CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW

1) Elaborate/ explain how or why are FOUNDLINGS citizens/ nationals of

the place where they are
found under international law.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted
principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125

International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the

combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by
this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right
to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on
our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in
accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless.

2) Differentiate/ compare/ contrast

a. ministrant vs. constituent functions of government

There are two functions of government: constituent and ministrant.

Constituent functions are those which constitute the very bonds of society
and are compulsory in nature. Examples are keeping of order and providing
for the protection of persons and property; the fixing of the legal relations
between man and wife, and between parents and child; the regulation of
property and the determination of contract rights; the definition and
punishment of crime, the administration of justice, the determination of
political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens, dealings of the state with
foreign powers, the preservation of the state from external danger and the
advancement of international interest.

Ministrant functions are those that are undertaken only by way of

advancing the general interests of society and are merely optional. Examples
are public works, public education, public charity, health and safety
regulations and regulations of trade and industry.

b. state vs. nation

What are then the differences between nation and state? Nation is an
ethnical concept while state is a political or legal concept. A state
presupposes a government and a definite territory, while these are not
necessary for a nation to exist. There can be a nation without there being a
state, but where there is a state, there is at least one nation. A state may be
made up of one or more nations, it is called a poly-national state. But where
there is only one nation in one state, it is called a mono-national state.

c. republican vs. democratic state

The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. As a republican state,

sovereignty resides in the People and all government authority emanates
from them (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1). “A Republican form of government
rests on the conviction that sovereignty should reside in the people and that
all government authority must emanate from them. It abhors the
concentration of power on one or a few, cognizant that power, when
absolute, can lead to abuse, but it also shuns a direct and unbridled rule by
the people, a veritable kindling to the passionate fires of anarchy. Our
people have accepted this notion and decided to delegate the basic state
authority to principally three branches of government — the Executive, the
Legislative, and the Judiciary – each branch being supreme in its own
sphere but with constitutional limits and a firm tripod of checks and
balances .”

Democracy and Republic are often taken as one of the same thing, but there
is a fundamental difference. Whilst in both cases the government is elected
by the people, in Democracy the majority rules according to their whims,
whilst in the Republic the Government rule according to law. This law is
framed in the Constitution to limit the power of Government and ensuring
some rights and protection to Minorities and individuals.

d. de jure vs. de facto government

A de jure government (government of law) is an organized government of a

state which has the general support of the people.
A de facto government (government of fact) is a government which actually
exercises power or control but without legal title.
There are three kinds of de facto government:
1 the government that gets possession and control of, or usurps by force or
by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter;
2 that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state; and
that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated as a government of paramount force.

The Second Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of

paramount force, having been established by the Japanese belligerents. On
the other hand, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court it declared
that the government under Corazon Aquino was a de jure government as the
people have already accepted it and the community of nations have
recognized its legitimacy

e. political vs. legal sovereignty

Legal Sovereignty.
Cruz: Legal sovereignty is the authority which has the

power to issue final commands. In our country, the Congress is the legal
sovereign.78

Bernas: Legal sovereignty is the supreme power to affect legal interests

either by legislative, executive or judicial action. This is lodged in the people
but is normally exercised by state agencies79

(Bernas: Political writers distinguish between legal sovereignty and political

sovereignty. The former is described as the supreme power to make laws and
the latter as the sum total of all influences in a state, legal or non-legal, which
determine the course of law. Sinco prefers not to make the distinction and
places legal sovereignty in the state itself considered as a juridical person.)

Political Sovereignty

Sum total of all the influences of a State, legal and non-legal which
determine the course of law.

3) Enumerate

a. state principles

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
ART. II – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND

STATE POLICIES
Principles [sec.1-6]: Binding rules which must be
observed in the conduct of government [BERNAS]

3 (1) The Philippines is a democratic and republican state [Sec. 1]

4 (2) The Philippines, under the Const., is not just a representative

government but also shares some aspects of direct democracy such,
for instance, as the “initiative and referendum” under Art. VI, Sec. 32
[BERNAS]

. (3) Renunciation of war [Sec. 2]

. (4) Only refers to wars of aggression, not defensive war

. (5) Adoption of generally-accepted principles of 
international law [Sec. 2]

. (6) Adherence to a policy of peace, freedom, and amity 
with all nations
[Sec. 2]

. (7) Civilian supremacy [Sec. 3]

. (8) Civilian authority (Section 3, Article II) is not defeated in 
a joint task
force between the PNP and Marines for the enforcement of law and
order in Metro Manila as long as control is left to the PNP. [IBP v.
Zamora (2000)]

. (9) (6) Role of the armed forces [Sec. 3]
(a) Protector of the people and the
State
(b) Secure the sovereignty of the State and the 
integrity of the
national territory

. (7) Compulsory military and civil service [Sec. 4] 
Under conditions

provided by law

. (8) Maintenance of peace and order, promotion of general 
welfare [Sec. 5]

. (9) Recognition of a hierarchy of rights [BERNAS] 
(a) Life
(b) Liberty
(c)
Property
(10) Separation of Church and State [Sec. 6]

b. state policies

Policies [sec. 7-28]:Guidelines for the orientation of the state [BERNAS]

. (1) Independent foreign policy [Sec. 7]

. (2) Freedom from nuclear weapons [Sec. 8]

. (3) Promote a just and dynamic social order [Sec.9]

. (4) Promote social justice in all phases of national 
development [Sec. 10]

. (5) Personal dignity and human rights [Sec. 11]

. (6) Family as basic social institution [Sec. 12]

. (7) Vital role of youth in nation-building [Sec. 13]

. (8) Role of women in nation-building [Sec. 14]

. (9) Fundamental equality before the law of women and 
men [Sec. 14]

. (10) Righttohealth[Sec.15]

. (11) Right to a balanced and healthful ecology [Sec.16, 
Oposa v.

Factoran]

. (12) Priority to education, science and technology, arts, 
culture, and

sports [Sec. 17]

. (13) Laborasaprimarysocialeconomicforce[Sec.18]

. (14) Self-reliant and independent national economy 
[Sec.19]

. (15) Roleofprivatesector[Sec.20]

. (16) Comprehensive rural development and agrarian 
reform [Sec. 21]

. (17) Recognition and promotion of rights of indigenous 
cultural

communities [Sec. 22]

. (18) Community-based,sectoralorganizations[Sec.23]

. (19) Role of communication and information in nation- 
building [Sec.24]

. (20) Autonomy of local governments [Sec. 25]

. (21) Equal access for public service and prohibition of 
political dynasties
[Sec. 26]

. (22) Honesty and integrity in public service [Sec. 27]

. (23) Policy of full public disclosure [Sec. 28]

c. qualifications of candidate for senator

Senate
[Art. VI, Sec. 2-4]
Composition: 24 senators elected at large

Qualifications:

(1) Natural-born citizen
(2) At least 35 years old on the day of the election
(3) Able to read and write

(4) A registered voter
(5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 2 years

immediately preceding the day of the election

th
Term of Office: 6 years, commencing at noon on the 30 day of June next
following their election

Term Limits: only up to 2 consecutive terms. However, they may serve for
more than 2 terms provided that the terms are not consecutive.

Qualifications of a senator

5 (1) Natural-born citizen of the Philippines

6 (2) At least 35 years of age on the day of the 
election

7 (3) Able to read and write

8 (4) Registered voter

9 (5) Resident of the Philippines for not less than 
2 years immediately
preceding the day of 
election.

“On the day of the election” means on the day the votes are cast. (Bernas
Primer)
 d. qualifications of a commissioner of the COMELEC

Section 1. COMPOSITION/QUALIFICATIONS/TERM
Composition: (7)
1) Chairman and
2) Commissioners (6)
Qualifications:
1) Natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2) At least 35 years old at the time of appointment
3) Holders of college degrees; and
4) Not candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.
5) Majority of the Commission, including the Chairman must be:
a). Members of the Philippines Bar
b). Engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years: “any activity in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.”
6) Appointments subject to CA approval
Term:
1) Chairman -7 yrs; 3 Members – 7 yrs; 2 Members – 5 yrs; 1 Member – 3
yrs.
2) LIMITATION: Single term only: no reappointment allowed
3) Appointment to a vacancy: only for unexpired portion of predecessor’s
term
4) No temporary appointments, or appointments in acting capacity
a). Thus, the President cannot designate an incumbent commissioner as
acting Chairman.
b). The choice of temporary chairman falls under the COMELEC’s discretion.

COMELEC Commissioners [Sec. 1[1], Art. IXC] (a) Natural-born citizen
(b)

35 years old at time of appointment
(c) college degree holder

(d) not a candidate for elective position in election immediately preceding

appointment

chairman and majority should be members of the bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years

e. a voter

QUALIFICATIONS

[Art. V, Sec. 1, 1987 Const.]

10 (1) Citizenship: Filipino citizen by birth or naturalization 
Incumbent

upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction
of the courth that he is really Filipino. Any doubt regarding citizenship
must be resolved in favor of the state. [Go v. Ramos (2009)]
11 (2) Age: at least 18 at the time of the election

12 (3) Residency:
(a) Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year and

(b) Resident of the place wherein they propose to 
vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election 
Note: Any person who
temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by
reason of his:
(1) employmentinprivateorpublicservice
(2) educational
activities 
(3) work in the military or naval reservations within the
Philippines

PAGE 125

(4) service in the AFP, PNP or
(5) confinement or detention

in government institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed to

have lost his original residence [Sec. 9,

R.A. 8189, Voter’s Registration Act of 1996]

It is not necessary that a person should have a house in order to establish

his residence or domicile in a municipality. It is enough that he should live
there, provided that his stay is accompanied by his intention to reside
therein permanently. [Marcos v. COMELEC (1995)]

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous

terms. Both import not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. [Pundaodaya v. COMELEC (2009)]

(4) Not otherwise disqualified by law: These are the 3 grounds for
disqualification to register as a voter under Sec. 11, R.A. 8189, Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996:

(a) Sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than 1
year (unless granted a plenary pardon or an amnesty) shall automatically
reacquire right to vote upon the expiration of 5 years after the service of
sentence.

(b) Adjudged by final judgment for having committed any crime involving
disloyalty to the duly constituted government (e.g. rebellion, sedition,
violation of the firearms law) or any crime against national security (unless
restored to full civil and political rights in accordance with law) shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon the expiration of 5 years after
the service of sentence

(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority

Registered voter: In order that a qualified elector may vote in any election,
plebiscite or referendum, he must be registered in the Permanent List of
Voters for the city or municipality in which he resides. [Sec. 115, B.P. 881,
Omnibus Election Code]
Note: No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

4) What types of information are covered by executive privilege?

Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777. April 20, 2006

What remains to be valid provision of E.O 464?

In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to

implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress (Section 1).

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between

the President and the public officers covered by this executive order,
including (Section 2(a)):

Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public

official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367,
23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002);

Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the

interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez,
G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;

Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716,

9 December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential

Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public

Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

5) May the President dispose state property?

4. Powers of eminent domain, escheat, land reservation and recovery of ill-

gotten wealth
The President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain. The power of eminent domains means the state has the
power to seize or authorize the seizure of private property for public use with
just compensation. There are two constitutional provisions, however, that
limit the exercise of such power: Article III, Section 9 (1) of the Constitution
provides that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. Furthermore, Article III, Section 9 (2), provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Once the aforementioned conditions are met, the President may exercise the
power of eminent domain which are as follows:
Power of eminent domain — The President shall determine when it is
necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in
behalf of the national government, and direct the solicitor general, whenever
he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the
proper court.
Power to direct escheat or reversion proceedings — The President shall direct
the solicitor general to institute escheat or reversion proceedings over all
lands transferred or assigned to persons disqualified under the constitution
to acquire land.
Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the government —
(1) The president shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public
use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain,
the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall
thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until
otherwise provided by law or proclamation.
(2) He shall also have the power to reserve from sale or other disposition and
for specific public uses or purposes, any land belonging to the private
domain of the government, or any of the friar lands, the use of which is not
otherwise directed by law, and thereafter such land shall be used for the
purposes specified by such proclamation until otherwise provided by law.
Power over ill-gotten wealth — The President shall direct the solicitor general
to institute proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees.
Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized by, the
constitution, the President shall have the authority to recover ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime,
and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or
freezing of assets or accounts.

6) May the President ban the return of a deposed dictator?

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Posted by kaye lee on 1:16 PM

G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in
Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to
request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to
them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution,
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase,
however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the
same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as
appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21),
borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power
(Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive.

7) Is the rule that every bill passed by Congress embrace only one subject
mandatory or directory?
Explain/ expound by citing jurisprudence.

8) Quoting from jurisprudence, explain “abuse of discretion”.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Under this definition,
the People bears the burden of convincingly demonstrating that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in the appreciation of the
evidence. We find that the People failed in this regard. As a rule,
misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the
level of grave abuse of discretion. That an abuse itself must be “grave” must
be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less, will be
affected. We have previously held that the mere fact, too, that a court
erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction
(People v. Sandiganbayan et al., G.R. No. 190963, February 6, 2012). Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (Solvic Industrial Corp.
vs. NLRC, 296 SCRA 432, 441 [1998]; Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999).

Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC et al., G.R. No.

155306, August 28, 2013: The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a
specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”
Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to “truly
extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body
is wholly void.” From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having
been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly
show that such act was patent and gross. x x x The Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only
questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The
sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. The phrase ‘grave abuse of discretion’ has a precise meaning in
law, denoting abuse of discretion “too patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.”
It does not encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake in the
appreciation of the contending parties’ respective evidence or the evaluation
of their relative weight.

Abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of

certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which
error is reversible only by an appeal. (Rep. v. Francisco, et al., G.R. No.
163089, December 7, 2007).
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a pleading
limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is to keep the
inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged
in and established by the petition: (1) that the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A writ of certiorari will
not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The
party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is proscribed from
assailing the decision or final order of said court via Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law. Furthermore, certiorari cannot be
availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal (Tan v.
Antazo, G.R. No. 187208, February 23, 2011).

9) Explain and/ or cite jurisprudence, as to

a. Whether or not abolition of office violates security of tenure

CASE TITLE: THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE vs.
BEATRIZ O. GONZALES
G.R. No. 185740
DATE: July 23, 2013
J. Brion
DIGEST BY: John Michael Vida

TOPIC: THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION – SECURITY OF TENURE – Both

career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure –
they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and
after procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however,
operates under a different rule for primarily confidential employees due to
the nature of a “primarily confidential” position.

Furthermore, security of tenure in public office simply means that a public

officer or employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as
provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a
right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held.

FACTS:
Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province of
Camarines Norte by then-Governor Roy Padilla on April 1991, with her
appointment on a permanent capacity. After almost 8 years, on March 1999,
the then-Governor Jess Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum to explain
why administrative charges should not be filed against her for “gross
insubordination/discourtesy in the course of official duties” and “conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service”. After Gonzales
submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her
guilty of the charges against her. Therefore, on September 1999, Gov.
Pimentel dismissed Gonzales.

This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently appealed to the Civil

Service Commission (CSC), which issued a Resolution, which modified the
earlier decision, found Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspended
Gonzales for 6 months. A subsequent appeal from Gov. Pimentel was denied
by the CSC. Upon motion for execution, CSC through a Resolution directed
the reinstatement of Gonzales upon clarification of service of the 6-month
suspension. Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales, however she was dismissed
the next day for “lack of confidence”. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the CSC of
his compliance to the CSC’s order and Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a
confidential employee, citing an earlier CSC Resolution where the CSC held
that the position of provincial administrator was highly confidential and
coterminous in nature.

The CSC responded with another Resolution which directed Gonzales’

reinstatement, stating that while the LGC (RA 7160) made the position of
provincial administrator coterminous and highly confidential in nature, the
conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued
permanent appointments as administrators prior to the effectivity of the
LGC. Gonzales had acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment
and is entitled to continue holding the office despite its subsequent
classification. The conversion should not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of
tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. Therefore, as a permanent
appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and
hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a
permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline under existing laws.

However, in a letter dated February 2005, Gonzales wrote to the CSC

alleging that the then incumbent Governor, Jesus Typoco, Jr., refused to
reinstate her. Hence, the CSC made another Resolution which ordered
Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an
equivalent position.

As a result, the Province, through Gov. Typoco, filed a petition for review
with the CA. However, the CA sided with CSC and Gonzales, citing Aquino v.
Civil Service Commission, which stated that an appointee acquires a legal
right to his position once he assumes a position in the civil service under a
completed appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute and the
Constitution, and he cannot be removed from office without cause and
previous notice and hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will
of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. The CA
then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public officer’s removal under
Section 46, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Revised Administrative Code,
and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. The CA concluded that
Gonzales’ dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security
of tenure, and that she has the right to be reinstated with payment of
backwages. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
WON Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial
administrator of Camarines Norte.

HELD:
NO. Decision of the CA reversed and set aside.

RATIO:
A. The Court supported the CA’s conclusion that the position of provincial
administrator has been re-classified into a primarily confidential, non-career
position upon the passage of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)
which took effect in January 1992. In making the position mandatory for all
provinces, the LGC also amended the qualifications for the position. Further
to this, the LGC made the provincial administrator position co-terminous
with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service
position that is primarily confidential. Upon this, the Court took note of
the argument that Gonzales has acquired a vested legal right over the
position of provincial administrator the moment she assumed her duties in
April 1991, hence the argument that she cannot be removed from office
except for cause and after due hearing.

According to the SC, the arguments reflect a conceptual confusion between

the nature of the position and an employee’s right to hold a position.
The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of
Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that
enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change
according to the nature of the position. Congress has the power and
prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator
position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service
position. When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public
officer’s security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or
the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office, such as changes in
qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as
they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.

B. The Court also pointed out that Gonzales’ reliance on the case of Gabriel
v. Domingo’s dissenting opinion (which stated that a permanent employee
remains a permanent employee unless he is validly terminated) was
misplaced. First of all, the factual differences were pointed out to be
dissimilar to the case of Gonzales, and even granting that they were the
same, the cited case (in Gabriel) of Civil Service Commission v. Javier actually
proposes that corporate secretaries in GOCCs cannot expect protection for
their tenure and appointments upon the reclassification of their position to
a primarily confidential position. These officers cannot rely on the statutes
providing for their permanent appointments, if and when the Court
determines these to be primarily confidential.
Further to this, said dissenting opinion in Gabriel cited EO 503, which
provided safeguards against termination of government employees affected
by RA 7160’s implementation. According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503
is an obvious indication of the executive department’s intent to protect and
uphold both the national government and the local government employees’
security of tenure. However, the Court emphasized that EO 503, however,
does not apply to employees of the local government affected by RA
7160’s enactment, as it only applies to National Government Agencies
whose functions are to be devolved to LGUs.

C. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service
employees have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers and
employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the
career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they
cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after
procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, operates
under a different rule for primarily confidential employees due to the nature
of a “primarily confidential” position. Serving at the confidence of the
appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office
expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When
this happens, the confidential employee is not “removed” or “dismissed”
from office. The term merely “expires” and the loss of trust and confidence is
the “just cause” provided by law that results in the termination of
employment. In the case of Gonzales, where the trust and confidence has
been irretrievably “eroded”, Gov. Pimentel only exercised his discretion when
he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.

Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or

employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided
by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public
office despite a change in the nature of the office held. The CSC might have
been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales’ right
to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause
from her position, but the situation had since then been changed. In fact,
Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently
terminated under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her
service. She was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the
trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’
termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be
reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other
comparable position. This, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’
entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in
government service.

b. Whether or not GOCCs are subject to Civil Service Law

HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, petitioner,

 vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 142297, June 15, 2004

Facts:
Republic Act No. 6971, "An Act to Encourage Productivity and
Maintain Industrial Peace by Providing Incentives to Both Labor and
Capital," was approved on November 22, 1990, and took effect on December
9, 1990. Section 3 of said Act states:

Sec. 3. Coverage.-- This Act shall apply to all business enterprises with or
without existing and duly recognized or certified labor organizations,
including government-owned and controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions. It shall cover all employees and workers including
casual, regular, supervisory and managerial employees

On June 4, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment and the

Secretary of Finance promulgated the Rules Implementing Republic Act No.
6971. Rule II of said implementing rules provides:

Section 1. Coverage. These Rules shall apply to:

(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly recognized or

certified labor organizations, including government-owned and controlled
corporations performing proprietary functions;

(b) All employees and workers including casual, regular, rank-and-file,

supervisory and managerial employees.

On November 21, 1991, petitioner HDMF granted Productivity

Incentive Bonus equivalent to one month salary plus allowance to all its
personnel pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971, and its Implementing Rules
despite the advice on August 26, 1991 of Undersecretary Salvador Enriquez
of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to all government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financial
institutions (GFIs) with original charters performing proprietary functions to
defer payment of the productivity incentive bonus to their employees,
pending the issuance of a definite ruling by the Office of the President on the
matter.

On December 27, 1991, the Department of Labor and Employment

and the Department of Finance issued the Supplemental Rules
Implementing Republic Act No. 6971, which provides that paragraph (a)
Section 1, Rule II of the Rules Implementing RA 6971, shall be amended to
read as follows:

“(a) All business enterprises with or without existing duly certified labor
organizations including government-owned and controlled corporations
performing proprietary functions which are established solely for business
or profit or gain and accordingly excluding those created, maintained or
acquired in pursuance of a policy of the state, enunciated in the
constitution or by law, and those whose officers and employees are
covered by the Civil Service. (Emphasis supplied.)”

On November 29, 1996, the grant of productivity incentive bonus to

the HDMF personnel was disallowed in audit under notice of disallowance.
The disallowance was based on COA Decision No. 96-288, dated June 4,
1996, stating that R.A. No. 6971 does not apply to government-owned or
controlled corporations or to government financial institutions with original
charters performing proprietary functions, such as the HDMF.

In a letter-request, HDMF, through its President and Chief Executive

Officer, Zorayda Amelia C. Alonzo, requested for the lifting of the
disallowance. Alonzo argued that R.A. No. 6971 applies to the employees of
HDMF since the coverage of the said law includes government-owned and
controlled corporations performing proprietary functions, and the
supplemental rules excluding it from coverage was issued after the HDMF
had already granted the productivity incentive bonus to its employees.

The COA affirmed the audit disallowance in a later decision stating

that it finds the HDMF’s argument, that the supplemental rules should not
be given retroactive effect, untenable. It must be noted that the grant of the
Productivity Incentive Bonus was made on November 21, 1991 or after
receipt of the advice of the Department of Budget and Management
Undersecretary dated August 26, 1991 to defer payment of Productivity
Incentive Bonus to all GOCCs/GFIs with original charters performing
proprietary functions, pending definite ruling of the Office of the President.
Despite the said notice, management proceeded with the payment.

HDMF filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied by the

Commission on Audit in Resolution No. 2000-086 dated March 7, 2000.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the Commission on Audit acted in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
affirming the audit disallowance.

Ruling:
No, Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the audit disallowance.

Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation performing

proprietary functions with original charter or created by special law,
specifically Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1752, amending PD No. 1530. As
such, petitioner HDMF is covered by the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX,
Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution, and, therefore, excluded from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6971.

Since Republic Act No. 6971 intended to cover only government-owned and
controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation law, the
power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation
of the statute is necessarily limited to what is intended and provided for in
the legislative enactment. Hence, the Supplemental Rules clarified that
government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions which are "created, maintained or acquired in pursuance of a
policy of the state, enunciated in the constitution or by law, and those
whose officers and employees are covered by the Civil Service" are excluded
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6971.

Therefore, even if petitioner HDMF granted the Productivity Incentive Bonus

before the Supplemental Rules were issued clarifying that petitioner was
excluded from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6971, the employees of
HDMF did not acquire a vested right over said bonus because they were not
entitled to it under Republic Act No. 6971.

Moreover, the DBM advised petitioner herein, HDMF, on August 26, 1991, to
defer payment of the productivity incentive bonus to their employees,
pending the issuance of a definite ruling by the Office of the President on the
matter. Despite said advice, the Board of Trustees of HDMF opted to grant
the said bonus on a voluntary basis as stated in its Resolution No. 91-549,
Series of 1991. It expressed its "concern over the welfare of the officers and
employees of the Fund rather than adhering to the stringent technicality of
the law." The Board, therefore, was aware that possibly HDMF may not be
covered by Republic Act No. 6971. It should have exercised prudence by
awaiting the definite ruling on the coverage to prevent legal problems.

10) Discuss the meaning of local autonomy as it progressed in various SC

decisions.

Province of Batangas vs. Romulo

Posted on November 20, 2012
.entry-meta
.entry-header
GR 152774
May 27, 2004
FACTS:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program
for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of
LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora
passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which
were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines
formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the
project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before
the Committee serves notice to the DBM for the subsequent release of the
corresponding funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to declare
unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they
uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion
for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA – they
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be
struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure
the local autonomy of local governments“. Consistent with the principle
of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the
LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude
the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control:
control lays down the rules in the doing of an act – the officer has the
discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act, or decide to do it
himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no
authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share”
of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution
mandates that the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Since the release is automatic, the LGUs aren’t required to perform any act to
receive the “just share” – it shall be released to them “without need of further
action“. To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would violate this
constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of the LGUs
IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year
is less than 40% of the collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The
exception does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committee’s authority is limited to the implementation of the
LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise
control over the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only through a
separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress
cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a
separate fiscal unit – any provision therein which is intended to amend
another law is considered an “inappropriate provision“.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters
of general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these
amendments through the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy
of the LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is measured by the
degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national officials should not only
comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.