Searh and Seizures Arrest. Bill of Rights 4

BILL OF RIGHTS: SEARCH AND SEIZURES AND ARREST
1. Silahis International Hotel Inc. vs. Soluta (No. 5)
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,

vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO
MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari partially assails the Court of Appeals Decision of March 26, 2004
holding herein petitioners Silahis International Hotel, Inc. and Jose Marcel Panlilio, along with Floro
Maniego and Steve Villanueva, civilly liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, for violation of
respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search of their office.
Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio (Panlilio) was the Vice President for Finance of his co-petitioner Silahis
International Hotel, Inc. (hotel), while respondents Rogelio Soluta (Soluta), Joselito Santos, Edna Bernate
(Edna), Vicenta Delola (Vicenta), and Florentino Matilla (Matilla) were employees of the hotel and officers of
the Glowhrain-Silahis Union Chapter, the hotel employees union (the union).
Petitioners’ version of the antecedents of the case are as follows:
In late 1987, as Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of the Rapier Enforcement Professional
Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA) which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, had
been receiving reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution were going on in
the union office at the hotel and that there existed a theft syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with the
approval of Panlilio, of suspected members and officers of the union.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, Panlilio, his personal secretary Andy Dizon, Maniego, Bulletin reporter
Nonoy Rosales, and REPISA security guard Steve Villanueva (Villanueva) entered the union office located at
the hotel basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay (Babay) who was apprised about the
suspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in the course of which Villanueva found a plastic bag
under a table. When opened, the plastic bag yielded dry leaves of marijuana. Panlilio thereupon ordered
Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.
On the other hand, respondents’ version follows:
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female
locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard pounding sounds outside,
prompting her to open the door of the locker room upon which she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she
failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel,4 forcibly opening the door of the union
office.5 She even saw one of the men hid something behind his back. She then closed the door and went back
to bed. Soon after she heard the door of the union office opened.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union
office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.
Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith, Efren
Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open the door. At that instant, men
in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run
to the female locker room, and to thereafter proceed to the Engineering Office where they called for police
assistance.6
While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latter’s request, met. At the meeting, Panlilio
told Babay that they proceed to the union office where they would settle the mauling incident, to which Babay
replied that the door of the office could not be opened. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open
the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the
objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. 7 A plastic bag was found containing
marijuana flowering tops.
As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an
investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers,8 namely: Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr.,
Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta, Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato Lina,
Avelino Meneses, Matilla, and Norman Agtani9 was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila, for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act).
An Information indicting the union officers was subsequently filed by the Fiscal’s Office before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
After trial, Branch 5 of the RTC acquitted the accused. The trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, with the specimen and/or the marijuana flowering tops allegedly found inside the Union Office
occupied by the accused not admissible in evidence, coupled by the suspicious circumstance of confiscation,
for lack of sufficient evidence, accused Henry Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Rogelio Soluta, Teodoro F.
Gimpayan, Vicente Delola, Edna Bernate, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene Velarde, Joselito Santos, Avelino Meneses,
Florentino Matilla and Norman Agtani, are ACQUITTED of the charge. The bonds they put up for their
provisional liberty are cancelled.
The Branch Clerk is directed to turn over the custody of the seized plastic bag containing flowering tops of
marijuana to the NBI Director as Permanent Custodian of the seized Dangerous Drugs.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the Manila RTC a Complaint
against petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who assisted in
the prosecution of the case against them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their constitutional right
against illegal search.
After trial, Branch 55 of the Manila RTC, by Decision13 dated June 2, 1994, held the hotel, Panlilio, Maniego
and Villanueva jointly and severally liable for damages as a result of malicious prosecution and illegal search of
the union office. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants Silahis
International Hotel, Inc., Jose Marcel Panlilio, Floro Maniego and Steve Villanueva, individually and
collectively, jointly and severally, to pay to:
1. Plaintiffs Union, Rogelio S. Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna
Bernate-Dacanay, jointly, the sum of P70,900.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of
P1,000.00 each for the same plaintiffs, except the Union, in the same concept and nature.
2. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-
Dacanay the sum of P100,000.00 each for moral damages.
3. Plaintiffs Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna-Bernate-Dacanay the sum of
P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.
4. To all the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of P30,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees.
The complaint, insofar as plaintiff Erlisa Ilustrisimo and defendants Ramos, Bautista and Tutaan are
concerned, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All the counterclaims of the defendants are likewise dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis.
Costs against the remaining defendants.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision. It found herein petitioners
et al. civilly liable for damages for violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against illegal search,
not for malicious prosecution, set aside the award of actual damages to respondent union, and reduced the
award of actual damages to individual respondents to ₱50,000. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the first paragraph of the dispositive portion should read:
"1. Plaintiffs Rogelio Soluta, Joselito Santos, Florentino Matilla, Vicenta Delola and Edna Bernate-Dacanay,
jointly, the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages, and the further sum of P1,000.00 each for the same
plaintiffs in the same concept and nature."
The Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, the present petition of Panlilio and the hotel, they contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE
FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THAT:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ APPLICATION OF PEOPLE V. ARUTA (288 SCRA 626[1998]) AND
SECTION 13, RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE INSTANT CASE IS
LEGALLY FLAWED.
2. PETITIONERS’ SEARCH OF THE UNION OFFICE IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS ENTIRELY
REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.16
While petitioners concede that the appellate court correctly cited the principles enunciated in People v.
Aruta17 and Section 13, Rule 12618 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it gravely erred when it applied Aruta to
justify petitioners’ alleged liability under Article 32 of the New Civil Code. They argue that Aruta does not
involve Article 32 as nowhere in the decision is there any reference to Article 32.19
Similarly, petitioners argue that being private persons, they are not covered by the standards set forth
in Aruta as the constitutional protection against illegal searches and seizures is not meant to be invoked
against private individuals.
Petitioners further argue that the search of the union office was reasonable under the circumstances,21 given
that the hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the search was not without probable cause as it was
conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue for
illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs;22 and the search was conducted with the
consent and in the presence of union officer Babay.23
The petition fails.
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic
community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal
offense or not, must be guarded against.
As the Code Commission noted,
xxxx
(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms named are not so frequent as
those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of the penal law. It is in these cunning
devices of suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are not criminally punishable, where the greatest danger to
democracy lies. The injured citizen will always have, under the new Civil Code, adequate civil remedies before
the courts because of the independent civil action, even in those instances where the act or omission
complained of does not constitute a criminal offense.24
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also
private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is
why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad
faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual
rights.25 It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in
late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted
surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their
companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time
for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the
exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Petitioners’ violation of individual
respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award
of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, a case for unfair competition, the progression of time between the
receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of the therein private respondents’ premises showed that
there was sufficient time for the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Yet they
did not apply for one. They went on with the raid and seized the goods of the therein private Respondents.
Under the circumstances, this court upheld the grant of damages by the trial court to the therein private
respondents for violation of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
As for petitioners’ contention that property rights justified the search of the union office, the same
does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office, had the right to raise the
question of validity of the search and seizure.27
Neither does petitioners’ claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to enter the union office
lie. Babay’s account of why petitioners and company went to the union office – to consider Panlilio’s
suggestion to settle the mauling incident is more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search,
and even asked if they were armed with a search warrant.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be
clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof.
There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however.
That a violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis for the recovery
of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code, there is no doubt.
Since the complaint29 filed before the trial court was for damages due to malicious prosecution and violation of
constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial court of actual damages to
respondent union was correctly set aside by the appellate court.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.30 Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who
orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to
herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation
to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxxx
(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners magnify the citation by the appellate court of Aruta allegedly "to justify [their] liability" under Article
32 of the Civil Code, which petitioners allege is erroneous as said case did not involve Article 32.
Aruta was, however, cited by the appellate court, not to justify petitioners’ liability but to rule out the legality of
the search in the union office as the search was not done as an incident of a lawful arrest.
Petitioners cite People v. Marti31 to support their thesis that the determinants in the validity of the constitutional
right against searches and seizure cannot be invoked against private individuals.
But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of whether "an act of a private
individual, allegedly in violation of [one’s] constitutional rights, [may] be invoked against the State." In other
words, the issue in that case was whether the evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity without the participation of the State, is admissible.
The issue in the present civil case, however, is whether respondent individual can recover damages for
violation of constitutional rights. As reflected above, Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil
Code, allows so.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
2. Stonehill vs. Diokno (No.27)
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity
as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE
DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant
Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on
different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they
were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above
as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the
Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law —
on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives
from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already
adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants
and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to
return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have
been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and
things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless
of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed,
it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby
the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the
rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not
affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth
Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs.
United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are
valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers
and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the
party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that
this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a
paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was
in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because
the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such
as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be
provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free
from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that
basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct.
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction
of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of
words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly
severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not
to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time
that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the
Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even
Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against
the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion
doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of
the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by
Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to
be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can
no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner
and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to
be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to
suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration
of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of
a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make
unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the
majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality
had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard,
House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the
premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P.
Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects
seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and
other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing
under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment
of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration,
and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have
sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to
warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June
29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
3. Disini vs. Sec of Justice (No. 29)
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and
ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203299

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203306
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP,

BERTENI "TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E.
RENTA, CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359
SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L.

ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R. BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203391
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN,
MA. KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE
NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203407
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist
BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG,
Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan,
FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B. MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis
Party-List, LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's Party, ADOLFO ARES P.
GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Executive Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE,
JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE,
Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office, NONNATUS CAESAR R.
ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of
the Philippine National Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203440
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J.
SANTIAGO, GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights
Center),Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA
in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The
DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of the Executive Department of
Government), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203453
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE

(PPI), CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN,
MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS
IN THE e-PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL
AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR
INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203454
PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203469
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C.
RIMORIN; JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD
ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P.
RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA; MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS
IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B.
LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E.
RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the
Philippines; SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive Director,
Information and Communications Technology Office; HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his
capacity as Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his
capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203501
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the
Philippines; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA
M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his
official capacity as Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology Office;
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of
the Philippine National Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203509

BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203515
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his
capacity as President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER
GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE PASSAGE AND/OR
IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR

MODERN HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar
S. Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A.
CASIÑO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES, JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M.
RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR., LAUREN DADO, MARCO
VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO,
ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE DOJ
OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND
COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a
person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other
things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research,
study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for
special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges,
trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual
accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for
greater information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a
number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of
them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by
posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use
the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card
or defrauding him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in
sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the
government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems
and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and
memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that
destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty
and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on
the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court
extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012,
enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain
acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the
government to track down and penalize violators. These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the
crime of libel.
The Rulings of the Court
Section 4(a)(1)
Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under
this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere
with the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, 1 useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this
standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on
the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is
the least restrictive means to protect such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.3
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a
condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned
conduct.4
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ
tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal
information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target system’s security and report back to the owners the
vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the
equivalent of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records.5
Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of
the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get out of jail free
card."6Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would
insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
this Act:
xxxx
(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission
of viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation,
may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism,8 the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in
this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private
documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect 9 or the
fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries
of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is
to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect
that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and
creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of
circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
this Act:
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a
personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being
narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or
take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a
well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the
person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the
name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction
between the two, the law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as
a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is
reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation,
or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to
the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
this Act:
xxxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration,
or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided:
that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged
its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court
explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator
Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard
we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right"
and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and
"everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches16 and
seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence.17 In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address,
his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar
data.19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause
damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates
the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the
specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section
regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another.
There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be
hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him
that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish.
Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and
disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless
special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. 20 As such, the press, whether in
quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to
negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or
consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.21 They express
fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which
are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in
cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right
granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."22 This meaning given to
the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies
into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
give a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing
x x x between and among two private persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some." 23 The
understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is
necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave
trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e.,
by webcam.25
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is not novel. Article
201 of the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or
pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a
person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other
consideration.27
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no
other purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography. 29 The Court weighed the property
rights of individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if containing pornographic materials, may be
forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by
some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the
exploitation of women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of
obscenity.30The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that
makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or
indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as
Congress has intended.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or
the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to
be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to
cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA
when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s
definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic
or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no
one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational
basis for such higher penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child
pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct,
manufacture or create any form of child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid
and abet the core offenses that ACPA seeks to punish.34 Petitioners are wary that a person who merely
doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child
pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces off his
ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below.
For now the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic communication with
the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are
prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from
the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the
recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same
source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the
electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The
term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same
sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus
scene in which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when reading options from a
menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications
or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces
the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the
recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection
in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency
of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such
unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such
ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with
spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is
not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression
but is nonetheless entitled to protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of
the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any
similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the
provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
xxxx
xxxx
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the
future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime
law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces
it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction. 38 Petitioners argue that inferring
"presumed malice" from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code
infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional
for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in
Fermin v. People39 even where the offended parties happened to be public figures.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 42 The reckless disregard
standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he
published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice. 43
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is
required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be
false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a
barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since
the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court
recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement
where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs.44
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher
standard of actual malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against
complainants who were public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence of malice in fact in that case.
Thus:
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against
complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no
malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was
also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.
(Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public figures in the
above case, cinema and television personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of
₱6,000.00.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice.
The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed
statement.45 For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory
statement even if it was in fact true.46
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the country’s
obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis
v. Republic of the Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General
Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an all-
encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that
the accused has been prompted in making the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the
court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless
the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the
discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply
suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of
expression.48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its
exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain
restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a
new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on
libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are
a world apart in terms of quickness of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace,
facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such
reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. Whether these reactions to defamatory
statement posted on the internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law
punishes, is another matter that the Court will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets
or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers
from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and
abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the
services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of
"aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and
common usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.51 The legislature
is not required to define every single word contained in the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or
abets another in destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful
picketing of laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in
character. These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and human
experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred.
The idea of "aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged
dogmas of cyberspace use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet
within a year, translating to about 31 million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the
top 10 most engaged countries for social networking.56 Social networking sites build social relations among
people who, for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections.57
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with
shared interests use Facebook to get in touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open
book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications
when they update their profile.59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be
made visible to anyone, depending on the user’s privacy settings.
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on
Facebook can react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of preferences on the program’s screen such
as "Like," "Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that the reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables
him to post online his feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!" When a Facebook user
"Shares" a posting, the original "posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile, consequently making it
visible to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to
send and read short text-based messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as "Tweets."
Microblogging is the practice of posting small pieces of digital content—which could be in the form of text,
pictures, links, short videos, or other media—on the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has "Followers,"
those who subscribe to this particular user’s posts, enabling them to read the same, and "Following," those
whom this particular user is subscribed to, enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter user can
make his tweets available only to his Followers, or to the general public. If a post is available to the public, any
Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is just reposting or republishing another person’s tweet
without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog
service provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet
café that may have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable
comment on the blog; and f) the person who posts a link to the blog site. 60 Now, suppose Maria (a blogger)
maintains a blog on WordPress.com (blog service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog so she
subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet Service Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit
affair with a movie star. Linda, one of Maria’s friends who sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so
true! They are so immoral." Maria’s original post is then multiplied by her friends and the latter’s friends, and
down the line to friends of friends almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda, comes
across this blog, finds it interesting and so shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter
account. Nena’s "Followers" then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random person’s "Retweet" of Nena’s original tweet and posts this on
her Facebook account. Immediately, Pamela’s Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the
assailed posting. A lot of them even press the Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original
posting into tens, hundreds, thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or
"Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on
the office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If
Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If
Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely
expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding
or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his
Friends or Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of
aiding or abetting libel? And, in the complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be
liable for aiding or abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and
Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to
the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of
joining hundreds or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed in court,
who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when
applied to cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique
circumstances and culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new
medium of communication in violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 61 a case
involving the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing
transmission, by means of a telecommunications device, of
"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age or to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age communications that, in context, depict or describe, in
terms "patently offensive" as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities
or organs.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of
speech for being overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. §223, is a matter of special
concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a
regulation raises special U.S. Const. amend. I concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.
Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the
CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity
of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably
unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk
of discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater U.S. Const. amend. I concerns than those
implicated by certain civil regulations.
xxxx
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, presents a great threat of censoring
speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That
danger provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on
protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis ours)
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous
statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in
hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous
reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication
technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and
broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.62
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will
suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties.
Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages.64 Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace
is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice
Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 65 "we must view these
statements of the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as
appropriate only insofar as these doctrines are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving
free speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any
constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards,
overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against
third-party standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the
constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it
involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad
or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.67
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that
any government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the
constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly
complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could
arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it?
Netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When
a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one netizen’s comment aided and abetted a
cybercrime while another comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new
defamatory story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an
original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of
defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to cascade in
the internet, it will destroy relationships and, under certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension
between social or economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and indexes child
pornography and facilitates the completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography,"
does this make Google and its users aiders and abettors in the commission of child pornography
crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in the American law on child pornography that the Cybercrimes law
lacks—the exemption of a provider or notably a plain user of interactive computer service from civil liability for
child pornography as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene...whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly
or unwittingly. Does this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user
downloads the Facebook mobile application, the user may give consent to Facebook to access his contact
details. In this way, certain information is forwarded to third parties and unsolicited commercial communication
could be disseminated on the basis of this information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding
the distribution of this communication? The legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of
annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of
aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the
petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated.71 In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section
5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply
to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on
Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses
borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A
hacker may for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally access another party’s computer system
but the security employed by the system’s lawful owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have
gained access to usernames and passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor is
alerted.72 If Section 5 that punishes any person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not
upheld, the owner of the username and password could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking.
But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from liability simply because of the vigilance of a lawful
owner or his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent. 73 While this may
be true with respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit
the other acts specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5),
Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1) as well as the actors
aiding and abetting the commission of such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty through
adroit tracking of their works. Absent concrete proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if
committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by
the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher
than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the
Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of
information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the
technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause
greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts
may be prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code.
When two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.74 With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography,
the Court would rather leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous,
is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The
two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section
4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed,
the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished
under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of
publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope
so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and
4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred
thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of
prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal
or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to
the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (Ph₱1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be
punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with
imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) but not exceeding
Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with
imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One
hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00)
or both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses;
4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure;
4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and
Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They
appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not
diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of
another offense or might just have been connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only
interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative
department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.78

Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be
authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of
underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or
recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1)
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real
time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing
where digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating
to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to
privacy and to be protected from government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one
another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the
disclosure of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a
rational relation to the purpose of the law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and that
the provision itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance
the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order
to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the
government should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide
law enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes
committed in cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt legislative measures to empower
state authorities to collect or record "traffic data, in real time, associated with specified communications." 83 And
this is precisely what Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or
record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterday’s traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been committed, adequate
for fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not.
Those who commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without right, 84 transmitting
viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;86 and producing
child pornography87 could easily evade detection and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of
their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually
anywhere: from internet cafés, from kindred places that provide free internet services, and from unregistered
mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered
SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the
cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays of
computers to mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is only real-
time traffic data collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant
that can succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample
safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the people’s right to privacy. The concern is
understandable. Indeed, the Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work
together to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that there exists an
independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all
freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into
two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to
independence in making certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—the right to informational privacy—that those who
oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live
freely without surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to
privacy, this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must
have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test,
where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular
person or group, petitioners’ challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology
(ICT) users, meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to
communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general
public’s point of view. Without reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication through a service
provider, must of necessity disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to
the recipient ICT user. For example, an ICT user who writes a text message intended for another ICT user
must furnish his service provider with his cellphone number and the cellphone number of his recipient,
accompanying the message sent. It is this information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting
communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it
through the postal service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will read the information
appearing outside the envelope.
Computer data—messages of all kinds—travel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened
to parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the
content is broken up into packets and around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header
contains the traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in
the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the
packet is going, and how the packet fits together with other packets. 93 The difference is that traffic data sent
through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or
office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel
from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover
the identities of the sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service provider’s communication’s
system will put his voice message into packets and send them to the other person’s cellphone where they are
refitted together and heard. The latter’s spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by
the service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number to the service provider when he puts his call
through. He also reveals the cellphone number to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating
electronically follow the same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that
telephone users in the ‘70s must realize that they necessarily convey phone numbers to the telephone
company in order to complete a call. That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that phone numbers
one dials should remain private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one
another over cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data
that are needed for a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out of
the private sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are
gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to
create profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a
person’s close associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is
likely beyond what the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right
to privacy. But has the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect
individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or
electronic means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in
law or jurisprudence and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying
to this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it uses
in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law,
dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor
General suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful
procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the
collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying
a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law
enforcement agencies use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build
up a case against an identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says
that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion.
Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into
the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry
to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications."
But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would
specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to
engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens
the right of individuals to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time"
because it is not possible to get a court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving
vehicle." But warrantless search is associated with a police officer’s determination of probable cause that a
crime has been committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is
immediately carried out, the thing to be searched stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided
in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users
and that the procedure envisioned by the law could be better served by providing for more robust safeguards.
His bare assurance that law enforcement authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not
enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their sources
and destinations must be narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine
and the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply
only to free speech cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech.
Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to monitor
individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even
impossible. "All the forces of a technological age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take
advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights
that the Constitution guarantees.
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6)
months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the
date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once
computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere
furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed
a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property.
They liken the data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment
of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and
disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients
and are to be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to
indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13,
however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services for at least six months from the date of the transaction and those relating to content
data for at least six months from receipt of the order for their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded.
The service provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of
law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The
process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall
issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic
data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in
relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary
and relevant for the purpose of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is
that the issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is
not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their
investigatory powers.98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually
lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed
procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is
properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the
functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to
provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and
examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer
data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from
date of approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure
procedures. On its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that
would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized
by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person
from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but
merely supplements them.
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15,
service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely
destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination, destroyed or
deleted upon the lapse of the prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the
service provider’s storage systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure that investigations are quickly
concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination
violates the user’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is
unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data
saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his
computer when he generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider for a copy
before it is deleted.
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima facie found to be
in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such
computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be
unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that
Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain
texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in
the digital space, it is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may
constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable.
Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a
restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected.
Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an
executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him
to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and
executioner all rolled into one.100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines
established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally
evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest
test, and the clear and present danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked
be found prima facie in violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration,
this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of
the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees
to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders
from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with
imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to
comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be
reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section
20 necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for
Section 20 to constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue
or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing
any of the following acts:
x x x.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must
still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and
justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions
of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days
from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy
coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity
plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of
cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any
sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he
will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the
CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and
user’s assets.104 This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the
cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat
such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and
international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." 105 This
policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient
standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in
bad faith to the prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information
belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised
Penal Code are committed with the use of information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve
traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the
expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the
original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply
receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D
and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on
Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related
Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections
4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online
Libel.1âwphi1
Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual
cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a
violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
4. Mendoza vs. People (No. 30)
G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014
ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
While the determination of probable cause to charge a person of a crime is the sole function of the. prosecutor,
the trial court may, in the protection of one's fundamental right to liberty, dismiss the case if, upon a personal
assessment of the evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated January 14, 2011,
which reversed the Regional Trial Court's dismissal of the complaint against petitioner Alfredo C. Mendoza for
qualified theft and estafa.
This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C.
Evangelista, on January 8, 2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo.3
In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car
Supervisor. On November 19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used
cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance
manager’s permission.4
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the
payments totalling ₱886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody,
only 18 were accounted for. Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001
Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts
and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount of ₱1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and
damage.5
In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to prove ownership over the
five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have
suffered damage.6
On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution7 finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.8 He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice on May 16, 2008.9
While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft10 and estafa11 were filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable
cause12 before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to defer arraignment.
Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted.13 On February 4, 2009, the parties
agreed to submit all pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution.14
On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order15 dismissing
the complaint, stating that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the assailed Resolution
dated 04 March 2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause
for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. x x x.16
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009.17
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that
"the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully
belongs to the public prosecutor."18
On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,19 reversed the trial court, and reinstated the
case. In its decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in
supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of
evidence and lack of probable cause."20
Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued that the
trial court was correct in finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on record. He
argued that "judicial determination of probable cause is broader than [the] executive determination of probable
cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the
prosecutor x x x."22
In its comment,23 Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere
rehash of those already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment 24 that the appellate
court correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there
was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should
respect his determination of probable cause.
In his reply,25 Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,]
covers a broader encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of probable
cause."26 He argued that the findings of the trial court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate
court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis
of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.
Time and again, this court has been confronted with the issue of the difference between the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutor on one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on the
other. We examine these two concepts again.
Juno Cars filed a complaint against Alfredo for qualified theft27 and estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph,
no. 3(c)28 of the Revised Penal Code. Since qualified theft is punishable by reclusion perpetua, a preliminary
investigation must first be conducted "to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial," in accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
At this stage, the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of
probable cause lie solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the evidence, the
prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information
with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then "personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this
stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,31 this court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those
whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not
he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial
court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether
a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.32
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is
enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In People v. Inting:33
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and
the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause
for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper—whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial—is the function of the
Prosecutor.34 (Emphasis supplied)
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is
only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of probable
cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo35 discussed the rationale. In that case, Jonathan Cerbo
allegedly shot Rosalinda Dy in the presence of his father, Billy Cerbo. An information for murder was filed
against Jonathan Cerbo. The daughter of Rosalinda Dy, as private complainant, executed a complaint-affidavit
charging Billy Cerbo with conspiracy. The prosecutor then filed a motion to amend the information, which was
granted by the court. The information was then amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused, and a
warrant of arrest was issued against him.
Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash the warrant arguing that it was issued without probable cause. The trial
court granted this motion, recalled the warrant, and dismissed the case against him. The Court of Appeals
affirmed this dismissal. This court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of
the amended information against Billy Cerbo, stating that:
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal case or the guilt or innocence of Private
Respondent Billy Cerbo. We are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and
there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public
prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for ‘want of evidence,’ because evidentiary matters should be
presented and heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor
in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an "oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial
powers do need to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we recognize this need, we also
acknowledge that the State must likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of
nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a public prosecutor’s duties, courts ought to refrain
from interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of
probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or
suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and
evidence were "sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x."37 There was nothing in his resolution
which showed that he issued it beyond the discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to
make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with
trial.
Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot
hold the accused for arraignment and trial.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where the judge has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The phrase "upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce" allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex parte.
For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge
to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause." Section 6,
paragraph (a) of Rule 112 reads:
Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint of information.
In People v. Hon. Yadao:38
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue
a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory.1âwphi1 The court’s first
option under the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause." That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable
cause against the respondents.39 (Emphasis supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to
its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court." 40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record and concluded
that "the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa."41Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent evidence"42 that the vehicles
alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles
were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the
complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or their valuation
purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused,"43 which she found crucial to the
prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article 315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code. She
also noted that:
x x x As a matter of fact, this court had even ordered that this case be set for clarificatory hearing to clear out
essential matters pertinent to the offense charged and even directed the private complainant to bring
documents relative to the same/payment as well as affidavit of witnesses/buyers with the end view of satisfying
itself that indeed probable cause exists to commit the present case which private complainant failed to do.44
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed
the case against Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing
cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only
when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he
or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to
proceed with arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. MC08-11604-05 against Alfredo C.
Mendoza are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
5. People vs. Butial (No. 31)
G.R. No. 192785 February 4, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOMER BUTIAL, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The prosecution's evidence must establish that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal· drug
actually recovered from appellant.1
This is an appeal from the February 26, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
03170 which affirmed in toto the December 3, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco
City, Branch 17 in Criminal Case No. T-3864 finding Jomer Butial (appellant) guilty of violating ·Section
5,4 Article II of !J2ublic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Factual Antecedents
On December 16, 2002,an Information5 was filed against appellant, the accusatory portion of which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of October, 2002, at 10:35 o’clock in the morning, more or less, at Purok 4,
Barangay Sto. Cristo, Tabaco City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and
criminally sell,deliver and give away to a poseurbuyer, METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE otherwise
known as "SHABU", contained in two (2) transparent plastic sachets each weighing approximately 0.1 gm.,
without the necessary government authority, to the detriment of public welfare.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6
After appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, pre-trial and trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as witnesses Gilbert Borlagdan (Borlagdan), PO2 Roy Martirez (PO2 Martirez),
SPO4 Rosalino Bonavente (SPO4 Bonavente), SPO4 Benito Bognaloc and SPO1 Carlos H. Desuasido (SPO1
Desuasido).7 From their testimonies, the following version emerged:
The Chief of Police of Tabaco Cityinstructed PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente to conduct a buy-bust
operation on appellant after receiving information that he was selling illegal drugs. Thus, on October 21, 2002,
PO2 Martirez arranged for Borlagdan, a police asset, toact as a poseur-buyer and gave him four ₱100 bills as
marked money. PO2 Martirez, SPO4 Bonavente and Borlagdan proceeded to Purok4, Sto. Cristo, Tabaco City
to entrap appellant.
Upon their arrival, Borlagdan walked towards a house which is under construction. PO2 Martirezand SPO4
Bonavente, on the other hand, hid behind houses which were about seven meters away from where Borlagdan
was. Borlagdan approached appellant who was then working at the construction site and asked if he could
purchase shabu. When an agreement was reached, Borlagdan handed overthe marked money to the appellant
while the latter, in turn, gave him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. After the
transaction, Borlagdan walked towards the place where PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente were hiding.
When he passedby them, Borlagdan nodded his head as a signal that the sale was already consummated and
gave the sachets to PO2 Martirez. Thereupon,the police officers came out of hiding. Theyimmediately
approached appellant who threw something on the ground. PO2 Martirez arrested appellant and brought him
to the police station. SPO4 Bonavente who was left behind searched the place where he saw appellant throw
something and found therein a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He also summoned for
the owner of the house being constructed and asked for appellant’s belongings. He was given a
backpackwhich he brought to the police station.
Meanwhile at the police station, PO2 Martirez ordered appellant to empty his pockets and recovered from him
one ofthe four ₱100 bills used as marked money. PO2 Martirez then turned over the said marked money and
the two plastic sachets to the police investigator. When SPO4 Bonavente arrived, he likewise gave appellant’s
backpack to the police investigator, who, in turn, searched the same. Found therein were more sachets
containing white crystalline substance. Two days later, five sachets with white crystalline substance were
referred and delivered to the crime laboratory for examination which all tested positive for shabu, viz:
xxxx
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Five (5) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets marked as "A" through "E" each with white crystalline
substance having the following markings and recorded net weights:
A = 3.7240 gram[s] B = 0.8642 gram C = 0.0513 gram8
D = 0.0336 gram E = 0.0313 gram
Version of the Defense
Appellant and two others, namely, Lourdes Benavides and Elsa San Buenaventura, both residents of Purok4,
Sto. Cristo, Tabacowho claimed to have witnessed appellant’s arrest, testified for the defense. Their version of
the incident is as follows:
While appellant was working at the construction site, Robert Sierra (Sierra) arrived and asked if there is a
vacancy. When appellant said that he had to ask the owner first, Sierra departed. A few minutes later, PO2
Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente arrived and arrested appellant. They took him to the police station. Thereat,
PO2 Martirezopened appellant’s bag which was brought to the station by SPO4 Bonavente. After asking him to
identify the same, PO2 Martirez placed something inside the bag and then closed it. Appellant was then
ordered to open the bag. When he complied, picturesof him holding the bag and the plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance were taken. PO2 Martirez also inserted a ₱100 bill into the back pocket ofhis pants
and thereafter presented him to the Chief of Police.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. It convicted appellant of the offense
charged and disposed of the case in its December 3, 2007 Decision9 as follows: WHEREFORE, from the
foregoing, accused Jomer Butial is hereby found GUILTY of Violation ofSection 5, Article II, Republic Act [No.]
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. Costs against accused.
SO ORDERED.10
Appellant filed a notice of appeal,11 which was approved by the RTC.12 Hence, the records of the case were
transmitted to the CA where the appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03170.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding the RTC’s conviction of appellant to be well-supported by evidence, the CA, in its February 26, 2010
Decision,13 ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged Decision dated
December 3, 2007 in Criminal Case No. T-3864 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.14
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
For the first time in thisappeal, appellant questions his warrantless arrest. He posits that his arrest was illegal
since he was not arrested in flagrante delicto. The police officers did not have personal knowledge that he was
committing a crime as they were hiding behind houses seven meters away from the place where the alleged
transaction took place and did not actually see the whole incident. This being the case, the sachets allegedly
seized from him cannot be used in evidence against him being "fruits of a poisonous tree." Appellant also
contends that the prosecution was unable to prove all the elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs. He
likewise points to the failure ofthe police officers to properly observe the procedure outlined in Section 21, RA
9165 and argues that the same constitutes a break in the chain of custody.
Our Ruling
The appeal must be granted.
The prosecution failed to show that the

identity and integrity of the corpus delicti
have been preserved.
There is merit in appellant’s contention that not all elements of the offense of illegal sale of shabuwere proven
and that there were unexplained gaps and irregularities in the chain of custody of the seized items.
In a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of drugs, there must be evidence of the following elements: "(1)
the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor."15 The evidence of corpus delictimust also be established beyond doubt. In this
case, the shabu"constitutes the very corpus delictiof the offense and in sustaining a conviction under [RA
9165], the identity and integrity of the corpus delictimust definitely be shown to have been preserved." 16 "The
chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts
concerning the identity of the evidenceare removed."17
The initial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachets from appellant and their
marking bythe apprehending officer. "Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use
the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the
corpusof all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed atthe end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, ‘planting,’ or contamination of evidence." 18 A
review of the records, however, reveals that the confiscated sachets subject of the illegal sale of shabuwere
not marked. PO2 Martirez, himself, admitted that he did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets that
were handed to him by Borlagdan after the latter’s purchase of the same from appellant. 19 While he mentioned
that the police investigator to whom he turned over the items wrote something down or made someinitials
thereon, he nevertheless could not remember who wrote the initials.20 And albeit later, PO2 Martirez identified
the police investigator as SPO1 Desuasido,21 the latter, however, when called to the witness stand, did not
testify that he made any markings on the said sachets or, at the veryleast, that he received the same from PO2
Martirez. His testimony merely focused on the fact that he prepared the affidavit of a certain Baltazar. 22
While SPO4 Bonavente testified that he put markings on several sachets of shabuallegedly seized from
appellant, it cannot be gathered from his testimony that the ones he marked were those sachets subject of this
case. Instead, what it suggests is that those he marked were the sachets belonging to appellant which he
subsequently recovered, i.e., the one allegedly thrown away by appellant and picked up by SPO4 Bonavente
from the ground, and those found inside appellant’s bag, viz:
[PROS. BROTAMONTE]- At that time[,] how was the buy-bust operation carried out?
[SPO4 Bonavente]- During that time we were in Sto. Cristo. When our asset got in the house and came out he
sent positive sign that he already bought the prohibited drugs. So I and Roy Martirez immediately got inside the
house.
Q- What happened next?
A- Upon seeing us[,] this Butial tried to escape and Roy Martirez grabbed him and they grappled with each
other. I saw Butial throw pieces of sachets and I picked up said sachets which contained shabu.
Q- How many sachets?
A- Only one.
xxxx
Q- What happened next?
A- After two minutes[,] the owner of the house arrived. I asked him [for] the belongings of Butial and he picked
up the bag in the corner and handed it to me.
Xxxx
Q- Upon arrival at the Tabaco Police Station[,] what happened there particularly, insofar as the bag was
concerned?
A- I presented the bag to the desk officer for record purposes and to the duty investigator.
Q- What did you do with the bag after that?
A- The duty investigatorsearched the bag.
Q- Where were you when the bag was searched.
A- I was outside the investigation room and I was only informed that they found another sachet inside the bag.
x xxx
Q- Tell us if you actuallywitnessed the procedure of the search?
A- No. Sir. I just saw the sachet already on the table when I was informed by the desk officer.
Q- Having seen the evidence already on the table[,] what did you do, if any?
A- I told the desk officer to prepare the papers to preserve the items.
Q- To preserve the integrity and identity of the supposed items[,] what else did you undertake, if any?
A- I remember, I put my initials [on] the sachets.
Q- Can you still recall what items were those where you put your initials?
A- The sachets, sir.
Q- Can you still recall how many sachets were those?
A- I cannot recall.
Q- Those sachets that bear your initials, if the same will be shown to you again, will you be able to identify
them by way of your markings or initials?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- I have here several sachets containing crystalline substance [e]ncased in two bigger transparent sachets
which were turned over by the PNP Crime No. 5[,] please lookat [these] and tell us if you could recognize
[them]?
A- Yes, sir, I recognize [them].
xxxx
Q- I am showing to you the contents of one bigger transparent plastic packet consisting of two small sachets
with crystalline substance in [them]. Please look at [them] and tell us if you are familiar with [them].
A- (Witness examining the very small sachets containing a very small amount of white crystalline substance).
This is not my initial.
Q- There is a marking which is not of the witness and said witness looking at the bigger transparent packet
from which these two plastic sachets came from. Look at[them] and tell us if you could recognize [them].
A- (Witness looking and examining the bigger plastic and recogniz[ing] the initials as [those] of Martirez).
Q- How about [the other] marking?
A- I do not know.
Q- How about these three other plastic sachets containing crystalline substance which I just took out from the
previously sealed plastic container?
A- [These are] my initials.

COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness acknowledging that it is his signature and also his marking on the other bigger one.
Two small and one bigger sachets. Smaller sachet with D-325-02 marked "A" with initial of
Bonavente.1âwphi1 Smaller sachet D-325-02 marked "B" with initial of Bonavente. Smallest sachet D-325-02
marked "C."23 (Emphases supplied)
Moreover, the Request for Laboratory Examination24 of the items seized suggests that the seized items were
improperly handled. As may be recalled, the police officers submitted five sachets of shabufor laboratory
examination. Aside from those three sachets marked by SPO4 Bonavente, the two other sachets were listed
and described as follows in the said request:
xxxx
2. Evidence/Documents submitted:
xxxx
a. Two (2) transparent plastic packets containing white crystalline suspected to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), approximately 0.1 gm. each, and One (1) ₱100.00 with SN ES684504, all placed in a
heat-sealed transparent plastic with marking [letter] "I" on both sides;25 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the portion "and One (1) ₱100.00 with SN ES684504, all placed in a heat-sealed transparent plastic
with marking [letter] "I" on both sides" was obliterated by pen markings and the erasure was initialed by SPO1
Desuasido. But even without the said erasure, the two transparent plastic packets containing white crystalline
substance appear to have no markings at all. Only the heat-sealed transparent plastic supposedly containing
them has the marking letter "I," which holds no significance as the making of the said marking is also not
supported by any testimony during trial.
Clearly, the absence of markings creates an uncertainty that the two sachets seized during the buy-bust
operation were part of the fivesachets submitted to the police crime laboratory. The prosecution’s evidence
failed to establish the marking of the two sachets of shabusubject of this case, which is the first link in the chain
of custody and which would have shown that the shabupresented in evidence was the same specimen bought
from appellant during the buy-bust operation. The lack of certainty therefore on a crucial element of the crime
i.e., the identity of the corpus delicti, warrants the reversal of the judgment of conviction. 26
The failure of the prosecution to identify the corpus delictiis more glaring after considering that none of the
fivesachets submitted to the police crime laboratory for qualitative examination and turned out positive for
shabuweighed close to the two plastic sachets that had an approximate weight of 0.1 gram each as stated in
the Information. As previously mentioned, the police officers sent five sachets that were marked and given
corresponding weights, viz:
A = 3.72040 g B = 0.8642 g C = 0.0513 g
D = 0.0336 g E= 0.0313 g
It therefore appears that the sachets of shabuconfiscated during the buybust operation are totally different from
the sachets forwarded to the police crime laboratory and thereafter presented in evidence.
As a final note, it does notescape the Court’s attention that there was also no testimony from the police officers
thatthey conducted a physical inventory and took photographs of the sachets of shabu confiscated from
appellant pursuant to Section 21(1)27 of Article II of RA 9165. Their sworn statements did not mention any
inventory-taking or photographing of the same. They also did not bother to offer any justification for this
omission.28 At this point, it is apt to restate the Court's pronouncement in People v. ,Pepino-Consulta:29
[T]he Court cannot emphasize enough that zealousness on the part of law enforcement agencies in the pursuit
of drug peddlers is indeed laudable. However, it is of paramount importance that the procedures laid down by
law be complied with, especially those that involve the chain of custody of the illegal drugs. This is necessary
in order to dispel even the most infinitesimal of doubts on the outcome of arrests any buy-bust operations, so
as not to render naught the efforts and the resources put forth in the apprehension and prosecution of violators
of our drug laws.30
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. . The February 26, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 03170 affirming the December 3, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Branch
17, in Criminal Case No. T-3864, finding appellant Jomer Butial guilty of Violating Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ACQUITTING him of the
charge. Criminal Case No. T-3864 is DISMISSED.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to immediately release appellant Jomer Butial from
detention, unless he is confined for another lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance within five
days from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
6. Pestilos vs. Generoso (No.32)
G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014
JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ and RONALD
MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96,
Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald
Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent motion
for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay
Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02
Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SP02 Javier,
together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived
at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly
beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to
"invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the
police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived
the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing
one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to parry the attack, to
his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the ground
that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that
they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular
procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They
attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of
their motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA ruled that
the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The
arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA
also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was
called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based,
pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently
explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE
MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued; they
went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of
Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of
the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at
the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no
personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings against the
petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution. The
thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of
Rule 65 petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case the
legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the
guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us
the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke 24 and The Great Charter of the
Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River
Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's
powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or
be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by
lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to
any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does not
prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. 32 With
regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness. 33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The Court
based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were not
different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of
Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila
was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes or
local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under the
common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on
common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative
Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for the
Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states
that: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forth with
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of
Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been denominated
as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. 44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable in the present case. This
provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in
our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza, 45 the Court cited Rule 28 of
the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom there is
reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their
agents, to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of
confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of confinamiento, if
his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear
when summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient bond,
to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will
appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested, although no formal
complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting to a crime
had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested participated in the
commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that certain
officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant,
any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that
such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may arrest persons walking in
the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no
proof of a felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an arrest
without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is
guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these
conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person turned out to be
innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for the
arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the
presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a
crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated in it. In
addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was
tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer
may be held liable for its breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting
person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance
which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless arrests,
the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that
a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. This principle
left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has
limited this discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially incorporated in
Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940
and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission
of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting
officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has
been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual
commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the
commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was
limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense. In other
words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests
under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded and
re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the
1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense
should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting
officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of
the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be
arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section S(b ),
the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just,"
connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based
on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer
as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. 51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of
probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer shall
proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether
the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v.
Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a violation
of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment limited the
circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was
a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed.
The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation and
exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought from
a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the information acquired later. 56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of
everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be determined in
each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.57
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his fair
inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may rest
on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer
need not verify such information.58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, distinguished
from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat. 60 In
Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the respondent
was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as
the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted,
there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence
submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in
determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting
without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause," within
the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and
circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable
man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must
determine probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence
submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in
warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should
not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a
judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own
belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that
these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that
were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only on
December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag
three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime.
Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,
stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical
harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was
then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police
officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case
that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed means
that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of
the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was arrested
only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers
were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's
identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on the
basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of the crime was held invalid
because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information
upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated
that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute
"personal knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this case,
the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation,
indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent
death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest
was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received information
from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived
from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time
of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident.
The policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the
accused as the assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on
the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the
assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded to
the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was
wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they
ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then
given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message.
When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon
the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused
was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a
logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.
In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a
shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez
later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the
incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found
him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police
headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up
his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run towards
his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened the
door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and
arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident
report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's
appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the
case. However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b
), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may
pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer
at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could
still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the
crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required
element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to
base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the
arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external
factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause
would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a
very limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause
as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid
warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid
warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of
discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances
within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the
reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners,
the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been
committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that
the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent
person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners? We rule in the
affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.81From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest
against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is purely
limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged crime
was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police
blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan St.,
Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of
the occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the
commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of the
crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner
Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense
against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by East
Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that
was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma,
Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd
posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant.
Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva
P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his
alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty.
Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the
petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the
petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with
Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed
less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of
the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police
officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the
police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the
warrantless arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in his
sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him;
however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily went
with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved
in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if the
police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately dispatched
the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. 90 This fact alone negates the
petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been committed
- the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1âwphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does
not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the
recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed
the crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion, the
personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the
immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that
the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is
largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested,
or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus, application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there
be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, 93 SP02 Javier could not but have the intention of
arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical
restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a similar
effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had
exhibited resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal
knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the
perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular
offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges
against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary

investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order denying the petitioners' urgent
motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section
14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary
nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the
Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the
motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the
RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to
the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was
precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated
the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008
and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor
of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
7. People vs. Belocura (No.33)
G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012

vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of marij11ana under
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of custody of the marijuana from the
time of its seizure until the time of its presentation as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal because the State fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823 grams of marijuana in
violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was
found guilty of the crime charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced
to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of ₱ 500,000.00.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January 23, 2006. 2 Hence, this final appeal for
his acquittal.
Antecedents
Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with a violation of
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in the Manila RTC through the
information:
That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) plastic bag
colored red and white, with label "SHIN TON YON", containing the following:
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 830.532 grams;
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 959.291 grams.
With a total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.3
After Belocura pleaded not guilty,4 the State presented three witnesses, namely: Insp. Arlene Valdez Coronel,
Chief Insp. Ferdinand Ortales Divina, and SPO1 Gregorio P. Rojas. On the other hand, the Defense presented
Belocura as its sole witness.
I
The State’s Evidence
On March 22, 1999, at 11 o’clock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the
Western Police District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a call from a male
person who refused to identify himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be
staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila. After relaying the tip to his superior officer, he was immediately
ordered to form a team composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to coordinate with the
Special Weapons and Attack Team (SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the site before
1:00 pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00
pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM-510) cruising
along Vitas Street and told the rest of the team about it. The numbers of the car plate were painted white. The
driver was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for verification but the
latter ignored the signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued Belocura’s jeep until they
blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and
the rest of the team approached the jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp.
Divina queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas confiscated Belocura’s Berreta 9 mm. pistol
(Serial Number M13086Z) that was tucked in his waist and its fully loaded magazine when he could not
produce the appropriate documents for the pistol and the government plate. They arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocura’s jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the driver’s seat. Chief Insp.
Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks
of marijuanawrapped in newspaper.
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The team
turned over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for proper
disposition.5
Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything about any vehicle; that he and his men were in
civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the red plastic bag containing
the marijuanabricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the contents of the bag in his presence.6
SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation.7 He conceded that he was not present when the red plastic
bag containing the bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time only at the
police station.8
Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received from the General Assignment Section of the
WPD one red plastic bag labeled "SHIN TON YON" containing two bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting
tops individually wrapped in newspaper at about 12:30 pm of March
23, 1999. The first brick bore the marking "RB-1" and weighed 830.532 grams while the other bore the marking
"RB-2" and weighed 959.291 grams, for a total weight of 1,789.823 grams. She conducted a chemical
examination of the marijuana bricks pursuant to the request for laboratory examination from Chief Insp. Nelson
Yabut of the WPD; and concluded as the result of three qualitative examinations that the submitted specimen
tested positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug.9
II
Evidence of the Defense
Belocura denied the charge. His version, which differed from that of the Prosecution, was as follows.
On March 22, 1999, Belocura was a police officer assigned in Police Station 6 of the WPD with a tour of duty
from 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm. At 2:00 pm of that day, he was on his way to work on board his owner-type jeep
when about thirty police officers blocked his path. He introduced himself to them as a police officer, but they
ignored him. Instead, they disarmed and handcuffed him, and confiscated the memorandum receipt covering
his firearm, his money and his police ID card. He recognized some of his arrestors as former members of the
CIS. They forced him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD headquarters, where they locked him up in a
room that looked like a bodega. They subjected him to interrogation on his alleged involvement in a robbery
hold-up. They informed him of the drug-related charge to be filed against him only three days later.
Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the bricks of marijuana for
the first time only in court. He insisted that it was physically impossible for the bricks of marijuana to be found
under the driver’s seat of his jeep on account of the clearance from the flooring being only about three inches.
At the time of his arrest, he was in Type-B uniform (i.e., blue pants with white side piping and blue T-shirt)
because he was reporting to work that afternoon. Belocura said that his arrest was effected possibly because
he had incurred the ire of a superior; that it was not unusual for a policeman like him to incur the ire of a
superior officer or a fellow policeman; that he had arrested a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in
Police Precinct 2, but the suspect turned out to be the nephew of Captain Sukila of Precinct 2 who admitted to
him that Captain Sukila owned the drugs; that on the day following the arrest of the suspect, Captain Sukila
called Belocura to request the release of the suspect (ina-arbor ang huli ko); that he told Captain Sukila that
they should meet the next day so that he could turn over the suspect; and that on the next day, he was
surprised to learn that the suspect had already been released.10
Belocura did not personally know Chief Insp. Divina prior to his arrest,11 or the other arresting policemen. He
mentioned that his owner-type jeep had been assembled in 1995, and that he had attached the plate number
assigned to his old vehicle pending the registration of the jeep despite knowing that doing so was a violation of
law; and that the incident involving the arrest of the nephew of Captain Sukila was the only reason he could
think of why charges were filed against him.12
On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the bricks of marijuana whether at the time of his
arrest, or at the police precinct, or during the inquest proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that while the
driver’s seat were fixed to the jeep, the bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the driver’s
seat only if pressed hard enough, but in that case the wrappings would get torn because the wirings of the car
underneath the seat were exposed. He recalled that the wrappings of the bricks of marijuana were intact.13
On April 22, 2003, the RTC convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay the fine of ₱ 500,000.00.14
As already stated, the CA affirmed the conviction.15
Issues
Belocura now submits that:16
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE PHYSICIAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE DRIED BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA PLACED UNDER THE DRIVER’S SEAT (sic).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
BASED ON THE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY
OF ITS SEIZURE DUE TO THE ABSENSE (sic) OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt; that his warrantless arrest was unlawful considering that his only violation was only a breach of traffic
rules and regulations involving the illegal use of a government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the
warrantless search of his jeep was contrary to law for violating his right against illegal search and seizure
protected under Section 17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution;17 and that the bricks
of marijuana supposedly seized from him, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Belocura’s arrest and the ensuing search of the jeep
were valid, the search being incidental to a valid, albeit warrantless, arrest; that the arresting policemen had a
reasonable ground to effect his warrantless arrest; that it became their duty following the lawful arrest to
conduct the warrantless search not only of the person of Belocura as the arrestee but also of the areas within
his reach, which then resulted in the recovery of the dried bricks of marijuana from under the driver’s seat; and
that any irregularity attendant to the arrest was cured by Belocura’s failure to object to the validity of his arrest
before entering his plea and by his submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC when he entered his plea and
participated in the trial.18
Ruling
After a meticulous examination of the records, the Court concludes that a reversal of the conviction is justified
and called for.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So
sacred are the right of personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures
that no less than the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of
exclusion is set down in Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless search and seizure are not
absolute. There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are
nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a
private person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the
following exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;19 (b) seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d)
consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent
and emergency circumstances.20 In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is
dispensed with.
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the incriminating bricks
of marijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights under the Constitution because he was then
violating only a simple traffic rule on the illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting
policemen had no probable cause to search his vehicle for anything.
The argument of Belocura does not persuade.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code).21 In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be
caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or
eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption."22 Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a
crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was
apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid,
therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person
and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach
or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search
was to protect the arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon.
Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.23
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to
establish the fact of possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record
indicates, however, that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.24 What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself.
This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness,
being the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2 Santos, a member of the
team, who had discovered and had actually recovered the red plastic bag containing the bricks
of marijuana from the jeep. Excerpts of Chief Insp. Divina’s relevant declarations follow:
ATTY LEE:
q Mr. Witness, it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents of the plastic bag. That is correct?
a I had testified that it was SPO1 Rojas who examined the contents.
q Okay, it was Mr. Rojas who retrieved the plastic bag? Is that correct?
a No sir, It was not SPO1 Rojas.
q It was not you who retrieved that plastic bag from the jeep?
a No, Sir. I was not the one.
q It was Dela Cruz?
a No, Sir.
q Who retrieved the plastic bag from the jeep?

WITNESS:
A It was PO2 Reynaldo Santos, Sir.
ATTY LEE :
q It was Santos who brought the plastic bag to the headquarters. Is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
q And you never had a chance to examine that plastic bag, the contents of that plastic bag is that correct?
a I had a chance to see it at the place where we had flagged down a vehicle.
q You saw only the plastic bag. Is that correct?
a No, Sir. When the bag was recovered from under the driver’s seat and when it was opened, I had the chance
to see it.
THE COURT:
q Including the contents?
WITNESS:
a Yes, your Honor.
ATTY LEE:
q It was not you who bring that bag to xxx
THE COURT:
Already answered.
ATTY LEE:
q And after that, you never had the chance to see that bag again. Is that correct?
a Not anymore Sir.25
The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of the team, but he provided no direct evidence
about the possession by Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks, and actually stated that he did not
witness the recovery of the marijuana bricks from Belocura, viz:
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q While you were taking the gun of this accused what were your other companion specifically Major Divina
doing?
WITNESS:
a Since I was the first one who approached Reynaldo Belocura I was the one who took the gun from his
waistline and I informed Major Divina that I already took the gun and place it inside the Tamaraw FX and when
I left the members of the SWAT arrive at the scene and I don’t know what transpired.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q And where was Major Divina then?
a Beside the owner type jeep, sir.
q You are referring to the owner type jeep of the accused?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go back to the said jeep?
a I did not return there anymore sir because the members of the other group surrounded the place, sir.
q Since you were then at that scene did you come to know if there is any other thing that was retrieved from
the herein accused in the said vehicle?26
xxx
WITNESS:
a Yes. When I was there according to them marijuana was taken from the owner type jeep.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q Who said that?27
xxx
WITNESS:
a The member of the SWAT and other team, sir were there.
q And then what else happen after such recovery?
a Actually sir at the scene I did not see anything recovered but it was only in the office that I heard their
conversation about it.
q What did you see or observe while in your office?
a He was investigated.
q Investigated for what?
a According to them the recovery of the plate number and the expired MR of the gun and
the marijuanarecovered.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q Before whom was he investigated?

WITNESS:
a General Assignment Section, sir.28
xxx
On further examination, SPO1 Rojas reiterated that he did not actually witness the seizure of
the marijuana bricks from Belocura’s possession, to wit:
ATTY LEE:
q Mr. Witness, so you did not see the actual the alleged recovery of marijuana, is that correct?
WITNESS:
a Yes sir.
ATTY LEE:
q And you have never that marijuana?
WITNESS:
a Yes sir. But only in the office.
q What do you only took from the accused is a gun, is that correct?
a Yes sir.
q So you cannot say positively that there was a marijuana recovered from the accused because you did not
see?
a I just got the information from my co-police officer, sir.29
xxx
PUB. PROS TAN, JR:
q Were you able to see the marijuana in the police station?
WITNESS:
a Yes sir.
q You mean to say that was the first time that you saw the marijuana?
a Yes, sir.30
The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas’ declarations were insufficient to incriminate
Belocura, much less to convict him. If neither of them was personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding
the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value,
considering that the Rules of Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his own
knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his own perception.31
Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocura’s illegal possession of the marijuana bricks, if Chief
Insp. Divina’s account was to be believed. Surprisingly, the RTC did not give due and proper significance to the
failure to present PO2 Santos as a witness against Belocura.
Nonetheless, the OSG contends that the State had no need to present PO2 Santos because his testimony
would only be corroborative; and that the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas sufficed to
establish Belocura’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The OSG’s contention is grossly erroneous.
As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocura’s vehicle beyond the
viewing distance of his fellow arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the Prosecution’s only witness who could
have reliably established the recovery from Belocura of the marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag
labeled as "SHIN TON YON." Without PO2 Santos’ testimony, Chief Insp. Divina’s declaration of seeing PO2
Santos recover the red plastic bag from under the driver’s seat of Belocura’s jeep was worthless. The
explanation why none of the other police officers could credibly attest to Belocura’s possession of
the marijuana bricks was that they were at the time supposedly performing different tasks during the operation.
Under the circumstances, only PO2 Santos was competent to prove Belocura’s possession.
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti
itself. The omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the
suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of
the incriminating evidence from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in
evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence.32 It is not enough that the evidence offered has
probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in
issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the
transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation
for the introduction of evidence are important.33
Yet, no such accounting was made herein, as the following excerpts from the testimony of Chief Insp. Divina
bear out, to wit:
PUB. PROS TAN, JR:
q How about the plastic bag containing the suspected stuff, what did you do with the same? You did not know?
WITNESS:
a I think it was turned over to the investigator of the General Assignment Section who made the proper
disposition.
q Who is the investigator again, Mr. witness?
a I remember SPO4 Boy Guzman
q Did you know what SPO4 Boy Guzman did with the accused as well as the confiscated stuff?
xxx
WITNESS:
a The items upon turn over to the investigator on case were handed to the custodian with proper receipt and
after those disposition, there were case filed against the subject.
PUB. PROS. TAN, JR:
q Were you able to know what did they do with the accused as well as the confiscated stuff if you know?
a I remember appearing in the MTC court Br, 20, I saw the exhibits, firearm and plate number, two blocks
of marijuana. I don’t have any idea where did the investigator brought them or have done.34
xxx
q You never had a knowledge of what happened to that bag and the contents thereof?
a I learned later that the items that were confiscated were turned over to the General Assignment Section
which held the investigation.
q So, it was not your group who conducted the examination and the alleged things that were recovered from
the alleged accused?35
xxx
a No, Sir.
q How about the things that were allegedly recovered from the accused?
a I just said that it was the General Assignment Section who handled the investigation.36
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized by
PO2 Santos from Belocura’s jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later
presented as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the
specimens of marijuanasubmitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly
seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to
the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt demanded that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti – the body of
the crime whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the
crime must be established.37 1âwphi1
The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.38 The requirement has come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No.
9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002),39 by reason of Section 2140 of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly
regulating the actual custody and disposition of confiscated and surrendered dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors, essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant
to its mandate under Section 94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates the requirement, stating:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
xxx
That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement applied under both laws
by virtue of the universal need to competently and sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the
Rules of Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or have a logical relation to, the
facts in issue to be established by one party or disproved by the other.41 The test of relevancy is whether an
item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for
which it is offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in
issue, or corroborate other relevant evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either
directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to be proved.42
The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused to
the evidence that is ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court said in Mallillin v.
People:43
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is
not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or
when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence
is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.44
The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the red plastic bag
said to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing because the Prosecution did not
present PO2 Santos, the only person with direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of
the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep of
Belocura did not exist. The second link was the turnover of the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another
officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated that he learned following the
seizure by PO2 Santos that the marijuana bricks were turned over to the General Assignment Section for
investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas’ testimony contributed nothing to the establishment
of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing the gun from Belocura. As for the subsequent
links, the records45 showed that the marijuana bricks were forwarded to the General Assignment Section on
March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the identities of the officer from the General Assignment
Section who received the red plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the
receiving officer received the marijuana bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for
laboratory examination of the marijuana bricks,46 which were thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez,
the records did not show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received the marijuana bricks from the
arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was dated March 23, 1999, or the day following
Belocura’s arrest and the seizure of the marijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not
identify the person from whom Chief Insp. Yabut had received the marijuana bricks.
Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the corpus delicti was
not credibly proved. This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks might easily be
open to doubt and suspicion, and thus the incriminatory evidence would not stand judicial scrutiny.
Thirdly, Belocura’s denial assumed strength in the face of the Prosecution’s weak incriminating evidence. In
that regard, Belocura denied possession of the marijuana bricks and knowledge of them as well, to wit:
q Were you able to view the alleged marijuana that were confiscated from you?
a: I saw it for the first time when it was presented in Court, Sir.
q: Now, according to Inspector Divina, it was police officer Santos who was able to recover from your vehicle
these two bricks of marijuana. What can you say about this?
a: At first, I did not see this marijuana, Sir, that they are saying because they immediately handcuffed me and
disarmed me even before I could board my owner type jeepney.47
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Mere suspicion of his guilt, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every evidence
favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the presumption of innocence in his favor was not overcome.
Hence, his acquittal should follow, for, as the Court fittingly said in Patula v. People:48
xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every element of the
crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its
success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution
arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be
acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other
words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as
the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged
and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.49
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 23,
2006; ACQUIT accused REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; DIRECT the immediate release from detention of REYNALDO BELOCURA y
PEREZ, unless he is also detained for some other lawful cause; and ORDER the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections to forthwith implement this decision upon receipt and to report his action hereon to this Court within
10 days from receipt. No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
8. Gamboa vs. Chan (No. 34)
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,

vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos
Norte, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 19 1 of
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No.
14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned
Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was
the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O.
275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate
the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May
2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President"
(the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a
PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each
private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as
"Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country
according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these
groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked
to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacañang on March 24, 2010
at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred
seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-
seven (67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that the
more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of
these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission which has
continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the
field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the
Commission’s efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that
there is a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General
Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten
and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation in the field,
the PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation that they revise their validation system to include
those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010,
there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs
have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with
a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on
the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa
Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other
people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher
PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from
forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face. 27 Thus, the trial court (a)
instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any
person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other
government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c)
ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled
the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in
conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database
supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder
and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder,
frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple
attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated
or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions
and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or
databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information.31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition. 33 The trial court
categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the
Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s
right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security
enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she
essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of
respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to
life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was certainly
intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all,
under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the existence of
private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused respondents, who
are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to
include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa
failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and that
they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial
court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her may have
already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather
information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded as a
necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38 raising the following
assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or
indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as
the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as
alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present substantial
evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly
dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing that respondents
were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to dismantle
PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of
unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present
sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is called
upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an
extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right
to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This
Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in
disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for
this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court,
stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the
First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of
soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme
Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses
for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of
the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity
and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the
forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area
of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in Philippine
jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in
several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and
punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also
holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and
liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping
Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that
the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that
privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees
respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to
privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that
the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute
where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid
down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state
that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative
investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to
weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there
must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even
the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins
from the European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of
personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v.
Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs
with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish
citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to
a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted
in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register, which was kept in
accordance with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed,
among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his
classification in the register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life of
Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference
in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified on the
following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of national
security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the scope and
the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the
authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in
particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24
November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the
scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the
particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State in
protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the
applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the Contracting
States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers
not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the
suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate interests through the
consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the
other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the
Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35), and, apart from those consequences,
the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the respondent State in
assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving
the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr. Leander
cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly, ensures
the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others
judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of 1969,
including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be effectively
applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in the Swedish
personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the
wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present
case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59
above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to have been
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to privacy, may
yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate
balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the state to dismantle private
armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized
by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in
scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate
state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them
permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an
investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records. 62 A.O.
275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency
to assist the commission in the performance of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to
the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her
as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of
information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and
thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to the
Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to
refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent
and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself
admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were
put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further determination
as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise
would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an
undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and jurisprudence,
this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must
observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered
to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted
exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential
nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach.
But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended
disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the
list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased
police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against
her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979
dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
9. Nolasco vs. Pano (No. 35)
G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F.
APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL.
JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated.
The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and
TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the
accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma.
Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security
Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an
allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had
previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT,
however, respondents have alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on
august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant
from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be
served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-
ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground
house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking
officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea
cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque,
Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was
Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col.
Saldajeno to Judge Paño.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under
oath by Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to
his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers
of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources
intended to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party
presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter,
and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was
made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No
mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the
Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged
before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against
petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-
ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying,
inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases
that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which
AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained
pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents
"shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings
under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground
that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was
apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant
issued by respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion
to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to
Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their
duly authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it
does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable
cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness.
The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised
cannot be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed
Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what
the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of
similar description were considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as
'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other
subversive materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as
to what articles might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not
worse than, the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of
Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed
copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper
dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as
to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are
legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant
which is constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for
Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col.
Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your
answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)—
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for
search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's

Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front,
Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and
instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money
from foreign and local sources. 9
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a
search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them
and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and
5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be
seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The
examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant
may issue. 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the
Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that
petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In
fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during
the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a
Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were
unlawful. Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the
legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of
justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and
a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant,
the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later
criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal
case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under
an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-
ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court,
explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person
who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where
the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated
that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the
extent of the place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the
individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order;
that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested
within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of
her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did
not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence
in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge
Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondent from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents
case hereby made permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group
for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military
commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking
said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
10. Luz vs. People (No. 41)
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as
follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a
traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, he saw the
accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City,
driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is
almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket
for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something
from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size,
including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said
container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon
cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the
container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the
other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On
the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been
lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his
person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and
extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as
minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱
300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper
disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1
September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on
the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE

OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS
BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE
DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims
that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or
charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza
and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by
motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The
accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said
police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the
apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime
in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught
in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. x x x.8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an
appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he
was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate
the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which
shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time
and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become
invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will
be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following procedure for
flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report
(TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have
been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself
testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
"almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there.
There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the
driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to
ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by
respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those
types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide
whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last
only a few minutes. A motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that
he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed
to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from
stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at
the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the
knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert
some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset
these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of
detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to
the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that
persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the
safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to
a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a
motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him
"in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.
See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions
while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should
have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at
the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to
wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It
may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on
the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may
be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a
traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest
were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the
latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended
due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial
setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts
from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions
were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation
and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second
time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.15 None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain
view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was
not immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown
by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is,
the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession
does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told"
to take out the contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the
defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective
state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was
alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several
police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police
officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot,
the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.20
In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search
when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such
as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the
need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later
use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x x x The threat
to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial
arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended
exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U.
S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its
attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine
traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ .
. . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.
S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and
less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop.1âwphi1 It
plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in
this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it
does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without
the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect
themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111,
and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon
reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a
"Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is
dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and
even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a
custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the need to discover
and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence
necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to
be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of
his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th
Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention,
unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
11. People vs. Enriquez (No. 48)
G.R. No. 197550 September 25, 2013

vs.
ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DE LOS REYES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal1 of the February 11, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03430,
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) February 28, 2008 Decision3 in Criminal Case Nos. DC03-209
and DC 03-210, wherein accused-appellant ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DE LOS REYES (Enriquez) was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
In two separate lnformations4 filed before Branch 57 of the RTC of Angeles City, Enriquez was charged with
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002." The pertinent portions of the Informations, both dated June 4, 2003, are hereby quoted as follows:
Criminal Case No. DC 03-209
That on or about the 3rd day of June, 2003, in Brgy. Manibaug Libutad, municipality of Porac, province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DELOS REYES, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had in his possession, custody and control forty[-]five (45) small size heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) weighing TWO GRAMS AND SIX
THOUSAND ONE TEN THOUSANDTHS (2.6001g) of a gram and one (1) pc. big size heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride(shabu) weighing ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TWELVE TENTHOUSANDTHS (0.1212g) of a gram, a dangerous drug. 5
Criminal Case No. DC 03-210
That on or about the 3rd day of June, 2003, in Brgy. Manibaug Libutad, municipality of Porac, province of
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DELOS REYES, without having been lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, deliver and/or sell one (1) small size heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) with an actual weight of FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-
TWO TEN THOUSANDTH(0.0422g) of a gram, a dangerous drug.6
Enriquez pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment7 on June 19, 2003.
Trial on the merits ensued after the termination of the pre-trial conference on September 25, 2003.8
As culled from the records and transcript of stenographic notes, the contradictory versions of the prosecution
and defense are as follows:
Prosecution’s Version
Sometime in May 2003, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Edilberto David, SPO2 Ernesto Divina, and SPO1
Saturnino Garung received reports from the barangay office and other concerned citizens of drug-dealing
activities in the locality of Porac, Pampanga. They immediately conducted a casing and surveillance operation
to verify the reports. About four operations were carried out, on a weekly basis, which confirmed that Enriquez
was indeed dealing drugs among the truck drivers and helpers within the vicinity. After confirming the reports,
SPO2 David, together with one civilian asset, conducted a test-buy on June 2, 2003.9 During the test-buy,
SPO2 David’s asset was able to buy ₱200.00 worth of shabu, which he confirmed to be so by burning it,
contrary to standard police procedure.10
After the test-buy, SPO2 David organized a team, composed of himself, SPO2 Divina, and SPO1 Garung, to
conduct a buy-bust operation.11 On June 3, 2003, after SPO2 Divina coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for their on-going narcotics operation,12 their Chief of Police Ricardo Erese
briefed the team at Kababayan Center No. 2, at Barangay Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga. At the briefing, SPO2
David was designated as the poseur-buyer, with the other two police officers as back-ups. To purchase the
shabu, Chief of Police Erese gave SPO2 David a₱100-peso bill and five ₱20-peso bills, which SPO2 David
marked by placing a small bar on the lower right corner of the bills. The team thereafter proceeded to Brgy.
Manibaug, Libutad in Porac, Pampanga. Upon arriving at the target area at around 11:00 a.m., SPO2 David
approached Enriquez, whom they spotted sitting in a sari-sari store, while SPO2 Divinaand SPO1 Garung hid
behind a dump truck parked across the store. SPO2David called the attention of Enriquez by saying "dalawang
(2) piso"13 while handing him the ₱200.00. Without saying anything, Enriquez took the money and went to the
back of the store. After one to two minutes, Enriquez emerged and handed SPO2 David a sachet of shabu.
This prompted SPO2David to put his hand at the back of his head, to signal his teammates that the sale had
been consummated. Upon the execution of the pre-arranged signal, SPO2 Divina and SPO1 Garung
approached the site of engagement, introduced themselves as police officers to Enriquez, and thereafter
conducted a body search on him, which resulted to the discovery of a plastic game card containing one big and
45 small plastic sachets of white crystalline substance.14 SPO2 David prepared the Confiscation Receipt for
the above-seized items, then subsequently brought Enriquez to the Porac Police Station, wherein the team
prepared the papers necessary in filing a case against Enriquez.15
As per Chemistry Report No. D-219-2003,16 prepared by Police Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer
Divina Mallare Dizon (P/Insp. Dizon), upon the request for laboratory examination 17 submitted by Chief of
Police Erese, the plastic sachets confiscated from Enriquez tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Defense’s Version
The defense’s version of the events, as quoted from Enriquez’s own brief, are as follows:
In truth, Enriquez was alone, eating in an eatery in Manibaug, Porac, Pampanga, when three (3) men, all in
civilian clothes, alighted from an owner-type jeep and approached him. One of the men, SPO2 David, then
poked a gun at him. The former asked Enriquez if he knew a certain truck driver who is suspected of selling
shabu. When he denied knowledge thereof, he was immediately handcuffed and was brought to the police
station for further investigation. He was detained and was told that he is being suspected of selling shabu.
Nora Pangilinan, a 37-year old helper of the sari-sari store, corroborated [Enriquez]’s testimony.1âwphi1 She
saw how the apprehending team rudely approached and arrested [Enriquez].18 (Citations omitted.)
On February 28, 2008, the RTC convicted Enriquez in its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in the two (2)
cases, the Court finds accused ARTURO ENRIQUEZ Y DE LOS REYES GUILTY of the offense as charged
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFEIMPRISONMENT and a fine of Php500,000.00, in
Criminal Case No. DC 03-210 for violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165. Accused Enriquez is also
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE YEARS (12) AND ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS, as maximum, of Reclusion Temporal in Criminal Case
No. DC 03-209 for violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165 and a fine of Php300,000.00.19
Aggrieved, Enriquez appealed20 to the Court of Appeals, which, on February 11, 2011, affirmed the decision of
the RTC.21
Issues
Enriquez is now before this Court, assigning22 the same errors he presented before the Court of Appeals, to
wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THEACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE

IRREGULARITY OFTHE BUY-BUST OPERATION.
II

PROSECUTION’SFAILURE TO PROVE WITH MORAL CERTAINTY THEIDENTITY OF THE CORPUS
DELICTI.
III
ARRESTING OFFICERS’NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THEPROPER CUSTODY
OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDERREPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.23
Enriquez questions the fact that despite a month-long surveillance and casing operation against him, the police
operatives still opted to conduct a buy-bust operation instead of securing a warrant for his arrest.24 Moreover,
Enriquez points out, the police officer, to test the substance they allegedly recovered from him during their test-
buy operation, burned such substance instead of going through the proper testing procedures.25
Aside from the foregoing procedural infractions, Enriquez finds it irregular that the police officers commuted to
the target area instead of using their precinct’s service mobile. Enriquez adds: "The lack of a service vehicle,
therefore, is an irregularity that is too uncommon and virtually affects the preservation of the seized pieces of
evidence."26
Enriquez also claims that the prosecution was not able to prove with moral certainty the identity of the corpus
delicti for failure of the police officers to comply with Section 21(a) of Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody
and disposition of confiscated or seized dangerous drugs. He avers that there was neither physical inventory
nor a photograph of the seized items. Moreover, Enriquez says, the markings on the confiscated items were
not immediately made upon its seizure, at the place of the incident, nor were there any indication in the records
that it was made in his presence. Enriquez points out that while "non-compliance x x x with Section 21 is not
fatal, as police lapses, may at times occur, these errors, however, must be supported with justifiable grounds
and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items must be preserved."27
Ruling of the Court
This Court has painstakingly reviewed the records of this case and after a thorough deliberation, resolves to
acquit Enriquez for the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This Court finds that
the prosecution was not able to establish with moral certainty that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items confiscated from Enriquez were preserved such that they could be used as basis for Enriquez’s
conviction.
The Constitution28 demands that an accused in a criminal case be presumed innocent until otherwise proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Likewise, Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify a
conviction; anything less than that entitles the accused to an acquittal.
Enriquez was charged and convicted for the sale and possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00)to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos(₱500,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential
chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
xxxx
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or " shabu;"
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxy
methamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine
(TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB),and those similarly designed
or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as
follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu"
is ten(10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA,LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and
their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams
of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
When prosecuting the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identities of
the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.29 In cases of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the essential requisites that must be established
are: (1) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.30
As the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of both offenses, its identity and integrity must
definitely be shown to have been preserved.31 "This means that on top of the elements of possession or illegal
sale, the fact that the substance [possessed or illegally sold], in the first instance, the very substance adduced
in court must likewise be established with the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining a
conviction."32Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as
proof of the corpus delicti.33The chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the
identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed."34
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of custody of
confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, viz:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 35 which implements the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines "chain of custody" as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
Describing the mechanics of the custodial chain requirement, this Court, in People v. Cervantes,36 said:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the
prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.37
While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically render the seizure
and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when "(i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-
compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved." 38 Thus, any
divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a
red flag, that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.
In the case at bar, not only was there no justifiable ground offered for the non-compliance with the chain of
custody requirement, there was an apparent failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation
in court.39 In other words, the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that
the sachets of shabu presented in court were the very same items seized from Enriquez.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure from Enriquez of the dangerous drugs and its
subsequent marking. Under the law, such marking should have been done immediately after confiscation and
in the presence of the accused or his representative. While it is true that the items presented in court bore the
initials of SPO2 David, who was also the poseur-buyer and primary apprehending officer, nowhere in the
documentary and testimonial evidence of the prosecution can it be found when these items were actually
marked and if they were marked in the presence of Enriquez or at least his representative. Emphasizing the
importance of this first link, this Court in People v. Zakaria,40 pronounced:
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of
marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial
custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires. (Citation omitted.)
The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. Both SPO2David and SPO2 Divina testified that after the buy-bust operation, they brought
Enriquez and the seized items to the police station. However, they both failed to identify the person to whom
they turned over the seized items. Records show that the request for laboratory examination was prepared by
Chief of Police Erese, and yet there is no evidence to show that he was the person who received the seized
items from the apprehending officers. There is therefore a crucial missing link, i.e., what happened to the
seized items after they left the hands of SPO2 David and SPO2 Divina and before they came to the hands of
Chief of Police Erese.
As for the third and the last links, although records show that Chief of Police Erese signed the request for
laboratory examination, he was not presented in court to testify as such. The testimony of Chief of Police Erese
is indispensable because he could have provided the critical link between the testimony of SPO2 David, and
the tenor of the testimony of P/Insp. Dizon, which the parties have stipulated on. The unaccounted for
whereabouts of the seized items from the time they were brought to the police station to the time they were
submitted to P/Insp. Dizon for examination constitutes a clear break in the chain of custody. Moreover, no one
testified as to how the confiscated items were handled and cared for after the laboratory examination.41
Overall, the prosecution failed to observe the requirement that the testimonies of all persons who handled the
specimen are important to establish the chain of custody.42 Of all the individuals who came into direct contact
with or had physical possession of the shabu allegedly seized from Enriquez, only SPO2 David testified for the
specific purpose of identifying the evidence.43
However, his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it ended with his identification of
the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed. In effect, the custodial link ended with
SPO2 David when he testified that he brought the seized items, together with Enriquez, to the police station.
Under the above premises, it is clear that there was a break in the chain of custody of the seized substances.
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of custody is fatal to its case as we can no
longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous
drug were properly preserved.44
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CR.-H.C. No. 03430 dated February 11, 2011
is REVERSED and SETASIDE. Accused-Appellant ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DELOS REYES is hereby
ACQUITTED in Criminal Case Nos. DC 03-209 and DC 03-210 for the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined
for another lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED To implement this Decision and to report to this Court
on the action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
12. Aberca vs. Ver (No. 49)
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE,
BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO
MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS
PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO
AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT.
RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question
whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the
military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa
(TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"
Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members
of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were
arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel;
that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of
plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at
least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00
each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise
of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming
that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin
Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez,
Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo
Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On
November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C.
Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the
defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their
detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of
action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated
plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible exception of
Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that
the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates or that they had
vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful
study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On
the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was
filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the
defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of
all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso
Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in
the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to
preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or
jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion
for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid
Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984,
the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion
to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez
represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos
represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel,
Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983,
dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as
prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984,
alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez,
Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to
reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs
claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order
of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already
become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to
dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of
dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan
Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is
deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or
complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects and refers to
defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3, 1983 is
granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the
respondent court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9,
1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in
behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those
sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than
the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and
cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must
prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to
reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the
community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him
who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of
Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of
sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public
officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official
duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to
safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call
them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but
providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of
the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection
rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent General
Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist terrorist
underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent
implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights
against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to
property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force should
be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members of the
armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to
recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties
run contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v.
Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of
protecting the performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or
constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes,
79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is now a
settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding
v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438
US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco
Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for
the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases
invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the
ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner
what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority,
under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation
and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for
the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any
manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers
vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts
cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of
this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding
to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27,
1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by
any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which
all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their
mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the
left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and
imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to
unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms.
The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the
suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry
into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is
indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same
claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for
release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e.
override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of
altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in
P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from
or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or
authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the
same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and
cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of
their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and
lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot
and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent
superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The
doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master
and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of
the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible)
who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added
meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his
duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.
Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando
Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt.
Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major
Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone
'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of
the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of
action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical
violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in
any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs'
constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of
cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and
illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular,
improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where
they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman,
degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains
a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable.
Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well
established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no
cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of
the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the
complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The
complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient
to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs
Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-
Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a
motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through
counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty.
Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for
Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino,
counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this
must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the
motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of
plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez,
Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon
Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all
the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in
behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party
concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to
take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint
was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for
the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to
declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs
whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be
sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated
November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be
remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
13. Pollo vs. Constantino-David (No. 53)
G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011
BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner,

vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the
computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo to
nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty,
grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.
The factual antecedents:
Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-
in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a courier service
(LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated
Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents
marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given
directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!
As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an
employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a pending case in the csc. I
honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of
the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the
Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly
because our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.
Concerned Govt employee3

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology
(IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in
the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."4 After some briefing, the team
proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around
5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director
Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was
witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity.
At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out
of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders
of the CSC Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:
"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction
of the Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be better."
"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair."
"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.
"We can’t do anything about … it … it’s a directive from chair."
"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint"; "ill send a copy of the memo via mms" 5
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just
get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the presence of the
team from CSC main office: "Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin."6 At around 10:00 p.m. of the same
day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and
secured for the purpose of preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files
sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents
of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files
in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters7 in connection with administrative cases
in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioner’s personal files, Chairperson David made the
following observations:
Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected with
administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the
CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and on
behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the
inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing
interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government
tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings so
prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it
with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against common
human experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without any
consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees.
That these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo invariably raises the
presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer
of origin was within his direct control and disposition.9
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which
had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the
CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed
personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right
against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he
was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his
computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is
not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to
privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that
though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum
of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for
personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply
with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his
consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree."10
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07038211 finding prima facie case against the petitioner
and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he
elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise
placed under 90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner
received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal
charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC
Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with
pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared not by him but by
certain persons whom he permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his computer out of close
association or friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted
his own files to be kept at petitioner’s CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosa’s client
who attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill for legal fees because in truth he owed
legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the case should be deferred in view of
the prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director
Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of
the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No. 07051912 dated March 19, 2007, the CSC
denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioner’s answer.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated
February 26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence
of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against
respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A.
Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for disbarment against
Director Buensalida.14
On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of the
case on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and
preliminary injunction.15 Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the
CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in
the said pre-hearing conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-
parte.16 Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation
proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his
request and again scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the
consequences of petitioner and/or his counsel’s non-appearance.17 This prompted petitioner to file another
motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.18
On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07113419 denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the denial
of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez.
The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.
In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was
deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,20 the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A.
Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its
accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation
of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations. 21
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC noted the
dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as employer invades
the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of
initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latter’s consent or
participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the
leading case of O’Connor v. Ortega22as authority for the view that government agencies, in their capacity as
employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace
without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by
the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons 23 which declared that the federal agency’s
computer use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its
employees. Though the Court therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the
respondent’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still, the
warrantless search of the employee’s office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to
conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is
reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view of the CSC
computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to a
computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative policy, the CSC was of the
view that the search of petitioner’s computer successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless
searches in the workplace as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the
search in its capacity as government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation
involving work-related misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With
the matter of admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of
evidence adequately supports the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified
petitioner’s dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.
In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from
the service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion,
he likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 07180025 which denied his motion for reconsideration.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the
basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation was conducted
and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-
up of files in petitioner’s computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on the
authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as government property and
that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or
receive on the computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in CSC’s act of proceeding with the
formal investigation as there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that –
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS

IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O.
292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd
PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT]
TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT
INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL
MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY
THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING
SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS
LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF
DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE
INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14
OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT
DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A
JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW
ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO
EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC
RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED
SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO
RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26
Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying
of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to
privacy.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution,27 which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable"
searches and seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the
issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction.
As the Court declared in People v. Marti29 :
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in
the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
(Sec. 1[3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such,
the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate
Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.30
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his
right to privacy and constituted a "search and seizure". Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of
privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective).32
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the workplace,
the US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to an office at
union headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their guests could enter the
office. The Court thus "recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police."
That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of
O’Connor v. Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital, claimed a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of mismanagement of
the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities
involving his private patients under the state medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal
items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically declared that "[i]ndividuals do not
lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private
employer."35 A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because "some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable", a court must consider "[t]he operational realities of the workplace" in order to determine whether
an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy
expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well
as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all
the circumstances."36
On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace, O’Connor
teaches:
x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and
procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employee’s expectation of privacy must be assessed in the
context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other
employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by
fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related
visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others – such as fellow employees, supervisors,
consensual visitors, and the general public – may have frequent access to an individual’s office. We agree with
JUSTICE SCALIA that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not
disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer," x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public
sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be
addressed on a case-by-case basis.37 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortega’s
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed "an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable." Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr.
Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept personal correspondence and
other private items in his own office while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were
stored outside his office, and there being no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable
regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file
cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it would not
otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his
desk and file cabinets.38
Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was reasonable, the
O’Connor plurality decision discussed the following principles:
Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals
simply concluded without discussion that the "search…was not a reasonable search under the fourth
amendment." x x x "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public employers]
is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches…[W]hat is reasonable depends on the
context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of
reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a
particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion." x x x In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion
of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision,
control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.
xxxx
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee’s
office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business
and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors,
who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast
to other circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are
hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely
incident to the primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant
requirement would conflict with the "common-sense realization that government offices could not function if
every employment decision became a constitutional matter." x x x
xxxx
The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper
operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these
agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an employee’s
desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept
of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a
search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning
for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To
ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide
latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.
We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee
misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest substantially different from
"the normal need for law enforcement." x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies
operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the
inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in
many cases, public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their
misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law
enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public
employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a
proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type
at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the
employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be
translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public
interest. x x x
xxxx
In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make
the…probable-cause requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither
unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore,
that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under
this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether
the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place,’" x x x
Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related
purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of …the nature of the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the character
of the search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was undertaken, the
case was remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the search and seizure, and
evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope.
In O’Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement. 40
O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the workplace. One
of these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L.
Simons41where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was
convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an
office which he did not share with anyone, and a computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a
policy on computer use stating that employees were to use the Internet for official government business only
and that accessing unlawful material was specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall
understand that the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the user’s Internet access as
deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the management of the agency’s computer
network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating from Simons’ computer, to conduct a
remote monitoring and examination of Simons’ computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded
pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of Simon’s computer were copied from
a remote work station. Days later, the contractor’s representative finally entered Simon’s office, removed the
original hard drive on Simon’s computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency security
officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched Simons’ office in the evening when Simons was
not around. The search team copied the contents of Simons’ computer; computer diskettes found in Simons’
desk drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; videotapes; and various
documents, including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these evidence,
arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing, the
district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.
Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons’ computer and
office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the search
remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was
discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s
Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the
capacity and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons’ office was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the search, the employer had
"reasonable grounds for suspecting" that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer
was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a thousand pornographic
images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search
was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did
not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.
x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a
legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one that
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x
xxxx
x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights
because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files
downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons’ Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated by FBIS’ retrieval of Simons’ hard drive from his office.
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his
Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would "audit,
inspect, and/or monitor" employees’ use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited,
and all e-mail messages, "as deemed appropriate." x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they
could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether
Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief was not
objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x x x Accordingly,
FBIS’ actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer files Simons downloaded from the Internet did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.
xxxx
The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x x
Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted above, the operational realities
of Simons’ workplace may have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is no evidence
in the record of any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore
conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.
xxxx
In the final analysis, this case involves an employee’s supervisor entering the employee’s government office
and retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had absolutely no expectation of
privacy – equipment that the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the employee in the
employee’s office. This situation may be contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a government
employee were unrelated to his employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the
employer’s policy and the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS’ intrusion into Simons’
office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer might engage. x x x 42 (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.)
This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board43 which involved the constitutionality of a
provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may be such
legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this
case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an office is
to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any,
entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine,
reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address
the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer
files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope?
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee’s relationship to
the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3)
whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to both the
subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions
together.44 Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-
workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space
and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.45
We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not
allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always
locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted
any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that
being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends,
associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a
trivial request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown people" and that in the past 22
years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients,
receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna
Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for
himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer." 46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be
deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims,
such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provides:
POLICY
1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for
legitimate business purposes.
2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their
respective jobs.
3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.
xxxx
No Expectation of Privacy
4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.
The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to
handle the confidential examination data and processes.
5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other computer network. Users
understand that the CSC may use human or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer
Resources.
6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the
exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or
operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor and must insure its care and
maintenance.
xxxx
Passwords
12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their passwords for
access to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or given to
others. Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using their passwords. No User may
access the computer system with another User’s password or account.
13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer system or to
encode particular files or messages does not imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in the
material they create or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global
passwords that permit access to all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of
whether those materials have been encoded with a particular User’s password. Only members of the
Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.
x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may
monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-
spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate
business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in determining whether an employee’s expectation of
privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy. 48 In one case, the US
Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his computer files where the university’s computer policy, the computer user is
informed not to expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is
specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched when the university is responding to a
discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth
Amendment rights when university officials conducted a warrantless search of his computer for work-related
materials.49
As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, we
answer in the affirmative.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies
in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly
"lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:
8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from unknown
sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as,
staff working in another government agency, "selling" cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all done
during office hours and involved the use of government properties;
9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to
warrant an investigation;
10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions involved
in the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;
11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on
the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to back up the files in the
computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;
x x x x50
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.51 Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where
a government agency’s computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in
addition expressly provided that employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the
agency information systems and technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of
privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless
search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant
employee’s computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a computer information technician after his
supervisor received complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-
mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to
access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and
floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants
were secured by the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as
well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public
employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.52
Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and
scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it
were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for
warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears
emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it
was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was
received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having
pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious,
as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the
practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt
upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less
effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled
that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so,
otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or
limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a
search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was
the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means
for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting
point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files,
that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate
action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat
the purpose of the wok-related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and
transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity,
were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified,
through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was
not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of
the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after
the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned
search are deemed admissible.53
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument
invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987
Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the
privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit
in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a
criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified
there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence
relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of
the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in
administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk
of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54 involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was investigated on
the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and attending to
personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided
by NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty. Morales’ personal computer and print two documents stored
in its hard drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila,
both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales’ computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but
was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein.
The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge
against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and
positive statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged
in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The
Court En Banc held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every
court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it
violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to
support the claim of OCA that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales,
as in fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot
investigation, questioning the validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings,
retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable,
the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.
The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which involved a
personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner were
retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer)
and other relevant factors and circumstances under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the
existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him.
Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are admissible in the
administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding the
petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only
respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.55
The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and
documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses it
presented during the formal investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed to be
similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the case records of some cases pending either with
CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those
pleadings filed with the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the explanation given
by petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer
friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer for drafting their pleadings in the
cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We hold that the CSC’s factual
finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is well-supported
by the evidence on record, thus:
It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to the
orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such as a petition for certiorari
or a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof knowingly and
willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the
Commission. Worse, the appearance in one of the retrieved documents the phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal
kulang ang bayad mo," lends plausibility to an inference that the preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings
was pursued with less than a laudable motivation. Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply
doing the same for the money – a "legal mercenary" selling or purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so
to speak.
Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that
he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer. More significantly, one of the
witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written copy of one of the pleadings found in the
case records lying on the table of the respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado
addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly
undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own employer.
To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents were the
personal files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally served as his
counsel of record during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a sworn
affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution
witness, Reyes, who testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the
computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in close proximity with
Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally knows, was using the computer in question.
Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the formal investigation to confirm his sworn
statement such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of weight and credence. The same is
true with the other supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.
At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact that he was
unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him for official purpose, not only once
but several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the interests of the
Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a principal by indispensable cooperation…Or at the very least, he
should be responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and
the electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially intended.
Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing in one
of the documents, "Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," was a private joke between the person
alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more
sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a statement appear in a legal pleading
stored in the computer assigned to the respondent, unless he had something to do with it?56
Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous complaint since
Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:
Rule II – Disciplinary Cases
SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course
unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the
proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation
therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person complained of may be
required to comment.
xxxx
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have been
initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files stored in the
hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining
authority’s own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the
petitioner who was then directed to file his comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of
Appeals57 --
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or
employee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to. Considering
that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly
acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to petitioner’s challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant
consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC
Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly
anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner
Buenaflor’s previous memo expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this
case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision
by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners
Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a Resolution for
the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of the Commission, the practice had been to
issue a memorandum order.58 Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which
regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its
effectivity.59
In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling that
petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate
penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and
Resolutiondated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
14. People vs. Jalosjos (No. 26)
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts1is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in
the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of

Representatives" was filed on the grounds that —
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any
ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks
the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S.
Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to
discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a
covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and
judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election
or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the
provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not
claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still
to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by
the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege
shall cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the
subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2, which states, inter alia, that —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo
case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It
does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated
in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is
not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail
and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted
by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties
outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture
despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to
surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which
accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate,
aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the
State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on
the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by
chartered plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when
he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a

mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he
was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project
area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or
compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities
or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free
man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is,
to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to
the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom
from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during
their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no
dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well,
without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to
pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing
to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm
of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that
precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of
course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices
to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges
a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary
detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with
the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1âwphi1.nêt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives
"[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of
Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by
Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration
Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further
admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been
receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging
his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is
presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the
prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at
any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." 6 This simply
means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same
class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of
one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under
the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction.
An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order.
Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in
favor of or against groups or types of individuals.8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. 10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free
exercise of his power of
locomotion.11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one's liberty. As a punishment, it is
restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. 12 The term refers to the
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free
action according to his own pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will
depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes
the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in
society.16 Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially
explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the
social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights. 17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to
public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
15. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary (No. 36)
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.),
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the Confirmation of Sentence dated
September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col. Henry A.
Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to Quarters1 containing the
following:
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the undersigned
dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters under guard pending
investigation of your case.
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the expressed
permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP.
3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be confined in a
hospital, you shall likewise be under guard.
Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial NR 2
presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following violations allegedly
committed by petitioner:
CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND
GENTLEMAN).
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, wrongfully and
unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act
6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received
from AFPSLAI from June 2003 to December 2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five
thousand pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and
Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota
Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr.
UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582
and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act
6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association,
Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend
received form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and December 2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred
thirty-five thousand pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied
Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names such as 1998
Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with
Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr.
FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a military officer to uphold
the Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an
immigrant/permanent residence of the United
States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor and
disrespect to the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and exhibits him as
morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession of arms.
CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER
AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).
unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act
6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF
unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act
6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum 2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the transfer of
confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the ISAFP Detention Center.
On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56), compulsorily retired from military service
after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1650,3 amending Sections 3 and 5 of P.D.
1638, which establishes a system of retirement for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was
transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-Trial
Report5 of the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following verdict and sentence:
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 of all
the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following findings. Finds you:
On Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar
peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut
Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils, dollar
peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island, United Coconut
Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time the votes
was taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may
direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)
Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following
recommended action:
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on Specification 1 on
Charge 1 – except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with
Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut
Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words dollar
deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de
Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development
Bank; GUILTY on Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence
imposed by the Special GCM is to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may
direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the sentence be
approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement.
The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2)
years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering
that the period left not served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer
appropriate.
4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is hereto
attached.
In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:
8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from the military
service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the offenses of violation of AW
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial
to Good Order and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the Accused.
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of Staff and the
Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the Accused herein being a General
Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st
Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of the attached
prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT."
After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was
released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the Confirming
Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner.
The Confirmation of Sentence,9 reads in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the case of People of the
Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;
b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and
c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.
FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos Flores Garcia
AFP shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP
shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date.
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Eleven.
Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, issued
a Memorandum10 to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of Sentence in the Court
Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the National
Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus,
alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the petition for habeas
corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13 dated November 15, 2011, but was denied14 by this Court
on December 12, 2011.
Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:
GROUNDS
A.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON THE
RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND PETITIONER'S
ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.
B.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED AMENABLE TO
COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND
CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
C.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND FORFEITURE,
THE SENTENCE HAD BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE CONFINEMENT
WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S
ARREST AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15
In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the above grounds
are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this
Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.
In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the following counter-
arguments:
I.
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF

HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
II.
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE HIS
RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE THE SAID
TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT.
III.
THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING PETITIONER TO BE

CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO. 408 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.
IV.
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN THIS CASE.
V.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER BY THE GCM,
AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
VI.
ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17
Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG due to the
following:
(A)
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE PRESIDENT, AS THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT WHERE HIS ACT MAY
BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE
COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.
(B)
ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER THE PERSON"
OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES ('AFP"),
HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE OSG, SEVERED HIS "JURAL
RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH
OF THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION.
(C)
UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE OF TWO
(2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD ALREADY
SUFFERED PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE THE SENTENCE
COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION WHEN
HE CONFIRMED IT, THEREBY RENDERING THE "CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT NULLITY,
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL HAD
JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19
Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According to him, the
said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that the Office of the
President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.
This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.

Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject thereto, to
wit:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be
understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law,"
whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty and
while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully
called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they are
required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to
these articles;
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).
It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and 2004, when
the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was arraigned on
November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time petitioner was
arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. 21 Therefore,
petitioner's retirement on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In
B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al. v. Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et al.,22 this Court ruled that:
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared that an
officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of
military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his
service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the
Court held:
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses.
This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings
against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of
the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against
the contention of the petitioners, viz. —
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to
military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date
of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by court-martial after that date,
their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the offense
was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the
offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates
and his right to a discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by
arrest or the service of charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued
by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x
Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the
initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. We see no
reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that under Section 28 of Presidential Decree
No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of War x x x" To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response,
and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen. Gudani's retirement as an issue in their subsequent
memorandum.23
It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, the
jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the event of
discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:
10. COURT-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General Rules – The general rule is that court-
martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on
discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to any offense committed during a
period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service.
Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:
xxxx
In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a person
belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial jurisdiction does not
terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged from said commission by reason
of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no interval between services under the
respective commissions, there is no terminating of the officer's military status, but merely the accomplishment
of a change in his status from that of a reserve to that of a regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to
try him for an offense (striking enlisted men for example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by
the discharge. So also, where a dishonorable discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed
while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to
trial for the offense. (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his retirement
holds true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds
citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al.24 and Martin v. Ve r.25 However, this is not true. The OSG
is correct in stating that in De la Paz,26 military jurisdiction over the officer who reverted to inactive status was
sustained by this Court because the violation involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was
still in the active military service, while in Martin,27 military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation
pertained to illegal disposal of military property. Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses
committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts-martial. On the
other hand, in the present case, the continuing military jurisdiction is based on prior attachment of jurisdiction
on the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement. This continuing jurisdiction is provided under
Section 1 of P.D. 1850,28 as amended, thus:
Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. - Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding – (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who
commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-
martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the
Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who
commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried
by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of
the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their
separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law: Provided further, that the President may, in the interest of justice, order or direct, at any time
before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate civil court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the petitioner,
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm petitioner's sentence as
mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states:
Article 47. Confirmation – When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-five,
confirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-martial is carried
into execution, namely:
(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer;
(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a sentence
extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may be carried into
execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the field;
(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second lieutenant;
and
(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of murder, mutiny,
desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death may be carried into execution,
subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the
said field.
When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority no
additional confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis supplied.)
In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the President directing
him to be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully served in view of his preventive
confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore, according to him, the Office of the President no
longer has the authority to order his confinement in a penitentiary. On the other hand, the OSG opines that
petitioner cannot legally demand the deduction of his preventive confinement in the service of his imposed two-
year confinement in a penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal Code29 which specifically mandates that
the period of preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the
Articles of War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the execution of
the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as confirmed by the President in appropriate cases.
On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic in the
assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the present case.
The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine judicial system,
citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4,30 hence, they are not expected to apply criminal law
concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions involving the discipline of military personnel. This
is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military commissions created under martial law during the
term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and was declared unconstitutional by this Court, while in the
present case, the General Court Martial which tried it, was created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, and remains a valid entity.
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 31 this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a
criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the same case, this Court
clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 1732 of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting
members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. This Court held:
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes the
General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted
provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel "in any
criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a
Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both a restricted and a
general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the
context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that
the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the
words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on
appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article
VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of Ramon
Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no relation or
connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and
within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound,
like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of the subject in
the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court
of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. and the
accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service,
but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of
the Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law
and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same authority
that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the
general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of the army but not to
other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United States, have
the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in controversies within
their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammelled an exercise of
their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the right to be
represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues controlling the
procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending that right to one accused
in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to
defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if
he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby,
24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the
reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a
court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be
approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution is
also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are offenses
against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the
Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines;
and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial shall prosecute (the
accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is strictly a
criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages
in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to award
punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p.
55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning, and none
can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No.
604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S.
547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not an
administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the
defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown by the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51
Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be accorded the finality
and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a civil court in a case of which it
may legally take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy, we
judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in
the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the
Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States,
could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that
territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the
word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as
those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary.
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary
to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code.34 In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order
and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The
corresponding penalty imposed by the General Court Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at hard
labor is penal in nature. Therefore, absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the
implementation and execution of the General Court Martial's decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner's period of confinement to his
sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review, thus:
x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City, is
the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his
favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire
on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the
National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus:
In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F. GARCIA
0-5820 AFP (now Retired), the verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to
become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for a period
of two (2) years is also approved.
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period of his
confinement since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year sentence of
confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.
The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an official military
detention facility.1âwphi1 However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the Sandiganbayan which
has directed that custody over him be turned over to the civilian authority and that he be confined in a civilian
jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the case(s) before said Court. For this reason, the Accused
shall remain confined at the PNP's detention facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines defers to the civilian authority on this matter.
Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan before the
expiration of his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall immediately take
custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the remaining unserved portion thereof at the
ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance
with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.37 It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner.38 The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 40 It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all
members of the same class.41 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 42 In the present
case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the
rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of
offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same
reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.43 It must be remembered that the provisions of
the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.
The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court
martial. As provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War:
Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a court-martial shall be
held to include:
(a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a finding of guilty of a
particular offense as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when, in the opinion of the
authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record requires a finding of only the lesser degree of
guilt;
(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and
(c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50. (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of the Articles of
War:
Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the sentence adjudged
by a court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or remit the whole or any part of the
sentence.
Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted by the military
authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and Disciplinary Barracks of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary, in which the person under sentence is held, a
court of the kind that imposed the sentence, and the same power may be exercised by superior military
authority; but no sentence approved or confirmed by the President shall be remitted or mitigated by any other
authority, and no approved sentence of loss of files by an officer shall be remitted or mitigated by any authority
inferior to the President, except as provided in Article 52.
When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or the area
commander may approve or confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without commuting), mitigate,
or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any sentence which under those Articles
requires the confirmation of the President before the same may be executed. (As amended by Republic Act
No. 242).
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military personnel is a
clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However, although the law (Articles of
War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the deduction of the period of preventive
confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such is also the right of an accused provided for by
Article 29 of the RPC.
As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this Court finds the
same to be without merit.
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of
cases.44 However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of
cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay.46
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being questioned by
petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the case has already been
decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities without
any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the President. The records do not
show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until
the sentence was finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 47 where, in spite
of the lapse of more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain
of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason for the
failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution. The Court held, inter alia:
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979.
It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-
Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to
follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a
resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the
testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on October 24,
1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
xxxx
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy
disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would
have just continued to sleep on his right − a situation amounting to laches − had the respondent judge not
taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he
could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years
between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused
showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at
least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to
transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a
waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and
although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not work
against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three people
died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the
disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has
completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to
dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give
the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises. 48
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights. 49 In fact, the delay in the confirmation of his
sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the President, his sentence cannot
be served.
Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the above
discussions.1âwphi1
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.50 Thus, applying, the earlier disquisitions, this Court finds that
the Office of the President did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of
Sentence in question.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP
(Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the
time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence
confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
SO ORDERED.
16. People vs. Bravo (No. 45)
G.R. No. 135562 November 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENITO BRAVO, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of a child was found in a vacant lot along the road leading to
Patul, Rosario Santiago City. 1 Her body was found between two concrete fences half naked, shirtless and skirt
pulled up, her panty stuffed in her mouth. 2 The body was identified to be that of a nine year old girl named
Juanita Antolin, a resident of Rosario, Santiago City and known in her neighborhood as Len-len. Her body was
found about 700 meters from her house putrid and in rigor mortis. 3 The scalp on the left side of her head was
detached exposing a fracture on the left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed fresh
laceration at 2:30 o'clock and old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00 o'clock and easily accepts two fingers. The
cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage. 4
On May 25, 1994 an Information for rape with homicide 5 was filed against herein accused-appellant which
states:
That on or about the 12th day of January 1994, in the municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design and by means of violence
and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with one Juanita Antolin y Jandoc, a nine year old girl,
against her will and consent; that on the occasion and by reason of the said rape, the said
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and hit with a
blunt instrument the said Juanita Antolin y Jandoc, inflicting upon her, a fracture on the skull,
which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6
On September 26, 1994 the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Evelyn San Mateo an eight year old second grader from Rosario, Santiago City neighbor and cousin of
the victim testified that she was with the deceased the night before she disappeared. She stated that
while they stood on the roadside watching "Home Along Da Riles" from an open window of a neighbor's
house the appellant approached them and asked Len-Len to come with him to a birthday party and
then he will buy her Coke and balut. Len-Len asked her to go with them but she did not want to
because she was watching television. Len-Len went alone with the accused. The following morning
Len-Len's mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len was missing. In court, Evelyn positively
identified the appellant as the person last seen with Len-len before she was found dead. 7
The owner of the house where Len-len and Evelyn watched television, Gracia Monahan, corroborated Evelyn's
testimony that on the evening of January 12, 1994 she saw the appellant talking to Len-len while the two girls
were watching television from her open window and that when she looked again towards the end of the
program to the direction where the girls were situated, only Evelyn was left watching television. Monahan
testified that she is familiar with the appellant and the two children because they are neighbors. 8
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Santiago Police Department, Alexander Mico, testified that on
January 15, 1994 his office received a report that a dead body was found in a vacant lot. The body was later
identified as Juanita Antolin. Mico stated that he interviewed San Mateo who pointed to the appellant as the
man last seen with the deceased. Mico found the appellant at his place of work at the Spring Garden Resort at
Sinsayon, Santiago City. Upon seeing Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a suspect in the killing of a girl in
Rosario, Santiago City and asked him to come with him for questioning. The appellant agreed. Mico further
narrated in court that at the police station the appellant admitted he was with the girl and he carried her on his
shoulder but he was so drunk that night that he does not remember what he did to her. 9 On cross-examination
Mico admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and of
his right against self-incrimination before the appellant made the said admission because according to Mico he
was only informally interviewing the accused when he made the admission and that custodial interrogation
proper was conducted by the assigned investigator. 10
The appellant Benito Bravo testified in court that on his way home after work at around five o'clock in the
afternoon of January 12, 1994 he was invited to go on a drinking spree at Purok 1, Rosario, Santiago City
where he and four other men consumed five round bottles of gin until 7:30 that evening. He then headed for
home. Appellant admitted in court that he passed by the house of Gracia Monahan but stated that he did not
see the two girls watching television along the road. At home, he found his mother very sick and so he decided
to stay home all night. He woke up the following morning at around 4:30 a.m. and prepared to go to work. On
January 15, 1994 a policeman came to his place of work and apprehended him without a warrant of arrest and
at the police station he was forced to admit commission of the crime of rape with homicide of Juanita Antolin.
The appellant denied the accusation and stated that the deceased was his godchild and that he has known
Fely Handoc, the mother of the child, for three years prior to this proceedings. 11
Juanito Bravo, the brother of the appellant testified that the appellant stayed home on the night of January 12,
1994 to take care of their sick mother who died a few days thereafter. 12
Ernesto Pastor, the foreman at the Spring Garden Resort where the appellant was employed, testified that he
has known the appellant for a long time and that he knows him to be hardworking and of good moral character.
Pastor corroborated the appellant's testimony that police investigator Mico came to the Spring Garden Resort
and arrested Bravo without a warrant. 13
The testimony of the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the autopsy was dispensed with by the
prosecution as the handwritten Autopsy Report made by the Municipal Health Officer of Santiago, Isabela,
marked as Exhibit B, was admitted by both parties. 14 The Report reads:
AUTOPSY REPORT
ABEL
MEMO
RIAL
HOME
S
PURO
K 2,
ROSA
RIO,
SANTI
AGO,
ISABE
LA
JANU
ARY
15,
1994
2:30
P.M.
JUANITA ANTOLIN
PUROK 1, BARANGAY ROSARIO
AGE: 9
FATHER: ANTONIO
MOTHER: OFELIA JANDOC
Was investigated under the mango tree where the crime was committed and left side of the face
is covered by sand (done by anay) with rigor mortis and with putrification, easy pulling of the
skin and plenty of small worms coming out from the ears, nose, eyes and mouth (without panty),
the whole body is edematous.
After complete washing, coming out of small worms on both eyes and ears and mouth, scalp on
the left side was detached and skull exposed.
— Fracture of the skull with left temporal

— Edematous
— Abdomen, extremities has no pertinent findings except easy pulling of skin and all are
edematous
Vaginal examination — shows fresh laceration at 2:30 o'clock, old lacerations at 5:00 and 7:00
o'clock — could easily accept two fingers.
Cause of death — cerebral hemorrhage (fracture of skull temporal region, left). 15
On August 25, 1998 the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime charged as
follows:
Wherefore, finding the accused BENITO BRAVO "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE punishable under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, the court sentences him the penalty of DEATH and ordering
him to pay the heirs of Juanita Antolin y Jandoc the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as indemnity and three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED. 16
and held that abuse of confidence and treachery attended the commission of the crime.
This case is before us on automatic review in view of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
Both counsels for the accused-appellant and the appellee plead for the acquittal of the accused. Both the
accused-appellant and the appellee invoke the constitutionally guarded presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused and the latter's right to remain silent and to counsel. The testimony of the policeman that the
accused admitted he was with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to
remember what happened should have been held inadmissible by the trial court in view of the policeman's own
admission in court that although he informed the accused that he is a suspect in the rape and killing of one
Juanita Antolin he did not inform the accused of his constitutional rights before he asked him of his
participation in the crime under investigation. Both the appellant and the appellee are in agreement that the
trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the sole
circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen by her cousin in the company of the accused whereas the
Rules of Court clearly requires the presence of at least two proven circumstances the combination of which
creates an unbroken link between the commission of the crime charged and the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The single circumstance proven by the prosecution that the victim was last seen conversing
with the accused two days before she was found dead cannot serve as basis for any conclusion leading to the
guilt of the accused of the crime charged. The evidence for the prosecution falls short of the quantum of
evidence required by the Rules to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In sum, both the
appellant and the appellee profess that the presumption of innocence of the accused was not successfully
overturned by the prosecution.
We resolve to acquit Benito Bravo.
Sec. 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a person under
investigation for the commission of a crime and the correlative duty of the State and its agencies to enforce
such mandate. It states:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(1) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other

means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
(2) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(3) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is
taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the
time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody. 17 The
exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for
coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under
investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily
and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit
although untrue. 18 Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of a
person under investigation and to insure that it is fully understood. Any measure short of this
requirement is considered a denial of such right. 19 Courts are not allowed to distinguish between
preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any
information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous
at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck down as
inadmissible. 20 It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant
of the accused is not covered by the exclusionary rule. 21
The admission allegedly made by the appellant is not in the form of a written extra-judicial confession; the
admission was allegedly made to the arresting officer during an "informal talk" at the police station after his
arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The arresting policeman testified that the
appellant admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of January 12, 1994, the probable time of the
commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drunk to remember what
subsequently happened. The arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. We note that the alleged admission is incriminating
because it places the accused in the company of the victim at the time the crime was probably committed.
The exclusionary rule applies.
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any statement allegedly made by
him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is
inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the
admission was made during an "informal talk" prior to custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The
appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in
custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary
rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of
such presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial confession to that effect and the appellant's denial
in court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as inadmissible.
We also agree with both the appellant and the appellee that the trial court erred in rendering judgment
convicting the appellant based on a single circumstance. Only one circumstantial evidence was proven i.e.,
that the victim went with the accused to buy soda and balut on the evening of January 12, 1994. Section 4
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce

a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case of People vs. Adorfina 22 this court held that:
. . . a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the

circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, that
is, the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that of guilty.
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence leads to no
other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. The two witnesses for the prosecution testified to
a single circumstance, namely, that the victim was seen in the company of the appellant on the night of
January 12, 1994. This circumstance alone cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction. There is no other
proven circumstance linking the appellant to the crime as the perpetrator thereof to the exclusion of any other
possible culprit e.g. that the appellant was at or near the scene of the crime at the time it was probably
committed or any other evidence to establish the appellant's participation in the commission thereof. The
prosecution's theory that the appellant is guilty of the crime charged because he was seen with the victim a few
days before she was found dead is not tenable. The approximate time the crime was committed was not
established at all because the physician who made the autopsy report was discharged as a witness when both
parties admitted the report. The two day interval between the evening of January 12th when the victim was
seen with the appellant and the day when her dead body was found on January 15th presents a wide range of
possibilities as to the perpetrator of the crime. The Rules and jurisprudence demand no less than an unbroken
chain of proven facts pointing to the appellant as the guilty person to the exclusion of all others. This the
evidence for the prosecution failed to do. Both counsels for the appellant and the appellee are correct in their
submission that the single circumstance that the victim was seen with the appellant two days before she was
found dead is clearly insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
The rape and killing of nine year old Juanita Antolin is supported by concrete evidence undisputed by both
parties. The unpardonable assault on the child is tragic and the trial court may have been swayed by the tide of
human indignation. We must however uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. The appellant Benito Bravo is acquitted of the
crime charged herein. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to immediately release him from
custody unless he is detained for another legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
17. Gamboa vs. Cruz (No. 46)
G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XXIX, respondent.
Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order, to annul and set aside the
order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case No.
47622, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales, Accused," and to
restrain the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of the aforementioned case.
Petitioner alleges that:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of
arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was
booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others.
The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant
Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the Identification, the other
detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was
being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her.
On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the prosecution
formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he
was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion
predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel
violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.
On 23 October 1980, the respondent court issued the following order (assailed in the petition at bar) denying
the Motion to Acquit:
For resolution is a motion to acquit the accused based on the grounds that the constitutional
rights of the said accused, to counsel and to due process, have been violated. After considering
the allegations and arguments in support of the said motion in relation to the evidence
presented, the Court finds the said motion to be without merit and, therefore, denies the same.
The hearing of this case for the purpose of presenting the evidence for the accused is hereby
set on November 28, 1980, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Hence, the instant petition.
On 3 March 1981, the Court issued a temporary restraining order "effective as of this date and continuing until
otherwise ordered by the court".1
Petitioner contends that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, in issuing the assailed order. He insists that said order, in denying his Motion To Acquit, is null and
void for being violative of his rights to counsel and to due process. 2
We find no merit in the contentions of petitioner.
To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980.
It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law
traditions. 3To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess
thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be so patent as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law. 4 This is not the situation in the case at bar. The respondent court considered petitioner's
arguments as well as the prosecution's evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.
The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every person is
entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
On the right to counsel, Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the 1987 Constitution. Section 12
(1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or
stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting
false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the
commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited provisions
of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, this Court
has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel,
engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not
be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. 5
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part of
the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General
states:
When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held
yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest,
hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a
confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of
the United States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of
his Identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he
was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory
process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and
due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he
was Identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police.
He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what
he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it
was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit
down in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition).
Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued. 6
Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, petitioner would have no cause for
claiming a violation of his rights to counsel and due process. In Kirby vs. Illinois, 7 the facts of the case and the
votes of the Justices therein are summarized as fellows:
After arresting the petitioner and a companion and bringing them to a police station, police
officers learned that certain items found in their possession had been stolen in a recent robbery.
The robbery victim was brought to the police station and immediately Identified the petitioner
and his companion as the robbers. No attorney was present when the Identification was made,
and neither the petitioner nor his companion had asked for legal assistance or had been
advised of any right to the presence of counsel. Several weeks later, the petitioner and his
companion were indicted for the robbery. At trial in an Illinois state court, the robbery victim
testified that he had seen the petitioner and his companion at the police station, and he pointed
them out in the courtroom and Identified them as the robbers. The petitioner and his companion
were convicted, and the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the petitioner's conviction,
holding that the constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of evidence derived from out-of-court
Identification procedures conducted in the absence of counsel did not apply to pre-indictment
Identifications (121 III App 2d 323, 257 NEE 2d 589).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an opinion, affirmed.
In an opinion by STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of the court and expressing the view
of four members of the court, it was held that the constitutional right to counsel did not attach
until judicial criminal proceedings were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-
court Identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply to Identification testimony based
upon a police station show-up which took place before the accused had been indicted or
otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.
BURGER, Ch. J., concurring, joined in the plurality opinion and expressed his agreement that
the right to counsel did not attach until criminal charges were formally made against an
accused.
POWELL, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusionary rule should not be
extended.
BRENNAN J., joined by DOUGHLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented on the grounds that
although Supreme Court decisions establishing the exclusionary rule happened to involve post-
indictment Identifications, the rationale behind the rule was equally applicable to the present
case.
WHITE, J., dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions establishing the
exclusionary rule governed the present case. 8
Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing his view and that of three other members 9 of the Court, said:
In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's landmark opinion in
Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR 527, it has been firmly
established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at
or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. See Powell
v. Alabama, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019, 146 ALR 357;
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 7 L Ed 2d 114, 82 S Ct 157; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US
335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 792, 93 ALR 2d 733; White v. Maryland, 373 US 59, 10 L Ed 2d
193, 83 S Ct 1050; Messiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 12 L Ed 246, 84 S Ct 1199; United
States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926; Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263,
18 L Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct 1951; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1, 26 L Ed 2d 387, 90 S Ct.
1999.
This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel only at
the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches at the time of arraignment
and the Court has recently held that it exists also at the time of a preliminary hearing. Coleman
v. Alabama, supra. But the point is that, while members of the court have differed as to
existence of the right to counsel in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases
have involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings —
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
(Emphasis supplied). 10
As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and beyond the guarantee of the
right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For while, under the
latter, the right to counsel "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him (the accused)," under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel
attaches at the start of investigation against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial
proceedings against the accused have begun.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under police
investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that,
while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the
moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there
be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and
constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities
to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted
to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The case at bar is far from this situation.
In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order denying a Motion To
Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon arraignment, the defendant shall
immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if the
defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should immediately
plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the
movant (in the motion to quash), he can appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections
(earlier raised in his motion to quash) which would then be subject to review by the appellate court.
An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is interlocutory and not a final
order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of
denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after trial. As
stated in Collins vs. Wolfe,12 and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco,13 the accused, after the denial of his motion to
quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered
against him, he could then appeal, and, upon such appeal, present the questions which he sought to be
decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.
In Acharon vs. Purisima, 14 the procedure was well defined, thus:
Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases filed against
him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy was not to file a petition
for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice on his part to reiterate the special defenses he
had invoked in his motion and, if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. This is the procedure that he should have
followed as authorized by law and precedents. Instead, he took the usual step of filing a writ of
certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is unwarranted it being contrary
to the usual course of law. 15
Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his rights to counsel and to due
process is a question which he could raise, as a defense or objection, upon the trial on the merits, and, if that
defense or objection should fail, he could still raise the same on appeal.
On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads, he
shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except where the
complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. 16
Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its
case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to have waived objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash.
Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds provided in
Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information. Consequently, the lower court
did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 3 March 1981 is
LIFTED. The instant case is remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings to afford the petitioner-
accused the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.
This decision is immediately executory. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
18. People vs. Lara (No. 47)
G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012

vs.
ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
On June 14, 2001, an Information3 charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC:
On or about May 31, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified person who is still at-large, and
both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M.
Bautista cash money amounting to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services,
Inc. represented by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said accused, with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista
with the said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.4
Following Lara’s plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Enrique
Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren Calix (PO3 Calix).
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian);
(b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of ₱ 230,000.00 from the
Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in going to
the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito
Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at
around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City,
Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na
ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?"; (f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay"; (g)
heeding Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista
alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seein Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the
chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to
relay the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the
vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag
was taken away from him; (m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other
companions were brought to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to
Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig
City; (o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and
Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian’s money.5
SPO1 Cruz testified that: (a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station; (b) at
around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station and informed him that he saw
Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street; (c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where
they saw Lara, who Sumulong identified; (d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning; (e) at
the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and
Atie; and (f) after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained. 6
PO3 Calix testified that: (a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police Station;
(b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City; (c) he, together with three (3) other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene; (d)
upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead of them, handed to him eleven
(11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol; (e) as part of his investigation, he
interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police station; and (f) before Bautista died, he was able to
interview Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident. 7
In his defense, Lara testified that: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig
City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was
constructing a comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on
June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers
arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the police officers
asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol
car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in another place
we will kill you" (sic); (g) he was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told
where he was investigated for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was at home when
the subject incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived
at the station, one of the police officers told them to come back the following day; (j) while he was at the police
line-up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and
(k) when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest. 8
To corroborate his testimony, Lara presented one of his neighbors, Simplicia Delos Reyes. She testified that
on May 31, 2001, while she was manning her store, she saw Lara working on a sewer trench from 9:00 in the
morning to 5:00 in the afternoon.9 Lara also presented his sister, Edjosa Manalo, who testified that he was
working on a sewer line the whole day of May 31, 2001.10
On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision, 11 the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) as
amended by Republic Act 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and Php230,000.00 representing the money carted by the said accused.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC rejected Lara’s defense of alibi as follows:
The prosecution’s witness Enrique Sumulong positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who
carted away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., on May 31, 2001 at around 10:30 o’clock
in the morning along the corner of Mercedez and Market Ave., Pasig City and the one who shot Joselito
Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the same day. As repeatedly held by the Supreme
Court, "For alibi to prosper, an accused must show he was at some other place for such a period of time that it
was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime" (People
versus Bano, 419 SCRA 697). Considering the proximity of the distance between the place of the incident and
the residence of the accused where he allegedly stayed the whole day of May 31, 2001, it is not physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene within the same barangay. The positive identification of the
accused which were categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the accused whose testimony was not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence (People versus Aves 420 SCRA 259).13 (Emphasis supplied)
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was arrested
without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings
including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him
in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.
Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to
present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed that he was the
one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money from him. The physical description of Lara that
Sumulong gave to the police was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating that he did not have
a fair glimpse of the perpetrator. Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified
companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money. Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that
his conviction was attended with moral certainty. Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his
witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by improper motives in testifying in his favor, their
testimonies should have been given the credence they deserve. While his two (2) witnesses were his sister
and neighbor, this does not by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.
The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant may not serve as a
ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections
to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the
accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not
a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability:
Appellant’s avowal could hardly wash.
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived. In voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead of filing a motion to quash the
information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to
assail the legality of his arrest. Applying the foregoing jurisprudential touchstone, appellant is estopped from
questioning the validity of his arrest since he never raised this issue before arraignment or moved to quash the
Information.
What is more, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void
all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can
the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their
culpability.14 (Citations omitted)
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to counsel was
violated, the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since
the latter is not part of custodial investigation.
Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the time he was identified in a police line-up
and therefore had the right to counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that an
accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a
part of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police
attention at the start of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by
prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that
appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse
to hearken to appellant’s hollow cry that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel given the hard
fact that during the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesi that appellant was subjected to interrogation sans counsel during the police line-up, it
does not in any way affect his culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a
prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission.15 (Citations omitted)
The CA addressed Lara’s claim that the prosecution’s failure to present a witness who actually saw him
commit the crime charged as follows:
Third. Appellant takes umbrage at the alleged failure of the prosecution to present an eyewitness to prove that
he shot the victim and took the money.
Such posture is unpersuasive.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim.
Sumulong vividly recounted, viz:
"Q When you said that "tinutukan ka", aside from this act was there any other words spoken by
this person?
A There was, sir.
Q What did he say?
A "Nasaan ang bag ilabas mo yung pera", sir.
Q Where were you looking when this person approached you?
A I was looking at his face, sir.
Q And upon hearing those words, what did you do?
A I put out the money, sir, because I got afraid at that time.
Q Did you hand over the black bag containing the money to him?
A No, sir, because one of my companion(s) shouted not to give the money or the bag so I
immediately threw away the bag at the back seat, sir.
Q And how long approximately was that person standing by your car window?
A Five (5) to ten (10) minutes, sir.
Q And after you have thrown the black bag containing money to the back of the vehicle, what
did that person do?
A I saw Joey alight(ed) from the vehicle carrying the bag and ran away, sir, and I also saw
somebody shoot a gun?
Q Who was firing the gun?
A The one who held-up us, sir.
Q By how, do you know his name?
A No, sir.
Q But if you can see him again, (were) you be able to recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is in the courtroom, will you be able to recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please look around and please tell this Honorable Court whether indeed the person you saw
holding you up at that time is in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and tap his shoulder to identify him?
Interpreter:
The witness tap the shoulder of a person sitting on the first bench of the courtroom wearing
yellow t-shirt and black pants who when ask identify himself as Arturo Lara (sic).
Q And when as you said Joey got the bag. Alighted from the vehicle and ran away with it, what
did the accused do? (sic)
A He shot Joey while running around our vehicle, sir.
Q Around how many shots according to your recollection were fired?
A There were several shots, more or less nine (9) shots, sir.
x x x x x x"
"Q So, you did not personally notice what had transpired or happened after you stepped down
from the Nissan pick-up, that is correct?
A There was, sir, my companion Joselito Bautista was shot.
Q When you heard the gunfire, you were already proceeding towards that store to call your
office by phone, that is correct?
A Not yet, sir, we were still inside the vehicle.
Q And was Joselito Bautista at the rear of the Nissan Sentra when you heard this gunfire?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so he was at the back, so the shooter was also at the back of the vehicle, that is correct?
A Yes, sir, he went towards the rear portion of the vehicle, he followed Joselito Bautista and
shot him.
Q So, to be clear, when Joselito Bautista ran to the rear, this alleged holdup(p)er followed him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the time(,) you heard this gunfire? A Yes, sir.
Q So, you did not personally see who fired that firearm?
A Because at that time he was the one holding the gun, sir.
Q So, you are presuming that he was the one who fired the gun because he was holding the
gun, am I correct?
A Yes, sir."
xxxx
Under Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove that the guilt of appellant is beyond
reasonable doubt, viz:
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly
emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag
containing the money.
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of the
vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells. 16 (Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
Finally, the CA found that Lara’s alibi failed to convince. Specifically:
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over
the alibi and denial of appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
All the more, to establish alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
Appellant miserably failed to prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of
the perpetration of the felonious act. He himself admitted that his house was just a stone’s throw (about three
minutes away) from the crime scene.17 (Citations omitted)
In a Resolution18 dated February 1, 2012, this Court accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental briefs. Both parties waived
their right to do so, stating that they would adopt the allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with the
CA.
Issues
The present review of Lara’s conviction for robbery with homicide gives rise to the following issues:
a. whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible
because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;
b. whether Lara’s supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of
nullifying his conviction;
c. whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara; and
d. whether Lara’s alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him from the crime charged.
Our Ruling
This Court resolves to deny the appeal.
I
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of
arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. 19 Any
objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial
court upon entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking any
irregularities that may have attended his arrest.20
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction
that was arrived upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. 21 As Section 9, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
II
Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance
of counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to
have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is
not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v.
Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The
right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.23 (Citations omitted)
III
It is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against Lara is based on
circumstantial evidence. The CA allegedly erred in this wise considering that only direct and not circumstantial
evidence can overcome the presumption of innocence.
However, well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each
other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is not.24
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed to
convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort
to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting
felons free and denying proper protection to the community.25
As the CA correctly ruled, the following circumstances established by the evidence for the prosecution strongly
indicate Lara’s guilt: (a) while the vehicle Sumulong, Atie, Manacob and Bautista were riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, he appeared at the front passenger side thereof armed with a
gun; (b) while pointing the gun at Sumulong who was at the front passenger seat, Lara demanded that
Sumulong give him the bag containing the money; (c) instead of giving the bag to Lara, Sumulong gave it to
Bautista who was seated at the back of the pick-up; (d) when Bautista got hold of the bag, he alighted and ran
towards the back of the pick-up; (e) Lara ran after Bautista and while doing so, fired his gun at Bautista’s
direction; (f) Bautista sustained several gunshot wounds; and (g) Bautista’s blood was on the crime scene and
empty shells were recovered therefrom.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation by the
accused must be presented by the prosecution. It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit
was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery.26 The mere presence of the accused at the crime scene is not enough to
implicate him. It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was necessary to realize such
intent.
In this case, Lara’s intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s positive narration that it was Lara who pointed the
gun at him and demanded that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara resorted to
violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by Sumulong’s testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun
at the direction of Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent Lara from taking
possession of the money.
Notably, the incident took place in broad daylight and in the middle of a street. Thus, where considerations of
visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against the accused, his or her assertions
as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally accepted.27
Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious
motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a serious charge. Thus, his testimony, which the trial
court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an
accused had nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events and of human nature and
against the presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former. 28
IV
In view of Sumulong’s positive identification of Lara, the CA was correct in denying Lara’s alibi outright. It is
well-settled that positive identification prevails over alibi, which is inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule,
for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.29
Moreover, in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far
away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission. Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and
convincing proof.
In this case, the proximity of Lara’s house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his alibi. Assuming as true
Lara’s claim and that of his witnesses that he was digging a sewer trench on the day of the incident, it is
possible that his witnesses may not have noticed him leaving and returning given that the distance between his
house and the place where the subject incident took place can be negotiated, even by walking, in just a matter
of minutes. Simply put, Lara and his witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.
In fine, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
19. Mangila vs. Pangilinan (No. 50)
G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP, and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into through habeas corpus.
Antecedents
On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated
estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and
with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995)
were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila
and the others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the
collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without
lawful authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).1
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted
a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants,
Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. 2 On the next day, the
entire records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City for further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.3
As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).4
Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the
preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that
the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable
cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from
detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she could no
longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had
already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the
warrant.5
In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003,6 the CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of
merit, explaining:
As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may be had or could have been
procured by resort to another general remedy. As pointed out in Luna vs. Plaza, if petitioner is detained by
virtue of a warrant of arrest, which is allegedly invalid, the remedy available to her is not a petition for habeas
corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the
Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Municipal Judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation shall transmit his resolution, together with the record of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, to the Provincial Prosecutor, who shall review the same and order the release
of an accused who is detained if no probable cause is found against him. Thus, the proper remedy available to
petitioner is for her to file with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the grounds
alleged in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, 8 but the CA denied the
motion on November 19, 2003.9
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from
detention?
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review lacks merit.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court discoursed on the nature of the
special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in
character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to
be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution
and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and
prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It
cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider
questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus
proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular
course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in
advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before
resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas
corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held
that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings
void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole
purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention
may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who
seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only
parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the
only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The
writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not
issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ of right on
proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which a
complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held. 11 (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is
found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not
issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. 12
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June
16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His
authority was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 2.Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.
– The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue
a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after
an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.1âwphi1 In the context of this
rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA
properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of
the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal
authority to do so.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary
investigations was removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan,
the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is
because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas
corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of Prisons: 13
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. The function of
habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not extend
beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon
its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 4.When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge Pangilinan in her attempt to
convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. She insists that the illegality
and invalidity of the warrant of arrest because of its having been issued without an exhaustive examination of
the complainants and the witnesses in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of probable cause; and
without consideration of the necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice were enough
reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.14
Mangila fails to persuade.
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the complainants
against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered Palayon’s evidence sufficient for
finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of
referring the case and its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the
preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by
which she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to
the law or rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights. 15
Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant of arrest by hinting that
the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of determining the existence of probable cause for
its issuance due to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for that consideration was
presumed.
And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor
who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should beultimately found against
her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure
her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct
of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City
Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case, including
the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate
action.17 We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for
another available remedy.18
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003 and November 19, 2003
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
20. Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia (No. 52)
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine

Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated
April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ),
petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to
a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed
an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by
the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional
arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent.
That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning
the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the
validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10,
2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the
RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled
off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding
that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight
risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It
was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application
for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private
respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is
granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable
to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court
to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the
condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely
to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that
this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila,
Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply
to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as
well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained
for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per
Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case. However, this Court cannot
ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe
these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be
a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law
are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual
defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual
person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition
and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights
of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are
now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus,
in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines
signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has
been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure
the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective
deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who
has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding,
some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied
to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign
nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality
of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of
Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation
cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to
it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as
"the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law
of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the
other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential
extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a
crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to
treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation
of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of
extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting
state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request
for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained
for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended
period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In
the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk
and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight
risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent
may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Searh and Seizures Arrest. Bill of Rights 4

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Searh and Seizures Arrest. Bill of Rights 4

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

BILL OF RIGHTS: SEARCH AND SEIZURES AND ARREST

1. Silahis International Hotel Inc. vs. Soluta (No. 5)

G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners’ version of the antecedents of the case are as follows:

On the other hand, respondents’ version follows:

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Costs against the remaining defendants.

SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.

The petition fails.

Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:

As the Code Commission noted,

(6) Illegal search;

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

2. Stonehill vs. Diokno (No.27)

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

3. Disini vs. Sec of Justice (No. 29)

G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

G.R. No. 203299

G.R. No. 203306

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP,

G.R. No. 203359

SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 203378

ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L.

G.R. No. 203391

G.R. No. 203440

G.R. No. 203453

NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE

G.R. No. 203454

PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 203469

G.R. No. 203501

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 203509

G.R. No. 203515

G.R. No. 203518

PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR

The Facts and the Case

The Issues Presented

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

The Rulings of the Court

Section 4(a)(1) provides: