16, 1910
Facts: Severo Aguillon, the petitioner, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of certain parcels of land described in the said
petition. the Attorney-General, representing the Insular Government, opposed the
registration of the parcels of land in question, upon the theory that the said land
belonged to the Government. At the time of the trial of the cause the Director of
Lands amended his opposition to the registration of the parcels of land in question,
alleging that the plans presented by the petitioner had not been prepared in
conformity with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1875 of the Philippine
Agriculture. The appellee contends that, inasmuch as his plans had been prepared
long before the enactment of the said Act No. 1875, the same was not applicable,
for the reason that to make the law applicable to the present case would be giving
to said law a retroactive effect, and cites article 3 of the Civil Code
Issue: Whether the Republic Act in question applies to the case of the petitioner?
Held: In our opinion the law does not have a retroactive effect. It only applied to
cases which were begun in the Court of Land Registration after its enactment. It is a
doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any
time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested
rights. The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and stand reversed
until with the provisions of Act No. 1875, and the case is hereby ordered to be
returned to the lower court with direction that the petitioner present his plans in
accordance with said Act.
People vs. Patalin
GR no. 125539 (July 27, 1999)
Facts:
Respondents were found guilty of robbery with multiple rape and were
sentenced to death by the RTC. At the time of the commission of the crimes (1984)
robbery with rape was punishable by death. However, the ratification of the 1987
Constitution caused the death penalty to be abolished with the qualifier that
Congress may thereafter provide for it “for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.” On January 1, 1994, Congress restored death penalty by virtue of RA no.
7659 or the Death Penalty Law.
When the 1987 Constitution immediately took effect upon its ratification,
the case was still in its trial stage.
Held:
The constitutional provision abolishing death penalty obviously intended
to give it a retroactive effect with the clause “...any death penalty imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.”
Since the retroactivity of a penal provision can be made effective during
three possible stages of a criminal prosecution (1-commission of the crime and
start of the prosecution; 2-sentence has been passed but service not yet begun;
and 3-sentence is being carried out), the death sentence meted in the present case
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Also, “the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested (in this case, the accuseds’ rights to be benefited by the
abolition of the death penalty). [Hence] the rule that all statues are to be construed
as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used.”
Cui vs. Arellano University
GR no. L-15127 (May 30, 1961)
Facts:
Cui was a scholar of Arellano University. As a condition of his scholarship
grant, he was made to sign a contract waiving his right to transfer to another
school without refunding Arellano the equivalent of his scholarship in cash. He
studied in Arellano until the first semester of his fourth year whereupon he
transferred to Abad Santos University and finished his law course there. In order to
take the bar exam, he needed the transcripts of his records from Arellano, which
were released only after he had paid the monetary equivalent of the tuition fees
refunded to him by virtue of the scholarship grant.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum
No. 38, series of 1949, where in was stated that “the amount in tuition and other
fees corresponding to [these] scholarships should not be subsequently charges to
the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another
institution.”
Cui asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue of his right
to secure his transcripts without need of refunding Arellano. The Bureau upheld his
position and advised Arellano, who, nonetheless, refused to issue the transcripts
without refund.
Arellano questioned the validity of the Memorandum, holding that it was
not a law; that the provisions are advisory, not mandatory; that the Director of
Private Schools had no authority to issue it and that, further, it has not been
approved by the corresponding department head not published in the Official
Gazette.
Held:
The SC did not find it necessary to pass upon the validity of the Memorandum since
it found the disputed clause in the contract to be contrary to public policy; hence,
null and void, since the main purpose of awarding scholarships is to reward merit
or to aid gifted students, not to attract and keep them in school for the school’s
private propaganda.
Leal vs. IAC
GR no. L-65425 (Nov 5, 1987)
Facts:
On March 21, 1941, a compraventa was entered into between Vicente
and Luis Santiago and Cirilio Leal, involving three parcels of land. Therein was
contained the phrase (orig in Spanish) “they shall not sell to others these three lots
but only to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his heirs or successors,” referring to
Cirilio Leal’s heirs.
When Cirilio died in 1959, his children inherited the subject lands, which
they then either mortgaged or leased. Vicente Santiago approached the Leals and
offered to repurchase the properties, but was refused. His complaint for specific
performance was dismissed by both the trial court and the IAC, there being no sale
or alienation equivalent to a sale yet. Later on, however, the IAC reversed its
decision, ordering the Leals to accept the offer of repurchase.
The issue now raised is whether the clause gives Santiago a right of
repurchase.
Held:
Provisions that restrict the right of ownership, indefinite as to time, are
null as being against public order, under Art 1255 of the Civil Code of Spain and Art
1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Even assuming the validity of the provision, the law requires the vendor
to reserve his right to repurchase the thing sold in no uncertain terms, in order for
a conventional redemption to take place. There was no such reservation, express
or implied, in the compraventa.
Furthermore, the phrase “en caso de venta” should be construed to
mean “should the buyers wish to sell” and not “the buyers should sell”, in which
case, Art 1508 of the Civil code of Spain (Art 1606 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines), applies, wherein is stated that the right to redeem of repurchase in
the absence of an agreement as to time, shall last four years from the date of the
contract. Repurchase under this should have been done in 1945.
Assuming again that the phrase “siempre y cuando estos ultimos puden
hacer de compra” (when the buyer has money to buy) can be construed to be an
agreement as to time, the second paragraph of the same Articles provide that the
right should exercised within ten years because the law does not favour suspended
ownership. In this second case, Santiago’s right to repurchase has already expired,
1966 being 25 years from the date of contract.
Sanchez vs. CA and Lugod
GR no. 108947 (Sept 29, 1997)
Facts:
Spouses Juan and Maria begot an only child, Rosalia. Maria died first.
Rosalia was named adminitratrix of her property, as well of her father’s who was
senile at that time. Upon the death of Juan, his illegitimate children petitioned for
administration of his estate, which was opposed by Rosalia. The parties entered
into and executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the
enumerated properties of Juan. Item (8) of the same agreement stated that the
Sanchezes absolutely and irrevocably waive all their rights, interests, and shares in
the property in favour of Rosalia, who was later named administratrix of her
father’s estate.
In 1970, Rosalia and the Sanchezes entered into and executed a
memorandum of agreement modifying the compromise agreement. However, in
1979, the Sanchezes filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise
agreement, praying for its annulment on ground of fraud.
Issues raised were (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy, (2) the
validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the presence of fraud in the
execution of the compromise and/or collation of the properties sold [to Rosalia’s
children by Juan and Maria during their lifetime].
Held:
Certiorari was the proper remedy because the lower courts exceeded its
jurisdiction when, being only a probate court, it adjudicated on the title to
properties when all it had power to do was to determine whether the disputed
properties should be included in the inventory to be administered.
 The compromise agreement and all the waivers therein contained were
binding. A compromise agreement is “a contract whereby the parties, making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced.” Hence, judicial approval is not required for its perfection. In the
present case, however, the so-called compromise agreement actually partakes
more of the nature of a deed of partition. But since all its requisites are present (1-
no will left by decedent; 2-no debt or all debts settled; 3-heirs and liquidators all of
age or duly represented if minors; and 4-partition done through public instrument
of affidavit duly filed with the register of Deeds) the compromise
agreement/partition is valid.
The contested waiver is also deemed valid because the heirs waived a
known and existing interest (their hereditary right vested in them by the death of
their father). Furthermore, “there is not legal obstacle to an heir’s waiver of his/her
hereditary share even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.” The Sanchezes have also already availed
themselves of the benefits of the compromise. They are thus barred by judicial
principle from asking for a recission of a compromise after enjoying their benefits.
“Compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even
if there was a mistake of law or fact..”
Finally, with regards the alleged fraud, there was no sufficient evidence
proving the same. It cannot be presumed. Even arguing to the contrary, the alleged
errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares, concealment of properties
and fraud are questions of fact not reviewable by the SC.
Allied Banking Corp vs CA
GR no. 123871 (Aug 31, 1998)
Facts:
Two crossed checks drawn against Allied in favour of Meszellen were
deposited with the ComTrust. The checks were cleared through the Philippine
Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) and then the proceeds thereof were paid by
Allied to ComTrust. Allied was later sued by Meszellen who alleged that payment
had been made by somebody else. Almost ten years later, Allied filed a third party
complaint against BPI, successor-in-interest of ComTrust, for reimbursement in the
event that it would be judged liable in the main case to pay Mezellen.
Central issue was whether trial court had authority to admit a third party
complaint filed by one bank against another involving a check cleared through
PCHC.
Held:
Trial court had no such authority. PCHC rules and regulations hold that
“disputes between two or more clearing participants involving items cleared
through PCHC should be submitted to the Arbitration Committee” without
prejudice to recourse to the courts in case of an adverse decision. A bank’s
participation in the clearing operations of PCHC is deemed its written and
subscribed consent to the binding effect of the arbitration agreement.
The doctrine that a trial court that has jurisdiction over the main action
also had jurisdiction over the third party complaint, even if said court would have
none of that jurisdiction had the third party complaint been filed as an
independent actions admits of an exception in the case of banks that have given
written and subscribed consent to arbitration under PCHC. Third party complaint is
merely a procedural device allowed when the court so permits.
Valenzuela hardwood vs. CA and Seven Brothers
GR no. 102316 (June 30, 1997)
Facts:
Valenzuela entered into an agreement with Seven Brothers for the latter
to ship its logs to Manila as a private carrier. The same were insured with South Sea
Surety and Insurance Co. The Seven Brothers’ ship sank, resulting in the loss of
Vvalenzuela’s logs, which sinking was due to the negligence of the captain. Seven
Brothers maintained that it was not liable for the loss because of stipulation in the
charter party exempting the ship owner from liability in case of loss.
The validity of the clause exempting Seven Brothers from liability is
assailed.
Held:
The invalidity of contractual stipulations stating that ship owners shall
not be liable for loss even due to the negligence of his employees/agents is
applicable only for common carriers, in which case the stipulation is invalidated for
being contrary to public policy. The same is, however, not true for private carriers
whose contracts are not contracts of adhesion but one wherein both parties may
freely stipulate their duties and obligations. In the latter case, such stipulations
shall be binding upon them.
Whatever rights Valenzuela had under Articles 586 and 587 of the Code
of Commerce it waived when it entered into the charter party wherein obligation
to bear the loss was shifted to it.
Pleasantville Dev’t Corp vs Ca, et al.
GR no. 79688 (Feb 1, 1996)
Facts:
Jardinico bought vacant subdivision Lot 9 and later discovered that
improvements have been introduced to it by Kee. Kee bought Lot 8 from C.T.
Torres Enterprises (CTTE), the exclusive real estate agent of Pleasantville. However,
CTTE’s employee, instead of pointing out Lot 8, pointed out Lot 9, which Kee relied
upon.
The issues raised are (1) whether Kee was a builder in good faith; (2) the
liability, if any, of Pleasantville and CTTE.
Held:
Kee is a builder in good faith. He applied and paid for a relocation of the
lot as well the lot plan of the subdivision and, accompanied by CTTE’s employee,
set out to survey the lot he bought. The steps he had taken to protect his interests
were reasonable.
Pleasantville’s contention that Kee cannot claim the erroneous pointing
out of the lot to him because of the provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment
stating that the vendee has personally examined or inspected the property as to its
location, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots and...expenses for
fillings (should the vendee wish it) owing to consequential changes due to erosion
should be borne by the vendee should not be construed to man that Kee
contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from Pleasantville’s
negligence, since the same provision refers only to shouldering of expenses due to
change from erosion.
Pleasantville is to be liable for the negligence of its agent. The principal
must still be responsible for acts done by its agent within the scope of that latter’s
authority, and should bear damages caused to third persons. The agent who
exceeded his authority, however, may be personally liable for the damage. Thus,
Pleasantville and CTTE are solidarily liable for damages due to negligence.
Edna Mabugay-Otamias vs. Republic of the Philippines
GR no. 189516 June 8, 2016
People vs Veneracion
GR no. (Oct 12, 1995)
FACTS:
The case arose from the conviction of two individuals by the respondent judge with
the crime of Rape with Homicide of seven-year old girl. The accused on the incident
also caused fatal injuries to the minor child by slashing her vagina, hitting her head
with a thick peace of wood and stabling her neck, which were all the direct cause of
her immediate death. Respondent-judge however, instead of imposing the
corresponding death penalty, imposed rather the reclusion perpetua to each
accused.
The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be
modified that the penalty be death instead of reclusion perpetua. Respondent-
judge still denied the motion citing religious convictions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent-judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he failed to attach the
corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
HELD:
Yes, respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in the attaching the proper corresponding penalty of
the crime of Rape with Homicide. The Supreme Court mandates that after
an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided for
by law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. Respondent-
judge is duty bound to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted
debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides
for the sentence of death as penalty in specific and well defined instances.
The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an
ancient one, but is a matter upon which judges have no choice. This is consistent in
the rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9, that no judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case back to the
respondent-judge for the imposition of death penalty of the accused.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia – Honoration B.
Catindig
GR no. 148311 (March 31, 2005)
Facts:
Honoration Catindig adopted his illegitimate daughter. As a consequence
of which, her name was changed to Stephanie Nathy Catindig. The issue on the
child’s middle name, however, was untouched, so Catindig petitioned that she be
allowed to use her mother’s surname of Garcia as a middle name.
Issue raised is whether a child adopted by her natural father may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name.
Held:
The law is silent as to what middle name an adopted natural child may
use. The Civil Code and Family Law Committees, however, agreed that the initial or
surname of the mother shall immediately precede the surname of the father,
which is the established Filipino way. Furthermore, adoption statues should be
liberally construed in favour of adoption. Therefore, it was held that there being no
law expressly prohibiting the adopted natural child’s use of her mother’s surname
as a middle name, it is allowed.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332
June 25, 2014
Van Dorn vs Romillo
GR no. 68470 (Oct 8, 1985)
Facts:
Reyes-van Dorn is a Filipino citizen while Upton is an American. They
were married in Hong Kong and later absolutely divorced in Nevada, the court
there having obtained jurisdiction over both parties. Upton later filed suit against
Reyes-van Dorn alleging that, since divorce decrees obtained abroad are not
binding in the Philippines, her shop in Manila is still considered their conjugal
property and that he should be declared to have the right to manage it also.
Explicitly stated in Upton’s Power of Attorney executed in Nevada, he
stated that his [then] spouse sought divorce, that there is neither community
property nor community obligations to be adjudicated by court.
Issue raised is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Held:
Upton, being an American citizen, is bound by the divorce decree
obtained in his country. The same is recognized in the Philippines, he being an
alien. Thus, according to his national law, he is no longer the husband of Reyes-van
Dorn and therefore bereft of the standing to sue as her husband. The decision of
his country’s court (which validly obtained jurisdiction over him) binding upon him,
and which he does not repudiate, estoppes him from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
[Note: non-binding of divorce decree upon Filipino citizens applies only
insofar as remarriage is concerned?]
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, et al.
GR no. 80116 (June 30, 1999)
Facts:
Pilapil and Geiling were married and absolutely divorced in Germany, the
divorce decree made by a court locally and internationally competent for divorce
proceedings and that the dissolution of the marriage was legally founded upon and
authorized by the law of that foreign jurisdiction.
After the decree of divorce, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
against Pilapil. The same were raised to the Office of the secretary of Justice.
Issue raised as to whether the charge for adultery may be filed by one
who is no longer a spouse at the time of filing the same.
Held:
American jurisprudence was resorted to wherein was ruled that in cases
where statue provides that the innocent spouse has the exclusive right to institute
a prosecution for adultery, such innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the guilty spouse after a divorce has been decreed. Even in
Philippine law, a charge for adultery must be initiated by the offended spouse who
has the status, capacity, or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of
the criminal action.
The reason for this is that the charge of adultery is allowed because the
innocent spouse has a family or marriage to protect, or is interested in preventing
the introduction of spurious heirs into the family. After the dissolution of a
marriage, that reason naturally disappears.
Llorente vs CA
GR no. 124371 (Nov 23, 2000)
Facts:
Lorenzo was a US serviceman who married Paula. In 1943 he was granted
US citizenship. When he returned from the US he discovered that Paula was having
an illicit affair and was pregnant. Lorenzo returned to the US where he filed for,
and was granted, a [absolute] divorce effective 1952. He later married Alicia and
had three children all surnamed Llorente, with her during their 25-year marriage.
Alicia did not know of Lorenzo’s first marriage.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed a last will and testament bequeathing all his
properties to Alicia and their three children. The will was admitted to probate by
the trial court, but Lorenzo died before the proceedings could be terminated.
 Paula then filed for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s property,
contending that she was his surviving spouse and, therefore, compulsory heir; that
the property in his will were acquired during their marriage; and that Lorenzo’s
bequeathment encroached upon her legitime and ½ share in the conjugal property.
Issues raised as to the validity of Lorennzo’s divorce in the Philippines,
and, subsequently, as to who should inherit from him.
Held:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen at the time of his divorce from
Paula, marriage to Alicia, execution of his will, and death, the same should all be
governed by applicable foreign law. Paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Civil Code was
cited: “...intestate and testamentary succession...shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration.” Lorenzo’s will,
executed in the Philippines according to the formalities required under Philippine
law and admitted to probate by the local court, is declared extrinsically valid. The
intrinsic validity of the provisions thereon are left to the determination of the
applicable foreign law.
The divorce obtained by Lorenzo was also declared valid “and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.”
Garcia vs. Recio
GR no. 138322 (Oct 2, 2001)
Facts:
Recio was a Filipino citizen when he married Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen. Their marriage was subsequently dissolved by a divorce decree
issued by an Australian family court.
In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and in 1994 married Garcia, a
Filipino citizen. They began living separately in 1995, and their conjugal assets in
1996 were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.
In 1998 Garcia filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy, alleging the existence of a subsisting marriage at the time
Recio married her. Recio was later able to secure a divorce decree in Australia
dissolving his marriage to Garcia, and prayed that the complaint be dissolved on
the ground that it stated no cause of action.
Issues raised were (1) whether the fist divorce was proven, and (2)
whether Recio was proven to be legally capacitated to marry Garcia.
Held:
There are two kinds of divorce: (1) absolute divorce (vinculo matrimonii)
that terminates the marriage; and (2) limited divorce (mensa et thoro) that
suspends the marriage but leaves the bond in full force.
The Australian divorce decree Recio presented contained the restriction
that “A party to a marriage who married again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.” From
this it can be concluded that Recio obtained a limited divorce that did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Furthermore, Recio’s failure to present a certificate establishing his legal capacity
to remarry prevents the court from concluding that he was legally capacitated to
remarry. The trial court erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
Recio with legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to present evidence
regarding Australian personal law governing his status, or at least proving his legal
capacity to remarry.
However, neither can Garcia’s petition to declare her marriage null and
void on ground of bigamy be granted because Recio may, after all, turn out to be
capacitated to remarry under Australian law. The case should therefore be
remanded to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, showing Recio’s legal
capacity to marry petitioner. Only upon failure of that can the marriage be declared
null and void on the ground of bigamy.
The court also ruled that divorce is a question of fact that must be proved
by the one alleging it as a defense before it can be admitted in evidence.
A writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by seal of his
office.
Although insufficient with regards to the above requirements, the divorce
decree between Recio and his first wife Samson was admitted as evidence due to
Garia’s failure to properly object to its admissibility.
Roehr vs. Rodriguez
GR no. 142820 (Jun 30, 2003)
Facts:
Roehr and Rodriguez were married in Hamburg, Germany, and then had
their marriage subsequently ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.
Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, to which
Roehr filed a motion to dismiss. The latter was denied by the trial court. Roehr
meanwhile obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese wherein custody of both their children was granted to him
through summary proceedings. Records remain unclear as to Rodriguez’s
participation in the proceedings. The decree of divorce was recognized by the RTC
when it endowed Roehr the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Issue raised as to the effects of the divorce decree, especially on custody.
Held:
A foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as the foreign spouse is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in Philippine civil law on status of persons, provided that such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, legal effects as to custody, care, and support of the children
must still be determined by Philippine courts. Before res judicata can be given to a
foreign judgment, there must be sufficient proof that the parties opposed to such
foreign judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so (ie. may repel such
judgment by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact).
Also, with respect to actions in personam, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of a party’s claim, and is subject to
proof to the contrary.
Republic vs. Crasus L. Iyoy
GR no. 152577 (Sept 21, 2005)
Facts:
Crasus married Fely and had five children with her. In 1984, Fely left for
the US, leaving their children with Crasus. She sent divorce papers to Crasus not
long after, around which time Crasus also learned that she was married to an
American and bore a child with him. Fely returned to the Philippines on several
occasions, flaunting her American family and American last name. She claimed to
have become an American citizen in 1988. Crasus filed for declaration of nullity of
marriage in 1997 under grounds of psychological incapacity.
Issues raised as to the continued validity of the marriage between Crasus
and Fely.
Held:
Quoting Santos vs cA, psychological incapacity was defined as “a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly [in]cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage...[including] their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.”
Psychological incapacity should be characterized by:
(1) Gravity – must be so serious that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(2) Juridical antecedence – must be existing before the marriage
although the overt manifestations may emerge only thereafter;
(3) Incurability – either incurable, or the cure must be beyond the
means of the party involved.
In republic vs. CA and Molina:
(1) Burden of proof to show nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favour of the validity of marriage;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) Medically or clinically identified,
(b) Alleged in the complaint,
(c) Sufficiently proven by experts
(d) Clearly explained in the decision
(e) Incapacity must be psychological, although manifestations may
be physical
(3) Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of celebration
of the marriage, or prior thereto, even though manifestations need
not be perceivable at such time;
(4) Incapacity must be medically or clinically incurable; may be absolute
or only in regard to the other spouse; and must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations;
(5) Such must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage;
(6) Affected marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-
71 and 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code;
(7) Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling nor
decisive, to be given great respect by the courts;
(8) Trial court must order appearance of prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and SolGen as counsel for the State. No decision shall be handed
down without SolGen certification stating his reasons for approval or
opposition to the petition.
(9) (from Marcos vs Marcos) there is no requirement for the respondent
spouse to be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for declaration of nullity based on psychological
incapacity. Such incapacity, however, must be established by
evidence during trial.
 As to the divorce allegedly obtained by Fely, it was ruled invalid for Fely
was a Filipino citizen at the time she filed for divorce. Thus, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity.
Since Philippine laws do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses,
the divorce she obtained couldn’t have been valid. The marriage between parties
continues to exist.

Republic vs Orbecido III

GR no. 154380 (Oct 5, 2005)

Facts:
At the time of marriage, Orbecido and his wife were both Filipino citizens.
The wife went to America, became a naturalized citizen, obtained a divorce decree,
and married an American instead.
Orbecido is petitioning that the court grant him the capacity to remarry
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code that recognizes a
divorce obtained by an alien spouse abroad.
Issue raised as to whether said Article 26 also covers cases wherein both
parties were Filipinos at the time of celebration of marriage.

Held:
Orbecido should be considered capacitated to remarry. The legislative
intention behind Article 26 was to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse is still considered married to an alien spouse who is no longer considered
married to him by virtue of a divorce decree obtained abroad. Jurisprudence cited
was Quita vs CA wherein the court hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
These, however, must be proven s that Filipino spouse may be granted
the capacity to remarry:
(1) Naturalization of the alien spouse;
(2) Fact of the divorce and its conformity to the foreign law allowing it;
(3) The fact of such foreign law; and
(4) That under such foreign law, the alien spouse is also capacitated to
remarry.